Global Food Value Chains and Competition Law BRICS Draft Report by Lianos, I
Ioannis Lianos © 2017 Work in progress  
 
 
  
  
Principal 
Investigator: 
Professor Ioannis 
Lianos 
 
Global Food Value Chains and 
Competition Law BRICS Draft 
Report 
1 
 
Work in progress 
 
Do not cite or use without prior explicit authorisation for each use by the contact author 
For citations and further questions please first contact the Principal Investigator Prof. 
Ioannis Lianos (UCL, HSE Skolkovo), i.lianos@ucl.ac.uk  
 
Updated versions of the Report will be available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/cles­research-
paper-series 
2 
 
Centre for Law, Economics and Society 
  
CLES  
Faculty of Laws, UCL  
 
 
 
 
HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development 
  
Higher School of Economics  
 
 
 
 
 
November 2017, updated January 2018 
 
 
Principal Investigator 
Professor Ioannis Lianos 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ioannis Lianos et al © 2017  
4 
 
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................................................... 4 
PART I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................ 16 
CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPING TOOLS TO DEAL WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF THE FOOD SECTOR ....................28 
1.1. Introducing the Global Value Chain concept in Competition Law and Policy ................... 30 
1.1.1. A primer on the Global Value Chain concept ................................................................................. 32 
1.1.2. Vertical competition .................................................................................................................... 38 
1.1.3. A Disruptive Concept in Competition Law? ................................................................................... 45 
1.1.3.1. The received view on vertical integration/quasi-integration .................................................... 46 
1.1.3.2. The disruptive potential of GVCs for competition law & policy on vertical restraints ............... 52 
1.1.3.3. GVCs and “real competition”.............................................................................................. 53 
1.2. The future of competition law in a complex economy ...................................................... 57 
1.2.1. The different dimensions of competition ........................................................................................ 57 
1.2.2. Multi-lever Competition policy: integrating technological and societal change .................................. 67 
CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GLOBAL FOOD VALUE CHAINS: TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETAL 
CHANGES ..........................................................................................................................78 
2.1. The genetic revolution ..................................................................................................... 78 
2.2. Digital revolution in food production and the convergence of genetics and digital technologies: the 
emergence of FoodTech .............................................................................................................. 85 
2.3. The emergence of new consumer trends and technologies: fair trade, organic food, e and m-
commerce ..................................................................................................................................... 88 
2.4. The financialisation of agriculture .................................................................................... 91 
PART II: GLOBAL FOOD VALUE CHAIN(S): GENERAL PRESENTATION .................... 102 
CHAPTER 1: THE FOOD VALUE CHAIN .............................................................................................102 
1.1. The emergence of global food value chains .................................................................. 106 
1.2. Specific sectors (examples and discussion per jurisdiction) .......................................... 107 
1.3. Global/transnational value chains, power relations and the need for advanced network analysis
 110 
CHAPTER 2: THE VARIOUS SEGMENTS OF THE FOOD VALUE CHAIN: A GENERAL ACCOUNT .................120 
2.1. Cost structure and global food value chains .................................................................. 120 
2.2. The various segments of food value chains ................................................................... 121 
2.2.1. Seeds & Traits .......................................................................................................................... 121 
2.2.2. Crop protection ......................................................................................................................... 128 
2.2.3. Fertilisers ................................................................................................................................. 134 
2.2.4. Agricultural machinery .............................................................................................................. 139 
2.2.4.1. The evolution of the agricultural machinery market ............................................................. 139 
2.2.4.2. The Big Data disruptive innovation in agricultural machinery .............................................. 143 
2.2.5. Animal Genetic Improvement..................................................................................................... 145 
2.2.6. Animal Health .......................................................................................................................... 146 
2.2.7. Animal Nutrition/Feed ............................................................................................................... 148 
2.2.8. Food Manufacturing/Processing ................................................................................................. 149 
2.2.9. Biofuel ..................................................................................................................................... 155 
2.2.10. Retail ....................................................................................................................................... 156 
2.3. Economic concentration and the emergence of industry global leaders ........................ 168 
2.3.1. Business Strategy: a focus on the factors of production segment of the food value chain ................... 168 
2.3.2. The emergence of global actors across the food value chain ........................................................... 173 
PART III: LEGAL ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 190 
5 
 
CHAPTER 1: AN HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK ...............................190 
1.1. Polycentric competition law ........................................................................................... 190 
1.2. The Governance of global value chains ......................................................................... 194 
1.2.1. Public governance tools ............................................................................................................. 194 
1.2.1.1 Market rules: competition law and beyond .................................................................................. 196 
1.2.1.2. Self-regulation or mixed public-private regulation, standard setting .............................................. 198 
1.2.1.3. Planning law, restrictions concerning trading hours and paternalistic regulation............................. 201 
1.2.1.4. The protection of consumers .................................................................................................... 202 
1.2.1.5. Unfair trading practices ........................................................................................................... 205 
1.2.1.6. Access to land and right to food ................................................................................................ 206 
1.2.1.7. Sustainability, environmental protection and biodiversity ............................................................ 212 
1.2.1.8. GMO regulation ...................................................................................................................... 214 
1.2.1.9. Agricultural Subsidies ...................................................................................................... 217 
1.2.2. Private ordering/governance ....................................................................................................... 224 
1.2.2.9. Vertical integration .......................................................................................................... 224 
1.2.2.10. Contract farming and purchasing agreements ...................................................................... 224 
1.2.2.11. Asset sharing agreements ................................................................................................. 228 
1.2.2.12. Private labels................................................................................................................... 229 
1.2.2.13. Upfront Access Payments ................................................................................................. 233 
1.2.2.14. Category management ...................................................................................................... 237 
1.2.2.15. Horizontal cooperation agreements and agricultural cooperatives ......................................... 240 
1.2.2.16. Standardization and certification systems ........................................................................... 242 
1.2.2.17. Transfer of technology and know-how agreements .............................................................. 245 
CHAPTER 2: COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN BRICS AND THE FOOD VALUE CHAIN .....255 
2.1. The enforcement activity of the BRICS competition authorities in the food sector ............... 255 
2.1.1 Enforcement statistics ................................................................................................................ 255 
2.1.1.1. Aggregate BRICS mergers ....................................................................................................... 255 
2.1.1.2. Aggregate BRICS infringements ....................................................................................... 256 
2.1.1.3. Brazil mergers ................................................................................................................. 260 
2.1.1.4. Brazil infringements ........................................................................................................ 261 
2.1.1.5. Russia mergers ................................................................................................................ 265 
2.1.1.6. Russia infringements ........................................................................................................ 266 
2.1.1.7. India mergers .................................................................................................................. 269 
2.1.1.8. India infringements .......................................................................................................... 270 
2.1.1.9. China mergers ................................................................................................................. 274 
2.1.1.10. China infringements ......................................................................................................... 275 
2.1.1.11. South Africa mergers ....................................................................................................... 279 
2.1.1.12. South Africa infringements ............................................................................................... 280 
2.1.2. A bestiary of competition law enforcement interventions in the food sector in BRICS ........................... 283 
2.1.2.1. Cartels ................................................................................................................................... 283 
2.1.2.2. Pricing Abuses ........................................................................................................................ 285 
2.1.2.3. Horizontal mergers .................................................................................................................. 287 
2.1.2.3.1. Unilateral effects ............................................................................................................. 287 
2.1.2.3.2. Coordinated effects .......................................................................................................... 288 
2.1.2.4. Mergers with vertical foreclosure .............................................................................................. 288 
2.1.2.5. Mergers with portfolio effects .................................................................................................. 290 
2.1.2.6. Public interest mergers ............................................................................................................ 291 
2.1.2.7. Licensing agreements .............................................................................................................. 291 
2.1.2.8. Joint Venture Agreements ........................................................................................................ 292 
2.1.2.9. Standardization Agreements ..................................................................................................... 292 
2.1.2.10. Agricultural Cooperatives ...................................................................................................... 293 
2.2. A comparative analysis of the competition assessment of some recent merger transactions in the 
agrochemical sector ................................................................................................................... 294 
2.2.1. Assessment of product competition .................................................................................................. 299 
2.2.1.1. The nature of these mergers : horizontal, vertical, conglomerate .................................................. 299 
2.2.1.2. Dow/Dupont ........................................................................................................................... 301 
2.2.1.2.1. United States ................................................................................................................... 302 
2.2.1.2.2. European Union .............................................................................................................. 304 
2.2.1.2.3. South Africa.................................................................................................................... 314 
2.2.1.2.4. China ............................................................................................................................. 319 
2.2.1.2.5. India............................................................................................................................... 323 
2.2.1.2.6. Brazil ............................................................................................................................. 325 
2.2.1.3. ChemChina/Syngenta .............................................................................................................. 328 
6 
 
2.2.1.3.1. United States ................................................................................................................... 329 
2.2.1.3.2. European Union .............................................................................................................. 330 
2.2.1.3.3. Brazil ............................................................................................................................. 336 
2.2.1.3.4. India............................................................................................................................... 337 
2.2.1.3.5. South Africa.................................................................................................................... 338 
2.2.1.3.6. China ............................................................................................................................. 338 
2.2.1.4. Bayer/Monsanto ..................................................................................................................... 339 
2.2.1.4.1. Brazil ............................................................................................................................. 339 
2.2.1.4.2. South Africa.................................................................................................................... 341 
2.2.1.4.3. Russia ............................................................................................................................ 346 
2.2.2. Non-conventional merger assessment: Innovation competition and broader public interest concerns ....... 348 
2.2.2.1. Innovation competition ............................................................................................................ 348 
2.2.2.1.1. MOFCOM’s Dow/Dupont merger decision ........................................................................ 348 
2.2.2.1.2. The EU Dow/Dupont merger decision ............................................................................... 349 
2.2.2.1.3. The Competition Commission’s of South Africa Bayer/Monsanto case ................................. 357 
2.2.2.1.4. The Russian FAS Bayer/Monsanto decision ....................................................................... 358 
2.2.2.2. Public interest concerns ........................................................................................................... 361 
2.3. Case study: The Dow Chemical Company/DuPont merger case in Brazil: anatomy of a competition 
assessment ................................................................................................................................ 362 
2.3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 362 
2.3.2. Cade`s analysis on the possible effects of the merger on the corn seeds market in Brazil ........................ 363 
2.3.2.1. Brazilian corn seed market overview ......................................................................................... 363 
2.3.2.2. Relevant markets affected by the merger ................................................................................... 364 
2.3.2.3. CADE’s competition assessment .............................................................................................. 366 
2.3.2.4. Remedies adopted ................................................................................................................... 367 
CHAPTER 3: SUPERIOR BARGAINING POWER AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMPETITION LAW ..............369 
3.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 369 
3.2. Theoretical foundations ....................................................................................................... 373 
3.3. Superior bargaining power and competition law and policy in the food sector..................... 384 
3.3.1. Measuring superior bargaining power ............................................................................................... 387 
3.3.2. Purchasing cooperation agreements and superior bargaining power ..................................................... 391 
3.3.3. Abuse of economic dependence provisions ....................................................................................... 393 
3.3.3.1. Abuse of economic dependence provisions in European competition laws ............................. 393 
3.3.3.2. Abuse of economic dependence in BRICS ......................................................................... 398 
3.3.4. Mergers and effects-based analyses integrating superior bargaining power generated unilateral effects.... 403 
3.3.5. Dealing with Superior Bargaining power outcomes (price discrimination) via specific legislation of general 
application (not “mainstream” competition law) ......................................................................................... 405 
3.3.6. Opening up the floodgates? Unfair commercial practices as a competition law issue ............................. 410 
3.3.7. Status-based protections of specific groups from superior bargaining power competition law ................. 416 
3.3.8. Consumer protection ....................................................................................................................... 421 
3.4. Beyond competition law: Superior bargaining power and the food value chain (contract law, unfair 
competition law) .......................................................................................................................... 425 
3.4.1. Contract law .................................................................................................................................. 425 
3.4.1.1. Foundations ............................................................................................................................ 425 
3.4.1.2. The many facets of superior bargaining power in contract law ..................................................... 427 
3.4.1.2.1. Unconscionability ............................................................................................................ 428 
3.4.1.2.2. Economic Duress ............................................................................................................. 433 
3.4.2. Unfair competition law ................................................................................................................... 434 
3.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 443 
CHAPTER 4: FINANCIALISATION OF THE FOOD CHAIN, COMMON OWNERSHIP AND COMPETITION LAW ..454 
4.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 454 
4.2. Economic Framework .......................................................................................................... 455 
4.2.1. The theoretical possibility of non-coordinated effects ......................................................................... 455 
4.2.1.1. Evaluating Market share .......................................................................................................... 456 
4.2.1.2. Cross-ownership ..................................................................................................................... 458 
4.2.1.3. Common ownership ................................................................................................................ 460 
4.2.2. Empirical Evidence ........................................................................................................................ 462 
4.2.3. Criticism ....................................................................................................................................... 463 
4.2.3.1. Measurement .......................................................................................................................... 464 
4.2.3.2. Methodology of the empirical estimation of links between common ownership and prices .............. 464 
7 
 
4.2.3.3. Possibility of the undecoordinated effect of common ownership feeding into the coordinated effect on 
horizontal competition ........................................................................................................................ 465 
4.2.3.4. Common ownership as a vertical issue? ..................................................................................... 467 
4.2.3.4.1 Mechanisms of a classic foreclosure in vertical market structure............................................ 468 
4.2.3.4.2 Empirical evidence on possible vertical exploitation from the food value chain ....................... 473 
4.2.3.4.3. Effect of margin squeeze on long-term sustainability ........................................................... 474 
4.2.3.4.4. Evaluating the effects of financialisation on the economy: evidence and controversy .......... 476 
4.2.3.5. Common ownership and coordinated effects ....................................................................... 479 
4.2.3.5.1. Overview: coordinated effects ....................................................................................... 479 
4.2.3.5.2. Collusive outcomes in dynamic setting ........................................................................... 481 
4.2.3.5.3. Challenges to the model of collusive outcome ................................................................. 482 
4.2.3.5.4. Application to Common Ownership ............................................................................... 483 
4.2.3.5.5. Partial Ownership Increasing the Parameter of Attractiveness of Long-Run Collusive Outcome
 484 
4.2.3.5.6. Signalling through commitment ..................................................................................... 485 
4.2.3.5.7. Application of signalling through commitment to common ownership ............................... 486 
4.2.3.5.8. Agent based programming ............................................................................................ 487 
4.3. Legal Framework ................................................................................................................. 488 
4.3.1. Anticompetitive issues raised by minority shareholdings. ................................................................... 488 
4.3.2. The competition law framework for common ownership: a work in progress ........................................ 496 
4.4. Common ownership in the global food value chain ............................................................. 500 
4.4.1. General evidence about common ownership in the food sector ............................................................ 500 
4.4.2. The Dow Dupont case ..................................................................................................................... 507 
4.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 508 
PART IV: INNOVATION AND COMPETITION IN AGRICULTURE .................................. 516 
CHAPTER 1: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND IP RIGHTS ....................................516 
1.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 516 
1.2. The expansion of intellectual property rights and the food value chain ............................... 516 
1.2.1. Patents ..................................................................................................................................... 518 
1.2.2. Plant/Animal breeder’s rights ..................................................................................................... 527 
1.2.3. Trademarks .............................................................................................................................. 539 
1.2.4. Geographical indications of origin .............................................................................................. 540 
1.2.5. Technological means of protection of innovation .......................................................................... 541 
1.2.6. Trade secrets ............................................................................................................................ 542 
1.2.7. A more inclusive innovation system: Balancing the rights of IP holders and farmers’ rights ................... 543 
1.2.8. The rise of patents versus other forms of IP protection for private investment in agricultural research ..... 549 
1.2.9. The governance of the innovation process: inter-business arrangements .......................................... 551 
1.2.10. The governance of the innovation process: knowledge commons ................................................... 555 
1.3. Public investment in agricultural research ..................................................................... 557 
1.4. The interaction between competition law and IP: how much room do competition law enforcers have 
in the innovation space? ............................................................................................................. 560 
1.4.1. General Discussion.................................................................................................................... 560 
1.4.2. General principles on the interaction between competition law and IP law ...................................... 567 
1.4.2.1. Standards for the interaction between competition law and IP rights ..................................... 568 
1.4.2.1.1. Formalistic standards .................................................................................................... 568 
1.4.2.1.2. Balancing tests ............................................................................................................. 569 
1.4.2.1.3. New standards for restrictions to innovation competition? ................................................ 571 
1.4.3. The interaction between competition law and IP rights in BRICS ................................................... 582 
1.4.3.1. Brazil ............................................................................................................................. 583 
1.4.3.2. China ............................................................................................................................. 583 
1.4.3.3. India............................................................................................................................... 585 
1.4.3.4. Russia ............................................................................................................................ 586 
1.4.3.5. South Africa.................................................................................................................... 586 
1.5. Exhaustion of IP Rights ................................................................................................. 587 
CHAPTER 2: MERGERS AND PRODUCT INNOVATION: SEEDS AND GM CROPS ..................................602 
2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 602 
2.2. Review of the economic literature .................................................................................. 603 
8 
 
2.2.1. Competition Policy and Innovation ............................................................................................. 603 
2.2.2. Innovation and Market Structure ................................................................................................. 604 
2.2.3. Innovation and Mergers ............................................................................................................. 609 
2.2.3.1. Moving from Market Structure to Merger: ......................................................................... 609 
2.2.3.2. Formal modelling of Merger and Innovation: First Steps ..................................................... 610 
2.2.3.3. The Impact of the Conditions of Merger............................................................................. 612 
2.2.3.4. The Ambiguous Results of the Empirical Work on Merger and Innovation ............................ 613 
2.2.3.5. Which market should competition policy be concerned about? ............................................. 614 
2.2.4. Approaching Merger and Innovation with Some Key Principles ..................................................... 614 
2.3. Main economic effects and a proposed typology ................................................................. 616 
2.3.1. Static Effects ............................................................................................................................ 616 
2.3.2. Dynamic Effects arising from the product markets ........................................................................ 617 
2.3.2.1. Mergers without Price Effects ........................................................................................... 618 
2.3.2.2. Price Effects.................................................................................................................... 620 
2.3.3. Efficiencies .............................................................................................................................. 621 
2.3.3.1. Economies of scale and Complementarities in the Innovation Markets .................................. 621 
2.3.3.2. Legal Uncertainty and Patent Thickets ............................................................................... 621 
2.3.4. Horizontal effects on innovation markets ..................................................................................... 622 
2.3.5. Vertical effects ......................................................................................................................... 622 
2.3.5.1. Foreclosure in the Innovation Market ................................................................................ 622 
2.3.5.2. Sequential innovation ....................................................................................................... 623 
2.4. Linking the effects to market structure ........................................................................... 623 
2.5. A competition policy algorithm ....................................................................................... 627 
2.6. The GM crops and seed industries: main features and past mergers............................ 628 
2.6.1. Product and industry characteristics ............................................................................................ 628 
2.6.2. Mergers and the direction of innovation ....................................................................................... 629 
2.6.3. Past mergers ............................................................................................................................. 630 
2.6.4. Vertical dimensions ................................................................................................................... 631 
2.7. BRICS: special concerns ............................................................................................... 632 
2.8. An empirical examination ............................................................................................... 634 
2.8.1. Using patent data to assess innovation: methodology and limitations .............................................. 634 
2.8.2. The data ........................................................................................................................ 635 
2.8.2.1. US Patents ........................................................................................................................... 635 
2.8.2.2. Espacenet ............................................................................................................................ 640 
2.8.2.3. A first look at some major mergers ......................................................................................... 651 
2.9. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 652 
Appendix A: formal analysis of the innovation effects of a merger ............................................. 660 
Appendix B: Mergers .................................................................................................................. 666 
PART V: COUNTRY REPORTS ...................................................................................... 675 
CHAPTER 1: BRAZIL ......................................................................................................................675 
1.1. The Food Value Chain ................................................................................................... 675 
1.2. Regulatory Framework of the Food Sector in Brazil ...................................................... 677 
1.2.1. General Introduction.................................................................................................................. 677 
1.2.2. The legal nature of the Regulation of the food sector..................................................................... 677 
1.2.3. Stakeholders and Policy Framing ................................................................................................ 678 
1.2.4. Courts and Regulations .............................................................................................................. 679 
1.3. Production ..................................................................................................................... 679 
1.3.1. Acquisition of Land by Foreigners .............................................................................................. 679 
1.3.2. Agricultural Policy and Food Supply ........................................................................................... 680 
1.3.3. Production and Trade ................................................................................................................ 681 
1.4. Access to Seeds ............................................................................................................ 682 
1.4.1. Seeds Market ............................................................................................................................ 682 
1.4.2. Food Security ........................................................................................................................... 682 
1.4.3. Protection of Seeds .................................................................................................................... 683 
1.4.4. GMOs ...................................................................................................................................... 684 
9 
 
1.5. Consumers’ interests ..................................................................................................... 685 
1.5.1. Food and Health Surveillance ..................................................................................................... 685 
1.5.2. Pesticides and Additives ............................................................................................................ 686 
1.5.3. Standards and Local Interests ..................................................................................................... 688 
1.5.4. Alcoholic Beverages and Consumption ....................................................................................... 688 
1.5.5. Consumer Protection System ...................................................................................................... 689 
1.6. Competition Law ............................................................................................................ 690 
1.6.1. Competition Law and Food Value Chains ......................................................................................... 690 
1.6.2. Merger Cases ............................................................................................................................ 691 
1.6.2.1. Agricultural Machines ...................................................................................................... 691 
1.6.2.2. Fertilisers ........................................................................................................................ 692 
1.6.2.3. Seeds.............................................................................................................................. 692 
1.6.2.4. Livestock Genetics Industry .............................................................................................. 692 
1.6.2.5. Fruits and Vegetables ....................................................................................................... 693 
1.6.2.6. Coffee ............................................................................................................................ 694 
1.6.2.7. Chocolate and Confectionary ............................................................................................ 694 
1.6.2.8. Meat and Poultry ............................................................................................................. 694 
1.6.2.9. Beer and Soft Drinks ........................................................................................................ 696 
1.6.2.10. Dairy .............................................................................................................................. 697 
1.6.2.11. Retail ............................................................................................................................. 697 
1.6.3. Conduct Cases .......................................................................................................................... 698 
1.6.3.1. Soybeans ........................................................................................................................ 698 
1.6.3.2. Meat and Poultry ............................................................................................................. 699 
1.6.3.3. Fish and Seafood ............................................................................................................. 699 
1.6.3.4. Orange ........................................................................................................................... 699 
1.6.3.5. Chocolate ....................................................................................................................... 700 
1.6.3.6. Cereals ........................................................................................................................... 700 
1.6.3.7. Salt ................................................................................................................................ 700 
1.6.3.8. Dairy .............................................................................................................................. 701 
1.6.3.9. Beer ............................................................................................................................... 701 
1.7. Superior Bargaining Power ............................................................................................ 702 
1.7.1. Contract Law ............................................................................................................................ 702 
1.7.2. Competition Law ...................................................................................................................... 703 
1.8. Agricultural Subsidies .................................................................................................... 705 
1.8.1. Mechanisms and Institutions for Support ..................................................................................... 705 
1.8.2. Level of Support and Crops ........................................................................................................ 706 
1.8.3. Forms of Support ...................................................................................................................... 707 
1.8.3.1. Minimum Prices Guarantees ............................................................................................. 707 
1.8.3.2. Agriculture Insurance and Environmental Requirements ...................................................... 708 
1.9. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 708 
CHAPTER 2: RUSSIAN FEDERATION................................................................................................711 
2.1. General Overview and Legal Framework ...................................................................... 711 
2.1.1. Domestic aspects and institutional framework .............................................................................. 711 
2.1.2. International Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 715 
2.2. Competition Issues on Different Levels of the Food Supply Chain ................................ 716 
2.2.1. Factors of Production ................................................................................................................ 716 
2.2.2.1. Right of Access of Farmers to the Plant Varieties and Animal Breeds in Russia ..................... 718 
2.2.2.2. Markets of Fertilisers in Russia ......................................................................................... 720 
2.2.2.3. Agricultural Production (Farming) .................................................................................... 720 
2.2.2. Processing and Wholesale .......................................................................................................... 725 
2.2.3. Retail ....................................................................................................................................... 729 
2.2.3.1. Private Labels ................................................................................................................. 733 
2.2.3.2. Code of Good Practices in Food Retail............................................................................... 734 
2.2.3.3. Regulation of Retail Prices and Mark-Up for Food Products ................................................ 735 
2.3. State Regulation of Food Supply Value Chains in Russia ............................................. 735 
2.3.1. Agricultural Policy and Food Supply ........................................................................................... 736 
2.3.2. Production and Trade ................................................................................................................ 740 
2.3.3. Food Security ........................................................................................................................... 741 
2.4. IP Rights ........................................................................................................................ 744 
2.5. Seed Markets ................................................................................................................ 744 
10 
 
2.5.1. Mergers in Agriculture .............................................................................................................. 744 
2.5.2. Antimonopoly regulation and sale models in Agriculture .............................................................. 745 
2.6. Consumers’ Interests ..................................................................................................... 746 
2.6.1. Food and Health Regulation ....................................................................................................... 746 
2.6.1.1. Pesticides and Additives ................................................................................................... 747 
2.6.1.2. Standards and Local Interests ............................................................................................ 748 
2.6.1.3. Alcoholic Beverages and Consumption .............................................................................. 748 
2.6.2. Consumer Protection System ...................................................................................................... 749 
2.7. Superior Bargaining Power ............................................................................................ 750 
2.7.1. Superior Bargaining Power in Russian Contract Law .................................................................... 750 
2.7.2. Superior Bargaining Power under Competition Law ..................................................................... 754 
2.8. Agricultural Subsidies .................................................................................................... 755 
2.8.1. Federal Law dated 29 December 2006 N 264-FZ “On Development of the Agriculture”. .................. 755 
2.8.2. State programmes aimed at subsidising agricultural producers: ............................................ 756 
CHAPTER 3: INDIA .........................................................................................................................767 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 767 
3.2. The Indian Food Value Chain(s) .................................................................................... 768 
3.2.1. The Basic Indian Food Value Chain ............................................................................................ 768 
3.2.1.1 The Input Sector ...................................................................................................................... 768 
3.2.1.2 The Agriculture Sector ............................................................................................................. 768 
3.2.1.3 The Wholesale Sector ............................................................................................................... 769 
3.2.1.4 Food Processing Sector ............................................................................................................ 769 
3.2.1.5 Food Retail and Services sector ................................................................................................. 769 
3.2.1.6 Consumers .............................................................................................................................. 769 
3.2.2. An Integrated Model of the Food Value Chain ............................................................................. 770 
3.3 The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Food Value Chain(s)........................................... 771 
3.3.1 The Input sector ........................................................................................................................ 771 
3.3.1.1  The Essential Commodities Act 1955 ................................................................................ 771 
3.3.1.2 The Seeds Act 1966 ................................................................................................................. 772 
3.3.2. The Agriculture sector ............................................................................................................... 773 
3.3.2.1 The Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmer Rights Act 2001 ........................................................ 773 
3.3.2.2 The Patents Act 1970 (as amended in 1999, 2002 and 2005) ......................................................... 774 
3.3.2.3  The Biological Diversity Act 2002 .................................................................................... 775 
3.3.2.4  Other Laws ..................................................................................................................... 776 
3.3.2.5  Proposed Laws ................................................................................................................ 776 
3.3.3. The Wholesale, Food Processing and Food Retail and Services sectors. .......................................... 776 
3.3.3.1 The Bureau of Indian Standards Act 2016 .................................................................................. 776 
3.3.3.2 The Food Safety and Standards Act 2006 ................................................................................... 777 
3.3.3.3. The Legal Metrology Act 2009 ................................................................................................. 777 
3.3.4. Consumers Related Laws ........................................................................................................... 777 
3.3.4.1  Consumer Protection Act 1986.......................................................................................... 777 
3.3.4.2   Competition Act 2002 ...................................................................................................... 778 
3.4  Relevant Government Ministries, Departments and Regulatory Bodies ........................ 778 
3.4.1 Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare ............................................................................... 778 
3.4.2 Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers .......................................................................................... 779 
3.4.3 Ministry of Commerce and Industry ............................................................................................ 779 
3.4.5 Ministry of Food Processing Industries ........................................................................................ 780 
3.4.6 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution ......................................................... 781 
3.4.7 The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare ................................................................................. 782 
3.4.8 Ministry of Corporate Affairs ..................................................................................................... 782 
3.5. Categories of Regulation and their Impact ..................................................................... 782 
3.5.1. Categories of Regulation ............................................................................................................ 782 
3.5.1.1 Private Regulation.................................................................................................................... 782 
3.5.1.2  Government Regulation ................................................................................................... 783 
3.5.2. Impact of Regulations ................................................................................................................ 783 
3.5.2.1   Courts and Regulation ..................................................................................................... 783 
3.5.2.2  Other Factors Affecting the Impact of Regulation ............................................................... 785 
3.6. Stakeholders in Food Sector Regulation in India ........................................................... 786 
3.6.1. Farmers .................................................................................................................................... 786 
3.6.2. Food Processors and Manufacturers ............................................................................................ 789 
11 
 
3.6.3 Consumers ............................................................................................................................... 792 
3.6.3.1 CERC (Consumer Education and Research Centre) ................................................................. 792 
3.6.3.2  FEDCOT (Federation of Consumer Organisations in Tamil Nadu)........................................ 792 
3.6.3.3  Citizen Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG) .............................................................. 792 
3.6.3.4  Consumer Guidance Society of India (CGSI) ..................................................................... 792 
3.6.3.5 Consumer Unity of Trust Society International (CUTS) ............................................................... 793 
3.6.6.6.  Mumbai Grahak Panchayat (MGP) .................................................................................... 793 
3.7 Intellectual Property Rights and the Agriculture Sector in India ..................................... 794 
3.7.1. Positive Impact of India’s IPR regime .............................................................................................. 794 
3.7.3 Challenges Remaining ............................................................................................................... 794 
3.8 Competition Law and the Indian Food Value Chain ....................................................... 795 
3.8.1. The Rationale for Competition Law ............................................................................................ 795 
3.8.2. Landmark Cases relating to the Food Value Chain(s) .................................................................... 796 
3.8.2.1   Suo Motu Case 1 of 2010 – In Re Sugar Mills decided on 30.11.2011 .................................. 796 
3.8.2.2  Suo Motu Case 1 of 2011 – In Re Rise in Onion Prices decided on 10.04.2012 ...................... 798 
3.8.2.3  Suo Motu case No. 2 of 2011—Re Aluminum Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers order dated 
23.04.2012 798 
3.9. Unfair Trading Practices ................................................................................................ 799 
3.9.1. Legislation governing Unfair Trading Practices ............................................................................ 799 
3.9.2. Instances of Unfair Trading Practices in Food Processing Industry ................................................. 800 
3.10. Superior Bargaining Power ............................................................................................ 801 
3.11. Interface between Competition Law, IP Rights, Unfair Trading Practices and Superior Bargaining 
Position 802 
3.11.1 Competition Law and IPRs ............................................................................................................. 802 
3.11.2. Superior Bargaining Power and Competition Law ........................................................................ 804 
3.11.3. Dealing with Unfair Trade Practices under Competition Law ......................................................... 806 
3.12 . Agricultural Subsidies .................................................................................................. 806 
3.12.1. India’s trade policies ................................................................................................................. 807 
3.12.2. Domestic policies ...................................................................................................................... 807 
3.13 . Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 811 
CHAPTER 4: CHINA .......................................................................................................................815 
4.1. China’s agricultural policy and food value chain ............................................................ 815 
4.2. Bodies regulating the food value chains ........................................................................ 817 
4.3. Regulatory framework for the food value chains ............................................................ 824 
4.3.1. National policy regarding the supply segments of the food value chains .......................................... 824 
4.3.2. National laws regarding the various segments of the food value chain ............................................ 827 
4.3.2.1. Basic laws for the production and supply segments of the food value chain ........................... 827 
4.3.2.1.1. Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China 1993(中华人民共和国农业法) ............ 827 
4.3.2.1.2. Fisheries Law of the People's Republic of China 1986 (FLPRC)( 中华人民共和国渔业法) and 
Animal Breeding Law of the People's Republic of China 2006 (AHLPRC)( 中华人民共和国畜牧法) ... 833 
4.3.2.1.3. Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (LALPRC) 1986(中华人民共和国
土地管理法 ), Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Contract in Rural Areas 2002 (LPRCLCRA) 
(中华人民共和国农村土地承包法), Grassland Law of the People's Republic of China 2002 (GLPRC) (中
华人民共和国草原法), Seed Law of the People's Republic of China 2015 (SLPRC)(中华人民共和国种子
法) 834 
4.3.2.1.4. Grain Law of the People's Republic of China (draft for public comments) 2015 (GLPRCdpc)( 
中华人民共和国粮食法 (征求公众意见稿)) ................................................................................... 839 
4.3.2.2. Basic laws for the distribution and consumption segments of the food value chains ................ 843 
4.3.2.2.1.1. Price Law of the People's Republic of China (PLPRC) 1998 (中华人民共和国价格法) ... 844 
4.3.2.2.1.2. Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
1994 (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法) .................................................................................... 845 
4.3.2.1.3. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China (1994) (中华人民共和国对外贸易法)
 845 
4.4. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights ....................................................................... 846 
4.5. Competition law, superior bargaining power, and food value chains ............................. 849 
4.5.1. Competition laws and the food value chains ................................................................................. 849 
4.5.2. Regulation of superior bargaining power and food value chains ..................................................... 851 
12 
 
4.6. Competition Law Enforcement in specific segments of the food value chain ................. 856 
4.6.1. Fertilisers ................................................................................................................................. 856 
4.6.2. Beans ....................................................................................................................................... 856 
4.6.3. Salt .......................................................................................................................................... 858 
4.6.4. Garlic ...................................................................................................................................... 858 
4.6.5. Sugar ....................................................................................................................................... 858 
4.6.6. Rice vermicelli ......................................................................................................................... 859 
4.6.7. Beverages................................................................................................................................. 859 
4.6.8. Milk ........................................................................................................................................ 859 
4.6.9. Milk Powder ............................................................................................................................. 860 
4.6.10. Alcohol .................................................................................................................................... 860 
4.6.11. Beer ......................................................................................................................................... 860 
4.7. Agricultural Subsidies ............................................................................................................... 862 
CHAPTER 5: SOUTH AFRICA ..........................................................................................................868 
5.1. The Food Chain(s) in South Africa................................................................................. 868 
5.2. The food market in South Africa .................................................................................... 871 
5.3. Inputs to Primary Production: ........................................................................................ 874 
5.4. Supermarkets: ............................................................................................................... 876 
5.5. Regulatory Framework: ................................................................................................. 879 
5.5.1. Food and Safety Standards: ........................................................................................................ 880 
5.5.2. Seed Regulation: ....................................................................................................................... 880 
5.5.3. Regulating contracts between retailers and SMEs through legislation: ............................................ 882 
5.6. Production ..................................................................................................................... 882 
5.6.1. Land Reform: ........................................................................................................................... 882 
5.6.2. Acquisition of Agricultural Land: ............................................................................................... 883 
5.6.3. Consumer Interests: ................................................................................................................... 883 
5.6.3.1. GMO’s: .......................................................................................................................... 883 
5.6.3.2. Food Safety:.................................................................................................................... 885 
5.6.3.3. Food Security: ................................................................................................................. 886 
5.7. Competition Law ............................................................................................................ 886 
5.7.1. Competition Law and Food Value Chains .................................................................................... 886 
5.7.2. Main competition law cases ....................................................................................................... 888 
5.7.2.1. Main Merger Cases: ......................................................................................................... 888 
5.7.2.1.1. Seed Industry ............................................................................................................... 888 
5.7.2.1.2. Cereals ........................................................................................................................ 888 
5.7.2.1.3. Poultry ........................................................................................................................ 889 
5.7.2.1.4. Fish ............................................................................................................................ 889 
5.7.2.1.5. Infant Milk Formula ..................................................................................................... 890 
5.7.2.1.6. Retail .......................................................................................................................... 891 
5.7.2.1.7. Beverages.................................................................................................................... 891 
5.7.2.2. Conduct Cases................................................................................................................. 893 
5.7.2.2.1. Fertiliser ..................................................................................................................... 893 
5.7.2.2.2. Bread Cartel ................................................................................................................ 895 
5.7.2.2.3. Wheat Flour Cartel ....................................................................................................... 896 
5.7.2.2.4. Milk Cartel .................................................................................................................. 897 
5.7.2.2.5. Poultry Cartel .............................................................................................................. 898 
5.7.2.2.6. Packaging.................................................................................................................... 898 
5.8. Agricultural Subsidies .................................................................................................... 899 
5.9. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 905 
PART VI: CASE STUDIES .............................................................................................. 908 
CHAPTER 1: INSIGHTS FROM SELECTED VALUE CHAINS IN SOUTH AFRICA ........................................908 
1.1.Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 908 
1.2. A value chain approach in conjunction with industrial organisation principles ............... 909 
1.2.1. Regional value chains? .............................................................................................................. 909 
1.2.2. Competition policy and links to industrial and other policies ......................................................... 912 
1.3. Brief background on the history and evolution of food sectors in South Africa .............. 913 
13 
 
1.3.1. History of protection in the food sector ........................................................................................ 913 
1.3.2. Recent developments in the food sector in South Africa ................................................................ 914 
1.4. Assessment of the Selected Value Chains .................................................................... 915 
1.4.1. Seeds Value Chain .................................................................................................................... 916 
1.4.1.1. A mapping of the key players and ownership structures ...................................................... 916 
1.4.1.2. Regulation and barriers to entry ........................................................................................ 918 
1.4.1.3. Performance of the seed industry in South Africa ............................................................... 919 
1.4.1.3.1. Production .............................................................................................................. 919 
1.4.1.3.2. Exports and Imports ................................................................................................ 921 
1.4.1.3.3. Prices ..................................................................................................................... 922 
1.4.1.4. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases .......................................... 923 
1.4.1.4.1. Competition cases and historical interventions............................................................ 925 
1.4.1.4.2. Recent mergers and acquisitions ............................................................................... 927 
1.4.2. Fertiliser Value Chain ................................................................................................................ 929 
1.4.2.1. A mapping of the value chain and key players .................................................................... 929 
1.4.2.2. Regulatory framework ..................................................................................................... 932 
1.4.2.3. Performance of the Fertiliser industry ................................................................................ 932 
1.4.2.3.1. Consumption ............................................................................................................... 932 
1.4.2.3.2. Prices .......................................................................................................................... 933 
1.4.2.4. Key investments .............................................................................................................. 934 
1.4.2.5. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key mergers ......................................................... 935 
1.4.2.5.1. Overview of competition interventions ........................................................................... 936 
1.4.2.5.2. Ex-post assessment of the Competition Commission’s intervention in 2009 ....................... 937 
1.4.2.5.3. Regional and global collusive practices .......................................................................... 938 
1.4.2.5.4. Barriers to entry ........................................................................................................... 939 
1.4.3. Animal Feed to Poultry Value Chain ........................................................................................... 939 
1.4.3.1. A mapping of the key players and ownership structures ....................................................... 939 
1.4.3.2. Regulatory framework ..................................................................................................... 943 
1.4.3.3. Performance of the South African poultry industry .............................................................. 943 
1.4.3.3.1. Production ................................................................................................................... 943 
1.4.3.3.2. Prices of poultry ........................................................................................................... 945 
1.4.3.3.3. Import and exports ....................................................................................................... 946 
1.4.3.3.4. Key investments .......................................................................................................... 949 
1.4.3.4. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key cases in South Africa ...................................... 950 
1.4.3.5. Overview of other competition interventions ...................................................................... 954 
1.4.4. Dairy Value Chain .................................................................................................................... 955 
1.4.4.1. A mapping of the key players and ownership structure ........................................................ 955 
1.4.4.2. Regulatory framework ..................................................................................................... 959 
1.4.4.3. Performance of the South African dairy sector .................................................................... 960 
1.4.4.3.1. Production and trade in the dairy sector .......................................................................... 960 
1.4.4.3.2. Prices in the Dairy sector .............................................................................................. 961 
1.4.4.3.3. Imports and exports ...................................................................................................... 962 
1.4.4.4. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases ........................................... 964 
1.4.4.4.1. Overview of competition interventions ........................................................................... 964 
1.4.4.4.2. Recent cases (2011- 2016) ............................................................................................ 965 
1.4.4.4.3. Barriers to entry ........................................................................................................... 967 
1.4.5. Milling Value Chain .................................................................................................................. 968 
1.4.5.1. A mapping of the key players and ownership structures ....................................................... 968 
1.4.5.2.Regulatory framework .............................................................................................................. 970 
1.4.5.2.1. Performance of the South African Milling sector ............................................................. 971 
1.4.5.2.1.1. Production ........................................................................................................... 971 
1.4.5.2.1.2. Imports and exports .............................................................................................. 972 
1.4.5.2.1.3. Prices .................................................................................................................. 973 
1.4.5.2.1.4. Key investments ................................................................................................... 975 
1.4.5.3. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases .......................................... 975 
1.4.5.3.1. Overview of competition interventions ...................................................................... 975 
1.4.5.3.2. Recent cases (2011- 2016) ........................................................................................ 977 
1.4.5.4. Barriers to entry .............................................................................................................. 978 
1.4.6. The role of retail in food value chains.......................................................................................... 979 
1.4.6.1. Mapping the retail landscape ............................................................................................ 979 
1.4.6.1.1. Significance of retail in South Africa.............................................................................. 980 
1.4.6.1.2. Key players and market shares....................................................................................... 983 
1.4.6.2. Policy and regulatory frameworks ..................................................................................... 984 
1.4.6.2.1. Nature of competitive rivalry and a review of competition concerns in South Africa ........... 984 
1.4.6.2.1.1. Nature of competition ........................................................................................... 984 
1.4.6.2.1.2. .Competition concerns at a horizontal level ............................................................. 986 
14 
 
1.4.6.2.1.3. Implications on suppliers – main vertical competition concerns ................................. 988 
1.4.6.2.2. Outcomes of key competition cases ................................................................................ 990 
1.4.6.3. Barriers to entry .............................................................................................................. 994 
1.5. Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................... 994 
CHAPTER 2: GM COTTON SEEDS: EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE VIS--À-VIS COMPETITION, PRICE CONTROL AND 
PATENT LICENSING IN INDIA ............................................................................................1005 
2.1. Background ................................................................................................................. 1005 
2.2. Recent Developments ................................................................................................. 1006 
2.2.1. Competition Enforcement ........................................................................................................ 1006 
2.2.2. Cotton Seeds Price (Control) Order, 2015 .................................................................................. 1009 
2.2.3. Licensing and Formats for GM Technology Agreement Guidelines .............................................. 1011 
2.3. Examining Contentious Issues .................................................................................... 1013 
2.3.1. CCI’s jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 1013 
2.3.2. Government Intervention under ECA ........................................................................................ 1014 
2.4. Patents and gene-editing ............................................................................................. 1017 
CHAPTER 3: NEW FORMS OF FINANCING THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN BRAZIL: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
SOYBEAN CHAIN .............................................................................................................1023 
3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1023 
3.2. Structural change in Brazilian agriculture .................................................................... 1023 
3.2.1. The effects of the Brazilian crisis of the 1980s on rural credit ...................................................... 1023 
3.2.2. Consolidation of Brazilian exported-oriented soybean agriculture ................................................ 1026 
3.3. New organizational forms of Brazilian soybean chains ................................................ 1029 
3.4. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 1035 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
  
16 
 
 
Part I: Introduction and Methodology 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
Aims of the research 
 
The research project aims to provide the first in-depth analysis of the regulation, from a 
competition policy perspective, of the food industry by the BRICS countries, and selected 
developed countries (European Union, United States). Our aim has been to map the structure 
of the food value chain globally, as well as in the various jurisdictions we examine, focusing 
on the balance of power between the various actors in the value chain: retailers, farmers, 
processors and suppliers, traders, agro-industry, consumers, in the current context of 
technological and societal transformation, as well as the impact of these power relations on the 
governance of these global food value chains. Our aim was to understand the broader contours 
of public action in the various segments of global food value chains, in particular when this 
takes the form of competition law, and the various values that seem to animate public 
authorities when interfering with the private governance regimes put in place, or more broadly 
the activity of global food value chains . Our understanding is that competition law, and more 
broadly competition policy, constitutes a tool, among a larger set of institutional options at the 
disposal of public authorities, in order to deal with the economic, social and political costs 
flowing from the exercise of economic power. The way it will be used, and the scope of 
competition law intervention, is highly dependent on the capability and incentives of the 
various formal and informal institutions managing the competitive activity in global food value 
chains. It is our belief that the forms this competitive activity takes place in the short, medium 
and long run cannot only be described through the sole perspective of price theory. 
Although we strive to take a broader perspective than price theory in the conceptualization 
of competitive interactions between economic actors involved in food production and 
commercialisation, we have chosen not to incorporate in this analysis the broader macro-
perspective of “food regimes”1. We recognize that this theoretical framework may offer useful 
insights in understanding the important structural changes of the governance of food systems 
the last decades, with the rise of the globalization of food production and consumption (the de-
nationalisation of food systems and the emergence of an international food order which largely 
operates on the basis of transnational food value chains) and the increasing financialisation of 
                                                          
1 This term denotes  a‘rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale: H. 
Friedmann, ‘The political economy of food: a global crisis’. (1993) 197 New Left Review 29. On “food regimes” 
see also, H. Friedman, International regimes of food and agriculture since 1870. In: T. Shanin, (ed.) Peasants and 
peasant societies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 258; H. Friedman, From colonialism to green capitalism: 
social movements and the emergence of food regimes. In: F.H. Buttel &  P. McMichael, (eds.) New directions in 
the sociology of global development. Research in rural sociology and development (Vol. 11, Oxford: Elsevier, 
2005), p. 229; Ph. McMichael, 'A food regime genealogy',(2009) 36(1) Journal of Peasant Studies 139. For a 
critical review, see H. Bernstein, ‘Agrarian political economy and modern world capitalism: The contributions of 
food regime analysis’. (2016) 43 Journal of Peasant Studies 3. 
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food with the emergence of a “corporate food regime”2  Although we recognize that the quest 
for “food sovereignty” may be an important driving force for the action of various public 
authorities involved in the regulation of economic activities in the food sector, we consider that 
if we had prominately integrated this concern in a competition law and policy setting, the clash 
of sovereigns that will have surely emerged would have made more difficult our effort to 
develop common understandings and practices among competition law authorities in BRICS 
and around the world. That said, we recognize that “food sovereignty3” concerns may, in 
reality, at least influence the enforcement activity of competition law authorities, in particular 
with regard to global mergers and conduct that further internationalises the food production 
and commercialisation system, away from its domestic “roots”, and that it might explain some 
of their enforcement priorities, and one may also argue, the design of remedies imposed for 
competition law infringements, for instance with regard to global mergers. We can therefore 
consider it as a useful background information and a possible independent variable, although 
we have not taken it systematically into account in this study. 
Our starting point is that as all markets, food markets cannot be analysed abstractly without 
realising that they are embedded in social relations4, not only between consumers and 
producers or retailers, but also between other sociological categories of actors that are present 
in various fields of life, sometimes invisible from the specific market where the economic 
exchange about food took place and the price was presumably formed5. These could even go 
beyond the economic sphere and touch upon the political or the cultural fields6. Furthermore, 
the social importance of food render these markets, and their regulation, particularly sensitive 
to politics. For instance, farmers and their struggle for land re-distribution and economic 
                                                          
2 Ph. McMichael, Global Development and the Corporate Food regime, in F.H. Buttel and P. McMichael (eds). 
New directions in the sociology of global development (Oxford: Elsevier Press, Volume 11, 2005), 269. 
3 On “food sovereignty” see, inter alia, Ph. McMichael, ‘Historicizing food sovereignty’ (2014) 41 The Journal 
of Peasant Studies’, 933; Ph. McMichael, ‘Commentary: Food regime for thought’, (2016) 43 The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 648; (noting that food sovereignty “is about reorganizing international political economy, 
modeling social struggle around democratic principles, gender equity, producer rights, ecological practices and 
rebalancing the urban/rural divide”). 
4 On the social embeddedness of markets and more generally economic activity, see M. Granovetter, Economic 
Action and Social Structure: The problem of Embededness, (1985) 91(3) American Journal of Sociology 481; M. 
Callon, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics", in M. Callon (ed.), The Laws of 
the Markets (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 1-57; B. Jessop, The Social Embeddedness of the Economy and its 
Implications for Economic Governance, in F. Adaman & P. Divine (eds.), The Socially Embedded Economy 
(Black Rose Books, Montreal, 2001); . This approach questions the assumption of neoclassical price theory that 
the market forms a clearly delimited, socially disembedded sphere of economic relations, in which the various 
actors only pursue their material interest in order to satisfy their wants, exchange being entirely driven by the 
optimizing, economizing behaviour of pre-constituted rational individuals with pre-given and stable preference 
functions, their incentives and subsequent action being “managed” by the invisible hand of the price mechanism. 
5 In reality, the process of price formation is quite complex, the global price of a food staple being set not by actual 
exchange on a market (actual prices), but also by “futures” and “prosthetic” prices, such as different global price 
indexes that also take into account subsidies and the expectations of financial investors, which structure the various 
exchanges and become the actual world price of the food staple, in question. For a fascinating analysis with regard 
to global cotton markets, see K. Çalişkan, Market Threads: How Cotton Farmers and Traders Create a Global 
Commodity (Princeton Univ. press 2010), Chap. 1 &2 in particular. 
6, See N. Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets - An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century Capitalist 
Societies (Princeton University press, 2001), highlighting the importance of studying markets also as political and 
cultural fields, markets being social constructions that require extensive institutional support. One may also add 
that in some cultural contexts, certain types of food may have both nutritional and sacralization functions (or only 
the second). 
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independence has profoundly influenced the political and economic constitution of modern 
capitalist societies7 and to a large extent explains the emergence of antitrust law, the last 
decades of the 20th century8.  
We consider that the (global) food value chain and its regulation constitutes an important 
area of study for competition policy. First, the food supply chain connects three economically 
important sectors: the agricultural sector, the food processing industry and the distribution 
sectors.  As the food processing industry and the distribution sectors have many interactions 
with other sectors, market malfunctioning along the food supply chain can have significant 
repercussions. Second, the important mutations that have characterized this industry in recent 
years, in particular technological development at the food production, processing and 
distribution, as well as important changes in the preferences of consumers, in particular those 
of the BRICS jurisdictions which have seen their disposable income rise significantly in recent 
years, but also more general societal trends (e.g. healthy food, organic food, e-commerce, m-
commerce) have inevitably affected the structure of the industry and the strategies of the 
different actors. We believe that competition law and policy should take that into account. We 
also consider that, despite the important socio-economic differences between BRICS 
jurisdictions as to the organization and functioning of this industry and the import or export 
orientation of their economies, there is a significant value in exploring possible synergies in 
the regulation of the competition in the global food value chains, including the prevalent 
position of multi-national corporations in various segments of the value chain, eventually with 
the development of common perceptions over the adequate competition policy options on offer. 
 The original hypothesis explored in this study is that power relations shape the structure 
of the market and its regulatory framework, including competition law. Economic power may 
take different forms and may draw from various sources9, including market power, that is the 
ability to raise process profitably or reduce output, or to affect another valuable parameter of 
competition, such as quality, innovation and variety, which may result from the high 
concentration of food markets, situations of relational power in view of the bargaining position 
that some market actors dispose, leading to asymmetrical power, either because of the presence 
of global networks managed by powerful actors or because of situations of economic 
dependence, and situations of exclusionary power that again some market actors dispose, 
enabling them to marginalise actual or potential competitors and raise barriers to entry in food 
markets, because of “unfair” or anticompetitive commercial practices. This conduct may have 
                                                          
7 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The political and economic origins of our time (first published 1944, 
Beacon press, 2001). According to Polanyi, the disembededness of th market from other spheres of social activity 
has been achieved only because it has been followed by a counter movement, various social groups (or society) 
attempting to re-embed market forces in social institutions and thereby to regulate the market mechanism (the so 
called “double movement”). Social movements, such as those initiated by farmers have played an important role 
in this respect. 
8 In the US, the so called “Granger movement” was established in 1867 by Oliver Hudson Kelley, with the aim to 
unite the farmers against the monopolistic practices of railroads and elevators and to institute for themselves 
cooperative methods of buying and selling: S.J. Buck, The Granger Movement - A study of agricultural 
organization and its political, economic, and social manifestations 1870-1880 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1913); T.J. 
DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest Group Perspective (1985) 5 International Review of Law and 
Economics 73 
9 On a discussion about economic power, see M. Granovetter, Society and Economy – Framework and Principles 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2017),  Chapter 4. 
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been generated and maintained either because of the use of legitimate tools provided by the 
state (e.g. property rights) or because of the links that associate these economic powerful actors 
with other spheres of power (e.g. political power). The research project aimed to understand 
how these various sources of power operate in this economic sector and in particular to explore 
how the transformative innovation in the methods of production and distribution in the food 
industry the last decade, can change, or has the potential to change, the existing power relations 
in the food industry. The role of the broader institutional design (e.g. property rights. commons, 
regulation) in empowering some actors in this transformative process has been an important 
theme in this study.  
It also becomes crucial to understand that competition law is a tool, among many others, 
with the aim to control economic power, in order to ensure that food markets operate in the 
short, medium and long term benefit of consumers and of the general public. The competition 
law tool has a number of advantages and disadvantages in achieving this purpose, in 
comparison to other governance tools, public and private. Our starting point is that it is difficult 
to establish in abstracto when competition law may be a superior tool than the other tools at 
our disposal, before making a comparative institutional analysis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the other tools in the specific jurisdiction10. To do that, it becomes essential 
to understand the political economy of the governance of the food sector in this specific 
jurisdiction, including if the other tools may be, or may not be, the least imperfect alternatives 
in order to promote the values that drive public interest. 
The analysis will, first, aim to uncover the most common commercial practices that occur 
across various jurisdictions in the food industry, including specific forms of distribution 
contracts, strategies of expansion and capacity building, and to unveil the complex governance 
framework, public and private, of global food value chains. We will then explore the market 
situation in the various segments of the global food value chains, examining the level of 
concentration, the main economic actors, data with regard to prices, consumer choice, quality 
and innovation, before turning to examining how the competition law tool was employed in 
order to ensure affordability of prices, but also broader aims, such as innovation, protection of 
smallholders and farmers etc.. We will focus on the regulations/norms that may apply to the 
food sector in each jurisdiction (including international norms), such as competition law, unfair 
competition statutes, IP laws, codes of conduct, contract law, planning law, self-regulatory 
initiatives etc. Our aim will be to explore how national (and international) legal regimes have 
coped with the complexity of this sector, the various interests that need to be balanced (those 
of consumers for cheap products, those of the government to limit inflation and promote 
innovation and consumer choice, those of farmers for adequate compensation, those of small 
                                                          
10 N. Komesar, Law’s Limits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 2001); N. Komesar, Imperfect 
Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (University of Chicago press, 1994). 
Neil Komesar has advanced a theory of comparative institutional analysis emphasizing the primary role of 
institutional choice. By institutional choice Komesar means the selection of the social decision-making process 
that would dispose the residual right of decision-making in a specific context. Komesar distinguishes between 
legislatures (the political realm), courts (adjudicators) and markets. It is, however, possible to break his categories 
and apply his analysis to various other intermediary social decision-making processes, such as the State 
bureaucracy, independent regulators, private standard setting/self-regulation bodies, or, in our case, competition 
authorities 
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retailers and groceries stores for sustainability, those of business actors for greater efficiency 
and profitability etc.) and how this balancing has occurred in each jurisdiction examined. We 
will aim to understand the reasons of regulatory divergence in the policy mix used and reflect 
on policies that will enhance economic development and promote transformative innovation in 
this context.  
Our emphasis will not only be on the consumer side (and the need to guarantee 
affordability, enhance consumer choice and innovation) but also the supply side (the integration 
of the factors of production segment of agriculture, the presence of large retailers and their 
competitive interaction with smaller grocery stores, e-commerce and m-commerce) in these 
jurisdictions, in particular in view of the need to enhance market access to global food value 
chains in conditions favouring investment, employment and productivity, while fulfilling 
objectives of sustainable development. Similarly, we will focus on the existence of significant 
FDI in the food industry in each jurisdiction examined. We will explore the governance aspects 
of transnational networks linking big distribution to food suppliers and farmers, the relations 
between food distribution and food supply, the need to take into account these transnational 
contractual networks when envisaging the enforcement of competition law, the adequacy of 
self-regulation and soft law to protect the public interest in this context, or the need for 
international cooperation and convergence, among BRICS, but also beyond.  
The team has engaged with a number of competition authorities (those of the BRICS but 
also other emergent jurisdictions), international organizations (e.g. UNCTAD, OECD), as well 
as a number of international and local experts (economist and lawyers). Because of their 
importance in the global economy and the political capital and ambition they dispose, in terms 
of promoting different paths and models for development globally, the BRICS countries have 
constituted the main focus of our research. There is also a lack of work on the issues raised by 
the food value chain and competition policy for developing and emergent jurisdictions, and the 
BRICS countries in particular. Although there is a lot of work on the regulation of the food 
value chain in the EU and the US, we consider that the same considerations may not apply in 
BRICS, with the result that it is difficult to transpose the solutions promoted for the European 
or the US markets. By promoting an in-depth discussion over these issues, and taking a political 
economy and comparative perspective, this research project has the ambition to create a 
knowledge base that will be particularly helpful for competition and other authorities in these 
jurisdictions in charge of policy in the food sector area, independent from the existing resources 
from the US and EU, and to develop cooperation between the competition and other authorities 
in BRICS on this issue.  
More importantly, we consider that an in-depth analysis of the competition policy issues 
in the food industry may provide a blueprint for rethinking competition law and policy and the 
interaction between competition law and other tools that have been used to manage relations 
of economic power, such as unfair competition, IP laws, contract law, regulation and self-
regulation, in order to promote a plurality of objectives that are often put forward by public 
authorities in this area: economic efficiency, innovation and consumer welfare, distributive 
justice and the fight against inequalities, right to food, the increase of national productivity, 
industrial and agricultural policy concerns, employment, sustainable development etc. The 
existence of various market actors (agribusiness, processors, distributors at the wholesale and 
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retail levels), different forms of commerce competing with each other (modern and more 
traditional), different means of self-regulation including standard setting and certification, 
various groups of consumers (some focusing on price, while others on quality, including 
organic and fair trade food), various forms of suppliers (e.g. industrial, farmers), presents a 
complex web of societal relations built in order to guarantee the production and distribution of 
food. Because of the societal importance of the sector, this social web of actors is intrinsically 
linked with politics, either at the national (democracy, political stability) or the global level 
(the new geopolitics of food). Indeed, as some have commented, “(t)he world is in transition 
from an era of food abundance to one of scarcity. Over the last decade, world grain reserves 
have fallen by one third. World food prices have more than doubled, triggering a worldwide 
land rush and ushering in a new geopolitics of food. Food is the new oil. Land is the new 
gold”11. Our aim is to develop a “holistic” competition law and policy perspective that will aim 
to integrate the multi-dimensional reality of global food value chains in the assessment of 
specific commercial practices or sectors. Hence, we have strived to provide the grammar for 
this more holistic perspective on competition law and policy in this crucial sector for the 
national and the global economy. 
The project had four central operational objectives/aims: 
1. Form a complete picture of the legal framework applying to the food industry in 
BRICS and other selected jurisdictions, as well as international efforts of 
convergence. We have focused on all aspects of competition law (antitrust, mergers, 
market inquiries) and the interaction of competition law with other tools employed to 
regulate economic power in the food sector in order to promote the public interest, 
including unfair competition, contract law, IP laws, regulatory and self-regulatory 
initiatives. An important aim of this work has been to understand how the different tools 
employed to regulate the activity of this specific sector interacted with each other and 
to determine the policy mix chosen by each of the examined jurisdictions.  
2. Understand the characteristics of the food industry and its link to food value chain 
at the level of the BRICS jurisdictions, selected emergent, developing economies 
and globally. We have focused on the actors involved, their relations, the institutions 
that “regulate” their activity at the local, national and global level, in order to 
understand the broader societal context in which these economic relations are 
embedded. This aim has been achieved by collecting information published on the 
organization of the food industry in the selected jurisdictions. This part is nevertheless 
uncomplete. We plan to conduct in the next few months some additional interviews and 
qualitative research in order to understand the strategies of the actors involved and their 
interaction with each other, the possible transnational links that exist between different 
actors, the role of politics and geopolitics and their effect, and the role of symbols, such 
as brands, in structuring these forms of social interaction. 
3. Explore the interplay between the characteristics of the food industry and the 
wider economic eco-system in each jurisdiction. This has been achieved by exploring 
the structural characteristics of the national and the global markets (in particular 
                                                          
11 L.R. Brown, Empty Planet, Empty Plates (Norton & Company, 2011), 3. 
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collecting data on market concentration, prices, quality, consumer choice and 
innovation to the extent these were publicly available and they been compiled and relied 
upon by the public authorities or trusted (non-biased by material interests) private 
actors.  
4. Examine the interaction between the legal and regulatory framework relating to 
the food industry in the selected jurisdictions (and globally) and the broader 
societal and economic context we have identified, as parts of aims 1 and 2. We have 
been particularly interested in understanding if the economic and social transformations 
that have characterized the evolution of this economic sector the last few decades, and 
in particular since 2005, have led to the development of new types of legal tools in 
competition law (or more broadly), or of different ways to understand traditional legal 
concepts, or of different methods/processes for adjudicating legal disputes and making 
trade-offs between the values, interests or rights protected 
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adjudicating competition law cases in South Africa as well as his conceptualization of global 
food value chains have been an important source of inspiration for this work.  
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to the report providing economic and empirical insights on the effects of mergers on innovation 
in the agro-chem sector. 
The project was officially launched at the first BRICS Competition Law Forum, organised 
by the HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, with the support of UCL in St 
Petersburg in May 201512. The workshop participants were asked to provide feedback to an 
exploratory report co-drafted by professor Ioannis Lianos with the assistance of Dr. Claudio 
Lombardi, senior researcher at the time at the HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and 
Development. 
The next step was the organization of a preparatory workshop in cooperation with the 
University of Cape Town and Judge Dennis Davis, which took place in Cape Town in 
November 2015, following up the annual BRICS competition law conference organised by the 
South African Competition Commission13. Professor Ioannis Lianos and Dr. Claudio Lombardi 
presented in this workshop an updated version of the exploratory report and asked partcipants 
to develop specific themes of interest in order to promote reflection on the various themes 
touched upon the food value chain project. 
This work continued with the Second BRICS Competition Law Forum organised in May 
2016 in St Petersburg, organised by the HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law & Development and 
the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL, a workshop that was entirely dedicated to 
the issue of global food value chains14. Some of the first results of this research work have been 
published at a special issue of the competition law journal Concurrences and appeared in 
January and April 201615. 
Professor Lianos presented some of the results of this work at a conference organised by 
the Forum for Law and Markets at the University of Haifa Faculty of Law, a conference also 
supported by the Loyola Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies in June 2016. Professors 
Ioannis Lianos, Alexey Ivanov, and Dr. Claudio Lombardi have also presented about the food 
value chains project in various conferences organised by the Russian Federal Antimonopoly 
Service (FAS) and the Skolkovo Foundation in December 2015, September 2016 and 
December 2016.  
It became essential at this point of time to explore in more detail the concept of global value 
chains and its possible contribution to competition law. For this reason, a workshop was 
organised in London by the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL in February 2017, 
where a number of participants commented on a concept note prepared by professor Lianos16. 
                                                          
12 See, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research_initiatives/gcl-economic/brics-competition-law-and-policy-forum . 
13 See, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research_initiatives/gcl-economic/index/edit/brics-competition-law-and-
policy-academic-workshop  
14 See http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research_initiatives/gcl-economic/global-food-supply-chains-and-competition-
law  
15 I. Lianos & C. Lombardi, Competition law and policy and the food value chain, January 2016, Concurrences 
Review N° 1-2016, Art. N° 78014, 22-35; I. Lianos, D. Katalevsky & A. Ivanov, The global seed market, 
competition law and intellectual property rights: Untying the Gordian knot, May 2016, Concurrences Review N° 
2-2016, Art. N° 78807, 62-80. 
16 See, https://www.laws.ucl.ac.uk/event/global-value-chains-in-competition-law/ . 
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The first preliminary draft of the food report was presented at a the third BRICS 
Competition Law Forum organised in May 2017 in St Petersburg, with the participation of a 
number of competition law officials and scholars from BRICS countries and beyond17.  
Drafts of the various chapters of the report were circulated in September and October 2017 
and a number of external reviewers were involved, with regard to the country reports and the 
data collected on the enforcement activity of BRICS competition authorities in this sector, as 
well as with regard to the other, more conceptual, parts of the report.  
We are happy to have received comments by two anonymous reviewers on Part V of the 
report, in particular regarding Chapter II on Innovation and mergers. Particular care has been 
taken to integrate the most recent decisional practice of the BRICS and other competition 
authorities, in particular as the mega-mergers on seeds, traits and plant protection were coming 
to be assessed by the competition authorities in 2016 and 2017.  
The report benefited from a dedicated team of senior and junior scholars that have spent 
time to gather information, analysing it and also contributing to various extens in the drafting 
of the report.  
At the HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, the contribution of Dr. Claudio 
Lombardi has been quite significant. Dr. Lombardi assisted professor Lianos in the 
conceptualization of some of the themes touched upon by the research project, and has also 
assisted professor Lianos in the drafting of the exploratory report and of its updated version 
presented in November 2015, having worked on this project from March 2015 to January 2017. 
Dr. Dimitry Katalevsky has provided the research team with his important expertise on the 
business side of the food industry and has contributed to the methodology of the 
financialisation study, regarding the visualisation of the common and cross-ownership links in 
the various segments of the food value chain, jointly with George Ovchinikov and professor 
Lianos. Mr Maksim Bashkatov, Ms. Katya Semenova & Mr. Georgy Tyulyaev have 
contributed to the country report on the Russian federation. Dr. Qiang Yu has contributed to 
the drafting of the country report on China as well as to the coding of the decisional practice 
of the Chinese competition authorities in this sector. 
At the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL, Dr. Amber Darr has contributed, 
jointly with professor Lianos, to the analysis of the implications of the right to food in 
competition law and, on her own, to the country report on India. Dr. Matthew Strader has 
contributed to the coding of the cases in South Africa and also helped with research on some 
aspects relating to price discrimination in the superior bargaining power chapter, in particular 
concerning US law. Mr Murilo Lubambo de Melo has drafted the country report for Brazil and 
has been dealing with the coding of the decisional practice of the Brazilian competition 
authority. Mr Wang Bo and Ms Ye Huilin have contributed to the drafting of the country report 
on China as well as to the coding of the food-industry related competition law cases in China. 
Mr Theodore Alysandratos and Mr George Poquillon have assisted professor Lianos with the 
statistical analysis of the data collected on the enforcement activity of the BRICS competition 
authorities in this sector. Ms Averil Campion has assisted professor Lianos with the industry 
analysis parts of the research and contributed to part of these Sections. Mr Justin Lindeboom 
                                                          
17 See, https://www.laws.ucl.ac.uk/event/global-antitrust-brics-style/ . 
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and Ms Christina Kanakari have contributed, together with professor Lianos, to the part of the 
research relating to the concept of superior bargaining power. Mr Lindeboom has also 
contributed to the drafting of sections of Part III, Chapter 1 of the report. Mr Igor Nicolic and 
Mr Riccardo Savona Siemens assisted professor Lianos with the drafting of the legal analysis 
chapter in the Innovation part of the report. Ms Alina Velias helped professor Lianos with the 
data collection and significantly contributed to the conceptualization and drafting of the 
Financialisation Section of the report. 
The research would not have been possible without the funding provided by the HSE 
Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at 
UCL and the Competition Commission of South Africa. Professor Lianos would like to thank 
the Leverhulme Trust for its financial support in particular with regard to replacement teaching 
costs and research assistance. The project aims to present a different perspective on the role of 
economics and social science literature in competition law, and apply it in an important 
economic sector, a theme intrinsically linked to the study of the role of economists and 
economics in competition law that forms part of professor Lianos’ research programme funded 
by the Leverhulme Trust.  
 
Structure of the Report 
 
This draft report is divided in six parts.  
Part I introduces the methodology and the conceptual framework of this study, in particular 
the concepts of “global value chain”, “vertical competition”, “multi-lever competition policy” 
and “polycentric competition law”, which constitute some of the theoretical innovations 
brought by this study.  
Part II engages with a description of the industry structure and of the major economic and 
technological transformations that have marked global food value chains in recent decades. 
This part will be updated and reviewed in order to include additional data and discussion when 
we will dispose of the final decisions of all the BRICS competition authorities on the recent 
seed and agrochem mergers and we have a clearer picture over the new structure of the industry, 
following the most recent merger wave.  
Part III engages with the legal framework. We start by exploring the competition law 
enforcement activity of BRICS competition authorities in general, before turning to the recent 
agrochem and seed mergers, the process of review being still ongoing. Then we turn our 
attention to the concept of superior bargaining power, which we think needs to be 
reconceptualised and be used more systematically, also in competition law enforcement, 
depending on the comparative institutional analysis performed as to the institutional 
capabilities of the various institutions and also other legal fields to deal with instances of 
superior bargaining power. This Section is still a work in progress and needs substantial 
theoretical work, which we hope to complete in the next couple of months. The next Section 
deals with an issue that, we believe, should become center-stage in competition law 
enforcement , in view of the prevalence of common ownership by the same institutional 
investors of the various economic actors at the different segments of the food value chain. We 
consider that this raises important competition law issues that competition authorities need to 
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tackle, not only on the basis of well-accepted theories of harm, such as unilateral effects, 
coordinated effects, vertical foreclosure, but also specific theories of harm focusing on the 
preservation of “vertical competition”. 
Part IV explores the issues raised by the need to adopt competition law enforcement that 
promotes innovation and works in tandem with other legal regimes having a similar objective. 
The first Chapter focuses on the legal framework and explores in more detail the interaction of 
competition law and intellectual property rights. The second Chapter explores the way these 
concerns may play out in assessing mergers, from an innovation perspective. Competition 
authorities increasingly worry about the impact that concentrations might have on innovation. 
Until recently, a common view was that, because of the well-documented “inverted U-shape” 
relationship between innovation and market concentration, mergers were only likely to have 
an adverse effect on innovation if market concentration is already quite high. New cases and 
new economic papers have challenged this orthodoxy, arguing that a refutable presumption 
that mergers lead to less innovation might make for better policy. We review this debate and 
propose a typology of effects to help decide whether or not such a presumption is actually 
warranted. We then apply these principles to the case of mergers in the seed/GM crops industry, 
which is of particular significance for BRICS countries. Finally we present a first illustrative 
empirical exploration of this typology and the economic principles that underlie it by 
examining how previous mergers in the industry have affected the merged parties’ propensity 
to patent in various jurisdictions. Because the economic needs of BRICS countries can be 
distinct, we emphasise not only the effect of mergers on total patent counts but also possible 
effects on the specific areas where research takes place 
Part V includes country reports from the BRICS jurisdictions. We have tried to include in 
these reports information on the legal framework structuring food markets and food value 
chains, not only in the area of competition law, but also other areas of law that exercise an 
important impact on the competitive interactions in this economic sector. We consider that this 
holistic perspective is essential if one is to understand the constraints and challenges faced by 
competition authorities when framing their intervention in food markets. We have a Section 
for each BRICS jurisdictions, starting with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
Part VI delves into a number of case studies of specific food value chains. We have six case 
studies from South Africa (on seeds, fertilisers, animal feed to poultry, dairy, milling and 
retail), one case study from India (GM cotton), and one from Brazil (soybean). These case 
studies provide insightful analysis on the challenges that competition authorities face in 
specific economic sectors and also constitute excellent illustrations of the descriptive and 
operational power of the value chain concept.     
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Chapter 1: Developing tools to deal with the complexity of the food sector 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
The last few decades competition law around the globe has been firmly geared towards the 
paradigm of consumer surplus/welfare as the main analytical framework in assessing alleged 
restrictions of competition. Consumer welfare has traditionally focused on the ability of 
consumers to benefit from lower prices and higher output. Competition authorities have 
developed tools and methodologies in order to assess when business conduct may have 
nefarious effects to consumer welfare/surplus. Different forms of business transactions, such 
as determining its own prices, providing rebates, subjecting the sale of a product to the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different product, or at least agrees he will not 
purchase the product from any other supplier, concluding agreements with other firms for the 
licensing of technology or the definition of a common technical standard, proceeding to a 
merger and acquisition transaction, may fall under competition law scrutiny when there is some 
likelihood that the specific conduct will harm consumer welfare or consumer surplus. This 
assessment is, in principle, done in the context of a relevant market.  
Economists of the neoclassical paradigm defined the market by reference to a single 
seller or buyer and including in it all considerations he/she took into account in determining 
his/her business policies and practices. The market was therefore seen as a group of firms that 
are significant competitors to the single firm in question. This specified even more the classical 
economic notion of market as an “area within which price tends to uniformity, allowance being 
made for transportation costs”18. U.S. economist Jo Bain developed the concept by setting the 
boundaries of the market as relating to the group of products that are not only “identical or 
perfect substitutes” to each other, but also alternatively “close substitute products”, close 
substitutability therefore becoming the general criterion for inclusion in the market19. This 
concept is based on cross-price elasticity of demand. U.S. economist Fritz Machlup added the 
cross price elasticity of supply dimension as a factor for determining market boundaries, noting 
the importance of significant interdependence between the firms included within the boundary 
of the market20.  
The usefulness of the concept of relevant market in order to analyse the effects on 
consumers of specific forms of business conduct has been frequently questionned. Gregory 
Werden comments that “hostility to market delineation was particularly intense from the early 
1930s to the mid-1950s, in view of the perception shared by economists at the time that product 
differentiation enabled each firm to a certain extent to behave as a monopolist on a particular 
market, at least to a certain extent21. However, even to the proponents of the imperfect 
competition school for whom product differentiation could be a source of market power, it was 
                                                          
18 G. Stigler, The Theory of Competitive Price (New York: Macmillan, 1942) p. 92, cited by G. J. Werden, The 
History of Antitrust Market Delineation, (1992) 76(1) Marquette Law Review 123-215, 15. 
19 J. S. Bain, Price Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1952), pp. 24-25 
20 F. Machlup, The Economics of Sellers’ Competition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1952), pp. 
213-214. 
21 G. J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, (1992) 76(1) Marquette Law Review 123-215, 125. 
29 
 
clear that assessing the welfare effects of a conduct at the industry level was not very useful 
and were quick to recognize that “(q)uestions relating to competition, monopoly and oligopoly 
must be considered in terms of markets”22. Most recent salvos against market definition were 
initiated by proponents of a more “direct” form of assessment of marker power23.  
Despite these criticisms, the tool of market definition offers a relatively simple 
analytical framework in order to analyse and, more importantly measure, the effects of a 
restriction of competition on the welfare of consumers (or consumer surplus), in particular with 
regard to the price parameter of competition. Indeed, these effects are almost always assessed 
with regard to their impact on the price mechanism. Conduct restricting rivalry between 
competing undertakings (economic entities) that may lead to higher prices, which could not be 
compensated in the short and medium term by lower prices (or more rarely some other benefit, 
such as higher quality, innovation) may constitute a restriction of competition and lead to 
competition law sanctions and remedies (depending on the competition law system in 
question).  
Although useful, the tool of market definition does not, however, provide a full picture 
of the competitive interactions taking place in a field of economic activity. Competitive 
interactions do not only take place in the context of a market, but may also arise in the context 
of a hierarchy or a network, if one adopts the classic categorisation by Oliver Williamson of 
economic organizations24. It is possible that various departments in the same undertaking may 
compete for resources and attention by the senior management. It is also possible that an 
undertaking member of a distribution network competes not only with other distributors, as to 
the amount of sales/market it can capture and consequently increase its profits, but also with 
its own suppliers as to the share of the joint profit generated by their cooperation.  
Although the analytical framework of the relevant market works generally well in order 
to assess competition between undertakings present at the same market and competing for a 
higher market share (in this market), and the welfare effects of this restriction of competition 
on price and output, it works less well the more one moves away from effects on price to 
consider the effect of such restriction of competition on innovation, variety and consumer 
choice. This study also contends that the concept of relevant market does not offer the proper 
analytical framework to assess the effect of restrictions of “vertical competition” that may be 
of concern for competition authorities in BRICS and other emergent and developing countries 
for reasons that we will explain in the subsequent Sections of this report. Competition 
authorities may not only be interested in assessing the effects of a specific restriction of 
competition on the welfare of the consumers situated in their jurisdiction but they may also 
want to understand how a specific conduct may affect the share of the total surplus value 
                                                          
22 J. Robinson, The Industry and the Market, (1956) 66(262) The Economic Journal 360-361, 361. See also, E. 
Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, (1950) 40 American Economic Review Papers & 
Proceedings 85-92, 86-87 noting that “(i)ndustry’ or ‘commodity’ boundaries are a snare and a delusion – in the 
highest degree arbitrarily drawn, and wherever drawn, establishing at once wholly false implications both as to 
competition of substitutes within their limits, which supposedly stops at their borders, and as to the possibility of 
ruling on the presence or absence of oligopolistic forces by the simple device of counting the number of producers 
included”. 
23 See, inter alia, L. Kaplow, Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive, (2013) 79(1) Antitrust Law 
Journal 361-379  
24 O Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (OUP, 1996). 
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generated by the value chain and captured by the undertakings (producers and distributors), 
consumers and other stakeholders. To the extent that enhancing productivity and promoting 
innovation become important aims for competition law, beyond the traditional focus of 
competition law on allocative efficiency, the last type of assessment becomes particularly 
important.  
Competition law assessment in a globalised world needs to engage with the “global 
value chain revolution” that has been the hallmark of the second phase of globalization 
unleashed by the ICT revolution in the 1990s25. According to Richard Baldwin, a feature of 
this second phase of globalization is the unbundling of the physical location of factories and 
manufacturing from places of consumption, as “radically better communications made it 
possible to coordinate complex activities at distance” and led to a considerable amount of off-
shoring to low-wages nations. This also led to a considerable transfer of marketing, managerial 
and technical know-how redrawing the contours of global industrial competitiveness, as these 
are now defined “by the outlines of international production networks rather than the 
boundaries of nations”26. The food sector has been one of those particularly affected by this 
second phase of globalization, to the extent that for a considerable period of human history, 
production and consumption were situated at the same territory, probably in view of the 
sensitivity of food that is not propice to long transport distances, perishable waste being quite 
important in the food supply chains27, and the high transportation costs. Elites were able to 
benefit from international commerce on food, but the transportation costs and the important 
risk of food waste made it less likely that trans-national commerce of food could reach the 
masses of consumers. The quite important drop in transportation costs since the 19th century 
(and the coresponding increase in transportation capacity), investments in intelligent food 
logistics, and the organization of the food production and distribution along global food value 
chains, controlled by international corporations, either in the form of contractual governance, 
or through Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and ownership, have considerably increased the 
scope of international competition for what was, until recently, a more localised to a defined 
territory set of competitive interactions. One neds therefore new concepts that could account 
for this important paradigm shift. We will first introduce the concept of global value chain, 
before focusing on its disruptive potential in competition law. 
 
1.1.Introducing the Global Value Chain concept in Competition Law and Policy 
 
During the last two decades we have witnessed the emergence of a “new economy” 
driven by important technological changes and the rise of a new kind of infrastructure 
                                                          
25 R. Baldwin, The Great Convergence (Harvard Univ. press, 2016). 
26 Ibid., 6.  
27 J. Gustavsson, C. Cederberg, U. Sonesson, Rv. Otterdijk, A. Meybeck, Global food losses and food waste: 
extent, causes and prevention. In Interpack 2011. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (noting that roughly one-third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted globally, this 
statistict being based on an analysis of the data from the FAO statistical yearbook)’ J. Parfitt, M. Barthel, S. 
Macnaughton, Food waste within food supply chains: quantification and potential for change to 2050, (2010) Phil. 
Trans. R. Soc. B 365, 3065–3081 (noting that average losses vary between 14% and 70% per product); FAO, 
Food Wastage Footprint: Impacts on Natural Resources (2013) available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3347e/i3347e.pdf (estimating food waste to 1.3 billion tons of food globally).  
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technology, the Internet. As sociologist Manuel Castells noted, this economy is global in 
nature, not just international: 
“A global economy is a historically new reality, distinct from a world economy. A 
world economy, that is an economy in which capital accumulation proceeds throughout 
the world, has existed in the West at least since the sixteenth century […] A global 
economy is something different: it is an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in 
real time on a planetary scale”28. 
 This is largely possible because of the organisation of economic production in the context of 
global supply or value chains. GVCs are prevalent in the global economy. As a recent joint 
OECD, WTO and World bank report indicates, “(b)etween 30% and 60% of G20 countries’ 
exports consist of intermediate inputs traded within GVCs”29. Economic production is 
increasingly structured around GVCs, which permit the simultaneous and coordinated 
transnational production and distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of 
the supply chain has to manage effectively, without this involving vertical integration by 
ownership.30  GVCs as typically coordinated by transnational corporations, which manage the 
cross-border trade of production inputs and outputs occurring in the context of their “networks 
of affiliates, contractual partners (in non-equity modes of international production) and arm’s-
length suppliers”31. The global markets of various food commodities are therefore embedded 
in these transnational networks of businesses that expand in both develop and developing 
countries. The image of a global market has therefore to be completed with the analysis of these 
social networks, Kevin Sobel-Read going as far as arguing that “(t)he most important paradigm 
for understanding the global economy, and the political and social relationships that both guide 
it and stem from it, is no longer the template of the market but rather the role of global value 
chains”, corporate action, in the form of global value chains not only driving but also defining, 
and therefore creating, the market32. GVCs do not only concern cross-border trade of product 
inputs (components) and outputs, but may also englobe transfer of technology and know-how, 
and from this perspective are particulalry important for the oerganisation of the generation and 
diffusion of innovation globally.  
Legal scholarship has been trying to analyse this phenomenon, leading even to the 
development of a new legal field, transnational legal studies. But as Kevin Sobel-Read rightly 
notes, 
“(t)he paradigm of the world political economy has shifted dramatically over the past 
twenty years. Legal scholarship, however, lags significantly behind. Existing legal 
scholarship is calibrated to an outdated model that suggests that multinational 
corporations – either individually or through one-to-one supplier relationships – create, 
                                                          
28 M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture – The Rise of the Network Society (Wiley, 
1996), p. 92. 
29 OECD, WTO and World Bank group, Global Value Chains; Challenges, Opportunities and Implications for 
Policy (2014), available at https://www.oecd.org/tad/gvc_report_g20_july_2014.pdf , p. 13. See also UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2013, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf . 
30 K. De Backer and S. Miroudot, Mapping Global Value Chains, European Central Bank, (2014) Working Paper 
Series No. 1677.  
31 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 (UN, 2013), 122. 
32 K. B. Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, (2014) 5(3) Transnational Legal Theory 
364-407, 367. 
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manufacture, and sell a given product. But in today’s world, in what have been termed 
“global value chains,” the research, design, production, and retail of most products take 
place through coordinated chain components that stretch systemically across multiple 
– from a few to a few thousand – firms”33. 
These global value chains (GVCs) are characterised by their “systemic, coordination-
driven nature”, as they rely on various systems of transnational governance and different sorts 
of linkages, some traditional such as contract law, others novel and relying on corporate law, 
property law or some more informal mechanisms34. For instance, “global value chains are 
becoming a primary conduit for the transfer of intellectual property globally”, as “(t)he creators 
of intellectual products are relying less on traditional intellectual property regimes to enable 
them to limit access to their material, and more on a combination of contractual rights and 
technological protections”35.  
Although this concept has so far been used in order to describe the operation of off 
shore expansion and organization of production, which are relevant concerns for public 
authorities involved in the context of industrial policy, we believe that it may be a quite useful 
tool in order to conceptualize the various forms of competitive interaction and the complexity 
of the social structure on which economic transactions in the food sector are embedded. In 
particular, the concept of global value chains calls attention to the process of vertical 
competition, which is as important as that of horizontal competition if one focuses not only on 
economic efficiency, but also on fairness in the allocation of the total surplus value generated 
by cooperation between independent economic actors to the extent that this may have pervasive 
effects on the increase in productivity and performance of the various segments of the value 
chain.  
 
1.1.1. A primer on the Global Value Chain concept 
 
 The GVC approach provides a theoretical framework enabling us to understand how 
the global division and integration of labour in the world economy has evolved over time and, 
more importantly, how the distribution of awards, from the total surplus value, is allocated 
between the various segments of the chain.36 The GVC framework aims to explain how global 
industries are organized by examining the structure and dynamics of different actors involved 
in a given industry. In the words of its initiator, Professor Gary Gereffi, 
“(i)n today’s globalized economy with very complex industry interactions, the GVC 
methodology is a useful tool to trace the shifting patterns of global production, link 
geographically dispersed activities and actors within a single industry, and determine 
the roles they play in developed and developing countries alike. The GVC framework 
focuses on the sequences of value added within an industry, from conception to 
                                                          
33 Ibid., 364. 
34 Ibid, 365. 
35 Ibid, 392. 
36 On the GVC framework and its predecessor Global Commodity Chains, see G. Gereffi and M. Korzienewicz 
(eds.), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Westport: Praeger, 1994); G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. 
Sturgeon, The governance of global value chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78-
104. 
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production and end use. It examines the job descriptions, technologies, standards, 
regulations, products, processes, and markets in specific industries and places, thus 
providing a holistic view of global industries both from the top down and the bottom 
up”37. 
A tool aiming to map the inter-firm networks on a global scale, the GVC approach 
enables the consideration of a number of factors that may influence competitive interactions. 
Although the tool was initially framed so as to help policy-makers to design industrial strategies 
geared towards a greater participation of firms, active in their jurisdiction, to the global 
economy, we think that its descriptive potential is wider than that. By exploring the sequences 
of tangible and intangible value adding activities, “from conception and production to end use”, 
GVC analysis offers a picture of global industries both “from the top-down”, by examining for 
instance “how ‘lead firms ‘govern’ their global-scale affiliate and supplier networks”, but also 
from “the bottom-up”, asking “how these business decisions affect the trajectory of economic 
and social ‘upgrading’ or ‘downgrading’ in specific countries”38.  
This mapping approach examines various dimensions: (i) the input-output structure of 
a GVC, by focusing on the process of transformation of raw materials and factors of inputs of 
production to final products, (ii) the geographic scope of GVCs which explains the degree of 
global dispersion of the chain, (iii) the governance structure of the GVC, which delves into the 
issue of control of the chain, (iv) the upgrading, which describes “the dynamic movement 
within the value chain” and “how producers shift between different stages of the chain”, (v) 
the local (or global) institutional context in which the value chain is embedded, including 
regulation and self-regulation, (vi) industry stakeholders that may be various local (but also 
global) actors of the value chain that interact to achieve industry upgrading. These may not 
only be companies, but also industry associations, workers, educational or research institutions, 
government agencies and ministerial departments. All these actors are involved to a certain 
degree in the operation of the global value chains and influence their development. 
 The starting point for the development of this analytical framework was the growing 
importance of new global buyers (big retail) constituting “buyer-driven global commodity 
chains.” Initially, research in the GVC tradition highlighted the power and important role of 
large retailers, such as Walmart and Tesco, but also successful brand merchandisers and/or 
designers of products or middlemen and facilitators, such as Nike, Reebok, Google etc, in 
“dictating the way the chains operate by requiring suppliers to meet certain standards and 
protocols, despite limited or no production capabilities”39, but also by largely determining “the 
location of high-value activities and the conditions under which other firms participate in 
GVCs”40 and sometimes through forcing un unfair balance of risks to suppliers. In reaction to 
these “buyer driven” commodity chains or GVCs, “producer-driven chains” are more 
vertically integrated along all segments of the supply chain and leverage the technological or 
scale advantages of integrated suppliers and from this perspective are characterised by higher 
                                                          
37 G. Gereffi and K. Fernandez-Stark, Global value Chain Analysis: A Primer (CGGC: 2nd ed., 2016), p. 7. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, p. 10. 
40 OECD, WTO and World Bank Group, Global value Chains: Challenges, Opportunities and Implications for 
Policy (2014), 21. 
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barriers to entry. Classic examples of producer-driven chains are the automobile and 
aeronautical industries, or some parts of the computer industry (e.g. Apple).  
 The framework shares Michael Porter’s emphasis on “value systems” a concept that has 
been used in order to describe a set of inter-firm linkages through which different economic 
actors (and their value chains) are interconnected.41 GVC’s “holistic view” of global industries 
focuses on the governance of the value chain, that is, how some actors can shape the distribution 
of profits and risks in the chain. Taking a political economy perspective, the GVC approach 
explores the way economic actors may maintain or improve (“upgrade”) their position in the 
global value chain, “economic upgrading” being defined as “the process by which economic 
actors—firms and workers— move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in 
GVC.”42 There are different types of upgrading: some relate to the entry in the value chain, 
where firms participate for the first time in national, regional or global value chains, others to 
“end-market upgrading”, firms moving into more sophisticated markets that require 
compliance with new, more rigorous quality standards, or into larger markets that call for 
investments in production scale43. 
 Governance analysis, which aims to identify “the lead firms in the sector, their location, 
how they interact with their supply chain and their sources of influence and power over them”44, 
constitutes an essential step in mapping GVCs. Hence, contrary to traditional neoclassical price 
theory (NPT) analysis, and more in vogue with transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
economics of organization, the GVC approach does not mainly focus on issues of horizontal 
market power and concentration at each segment of the chain, but engages with the vertical 
links between the various actors. However, in contrast to TCE, it aims to understand how and 
whether “lead” actors can capture “value”. Hence, its focus is on the distribution of the value 
generated by the chain, rather than the maximization of the surplus (efficiency) as such. A 
typology of GVC governance structures was elaborated with the aim to describe and explain 
the driving forces for the constitution of global value chains. According to Gereffi et al., there 
are “three key determinants of value chain governance patterns: complexity of transactions, 
codifiability of information; and capability of suppliers.”45 His framework is broader than the 
framework often employed by TCE in order to explain the prevalence of certain forms of 
organization (hierarchy versus the market system), as the latter focuses only on the 
determinants of asset specificity and the frequency of the transactions as the driving forces for 
organizational choice.46  
                                                          
41 M. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance (New York: Free Press, 
1985). 
42 G. Gereffi, Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world, (2014) 21(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 9-37, 18. 
43 G. Gereffi and K. Fernandez-Stark, Global value Chain Analysis: A Primer (CGGC: 2nd ed., 2016), p. 12. 
44 Ibid, p. 10. 
45 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of 
International Political Economy 78-104, 84. 
46 In a nutshell, the more there is asset specificity and the interaction is long-term, the more it is justifiable to 
invest resources in order to build a hierarchy form of organization. 
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 The GVC framework draws inspiration from the resource-based or competences-based 
view of the firm,47 according to which firms as path-dependent entities characterised by 
heterogeneous competence bases and operating under conditions of genuine uncertainty, their 
existence being justified by the development of productive competencies and learning for a 
specific cognitive community that forms the firm’s core. Contrary to what TCE predicts, firms 
will not necessarily develop specific capabilities and learning in order to engage in certain 
value activities, because, for instance, of economies of scale and the frequency of transactions, 
as they may be unable to develop the capabilities which are necessary for them to participate 
in certain value chain activities; they will be thus obliged to appeal to external resources.48 In 
contrast to the contract theory of the firm, pioneered by TCE, the competence-base view of the 
firm enquires into the sources of the competitive advantage and the path-dependent process of 
accumulation of such capabilities. Although the GVC framework adopts the markets and 
hierarchy categories of TCE, it perceives them as part of a continuum, the network category, 
which it then analyses as three distinct types of governance regime.  The three variables 
mentioned above (complexity, codifiability and capabaility) act as parameters in predicting 
how the value chain governance shifts in different situations.  
In a nutshell, the GVC framework advances the following five governance categories: 
• Markets where the costs of switching to new partners is very low. These “arms-length 
exchanges” require little or no cooperation between the actors, hence explaining the 
low switching costs. Here, “(t)he central governance mechanism is price rather than a 
powerful lead firm”49. 
• Modular value chains where suppliers make products to a customer’s specifications, 
without however making transaction-specific investments that will generate a situation 
of mutual dependence or just dependence. Modular governance occurs when complex 
transactions can be easily codified. This keeps switching costs relatively low as 
transaction-specific investments are limited. However, “linkages (or relationships) are 
more substantial than in simple markets because of the high volume of information 
flowing across the inter-firm link”50. 
• Relational value chains where complex interactions between buyers and sellers often 
create mutual dependence and high levels of asset specificity. This merely occurs if 
buyers and sellers rely on complex information that may not be easily transmitted or 
learned, leading to more frequent interaction, information exchange and knowledge 
sharing between parties. These relations require a high degree of trust between business 
partners that needs to be built over a significant period of time. This makes switching 
to a new partner relatively difficult, the company having invested considerable 
resources on the specifications of the specific value chain to which it has so far 
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International Political Economy 78-104, 81. 
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participated to. These value chains are more frequently used by suppliers of 
differentiated products based on quality, geographic origin, or some other unique 
characteristics51. 
• Captive value chains where relatively small suppliers face significant switching costs 
and are “captive” to large buyers, such networks being characterized by a high degree 
of monitoring and control by lead firms. These networks are characterized by power 
asymmetry between the parties, which forces thick ties and high switching costs. Lad 
firms will usually tend to have competence in areas outside of production. 
• Hierarchy which denotes situations of vertical integration with the exercise of 
managerial control, lead firms developing and manufacturing products in-house.52 This 
is usually the case when product specifications cannot be codified, products are 
complex or highly competent suppliers cannot be found53. 
The operation of the key determinants of global value chain governance is described in the 
following table. 
 
Table 1: Governance types in GVC 
 
Governance 
type 
Complexity of 
transactions 
Ability to 
codify 
transactions 
Capabilities in 
the supply-base 
Degree of 
explicit 
coordination 
and power 
asymmetry 
Market Low High High Low 
Modular High High High  
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low High 
 
Source: G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon  (2005)54 
 
 Of particular interest for the purposes of competition law is the category of captive and 
relational value chains where power is exercised by “lead firms”. For instance, these may be 
modern retailers and supermarkets controlling the agri-food chain, linking daily groceries’ 
consumers with small farmers around the world. In this context, supplier’s capabilities are 
relatively low, the complexity of product specifications being high and amenable to 
codification. In the face of complex products and specifications, the “lead” firms have 
important incentives and abilities to intervene and to control the chain, thus building up 
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transactional dependence and locking in suppliers. The latter are confined to a narrow set of 
tasks (for instance, provide raw products or simple assembly) and are dependent on the “lead 
firm” for complementary value adding activities, such as branding, marketing, 
commercialisation, advertising. As a consequence of this configuration, “lead firms” are able 
to reap the overwhelming part of the total surplus-value of the chain. In the context of relational 
value chains, the power balance between retailers and suppliers is more symmetrical, as 
suppliers' capabilities are high, thus each firm is contributing key competencies leading to a 
situation of mutual dependence. Trust rather than power may constitute in this case the main 
mechanism of coordination of the value chain and eventually the allocation of the total surplus 
value of the chain may appear more symmetric.  
 This classification of various forms of organization of the value chain highlights the 
importance of conducting a careful analysis of the power relations along the supply chain, the 
aim being to unveil value extraction bottlenecks affecting the distribution of the total surplus 
value.55 This analysis cannot be undertaken by the traditional NPT framework which mainly 
focuses on horizontal competition and its effects on consumers or total welfare and assesses 
the competitive interactions between firms within a specific relevant market. In contrast, the 
GVC perspective has a distributive focus and may be particularly helpful if one aims to 
understand real business strategies and how the design of the value chain may determine who 
profits from the collective innovation and other surplus value generated, the inter-country 
distribution of the total surplus value, in the case of transnational networks, if one takes a 
political economy perspective, and more broadly the impact of value extraction bottlenecks on 
the competitive process, the latter concept being intrinsically linked to an evolutionary 
perspective on economic change. GVC analysis may question the mechanistic view of the 
countervailing bargaining theory argument, claiming, for instance, that the consolidation and 
increasing concentration at the supplier level may curtail the rising power of retailers, by 
emphasizing the risk of the development of “bilateral oligopolies” of consolidated producers 
and retailers and subsequently of double marginalisation that may harm consumers and the 
competitive process.56 
 We consider that such an approach is particularly helpful. Not uniquely in the context 
of global value chains affecting developing or emergent economies57, which is a topic that has 
attracted some attention, if one wants to promote a political economy framework that will 
enable local firms to participate to global value chains and thus to “upgrade” existing 
capabilities and to create “domestic” added value, but also in the context of a developed 
countries’ club, such as the EU. Indeed, it becomes easy to observe a large heterogeneity of 
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productive capabilities between the North and the South/Eastern part of the Continent and the 
establishment of value chains with “lead” firms (mostly based in the Northern part of Europe) 
extracting an important share of the total surplus value produced. Article 3(3) of Regulation 
1/2003 offers some policy space by explicitly authorizing Member States to adopt and apply 
provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued 
by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, for instance, legislation that “prohibits undertakings from 
imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from them terms and 
conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate or without consideration.”58 
 
1.1.2. Vertical competition 
 
The concept of global value chains has been employed by economic sociologists and business 
economists with the aim to describe the way trade flows are organized in the modern economy 
and to guide the action of public authorities eager to upgrade the productive activities in their 
jurisdiction to higher added activities. This is not what is sought by the use of this concept in 
competition law. The aim here is different: it consists in emphasising the importance of vertical 
competition in the process of producing and distributing products for end-consumers. We 
consider that focusing on horizontal competition in the context of a relevant market and with 
regard to substitutable goods and services only tells part of the story about competitive 
interactions, as the undertakings’ incentives and strategy and that of their management is often 
influenced even more significantly by the constraints imposed by the vertical competition that 
opposes it to other undertakings in each value chain with the aim to attract the higher percentage 
of the total surplus value generated by the value chain. This “surplus value” may result from 
sales in various relevant markets in the various segments of the value chain, the use of inputs 
for the in-house production and sale of outputs when this process of transformation adds value, 
or value generated by the presence of the various undertakings in financial markets, where 
specific decisions are made by investors as to the market value of a company, on the basis of 
expectations about future returns on investment.  We will explore this competition for capital 
which is an important characteristic of the modern financialised economy, often ignored by 
competition law, in Section 1.1.3.3. 
Firms operating in each of the layers of a value chain face an important dilemma: they 
want to maximise their market power, as this will enable them to increase their profits, to the 
extent that they are able to charge higher prices to consumers in their segment of the value 
chain, but their ability to do so may be limited by the need to take into account the effect that 
this price increase may have on the overall competitive position of the value chain they are 
participating to, as increasing prices at one segment of the chain may hurt other firms operating 
in other parts of the chain, which may then react and increase prices as well, should they have 
the ability to do so without taking into account the joint interest of the various companies 
members to the value chain. Hence, a winning strategy may be to increase competition in other 
parts of the chain by promoting entry and fragmenting supply, while maintaining their 
monopoly position in their segment of the chain, or to cooperate with other monopolised 
                                                          
58 Recital 9 and Article 3(3) of Regulation 1/2003. 
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segments of the value chain, thus sharing between them the profits arising out of the joint 
activities of the chain (co-opetition or the so called frenemies situation). 
 
Figure 1: A general view of the Food Value Chain 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 It becomes clear that intervention, or non-intervention, at one segment of the vertical value 
chain may lead to adverse unintended consequences at other parts of the chain. It becomes 
therefore necessary to internalize the complexity of the value chain as an integral part of the 
overall economic and legal context, and avoid any localized silo-based competition law 
assessment of a particular segment that would only take into account horizontal competition 
and not vertical competition.  
The Global Value Chain approach enables competition authorities to focus not only on 
issues of horizontal market power and concentration at each segment of the chain, but also to 
engage with the vertical links between the various actors with the aim to understand how and 
whether “lead” actors can capture value. Competition authorities may therefore focus on the 
distribution of the surplus value generated by the chain, rather than just on the maximization 
of the surplus (economic efficiency) as such. This may be important, should fairness, inequality 
or distributive justice considerations constitute an important aim to be pursued by competition 
law59. Focusing on pecuniary externalities, that is the creation of third-party eﬂects through 
changes in relative prices may be irrelevant if one focuses on economic efficiency (which takes 
into account only technological externalities) and assumes away distributive justice concerns, 
on the basis of the existence of possible transfers (through progressive taxation, subsidies etc) 
                                                          
59 On a more detailed analysis of the role of different forms of inequality in competition law, see I. Lianos, The 
Poverty of Competition Law, CLES Research paper series 2/2018. 
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that may mitigate these effects, according to the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics60. It is thought that these pecuniary externalities should be left to the political 
process to sort out. However, one may not assume that this is always the case in reality, as it 
might be that the political process does not function well in the sense of taking seriously into 
account the compensation of losers, or that the State in question cannot afford the transfer of 
the appropriate level of resources to compensate the losers, in particular as those that benefit 
from the restrictions of competition may be outside the reach of its tax authorities and there is 
an inter-jurisdictional transfer of wealth. Hence, it is possible that the source of these pecuniary 
externalities could be better dealt with by competition law. It may also be possible, in particular 
in jurisdictions with weak institutions and quite significant wealth disparities, that the resource 
misallocations that may result, should these pecuniary externalities be taken into consideration 
by competition law, could be less severe than those generated  by the transfers that would be 
required to ensure the specific fairness objectives pursued by the specific jurisdiction 
Transfers may become a permanent feature of the specific political economy, with 
serious effects as to the incentives of the various economic actors. In the long run it may also 
be more efficient to deal directly through the tool of competition law with the structural position 
of the lead firms that led to the structural weakness of these economic actors at the first place, 
rather than delegate the task to wealth transfers decided by the political process, in particular 
if the later has proven so far ineffective to deal with the “losers”. One may not also exclude the 
costs of political turmoil in the presence of a widespread perception by the public opinion and 
the participants to the value chain that they do not have equal opportunities to benefit from the 
joint surplus of the value chain, generated by the increased amount of trade made possible by 
this coordination of economic activity at the global scale through these value chains (equality 
of opportunity). 
 It may not also be excluded that the allocation of the total surplus value of the chain 
may have important implications on the investment and innovation incentives of the various 
segments of the value chain, but also more generally affect those of the overall global value 
chain. It has become quite uncontroversial to examine the distribution of financial value from 
innovation in the global supply chains, precisely because innovation needs to be nurtured by 
the development of technological capabilities across the various segments of the value chain 
and subsequent levels of investment by the various economic actors61. Independent actors 
pursuing different avenues of innovation through the constitution of R&D poles may also 
enhance the likelihood that innovation will be successfully diffused to farmers and the rest of 
the economy. The economic effects of a significantly higher extraction capacity at one level of 
the chain, because of the presence of a lead firm, may also have negative effects on growth, as 
                                                          
60 See, M. Blaug, ‘The Fundamental Theorems of Modern Welfare Economics, Historically Contemplated’, 
(2007) History of Political Economy 39(2) 185-207 :  
“The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and firms are selfish 
price takers. Then a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.  
The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics: Assume that all individuals and producers are 
selfish price takers. Then almost any Pareto optimal equilibrium can be supported via the competitive 
mechanism, provided appropriate lump sum taxes and transfers are imposed on individuals and firms” 
61 See, J. Dedrick, K. L. Kraemer & G. Linden, Who profits from innovation in global value chains?: a study of 
the iPod and notebook PCs, (2010) 19(1) Industrial and Corporate Change, 81-116, (examining the allocation of 
the profits of iPods and notebook computers value chain and the role of bargaining power in this context).  
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this could lead to inequalities in the distribution of innovation income62. These may be expected 
if the other economic actors involved in the value chain, in particular small holders and small 
and medium undertakings (SMEs), see their margins squeezed by the restriction of vertical 
competition. The role of SMEs in the development of innovative activity is quite important. 
It is frequently argued that lead firms have a special responsibility to organize 
innovative activity when strategically designing their value chains and that they have the 
incentive and the ability to use strategies in order to “encourage and enable their supplying 
farmers to adopt technologies that meet the firms’ needs (product attributes, transaction 
specifications, and so on), and their use of contracts to both enforce the requirements and 
include provisions for inputs and services for farmers to adopt the needed technologies (and 
commercial practices)”63. Relying on a Schumpeterian approach, these studies argue that the 
“the implementation of innovations leads to non-competitive behaviour or market structure” 
and that policy makers should be flexible and develop “a degree of tolerance to non-
competitive behaviour associated with implementing new innovations” as “(i)mplementation 
of policies that aim to preserve competitive market structures may diminish the innovative 
spirit”64. “Interlinked contracting” or outright vertical integration between farmers, processors 
and/or technology firms enable technology transfers and finance provision to occur, while 
preserving investors from situations of ex post opportunism and hold up. Hence, value chains 
operate as “engines for technological adoption” in the presence of imperfect credit markets and 
access to finance, the existence of important relation specific investments, in particular for the 
adoption of firm-specific technologies and in the presence of weak institutions of contract 
enforcement65.  
These studies assume that lead firms will have the incentive to organize the diffusion of 
innovation along the various segments of the value chain. This may be true under specific 
circumstances, where there is competition between various value chains, and the switching 
costs of the various suppliers to other value chains are not prohibitive, although it is also argued 
that when competition is very strong this may affect contract enforcement, and consequently 
impact on innovation incentives66. The underlying assumption is that market size constitutes a 
major determinant of innovation incentives and the amount and type of technological change, 
a classic feature in Schumpeterian approaches to innovation. As Aghion and Howitt put it, 
when exploring whether market competition is good or bad for growth, “(t)he Schumpeterian 
answer to this question, appears to be one- sided: to the extend that monopoly rent is what 
                                                          
62 See, E. Dabla-Norris, K. Kochhar, N. Suphaphiphat, F. Ricka, E. Tsounta, Causes and Consequences of Income 
Inequality: A Global Perspective (IMF, June 2015), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf . 
63 T. Reardon, L. Lu & D. Zilberman, Links among innovation, food system transformation, and technology 
adoption, with implications for food policy: Overview of a special issue, Food Policy (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.10.003  . 
64 D. Zilberman, L. Lu & T. Reardon, Innovation-induced food supply chain design, Food Policy (2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/jfoodpol.2017.03.010  
65 J. Swinnen & R. Kuijpers, Value chain innovations for technology transfer in developing and emerging 
economies: Conceptual issues, typology, and policy implications, Food Policy (2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.07.013  
66 J.F.M. Swinnen, A. Vandeplas & M. Maertens, Liberalization, Endogeneous institutions, and growth: a 
comparative analysis of agricultural reforms in Africa, Asia, and Europe, (2010) 24(3) World Bank Econ. Rev. 
412-445. 
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induces firms to innovate and thereby makes the economy grow, product market competition 
can only be detrimental to growth67. However, empirical works by Nickell, Blundell, Griffith 
& Van Reenen, among others, point to a positive correlation between product market 
competition (as measured either by the number of competitors in the same industry or by the 
inverse of a market or profitability index) and productivity growth within a firm or industry68. 
In a competitive environment firms innovate in order to survive (the so called “Darwinian 
view”)69. 
One may further advance that lead firms may undertake strategic investments (in 
technological innovations such as enhanced traceability, brand building, or product 
differentiation) to make their products more attractive. If the incentives for these endogenous 
sunk costs are sufficient, then it is possible that industry structure remains concentrated even 
in the presence of a substantial increase of demand and output 70. Hence, high concentration in 
these markets may persist because of the fact that firms in the industry decide to incur, in 
addition to the exogenous sunk costs which are costs that any firm will have to incur upon entry 
into the market, endogenous fixed sunk costs (.e.g. advertising, R&D, process innovations), 
with the aim to increase their price-cost margin. Sutton shows that the size of these endogenous 
sunk costs does not depend on the level of output and that as market size grows and demand 
increases in industries with significant endogenous sunk costs, there will be “a lower bound to 
industry concentration” and an increase in sales may cause the number of firms to shrink.  The 
reason provided for this is that all firms will invest in endogenous sunk costs and in the long 
run this investment will produce little or no profit in view of the fact that the competitive 
advantage gained by each firm’s investment will be largely ineffective if all other firms may 
do the same investment. Industry profitability may fall in the long term in such expanding 
market if the additional profit gained from the increased volume of sales is exceeded by the 
increase in investment in exogenous sunk costs. Consequently, there will be less entrants in the 
market and more concentration. Sunk, fixed R&D investments can jointly determine both the 
levels of concentration and innovation activity. 
It becomes therefore important to analyze whether the consolidation of the inputs of 
production food sector is consistent with an endogenous sunk costs framework. There have 
been various studies undertaken within the endogenous sunk costs framework in this sector. 
Oehmke, Wolf, and Raper show an endogenous, cyclical relationship between industry 
concentration and R&D intensity71. Magnier, Kalaitzandonakes, and Miller described the 
decreasing product life cycles associated with increasing innovation in corn seed72, while 
                                                          
67 P. Aghion Philippe & P. Howitt, Endogenous Growth Theory (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998), 305. 
68 R. Blundell, R. Griffith & J. Van Reenen, Dynamic Count Data Models of Technological Innovation (1995) 
105 (429)  Economic Journal 333;  S. Nickell, Competition and Corporate Performance, 104(4)  Journal of 
Political Economy 724. 
69 M. Porter The Competitive Advantage of Nations, (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
70 J. Sutton, Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of 
Concentration, (MIT Press, 1991). 
71 J. Oehmke,  C. Wolf, & K. Raper, On Cyclical Industry Evolution in Agricultural Biotechnology R&D, (2005) 
3(2) Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, https://doi.org/10.2202/1542-0485.1107 . 
72 A. Magnier, N. Kalaitzandonakes & D.J. Miller, Product Life Cycles and Innovation in the US Seed Corn 
Industry, (2010) 13(3) International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, available at 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/93557/2/2.pdf . 
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Kalaitzandonakes and Bjornson explained the endogenous relationship between firm 
innovation strategies, including complementary intellectual assets, and industry consolidation 
characteristics73. Fulton and Giannakas74 claimed that R&D expenses to obtain regulatory 
approvals should be considered as sunk costs. Sunk costs potentially prevent new entrants to 
enter a market niche. Taking an endogenous sunk costs approach, Anderson and Sheldon’s 
research supports the hypothesis that the GM corn, cotton, and soybean seed markets are 
characterized by endogenous fixed costs to R&D with the theoretical lower bounds to R&D 
concentration ranging from 54.8% for corn, 47.3% for cotton, and 78.6% for soybeans75. They 
find that in the markets for GM corn, cotton, and soybean seeds endogenous R&D investments 
are mainly responsible for the rising levels of concentration. The authors find little to no 
evidence that accounting for mergers and acquisitions significantly increases the lower bound 
to R&D concentration. 
However, this research does not account for the possibility that innovation may come 
from within the various segments of the existing value chain, and that lead firms may behave 
strategically and block new avenues of innovation that may challenge their strong structural 
positioning and the share of the total surplus value they are able to extract from the value chain 
(vertical innovation competition)76.Vertical innovation competition constitutes to a certain 
extent one of the most frequent ways entrenched dominant positions resulting from the control 
of general purpose technologies (GPTs) may come to an end. Going back to the history of the 
GPT of individual productivity computing, the industry was for a long time dominated by a 
hardware manufacturer, IBM initially manufacturing mainframes before moving to the 
production of personal computer77. In this process, IBM contracted with a software firm, 
Microsoft, delegating to it the task to come up with an operating system for PCs. Microsoft 
came to appreciate the importance of the computer’s operating system, which was akin to its 
nervous system as it does the logistical work that allows the central processing unit to compute: 
shifting from program to programme, allocating storage to files, moving data to and from 
modems and disk drives and printers. In order to understand the operating system, of course 
one needs to have access to the source code. Microsoft concluded a non-exclusive contract with 
IBM for the operating system of IBM PCs (the DOS operating system), maintaining the ability 
                                                          
73 N. Kalaitzandonakes & B. Bjornson ‘Vertical and Horizontal Coordination in the Agro-biotechnology Industry: 
Evidence and Implications’, (1997) 29(1) Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 129-39. 
74 M. Fulton & K.Giannakas. Agricultural biotechnology and industry structure. AgBioForum 4(2), 2001. pp. 137–
151. 
75 B.C. Anderson & I.M. Sheldon, R&D Concentration under Endogenous Fixed Costs: Evidence from the 
Agricultural Biotechnology Industry (mimeo, 2015) 
76 To a certain extent, these various possibility theorems are common to all forms of vertical integration in the 
presence of a concentrated market structure: see T. Bresnahan & J. Levin, Vertical Integration and Market 
Structure, NBER Working Paper No. 17889, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17889  
77 See, T. Bresnahan & S. Greenstein, Technological Competition and the Structure of the Computer Industry, 
Working Paper 1997, available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.598.252&rep=rep1&type=pdf 33 (noting that “(t)he 
simple framework [of contractual theories of vertical integration on the basis of transaction cost economics or 
property rights approaches] suggests a relationship between horizontal concentration and vertical integration that 
is driven by efficiency considerations --- the size of scale economies relative to the size of the market. What it 
neglects is the possibility that firms might make strategic efforts to limit competition.  An industry can be very 
concentrated and feature considerable market power because of scale economies or because business strategy 
limits the number of active firms, for instance by affecting the potential for entry”. 
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to sell DOS to other companies. This would eventually make Microsoft's MS-DOS the standard 
and set the stage not only for Microsoft becoming the leading PC software company, as it 
provided Microsoft the rights to sell DOS for other machines, but also to end up as the lead 
firm in the PC value chain for years, as hardware (PCs) was increasingly commoditized and 
subject to intense international competition. To the extent that the operating system and 
software became the most valuable “commodity” in the PC value chain, Microsoft replaced 
IBM as the lead firm in this value chain, and this guaranteed the considerable profits and high 
rates of return Microsoft made during the first two decades of the individual computer industry. 
With the exception of the integrated model followed by Apple, which tightly integrated 
software and hardware with the aim to ensure control of the user experience end to end, all 
other hardware producers saw a decreasing percentage of the total surplus value generated by 
the PC value chain78. 
Economic theory accepts that “a market form of organization may have considerable 
value when there is substantial uncertainty about the optimal direction of technical progress, or 
about the source of that progress”79. Although there are important benefits in the coordination 
of innovative activity, it is possible that potential inventors may have different views about the 
appropriate direction of innovation on the basis of their private information, thus making it 
worthwhile to enhance vertical competition as a source of innovation variety, in particular if 
the sector is already highly concentrated. 
Of course, in order to become of interest for competition law intervention, restrictions 
of vertical competition need to be pervasive and not temporary, and should lead to significant 
pecuniary externalities, at least in the medium term. There should also be a high possibility that 
these may be converted to strong structural positions in other value chains in which the lead 
firm may be involved, thus renewing the cycle of total surplus value capture. The aim of 
competition law is not to micro-manage the allocation of profits between the various segments 
of the value chain but to ensure that the basics of vertical competition are sound and that there 
is no entrenched superior bargaining power situation that may lead to misallocation of 
resources in the medium and long term.  
Competition is not also the only tool available in order to ensure the right degree of 
vertical competition. In the context of the food supply chain, various legal tools may be used 
to ensure this, such as provisions of contract law on superior bargaining power, limits to 
appropriability of intellectual property rights on which lad firms may rely to exercise 
bargaining power, such as laws ensuring access to seeds, price regulation. The optimal choice 
among these tools is not fixed and may depend on the remedies each of them provides, the 
capabilities of the specific institutions to assess restrictions of vertical competition and more 
generally the political economy of the specific jurisdiction.  
 
                                                          
78 J. Dedrick, K. L. Kraemer & G. Linden, Who profits from innovation in global value chains?: a study of the 
iPod and notebook PCs, (2010) 19(1) Industrial and Corporate Change, 81-116, (noting that “that Apple has 
captured a great deal of value from the innovation embodied in the iPod, while notebook makers capture a more 
modest share of the value from PC innovation”). 
79 T. Bresnahan & J. Levin, Vertical Integration and Market Structure, NBER Working Paper No. 17889, available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17889 38. 
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1.1.3. A Disruptive Concept in Competition Law? 
 
With some exceptions GVCs have not been explored systematically by competition law 
scholars80. The concept offers an important descriptive and analytical potential. The most 
obvious one relates to the transnational dimension it brings forward, calling for a “transnational 
coordination” between “destination states” and “producer states”, this coordination being 
pursued at global, regional or bilateral levels81. The concept may provide a wider and much 
needed canvass in order to better conceptualize issues emerging in the enforcement of more 
than 130 competition laws now in a globalized economy.  
We turn to the normative potential of the concept. The concept may accommodate a re-
focus of competition law from a unitary emphasis on consumer welfare to include other 
considerations, such as improving productivity and eventually pursuing other broader public 
interest considerations, to the extent their realisation may be affected by the restriction of 
competition. It could form part of a competition policy that is not only aimed at market fixing 
but also market shaping, this being crucial in the context of emergent economies, such as the 
BRICS. We also think that it has the potential to put forward a more holistic picture of 
competitive interactions, englobing the important but often ignored by mainstream competition 
law analysis, competition on attracting capital investment, which is particularly significant in 
the era of financialisation.  The concept may require going beyond the assessment of price 
competition and the use of the “traditional” concepts of market definition and market power. 
In essence, we believe it may have the same transformative potential as the concept of multi-
sided markets, although it might play out differently, as it may renew the focus of competition 
law on vertical market power and vertical competition 
More specifically, by bringing the focus back to governance and power within the value 
chains, we believe that the concept of GVC may potentially alter the direction of competition 
policy towards vertical contractual restraints, and break with the quasi-forbearance regime this 
category of restraints benefits from, in the absence of a prima facie indication of horizontal 
market power. This may imply a renewed interest for theories of “relational market power” or 
“superior bargaining power” in competition law enforcement (see our analysis in Part III, 
Chapter 3). The holistic perspective that the GVC methodology offers for conceptualizing 
competitive interactions and the social context to which these are embedded may also provide 
competition authorities a more complete picture of the way restrictions of horizontal and/or 
vertical competition may affect the structural position of various economic actors and could 
also endanger the realisation of various public interest objectives, beyond consumer 
welfare/surplus. 
                                                          
80 See, I. Lianos and C. Lombardi, Superior Bargaining Power and the Global Food Value Chain: The Wuthering 
Heights of Holistic Competition Law?, Concurrences I-2016 22-35; D. Gerber, Competition Law and Global 
Supply Chains, (2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2807154; I. Lianos, Global Value Chains 
and Competition Law, (2017) CLES Research Paper Series 3/2017; D. Davis, R. Kalpinsky and M. Morris, Rents, 
Power and Governance in Global Value Chains, in I. Lianos, A. Ivanov and D. Davis (eds.), Global Food Value 
Chains and Competition Law (forth. 2017). 
81 D. Gerber, Competition Law and Global Supply Chains, (2016). Available at SSRN: 
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1.1.3.1.The received view on vertical integration/quasi-integration 
 
It is well accepted in Industrial Organization (IO) theory that vertical control may take 
different forms, going from a rigid mechanism of control within a hierarchy (vertical 
integration), which is based on control through the exercise of power, to more loose forms of 
coordination of economic activity (vertical control through contractual arrangements)82 and 
‘take it or leave-it exchange’, that are only based on trust, rather than a binding commitment.83  
 
Hierarchy                                                 Market 
Vertical Integration Quasi-integration Vertical 
contractual 
arrangements 
(vertical 
cooperation) 
Take-it-or-
leave-it 
exchange 
 
There might be different reasons explaining the choice between vertical integration and 
vertical contractual arrangements. The starting point is transaction costs economics (TCE), in 
particular the work of Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and Paul Joskow84. According to TCE, 
the coordination of economic activities may take place either through the market or through 
some form of hierarchical control imposed by the entrepreneur within the boundaries of a 
hierarchy. One of the main reasons for incurring the costs of organization within a hierarchy 
are the costs that are imposed by employing the market mechanism, due to a number of market 
imperfections, such as the absence of perfect information that would enable the economic 
operator to select the best available partner (as an example of transaction costs).85 The 
governance of these costly (if one uses the market mechanism) transactions would require 
either the constitution of a hierarchical organisation under the control of the entrepreneur, who 
will integrate these activities in its existing hierarchy, or the selection of (independent) partners, 
their relation being managed by (long-term) contractual arrangements. Relying on vertical 
control, instead of the pure market exchange mechanism, may also be explained by the bounded 
rationality of economic agents. US economist Herbert Simon once explained that ‘it is only 
                                                          
82M. K. Perry, Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig (eds.), 
Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol 1, Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1989) p. 183, 186. A vertical 
control ‘arises from a contract between two firms at different stages which transfers control of some, but not all, 
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each set by one firm or the other’. The distinction between power and trust as the defining characteristic of the 
opposition between hierarchy and market is inspired by N. Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979). 
84 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, (1937) 16(4) Economica 386; O. Williamson, The Economic Institutions 
of Capitalism (Free Press, 1985); P. Joskow, The New Institutional Economics: Alternative Approaches, (1995) 
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Chapter 2. 
85 E.G. Furubont and R Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory-The Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics (The Univ. of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999) 
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because individual human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that 
organizations are useful investments for the achievement of human purpose’.86  
Transaction costs economics and the bounded rationality of economic agents explain 
the constitution of different forms of organization of economic activity promoting efficiency-
enhancing collaboration. One option is to vertically integrate, in order to achieve a durable 
integration of the assets of different economic agents. Another option would be to put in place 
a flexible form of coordination that avoids any risk of opportunistic behaviour by the agents.  
In some cases, the realization of the objectives of the economic agents will require the 
elaboration of a long term agreement. A long term agreement may create a risk of opportunism 
as each party will commit some specific assets necessary for the completion of the common 
objective (“asset specificity”) and will thus incur a sunk cost, that is, a cost that could not be 
recovered if the company exited the market. Whenever a firm has to make an investment in 
something that has no other equally valuable use, it needs contractual protection from 
opportunistic behaviour by its suppliers. The costs sunk in the investment create an inequality 
in bargaining power and hence allow unilateral appropriation of the benefit of that investment 
(“hold up”) unless the investor protects himself by a contract that is enforceable. This is a major 
justification for imposing contractual vertical control. There are different tools ensuring 
vertical control in relations of vertical cooperation. These arrangements may impose ‘vertical 
restraints’, that is, ‘agreements and contractual provisions between vertically related firms’.87  
Markets and Hierarchies are not distinct concepts but different poles of a continuum. 
This led Williamson to introduce a third category in his taxonomy, falling between Markets 
and Hierarchies, for organizational forms that do not correspond to the characteristics of those 
two forms. He called this category ‘Hybrids’.88 This term, still highly imprecise, covers a 
variety of organizational forms, such as alliances, collective trademarks, networks, partnerships 
and relational contracts89 which do not institute hierarchies, as each of the participants retains 
its autonomy, and do not institute markets, as there are formal or informal mechanisms that are 
set in order to facilitate a long-term coordination and cooperation between the different entities 
forming the hybrid.90 
According to Williamson, each of these organizational forms presents different 
characteristics and is supported by different forms of contract law.91 The identity of the parties 
is irrelevant in transactions in spot markets and the price mechanism is the only way to allocate 
tasks and rights of control. However, it becomes an important element if the transaction 
involves specific investments, since its long duration creates uncertainty regarding the ex post 
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sharing of joint profits, which induces the risk of opportunistic behaviour from the parties. 
Because of the difficulty of considering ex ante all the possible ‘consequential disturbances’ 
that may happen in the future, the contract will inevitably be incomplete.92 ‘Long term 
incomplete contracts require special adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment and restore 
efficiency when beset by unanticipated disturbances’.93 Although these adaptive mechanisms 
perfect the contract between the parties at the same time, they impose important restrictions on 
their autonomy in the market. If the specific investments are important and there is an important 
risk of opportunism, the transaction costs will be important and a hierarchy will emerge. 
Economic literature has relied on the transaction costs framework in order to analyse 
agricultural supply chains94. 
Property rights theories of the firm acknowledge the importance of vertical restraints as 
control mechanisms for complementary assets95, even in the absence of asset specificity. As 
Hart pointed out, 
‘in a world of transaction costs and incomplete contracts, ex post residual rights of 
control will be important because through their influence in asset usage, they will affect 
ex post bargaining power and the division of ex post surplus in a relationship’, division 
which will, in turn, ‘affect the incentives of actors to invest in that relationship’.96 
The degree of control (ownership versus contractual commitment) will of course 
depend on a number of variables. 
For the proponents of TCE, the legal regime should take account of the specificities of 
each of these forms of organization and the existence of transaction costs that would justify a 
more integrated form of control and coordination between the parties to the transaction. 
Accordingly, the law applicable to the internal organization of the firm or hierarchy should be 
forbearance. Williamson explains 
‘whereas courts routinely grant standing to contracts between firms should there be 
disputes over prices, the damages to be ascribed to delays, failures of quality, and the 
like, the courts have the good sense to refuse to hear disputes between one internal 
division and another over identical technical issues. Access to the courts being denied, 
the parties must resolve their differences internally, which is to say that the firm 
becomes its own court of ultimate appeal’.97 
There are two reasons that mainly justify the law of forbearance: 
‘(1) parties to an internal dispute have deep knowledge – both about the circumstances 
surrounding a dispute as well as the efficiency properties of alternative solutions – that 
                                                          
92O. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, (1991) 
36 Administrative Science Quarterly 269-296, 271. 
93O. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 96. 
94 See, for instance, J.E. Hobbs, Measuring the importance of transaction costs in cattle marketing, (1997) 79(4) 
Am. J. Agr. Econ. 1083-1095; R.E. Goodhue, Broiler production contracts as a multi-agent problem: common 
risks, incentives and heterogeneity, (2000) 82(3) Am. J. Agr. Econ. 645-676 
95O. Hart and J. Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, (1990) 98 Journal of Political Economy 1119-
1158. 
96O. Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, (1989) 89 Columbia  Law Review 1757-1774, 
1766. 
97O. Williamson, The Economics of Govenance, (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1-18, 10. 
49 
 
can be communicated to the court at great cost, and (2) permitting the internal disputes 
to be appealed to the court would undermine the efficacy an integrity of hierarchy’.98 
 The identification of these different forms of organization and of their corresponding 
regimes of contract law has important implications for competition law analysis. Vertical 
restraints may be considered as governance tools that are used in order to avoid organizational 
failures that arise in situations of hierarchy or hybrid (networks). In the absence of significant 
market power, competition law should not intervene in a situation of hierarchy, as this will 
compromise the internal organization of this form of governance. The scope of competition 
law intervention will be more important in the situation of a network. 
The distinction between network and hierarchies should not, however, be overstated. 
Networks may evolve towards a loose form of hierarchy as they are subject to cyclical 
developments following which the most powerful participants may bring the network itself 
under control and create a situation of hierarchy.99 Consequently, it is important for competition 
law to recognize the specificities of these different organizational forms and adopt a flexible 
approach, which will not affect the choice of the most efficient organizational structure by the 
parties to the transaction, in the absence of significant market power.100 
In its survey of the American business history in 1977, Chandler noted that vertical 
integration was the result of the nineteenth-century technical change in transportation and 
communication that made possible the collapse of geographical barriers and the emergence of 
larger markets.101 This, in turn, increased economies of scale that led to mass distribution with 
the emergence of department stores, mail-order houses and chain stores.102 The position of the 
distributors in the value chain changed: independent wholesalers were increasingly replaced 
by in-house purchasing and marketing units. First, producers demanded increasingly higher 
volumes, thus eliminating ‘one of the primary raisons d’être of wholesalers, the ability to work 
at higher volumes than one’s customers’.103  Second, the standardization of inputs and outputs 
required a relative specialization, rather than a more general ability to deal with a diverse set 
or products. Also, ‘standardization of inputs and outputs militated against another of the 
merchant’s comparative advantages, the ability to deal with a diverse set of products’.104 This 
period of vertical integration has been followed by a period of vertical disintegration. Large 
vertically integrated firms were becoming less significant and were joining a richer mix of new 
organizational forms (eg franchise agreements, alliances, sub-contracting).105 This followed 
the need for further specialization of functions coupled with the generalization of the 
capabilities of managers, which became detached from the specific product as their main 
function became to manage risks. This evolution is also linked to the emergence of a modular 
                                                          
98O. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 100. 
99H. B. Thorelli, Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies, [1986] 7 Strategic Management Journal 37-51. 
100C. Ménard, Maladaptation of Regulation to Hybrid Organizational Forms, (1999) 18 International  Review Law 
and Economics 403-417, 414–416. 
101 A. D. Chandler, The Visible Hand – The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard University 
Press, 1977), p. 79. 
102Ibid, ch. 7. 
103 R. N, Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, (2003) 12 Industrial 
and Corporate Change 351-385, 369. 
104Ibid. 
105Ibid. 
50 
 
system of production, which relied on a vertically disintegrated production system and thus 
required looser forms of vertical control than ownership. The concept of network perfectly 
captures these intermediate forms of vertical control. The case law on franchise and selective 
distribution illustrates that EU competition law has recognized the importance of this form of 
organization of the transactions, alongside the specific competition law regime for hierarchies, 
and the neutrality of competition law towards the choice of different forms of organization of 
the transactions. 
Technological changes in the ICT sector have played an important role in the revision of 
the EU rules on distribution agreements in mid-1990s, arguably as important as the role played 
by the change of policy paradigm with the advent of the ‘more economic approach’ and the 
increasing influence of economics in determining the scope of intervention of competition 
authorities concerning ‘vertical’ restraints.106  
First, they significantly decreased organisation and monitoring costs, improving the level 
of communication between the various business units of a vertically integrated firm, while at 
the same time they decrease transaction costs at the marketplace, for instance by considerably 
limiting search costs. This may affect the incentives of firms for vertical integration and also 
leads to the development of network economic structures, where independent economic entities 
form long-term relationships with other companies, sharing resources and jointly developing 
strategies. These networks may take different forms: strategic alliances and partnerships, 
supply webs interconnecting various strategic alliances and complex outsourcing contracts, 
electronic marketplaces and portals. These networks form industry value chains, sometimes 
long, sometimes short, always oriented towards the final consumer and enclosing a series of 
primary (identify customers, design, purchase inputs, manufacture,  market and sell, deliver, 
provide after-sales services and support) and supportive activities (finance and administration, 
human resources, technology development activities). 
Second, the possibilities offered by tracking technology and the wider availability of 
personal data, on the online and market behaviour of consumers, have led a number of 
companies to develop, more effectively, commercial practices that discriminate between 
different market segments, divided according to the customers’ characteristics (gender, age, 
geographic location, income level, personality, approach to life etc), leading to different forms 
of market segmentation. This is particularly important for focused advertising and e-marketing, 
eventually also pricing the products or offering specific tailored-made to these segments, 
versions of them. This may of course enable these firms to extract more revenue out of the 
various market segments, if they are able to prevent arbitrage between the different groups of 
customers. This market segmentation may be achieved either unilaterally or with the 
cooperation of the other parts of the supply chain, through specific agreements ensuring the 
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effectiveness of the segmentation, which could eventually give rise to different forms of 
vertical restraints. 
Third, through technology supply chain management becomes more effective and less 
expensive, enabling companies to achieve higher quality at a lower production cost. Firms find 
it crucial to enter into long-term agreements with partners in other segments of the chain, in 
order to create the necessary relation of trust that is required by the importance of relation-
specific investments that need to be undertaken in setting the supply chain management. This 
may lead to disintermediation and vertical integration but also to deconcentration through the 
constitution of networks or supply alliances that are managed by supply chain councils. These 
various forms of supply chain management share the common characteristic that they are all 
ultimately consumer-orientated, as any segment of the chain directs its efforts towards meeting 
the needs of the next member of the chain, the perception being that all segments of the chain 
do not constitute separate islands of activity but essential ingredients for the formation of the 
total value of the chain. For instance, brand-building takes the wider perspective, that of the 
whole value chain, leading to the elaboration of labels and standards to which the various 
segments of the chain abide. Issues relating to the distribution of the total surplus value of the 
chain also take a prominent role in the relation between the various economic actors 
participating to the supply chain, in particular as supply chain management, even if it is flexible, 
crystallizes more easily their position (and total surplus value share). Alternatively, the 
possibilities offered by private electronic marketplaces and portals, such as AmazonSupply 
which also operates as an actual distributor, with warehouses and products stocked on shelves, 
may lead firms to opt for a spot-market method of organisation of their economic activity, if 
the nature of their products and other considerations does not justify the cost of elaborating 
long-term supply relationships. 
Fourth, Internet and the advent of digital economy profoundly change the organisation 
and the revenue models of the industry. Long gone are the days where distribution was 
organised as a web of conflicting interests, each of the actors (manufacturer, wholesaler and 
retailer) acting in order to defend their interests and develop independent strategies, sometimes 
to the detriment of the chain. Online commerce enables manufacturers to bypass intermediaries 
by proceeding to a direct distribution of their product through the Internet. This can take the 
form of the conventional catalogue revenue model, with the difference that the catalogue is 
now online, consumers placing orders through the manufacturer’s website. Internet also 
empowers discount retailers to lower down their costs and thus to take advantage of the fact 
that their website operates as a hub for discount offers from different manufacturers. Marketing 
channels are also diversified, with the development of omni-channel strategies, where 
manufacturers operate their own website, while also distributing through traditional retailers, 
online retailers and discounters. These different online forms of distribution and the 
corresponding revenue models are also expanding in the food sector. 
Among the various models, advertising-supported revenue models have been on the rise. 
These business models usually rely on multi-sided platform strategies, bringing together two 
or more interdependent groups of consumers, information technology and the possibilities 
offered by Big Data technology and the social Web to collect personal data making it an 
extremely valuable business method for advertisers. This provides incentives to the various 
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economic actors to strategically design platforms that appeal to multiple sides, thus increasing 
the instances of platform competition. 
These various models may co-exist in the same industry but also within the same supply 
chain. They are often implemented through vertical restraints, which aim to ensure the 
profitability of the whole supply chain, as opposed to the profitability of just the specific 
segment of the chain, by institutionalising procedures for the distribution of profit margins 
along the chain. This alters the usual understanding that each economic transaction should be 
assessed at the level of the chain it intervenes, without any consideration to other sides of the 
platform or other segments of the value chain. Competition authorities cannot therefore assume 
that the conflicting web of interests will lead the various levels of the chain to police each other 
(the so called self-policing character of vertical restraints) which have led many competition 
authorities to abandon the area of vertical restraints in setting their enforcement priorities, 
deciding instead to focus on cartels. These important economic and technological 
transformations and the increasing importance of supply chain management may call for new 
operational concepts in competition law and the development of a more ‘holistic’ approach that 
engages more fully with value chains. 
 
1.1.3.2.The disruptive potential of GVCs for competition law & policy on vertical restraints 
 
The various forms of organization of global value chains highlight the importance of 
conducting a careful analysis of the power relations along the supply chain, the aim being to 
unveil value extraction bottlenecks affecting the distribution of the total surplus value. This 
analysis cannot be undertaken by the traditional NPT framework which mainly focuses on 
horizontal competition and its effects on consumers or total welfare and assesses the 
competitive interactions between firms within a specific relevant market. In contrast, the GVC 
perspective has a distributive focus and may be particularly helpful if one aims to understand 
real business strategies and how the design of the value chain may determine who profits from 
the collective innovation and other surplus-value generated. 
A focus on GVCs will enable a re-conceptualization of the way competition law deals 
with vertical integration or quasi-integration. Traditionally, the relation between the different 
levels of a vertical supply chain has been thought as complementary, competition authorities 
rarely seeing any reason to intervene, unless one of the segments disposes of considerable 
market power and engages in acts of exclusion by, for instance, raising the costs of its rivals 
upstream or downstream. This approach tends to ignore the allocation of the revenues 
engendered by the supply chain between the various partners (“vertical competition”) as an 
issue external to the exclusive focus of competition law on economic efficiency. In contrast, 
the GVC approach recognizes that issues relating to the distribution of the total surplus value 
of the chain also take a prominent role in the relation between the various economic actors 
participating to the supply chain. By dissecting the chain-wide coordination of various 
economic activities, the GVC approach also better describes the systemic nature of GVCs, each 
part of the chain impacting on the others.  
Such view is of course anathema for the proponents of the received view on vertical 
restraints. As it was made clear by Advocate General Van Themaat in Pronuptia, the seminal 
53 
 
EU case regarding franchising, a precedent setting the new direction of EU competition law on 
vertical restraints towards a more Chicago-oriented approach, “the question whether or not a 
franchise agreement results in a fair division of costs and benefits as between franchisor and 
franchisee is not in itself relevant to the question whether Article [101(1) TFEU] is 
applicable’107 However, we consider that for reasons we will explain in the following Section, 
modern competition law cannot afford ignoring issues of total surplus allocation between the 
various segments of the chain, as this may greatly affect productivity, which should be an 
important concern for competition law enforcement. 
 Concerns over global competitiveness, employment, investment in quality competition and 
long-term consumer interest may also weigh in the decision of competition authorities to 
explore the dynamics of global value chains and the way issues of distribution of the total 
surplus produced by the chain may be included in competition law assessment. 
 We consider that the GVC approach provides a theoretical framework enabling us to 
understand how the global division and integration of labour in the world economy has evolved 
over time and, more importantly, how the distribution of awards, from the total surplus value, 
is allocated between the various segments of the chain. Contrary to traditional NPT analysis, 
and more in vogue with transaction cost economics (TCE) and economics of organization, the 
GVC approach enables competition authorities to focus not only on issues of horizontal market 
power and concentration at each segment of the chain, but also to engage with the vertical links 
between the various actors with the aim to understand how and whether “lead” actors can 
capture value. Their focus is on the distribution of the value generated by the chain, rather than 
just on the maximization of the surplus (efficiency) as such. We think that such an approach 
will more truthfully reflect the various forms of competitive interaction taking place in the 
marketplace and within global value chains. 
 
1.1.3.3.GVCs and “real competition” 
 
In his recent work on Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises, Anwar Shaikh provides an 
alternative picture of competitive activity, heavily relying on the “classical” school of 
economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx, to which he also adds the work of 
Piero Sraffa108. Shaikh argues that the profit motive, not making things or carrying out services, 
is seen as the driving force of capitalism: “Capital is a particular social form of wealth driven 
by the profit motive. With this incentive comes a corresponding drive for expansion, for the 
conversion of capital into more capital, of profit into more profit”109. Taking a different 
perspective than neoclassical economics, both the perfect competition view and the imperfect 
competition paradigm, he argues that the capitalist economy should not be viewed as a 
“perfect” market economy with accompanying “imperfections”, but as individual capitals in 
competition to gain profit and market share110. What he calls, “real competition” is a struggle 
to lower costs per unit of output in order to gain more profit and market share and thus raise 
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the rate of return of the capital invested. Competition within an industry compels individual 
producers to set prices that keep them in the game, forcing them to lower costs so that they can 
compete effectively, and producing a persistent differential in costs as new capitals enter and 
oldest ones are retired. In this context, competition within an industry turbulently equalizes 
selling prices and therefore dis-equalizes profit margin and profit rates. Competition between 
industries comes about through inter-industrial investment flows which focus on the lowest 
cost techniques that are generally reproducible and providing higher rates of return for the 
capital invested, the capital moving from one industry to another in search of higher profits, 
thus bringing about the equalization of profit rates between industries (“regulating capitals”)111. 
Contrary to what was advanced by mainstream economic theorists, Shaikh also argues 
that that the profit rates will not necessarily raise with new technology, but may well fall.112 
Indeed, if one looks to empirical data, the profit rates have been decreasing considerably the 
last few decades in what has been considered by some as a productivity crisis for modern 
capitalism113. Despite the fact that the cost of capital is “close to zero and that companies may 
take up almost free liquidity on markets”, large and global MNE governing global value chains 
use their record surplus liquidity for other purposes rather than turning it into working 
capital114. Some have talked about “the weakened capitalist ethos”, the firms being “worn out 
in their capacity for using and combining labor and capital in more productive ways”, 
advancing the increasing bureaucratization of the firms and their opaque ownership by 
institutional investors, rather than by virulent entrepreneurs as the main cause115. Others have 
put forward the lower increase of total factor productivity brought by the most recent waves of 
technology revolutions116. Finally, some have argued that the fall of real wages and over-
indebtedness, as well as the rising levels of inequality of income, has eaten the purchasing 
power of consumers/workers and led to decreasing levels of profitability for capital overall.117  
This phase of capitalism largely coincides with the financialisation movement starting 
in the early to mid-1970s and taking unprecedented proportions until the 2008 economic 
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crisis118. During this period productivity growth has gone down in all Western economies119. 
According to Shaihk, the real cause of this drop in productivity is the movement in 
profitability—the dominant factor under capitalism. The profitability of corporate capital in the 
Western world has been in “secular decline”120 since the end of the Second World War with 
only a moderate stabilisation from the early 1980s, although dropping in the 2000s121. 
Suppressed wage growth and reduced wage share stabilised the rate of profit as well as an 
enormous fall in the interest rate in the 1980s, which fuelled credit expansion and massive debt 
finance, ultimately raising the net (or enterprise) rate of profit. These policies led to 
phenomenal leveraging and excessive financialisation, which reduced the rate of return of 
working capital in relation to other forms of capital investment. This expansion of liquid assets 
does not correspond with operational costs, or working capital. Companies have excess 
liquidity, which leads to excess corporate savings, the typical multinational being a net 
contributor of savings, rather than a net user of savings122.  
Cash hoarding is seen as a defensive act in order for the companies and their 
management to protect their current stock of technology, innovation. As a result they do not 
invest as much in new technology/innovation (for instance new network infrastructure which 
would require enormous amounts of fixed capital). Business investment is down and has 
declined since the late 1970s as measures as a share of GDP indicate123. There is increasing 
evidence that the economy has moved from capital intensive to less capital intensive sectors. 
Companies prefer to retain earnings and distribute them to shareholders and the management 
rather than invest them in R&D124. Investments in R&D are increasingly concentrated in a few 
sectors across most of the mature economies125. The concept of research has also changed – a 
lot of money is actually spent on product adaptation, design and development, copying a feature 
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or add on from another product or adjusting the product stock to local demands, the D, and 
little is spent to the R126. Growth in real investment on R&D is declining, the US National 
Science Foundation reporting that its measure of R&D intensity has flatlined since 1995127. 
Many companies have reacted to problems with their R&D strategy by outsourcing R&D to 
smaller firms that can take bigger risks128. Once the R&D investments have begun to mature 
into innovative products, large companies have acquired them and integrated them into their 
global value chains129. This may affect the innovation and entrepreneurial ethos. Companies 
also spend their money in defensive ways by buying competition with a considerable 
acceleration of M&A activity. From 1997 to 2012, 8327 delists out of which 4957 were due to 
M&A activity as companies intended to consolidate rather than invest in more competitive 
products and services or reward efficient staff and workers130. Recent research on innovation 
has put forward the full picture of the innovation value chain, and highlighted the important 
role of the State in funding fundamental R&D that ripened to highly successful commercial 
innovation leading to important private returns and profits131. 
One of the main reasons advanced for this lack of risky investments is the lower 
profitability of R&D research132. Indeed, as economist James Bessen recently noted the higher 
aggregate profits in what he calls the ‘rent-seeking sector’, such as pharma/chemicals, 
petroleum refining, transportation equipment/defense, utilities, communication, in comparison 
to sectors that are less regulated, noting that for each dollar spent lobbying for a tax break, 
firms received returns in excess of $220133. This makes rent seeking and lobbying the second 
most important driver of firms’ profitability, before even R&D spending. In other words, 
corporations achieve more returns per dollar if this is spent on lobbying and rent seeking 
regulation than on R&D. These empirical findings may of course be related to the specific US 
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Coming: Robert Gordon and the Future of Economic Growth, (2016) 106(5) American Economic Review: Papers 
& Proceedings 68-71, 70. 
133 J. Bessen, Accounting for Rising Corporate Profits: Intangibles or Regulatory Rents? (2016) Boston University 
School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-18. Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=2778641. 
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context, but arguably the situation may not be that different in Europe134. If profit in capitalism 
is what drives growth profit then it is necessary to raise the net rate of profit of working capital. 
How is the above discussion relevant for competition law and policy, and also with 
regard to our topic of Global Value Chains? The hypothesis we advance is that the constitution 
of global value chains, in particular of the captive sort, leads to a profit squeezing of the various 
actors in the chain controlled by the lead firm. Lead firms seek to increase their share of the 
total surplus value produced by the chain. This is the normal effect of restricting vertical 
competition across the various segments of the chain. However, one may assume that this will 
decrease the profitability of productive activities along the chain, the effect of which may be a 
fall in overall productivity, generating a fall in profitability in a never ending and mutually 
reinforcing cycle, for the following reasons. Often lead firms exercise control through strategic 
assets (brands, IP rights) relying on past investments and without necessarily facing the 
competitive pressure to increase their profitability by productive investments, in view of the 
declining rate of profitability and therefore the declining “real competition” between capitals. 
They may prefer to distribute their profits to their management and shareholders, or to defend 
their position by buying out actual or potential competition. Large lead firms may also have 
less incentives to invest in an increase of productivity than small and medium firms, to the 
extent that they prefer to invest in strategies that lock in the other firms in their value chains.  
 
1.2.The future of competition law in a complex economy 
 
1.2.1. The different dimensions of competition 
 
New technologies require important investments and fixed costs for their development, which 
often lead to network effects, as use of a product or service by any user increases the product's 
value for other users (sometimes even all users). In other words, the value of the product to one 
user is positively affected when another user joins and enlarges the network (positive network 
externalities). For instance, an additional user of a search engine may increase the quality of 
search provided by this search engine, therefore benefitting all users, in view of the additional 
queries that this may direct to the search engine and consequently the increase in the stock of 
data/information the specific search engine disposes about users and their preferences which 
can help search engines to offer better search services to all consumers. This positive feedback 
loop mechanism explains why these markets are tippy and are characterized by ‘winner takes 
it all’ competition. For instance, there might be fierce competition to conquer a market share 
advantage over rivals, with regard to the specific technology or standard applying in the 
industry, as the market may switch almost completely to the winner (competition for the 
market).135  
                                                          
134 Tori and Onaran, for example, analysed firm-data in Europe and found that the increased financialisation by 
nonfinancial companies can be seen as resulting in lower physical investment due to altered incentives: D. Tori 
and O. Onaran, The effects of financialisation and financial development on investment: Evidence from firm-level 
data in Europe, (2017) Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, University of Greenwich No 44. 
135 Usual examples include the videotape format war between VHS and Sony’s BETAMAX, or the competition 
between Windows and Intel from one side and Apple from the other for the microcomputer market. For an analysis 
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Quite often, these products or services constitute a package of complementary products 
and technologies, which form a system competing with other systems (‘system 
competition’).136 The value of the product does not always depend directly on the number of 
adopters, but on the adoption of some complementary products that are bundled/packaged with 
the first product (think about a book reader and the content of the book). Network effects lead 
to collective switching costs and lock-in effects, which reduced competition and may entrench 
the dominant position of the winner for a significant period of time. Firms are quite imaginative 
in their business models, sometimes distributing the product for free in one side of the market, 
thus inducing more users to join the network and therefore increasing the value of the product 
for other users situated at the paying side of the market, the platform facilitating the interaction 
between two different groups of customers (multi or two-sided market platforms). They may 
also use various business practices, such as penetration pricing where they charge low prices 
(even below their costs) to gain market share, or strategically bundling their products so as to 
take hold of another market and then expand. In these markets, it is possible that firms may 
incur losses for a significant period of time in order to invest in acquiring market share (either 
through natural growth or by buying out actual or potential competitors) in order to constitute 
one stop shop solutions or essential platforms for various groups of customers.137 Competition 
between firms takes unexpected forms, such as competing for consumers’ attention (or 
eyeballs), eventually profiling them and using algorithms in order to predict and possibly 
manipulate their behaviour.138 These developments thus require a renewal of the theoretical 
frameworks so far used by economics for traditional markets, as well as a clear understanding 
of business strategy, thus widening the sources of wisdom for competition law beyond 
neoclassical price theory economics.139  
Similarly, one may criticize the relatively narrow perspective of the mainstream 
neoclassical price theory economics, which is based on methodological individualism, the idea 
that social action and the ensuing order are perceived as generated by objective economic 
interests of the individual actor, the latter behaving in an instrumental (rational) way in order 
to maximize his welfare. What is absent from such analysis is the role that social relations and 
social institutions play in the economy, the latter being considered as distinct configurations of 
interests and social relations. Work in political economy and economic sociology may provide 
the bigger picture we need in order to understand the full dimension of competitive interactions.  
The various forms of competitive struggle are not only taking place in the context of 
product markets. Competition becomes a struggle to lower costs per unit of output with the aim 
                                                          
of competition in open and closed systems see, CMA & Autorité de la Concurrence, The Economics of Open and 
Closed Systems (December 16th, 2014). 
136 M L Katz & C Shapiro, ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ [1994] 8(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 93. 
137 For an example of this strategy see, LM Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ [2017] 126(3) Yale Law Journal 
564. 
138 F Pasquale, The Black Box Society - The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (Harvard 
University press, 2015). 
139 On the importance, for instance, of other fields than economics see, among others, the special issues of the 
Antitrust Bulletin on Entrepreneurship and Antitrust [2016, Vol. 61(4)]; and on Antitrust as a Multi-disciplinary 
field [2014 Vol. 59(4]. 
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to gain more profit and market share and thus raise the rate of return of the capital invested140. 
Some have distinguished between competition within an industry, which forces individual 
producers to set prices that keep them in the game and compels them to lower costs so that they 
can compete effectively, thus leading to a turbulent equalization of selling prices but a dis-
equalization of profit margin and profit rates, and competition between industries, the capital 
moving from one industry to another in search of higher profits, thus bringing about the 
equalization of profit rates between industries.141 The financialisation movement, that is the 
increasing influence of global financial markets in the real economy, started in the early to mid-
1970s and has since taken unprecedented proportions.142 It has led to phenomenal leveraging, 
which has allegedly reduced the rate of return of working capital in relation to other forms of 
capital investment, such as lobbying, rent-seeking activities or short-term investments in 
financial assets.143 One should also take into account the level of development of capital 
markets as part of the overall economic context, when examining competitive strategies, and 
explore if firms have multiple source of finance beyond traditional bank lending. 
The rising concentration of the different levels of the food value chain has certainly 
attracted the attention of the public, but one should not overestimate its importance as a factor 
indicating the level of competition in a market. Already in 2009, the European Commission 
noted that the high concentration of the retail sector did not lead to a higher profitability, 
observing that “on average in 2006, the average net profit margins of European retailers were 
around 4%, whereas these same margins in the case of The Coca-Cola Company and the Group 
Danone were around 20% and 11%, respectively”144. The negotiations occurring between 
retailers and large multinational suppliers, who are often producers of a portfolio of goods 
which are in some cases must-carry brands and have significant market power, may offset in 
some cases the buyer power of even the largest retailers. More recently, the Harper review in 
Australia noted that  
 “(a)lthough concentration is relevant, it is not determinative of the level of competition 
in a market. […]”145. 
The attraction of consumers to specific brands and product differentiation may also be 
a source of market power for suppliers, although it is also possible that low cost “no frills” 
brands may enhance competition and lead to lower prices for consumers. The complex 
                                                          
140 A Shaikh, Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
141 Ibid., p 34. 
142 J. Montgomerie & K. Williams, ‘Financialised Capitalism: After the Crisis and Beyond Neoliberalism’ (2009) 
13(2) Competition & Change 99. For a historical and explanatory analysis of the concept financialisation, with 
regards to profitability, shareholder value and shifted incentives on innovation, see N van der Zwan, ‘State of the 
Art: Making Sense of Financialisation’ (2014) 12 Socio-Economic Review 99. 
143 J Bessen, ‘Accounting for Rising Corporate Profits: Intangibles or Regulatory Rents?’(2016) Boston University 
School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-18. Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=2778641; 
O Orhangazi, Financialisation and the US Economy (Edward Elgar, 2008) (showing that investment in financial 
assets crowds out investment in real assets, companies preferring to make investor pay outs through dividends or 
stock buybacks, rather than investing in R&D or in promoting productivity). 
144  Commission Staff Working Paper, Competition in the Food Supply Chain, SEC(2009) 1449. 
145 Ian Harper, Peter Anderson, Su McCluskey, Michael O’Bryan QC, Competition Policy Review, Final Report 
(March 2015), available at http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2015/03/Competition-policy-review-
report_online.pdf  , pp. 283-284. 
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interrelation between low-cost and ‘quality-focused’ brands has not yet been thoroughly 
considered. 
There have also been some significant changes at the upstream level of the food value 
supply chain. First, farmland consolidation resulted in a considerable increase of farm size the 
last four decades, with important purchasers including private-equity firms and sovereign 
wealth funds146. Second, the development of new technologies has led to the emergence of a 
diverse group of players: “crop protection and seed companies, equipment companies, fertiliser 
companies, retail distributors, and pure-play digital start-ups”, which seek to develop an 
“integrated offering of equipment and services for farmers” enabling them to “gradually build 
a compelling one-stop solution that will allow them to compete for the lion’s share of the 
market”147. Consequently, these companies develop strategies in order to develop new 
capabilities and exploit different sources of revenue by “applying new technology or by 
expanding across the value chain or geographically”148. An illustration of such strategies is 
offered by Monsanto: 
“Having already transformed itself from a chemical company into a seeds company, 
Monsanto moved into crop-planting technology by acquiring Precision Planting, a 
manufacturer of precision equipment and software used to tailor planting to different 
parts of a field. Monsanto likewise moved into data science by acquiring Climate 
Corporation, a provider of hyperlocal weather monitoring, agronomic data modelling, 
and high-resolution weather simulations. Finally, Monsanto developed FieldScripts, a 
high-tech service that applies field data to increase planting efficiency and yield 
potential. The company is expected to further expand into variable-rate fertilization and 
crop protection. Through these efforts, Monsanto is building an integrated, ‘beyind the 
seeds’ solution that will allow it to exploit new sources of revenue relating to 
equipment, fertiliser, crop protection, and even software”149. 
 Of particular importance is also the need to enhance dynamic efficiency and innovation 
at each stage of the food value chain. A careful balancing of competition law and intellectual 
property law should be performed. These regimes employ different means to the same ends of 
enhancing long-term consumer welfare and promoting innovation. The competition laws 
preserve the competitive spur to innovation, and the intellectual property laws create incentives 
for innovation. Market players should therefore make the choice of positioning themselves as 
fully integrated providers, or the orhestrators of a network, or partners of an established 
network150. 
Finally, the role of state intervention in the form of ownership, more or less intrusive 
regulation of the various dimensions of competition, eventually price competition, or subsidies 
needs also to be taken into account. Competition law is one among various tools for state 
intervention in markets, and its contours must be defined with regard to other forms of state 
                                                          
146 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector (April 2015), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/process-industries-innovation-crop-farming-2030-
reinvention-sector/ , p. 11. 
147  Ibid., p. 10. 
148 Ibid., p. 12. 
149 Ibid., p. 12. 
150 Ibid., p. 15. 
61 
 
intervention, such as regulation151. Governments intervene widely in markets to achieve 
various policy goals. Sometimes these policy goals align with one another and sometimes they 
conflict and require various trade-offs in policy responses, such as to pursue efficiency, to 
correct market failures, or to ensure equity and distributive justice. 
The broader competition policy (which includes not only competition law but also other 
measures to address issues of competition in the economy) interfaces with state activity across 
many different levels of how government organizes economic behaviour. Government 
organizes economic activity in part through the shape and nature of regulation and overall state 
involvement. Understanding the distinction between competition law and policy clarifies 
competition authorities’ capabilities and limitations when it comes to promoting competition 
in situations of a broader regulatory overlay. When considering the question of institutional 
design, how countries design optimal competition policy involves three choices: what to leave 
to the jurisdiction of competition law (and competition agencies and judges), what to assign to 
noncompetition authorities (such as sector regulators) exclusively as part of their jurisdiction, 
and how to establish concurrent jurisdiction among the competition authority and two or more 
regulatory authorities. 
Government intervention may take different forms, depending on the policy area and 
the dimension of government action with the preservation of some form of market 
competition152. For example, governments may intervene as market makers: they might decide 
to use competitive tendering to introduce competition for goods and services that were 
previously supplied solely by the public sector; they might introduce more choice in the 
provision of public services by opening access to private or voluntary sector providers; or they 
might make tradable permits accessible in such a way as to most efficiently allocate among 
private providers the costs of engaging in an activity that is harmful to society. The state may 
operate to create or facilitate markets, or in some cases to act as a market participant. 
Governments can affect markets through direct participation as a supplier to provide public 
goods and services that free markets are unlikely to supply at an adequate level. Governments 
also act as significant buyers of goods and services from the private sector to deliver public 
services and perform their normal functions. In dispensing public services the government may 
establish a state-owned enterprise (SOE) or a public-private partnership (a relatively recent 
phenomenon), or it may decide to procure services through a competitive tendering process. 
Alternatively, the state may act as a deregulator in which it removes regulation to unleash 
market forces within various parts of the economy. 
A possible way of intervention in the economy by the State is through State Owned 
Enterprises. In some jurisdictions, such as in the European Union (for national SOEs) and 
China (for regional and local administrative monopolies) these are generally subject to some 
form of competition law scrutiny. Likewise, governments may intervene indirectly by 
influencing private markets when they create either negative or positive impacts on consumer 
                                                          
151 There is a massive literature on this distinction between competition and regulation, perceived as separate 
spheres but still in constant interaction with each other. We note some recent contributions in Europe: N Dunne, 
Competition law and Economic Regulation – Making and Managing Markets (CUP, 2015); J Drexl & F DiPorto 
(eds.), Competition Law as Regulation (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
152 For an introduction to the interaction between competition and government action, see T Cheng, I Lianos & D 
Sokol, Competition and the State (SUP, 2014). 
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or total welfare. In this case, command and control regulation or more market-based incentive 
forms of regulation might be other venues for taxes and subsidies to influence the incentives 
and behaviours of private firms. Sometimes, governments deliberately try to influence 
consumer behaviours in a variety of ways— for example, by providing information on hidden 
costs associated with certain types of consumption (eg, advertising campaigns against tobacco 
or alcohol), or by nudging consumers to adopt a behaviour that will protect their self-interest. 
They might also attempt to indirectly influence businesses by coordinating private-sector 
activities to generate the appropriate amount of information for the adoption of public policies 
or by promoting self-regulation by business, as this generally saves implementation costs. In 
some situations, government intervention may be the by-product of corruption, may be 
captured by special interests, or it may be following the right objectives but be badly 
designed—what is called ‘government failure. In this case it will be, in general, welfare 
reducing. In other instances, however, government intervention is justified by legitimate public 
interest objectives. Of course, it is not the aim of competition law to correct any form of 
government failure if that failure does not impact the competitive process. Competition law 
may supplement other areas of law in an effort to improve government action and increase 
efficiency. Yet, the role of competition law is also relevant in the context of legitimate state 
action, depending on the forms that the latter may take, some of which may affect the 
competitive process more than others. 
Conflicts between competition law and regulation may be direct, if regulation affects 
the core parameters of competitive markets by restricting competition on price, entry and 
quantity, as it is often the case for economic regulation, or lateral, in case these core dimensions 
of competition are not directly targeted, but regulation may nevertheless indirectly affect them, 
as it may be the case in situations of social or technical regulation. Economic regulation denotes 
the government intervention in a sector to correct a market failure arising from e.g. a natural 
monopoly (telecom, energy), or asymmetric information. It acts a priori, requires continuous 
monitoring and is intrusive in management. In contrast, competition law consists in a set of 
rules for market operation that prevents and sanctions abuses of market power, across all 
sectors. It acts a posteriori, once behavior is observed and mostly relies on the dissuasive power 
of sanctions. From this perspective, it is a less intrusive tool for market management in 
comparison to regulation. 
Economic regulation’s role is often complementary to competition law since regulation 
controls monopolies that would never function efficiently under competition, its main function 
being to adopt measures that can control monopoly pricing. By ensuring non-discriminatory 
access to necessary inputs, e.g. network infrastructure, economic regulation may also facilitate 
competition in markets, thus enabling a greater scope of intervention for competition law. The 
less the regulatory regime interferes with the workings of the market, the more room for 
competition law. Expanded confidence in competition and markets may lead some previously 
regulated sectors to towards a specific competition law regime, taking into account the 
specificities of the economic sector, and even leading to the application of general competition 
law rules. This movement across the regulation/competition continuum may be observed in 
various sectors, such as airlines, maritime transports, telecoms, and can also be observed in the 
food sector, by the transition of the sector to private markets from a regime of administered 
63 
 
economy or state-owned enterprises in some of the jurisdictions examined, in particular during 
the 1990s. However, it may also be substitutable to competition law, as experience has shown 
that when markets or segments of the industries become competitive, or there is a political 
decision to move to competitive markets as the main mechanism of organizing economic 
activity in this sector/segment, then state-ownership, administrated economy or sector-specific 
regulation may often be substituted by competition law. Indeed, this may happen when the 
interaction of competition law and regulation could prove problematic, in particular if the 
regulatory regime aims to control prices, restrict entry, give incumbents a competitive 
advantage, or requires or permits some practice that competition law prohibits. These risks of 
substantive conflict may be exacerbated if different institutions are in charge of competition 
law enforcement from those in charge of regulating the specific economic sector. The rules 
regulating the interaction between competition law and regulation may vary from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction: some prefer a cumulative application of competition law and economic 
regulation so that ex ante regulation by a Regulatory Authority does not prevent the ex post 
intervention on the basis of competition rules, others opt for a regime of substitution, the choice 
being between regulation or competition law. 
It therefore becomes important to examine the interaction of the various competitive 
forces in operation and their impact on the incentives of the actors to innovate and compete on 
price/quality/variety. Taking the example of genetically modified seeds, the structure of the 
industry has changed considerably the last few decades, in view the expansion of IP rights and 
technological development. Diana Moss notes that  
“[…] the organization of the transgenic seed industry has shifted fundamentally over 
the past two decades from separate ownership of agricultural biotechnology and seed 
assets to integrated platforms. These platforms comprise three major levels: (1) 
innovation involving genetic transformation technologies and genomics; (2) genetic 
traits that are expressed in plant agronomics, including insect resistance (Bt) and 
herbicide tolerance (Ht); and (3) state-of-the-art seeds containing genetic traits, for 
which seed companies are the major distribution channel for ultimate sales to farmers. 
Most current-generation transgenic seeds contain multiple or “stacked” genetic trait”153. 
These seed platforms may be established for benign reasons, for instance the prospect of 
economies of coordination that potentially arise from complementarities between complex 
research and development. However, seed platforms may also result from a strategy to create 
or enhance market power though control of patented technology and distribution channels for 
delivering transgenic seeds to farmers, in particular through a wave of merger and acquisitions 
by the dominant players in the market154. This has occurred partly because of the expansion of 
IP rights in this sector, as instead of negotiating for the rights to a competitor’s technology, it 
was simpler, cheaper, or more advantageous to acquire the competitor outright.  
The trade-offs are further complicated by the variety of competition models 
characterizing the industry. As it is reported by Diana Moss,  
                                                          
153 Diana L. Moss, Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, American 
Antitrust Institute (AAI) Submission, October 23, 2009, p. 2.. 
154 Ibid., p. 2.. 
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“[…] two non-mutually exclusive models of competition characterize rivalry in 
transgenic seed--inter-platform and intra-platform competition. In the first case, rivalry 
is between transgenic seed platforms. Seed containing traits that are exclusive to a 
single firm are the product of such platforms. Intra-platform competition involves 
rivalry within platforms whereby firms develop new transgenic seed products, in part, 
by obtaining access to rivals’ patented traits. […] What model of competition is likely 
to produce the greatest benefits for competition and consumers poses key a question for 
antitrust enforcement”155. 
Moreover, firms have the choice to either opt for an open system in which different 
complementary assets (such as genetic traits and seed germplasm) interoperate well with rival 
technology, or to develop “closed” platforms. This choice involves “fundamental decisions to 
promote open source versus proprietary technologies, “plug-and-play” versus non-
standardized components, and tactics that are designed to frustrate rivals’ access to needed 
technology”156. Although traditional breeding methods required important resources and a 
considerable investment of time (because of long breeding cycles) and hence economies of 
scale and large market players, the latest genome-editing technologies, particularly 
CRISPR/Cas, may constitute more efficient and less resource intensive and time-consuming 
breeding methods, that offer opportunities for the emergence of a more competitive and less 
integrated market structures relating to seeds. Indeed, as a recent Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
report observes, “the potential of genome editing techniques (in terms of decreased cost and 
technical difficulty, and increased speed) may revive the opportunities for small and medium-
sized biotech companies in the agricultural area and unlock development of a wider variety of 
traits”157. This likely emergence of a more competitive market structure, in view of reduced 
endogenous sunk costs, may be blocked by the business strategies of integrated agro-chem 
corporations that may try to establish one-shop platforms, combining traits, seeds, pesticides 
and smart agriculture or digital solutions for farmers in order to raise barriers to the independent 
entry of small and medium-sized start-ups in the various segments of the value chain. 
One may thus advance that competition in this context may occur between platforms 
and within platforms. Competition authorities should make efforts to promote inter-platform 
competition, but also intra-platform competition, in view of the consolidation of the industry 
and the significant competitive position of Monsanto which controls large, totally closed 
platforms in transgenic seed that may be challenged only by the unlikely emergence of rival 
platforms. This may lead to single-firm dominance and the foreclosure of competitors from the 
access to technology that is critical for intra-platform competition. Diana Moss explains that as 
the dominant player in the market for genetic trait, Monsanto acquired numerous independent 
seed companies between the mid-1990s to late 2000s, beefing up its presence in downstream 
markets for traited seed with the effect that it has been to create vertically integrated platforms 
of genetic traits and traited seed.  In order to stack, a developer must combine its own traits 
with those of Monsanto or another rival. In view of Monsanto’s important share in genetic 
trains, the number of possible traits combinations that could be created between non-Monsanto 
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developers is limited, with the result that the majority of stacked trait combinations contain a 
Monsanto trait. The possibility of generic competition in transgenic seed, following the end of 
some Monsanto patents is also limited, without the development of an institutional structure 
for promoting and managing generic competition and incentives for the dominant player in this 
market to facilitate the development of generic products158. According to Diana Moss, “(a) 
myriad of adverse effects potentially flow from this, including reduced or lower quality 
innovation in transgenic seed, higher seed prices to farmers (i.e., “technology fees”), fewer 
transgenic seed choices, and higher commodity prices than what would have prevailed under 
competitive market conditions”159.  
 Similar complex trade-offs involving static and dynamic competition across different 
platforms should also be performed at the retail segment of the market. Supermarkets may also 
be perceived as platforms providing services both to consumers, who have a wider choice of 
products/brands to buy at one stop shop service (thus practising one-homing), and grocery 
brands, which offers them access to its shelf-space as well as a wide array of remunerated 
services, which condition access to as many supermarket platforms as possible (thus practising 
multi-homing)160. Sometimes these fees may become a more important source of revenue for 
multi-product retailers than retail margins161. 
It is important to pause a little here in order to understand that demand substitutability 
and cross-price elasticity of demand and supply are not the only ways to delineate spaces where 
competition takes place, other routes being also open. The point we want to make is that market 
definition is as much a legal construct as an economic one. What is clear is that there is no 
clear-cut boundary of the market, so long as this identifies an arena/field for competition. Some 
have considered that the market can be “the smallest area within which it is possible to be a 
viable competitor”162. One may take a strategic approach, starting from the perspective of the 
firm, which either focuses on its potential consumers whose needs and functions it tries to 
satisfy (demand side), or ignores demand by focusing on comparable (and competing) firms 
(supply side). If one focuses on the supply side, it may be possible to consider as competitors 
and thus forming part of the “relevant market” for the purposes of competition law analysis, 
firms with resources similar to the firm under investigation, which in all likelihood may pose 
a competitive threat to its competitive position. These resources may include physical capital, 
such as an industrial plant, equipment, technology, geographical location, but also human 
capital resources (managerial skills, innovation capabilities), organisational resources as well 
as important assets for production (for instance, crucially important for the competitive process 
personal data) that may sustain the competitive advantage of the firm163. Firms following 
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similar strategies, thus constituting a “strategic group”164, disposing of similar resources, and 
serving the same customers’ needs165, may thus, under such an approach, be considered as 
competitors, constraining the action of each other, even if their products do not overlap in the 
same relevant market. In a period of convergence of physical, biological and digital worlds, as 
a result of the recent transformations of industrial production, and the dislocation of boundaries 
between markets, one may find that such an approach fits better the economics of the fourth 
industrial revolution than the narrower market definition based on the principle of cross-price 
elasticity between products, from the point of view of the consumer. How could one proceed 
to market delineation in a world in which personalisation of production means that consumers 
become the designers of the individually customised products they will consume, the products 
being produced by 3-D printing and robots, firms competing mainly on the market for personal 
information, which will serve as the raw material on which personalised production will take 
place?  
The focus on innovation also raises important questions as to the locus of competition 
assessment to the extent that the concept of “innovation market” that has been employed in 
order to assess the effect on future effects on innovation competition may not provide an 
appropriate framework to the extent that it does not take into account the possibility of drastic 
innovation and the possible entry of undertakings that are not presently active in the specific 
industry or market, but may have some technological capabilities that could enable it to 
constitute a possible competitive constraint in innovation competition. In some recent merger 
cases concering the seed/agrochem sector, the European Commission took a broader 
perspective and employed the concept of “innovation space” and the “industry” when assessing 
the possible effect of the merger transaction on innovation166. According to the Commission, 
when analysing the effects on innovation it becomes important to to assess the impact of the 
transaction “at the level of innovation efforts by the Parties and its competitors”167. The 
assessment of innovation competition follows three steps: 
“(349) First, the assessment of innovation competition requires the identification of 
those companies which, at an industry level, do have the assets and capabilities to 
discover and develop new products which, as a result of the R&D effort, can be brought 
to the market. 
(350) Secondly, it is also relevant to identify and analyse those spaces in which 
innovation competition occurs in the crop protection industry. The R&D players do not 
innovate for all the product markets composing the entire crop protection industry at 
                                                          
164 According to M.E. Porter, Competitive strategy. Techniques for analysing industries and competitors (Free 
Press, 1980), 129 defines “strategic groups” as a “group of firms in an industry following the same or similar 
strategy along the strategic dimensions”, the firms within a “strategic group” competing more intensely with each 
other than with firms outside this core group. See, K.G. Smith, C.M. Grimm, S. Wally & G. Young, Strategic 
groups and rivalrous firm behaviour: Towards a reconciliation, (1997) 18(2) Strategic Management Journal 149; 
R.K. Reger & A.S. Huff, Strategic groups: A cognitive perspective, (1993) 14(2) Strategic Management Journal 
103 (emphasising the need to take into account psycho-sociological factors influencing manager’s cognitive 
perception about their competitors). 
165 M. Bergen & M.A. Peteraf, Competitor identification and competitor analysis: A broad-based managerial 
approach, (2002) 23(4/5) Managerial and Decision Economics 157. 
166 EU Commission Decision, CASE M.7932 Dow/Dupont (2017), paras 348-352 
167 Ibid., para. 348. 
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the same time. They also do not innovate randomly without targeting specific spaces 
within that industry. When setting up their innovation capabilities and conducting their 
research R&D players have specific discovery targets ([…]). 
(351)A given discovery target is based on lead crops and lead pests and may thus 
comprise AIs that can be used in several downstream formulated product markets (for 
example chewing Lepidopteran insecticides, broadleaf herbicides). The spaces where 
innovation competition takes place are thus broader than an individual downstream crop 
protection market, but are nonetheless small. In fact, in light of increasing regulatory 
hurdles, which require crop protection products to be ever more selective, the 
innovation spaces in the crop protection industry are getting ever smaller: the 
innovation output tends to be confined to ever narrower spaces from which it is more 
difficult to adapt the innovation to other purposes. 
(352) In conclusion, in order to assess innovation competition, the Commission will 
both consider metrics of innovation taking place at industry level, as well as innovation 
taking place in spaces consisting of groupings of crop/pest combinations […]” [areas 
where the parties’ activities overlapped]168. 
 The concept may also affect the way we proceed to the definition of the geographic 
boundaries in which competitive interactions take place169. In its assessment of the 
Dow/Dupont merger the Commission focused both on innovation competition “at the level of 
innovation spaces within the crop protection industry and on innovation competition at the 
industry level”170. More specifically, the Commission focused on the line of research the 
merging companies weer active, the latter concept comprising “the set of scientists, patents, 
assets, equipment and chemical class(es) which are dedicated to a given discovery target whose 
final output are successive pipeline [products] targeting a given innovation space”171. It 
therefore becomes clear that which of the various approaches on offer is chosen depends greatly 
on the type of competition/tournament taking place in the specific “field” of economic/social 
activity172.  
 
1.2.2. Multi-lever Competition policy: integrating technological and societal change 
 
Science and technology studies (STS) and sociology literature emphasises the need to uncover 
the various social processes at play composing the field of the food industry, before proceeding 
to any conclusion with regard to the manifestation of economic power173. It becomes therefore 
important to unearth the socio-technical agencements that characterize the specific industry. 
As actors in these markets invent new products and technologies, they transform these markets 
                                                          
168 Ibid., paras 349-352. 
169 Ibid., para. 361. 
170 Ibid., para. 1956. 
171 Ibid., para. 1958. 
172 On the concept of “field” and its possible contribution to address complex competitive interactions, see P. 
Bourdieu, Principles of an Economic Anthropology, in P. Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, 
(Cambridge, Polity press, 2005), 193; N. Fligstein & D. McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action 
Fields, (2011) 29 Sociological Theory 1. 
173 P. Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, (Cambridge, Polity press, 2005), 193; N. Fligstein & D. 
McAdam, Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields, (2001) 29 Sociological Theory, 1-26 
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beyond recognition and add new value chains to the existing ones, thus leading to disruptive 
innovation. This is a process that usually takes a considerable period of time and may lead to 
situations of entrenched economic (and market) power for a significant period. Founded for 
one objective, markets often end up serving an entirely different purpose after a certain time. 
This constructive action takes place furthermore in hybrid collectives based on economic actors 
conceptualized as socio-technical agencements that not only denote collectives of human 
beings but also abstract collectives incorporating technical devices, tools and algorithms174. 
These sociotechnical arrangements provide the capacity to act but also to give meaning to 
action. Their ontology does not possess inherent or fixed properties but is variable and largely 
dependent on adaptive behaviours and reflexive agencies. Financial market models, methods 
and tools can thus be made to work if the corresponding agencement is constructed and actors 
are configured in such a way that the postulates may be found to have empirical validity.  
In the era of genetically modified and edited food, technologies play an increasingly 
important role in forming the core of the socio-technical agencement of global food supply 
chains and of their finance, which is increasingly automated through algorithmic configurations 
in global financial markets. Financial markets for agricultural commodities and futures markets 
grow in abstraction as they tend to organize encounters between distant and desynchronised 
supplies and demands, seemingly decoupled from the ordinary economy of production and 
consumption. The increased level of technical complexity of these agencements, as well as the 
dehumanization and variability of global food supply markets this implies create important 
challenges for competition authorities. To our knowledge, this financial dimension of the 
interconnectedness between various food systems has rarely been encountered in legal 
scholarship about food supply chains. The following graph represents the various units of 
analysis we would like to bring together in exploring this issue175. 
 
                                                          
174 M. Callon, The Law of the Markets (Blackwell, 1998) ; M. Callon, Y. Millo, F. Muniesa (eds.), Market Devices 
(Blackwell, 2007); M. Callon & F. Muniesa, “Les marchés économiques comme dispositifs collectives de calcul,” 
Réseaux (2003) 21(122): 189–234. 
175 The framework is inspired by the classic four layer model of Koppenjan & Groenewegen on institutional design 
for complex technological systems with our addition of a fifth layer focusing on the nature and potential uses of 
technology, the risks involved, as perceived by the actors and the current biophysical conditions possibly 
restricting its use and further development: J. Koppenjan, & J. Groenewegen, Institutional design for complex 
technological systems. (2005) 5(3) International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 240–257, 
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Competition authorities constitute part of the formal institutional environment of socio-
technical systems in the food sector, along with other areas of law, such as intellectual property, 
unfair competition law, contract law, with which competition law interacts and occasionally is 
in tension. All of these areas of law deal with broader dimensions of the public interest, going 
beyond lower prices and higher output to the benefit of consumers, or promoting consumer 
choice and innovation, which form the core of the tasks of competition authorities. They 
represent the plurality of values usually taken into account in setting regulatory goals for food 
systems. Among them one may identify the right to food, biodiversity and sustainability in the 
era of the Anthropocene, security of supply, which becomes essential in a period of rapid and 
eventually catastrophic climatic change for food production in various regions of the world, as 
well as more general geopolitical concerns in the control of the factors of production for food 
and the promotion of the competitiveness of the local industry. 
 One may distinguish between various conceptions of the role of competition authorities: 
(i) the core, where there is a large agreement among jurisdictions, (ii) a grey area, where there 
is a significant number of jurisdictions, developed and developing economies that, either 
explicitly, or implicitly, integrate these concerns in their competition law, and (iii) what has 
been characterised as ‘public policy concerns’, which are areas where there is some strong 
disagreement between competition authorities as to possibility to integrate them among the 
aims of their action. 
 
Informal institutional environment of socio-technological systems 
(norms, values, orientations, codes of conduct)
Formal institutional environment of socio-technological systems
Law and regulations 
(competition law, unfair competition law, contract law, IP law… )
Formal and informal institutional arrangements of socio-technical 
systems
standard-setting, contracts, alliances, joint-ventures, mergers
Actors and games in socio-technological systems
Agents and their interactions, power and networks
Biophysical conditions & Technology
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There is little to no work on the way these broader concerns may be integrated in a sound way 
in the assessment performed by the various public authorities in charge in conducting 
competition policy in this field, although there is a clear trend recently to focus on the 
contribution of competition law and policy to inclusive growth176.  
Various BRICS authorities include public interest concerns in the criteria usually taken into 
account when assessing the compatibility to competition law of mergers and acquisitions, and 
eventually also cooperative agreements. For instance, the Anti-Monopoly law of the Republic 
of China identifies among its objectives not only “protecting fair competition in the market” 
and “the interests of consumers” but also protecting the “lawful business operations” of 
undertakings in industries “controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline 
of national economy and national security”. The “Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic 
of China” and “ Interim Provisions on Assessing the Impact of Concentration of Business 
Operators on Competition” regulate the factors to be considered when examining business 
operators, and it is clear that the public interest should be considered comprehensively177. 
The South African competition legislation takes into account not only how a specific 
merger may produce anticompetitive effects or provide pro-competitive synergies, but also 
how it may promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy, promote 
employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans, or ensure that 
small and medium-size enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy 
and promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of 
historically disadvantaged persons178.  
                                                          
176 See J. Furman, Beyond Antitrust: The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Inclusive Growth, Searle 
Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy (September 2016), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160916_searle_conference_competition_f
urman_cea.pdf ; A. Dierx, F. Iljkovitz, B. Pataracchia, M. Ratto, A. Thum-Thyssen, J. Varga, Does EU 
Competition Policy Support Inclusive Growth?, (2017) 13(2) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 225-
260. 
177 Submission Questionnaire PRC.  
178 Submission Questionnaire, South Africa indicates that Section 12 of the South African Competition Act, sets 
out that in considering mergers, the competition authorities have to “determine whether or not the merger is likely 
to substantially lessen or prevent competition” taking into account the following factors: 
Competition law core
• Ensure low prices
• Ensure high output
• Promote innovation 
(disruptive & sustained) 
• Promote consumer 
choice & variety 
competition
Grey area
• Fairness (no exploitative  
conduct)
• Freedom to 
compete/freedom to 
trade
•Limit abuse of economic 
dependence & superior 
bargaining power
• Ensuring market access 
for small and medium 
undertakings
•Privacy
Normally outside the 
competition law core
Public policy interests
• Security of supply
• Right to food 
• Biodiversity and 
sustainability
• Competitiveness of the 
local industry
• Geopolitical concerns & 
national security
• Promote employment & 
social welfare
•Promoting human 
happiness or capabilities 
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In a similar fashion the Russian Federal Law on the Protection of Competition (article 13) 
allows some forms of anticompetitive conduct as well as agreements and mergers to be 
authorized by the authority if such anticompetitive acts help with substantial modernization of 
the related industries or increase in innovation activities and technological advance in Russia 
or lead to an expansion of the Russian products’ share in the global markets. In the context of 
a wave of mega-mergers that have changed the competitive architecture of the industry, it 
becomes important to understand how these public interest concerns have already been 
integrated in merger law, identify best practices and devise a methodology for their inclusion 
in the competition policy assessment, while preserving the rights of due process and the legal 
certainty of the parties to the transaction, and the possibility of all affected interests to be 
represented. There is little work that goes beyond accepting that these concerns may play a role 
and which explores thoroughly the way these concerns and values may be taken into account, 
eventually measured and evaluated, in a way that is compatible with legal certainty and could 
facilitate compliance by corporations. 
One may distinguish between situations of lateral conflict which may occur because 
competition law enforcement can jeopardise the aims followed by these various regulatory 
tools, from what we can call situations of regulatory osmosis, that is, the absorption of 
regulatory aims in the enforcement of competition law. This process may occur as a result of 
the pressure to interpret and enforce competition law principles in congruence to the aims and 
the structure of the entire legal system to which competition law is integrated. Without the need 
to refer to the concept of law as integrity of philosopher Ronald Dworkin, it is we think 
uncontroversial to argue that a competition authority or a judge enforcing competition law 
should strive to interpret the law in accordance to the broader moral and legal principles 
underpining the legal system179 One may distinguish two situations. First, it is possible that 
competition law includes among its own objectives the consideration of public policy (as the 
previous examples indicated) or that sector-specific regulators that have concurrent jurisdiction 
to apply competition law may have more than one aims in their mission statement and they 
often need to take into account and satisfy all these objectives. Second, even if one does not 
integrate these concerns as ‘objectives’ to be followed by the competition legislation, one needs 
to ‘take into account’ the broader principles of the legal system when interpreting the law, 
focusing on the way these are transcribed in its legal and institutional context, in particular for 
                                                          
- Actual and potential levels of import competition  
- Barriers to entry 
- Concentration and history of collusion  
- Countervailing power 
- Innovation, growth, product differentiation 
- Vertical integration  
- Failing firm 
- Removal of an effective competitor. 
The Competition Act also requires that competition authorities have regard for the following public interest 
factors: 
- Impact on a particular industrial sector or region 
- Employment  
- Ability of small businesses controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged people to compete 
- Ability of national industries to compete in international markets 
179 See, generally, R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard Univ. Press, 1986). 
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areas like competition law, where the legal rules do not provide much detail on the way one 
should interpret them, and statutory interpretation plays an important role. Hence, one may 
distinguish between various degrees of the ‘duty’ to take into account public interest concerns 
followed by social and technical regulation. A strong and extensive in scope duty if these are 
listed among the objectives of competition law or in the mission statement of regulators 
enforcing competition law, which means that the decision-maker should maximise all the 
objectives or to the extent there is some hierarchy between them prioritise some objectives. A 
weaker one, in all other circumstances, when these objectives must be taken to a certain degree 
into account so that the legal system does not create conflicting demands from economic actors, 
and, more broadly, the values integrity of the legal system does not suffer. 
It is important to acknowledge here that competition law should intervene whenever there 
is a restriction of the competitive process180, and the decision to intervene, or not to intervene, 
needs to be justified, as scarce enforcement resources are used and chilling effects may be 
created for welfare-enhancing conduct. The process of justification may involve arguments in 
favour of such restriction of competition and thus of the decision not to intervene on the basis 
of economic efficiency considerations, but also arguments relating to the need to intervene 
against this restriction of competition, these taking into account all the social costs engendered 
by such restriction, including the social costs of the increase of prices on the market, less 
consumer choice, but also restrictions on privacy, to the extent that these are important 
parameters of competition and could be considered as providing content to the concept of 
competition on quality. It is possible that regulation may offer a superior institutional 
alternative than competition law in order to alleviate these concerns. This requires a careful 
comparative institutional analysis, the final choice to act through a specific tool (competition 
or some form of transparency regulation) being at the end between imperfect institutional 
alternatives. For instance, it is possible that the extent of remedial action and possibly the 
continuous supervision of data markets this may entail could be considered as outside the 
traditional remit of competition law and the technical competences of competition authorities 
and may require the intervention of regulation, in particular in view of the reticence of 
competition authorities to intervene in this sector. But it cannot be excluded that it might make 
more sense to focus on the practices of the undertakings having a significant structural/lead 
position in data markets and/or value chains and not on the conduct of all undertakings. To the 
extent that competition law disposes of the tools to engage with economic power more than 
data protection legislation, it could provide in this context a superior alternative.  
                                                          
180 A Edlin & J Farrell, Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process, in R Blair & DD Sokol (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. I (OUP, 2014), Chap. 13, define the competitive process as 
“the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions”, they argue that “[competition law] protects the 
potential beneficial trades between competitors and consumers. Since both consumers and competitors gain from 
such trade, this view can explain why both consumers and thwarted competitors have antitrust rights, even though 
antitrust protects ‘competition and not competitors’. Consumers are not protected from all high prices, but only 
from those that a competitor would be happy to beat but for some thwarting action; this explains why a pure 
monopoly does not violate the law simply, but only from tactics such as moving he goalposts that block them 
from giving customers a better deal than a monopoly does”. Such an approach may dispense, to a certain extent, 
with focusing on all practices that reduce consumer welfare in equilibrium and may provide a useful starting point 
for the competition assessment. 
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A similar analysis may take place with regard to other considerations of “public interest”. 
For instance, promoting biodiversity may constitute an important aim pursued by public 
authorities, eager to ensure a higher quality of nutrition and to preserve food safety, biodiversity 
being the best way to guarantee a healthy eco-system and consequently resilience in the face 
of the uncertainty associated with climate change181. One may also want to take into account 
the gerater impact on wealth inequality of cartels, anticompetitive merger activity and other 
anti-competitive prices in the food sector, in particular if this affects markets of staple food 
products182. 
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Chapter 2: The Transformations of the Global Food Value Chains: Technology and 
Societal changes  
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
2.1.The genetic revolution 
 
For a significant part of human history the manipulation of the process of natural 
variation by humans made possible the selection and the retention of organisms suitable for 
agricultural use in cultivating land and breeding livestock. It is well-known that genetic variety 
results from a process of mutation generated by natural selection, different traits resulting from 
genetic variety being expressed as the organism’s phenotype183. With this process, “useful traits 
appearing spontaneously in nature were bred into certain crops or animals by human (rather 
than natural) selection”184, and led to the development of modern agriculture.  
Domestication, breeding and non-natural selection has led to the development, roughly 
10000 years ago, of major crop plants that constitute our staple foods today, such as corn 
(maize), wheat, rice, potato, tomatoes, grape, peach, various other fruits and vegetable, from 
wild plant varieties to the ones we are familiar now, during a period of non-natural selection 
over the span of several hundred years. A similar process took place in domesticating, breeding 
and artificially selecting phenotypic traits and a vast number of phenotypically different breeds 
with desirable traits during an evolutionary short time period. The domestication of cattle from 
their wild ancestors, but also the transition from the ancient Siberian wolves to the domesticated 
dog constitute landmark successes of humanity in its effort to control and manage nature to its 
own benefit, leading to the emergence of institutions, such as property rights, that led to the 
development of political communities185. Manipulating microbes, bacteria and yeasts, and 
other micro-organisms, to produce different varieties of wine, beer, bread, cheese and yogurt, 
or in order to serve in food fermentation and in preventing food spoilage, has been an important 
feature of the food systems that emerged at the time of the First Agricultural Revolution 
between 10000 and 2000 BC. This process “has exerted a tremendous evolutionary constraint 
that has left almost nothing that is commonly eaten today (except perhaps fish) biologically 
unaltered by human intervention and has rendered many wild antecedents extinct”186. 
The discovery of the laws of inheritance by George Mendel and Charles Darwin’s 
discovery of the process of natural selection in the 19th century, as well as the implementation 
of the process of increased mutagenesis in the 1920s, led to an acceleration of the alteration of 
                                                          
183 European Commission, Explanatory Note, New Techniques in Agricultural Biotechnology (2017), 24. 
“Phenotype” refers to the “visible appearance of an organism (with respect to one or more traits) which reflects 
the interaction of a given genotype with a given environment”. A “genotype” “corresponds to the DNA sequence 
of a cell, and therefore of an organism or individual, which determines, together with epigenetic and environmental 
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185 See, for instance, the role the domestication of the dog played for the emergence of the institution of private 
property rights: see . D. Friedman, Law’s Order (Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), 118-119. 
186 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing: An Ethical Review (September 2016), 58. 
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the genotypes and phenotypes of plants and animals by selective non-natural breeding for 
purposes of increasing genetic diversity. Indeed, domestication is highly dependent on 
mutagenesis, “as random or induced genomic mutations are fixed, giving rise to desirable traits, 
such as high yield”187, while reducing genetic diversity.  
The multiplication of hybridization experiments transformed conventional farming to 
“agricultural science”, with a variety of conventional breeding techniques emerging during this 
period, techniques that are still in use for various crops in different parts of the world188. These 
include, for plants, the process of simple selection, which as we explained above led to the 
development of all widely used modern crops, the practice of sexual crossing through 
hybridization, that can occur intraspecies or interspecies, its aim being to develop novel hybrid 
cultivars that feature traits that do not occur within a single species, bridge crossing through a  
third species if a direct cross is not possible, embryo rescue, somatic hybridisation through 
chromosome engineering in order to combine genes from varieties which are sexually 
incompatible, induced mutagenesis by exposing plants or seeds to physical (e.g. X-rays, 
gamma rays) or chemical [e.g. diethyl sulfate (dES), ethyl methanesulfonate (EI)] manipulation 
or mutation-inducing agent so as to trigger random changes in the plant’s genetic composition, 
translocation breeding, and doubled haploids or polyploidy induction189. One of the tools 
widely chosen to ensure crossing, at least since the mid-1970s, is marker-assisted selection, 
which is based “on the molecular detection of genomic markers closely associated to the 
specific trait”190. Progress in computing technology have made marker-assisted quicker and 
more precise. For animals, modern breeding programmes on the basis mostly of artificial 
insemination, but also embryo transfer technology and in vitro production of embryos, have 
replaced simple selection, a process starting at least six decades ago. Mutagenesis and selection 
is also the most widely used technique to generate and select microbes and other micro-
organisms with preferred characteristics, these been enriched with the assistance of physical or 
chemical agents191.  
The progress of molecular biology in isolating and sequencing DNA and a more 
complete understanding of the molecular mechanisms of genetic inheritance, led to the 
emergence of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s and other established 
techniques of genetic modification. This enabled scientists to insert genetic information into 
the genome of another unrelated organism, thus making possible transgenic animals and plants. 
Boyer and Cohen employed recombinant nucleic acids in bacteria in 1973, leading the way to 
the application of genetic engineering in animals and plants in the late 1970s-early 1980s. In 
1983, the first genetically engineered plants consisted in tobacco to which was inserted 
antibiotic resistance genes. The first commercial Genetically Modified (GM) crops were 
commercialised in 1992 (tobacco), the first insect and herbicide resistant crops being approved 
in 1995-1996192. GM crops are now constituting a sizable, although still not the most significant 
in terms of arable land, part of agricultural production of seeds, with, in 2014, a “reported 18 
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million farmers in twenty-eight countries across the world” devoting “181,5 million hectares” 
of arable land for cultivation of GM crops. However, in terms of value, it is estimated that more 
than half of the global seed market consists in GM seeds193. GM seeds account for 83% of the 
soybean, 29% of the production of cotton, and 24% of the canola grown worldwide194.  
This geographic expansion of GM seeds varies from region to region. Although 
worldwide the cultivation of genetically modified plants has increased “100-fold in the last 17 
years”, the total area of cultivation of GM plants in Europe was “a mere 129000 hectares in 
2012)195. One also needs to take into account that commercial seeds (GM or conventional) do 
not form the only two categories of seed used in agriculture, but that one should also account 
for “farmers’ seed systems” which “result from the breeding efforts of farmers in their fields 
to obtain seeds that they expect to be better suited to their soil, practices and needs” that still 
constitute “a substantial part of the seeds sown in less-developed countries” and “farm-saved 
seeds, which “are sown and harvested from conventional seeds purchased in the previous year”, 
only a small fraction of these being sown “the next season after sorting and cleaning”196. To 
our knowledge, their value is not accounted for in the previous statistics, which, in any case as 
Sylvie Bonny notes is underestimated, “given the extent of partial or biased analyses, as well 
as a lack of data on certain aspects”, economic data being “heterogeneous and sometimes “non-
concordant”197. 
A variety of techniques are available for genetic transformation of plant cells or 
animals, the most common, for plants, being the transformation by a gene vector of the soil 
bacterium Agrobacterium tumefaciens, other techniques being the particle bombardment 
method (biolistics) or gene gun, microinjenction, polyethylene Glycol and electroporation-
based propoplast transformation, laser microbeams, vaccum infiltrationultrasoundm 
electrophoresis and agrolistic transformation198.  
Biotechnology engineering may also genetically alter animals. The first transgenic 
livestock was reported in 1985. The most typical methods include microinjenction, which has 
been used for more than 20 years, and which is currently replaced by more efficient protocols 
based on somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT)199. Dolly was the first mammal cloned from an 
adult body cell, using the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer (traditional cloning), where 
researchers remove the genetic material from an egg and replace it with the nucleus of some 
other body cell, this becoming a factory to produce an embryo that develops into an offspring. 
                                                          
193 S. Bonny, Corporate Concentration and Technological Change in the Global Seed Industry, (2017) 9 
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These methods aim to increase fecundity, for instance by genetically engineering chicken that 
will only produce female offspring for egg-laying, or cattle which better converts feed to 
muscle. However, to date, “the only example of a GM animal being approved for direct human 
consumption is the AquaAdvatage salmon, which was approved by the US FDA in late 2015, 
almost 20 years after the initial application”, and following an extensive review200. In contrast, 
there are no GM animals or derived products on the EU market, nor have there been any 
applications for GM animals in the EU. In microorganisms, a large variety of end products 
result from genetic engineering, producing DNA constructs and transferring them into another 
microorganism, using methods such as electroporation, introduction via conjugation or 
transduction201. 
GM seeds are at the centre of the innovative effort in modern agriculture, the plant 
science industry being one of the world’s most R&D intensive industries. The plant 
biotechnology R&D industry consists of a handful of large firms (around 8-9 global firms, four 
of which are particularly strong competitors), a varying number of smaller firms (around 7500 
of different sizes from around the world producing conventional seeds)202, and public-sector 
research organizations such as land-grant universities. The degree of consolidation of this 
industry is remarkable if one takes into account that in the early 1980s there were more than 
two hundred different seed and trait companies and that many agricultural chemical companies 
included units in both seeds and agricultural chemicals. The process of consolidation has been 
described as following: 
“At first, pharmaceutical and chemical companies sold off their bulk chemicals 
businesses and bought up or merged with other pesticide and pharmaceutical 
companies. The major life-sciences companies each purchased smaller biotechnology 
companies that had promising new genes and seed companies that owned efficient seed 
distribution networks and/or traditional varieties into which novel genes could be 
inserted”203.  
This concentration is not only limited in seeds. It is also reported that the 10 biggest 
pesticide firms now control 90% of the global pesticide market, that 10 companies control 76% 
of the animal pharmaceutical sales, 10 animal feed firms control 52% of the global animal 
market204. A lot of these companies control IPRs. In the seed business IPRs consist of patents, 
plant variety rights and trade secrets. In view of the possibilities of replication through reverse 
engineering trade secrets are not the most optimal way to protect products sold on the open 
market.  
GM seeds and crops also led to various ethical and environment-focused concerns, 
vocally expressed by civil society, and which led to the establishment of strict regulatory 
regimes and standards specifically focusing biotechnology and genetic engineering, eventually 
also the prohibition of GMOs in a number of jurisdictions.  
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In the EU, a key distinction is made between genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
where alteration was made “in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural 
recombination” and requiring the use of a listed to Annex I A, part 1 of Directive 
2001/18/EC205, and food that does not fall within this classification and has not been subject to 
genetic alteration. Although non-GM food and feed is subject to the General Food Law 
Regulation which provides general safety standards and is regulated by the European Food 
Safety Authority206, GM food and feed is subject to specific regulation in relation to 
containment and environmental risks207. According to Directive 2001/18/EC, a “Genetically 
Modified Organism (GMO) means an organism, with the exception of human beings, in which 
the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or 
natural recombination”208. The current approval process for GM plants is time-consuming 
(around 4-6 years) and expensive (around €7-15 million), and does not ensure EU-wide 
distribution of the approved plant/seed, as the safeguard clause enables Member States to reject 
already approved GMOs in case of new scientific information about adverse effects. 
A different regulatory approach is followed in the US, where a “Coordinated 
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology” was put in place in 1986209, assigning broad 
federal jurisdiction over biotechnology products to three federal agencies: the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). Each of these agencies derives its power to regulate from different 
legislative frameworks: the USDA relies on the Plant Protection Act210, the FDA relies on the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and in particular its provisions on food adulteration 
and food additives211, and the EPA mainly on the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act212. Their approach for the regulation of GMOs is products-based, rather than 
process-based, as it in the EU, as regulation focuses on the nature of the products, their 
                                                          
205 Art. 2(2) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, [2001] OJ L 106/1. 
206 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing 
the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, [2002] OJ L31/1. 
207 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate 
release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, [2001] OJ L 106/1, amended by Directive (EU) 
2015/412 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their 
territory, [2015] OJ L 68/1; and Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003 on transboundary movements of genetically 
modified organisms, [2003] OJ L 287/1; Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, 
[2003] OJ L 268/1; Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified 
organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms, [2003] 
OJ L 268/24. On EU Food law, see A. Alemanno & S. Gabbi (eds.), Foundations of EU Food Law and Policy 
(Routledge, 2016); B. Jack, Agriculture and EU Environmental Law (Routledge, 2009, paperback ed., 2016);  M. 
Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs – Law and Decision Making for a New Technology (Edward Elgar, 2008. 
208 Art. 2(2) Directive 2001/18/EC. 
209 Coordinated Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986), available at 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/fedregister/coordinated_framework.pdf . 
210 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-86 (2012). 
211 21 U.S.C. § 402 (food adulteration) and § 409 (food additives). Under the FFDCA, substances added to food 
can be classified either as “food additives,” which require approval from the FDA that they are safe before they 
can be marketed, and substances added to food classified as “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS), as to which 
preapproval is not needed. 
212 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012). 
83 
 
characteristics and intended use, rather than the process in which they are produced213. An 
important scientific and social debate is currently ongoing with regard to the regulation of 
GMOs, in view of some recently published research214, but of course the issue of GMO 
regulation is broader than just addressing environmental and safety concerns, and relates to the 
wider economy and governance of agriculture and the control of food production systems. 
Contrary to the EU regulation of GMOs, the US one does not require the labelling of GM food. 
Most recently, “gene-editing” techniques have enabled targeted interventions at the 
molecular level of DNA or RNA function, thus making it possible to shear DNA with 
tremendous precision. These New Breeding Techniques (NBT) followed earlier generation 
genetic engineering techniques that most often involved the transfer of cloned genes from one 
organism to another in order to produce a transgenic organism. The aim was to use genetic 
engineering so as to give rise to a phenotype that may be radically novel in the engineered 
strain and reproduce this effect in populations. This research came out of dissatisfaction with 
recombinant DNA technologies that were quite time-consuming, expensive, highly inefficient 
at times and that required a special skill-set and important investments in specialised personnel 
and laboratories. NBTs were enabled by advances in genome sequencing and DNA assembly, 
following important progress in various fields, such as molecular biology, bioinformatics and 
data technologies215.  
These NBTs made it possible to introduce changes to the genome without introducing 
genes or sequences from another species. Oligonucleotide Directed Mutagenesis (ODM) is a 
gene-editing technique, where short DNA (or DNA-RNA) fragments (oligonucleotides) are 
introduced into cells so as to trigger the cell to modify its own DNA to match the introduced 
DNA fragments. Alternative gene targeting technologies emerged with genome modification 
becoming possible via the development of site-directed nucleases (SDN), that operate as 
molecular scissors. These took first the form of zinc finger nucleases (ZFN) first used in 2005 
and the transcription activator-like effector nucleases (TALENs), first used in 2010. They 
consist in proteins which are engineered to both recognise specific DNA sequences and to cut 
DNA in the region of such sequences. They require some considerable effort to produce a pair 
of proteins for every editing procedure. The clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic 
repeat (CRISPR/Cas) system, was discovered in 2012. CRISPR is an adaptive immune system 
that uses complementary single-guide RNA (sgRNA) to recognize and cleave select foreign 
DNA, neutralising the ability of a pathogen to wreak havoc in the host216. It comprises two 
elements: a clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR) RNA and the 
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CRISPR-associated protein 9 (Cas 9), which is an endonuclease. CRISPR-Cas9 and other gene-
editing technologies, such as the “more precise” CRISPR-Cpf1, allow scientists to manipulate 
the genetic makeup of an organism by de-activating or knocking out a gene function, eventually 
without the need to introduce genes from other organisms, as this is the case for classical GMO 
genetic engineering. 
Compared to the previous technologies of genetic editing, CRISPR is much more 
efficient (“in terms of successes per attempt”), and cheaper as “the components are trivial to 
produce”, they can be “synthesized with commercially available kits” and the “system 
functions with a universal Cas9 protein framework that dispenses with the need to design a 
different protein for each DNA target”217. New Breeding Techniques, such as CRISPR, which 
enable the production of a specific and targeted mutation, “avoid the need to screen hundreds 
of thousands of crosses […] to identify those with the desired traits”, thus significantly reducing 
“the time and numbers of plants involved in achieving a desired mutation that might otherwise 
be sought by using methods of random mutation and selection”218. To the difference of 
conventional breeding techniques, gene editing makes it possible to reduce the time needed to 
generate the desired genetic characteristics in a plant population from 7-25 years to as few as 
2-3 years as well as to bypass “the need to go through a number of plant generations to achieve 
a particular genetic combination”219. By allowing multiple editing simultaneously in various 
parts of DNA able to inactivate up to tens of targets at once220, CRISPR also allow much faster 
products development. This complies with the finding of a recent study published by the US 
National Academy of Sciences that with the CRISPR breakthrough “the scope, scale, 
complexity, and tempo of biotechnology products are increasing”221.  
Another advantage of using CRISPR editing techniques consists in the recent USDA 
regulation suggesting that CRISPR modified seeds may not need regulatory approval as GMOs, 
since in some cases gene manipulations may involve only deletions or modifications with 
existing DNA222. The competitive advantage of such genome-editing technologies, should 
these not be subject to the existing restrictions of conventional GMO regulation, in comparison 
to conventional breeding methods, may significantly alter the market structure and industry 
dynamics. Of course, the way GMOs are defined for regulatory purposes is different in Europe, 
which raises the question whether these New Breeding Technologies, such as OFT and CIRPR, 
could fall within the scope of the existing EU Regulations on GMOs223. 
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Genome editing techniques, such as CRISPR, may be used in plant breeding in order 
to enhance pesticide resistance (e.g. bacterial-blight resistant rice), induce draught tolerance 
and improve yield or nutritional benefit and appearance224. Application of CRISPR 
technologies for biofuels with the development of plant-based industrial bioproducts may also 
decrease dependence on oil-based products225. In animal genetics, gene-editing technologies 
“made possible research that had been previously unfeasible”226, as the technology may apply 
to animals having long reproduction cycle and CRISPR/Cas9 doesn’t require knowing the 
entire genetic blueprint of the organism, as it is the case with more “traditional” biotechnology 
methods. 
The impact of these revolutionary technologies on food production is still a matter of 
speculation. However, the technology trend makes it plausible that the most valuable 
productive asset in agricultural production will not anymore be the control of genetic material 
(e.g. seeds) but the control of genetic information (e.g. DNA sequences), the next generation 
biotech leading to revolutionary changes in bioengineering tools, enabling the systematic 
design of phenotypes by manipulation of genotypes. The economic actor that will control this 
strategically essential abstract information, for instance through Intellectual Property (IP) 
Rights, may finish by controlling physical living DNA designs. This may engender profound 
structural changes in the industry, as gene-editing technologies may be cheaper and less 
regulated to develop, therefore leading to lower endogenous sunk costs, which provide more 
opportunities for new entry in the seeds/traits/animal genetics markets. Indeed, as a recent 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics report recognizes, “the potential of genome editing techniques 
(in terms of decreased cost and technical difficulty, and increased speed) may revive the 
opportunities for small and medium-sized biotech companies in the agricultural area and 
unlock development of a wider variety of traits”227. These developments may be blocked either 
by regulatory burdens similar to those imposed to GMOs, or by the business strategies of 
incumbent agro-chem corporations that may try to establish one-shop platforms, combining 
traits, seeds, pesticides and smart agriculture or digital products in order to erase barriers to the 
independent entry of small and medium-sized start-ups in the various segments of the value 
chain, licensing or a merging with the agro-chem behemoths being the only options on the 
table. One needs therefore to look closer to the development of digital revolution in agriculture. 
 
2.2. Digital revolution in food production and the convergence of genetics and digital 
technologies: the emergence of FoodTech 
 
 Collaboration is at the forefront of the next Green Revolution. With the Internet comes 
the creation of a new scale of interconnectedness that serves to link networks in more intricate 
and efficient ways than ever before witnesseed in history. The global agricultural value chain 
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can be transformed into an ecosystem of closely tied players as the IoT increases228. In 
particular, this could entail “farmers, food manufactureres, distributors, retailers, technology 
companies, the public sector, and NGOs working together to alleviate the bottlenecks to 
information flow as they arise”229. Digital techniques will place the quantity and quality of 
agricultural output, cost savings, less input utilization as the aim of its intention230. Precision 
agriculture and its ability to use technologies to produce more with less will benefit large farms 
the most, resulting in farm size increases due to the large investments needed for these 
technological implementations.  
 Farmers are often required to secure lending in order to fund the high input costs   
derived from Fertilisers, seeds, and volitbale export sales. The 2016 growing season in the 
United States, for example, saw corn prices halved231 and the USDA reported net farm income 
was down 55 percent in the past year232. From an economic incentives standpoint, this presents 
a worrying landscape. Consequently, the next Green Revolution could mean small farms face 
a lack of economic incentives and financial challenges due to the «thin profit margins and 
relatively long payback periods» for those in the agricultural sector233. Whie offering numerous 
benefits, the emergence of FoodTech requires a more skilled workforce of farmers, but could 
also decrease the number of jobs on farms because of greater use of these technologies234. 
 As farmers begin to implement these technologies, the vast amount of data that will be 
generated through the use of smart sensors and connected farm equipment will raise questions 
of ownership and control of these agronomic and equipment insights235. Consequently, policy 
makers and businesses must answer what data management, data ownership, and access to open 
data should look like throughout the food value chain in terms of standards for exchange, 
exploitation, and abuse. Experts convey that “making farmers the owners of their data and 
providing opportunities to control the flow of their data to stakeholders should help build trust 
with farmers for exchanging data” to encourage an egalitarian approach to big data analysis236. 
Others reinforce the argument that information is thus the revolutionary aspect of the Green 
Revolution and not genetic tinkering or new plant breeds237.  
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 The hope is that with increased insights, decision making will become simpler, more 
intelligent, and more focused by fusing instinct with technology. In particular, argricultural 
giants like Bayer aim to supply the tools needed for “improved decision making”. Other key 
actors such as Monsanto intend to build a “network of in-field sensors to expand the scope of 
soil, weather and other data flwoing in its digitial agriculture tools” which could combine open 
source software development to enable relevant application creation238. Overall, it would 
appear that the future is geared towards these Amazon-styled eco system models for 
agricultural products.  
 Additional pushes for the adoption of FoodTech are that the modern farmer deserves 
less time consuming ways to inspect crops that conventional methods and should have access 
to the prosperity produced by digital agricultural services239. Furthermore, precision agriculture 
will use machine learning to detect biotic stress for effective crop protection. For example, the 
use of non-invasive high resolution sensors can provide information that is calculated in linear 
and nonlinear models and used to successfully detect plant disease and weeds very early on240. 
Delving even deeper into the components of FoodTech reveals that products and applications 
for food production, processing, preservation packaging and all aspects of the food value chain 
will experience new opportunties for innovation. Technology can turn farms into lab-like 
settings, to more efficiently approach high-value but thirsty crops such as almonds, pistachios 
and grapes through smart farming241. 
 Fueling the framing of the digital revolution in agriculture is to define farmers as 
businessmen who urgently need the capacity to make rapid decisions with customizable options 
they cannot do with their own instinct: like choosing the right crop variety and “applying 
exactly the right fertiliser dose”242. Emerging markets involve small holder farmers still 
entrenched by antiquated farming practices, overusing macro Fertilisers or missing preventable 
pest infestations243. Not without moral and ethical questions, the digital revolution in 
agriculture means acknowledging that these 500 million smallholder farms will likely depend 
on the social responsibility of corporations and governments in their transition towards the IoT 
adoption and sensor dispersal244.  
 This further exemplifies the need for a skilled workforce capable of utilizing the 
technology to effectively reap its benefits. Of course, it is the younger generations who must 
re-engage with rural areas to better understand how food is produced and inspire innovation 
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and improved food security245. Ultimately, consumers can drive the demand for change in the 
industry by engaging with the connectedness the IoT provides to encourage more locally 
sourced food access or more sustainable shipping routes through improved mapping 
technology. This need of global food value chains to track and trace, starting from the farm 
level, leads to communication improvements for consumers about the origin, production, 
processes and carbon footprints. Consumers should be able to trust the agri-food sector founded 
“upon greater transparency and traceability along the whole value chain”246.  
   
2.3. The emergence of new consumer trends and technologies: fair trade, organic food, e 
and m-commerce 
 
Although the digital revolution with e and m-commerce have introduced major changes in 
the distribution of products,  less than 1% of food and beverage sales currently occur online247. 
This slow introduction of e and m-commerce in food retail is due to factors such as costs, the 
complexity of logistics, shipping fees, the quality and freshness of the products; Yet, it is 
estimated that between 2013 and 2018, online grocery sales will grow at a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 21.1%, reaching nearly $18 billion by the end of the forecast period in 
the US, while in comparison, offline grocery sales will rise by 3.1% annually during the same 
period248. The market has seen the emergence of new intermediaries, such as online grocery 
delivery services, concierge shopping and subscription prepared meals start-ups offering 
services that really are differentiated from traditional supermarket shopping and do not 
necessarily require home delivery of food items but enable also offer “click and collect” 
services. Organic food constitutes one of the most fast-growing areas of e-commerce in both 
developed and developing economies249. Omnichannel retailing, that is, the use of all physical 
channels (offline) and digital channels (online) offering a seamless, customer-centered 
experience may be the new frontier in food retail. Although supermarkets and big brick and 
mortar stores have been attempting to integrate digital commerce in their model, this is still at 
its infancy. Public policy makers have been increasingly looking closely to e-commerce. In 
particular in the EU, following the recent adoption of the Digital Single Market Strategy, the 
Commission announced an e-commerce sector inquiry in order to address contractual 
restrictions in distribution agreements that prevent retailers from selling goods or services 
purchased online or cross-border to customers located in another EU country. Although the 
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food sector and more generally perishable products may not be the primary focus of such 
inquiry, the boost to intra-EU e-commerce that may result from such sector inquiry may also 
benefit this sector.  
 The Digital revolution is also revolutionizing the food industry through a more 
systematic use of Bog Data. The Industry may take advantage of the same big data services as 
financial firms and marketing departments to better understand their consumer, increase 
efficiency and create new products250. Companies believe that big data may create a more 
customized, customer-centric experience, where specific customer profiles may be collected 
and used in order to enhance more relevant marketing efforts. It was reported that Starbacks 
which has 13 million mobile payment app users representing 16% of total transactions, uses 
this data to track what individual customers like, or what makes someone different from other 
customers251. Several supermarkets may use data from their loyalty cardholders to personalize 
the shopping experience and target rewards and new promotions. Data aggregation technology 
may also be used in farming. It was reported that Monsanto bought several farm data analytics 
companies between May 2012 and February 2014: 
“Monsanto acquired Precision Planting, a maker of hardware and software that assists 
farmers with seed space, depth, and root systems in fields, in early 2012. In October 
2013, the company bought Climate Corporation, a weather data analysis startup in San 
Francisco, for almost a billion dollars. Then, in February 2014, Climate Corporation 
bought Solum, a soil testing service based in San Francisco. Monsanto's primary 
software product, Filed Scripts, works with all of these systems to determine soil 
productivity and yield”252. 
Monsanto’s acquisition of Climate Corp. shows the potential applications that big data 
may have in agri-business. Climate Corp. offers insurance against weather-related incidents 
which goes beyond what has traditionally been the federal crop insurance in the U.S. which  
protects farmers against the costs of their inputs—fertiliser, seed—during hard times but does 
not do more than just assist them in breaking even on these costs. Climate Corp. offers 
insurance covering the profit. Using weather data to measure temperature and rainfall and other 
factors it guarantees to a farmer that bought a policy that covered drought and his land didn’t 
receive the specified amount of rain covered by the policy, that he will be paid out 
automatically by Climate Corp. (for his lost profit) based on the measurements253. The era of  
“Smart” or “Precision agriculture” has begun. 
Ag analytics and technology-aided farming aim to develop new sensors to monitor and 
make farms more efficient or better manage resources and constitute a dynamic emergent 
market, with the involvement of agri-tech start-ups and larger agricultural corporations254. 
Cheap sensors constantly monitor the moisture and nutrients in soil, while satellite images may 
assist farmers to measure the yields of crops. Big data may also become important in order to 
establish global networks of information-sharing among players in supply chains which can 
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result in significant cost reductions, reliability and sustainability benefits and ultimately 
guarantee the security of food supplies at a time when climate change may lead to situations of 
food scarcity and disruption255. Further applications may include the use of data on food 
purchases, along other social activities in order to identify health risks, which although 
controversial has already occurred256. These technologies will change the way farming operates 
and the need for labour in this sector. As it was noted in a recent report, 
“(i)nstead of sitting on equipment outdoors, (the farmer) and a handful of associates 
operate all the equipment for a farm covering thousands of hectares from a control 
room. GPS-guided autonomous drones constantly provide the data required for the 
algorithms, and other GPS-guided equipment works the fields with precision, 
sometimes even at the level of the individual plant. The crops have been genetically 
engineered to resist most fungi, viruses and insects and are highly efficient in their 
uptake and use of nutrients. As a result, the farm needs less fertiliser, water, and crop 
protection than it did in the past”257. 
 Finally, an important societal development is the emergence and increasing popularity 
of organic food and fair trade, in particular in Europe. Both constitute strategies of quality 
product differentiation that occur not only at the food processing level, but also at the retail 
level with specific retailers specializing in the distribution of organic and fair trade products. 
Contrary to traditional product differentiation relying on branding and advertising for specific 
products, these constitute generic categories of product differentiation and labelling, based on 
perceived attributes of particular types of products, in particular relating to the inputs used and 
the process of their production (e.g. natural, recyclable, eco-friendly, low energy, recycled 
content, non-toxic etc.). This market for quality-product differentiation is regulated by private 
or government run certification process. Such public and private certification systems may raise 
similar competition concerns to technology standard-setting258. 
Market definition may also be quite challenging in this context of generic categories 
product differentiation. In Federal Trade Commission v. Whole Foods Inc., the court of appeal 
reversed the decision of the district court, which had rejected the demand for a restraining order 
and preliminary injunction brought by the FTC in order to block a merger between two 
premium, natural and organic (PNO) supermarkets259. The government’s case was based on 
the theory of unilateral effects, advancing that the merger will create a monopoly in eighteen 
cities where the two merging companies were the only PNO supermarkets. This contention was 
based on internal business documents that demonstrated the closeness of competition between 
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the two merging companies and direct evidence (based on diversion ratios) showing that entry 
by other PNO supermarkets had greater impact on PNOs prices than entry by conventional 
supermarkets. The district court rejected these arguments, as they focused on the effect of the 
merger to consumers that were buying only organic food. The district court chose instead a 
market definition that considered important the role of marginal consumers, thus including 
conventional supermarkets in the same relevant market as the PNO supermarkets: “because so 
many people are cross-shopping for natural and organic foods and are marginal rather than core 
customers, the actual loss from a SSNIP would exceed the critical loss”, that is, it will be 
unprofitable. The court of appeal agreed with the district court on the need to define a relevant 
market but it also emphasized that core consumers, demanding exclusively a particular product 
or package of products, are in some situations “worthy of antitrust protection5”, therefore 
leading to the definition of a distinct submarket of PNO supermarkets. The Court found that 
these consumers “may be captive to the sole supplier, which can then, by means of price 
discrimination, extract monopoly profits from then while competing for the business of 
marginal consumers”260. 
 
2.4.The financialisation of agriculture 
 
The process of financialisation of the global economy has been described as a recurrent trend 
affecting a number of markets261. Following up the transformation of corporate control since 
the 1970s with the development of the multiproduct firm, in which managers sought to spread 
risks across various product lines in order to achieve greater profitability and to grow through 
mergers financed by leveraged buyouts, private equity investing financed by junk bonds and 
other innovative financial techniques, the level of corporate (but also household) debt has 
considerably increased. The financialisation of the modern corporation has been a marking 
feature of this evolution, with the prevalence of the shareholder value principle, the focus on 
short-term share price, leveraging through debt and various hybrid financial instruments as well 
as the important role of institutional investors, in particular financial institutions but also 
sovereign wealth funds.  
 The financialisation of agricultural commodities trade is an episode of this ongoing 
expansion of financialisation of agricultural markets. Financial speculation on agricultural 
commodities has been facilitated by the creation of new financial devices with the aim to 
establish private insurance markets through forward trading that would substitute for existing 
public price-control mechanisms set in order to protect farmers from market price fluctuations. 
For instance, The Food Corporation of India is a public body, established in 1964, with the aim 
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to act as a cross between a marketing board, a food bank and a subsidy scheme, intervening 
with the aim to protect farmers from market prices’ volatility, thus acting as a public insurance 
mechanism262. Yet the development of such commodity futures trade triggers through self-
reinforcing speculation price fluctuations, thus putting the farmers at the mercy of big market 
actors, such as one-stop shop solution corporations providing farmers insurance with regard to 
their yields. As it was explained by Ghosh, 
“The declared purpose of forward trading and of futures markets is to allow for hedging 
against price fluctuations, whereby the selling of futures contracts would exceed the 
demand for them. This implies that futures prices would be lower than spot prices, or 
what is known as backwardation. However, throughout much of the period from 
January 2007 to June 2008, the markets were actually in contango, in which futures 
prices were higher than spot prices. This cannot reflect the hedging function and must 
imply the involvement of speculators who are expecting to profit from rising prices”263. 
 An important step in this process of financialisation is the creation of a tradable 
commodity price index, the first one in the Unites States being the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Spot Commodity Index, extablished in the early 1940s, followed in 1991 by the creation of the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (SP-GSCI), thus enabling investors to bet on commodities, 
simply buying a swap contract from Goldman Sachs, “without having to participate in formal 
futures markets with their position limit restrictions”264. The following step in this financial 
innovation was the creation of the Exhange Traded Funds (ETFs), which enabled institutional 
and retail investors to add commodities to portfolios, therefore transforming commodities to a 
new asset class265. The financialisation of commodity markets culminated with the passage of 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, which led to a phenomenal 
increase of the swaps market. In order to avoid price manipulation, the CFMA required that all 
agricultural futures be traded on a CFTC-regulated exchange. However, it also allowed for the 
possibility of an exemption if this “would be consistent with the public interest”266. On the 
understanding that financial investments would not influence spot prices, such exemption was 
widely interpreted and that led to a “tremendous flow of funds” into commodities267. Hence, 
CFMA led to a deregulation of futures trading for agricultural commodities, financial interests 
dominating now futures trading and accounting for 70-80 percent of open interest in many 
markets268.Following the 2008 commodity price bubble, the CFTC proposed the establishment 
of speculative position limits for a number of previously exempted agricultural commodity 
futures and option contracts, adopting these new posiiton limits rules in October 2011. 
However, these rules were successfully challenged in court, which interpreted the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the statutory legal basis for the CFTC action, as requiring the CFTC, when establishing 
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new position limits, to prove that speculative limits were necessary in order to avoid excessive 
speculative positions that could lead to higher prices in interstate commerce. CFTC had to 
propose new limits in 2013. 
The intricacies of commodity futures trading are explored in the following article, of 
which we include extended excerpts.  
 
Luigi Russi and Tomaso Ferrando, Capitalism a Nuh’ Wi Frien’ – the Formatting of 
Farming into an Asset, from Financial Speculation to International Aid, Catalyst – A 
Social Justice Forum, Vol. 6, issue 1 (2015) (excerpts - references and footnotes omitted)  
 
“[…] The consequences (of commodity futures trading), for farmers, are particularly 
challenging, and often sufficient to push many off the land. For instance, they might decide to 
err on the side of caution and sow more from one year to the next, so as to preserve their overall 
income even in the case of falling prices (by selling more). The sad irony of this strategy is 
that, as many farmers simultaneously do the same, they can create a glut that depresses prices 
even further, producing the very conditions they are trying to shelter themselves against. 
Desperate to secure sales for their crops, farmers will also accept whatever prices will get them 
an income. In other words, they will be more eager to bend to the dictates of more concentrated 
brokers and processors further along the food supply chain. In the absence of a public insurance 
system like the FCI, in fact, those who can—typically farmers more integrated in global 
commodity chains, leaning towards extensive mechanization and scale of agricultural 
production—are left with the option of purchasing private insurance. And that private 
insurance, when it comes to crops, is called a future. Futures are agreements for the sale or 
purchase of commodities (like many food staples, e.g. grains) at a fixed price, for future 
delivery. These agreements are in turn exchanged as standardized positions on regulated 
exchanges, the largest of which are located in the US. Because they are traded on regulated and 
centralized exchanges, futures prices are considered reliable indicators of the conditions of the 
markets for the concerned commodities, even by operators who trade those commodities on 
spot exchanges (i.e. everyone who buys and sells agricultural produce, such as wholesalers), 
since futures prices are meant to reflect information more complete than would be available on 
fragmented spot markets. In this sense, even if only a few farmers can directly transact in 
futures, all farmers are affected by fluctuations in the prices of these instruments. 
The fact that futures are exchanged in standardized form means that one does not directly enter 
into an agreement with a specific party. Instead, buy and sell orders are matched by a 
clearinghouse. Indeed, one way to think of the functioning of futures markets is to think of 
them as like the more familiar stock exchange where, however, what is exchanged is not stocks, 
but rather commodities with a pre-determined delivery date. This means that there are as many 
different ‘prices’ as there are available delivery dates to choose from. Like a stock exchange, 
futures markets can also be subject to endogenous dynamics (i.e. patterns of trading emerging 
from the combination of motives, institutional arrangements, and the technological and 
analytical equipment of market participants, rather than from exogenous factors such as the 
available supply or demand of the goods being traded) that can—under certain conditions—
make their functioning a ticking time-bomb. 
94 
 
Indeed, economists like Hyman Minsky have, for instance, long suggested that a lot of 
what happens in a financial market need not necessarily be explained by appealing to 
fluctuations in supply and demand, understood as external variables that are simply reflected 
in price dynamics. 
Sometimes, instead, markets cause by their own functioning the problems that 
neoclassically-trained economists subsequently try to pin on fluctuations in demand and 
supply. 
In the case of commodity futures, the beginning of the story lies in the changing 
structure of commodity futures markets after the approval of the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act in the US in the year 2000. A commodity future, as anticipated above, is a 
contract for the sale or purchase of a standardized commodity (including many food staples) 
with a future delivery date. The regulated markets for commodity futures basically generate a 
price for a given maturity date, by matching standardized buy and sell orders. The effect of 
opening a position on the futures market is not—like on a stock exchange— to acquire 
ownership of the underlying asset, but simply to freeze the price at the level it stands, for a 
given future delivery date. This is where the original insurance function stems from, since an 
open futures position insulates the transaction from the dynamics of the spot (immediate 
delivery) market because, on maturity, the exchange will be performed at the previously agreed 
price, not at the spot (current) price. An alternative to holding a futures position till maturity, 
however, is to determine one’s exposure before taking delivery, by opening at a later time the 
opposite position (for the same delivery date), presumably for a different price than had been 
previously fixed on the original order. This means that opening and closing positions on the 
futures market, for a given delivery date, at different moments in time can result in profits or 
losses. Because standardized futures contracts are not entered into with a specific party, if one 
submits a ‘buy’ order it is always possible for that investor to determine his or her exposure, 
by putting in a ‘sell’ order for that same delivery date, and vice versa. Of course, if ‘buy’ and 
‘sell’ orders for a particular delivery date are put in at different moments in time prior to 
delivery, it might be that one might sell for more than he or she bought (a profit-making strategy 
called ‘going long’), or that they will buy for less than they originally sold (a strategy called 
‘going short’). Prior to the 2000 Act coming into force, participants in this market (especially 
when it came to agricultural commodities) were either commercial operators who needed to 
insure themselves against price fluctuations, or arbitrageurs, who merely sought to profit from 
temporary price variations, while being subject to precise position limits. After 2000, however, 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act allowed unregulated over-the-counter derivative 
transactions on commodities (thereby opening a market for financial products indexed to the 
price of commodity futures, as described below), as well as containing the so-called ‘swap-
dealer loophole’, whereby parties hedging a financial position could trade on the futures market 
like ‘commercial’ operators engaging in it for operational needs (such as to insure their produce 
against price fluctuations), thereby being exempt from the stricter position limits for 
speculators. Both of these are relevant for what was to follow. 
As a consequence, in fact, after 2000 a new type of investment scheme became 
ubiquitous, which has since become known as ‘commodity index speculation’. In its original 
OTC form, it consists of a swap contract between the swap dealer (typically an investment 
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bank, like Goldman Sachs) and an institutional investor, like a pension fund, with money to 
invest. The swap would be used to simulate (financially) the (actual) ownership of 
commodities. This would initially require the institutional investor to pay the dealer a lump 
sum. In exchange for it, they would be credited at contractually-stipulated dates with the 
variations in value of their simulated investment in commodities. The way this ‘virtual’ 
ownership of commodities would be simulated is by taking as a point of reference the value of 
a commodity index. This is a figure obtained through a mathematical formula that averages the 
price of different commodity futures, weighted by the percentage of different commodities that 
have been included in the index. 
Let’s take for instance a hypothetical index including grain, gas and oil futures in equal 
percentages. This would translate into a number that would track over time—in equal measure 
relative to one another—the price of gas, grain and oil. The reason for choosing the futures 
price specifically stems from the assumption that futures prices are a reliable indicator of the 
proximate fluctuations in spot prices, so that investing in commodity futures is more or less 
equivalent to buying the commodities themselves, if all one is looking for is to simulate 
commodity ownership from a purely financial standpoint.  
To return to the swap contract, the dealer would then—at fixed dates—have to transfer 
the variation in the value of the index between any two contractually stipulated settlement 
dates. 
However, once the dealer takes the obligation upon him-/herself to deliver a cash flow 
that reproduces ownership of a basket of commodities, it would then make sense for them to 
procure insurance against fluctuations in the prices of those commodities. And the way to do 
so is to join commercial operators (trying to insure themselves against risks related to their 
business, e.g. as grain traders or producers) on the futures market: this is how the link between 
an OTC derivative transaction— the swap—and the futures market is first established. What is 
significant to note, here, is that swap dealers enter the same insurance market as commercial 
operators, to cover themselves against the fluctuation of commodity prices. This entails, in 
turn, that their trading strategies will be responsive (not to events pertaining to the actual 
production and exchange of commodities, but) to the peculiar characteristics of the financial 
risks they are insuring themselves against, as illustrated below. 
This, in fact, is where a crucial issue arises, namely that, while a futures contract by 
definition has a time-limited duration (because it is subject to a delivery date), the sort of 
obligation that the swap dealer enters into with the institutional investor can in theory be open-
ended. In other words, the swap dealer can synthesize ‘ownership’ of commodities over an 
unspecified length of time, and they would ‘insure’ themselves against the risk entailed by this 
financial obligation by opening futures positions, which however expire at a certain date in the 
future. So the tool (commodity future) used to insure the swap dealers’ financial risks is not 
built to cover the entire span of the risks— from indefinite exposure to commodity price 
fluctuations—that they are trying to shield themselves against. 
This creates a discrepancy between: 
1. The length of the obligation of the swap dealer towards the institutional investor through the 
swap contract on the one hand, and 
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2. The length of a standardised futures contract on the other, through which the swap dealer 
may try to insure their financial risk. 
This discrepancy poses the need for periodical rollover of any futures positions that have been 
opened by the dealer to hedge the swap. In other words, it’s as though the swap dealers had to 
keep renewing their insurance coverage, upon its expiry date. The way they do so is through a 
particular trade called a rollover, which involves closing one’s exposure on futures nearing 
maturity, and opening an interest in the next-expiring batch. 
A rollover requires first of all to open the opposite position (say ‘sell’) on a given 
maturity date, to the one that an operator already holds. In this way, the original undertaking 
(for example, ‘buy’) cancels out with the new one. This is followed by opening a new position 
(e.g. ‘buy’) for a later delivery date. So, if I enter into a commitment to buy grain for delivery 
on the 2nd of February, I can later enter into another one to sell grain for delivery on the 2nd 
of February, so that my two positions cancel out and I don’t actually have to take physical 
delivery. Subsequent to that, I may then wish to ‘roll over’ my exposure to the futures market 
by submitting another commitment to buy grain for delivery on March 2nd. 
This, in fact, is what a swap dealer would be doing, since they would typically hold a 
number of positions containing the undertaking to buy for delivery at a fixed date into the future 
(say February 2nd). As that date approaches, the swap dealer would undertake to sell the same 
amount for delivery on February 2nd, so that its obligations would cancel out. When this 
happens, however, what a third-party observer would see would be a sudden surge in ‘sell’ 
orders for the given commodity as the delivery date of February 2nd approaches. For these 
‘sell’ orders to clear with matching ‘buy’ orders, it is likely that the price they will attract will 
be lower than it would otherwise have been outside of the rollover period. 
Symmetrically, as the swap dealer rolls its position over into a later-expiring future, it 
would issue a ‘buy order’ with a later expiry date (say March 2nd). For this surge in ‘buy’ 
orders to clear with matching ‘sell’ orders, the commodity will draw a higher price than it 
otherwise would outside the rollover period, when sudden surges in ‘buy’ orders would not 
normally occur. 
The fact that these rollovers happen at regular intervals, for contractual reasons 
(insuring the risks stemming from a commodity index swap) and not to reflect fundamentals in 
the underlying commodity market muddles the informational value of futures prices. 
Furthermore, the periodical price-depression of near-expiring futures (as swap dealers close 
expiring future positions) and price-inflation of later-expiring futures (as swap dealers open 
new positions on the buy side) tilts the structure of futures prices towards contango. 
Many commentators of neoclassical formation have denied that this sort of price 
structure—even if induced by the activity of commodity index speculation—could ever have 
any repercussions on spot prices, which they suggest only reflect present (not anticipated) 
scarcity of a commodity, based on standard demand and supply interaction. On this reading, 
the rise of grain prices becomes something to ascribe exclusively to increased meat 
consumption, draughts, and competition between edible crops and biofuels, all of which 
directly affect supply of the relevant commodities. 
However, as buyers and sellers on spot markets take into account the signals coming 
from the futures market, those sellers with access to storage facilities might decide to hoard, 
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whereas interested buyers, anticipating a rise in prices, might try to stockpile today to shelter 
themselves from rising prices in the future. Hence, a price structure induced by the periodical 
rollover of futures contracts seems capable to affect spot prices as well, even though any 
ownership on the part of the swap dealers themselves would never be more than ‘virtual’ as 
they close off their positions and never take delivery. As a consequence of contango in the 
futures market, instead, ‘real’ scarcity could and did in fact ensue on spot markets in the 2007-
08 period (during which time futures markets were precisely in contango), sparking protests 
and ‘hunger revolutions’ around the world: this—as mentioned at the beginning of this 
section—is because, while the main futures markets are centralized in the United States, they 
are used worldwide as a reference for spot trading as well. 
Add to this that commodity-indexed financial products became particularly attractive 
as investment opportunities, particularly after the dotcom and subprime bubbles. […]  
The increase in the percentage of futures trades being undertaken in connection with 
speculation would eventually cause a self-reinforcing loop whereby, as more and more 
commodity investors engage in ‘automatic’ rollovers, the contango-inducing dynamics that 
these rollovers perpetuate would become stronger. This drives up futures prices even further, 
increasing the appeal of commodities as an investment, and eventually leading to an increasing 
amount of trading that takes place to hedge commodity index-linked products, thereby giving 
rise to a self- reinforcing loop of investment driving futures prices higher through contango-
inducing rollovers, and higher futures prices begetting more investment. In addition to this, 
contango-inducing dynamics were further exacerbated by other speculators, such as money 
managers, who positioned themselves so as to profit from the rollover. If, in fact, market 
participants who are not involved in hedging commodity indexed products anticipate that the 
near-expiring future will trade for less in response to a predicted surge in ‘sell’ orders from 
swap dealers during the rollover period, they may adopt a strategy of ‘going long’, by selling 
before the rollover period and buying (for less) during that subsequent phase. 
However, as several operators simultaneously trade in anticipation of the rollover, this can 
create another ‘mini-surge’ of sell orders that lengthens the span and breadth of contango 
inducing trading. 
 
If, as the authors contend, the commodity futures market leads to a dissociation of the price 
formation from the present standard demand and supply interaction, thus reflecting the 
preferences of the consumers, and is intrinsically linked to the perceptions of investors about 
future evolution of demand (which may be irrational), it is hard to imagine how a competition 
law ignoring the formation of commodity prices could operate if it did not find a way to 
integrate in the analysis the contango-inducing dynamics of commodities future trading and 
the externalities that such pseudo-market configuration may produce on the different economic 
actors involved (farmers, final consumers, processors).  
A second illustration of the increasingly important role of financialisation is the growing 
role of institutional investors and private equity in the food industry. Schmidt reports that from 
the 281 deals reported in 2013 in the Food and Beverage Industry, investment firms and banks 
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were involved in 47, or 15% of all activity269. A number of the largest companies in the various 
segments of the value chain are privately held corporations, most notably grain companies, 
with a number of companies at the retail level having a mixed ownership structure270. 
Moreover, a number of institutional investors, including sovereign wealth funds, but also 
privately held grain corporations are investing in agricultural land, in particular global farmland 
investments. This has led to backclash from some quarters that raised the problem of global 
fam land grab as a main public policy concern271.  
Broadening the horizon of competition authorities to envision tools and frameworks that 
respond to such crucial developments, such as financialisation, constitutes an important 
challenge we need to take into account. This is particularly important as to the visible economic 
concentration of some of the segments of the food value chain, one should also add the “stealth 
concentration” arising out of the investment of the same institutional investors in various 
companies active in the multiple segments of the food value chain. Chapter 4 of Part III 
examines in more detail the role of large institutional investors in the food sector, the possible 
effects this may have on competition, and the different tools at the disposal of competition law 
authorities. 
 
References 
 
Accenture. Digital Agriculture: Improving Profitability. (2015). 
Backer, K., Miroudot, S. Mapping Global Value Chains (OECD, 2013). 
Biscarini, F, Nicolazzi, E. Challenges and opportunities in genetic improvement of local 
livestock breeds. (2015), Frontiers in Genetics, 6(33). 
Bekakers, R.,Duysters, G., Verspagen, B. Intellectual property rights, strategic technology 
agreements and market structure: the case of GSM, (2002) 31(7) Research Policy 1141-1161. 
Behmann, J, Mahlein, T, et al. A review of advanced machine learning methods for the 
detection of biotic stress in precision crop protection. (2015), Precision Agriculture. 16(3), 239-
260. 
Bonny, S.  Corporate Concentration and Technological Change in the Global Seed Industry, 
(2017). 
Boston Consulting Group, The Value of our Digital Identity (November 2012). 
Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector (April 2015). 
Competition Commission of India, Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in India, (2012). 
Cotterill, R. ‘Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont,’ (1986), The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 379. 
Enriquez P., CRISPR GMOs, (2017) 18(4) North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology 432. 
ETC, Who will Control the Green Economy? (November 2011). 
                                                          
269 T.P. Schmidt, The Political Economy of Food and Finance (Routledge, 2016), 111. 
270 Ibid., 114. 
271 Ph. McMichael, The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring, (2012) 39 (3-4) The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 681. 
99 
 
ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 
115. 
European Commission, Digitising the Agri-food Sector: a research agenda for Horizon 2020 
(European Commission – Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development  
November 2016). 
European Commission, Explanatory Note, New Techniques in Agricultural Biotechnology 
(2017), 24. 
European Parliament, Precision Agriculture and the Future of Farming in Europe, 
IP/G/STOA/FWC/2013-1/Lot 7/SC5 (December 2016). 
Evenson, R. Government Policy and Technological Progress in U.S. Agriculture, in R. Nelson 
(ed.). Government Support of Technological Progress: A Cross Industry Analysis (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1982). 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, Commission on Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture  (2015). The Second Report on the State of the World’s 
Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. 
Fuglie, K. Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural 
Input, and Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 
(2011) 11 
Gereffi, G., Christian, M. Trade, Transnational Corporations and Food Consumption: A Global 
Value Chain Approach, in C. Hawkes, C. Blouin, S. Henson, N. Drager, L. Dubé (eds.), Trade, 
Food, Diet and Health Perspectives and Policy Options, (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 3. 
Ghosh, J. The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance, (2010) 10(1) Journal of Agrarian 
Change 72–86, 78-79. 
Gataulina, E.A., Vertical Integration in an Agroindustrial Complex: Agrofirms and 
Agroholdings in Russia, The dynamics of vertical coordination in agrifood chains in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia: case studies. Working Paper 45 (2006). 
Hartung, F., Schiemann, J. Precise plant breeding using new genome editing techniques: 
opportunities, safety and regulation in the EU, (2014) 78 Plant Journal 742-752, 743. 
Harris, J The US Food Marketing System: Competition, Coordination, and Technological 
Innovations Into the 21st Century, (2002), USDA Economic Research Service 1. 
Howard, P. Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008, (2009) 1(4) 
Sustainability 1266-1287. 
Humphrey, J., Memedovic, O.  ‘Global Value Chains in the Agrifood Sector’ (2006) UNIDO 
5. 
Karolyczk, P. Product Certification – the next big standard-setting debate? (March 14, 2013). 
Kaufman, P., Handy, C. U.S. Fresh Produce Markets: Marketing Channels, Trade Practices, 
and Retail Pricing Behavior (US Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research Service 1989). 
Krijn, P, Wolfert, S, Verdouw, C.N. A European Perspective on the Economics of Big Data: 
(OECD, 2015). 
Kneafsey, M.  Short Food Supply Chains and Local Food Systems in the EU (2013) Report 
EUR 25911 EC. 
100 
 
KPMG International, The agricultural and food value chain: entering a new era of cooperation 
(2013). 
Lianos, I.,Katalevsky, D., Ivanov, A.The global seed market, competition law and intellectual 
property rights: untying the Gordian knot. Concurrences , 2016 (2) , Article 78807. 
Lyneis, J. System dynamics for business strategy: a phased approach, (1999) 15 System 
Dynamics Review 37-70. 
MacDonald, J. ‘Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of 
Agricultural Commodities’ (2004) USDA-ERS Agricultural Economic Report. 
Ph. McMichael, The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring, (2012) 39 (3-4) The 
Journal of Peasant Studies 681 
Meade, B, Puricelli, E, McBride, W et al. (2016). Corn and soybean production costs and 
export competitiveness in Argentina, Brazil, and United States (USDA report summary for 
Economic Research Service). 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, Report on Agricultural Marketing, 2007. 
Nordås, H., Grosso, M., Pinali, E. Market Structure in the Distribution Sector and Merchandise 
Trade (OECD 2008) 14. 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing: An Ethical Review (September 2016). 
Pray, C., Ohmhke, J., Naseem, A. Innovation and Dynamic Efficiency in Plant Biotechnology: 
An Introduction to the Researchable Issues, (2005) 8(2&3) AgBioForum 52, 59. 
Rama, R. Foreign Multinational Enterprises in the Food and Beverages Industries of the 
BRICS, in W. Naude, A. Szirmai, & N. Haraguchi (eds.), Structural Change and Industrial 
Development in the BRICS. (OUP, 2015) p. 300 
Reardon. T., Chen K. The quiet revolution in Asia’s rice value chains. (2014), Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences., p 110. 
Roberts, M.T.,  Food Law in the United States (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
Russi, L., Ferrando, T. Capitalism a Nuh’ Wi Frien’ – the Formatting of Farming into an Asset, 
from Financial Speculation to International Aid, Catalyst – A Social Justice Forum, Vol. 6, 
issue 1, 3 (2015). 
Sarni, W., J. Mariani & J. Kaji, From dirt to data: The second green revolution and the Internet 
of Things, (2016) Deloitte Review Issue 18 
Schmidt T.P., The Political Economy of Food and Finance (Routledge, 2016) 
Swinnen, J.  Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor How the Globalization of Food 
Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and Poverty (CABI 2007) 1. 
Tiwari, B, Norton, T, Holden, M et al (2013). Current Concepts and Applied Research in 
Sustainable Food Processing. John Wiley & Sons. 12-14. 
Wandel, J. ‘Business Groups and Competition in Post-Soviet Transition Economies: The Case 
of Russian “agroholdings”’ (2011) 24 The Review of Austrian Economics, 403. 
Warren, K. Why has Feedback Systems Thinking Struggled to Influence Strategy and Policy?, 
(2004) 21 Systems Research and Behavioral Science 1-17. 
Warren, K. Strategic Management Dynamics (Wiley, 2008). 
World Bank, Agriculture for Development (World Bank 2008). 
101 
 
World Bank and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World 
Bank 2005). 
Wolstenholme, Qualitative vs quantitative modelling: the evolving balance, (1999) 50 Journal 
of Operational Research Society, 422-428. 
Wolfert, S, Ge, L. “Big Data in Smart Farming-A Review”. (2017) 153 Agricultural Systems, 
69-80. 
Wozniak, M.T.,  McHughen A. (eds.), Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: The United 
States and Canada (Springer, 2012). 
Zhang,Y.,Xudong, R. Organization, technology and management innovations through 
acquisition in China’s pork value chains: The case of Smithfield acquisition by Shuanghui. 
(2017) Food Policy. 
 
  
102 
 
Part II: Global Food Value Chain(s): General Presentation 
 
Chapter 1: The food value chain 
 
Ioannis Lianos & Claudio Lombardi 
 
1.1.  General Presentation on Food Value Chains 
 
The food supply chain is generally depicted as composed by three main levels: agricultural 
production, industrial processing and wholesale or retail distribution. At a closer look, 
however, the food supply chain becomes more complex than this tripartition, involving a 
number of other stages and links that add value to the chain either in the form of goods or 
services inputs.272 At each level of the supply chain, firms as well as other organizational forms 
perform specific activities supplying goods or services. Moreover, at the same level there may 
be one or more firms performing the same or complementary activities, adding specific value 
at their stage of activity.  
 
Figure 1: Total Food Supply Chain 
 
Source:Moniqa273 
                                                          
272 The accent on the activity that at each stage of the supply chain one or more subjects perform adding certain 
value, generated the definition of value-added chain.  Initially defined by Bruce Kogut, ‘Designing Global 
Strategies: Comparative and Competitive Value Added Chains’ (1985) 26 Sloan management review. For later 
development see Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’ 
(2005) 12 Review of international political economy 78. 
273  See http://www.ineffableisland.com/2010/06/eu-funded-moniqa-tracks-edible-safety.html#!/2010/06/eu-
funded-moniqa-tracks-edible-safety.html . 
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The food supply chain, as a whole, originates therefore even before the agricultural 
sector,274 with the factors of production market (for example the seed and traits provider, 
fertlisers, agricultural machinery, plant protection agents) and ends with the final consumer.  
The agricultural commodities generally undergo a processing stage before being 
distributed. However, in some cases they are sold directly to consumers (direct chain) or 
through the sole mediation of the wholesale industry (short supply chain). The length of the 
supply chain depends therefore on how many stages of transformation or commercialiation the 
product undergoes before reaching the final consumer. 
 
Figure 2: The Long and Short Supply Chains  
 
 
 
Source: Europea Commission, Joint Research Center 2013275 
 
A simplified description of the structural organization of the supply chain is generally 
based on the relationships between producers and suppliers, on one hand, and suppliers and 
retailers, on the other.276   
                                                          
274 The agricultural sector is in this paper intended as comprising both crop production and raising of livestock. 
275 M. Kneafsey and others, ‘Short Food Supply Chains and Local Food Systems in the EU’ (2013) Report EUR 
25911 EC, available at http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=6279. 
276 Food supply chains are generally presented as characterised by a structure characterized by two bottlenecks, 
one at supply level and the second at retail level, see for instance South Centre, ‘Rebalancing the Supply Chain: 
Buyer Power, Commodities and Competition Policy’ (2008) South Centre. 
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Typically, at production level, the relationship between market actors spans from a spot 
market exchange to a full ownership integration.277 Within this range, there are different types 
of contractual relationships, which contribute to the definition of the governance model adopted 
by the supply chain. In particular, marketing agreements and production agreements are the 
categories under which different relationships between contractors and growers are defined.278  
At distribution level, instead, there are generally three types of wholesalers around 
which the supply chain is structured: a) merchant wholesalers; b) manufacturers’ branches and 
ofﬁces; and c) brokers and agents.279 
 
Figure 3: Food distribution channels 
 
Source: Harris et al., 2002280 
 
Along the food supply chain, firms perform their activities together with and in compliance 
to governmental agencies and NGOs-managed regulatory regimes and certifications. In this 
perspective, production, services and monitoring activities, all bundle in the same value chain 
that brings the product to the final consumer. Consequently, one may add to the concept of 
‘length’ of the supply chain that of ‘width’, aiming to describe  the situation in which actors 
that are situated at the same level of the value chain perform similar or complementary 
activities, adding specific value at their stage of activity. However, some of the actors may 
simultaneously perform the same activity for different levels of the supply chain. This is the 
case, for instance, of the certification agencies, which verify the activity of both suppliers and 
sub-processors, thus blurring the significance of the distinction between width and length. The 
                                                          
277 J.M. Harris and others, ‘The US Food Marketing System: Competition, Coordination, and Technological 
Innovations Into the 21st Century’ USDA Economic Research Service (2002) 1. 
278 James M MacDonald and others, ‘Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of 
Agricultural Commodities’ [2004] USDA-ERS Agricultural Economic Report 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=754986> accessed 22 May 2015. 
279 .M. Harris and others, ‘The US Food Marketing System: Competition, Coordination, and Technological 
Innovations Into the 21st Century’ USDA Economic Research Service (2002) 1. 
280 Ibid. 
105 
 
characteristics and number of firms involved in the different segments of the food value chain 
also vary considerably: 
The profitability and structure of the various segments of the value chain vary. Some 
segments are characterised by intense levels of competition and consequently lower 
profitability, while others are more concentrated (see Figures 4 and 5). 
 
Figure 4: Key profitability metrics of the agribusiness value chain 
 
 
Figure 5: Key profitability metrics 
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Source: KPMG International (2013)281 
 
1.1.The emergence of global food value chains 
 
The structure of the food value chain and the relationship between the firms operating in it 
has changed drastically the last two decades.282 Agriculture and agri-food production has taken 
advantage of technological innovation becoming more industrialised283 and globalised.284 This 
resulted in a constant increase of global agricultural trade during the last three decades285, the 
volume of trade passing from 230 billion US dollars in 1980 to 1,100 billion in 2010.286 At the 
same time, markets have witnessed the development of new technologies at the production 
stage, for instance through the optimization of processes, and at the distribution level, because 
of ICT advances. Modern information systems enable suppliers to receive directly signals over 
the preferences of consumers for higher quality products, the private sector responding by 
creating “value chains” with the aim to reduce, through the exercise of control, the uncertainty 
emerging out of their interaction with a number of economic actors present in different market 
segments (and for which they do not dispose sufficient information).  
The globalisation of the economy has led to the development of a transnational mode of 
production, with a number of production facilities dispersed in various jurisdictions, thus 
increasing the need to put in place transnational value chains reducing the resulting uncertainty 
of dealing with foreign economic actors. One may also trace the development of value chains 
in the expansion of national and international regulations regarding consumer protection, food 
safety and quality, for instance regulation imposing the traceability of food, feed, at all stages 
of production, processing and distribution (e.g. EU Regulation 178/2002287, the WTO sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards, Codex Alimentarius). The private sector complies with such 
regulations by establishing standards (e.g. organic agriculture ISO-9000) and specific codes of 
conduct managed by industry associations or non-governmental organizations (e.g. Global gap, 
a NGO that sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the 
globe, in particular the Integrated farm Assurance (IFA), the international gold standard in farm 
certification). The coexistence of public and private regulation in supply chains leads to a 
double interdependence, when the regulatory framework contributes to shape supply chains 
adopting private regulation, which, in turn, affects public regulatory strategies. 
                                                          
281 KPMG International, The agricultural and food value chain: entering a new era of cooperation (2013), 5 
282 Johan FM Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor How the Globalization of Food Systems 
and Standards Affects Rural Development and Poverty (CABI 2007) 1. 
283 John Humphrey and Olga Memedovic, ‘Global Value Chains in the Agrifood Sector’ [2006] UNIDO 5 
<Available at http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=GB2013202293> accessed 15 May 2015. 
284 Gary Gereffi and Michelle M Christian, ‘Trade, Transnational Corporations and Food Consumption: A Global 
Value Chain Approach’, Trade, Food, Diet and Health Perspectives and Policy Options, C. Hawkes, C. Blouin, 
S. Henson, N. Drager, L. Dubé, eds (2010) 3 <Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564948> accessed 8 May 2015. 
285 World Bank, Agriculture for Development (World Bank 2008). 
286 FAOStat, 2013, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E. 
287 Regulation 178/2002 of the European Parliament and the European Council laying down the general principles 
and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety [2002] OJ L 31/1. 
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As a result of these developments, the food value chain is increasingly structured around 
“global value chains” (GVCs).288 Global value chains permit the simultaneous production and 
distribution of a very large array of products that each stage of the supply chain has to manage 
effectively. In this regard, information technology plays a fundamental role especially in those 
‘small conduits’ of the supply chain where few actors organize a large number of activities and 
operations. For instance, the OECD acknowledges that “the average number of items in a sold 
in a typical grocery store in the US has increased from about 6 000 in 1960 to about 45 000 in 
2006”.289 
In this context, the interplay or even combination of local and global supply chains may 
structure the value chain in different ways, depending on the interaction between the two. 
 
Figure 6: Example of Interaction of Global Value Chain and Local Value Chain in the 
Wheat Market 
 
 
Source: Duke Minerva290 
 
1.2.Specific sectors (examples and discussion per jurisdiction) 
 
                                                          
288 Koen Backer and Sébastien Miroudot, Mapping Global Value Chains (OECD, 2013). 
289 Hildegunn Kyvik Nordås, Massimo Geloso Grosso and Enrico Pinali, Market Structure in the Distribution 
Sector and Merchandise Trade (OECD 2008) 14. 
290 http://sites.duke.edu/minerva/the-global-value-chain/ 
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The interplay between global value chains and local markets is fundamental in order to 
understand the structure of the different food supply chains in the BRICS countries. The 
opening of internal economies to the global market have, indeed, deeply changed the structure 
of the food supply chain in these countries. 291 However, BRICS jurisdictions reacted to this 
changes in different ways.  
For instance, the Russian agri-food industry, prior to 1993, was based on a system governed 
by the Ministry of Trade and supervised by a number of State agencies. The commodity was 
transferred from producer to wholesale intermediaries that distributed the goods to industrial 
processors or to territorial departments. 
 
Figure 7: The system of wholesale in Russia prior to 1993 
  
Source: Gataulina et al. (2006)292 
 
The opening up to the world market and the dissolution of the Soviet regime brought a number 
of consequences, including the 1998 financial crisis. The agricultural sector reacted by 
consolidating under the aegis of few national incumbents. In particular, Gazprom became the 
largest agricultural holding, controlling 91 agricultural firms through 25 of its subsidiaries.293 
Orel Niva is one of them: 
 
                                                          
291 Johan FM Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor How the Globalization of Food Systems 
and Standards Affects Rural Development and Poverty (CABI 2007) 1. 
292 EA Gataulina and others, ‘Vertical Integration in an Agroindustrial Complex: Agrofirms and Agroholdings in 
Russia’ [2006] The dynamics of vertical coordination in agrifood chains in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: case 
studies. Working Paper 45. 
293 World Bank and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank 2005) 91. 
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Figure 8: Structure of Orel Niva Public Company 
 
Source: Gatualina et al (2004) 
 
The leading motive of the regional authorities in Orel for assisting in the creation of agrofirms 
and large regional holdings was “to actively employ methods of state control to preserve and 
develop the agroindustrial sector of the region, to rehabilitate bankrupt agricultural 
enterprises, to provide the enterprises with fixed and current assets, and to restore the broken 
integration links”.294 The Orel region was to become a model for developing a regional 
agricultural sector under market conditions but with a strong controlling role of the state. The 
creation of huge agroholdings in Russia has significantly affected the performance of the farms. 
Interestingly, the results appear to be quite mixed.295 Gataulina et al.’s (2004) study finds that 
vertical integration has contributed to: 
•  A better supply of inputs to farms. 
•  Growth in output and productivity. 
•  Poor financial results. 
•  “Important heterogeneity among the farms. Some of the integrated farms with 
good management seem to have performed very well”296. 
However, on the other hand, Gataulina et al found out that the profitability of such agro-
holding worsened almost 20 percentage points in the period 1999-2002. The negative trend 
on profitability affected at the same time also the other vertically integrated agricultural 
enterprises to the extent that, for instance, on 149 agriholdings in the Belgorod region only 39 
were profitable in 2002297. 
                                                          
294 World Bank and others (n 21). 
295 ibid. 
296 ibid; Gataulina and others (n 20). 
297 World Bank and others (n 21). 
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In contrast, in India, contract farming has found ‘fertile ground’ in regulating the 
relationships between agricultural producers and suppliers or wholesalers, in some cases even 
as a solution to offset cartels at wholesale level created by national legislation.  
In 1963, the Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) passed the APMC 
Act with the aim of regulating marketing of agricultural produce. The Act fully regulated the 
relationship between farmers and suppliers to the extent that only licensed intermediaries 
could trade the commodities on the market. The outcome of this regulatory framework did not 
solely ended up in the creation of monopolies and high entry barriers, but also of a highly 
cartelized wholesale market.298 Since 2007, this regulatory framework has been changed by a 
number of amendment laws aiming at a more liberalized agricultural market. In a 2012 market 
study on the onion market, the Indian competition authority observes that the solution for 
managing the liberalization of the market lies also in the use of contract farming.299 
The onion market is paradigmatic of the Indian agricultural production. The producers 
are generally small farmers scattered throughout the country. They sell the produce mainly 
through arm’s length agreements at the local markets where traders fix rates comparing the 
local rates to the other national markets’ rates.300 Finally, market traders are often vertically 
integrated with wholesalers and retailers. As in other sectors of agricultural production301 the 
Indian authorities envisaged contract farming, in line with what was also put forward by the 
APMC 2007 Amendment Act, as one of the main viable solutions to the problems affecting 
the market, especially to fight cartels. With contract farming the supplier agrees with the 
farmer not only on price, quantity and time of the performance, but establishes also the 
standards that the farmers have to follow in production. The authority can therefore monitor 
parties’ behaviour on the market, encouraging the adoption of high international safety 
standards and, at the same time, leaving to the market some degree of contractual freedom. 
 
1.3.Global/transnational value chains, power relations and the need for advanced 
network analysis 
 
National governments cannot ignore transnational value chains in the food sector. The 
food prices are a sensitive issue largely due to the proportion of income spent on food and also 
the potentially regressive effect it has on lower income households. The share of household 
income spent on food varies substantially, a recent OECD study reporting for the OECD 
countries that it may range from around 22 per cent in Turkey and Mexico to less than 10 per 
cent in the US, Canada and the UK302. However, even in countries where the aggregate share 
is relatively low, since the lower income groups spend a greater proportion of their income on 
food, the rise in food prices can have a regressive effect on the less well-off. 
                                                          
298 Competition Commission of India, Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in India, 2012, available at 
http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/AO.pdf. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid., 41. 
301 For instance in the tea and paddy markets, see respectively Annexes IV and V regarding two examples of 
contracts in these sectors. 
302 OECD 
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The power relations in the global food value chain are characterized by international 
actors and local producers operating within the geographic area determined by the logistics of 
the product. Additionally, the whole value chain goes through continuous reshapes, as to meet 
consumer changing demand. The market power of a firm, in the food as in any other industry, 
generally triggers the attention of competition watchdogs, if it corresponds to the notion of 
dominance, intended as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which 
enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording 
it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers”303. This notion of dominance leaves therefore, at least partially, 
undisclosed the relative power304 of the company on its trading partners. 
Globalized markets are the result of a complex nexus of interconnections between 
firms, where the relative power of a firm and its market power are deeply intertwined, to the 
extent that, in some cases, the relative power of a firm, rather than its market share and 
concentration, may explain better the causes of markets distortions. Several studies have tried 
to find a correlation between the level of concentration of modern retailers and the ratio of 
passing on of price benefits or the creation of market efficiency305, on one hand, or the creation 
of inefficiencies, on the other. The creation of a negative externality associated to the high level 
of concentration, would indeed presume an abuse of superior bargaining power having 
distorting effects on the market. However, the research findings on the point are mixed, as 
while some papers find a connection between levels of retail concentration and higher 
consumer prices306, others state that there is no empirical basis to find such correlation, but that 
in many cases the opposite is true307. 
In global value chains, the effects of the use of bargaining power through contracting 
and technology transfer are equally debated308. Some scholars have found positive effects of 
contracting in situation of unbalanced bargaining power, in particular with regard to the 
development of quality standards in developing and transition economies, also through 
technology and know-how transfer309 and income stability and food security of participating 
                                                          
303 Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207 at 
para. 65 and Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission, 85/76, [1979] 
E.C.R.-461 at para. 38. 
304 Here for relative power, we intend the power exerted by a firm on a commercial partner.  
305 See for instance the USDA Report discussing some of them, Sharad Tandon and others, The Expansion of 
Modern Grocery Retailing and Trade in Developing Countries (US Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service 2011) <Available at http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo17052> accessed 21 August 2015. 
306 Ronald W Cotterill, ‘Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont’ [1986] The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 379; Ronald W Cotterill and C David Harper, Market Power and the Demsetz Quality 
Critique: An Evaluation for Food Retailing (University of Connecticut, Department of Agriculture and Resource 
Economics 1995). 
307 Phil R Kaufman and C Handy, U.S. Fresh Produce Markets: Marketing Channels, Trade Practices, and Retail 
Pricing Behavior (US Dept of Agriculture, Economic Research Service 1989); James K Binkley and John M 
Connor, ‘Market Competition and Metropolitan-Area Grocery Prices’ [1996] Available at SSRN 1238553 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1238553> accessed 21 August 2015. 
308 Johan FM Swinnen, ‘Global Agricultural Value Chains, Standards, and Development’ (2014) 30 Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS <available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434532> accessed 8 May 2015. 
309 Johan FM Swinnen and Anneleen Vandeplas, ‘Quality, Efficiency Premia, and Development’ <Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106101> accessed 21 August 2015. 
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households310. By contrast, others have denounced the repeated abuse of such superior 
bargaining power of multinational organizations exploiting poor countries, extracting rents 
through unfair contract terms311. 
Another important issue to consider is the difficulties of the relevant market concept and 
traditional NPT analysis to represent the power relations between the various economic actors 
involved in the food value chain, in particular if this is of trans-national dimension and their 
possible welfare effects on final consumers or other economic actors. Global seed producers 
(Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPoint Pioneer, BASF, etc.) continue to increase their global presence 
have recently acquired critical market influence in key food exporting regions. Some global 
players have gained such an influence on national markets which is already not under control 
by national legislative and executive powers. Combined with the natural complexity of global 
food production-supply chains, any disruption in seeds supply may cause a systemic food shock 
of a global magnitude. 
 
Figure 9: Seed Industry Structure 
                                                          
310 Bart Minten, Lalaina Randrianarison and Johan FM Swinnen, ‘Global Retail Chains and Poor Farmers: 
Evidence from Madagascar’ (2009) 37 World Development 1728; Christina Handschuch, Meike Wollni and Pablo 
Villalobos, ‘Adoption of Food Safety and Quality Standards among Chilean Raspberry producers–Do 
Smallholders Benefit?’ (2013) 40 Food Policy 64; Solomon Asfaw, Dagmar Mithöfer and Hermann Waibel, ‘EU 
Food Safety Standards, Pesticide Use and Farm-Level Productivity: The Case of High-Value Crops in Kenya’ 
(2009) 60 Journal of Agricultural Economics 645; Julie Subervie and Isabelle Vagneron, ‘A Drop of Water in the 
Indian Ocean? The Impact of GlobalGap Certification on Lychee Farmers in Madagascar’ (2013) 50 World 
Development 57. 
311 Catherine Dolan and John Humphrey, ‘Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact of UK 
Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry’ (2000) 37 Journal of development studies 147; Thomas 
Reardon and others, ‘The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America’ (2003) 85 American journal 
of agricultural economics 1140; Matthew Warning and Nigel Key, ‘The Social Performance and Distributional 
Consequences of Contract Farming: An Equilibrium Analysis of the Arachide de Bouche Program in Senegal’ 
(2002) 30 World Development 255. 
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Source: Philip H. Howard, (2009)312 
 
It is also important to take into account of the specific local competitive conditions, which 
may provide to an undertaking significant power over price that may impact a large group of 
consumers, even in the absence of a large presence in the national market. A recent submission 
by the Israeli competition authority to an OECD Report on Competition Issues in the Food 
Chain Industry advances the concept of “competition groups” in the assessment of the 
competition interactions between various retail stores in a geographic area. 
 
Textbox 1: Constructing a Store’s Competition Group 
 
OECD, Report on Competition Issues in the Food Chain Industry, DAF/COMP(2014)16, 
239-241 
                                                          
312 Philip H. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008, Sustainability 2009, 
1(4), 1266-1287. 
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To support the implementation of the Food Act, the antitrust authority developed a model 
that defines geographical markets in the grocery retail sector and establishes a demand area 
and competition group for each store of a major retailer. The application of the model 
consists of three stages:  
1. Defining the demand area – a demand area is defined from the perspective of each store 
as a collection of statistical regions in its vicinity that account for a significant portion of the 
store’s sales. This area will be defined based on the characteristics of consumer 114ehaviour 
in the area (or at the national level) such as preference for certain store characteristics (size, 
amenities, variety, etc.) and average travel time to a store. 2. Defining the competition group 
– a store’s competition group is comprised of a collection of rival stores that compete over a 
significant number of consumers with the store in question. That is, any rival store for which 
the number of consumers existing in both the demand area of the rival store and the demand 
area of the store in question is above a certain threshold will be included in the competition 
group. The underlying assumption is that for the rival store to serve as a competitive restraint 
on the 114ehaviour of the store in question there needs to be a critical mass of consumers 
both stores compete over. The threshold corresponding to this critical mass is determined by 
the director general (“the determined rate”). Three main points regarding the determination 
of the competition group call for clarification:     
A. A rival store may be located outside a store’s demand area but included in its 
competition group as long as there is overlap between the demand areas of the two 
stores. For example, as shown in the figure below, stores B and C compete with store 
A despite the fact that they are not in store A’s demand area. Store B is in store A’s 
competition group because these two stores share statistical regions 1 and 4 and the 
population in these two regions constitutes 40% of the total population of store A’s 
demand area (statistical regions 1 to 5). Hence store B constrains store A’s incentive 
to raise prices, as then store A stands to lose 40% of its potential customers. A similar 
reasoning shows that store C too is in store A’s competition group.   
B. Not every rival store in the demand area of the store under examination is 
necessarily included in the store’s competition group. For example: store D in the 
figure below is not in competition with store A despite being in store A’s demand 
area. Store D attracts only consumers from statistical region 5. Hence, if store A 
raises prices, the highest number of consumers it could lose to store D is the 
population of statistical region 5, which constitutes only 15% of the population in 
store A’s demand area.   
C. The relationship of being in one’s competition group is not necessarily symmetric. 
For example, a high revenue store located near a low revenue store may be in the 
competition group of the low revenue store, but not vice versa. To illustrate, as noted, 
store A does not see store D as a competitor (only 15% of store A’s potential 
customers come from store D’s demand area). Nevertheless, store D sees store A as 
a competitor: 100% of store D’s potential customers (the population of statistical 
region 5) are also in store A’s demand area. When store D raises prices, it might lose 
all of its potential customers to store A.  
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3. A store is determined to be “concentrated” if the total revenues of all stores in its 
competition group that belong, along with the store in question, to the same chain constitute 
more than 30% of the total revenue of all stores in the competition group. 
 
 
 
In the UK, in the private ophthalmology investigation of Chapter I CA98/101 TFEU 
infringement the CMA focused on local areas313. The CMA has also used catchment areas in 
market definition of various merger cases314. Finally, the CMA also used catchment areas for 
market definition purposes on the private healthcare market investigation315. The European 
Commission has used catchment areas in merger cases especially involving airline 
companies316 and some cases involving maritime conferences317.  
The recent SIA Maxima Latvija case of the CJEU may provide an additional example 
of the consideration of the local competition conditions when assessing vertical restraints and 
the possibility of local market power. The case concerned a non-compete clause concerned 
                                                          
313 Conduct in the ophthalmology sector, Case CE/9784-13 (2015), paras 3.46-3.48. 
314 eg. Completed acquisition by Lafarge Tarmac Holdings Limited of Tarmac Building Products Limited, 
available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/53760e58ed915d0ff1000005/Lafarge.pdf and more 
recently see Celesio / Sainsbury's Pharmacy Business merger inquiry (2016), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/579b817540f0b64974000014/sainsbury_s-celesio-final-
report.pdf. 
315 Final Report, Private Healthcare Market Investigation (April 2014, CMA25), paras 5.62 and onwards. It re-
adopted the approach also in its provisional findings report in the Private Healthcare remittal, (November 2015), 
para 3.34. 
316 e.g. Case No COMP/M.6447 -IAG/ BMI (2012),  Case No COMP/M.6447 -IAG/ BMI (2015) and Case No 
COMP/M.4439– Ryanair / Aer Lingus (2007). 
317 Commission Decision 94/980/EC, (IV/34.446 — Trans-Atlantic Agreement), [1994] OJ L 376/1, paras 67 
onwards; See also, Commission Decision 1999/243/EC, (IV/35.134 - Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement), 
[1999] OJ L 95/1, para 84 in relation to Northern Europe ports. 
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included in a commercial lease agreement between a major retailer and the owner of a shopping 
centre.318 The Court considered that this was a vertical agreement and applied the Delimitis 
cumulative effect approach in order to assess the possible foreclosure effect, focusing on the 
various catchment areas affected by the agreement. According to the Court, the first part of the 
test consists ‘in the examination of all the factors affecting the access to the relevant market for 
the purposes of assessing whether, in the catchment areas where the shopping centres which 
are covered by those agreements are located, there are real concrete possibilities for a new 
competitor to establish itself’.319 The second part of the test explores ‘the conditions under 
which competitive forces operate on the relevant market’, which includes ‘not only the number 
and the size of operators present on the market, but also the degree of concentration of that 
market and customer fidelity to existing brands and consumer habits’.320  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
318 Case C-345/14 SIA Maxima Latvija v Konkurences padome [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:784. 
319 ibid, para 27. 
320 ibid, para 28. 
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Chapter 2: The various segments of the food value chain: a general account 
 
Ioannis Lianos with Averill Campion & Dmitry Katalevsky 
 
2.1.Cost structure and global food value chains 
 
The market for factors of production comprises different segments, the largest in terms of sales 
being fertilisers and animal feed (not including medicated seeds, which form part of the animal 
health sector)321. These two markets consist of mostly bulk inputs not involving much of R&D 
and account for 60 percent of total agricultural input sales322. Farm machinery and equipment 
account for 21 percent, crop protection chemicals for around 9,5%, while crop seeds for 5,5% 
of inputs purchased by farmers. Animal health and animal breeding materials account for the 
remaining 4 percent323. In China, the cost of buying seed account for 25% of the total cost of 
fertiliser, farmyard manure , agricultural pesticides and agricultural mulch324. 
 Historically farmers have met their proportion of demand for crop seed and animal 
breeding stock through self-supply or by obtaining these inputs through informal markets or 
from neighbouring farms. These methods of procurement however declined since the 
emergence of private seed companies and about 2/3 of the crop used globally now is supplied 
by private seed companies325. The situation is however different in developing countries, where 
“80% - 90% of the seed planted by farmers in the global South comes from the so-called 
“informal sector” – that is, farm-saved seeds (including seed exchange with neighbouring farms 
and seed sales from local markets or seed fairs)” and “(j)ust 10%- 20% of seed requirements 
in developing countries is met by the “formal sector” – that is, seed companies, government 
seed sources or other institutions”326. 
 If one looks to growth, only the markets for farm machinery and seeds have grown 
significantly in recent decades327. In recent years there has been significant investment in Ag 
Biotechnology (with an increase of almost 150% from 2014 to 2016), in farm management 
software, sensing and Internet of Things applications in agriculture (with an increase of 
investment of 3.7% during the same period), novel farming systems (an increase of 63% the 
same period) and supply chain technologies (an increase of 3% during the same period)328. 
Investment in Robotics mechanization and other hardware, such as drone technologies applied 
in agriculture, has also increased in 2015 although it suffered a pullback in 2016. The sector’s 
funding is, however, dominated by investments in food marketing/food e-commerce which 
                                                          
321 K. Fuglie et al, Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and 
Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 (2011) 11. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Survey questionnaire completed by the Chinese competition authorities for the purposes of this Study. 
325 K. Fuglie et al, Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and 
Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 (2011) 11. 
326 ETC Group, Putting the Cartel before the Horse ...and Farm, Seeds, Soil, Peasants, etc. - Who Will Control 
Agricultural Inputs, 2013?, Communiqué no 111 (September 2013). 
327 K. Fuglie et al, Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and 
Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 (2011) 11. 
328 AgTech Investing Report, Year in Review 2016 (January 31st, 2017), 17. 
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account for 40% of the total funding, the category of food and agtech being valued to at least 
$60 billion329. Biotechnology startups come next, attracting almost 22% of funding330. 
 
2.2.The various segments of food value chains 
 
2.2.1. Seeds & Traits 
 
The seeds industry is an example of industries that changed dramatically over the last 
50 years from post-harvest seeds savings practice by farmers to purchasing of seeds from a few 
global industrial giants. Crops are usually classified in eight broader groupings: corn, cereals, 
soybean, vegetables, rice, diverse field crops, sugar cane, and specialty crops331. The industry 
evolved through a number of major biotech advancements and legal enhancements of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). Technology-driven growth has not been the only major 
transformation of this economic sector. Its consolidation, in particular in the factors of 
production segment, has been particularly important in recent years. The various segments of 
the factors of production markets have been progressively consolidated in (most frequently 
tight) oligopolies. In the seeds sector, a number of merger waves, starting in the 1980s, have 
led to the emergence of a relatively concentrated market structure of 6 big players thirty years 
later (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, Bayer, Dow, the so called ‘Big Six’).  
The first merger wave occurred in the mid-1980s, swiping aside a market structure 
dominated until then by commercial seed companies that were formed in the 1930s following 
the introduction of the first hybridized crops. Until then farmers have been cultivating new 
plant varieties for thousands of years through selective breeding by cross-pollinating two 
different, but related plants over 6 to 10 plant generations, eventually creating a new plant 
variety. The introduction of a method of controlled crossing (marker-assisted breeding) that 
can create these desired traits within just one generation led to the development of a special 
kind of hybrid crops, the so called F1 hybrid seeds, which combine characteristics of two 
related plants, thus following the process of cross-pollination. Second generation hybrids do 
not however ‘reproduce true’, thus they may not share the desired characteristics as selected in 
the first generation. A farmer cannot expect the next generation of plants to be identical to the 
first, which may lead farmers to purchase seeds rather than save the seeds and replant them the 
next season, as they have done for generations. 
 Following the discovery in 1973 by Cohen and Boyer of the basic technique for 
creating recombinant DNA, enabling the development of bacterial enzymes capable of cutting 
DNA at specific sites and splicing DNA segments into foreign DNA in order to create 
recombinant molecules with altered functions, crop scientists were able to identify and isolate 
desired traits, modify the relevant genes, for instance knocking out a gene to produce a 
desirable characteristic (for instance resistance to a specific disease), or eventually adding one 
or more new genes that are not already found in that organism (transgenic genetic engineering) 
and then incorporate these traits into new crop varieties via transplantation with greater 
                                                          
329 Ibid., 14. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Syngenta, Our Industry 2016, 49. 
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precision and more quickly than traditional marker-assisted breeding for native (non-biotech 
or non-genetically engineered) traits. The traits are engineered by insertion of foreign genes 
into the plants, that cross different biological groups (bacteria and plants). These genes may be 
single or stacked and usually confer a desirable attribute to the seed, for instance herbicide or 
insect resistance.  
Traditional marker-assisted breeding enables breeders to select plants with desirable 
combinations of genes by using genetic markers to identify the versions of the specific genes 
associated with the desirable trait. Markers allow breeders to guide performance at the early 
stages of breeding, leading to the development of plants with new properties without 
incorporating undesirable genes generally found in the original organism. Although marker-
assisted breeding and traditional hybridization creates seed varieties with greater yield potential 
and more desirable biological characteristics, from those already found in the organism, genetic 
engineering provides the possibility to add new traits that it would not have been possible to 
develop using marker-assisted breeding, thus greatly enhancing breeding productivity. 
Genetically-engineered seeds may also limit the possibility of farmers to save the seeds 
and replant them the next season. In a meta-analysis of 147 studies332 about the impacts of these 
genetically-engineered seeds, it was found that overall GM technology adoption has reduced 
chemical pesticide use by 37% , increased crop yields by 22%, and increased farmer profits by 
68%. Consequently, the benefits in terms of productivity of genetically-engineered seeds 
appear to be significant.  
By finding in Diamond vs Chakrabarty (1980) that a bacterium breaking down crude 
oil qualifies as patentable subject matter as a “non-naturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter” and a “product of human ingenuity” the US Supreme Court opened the 
door to the patentability of engineered plant breeds333. In 1985, the USPTO expanded patent 
protection to genetically modified traits in Ex Parte Hibberd334, adding to the existing IP 
protection of newly developed plant breeds through the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (providing 
patent rights for developers of new varieties of asexually propagated plants propagated by 
cutting pieces of the stem rather than germinating seeds) or the Plant Variety Protection Act of 
1970 (protecting developers of new varieties of seed-propagated plants). In 2001, the US 
Supreme Court held for the first time in J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer that utility patents 
may be issued for crops and other flowering (sexually reproducing) plants and can be combined 
with plant variety rights protection and/or plant patents335. With a utility patent, patent-holders 
can sue farmers and rivals for patent infringement and pursue litigation to enforce licensing 
agreements. Utility patents are routinely used for genetically modified traits, traditional 
germplasm and biotechnology research tools and provide a higher degree of protection than 
                                                          
332 See Klumper, W, Qaim M (2014). A Meta-Analysis of the Impacts of Genetically Modified Crops. PLoS ONE 
9(11): e111629. 
333 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
334 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Board of Patent Applications and Interferences, 1985). 
335 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). This overlapping 
protection was significant as U.S. Plant variety protection legislation [7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544] conferred “less 
robust protection than utility patents” as it allows farmers to save seeds for replanting and provides for a research 
exception for private, non-commercial uses of protected seed. See, D. Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) 
Michigan State Law Review 559, 567. 
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plant variety rights as there is no exemption for farmers or plant breeders to use materials 
protected by the utility patent. We examine the role of IP rights in this sector at Part IV, Chapter 
1. 
Intellectual property protection first permitted small biotech start-ups to receive funding 
from venture capital and other sources of funding in order to progress in the applied segment 
of their research, while it also enabled them, at the second stage, to be targeted by a wave of 
merger and acquisitions with large agri-chemical corporations that started investing in the 
development and large scale commercialisation of the products emerging out of the research 
efforts, thus guaranteeing a greater dissemination of these new technologies and products in 
food production. Already in the 1970s and the development of plant variety protection rights, 
a number of chemical and pharmaceutical companies had acquired a number of small and 
medium sized regional seed companies, but a number of larger seed companies (e.g. Pioneer, 
DeKalb) and smaller regional seed companies remained in the market.  
The second wave of M&As occurred in the mid-1990s/early 2000s where a number of 
seed companies were either acquired or entered into joint ventures with a number of large 
multinational with investments and research capacity in biotechnology. At the same time, large 
pharmaceutical companies, such as AstraZeneca, Novartis, and American Home Products, 
which collectively controlled about 26 percent of the global agricultural market, chose to divest 
their seed germplasm assets and concentrate on core their pharmaceutical businesses. This led 
to the re-structuring of the sector with the combination of biotechnology know how, genetic 
research assets and IP rights with seed germplasm, as this would have facilitated the 
commercial introduction of new GM or biotech seeds. As agro-chemical firms and other 
diversified firms vertically integrated into the seed business and seed genetics, new global 
players emerged. For instance, before the mid-1980s, Monsanto was primarily active in the 
production of chemicals and optoelectronics, while Syngenta was created in 1999 as a spin-off, 
following the merger between the agrochemical business of pharmaceutical corporation 
AstraZeneca and the seeds and crop protection business of Novartis. The result of this extensive 
merger activity is that in the number of independent seed companies has passed from 600 in 
1996 to 100 in 2009. 
The most recent merger wave was initiated in July 2014 when Monsanto made a 
number of acquisition offers to Syngenta.  These offers were rejected, but the Monsanto bid 
triggered a number of other M&A transactions that were announced in 2015 and 2016 between 
the various market leaders in the factors of production segment. In November 2015, Syngenta 
accepted the offer of ChemChina (which owns ADAMA, one of the largest agrochemical 
companies in the world). In December 2015, Dupont and Dow announced their merger, which 
was cleared with conditions by the European Commission in March 2017336. In September 
2016, Bayer put forward a merger deal with Monsanto, triggering an in-depth investigation337 
by the European Commission due to concerns over reduced competition, especially in the seeds 
                                                          
336 European Commission, IP/17/772 (2017), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm  
337 European Commission,  IP/17/2762 (2017) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
2762_en.htm 
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area. One year later, BASF is now set to acquire Bayer’s seed business338 which will result in 
an even denser market shrinkage. However, until October 2017 BASF had not initiated any 
specific actions to consolidate, leading its speculative chess board open to the possibility to 
buy up smaller companies, or sell, because it would not have the strength to take on the 
concentrated power of its competitors339. If all the proposed megamergers are approved, these 
three companies (ChemChina–Syngenta, DuPont–Dow, Bayer–Monsanto) will own and sell 
about 60% of the world’s patented seeds and pesticides/herbicides (AgriPortal, 2016). 
The global commercial seed market is valued at around USD 38.5 billion (some 
estimates putting this at USD 48.5billion)340, with Monsanto possessing the highest seeds 
market share of 23%, followed by DuPont at 15%, and Syngenta at 9%. in 2016  
 
Table 1: The twelve main global seed companies ranked by their global seed sales in billions 
USD in 2016 
 
Source: S. Bonny (2017) 341  
 
The size of the seed market is relatively small in comparison to the rest of the food value chain, 
and in particular retail, mainly “because the added value is much higher at the end of the agri-
food chain than at its beginning”342. Most of the big companies in the sector come from the 
chemical industry, only Limagrain and KWS being from the agricultural and seed sector. 
Monsanto and DuPont have a high share of seeds in their total agricultural sales, while 
Syngenta, Bayer, Dow and BASF mainly sell pesticides, while Limagrain and KWS only focus 
                                                          
338 See Financial Times (2017), available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1d5ca16b-412d-3ed2-8899-
7185f5308009?mhq5j=e5 .  
339 ETC Group. 2016. The Monsanto-Bayer tie-up is just of seven: Mega-mergers and big data domination threaten 
seeds and food security. [Online] Available: http://www.etcgroup.org/content/monsanto-bayer-tie-just-one-
sevenmega-mergers-and-big-data-domination-threaten-seeds-food . 
340 See the comparative table by S. Bonny, Corporate Concentration and Technological Change in the Global Seed 
Industry, (2017) 9 Sustainability 1632, Table 1. 
341  Ibid., Figure 3 (noting that “(t)he total size of seed market is not well known due to the difficulty of assessing 
the value of seeds saved by farmers and the total value of the commercial seed market”). 
342 Ibid., at 1632 (noting in comparison that the food distribution segment of the value chain weighs USD 834 
billion, while the food processing segment USD 507 billion). 
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on seeds. The recent merger consolidation will however establish integrated platforms in both 
seeds and plant protection agents. 
 There exist various kinds of seeds that may be used by the farmers. Bonny distinguishes 
four categories: 
“ - Conventional’ seeds are supplied by approximately 7500 companies of different sizes 
from around the world. 
- GM seeds are usually created by big companies. However, smaller companies can also 
sell GM crops through license agreements on genetic traits. 
- Farmers’ seed systems result from the breeding efforts of farmers in their fields to 
obtain seeds that they expect to be better suited to their soil, practices, and needs. While 
these have become less important in industrialized countries because of the 
development of hybrid seeds for some crops, they can constitute a substantial part of 
the seeds sown in less-developed countries. 
- Farm saved seeds are sown and harvested from conventional seeds purchased in the 
previous year. Seeds from a small fraction of this harvest are sown the next season after 
sorting and cleaning. It is essential to differentiate these seeds from the farmers’ seed 
systems mentioned above, since these saved seeds are a kind of “copy” of purchased 
seeds rather than newly-bred ones. 
- Seeds from public research are rarely sold as end-user seeds to farmers since public 
research generally works upstream in plant breeding”343. 
Genetically modified (GM) seeds’ share in the global commerce of seeds has been 
growing from 9% in 2001 to 33% in 2016. The seed and traits value chain is primarily guided 
by the Big Six (Monsanto, Bayer, DuPont, Sygenta, Dow, and BASF) and consists two primary 
crucial inputs: the germplasm pool and advanced breeding technologies. Plant germplasm 
refers to the genetic base of a specific crop ranging from the “elite” germplasm of modern plant 
improvement to more wild plants that can potentially provide useful genes for improvements 
or for future domestication. As living genetic resources, germplasms are stored in seed banks 
to be used for plant research, breeding, and preservation and play a critical role in maintain the 
diversity needed to sustain genetic improvements for polygenic traits like yield, responding to 
pathogen pressures, and for providing genetic buffering. The second major input, advanced 
breeding technologies, involves using gene-editing technologies such as DuPont Pioneer’s 
CRISPR-Cas to increase the productivity and sustainability of these seeds344. CRISPR-Cas 
advanced breeding technology can improve seeds with the creation of elite corn hybrids that 
use native characteristics found in a target crop, resulting in a five-bushel-per-acre increase in 
grain yield. This is particularly useful for water limited environments.  
 
Table 2: Seed and traits value chain 
 
 
                                                          
343 S. Bonny, Corporate Concentration and Technological Change in the Global Seed Industry, (2017) 9 
Sustainability 1632. 
344 See SeedWorld (2016). DuPont Pioneer Establishes a CRISPR-Cas Advanced Breeding Platform. Available 
at: http://seedworld.com/dupont-pioneer-establishes-crispr-cas-advanced-breeding-platform/ 
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Source: Competition Commission of South Africa (2017)345 
 
The interconnected and interdependent relationships amongst actors in the second and third 
stages of the seed and traits value chain has resulted in a highly integrated relationship between 
agbiotechnology and seed firms346. Specifically, the second stage consists of germplasm pools 
to breed seeds using their own traits or companies that infuse their own patented traits into the 
seeds and breeding process.. As a result, the commercialization of these GM traits has raised 
major strategic issues for agbiotechnology and seed firms involved at this stage as to whether 
it is better to release their own varieties of traits or to license the seed firms. These licensing 
agreements between seed firms and agbiotechnology firms allow trait development for the 
portfolio, but not for commercial output. The third stage in the seed & traits value chain is the 
production of new varieties of seeds which are produced in commercial sized volumes. Next 
in the value chain, seeds receive treatments and are coated with fungicides or insecticides.  
  The South African DAFF reports that the formal seed system was worth USD 3.6 
billion in 2010-11 with maize as the largest seed sector in 59% of the total seed market by 
value. In May 2017, the Competition Commission of South Africa conditionally approved a 
Bayer and Monsanto transaction whereby Bayer intends to acquire Monsanto. While the new 
                                                          
345 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 34, para. 76 
(figure based on third parties and merging parties’ submissions). 
346 W. Wilson & Huso, S, Trait Stacking, Licensing, and Seed Firm Acquisitions in Genetically Modified Grains. 
(2008) 33(3) Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 383. 
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company will control 20% of the commercial seed market and agrochemical market347, the most 
concerning area of competition are GM cotton seeds, as 84.6% of cotton seeds varieties in 
South Africa are owned by Monsanto. In addition to GM cotton seeds, Monsanto also employs 
80% of private sector breeders in maize and and 100% of the breeders in soybean and 
sunflowers348. Although the merger would create a monopoly and eliminate competition in the 
development and production of seed traits and herbicides, it is argued that the consolidation of 
these forces is beneficial to the scaling of research and development budgets349 so that greater 
innovation can take place. With a shift from the Big Six to the Big Three, the power and control 
over R&D risks being focused more on high-profit products that benefit the mergers versus 
targeting the most appropriate products needed by South African farmers. A 2016 South 
African Grain Seeds Analysis report conveys that “ a competitive seed sector is key to ensuring 
timely availability of appropriate and high quality seeds and affordable prices to farmers in 
South Africa.” The South African seed industry has matured into a sector with 107 seed 
companies and has seen exports of around USD 73 mill from the years 2012-2013. Currently, 
four companies dominate ownership of maize seeds: Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Breed, Pannar, and 
Klein Karoo Seed350, which is differentiated from the market share due to variety types.  
  On the other hand, it is further suggested that due to the interlinkage of this stage, the 
elimination of competition actually remedies the situation since the SA Commission will 
require Bayer to divest and sell the entire global Liberty Link trait technology and associated 
branded business and require the future purchaser to commercialize it in South Africa or license 
out to a third party as to enable the country to benefit from this divestiture. As both Monsanto 
and Bayer possess technological systems for seed trait production and accompanying 
herbicides used on those seeds, cross licensing agreements could enhance the merger. 
Nonetheless, less competition and more oligopoly could lead to a path dependency, locking 
farmers into a narrow input model of producing just three main crops: maize, soya, cotton351 
instead of a variety that could feed and benefit the food security of the South African 
population. There are also expressed concerns that the reduced competition trend undermines 
the emergency of alternative systems more inclusive of smallholder farmers to promote a more 
egalitarian agricultural economy. Moreover, implications of increased input costs and reduced 
choices for farmers and consumers could reinforce that the South African market is a dumping 
ground for the unsuccessful, old GM technologies in which Monsanto has incurred deep sunk 
costs from development352. Regardless, South Africa is strategically important for both 
companies in terms of sales as Bayer holds (206) patents on transgenic plant traits and 
Monsanto holds (119). Consequently, this merger is advantageous as means of access to 
proprietary knowledge of each company and expected costs savings towards the next big shift 
in genome editing technology CRISPR.  
                                                          
347 See All Africa (2017) “Agribusiness Giants on Merger Path”. Available at: 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201702270838.html  
348 African Center for Biodiversity available at http://www.acbio.org.za 
349 ACBIO (2017). The Three Agricultural Input Mega-Mergers: Grim Reapers of South Africa’s Food and 
Farming Systems.  
350 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Republic of South Africa (2016). 
351 Ibid 
352 Ibid 
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 A number of seed firms are now actively investing in R&D in gene-editing 
technologies, such as CRISPR and TALEN: 
“Bayer: Bayer CropScience entered into collaboration with Cellectis in 2006 for 
access to Cellectis' proprietary meganuclease technology for use in plant research and 
product development. Bayer extended the partnership in 2014 to access the TALENs 
technology for gene stacking and targeted mutagenesis applications and for 
collaborating to develop commercial canola traits. Bayer also has collaboration with 
Precision BioSciences around meganucleases and has successfully used the technology 
for trait stacking in cotton. 
Calyxt. Calyxt uses TALENs technology developed by Cellectis and at the 
University of Minnesota and is currently conducting field testing on improved starch 
potato seeds as of 2015. 
Cibus. Cibus is a US-based company that has developed the Rapid Trait 
Development System (RTDS), a plant and microbial platform for precision gene editing 
and advanced non-transgenic breeding. RTDS enables site-specific edits of native traits 
with no introduction of foreign DNA. Cibus has launched its first commercial crop, SU 
Canola, a non-transgenic canola tolerant to sulfonylurea herbicides in the US. 
Limagrain. In 2009, Cellectis and Limagrain entered into a non-exclusive 
licence agreement on the use of the I-Scel meganuclease, an engineered nuclease, in 
plants. 
Monsanto. Monsanto has access to the TALENs technology from the Two 
Blades Foundation and has generated TALENs recombinase hybrids for targeted 
transgene insertion in crops. 
Syngenta. On 30 April 2016, Precision BioSciences announced that it has been 
working with Syngenta to develop advanced agricultural products using its proprietary 
ARCUS technology, a fully-synthetic engineered nuclease. Researchers at Syngenta 
have successfully used ARCUS to insert genes into desired locations in the corn genome 
Moreover, Syngenta entered into a non-exclusive license agreement with the Two 
Blades Foundation in 2012 to access the TALENs technology for commercial use in 
certain crop plants”353. 
Other actors include Precision BioSciences, The Broad Institute, Cibus, Calyxt, Two Blades, 
etc. Who are actively trying to license their technology. For instance, the Broad Institute 
recently licensed its CRISPR technology to Monsanto. 
Finally, the sixth stage is the retail distribution of the seeds, which eventually ends up 
in their final use by farmers as the last stage in the value chain.   
 
2.2.2. Crop protection 
 
Crop protection aims to protect crops by avoiding the occurrence of diseases, 
controlling weeds and protecting from insects. Their use has been an essential feature of the 
                                                          
353 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), paras 3427-3432. 
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Green Revolution, leading to a staggering increase in yield productivity the last forty years354. 
The industry grew considerably in recent years355. Plant protection products include herbicides, 
fungicides, insecticides, seed treatment by chemical or biological substances or physical 
processes applied to seeds or seedings. A significant feature of this industry is that it is heavily 
regulated in order to mitigate the risk of residues or, in case the residues occur, ensure that 
these are below the approved Maximum Residue Level (MRL). As it is explained in a recent 
report by Syngenta, ‘(a) significant amount of time and money must be invested into the 
registration of a crop protection product. The chance of a discovery compound passing all the 
many safety and efficacy tests on the way to market is about 1 or 2 in 100000 […]’356. 
This market is dominated by companies based in 4 countries – Germany, the US, 
Switzerland and Japan, which account for almost 83% of global sales of agricultural chemicals 
(in 2006)357. Germany is the location for two of the largest companies in agricultural chemicals 
(Bayer and BASF) which represent 40% of total global R&D in the sector. The industry 
provides crop protection through a combination of using agricultural chemicals with seeds with 
GM traits but not all firms are integrated in both chemical and genetic research. Some firms, 
such as Monsanto are mostly active in genetic research, although the company has developed 
the herbicide glyphosate, which has been used widely in agriculture, in conjunction with 
Monsanto seeds. BASF is presently only active in agricultural chemicals and is not present in 
the seeds segment of the market, focusing its research on chemical and biological trait 
discovery. In 2007, BASF and Monsanto agreed to jointly develop new crop technologies, with 
Monsanto concentrating in marketing products issued from the collaboration and both 
companies sharing net profits. More details about the market structure of the industry are 
provided below. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the agrochemicals supply chain 
 
 
                                                          
354 See, S. Ling Wang, P. Heisey, D. Schimmelpfennig & E. Ball, Agricultural Productivity Growth in the United 
States: Measurement, Trends, and Drivers (USDA Economic Research Report 189, July 2015). 
355 For a thorough analysis, see K. Fuglie et al., Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food 
Processing, Agricultural Input, and Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 
130 (2011).  
356 Syngenta, Our Industry 2016, 70. 
357 K.O. Fuglie et al, Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and 
Biofuel Industries Worldwide (USDA, Economic Research Report Number 130 December 2011), 49. 
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Source: Competition Commission of South Africa (2017) 358 
 
 The plant variety protection value chain begins with the global provision of R&D 
technology for manufacturing active ingredients. Bayer reports that planned R&D investment 
in this field will be approximately EUR 1 billion in 2017 with efforts to bring over 15 new 
products to farmers in the next five years359. Due to tight European regulations, these key 
players have focused their R&D efforts on meeting the stringent regulatory measures.  
 While the second stage of the value chain has been focused on four main protection 
areas: fungicides, insecticides, herbicides, and seeds treatments, there is growing interest in 
biological crop protection solutions (such as Bayer’s Poncho 2.0), and complementary 
bacterium that can increase the productivity of soil around plant roots for better nutrient rich 
feeding. However, the main pathogens which cause plant diseases are often fungi360 as well as 
bacteria and viruses. The global fungicides market is estimated to be valued at USD 14.49 
billion in 2016 with projections to reach USD 19.17 billion by 2022. The most common fungal 
infections that impact agricultural productivity include: powdery mildew (wheat, barley rye), 
stripe rust (wheat and barley) and ergot (wheat, barley and rye. The fungicides market is led 
by: triazoles, strobilurins,  and chloronitriles, but the phenylamides segment is the fasted 
                                                          
358 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 40, para. 92 
(figure based on third parties and merging parties’ submissions). 
359 Bayer (2017). Crop Science Division of Bayer well positioned to fulfill future customer, market and social 
needs., available at http://www.press.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/Crop-Science-Division-of-Bayer-well-
positioned-to-fulfill-future-customer-market-and-societal-needs . 
360 European Crop Protection Association, Pesticides and Biodiversity, (ECPA, 2010), available at 
http://www.ecpa.eu/sites/default/files/7584%2BBiodiversity_V04_b%C3%A0t.pdf . 
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growing type in the market361. Regional sales performance for Adama362 in the India, Middle 
East and Africa markets for 2015 was around USD $289.5 million in comparison to USD $ 
983.9 million for crop protection. BASF’s crop protection division saw more than EUR 5.8 
billion in sales for 2015.  
 The third stage in the plant variety protection value chain moves from the 
manufacturing of fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides towards the wholesale of these 
branded agrochemicals, which are then sent to retailers in order to end up in the last stage with 
farmers. Last spring, Bayer agreed to divest its herbicide Liberty for antitrust approval purposes 
to meet conditions imposed the South Africa Competition Commission363. Without such a 
divestiture, the merger would mean Monsanto and Bayer could combine their Liberty and 
RoundUp Ready seeds brands, which would have reduced the level of competition in this 
market. Further implications for South Africa mean that just three corporations would control 
64% of the agrochemical market with Bayer-Monsanto controlling 25% of this share, making 
it the world’s largest supplier of seeds and chemicals364. South Africa also play a key role in 
the future expansion for the two companies and its dominant position over traits-germplasm 
crop protection products in the country. In fact, South Africa uses more agrochemicals that any 
other African country and farmers in South Africa have spent USD 2.3 billion on agrochemicals 
in the 2014/15 season365.  
 The process of product development of crop protect begins with active ingredients (AI) 
which are formulated into granules or emulsifieable concentrates designed for potency and 
efficiency purposes that are sold to distributors and farmers366. These active ingredients that are 
essential to crop protection are based on five areas of need: the chemical class, the plant to be 
protected, the molecule itself, the mode of action, or the pests against which the substances act. 
In total, the lifecycle process for AIs can be around 30 years, involving pharmaceutical 
companies and academic institutions which initially provide thousands of molecules that are 
synthesized each year367.  
In terms of the lifecycle of AIs used for crop protection, the R&D company normally 
spends an 11 year period for discovery and development368. During the discovery process, 
candidate molecules are assessed based on a combination of company aims and other porperties 
in which patents are developed for these new AIs, formulations, mixtures, and process 
technologies369. Next, the development stage begins with field studies to meet regulation 
criteria and the trial preparation can move forward, which is generally a 5-6 year development 
                                                          
361 See http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/fungicides-
356.html?gclid=CjwKCAjw64bPBRApEiwAJhG-fhu8BBRoHxfKKtXCxg1rCWZ7bQYoOFzLi2vzM-
6vA0XvF5t3525B2BoC2HcQAvD_BwE 
362 Adama See: https://www.adama.com/en/media/press-releases/adama-performance-q3-2015.html 
363 See Business Insider (2017). Available at: http://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/r-bayer-to-sell-
liberty-crop-protection-brands-to-get-merger-nod-2017-5-1001989110 
364 ACBIO (2017). The Bayer-Monsanto merger: Implications for South Africa’s Farmers. Available at 
http://acbio.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Bayer-Monsanto-report.pdf 
365 Ibid. 
366 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), para. 159. 
367 Ibid., para. 173. 
368 Ibid., para. 161. 
369 Ibid., para. 163. 
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process370. In order for the AI to be profitable,  the commercialization stage involves finding 
uses for the product or combing it with other components and AIs371. Other strategic measures 
used to extend the life of AIs include more supplementary patents for its compositions or 
formulations372. Moreover, patenting strategies aim to tackle generic competition through 
combining forces with other AI mixtures that are also patented373.  
 Because of the long time period for discovery and development combined with the high 
cost of around USD 286 million374, it is common for firms to partner in the early stages with 
licensing, technical sales, or reciprocal arrangements to mitigate economies of scale and 
manufacturing costs375. Other costs are found in the later stages of approval which can be USD 
33 million376 before the product is finally authorized as being safe for people, animal, and 
environmental health. The importance of the approval and authorization stage is to ensure that 
the health jeopardizing components are regulated377. Overall, the AI must go through a strict 
assessment in the EU  before it is approved and registered on a list which currently exceeds 
400 approved active ingredients for crop protection378. This analysis monitors residues and 
effects to monitor carcinogens, endocrine disruptors, and mutagenics taking around 2.5-3.5 
additionaly years for approval and requiring additional preparation before the application can 
be started379. As such, in order for farmers in the EU to access the crop protection, the AI must 
have received two types of authorisation before they can be sold to farmers in the EEA380. First, 
the crop protection products with the AI must have been authorised by the Commission, upon 
the advice of European Food Safety Authority ("EFSA"). Second, the crop protection product 
incorporating the AI (alone or as part of a mixture of AIs) must have been authorised by the 
competent authority in the Member State(s) where it will be sold.381. Both registration of the 
final product and commercialization take place in the national markets.  
 Marketing to farmers is another strategic step that takes place several years before the 
AI is launched using communication with growers, advertising, and branding382. However, 
generic companies can impose competitive constraints since the development period is several 
years shorter for a generic383. The elaborate web of AI patents means generic players deal 
mostly with off-patent technologies, meaning they have a limited ability to address farmer 
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375 Ibid., para. 204. 
376 Ibid., para. 189. 
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needs384. Usual complaints about generics are about the fact that their products are aged, the 
lack of innovative capabilities, and inadequate consultancy for customers. Currently, Adama 
leads the generic players in crop protection products385. As such, generic companies focus less 
on discovery and original development and leverage advantage from selling different mixes or 
formulations386. Especially, because resistance is a major problem for crop protection products, 
there is a need for new innovative insecticides and fungicides and AIs which are mostly 
developed through non-generic R&D focused companies, which can offer more competitive 
products of high quality387.    
 Generic players find it hard to compete against such massive R&D players and are left 
with portfolios of low margin AIs that large R&D companies do not want388. The complexities 
and costs of registering in multiple EU countries can also deter generic players from 
commercializing off-patent AIs and a general lack of technical expertise makes that their 
production processes (and costs) will usually not be as efficient as those of the R&D player389. 
Nonetheless, generic products represent an important competitive constraint on the market 
leaders as analysis shows that customers typically switch to generic suppliers more than 
amongst the large multinationals. Yet, the crop protection sector is characterized by high entry 
barriers to knowledge and expertise, financial resources, and capital. 
 Among the generics, Adama is a lead developer in crop protection products and is the 
leader in the off-patent active ingredients in terms of sales, with a dominant international 
presence in over 100 countries. This places Adama at a rank of number seven amongst all 
global companies engaged in the field. Due the aforementioned constraints listed previously 
for generic companies, such as overcoming expensive regulatory issues and innovation, Adama 
nonetheless utilizes a competitive strategic business model that has managed to overcome these 
weaknesses worldwide. In 2011, Adama became part of ChemChina, a major conglomerate 
controlled by the Chinese government, and has since penetrated the Chinese market in terms 
of commercial and operational infrastructure to solidify its commercial platform with numerous 
agreements with other Chinese government-owned agricultural companies that have resulted 
in Adama being the exclusive distributor for these Chinese companies (Adama 2016 financial 
report). For example, crop protection represented 93.7 percent of the company’s sales in 2016 
with segment revenues in crop protection at USD 287 million for 2016. The company reports 
that registration requirements prove to be the biggest barrier to entry in a country, often 
consisting of renewed compliance and testing.  
 Due to macro trends, the top conglomerates often maintain diversified portfolios to 
ensure they have products at various stages in the lifecycle due to the high costs of discovery, 
development, and commercialization. Adama has a dominant presence in emerging markets 
with Latin America being 26.2 percent of its market distribution and Asia 27.7 percent.  
Overall entry and exit barriers include general reputation and knowledge accumulation 
in the sector, financial resilience, access to stable funding sources, technological knowledge 
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and successful off-patent product development, raw material supply chain efficiency, and 
obtaining regulatory approval and permits for their products. Herbicides are 49.3 percent of 
Adama’s revenue in 2016, almost double in comparison to insecticides and fungicides.  
 FMC, another generic products player, operates with a low-cost, flexible manufacturing 
and supply chain model. It completed the acquisition of Cheminova in 2015 for an aggregate 
purchase of USD 1.8 billion. The acquisition is nearing full integration, enabling FMC to access 
new direct market channels and expand its product lines and technology. In 2016, FMC 
reported USD 3.3 billion in annual sales. Recently, FMC announced the acquisition of a large 
proportion of DuPont’s crop protection business in response to the European Commission’s 
decision that required DuPont to be divested due to its recent merger with The Dow Chemical 
Company. Direct operations for FMC in Europe take place in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia with R&D investments representing 5.8 percent of  total revenue in 2016.  
Nufarm is a generic player competing worldwide in crop protection and prioritizes its 
investments on a small number of important crops in four geographical regions. In 2016 
Nufarm experienced around USD 2.7 billion in sales revenue with profits at around USD 27.5 
million in 2016. 
Japanese companies, such as Sumitomo, are more R&D.focused. Other companies 
include Agro-Kanesho, Hokko, Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha (ISK), Kumiai, Kyoyu Agri, Mitsui 
Chemicals, Nihon Nohyaku, Nippon Soda and Nissan Chemical. These companies have a 
regional focus, mostly targeting domestic crops and pests390.Furthermore, in case a new active 
has promising applications in other markets it is often developed by or in cooperation with one 
of the largest R&D-integrated players391. The Japanese companies individually are also  much 
smaller than the Big 5 as concerns global sales, an important proportion of their sales being 
generated in Japan392. 
 
2.2.3. Fertilisers 
 
Fertilisers can be inorganic (or mineral) and organic. Inorganic Fertilisers are manufactured by 
firms in the agro-chemical industry, and can either include one macronutrient (simple nutrient 
Fertilisers, such as urea) or made of compounds mixtures (mineral Fertilisers containing NP, 
NK, and NPK, such as diammonium phosphate). Organic Fertilisers include instead, for 
example, manure or compost and they are not generally associated with the agro-chemical 
industry. Inorganic Fertilisers constitute a critical ingredient in the global food economy. There 
are three main agricultural fertiliser nutrients: nitrogen (N), phosphate (P2O5), and potash 
(KCl, or potassium). Nitrogen accounts for the larger part of the total tonnage of Fertilisers 
(around 63%), while phosphate and potassium for 21% and 15% respectively393. World 
fertiliser nutrient (N+P2O5+K2O) consumption is estimated to reach 186,900,000 tonnes in 
2014, up by 2.0 percent over 2013, world demand for total fertiliser nutrients being estimated 
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to grow at 1.8 percent per annum from 2014 to 2018394.  The use of fertilisers raises 
environmental concerns as it may affect surface and groundwater quality, and, for nitrogen, it 
may vaporize into the atmosphere in the form of nitrous oxide that constitutes a greenhouse 
gas. The industry developed considerably post-Second World War, in particular because of 
heavy investment by the public sector. Since the 1980s, fertiliser markets have been liberalized, 
although government-owned or controlled production still accounts for the largest part of 
global nitrogen production and a significant part of the phosphate production395. 
 With regard to economic concentration, one needs to distinguish between nitrogen, 
whose supply is the least concentrated as its production is associated with the availability and 
cost of natural gas, the main ingredient for synthesizing ammonia, and phosphorus or 
potassium, whose supply is concentrated, as these fertilisers are primarily mined from 
underground deposits from only a handful of countries. In particular, for potash, only three 
countries in the world (Canada, Belarus and Russia) account for more than 80% of the world 
reserves.  
With regard to the supply of potash, the Canadian company PotashCorp is the world’s 
largest potash manufacturer but also produces significant amounts of all three primary 
fertilisers. Together with another Canadian firm Agrium and the U.S. firm Mosaic (which 
sources most of its potash from mines in Canada), it conducts its offshore marketing of potash 
through a common trading consortium Canpotex, which controls more than one-third of global 
potash production, and accounts for almost 2/3 of world potash trade, including trade by other 
potash companies in which PotashCorp has significant ownership. The competing trading 
consortium in this industry is a cabal of three companies, Belaruskali, Silvinit, and Uralkali, 
which operate through their marketing consortium, the Belarusian Potash Company (BPC) with 
regard to exports, which accounts for 1/3 of world potash trade. In 2013 Uralkali quitted BPC 
heralding a price war that led to an important drop in the price of potash. 
The phosphate segment is oligopolistic with the government-owned Moroccan 
company, the OCP group, being the largest global producer of phosphates. OCP controls 36 
percent of the global raw phosphate market and 51 percent of the global phosphoric acid sales, 
providing phosphate rock to both PotashCorp and Agrium396. 
Yara International, based in Norway, is one of the world’s biggest nitrogen fertiliser 
producer, but also present in all other fertilisers, being the industry leader in the production of 
inorganic Fertilisers globally, in terms of value of sales, followed by Agrium, Mosaic and 
Potash Corp397. Although the overall fertiliser market, if nitrogen is included, does not seem to 
be overly concentrated, the Top 10 of Fertilisers firms controlling approximately two fifths of 
the global market in 2011, for a CR4 of less than 25%398, the level of concentration is quite 
high with regard to potash and phosphorus. Nitrogen-phosphorus-potash nutrients do not 
substitute for each other in plant growth, but are all necessary to biosynthesize basic building 
blocks of plants, animals, and other life forms so therefore are complementary inputs to crop 
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production. One should also account of the fact that many of the major phosphorus producers 
also manufacture nitrogen fertiliser, partly because a source of nitrogen is required to stabilize 
phosphorus, and partly because many fertiliser manufacturers sell blended nitrogen-
phosphorus-potash fertiliser at wholesale and retail. 
Although real fertiliser prices were relatively stable from the late 1980s until 2004, this 
period was followed by another where fertiliser prices have risen considerably between 2005 
and 2008399 and 2010-2012. They have since been going down, rather considerably400.  It has 
been alleged, with regard to the previous price hikes that global fertiliser producers have acted 
in a coordinated fashion to raise prices, to the detriment of competitors and consumers, forming 
a global potash cartel401. There is indeed some history of collusive agreements between fertiliser 
producers on prices and market shares dating back to the 1880s402. The industry is comprised 
largely of a small, close-knit group of executives and closed trade associations, which may 
facilitate collusion403. Allegedly the potash cartel collapsed when a Russian company, Uralkali, 
quitted BTC in 2013404. 
The exercise of buyer power by large users such as India and China, fertiliser contracts 
for these countries being now negotiated by a single entity, or only a few entities for each 
country405, and the drop in demand following the high fertiliser prices during the period from 
the early 2000s to 2008, may also signal a fundamental change in fertiliser market dynamics406. 
Consumption of fertilisers has been declining in the EU-27, most probably for environmental 
regulation related reasons and probably as demand from farmers declined in  reaction to the 
price hikes observed between 2004 and 2012. The farmers temporarily reduced the application 
of phosphorus and potash, as the prices of these two commodities have considerably risen, the 
decline in consumption of N-based products being less marked than for K and P407. The share 
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of fertilisers costs over total specific cost has also followed a positive but declining trend over 
time. 
The industry is characterized by important barriers to entry, in particular for phosphorus 
and potash production, as dominant firms or governments control most known reserves, and 
activity is subject to strict environmental regulations. Large fertiliser producers also have 
similar cost structures, with substantially lower costs than smaller, non-integrated rivals. The 
competitive fringe is dependent on the dominant firms for raw materials necessary for 
phosphorus and potash fertiliser production, or for mixing product for wholesale and retail 
sales, and consequently, its expansion seems limited. In September 2016 a deal was announced 
between two of the leaders in the market for fertilisers, Potash Corp and Agrium for US$30 
billion. The deal is expected to close in mid-2017 and will create the largest fertiliser company 
in the world; it also plans to expand into seeds and crop chemicals. 
The fertiliser industry spends relatively little in research, relative to company sales, with 
R&D spending to represent less than 0.25% of sales. Most of the innovations in the industry 
are spill-overs from either the public sector or private R&D effort in other chemical and energy 
industries or a result of “learning-by-doing” within the fertiliser industry408. There are various 
reasons explaining the low level of R&D spending and innovation in the industry. First, 
“fertiliser is a large-volume and low-value commodity with few opportunities to develop 
differentiated products”409. Second, the industry involves high costs related to environmental 
regulation or raw resources procurement, with the result that it is quite capital intensive and 
there are few opportunities to develop more efficient manufacturing processes410. Third, the 
industry may suffer from low incentives to innovate in view of the difficulty to claim 
intellectual property over improvement of manufacturing technology and therefore recoup 
returns to research investment411. Fourth, the oligopoly structure of the industry may also 
reduce the competitive pressure on firms to innovate. A lot of research is jointly funded by the 
industry, which has constituted an International Plant Nutrition Institute (IPNI), a non-profit, 
science-based organization supporting research and education for better fertiliser utilisation. 
The International Fertiliser Development Center (IFDC), a public non-profit R&D centre 
focuses on developing and transferring fertiliser technology to developing countries, including 
the “Virtual Fertiliser Research Center,” a global initiative initiated in 2010 which combines 
the work of multiple research institutions around the world cooperating to advance a unified 
research agenda in order to create a new generation of more efficient Fertilisers and soil 
fertiliser management technologies. 
The action of competition authorities in this segment of the value chain has been 
relatively limited. In 2010, the European Commission fined €175 647 000 nine animal feed 
phosphate companies for manipulating phosphorus prices from 1969 through 2004, their aim 
being to share a large part of the European feed phosphates sales by allocating sales quotas and 
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coordinating prices, as well as coordinating sale conditions when and to the extent necessary 
for those purposes412.  
In 2011, the Russian FAS approved the proposed merger of Uralkali and Silvinit 
considering the fact that Uralkali and Silvinit export about 85-90% of produced potash, with 
just remaining 10 – 15% going for domestic consumption, in view of the positive effects the 
merger would have had on the competitiveness of Russian producers on the global market and 
a number of conditions imposed on market pricing and treatment of customers. In 2011, FAS 
opened an investigation into Uralkali’s potash pricing, noting that “there are signs that the 
prices are ’monopolistically’ high. The case started following a customer complaint that 
carnallite prices were excessive. In October 2015, FAS found that Uralkali’s prices did not 
generate supra-competitive profits and were thus not abusive413.  
In 2005, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) opened an investigation 
against Sasol regarding the collusion between the company and its competitors, Omnia and 
Yara, to divide markets and fix prices in South Africa and in 2007 another investigation for a 
cartel between Sasol and Foskor in the phosphoric acid industry. Sasol, Omnia and Yara, are 
the main suppliers of fertiliser in South Africa, and had set up various committees to co-
ordinate business practices, derive forecasted market shares and ensure balance of supply and 
demand. These arrangements between these competitors resulted in Sasol becoming the sole 
wholesale supplier of an important fertiliser product, limestone ammonium nitrate (LAN). The 
CCSA settled the case for R188 million, the settlement being approved by the Competition 
Tribunal and covering the collusion investigations against Sasol, first with Omnia and Yara 
and then with Foskor, without however covering any abuse of dominance issues414.  
In 2012, the Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS), approached the India 
Competition Commission to investigate what they maintain is a global potash cartel operated 
by PotashCorp, Mosaic, Agrium, and the Russian producers requesting the Competition 
omissionn of India (CCI) to undertake an investigation under Section 19 of the Competition 
Act for an act taking place outside India that has or is likely to have an appreciable adverse 
effect on competition in India vide Section 32 of the Competition Act (the “effects doctrine”) 
against the global potash cartel 415. Although the US FTC has not initiated any enforcement 
action against fertiliser producers, deciding instead to approve the PhosChem export cartel 
under the Webb-Pomerene Act, there were some private actions in the US, alleging that potash 
producers operated a cartel through which they fixed prices in Brazil, China, and India, and 
that inflated prices in those markets influenced the price of potash in the U.S. Defendants 
moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. 6a, but the district court denied the motion and the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed416. Following this judgment the parties settled damages for $110 
million for direct and indirect purchasers.  
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2.2.4. Agricultural machinery 
 
2.2.4.1.The evolution of the agricultural machinery market 
 
World demand for agricultural equipment is expected to grow 6.8 percent per year through 
2016 to $175 billion, with particular growth in China, Brazil, and India. The U.S.-based 
company John Deere is the world’s largest manufacturer of farm machinery, followed by CNH 
Industrial (following the integration of Fiat Industrial and CNH Global)) and AGCO. The next 
tier consists of the following large producers: Kubota, Yanmar and Iseki; CLAAS, Caterpillar, 
Same Deutz-Fahr (SDF), Mahindra & Mahindra and Bucher Industries. There are 1,500 firms 
making agricultural equipment around the world, but less than 12 large multinationals are 
present in this market. Most of the large players offer a broad array of agricultural equipment 
to achieve economies of scale, but several focus on a few select lines such as irrigation products 
or milking machines. There are also large firms that cut across several industrial machinery 
categories, and for some, their involvement is quite limited in agricultural equipment. Three of 
the four leading manufacturers produce nonfarm machinery, such as earth-moving and 
construction equipment or machines for home-gardening and lawn care.  
The manufacture of high-end farm machinery requires heavy capital investment and a 
concomitant need to achieve economies of scale and scope. The advent of ‘smart agriculture’ 
has led to increasing technical complexity of such equipment with emphasis on electronic 
controls and sensors. That has considerably increased the threshold level for entry into the 
industry on a worldwide scale and increasing consolidation of the industry. Small and medium-
sized firms (as well as individual inventors and farmers) have historically been a source of 
innovation in farm machinery, but their share of the global market appears to have significantly 
declined the last two decades417. Consolidations and mergers have led to fewer and larger 
companies producing for global markets. Between 1994 and 2009, the market share of the four 
largest farm machinery manufacturers rose from 28 to 50 percent of total global sales418. 
Farm tractors make up the largest share of the market, accounting for nearly 30 percent 
of global sales of new farm equipment, with harvesting and haying machinery making up 
another 22 percent of the global market, while equipment for such uses as planting, fertilizing, 
plowing, cultivating, irrigating, and spare parts accounting for the remainder419. 
Large multinational firms account for most of the formal R&D by the farm machinery 
industry, but small and medium-sized firms’ contribution to innovation has been significant, 
some studies noting that the farm machinery industry is one in which large firms have 
concentrated on making refinements and achieving economies of scale in the manufacture of 
innovations originating from small-sized entrepreneurs, some of which have been bought by 
larger firms, offering them the necessary economies of scale in manufacturing and 
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distribution420 The large firms spend relatively little on R&D, with a reported R&D to sales 
ratio that does not exceed 4 percent and for some is less than 1 percent421.  
A recent game-changer in this industry is the development of precision agriculture and 
innovative high-speed precision planting systems. These systems enable farmers to plant seeds 
at substantially higher speeds than conventional planters without sacrificing accuracy. By 
allowing farmers to plant crops more quickly and accurately within the optimal planting 
window, high-speed precision planting systems can substantially improve crop yields. This 
high speed planting is expected to become standard in the next few years. High-speed precision 
planting technology takes several years to develop and important investments.  This industry 
has recently been the focus of competition law activity with the recent challenge by the US 
DOJ of the John Deere-Precision Planting merger in August 2016 and the subsequent 
abandonment of the merger by the parties in May 2017.  
Precision Planting, which forms part of The Climate Corporation, a digital agriculture 
company acquired by Monsanto in 2013, was first to develop a high speed planting system, 
called SpeedTube, in 2014. Its main competitor Deere developed the ExactEmerge high-speed 
precision planting system, also in 2014. The business model followed by each company was 
different, as unlike Deere, which sold its high-speed precision planting technology bundled 
into new planters, Precision Planting first offered SpeedTube as a set of components that could 
be purchased at a relatively low cost and retrofitted onto existing planters made by planter 
manufacturers, including John Deere. This posed a formidable challenge to Deere and its 
profitable sales of new planters. The two companies have remained the dominant providers of 
high-speed precision planting systems in the United States - accounting for at least 86% of all 
U.S. sales. In November 2015, Deere announced that it had agreed with The Climate 
Corporation (Monsanto) to acquire Precision Planting, for $190 million, subject to a carve-out 
of some assets and adjustments, thus leading Deere to control nearly every method through 
which American farmers can acquire effective high speed precision planting systems. Head to 
head competition between Deere and Precision Planting had largely benefitted farmers so far 
through lower prices and more innovative high-speed precision planting systems in the 
marketplace, the firms offering a series of discounts and aggressive financial packages. Deere 
and Precision Planting have also competed intensely for farmers’ business through advertising 
campaigns and industry events. 
Concurrently, Deere announced that it has entered into an into an exclusive data-sharing 
agreement with The Climate Corporation, providing The Climate Corporation near real-time 
access to data collected from Deere equipment (the Digital Ag Connectivity agreement). This 
data-sharing agreement offered Monsanto considerable value in addition to the $190 million 
that it would have received from Deere. 
Indeed, high-speed precision planting systems enable farmers to plant accurately at up 
to twice the speed at which they would otherwise be able to plant with conventional systems, 
thus leading in spacing that allows for ideal plant growth. Planting at higher speeds, while 
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maintaining precision, is valuable because it better enables farmers to plant crops within the 
optimal planting window - the narrow set of days each season when planting conditions are 
most likely to produce high crop yields. Farmers can acquire high-speed precision planting 
systems by purchasing a retrofit kit to update their conventional planter, or by purchasing a 
new planter with a high-speed precision planting system factory-installed.  
Deere was particularly concerned about Precision Planting’s technology because of its 
retrofit solutions that would have enabled farmers to upgrade their conventional planters with 
the latest high-speed planting technology without purchasing a new planter. Deere was also 
concerned that Precision Planting’s technology could commoditize the planter toolbar. Indeed, 
because Precision Planting’s high-speed precision planting retrofit components can be attached 
to existing planter toolbars, they would foster farmers’ indifference to the brand of the planter 
toolbar and exert competitive pressure on Deere’s planter sales. 
In its complaint422, the US DOJ argued that the relevant market included both high-
speed precision planting systems that are factory-installed on new planters, and systems that 
are retrofitted onto new and used conventional planters, noting that no reasonably 
interchangeable substitutes exist for high-speed precision planting systems. Indeed, wider 
conventional planters are not effective substitutes for planters equipped with high-speed 
precision planting systems because wider planters are less manoeuvrable, are more expensive 
to purchase, operate, and maintain, have lower resale value and may have other detrimental 
effects on the planting process. 
The complaint noted that Deere and Precision Planting were the only two meaningful 
providers of high-speed precision planting systems in the United States. Although Kinze and 
Horsch Maschinen GmbH claim to offer comparable solutions in the United States, their 
planters’ use of a conventional seed tube instead of a seed-delivery cartridge made them 
incapable of delivering the same accuracy at high speeds as Deere’s and Precision Planting’s 
high-speed precision technology. Even counting Kinze’s and Horsch’s systems that lack seed-
delivery cartridges as high-speed precision planting systems, their shares of the high-speed 
precision planting systems market in 2015 were approximately 12% and 2%, respectively, 
while Deere’s share of the market was approximately 44%, and Precision Planting’s was 
approximately 42%. As a result, should the merger be authorised Deere would control 86%, or 
nearly all of the relevant market post-merger, if Kinze and Horsch are not included. Even 
accounting for Kinze’s and Horsch’s shares, the HHI for the highspeed precision planting 
systems market exceeds 3800, and with the acquisition the HHI would exceed 7600, thus 
indicating, according to the US horizontal merger guidelines that the merger will be 
presumptively anticompetitive. 
In addition, the US DOJ noted that the merger would have averted the need for Deere 
to reduce ExactEmerge pricing by 5–15% to maintain ExactEmerge’s market share, and thus 
the ‘strategic value’ of the acquisition, that it would retain from not having to compete with 
Precision Planting, would range between $70 million and $210 million. It was also alleged by 
the US DOJ that the proposed acquisition was also likely to reduce the quality of some of the 
highspeed precision planting options in the market, as post-acquisition, Deere would likely 
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seek to reposition Precision Planting’s offerings to maximize the profitability of Deere’s high-
speed precision planters and to reduce competition between Deere’s and Precision Planting’s 
retrofit solutions, thus ‘tempering’ both Deere’s growing retrofit business and Precision 
Planting’s growing factory-install business with Case and AGCO, both of which would 
cannibalize Deere’s high-speed precision planters business. According to the DOJ, the 
extensive intellectual property rights held by both Deere and Precision Planting, would have 
also prevented other firms from adopting important aspects of their respective high-speed 
precision planting systems, further inhibiting entry. 
Following this development, The Climate Corporation announced Monsanto’s 
termination of their agreement with Deere & Company for the acquisition of the Precision 
Planting LLC equipment business, and expressed its intention to sell the Precision Planting 
equipment business423. The digital collaboration agreement between Deere and Climate and a 
distribution deal with farm data management company Ag Leader has also been terminated. 
When describing the value chain of farm machinery, the most important aspect to note 
is that the final  customers and users of agricultural equipment are farmers. First, farm 
machinery is cyclical424 with correlations related to rises in commodity prices and demand for 
equipment. At the same time, experts argue that “trends in commodity prices cannot explain 
long-term structural changes within the farm machinery industry” such as the “entire range of 
famous tractor brands: Lanz, FAR, Ford, Citroën, Röhr, BMB gradually disappeared in the 20th 
century due to the industrial landscape425.” This is exemplified through the increasing adoption 
of strategic growth instruments such as M&A, JVs, and cooperative agreements to increase 
market shares in “turf” with the future expansion of new geographic markets.  
 It is expected that in the near future profit pools for the farm machinery value chain will 
shift from Europe towards China, but with high industry consolidation, only 75 to 80 percent 
of machine manufactures see opportunities for organic growth in market share gains426. The 
position of companies across the machinery value chain takes several archetype forms: 
component specialists, machine manufacturers, equipment & machine system providers, 
aftersales providers, and software/system providers. In particular, component specialist focus 
on the development of components for industrial machines. Next, the sale of single machines 
places a focus on the development and production of these single machines like milling and 
grinding machines. Third, equipment and machine system providers focus on assembly and 
integration of combined machinery systems, lines and equipment lik, wuch as processing 
machinery equipment and packaging lines. The aftersales providers are active in the aftersale 
business of parts and services. Finally, the software development providers focus on the high 
price, country specific segment.  
 Farming equipment consists of a variety of machinery and tools that help carry out a 
number of “processes to upgrade the quality and quantity of production such as using 
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machinery for multiple purposes like :harrowing, ploughing, tilling, and planting427. For 
example,  sugar beet production involves machinery for seeding, harvesting, short-term 
storage, load and cleaning, transport and return of by products. In emerging economies such as 
India and Brazil, governments are escalating subsidies on agricultural machinery which is 
encouraging for multinationals hoping to expand their global operations. However, there are 
reports that these central government sponsored schemes are failing to make an impact at the 
grassroots level in several Indian districts428.  For example, the central government of India has 
subsidized over 20 types of farm machinery for the Pilibhit district through the use of online 
registration for the purchase of this machinery.  
 With falling commodity prices, farmers are nonetheless encouraged to invest in more 
expensive, bigger, and more productive machinery and technology. This expenditure is mostly 
funded by cheap debt and high tax allowances429. France, the biggest crop producer in the EU 
has suffered from poor grain harvests and market prices which negatively affects farmers’ 
ability to invest in more machinery430. This further indicates that the customer base is shrinking, 
but the reliance on mechanisation is not. Thus, from a strategical standpoint the key is to 
convince farmers that they need new innovation and technology to increase production since it 
is more difficult to expand the customer base within the EU and US markets. As such, the 
incorporation of monitoring systems, GPS, systems, and self-driven mechanism will fuel the 
desired material/economic increase431s for machinery suppliers.  
 
2.2.4.2.The Big Data disruptive innovation in agricultural machinery 
 
 It is expected that five main drivers of big data in farming will disrupt conventional 
farm equipment technologies: precision agriculture, sensors, Internet of Things, smartphone 
usage, and cloud computing432. The Big Six are quickly delving into investments in this area, 
with Bayer planning to put at least EUR 200 million in their Digital Farming business by 2020. 
The framing of digital solutions is often geared towards the desire to help smallholder framers 
reach their potential and productivity levels. For example, venture capital is saturating the ag 
tech space with investment increasing 80% annually433.  
 First, farming machinery already employs precision agriculture features to use one or 
more sources of data like soils, crops, nutrients, and pests for optimization purposes. For 
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example, these tools can aid farmers with increasing inputs like crop protection agents and 
fertiliser to improve yields and quality. Additionally, real time data can help farmers adapt their 
growing conditions. Second, sensors (both remote such as satellite technology, UAVs/drones) 
and in-field sensors (monitory anything from seed applications to yield) are building blocks for 
transforming ag systems as a mechanism for collecting the vast volumes of information. These 
sensors on crops can provide data points on soil condition as well as information about wind 
requirements or water availability. Third the IoT creates linkages with external data sources so 
that analytics can be used to prevent spoilage, for example. The already established popularity 
of smart phones will provide numerous apparatuses for farmer’s to download and use apps to 
reap the uses of big data. This, coupled with cloud computing, can create structures for big data 
projects and as a way to deal with the capacity requirements associated with big data.  
 Examples of data exchange platforms in agriculture include Monsanto’s fieldscripts, 
the Farm Business Network, and Farm mobile.434 There are also aspirations to integrate 
suppliers and food processors with cloud platforms that create connectivity with many 
businesses at once for data exchange. Ultimately, this means that agriculture will undergo its 
third major revolution, but there are still issues over information storage, processing, and the 
extent to which the data generated can actually be used effectively to enhance farmer 
productivity. Yet, the future of digital agriculture is not limited to these main ideas. “Modern 
information-based technologies, such as self-driving tractors, GPS (global positioning 
systems), robot milking machines, automated egg production, drones, satellite data and social 
media, will change farm practices and agricultural structures,” according to the USDA. From 
an optimistic viewpoint, a more data driven agricultural sector should lead to improved 
sustainability, food safety, resource efficiency, and waste reduction435. As such, governments 
are providing funding to support these efforts, with a recent announcement by the USDA for 
$1.35 million for data driven farm management practices436.  
 “Smart Farming” is also expected to incorporate robots and more artificial intelligence 
in farming in coming years437. Consequently, the stakeholder landscape will entail power shifts 
with the emergence of new actors, such as tech companies, venture capitalists and new entrants. 
Scholars also point out that these power shifts should inevitably change relations among 
“different players in current food supply chain networks.” Ensuring open data and privacy 
protection will be the biggest challenge for public institutions and smart farming could “unravel 
two extreme scenarios 1) closed, proprietary systems in which the farmer is part of a highly 
integrated food supply chain or 2) open, collaborative systems in which the farmer and every 
other stakeholder in the chain network is flexible in choosing business partners as well for the 
technology as for the food production side438.”  
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2.2.5. Animal Genetic Improvement 
  
The global animal genetics market is estimated to be worth around $4 billion by 2020 from 
$3.68 billion in 2016439.With more diverse genetic pools, live-stock production systems are 
more resilient to shock, have improved productivity, and are better adapted to changing 
environmental conditions. Drivers of change in the animal genetics resources management 
stem from increased demands for livestock products, marketing infrastructure and access, 
retailing, climate, disease, and lifestyle factors, just to name a few440. The next 50 years will 
foresee an increase in meat production by 75 million tonnes in developing countries alone, 
totalling at an average of 175 million tonnes. Developed countries already experience an 
average of 75 million tonnes of meat produced in 2017 and that figure is expected to level off 
in coming years, placing the emphasis on the Global South. Moreover, the increasing demand 
in animal protein consumption further drives the growth of the animal genetics market as 
farmers are incentivizes to adopt “advanced genetic technology for larger-scale production and 
quality breeds.” 
 Genetic diversity remains under threat due to known risks and breed distinction. These 
threats include: indiscriminate cross-breeding, introduction/increased use of exotic breeds, lack 
of profitability/competitiveness, diseases/disease management, loss of pasture or production 
environment and poor control of inbreeding441. However, genetic food engineering first began 
in 1994 with the debut of a GM tomato, the first food licensed by the FDA for human 
consumption. Genetic modification of animal specifies is largely used for research purposes442 
with reports of animal breeding and genetics R&D expenditures at around $339 million in 
2010443.  
 Advances in technology are most intense within the area of genomics. Although this 
has helped define the genetic basis of heritable traits, its advantages are restrained to only a 
few breeds widely used. Additionally, there are strict regulations surrounding animal genetic 
engineering, in addition to its high costs and time consuming R&D activities.  
The major players of the animal genetics market are Genus Plc, Topigs, Envigo, CRV 
Holding B.V., Hendrix Genetics BV. The market is segmented by product, testing service and 
region444 and is further segmented into live animals and genetic materials. Additionally, the 
live animals segment is further categorized into canine, equine, poultry, porcine, bovine etc. 
and the genetic materials segment is further categorized into semen and embryo. Europe is the 
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largest regional segment of the global animal genetics market. Nonetheless, the rising 
populations and urbanization in BRICS will shift these countries into the fastest growing 
markets.  
 Hendrix Genetics BV operates in the layer, hybrid turkey, pig, aquacultulre, and 
traditional breed activities as a multi-species animal breeding company. Major breeding centers 
are in the Netherlands, France and Canada and it provides genetics for animal proteins such as 
eggs and salmon445. Its annual revenues were $436 million, while Tyson Foods earned around 
$25.6 billion in annual revenues in 2015. Another key player in animal genetic improvement, 
Genus PLC, enables farmers to more efficiently produce animal protein, meat and milk, 
totalling $398 million in revenue for 2015. The company sells genetics directly and through 
distributors in more than 70 countries with Latin American containing 29% of the revenue. The 
two main markets are the porcine market, which sells genetically superior boars and sows to 
produce offspring, the dairy and beef markets where the primary product is bull semen and is 
delivered with artificial insemination.  
 The current trend is for “reduced genetic variation both within and across breeds”446. 
This has led to a technological focus on the high-output of international transboundary breeds 
and the loss of smaller ones, neglecting the benefits of local, smaller breeds. Genomics has 
experience successful application in the dairy cattle breads447, but the genetic selection of 
animal breeding dates back for thousands of years.  
 Often, genetic improvement in livestock sectors involves extremely organized systems 
with selection based on : visual appraisal, pedigree information, performance data, genetic 
metric values and accuracy, genomic/DNA markers enhanced genetic merit values. Since 1957, 
poultry growth has increased by 85-90%. In dairy, for example, in the 1940s 25M cows 
produced 4500 lbs. per lactation, and in 2008 9.2M cows produce 22,000 lbs. per lactation. As 
such, there is a 2.7 fold reduction in cow numbers and 4.9 fold milk yield per cow increase due 
to genetic improvements as 1940s cows required 4.5 times more land and produced 2.6 times 
more methane448. 
 
2.2.6. Animal Health 
 
The global animal health market is expected to reach $58.4 billion by 2025, primarily driven 
by technological advancements to combat a rise in zoonotic and food-borne diseases 
internationally449. The projected population increased, coupled with the expansion of required 
livestock mean that animal based food products should increase in demand. Feed additives are 
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segmented into nutritional and medicinal with a 46.7% market share of products in 2015450. 
Food additives are used to increase muscle growth to increase feed utilization.  
 Because commercial animals including livestock and poultry enter the human food 
chain, the “prevention and eradication of disease is a vital ongoing concern” driving the 
demand for animal healthcare products as a necessary expense451. The nutritional chemical 
segments are set to remain key, while the faster growing segments in animal health appear to 
be vaccines and diagnostics, according to the report.  
 Furthermore, this market also undergoes extensive collaboration research initiatives 
like the recent “Zoetis agreement with the University of Nottingham to conduct a research on 
maximizing muscle growth and feed efficiency in pig farming.” Zoetis (as a part of Pfizer) 
possess around 20% of the animal health market share, making it the largest company in the 
segment. The company delivers quality medicines and vaccines, complemented by diagnostic 
products, genetic tests, biodevices and a range of services.For 2016, the company reported 
shares of $1.3 billion with a 5% operational growth driven by the launch of new products. 
Operating in the U.S. and internationally, the company delivers a portfolio of products for 
livestock and companion animals with sales of livestock products flat operationally at the 
international level.  
 For example, Draxxin is an injectable anti-infective used to help treat respiratory 
disease in swine and cattle and has expanded its Fostera swine vaccine franchise. Other key 
actors include Merck Animal Health whicih operates in more than 150 countries with global 
sales reported at $3.5 billion in 2016452, Merial (Sanofi) at a $2.7 billion revenue, and Elanco 
(Eli Lilly subsidiary) which competes closely with Merck in the swine flu and aquaculture 
markets recently acquired Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica in 2017, expanding its vaccine 
portfolio453. Additionally, there is Bayer Animal Health, Novartis Animal Health and Virbac 
S.A. 
 Major products driving the performance of the animal health segment include 
aquaculture products to maximize fish survival and growth (salmon, tilapia, trout) and swine 
products to help in the production of safe and high quality pork. Vaccines tend to be given to 
animals at different life stages and vaccinating these groups can protect against herd 
immunity454. Dairy, beef cattle and sheep face a constant threat from a range of soil dwelling 
bacteria, prompting the frequent use of vaccines to fight these bacterial diseases.  
 Antibiotics resistance is facing growing concerns for public officials as its use in 
agricultural settings has received relatively low attention455. Human consumption of antibiotic 
treated animals threatens human health due to “pathogenic-resistant organisms propagated in 
these livestock” as the bacteria found in livestock meat can harbour resistant genes456. However, 
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the overall impact from antibiotic use in food animals has not been adequately assessed due to 
a lack of research. The World Health Organization reports that Norway is intentionally 
reducing its antibiotic use in salmon457, a major export for the country and highly consumed. 
This is in a large part due the increase in salmon farming, which was developed by the Scottish 
in the early 1970s as an alternative to river fishing. When antibiotics are overused, especially 
in farming, bacteria will become resistant to the treatment and can have profound effects on 
future animal health if widespread. 
 
2.2.7. Animal Nutrition/Feed 
 
In the United States, corn is the most commonly produced feed grain at more than 95 percent 
of total production and is the main energy ingredient in livestock feed458. Sorghum, barley, and 
oats make up the other major feed grains. Competiveness in the commodity market can be 
summarized as following: Brazil has the lowest production cost of soybeans per bushel at 8.5 
percent under the U.S. cost, while the average cost per bushel for corn remains lowest in the 
United States459. Geographically, Parana in Brazil’s coast benefits from its location and is the 
lowest cost exporter of corn and soybeans, followed by the U.S. Heartland, which has a larger 
production capacity than Parana. However, only 25 percent of soybean and corn production in 
Brazil comes from Parana, while 75% is from the Heartland460. Other factors such as low land 
costs and improvements to inland transportation costs in Brazil improve the competitive 
position of the country.  
 The animal nutrition market can be divided by nutrition type (amino acids, minerals, 
vitamins etc.), by livestock, and by administration method (oral, topical, injection) and will hit 
$18.8 billion by 2020461. Increasing demands for food mean farmers “must have access to 
reliable feed for the livestock with proper nutrition for health and reproductive purposes.” For 
example, amino acids substitute to protein sources and have a major share in the market. 
Evonik, an animal nutrition amino acid provider, reports that their amino acid feed can even 
minimize nitrogen excretion. The biggest shares of the nutrition market are Amino acids, 
followed by prebiotics for the poultry industry.  
 The top feed producers include: CP Group with annual production of 27,650 metric 
tons, Cargill with 17,900 metric tons of annual feed produced, New Hope Liuhe, Purina Animal 
Nutrition, Wen’s Food Group, Tyson Foods, and BRF. Overall the global animal feed market 
is highly competitive and contains a large number of players with its strongest markets in North 
America and Europe. Remaining at the forefront of feed nutrient development, Cargill Inc. has 
traditionally acquired regional companies in different locations to “get easy entry in that 
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particular market to benefit from the customer base462.” In this industry, market shares are 
stabilized with the introduction of novel ingredients. Therefore, companies tend to focus on 
research expansion and facilities and new investment opportunities in Latin America and Asia.  
 The animal feed market plays a lead role as an enabler of economic production of 
animal proteins and is the largest element in creating affordable and profuse animal proteins463. 
Global commercial manufacturers generate over $400 billion per year with compound feed 
production at 1 billion tonnes annually. Feed grain prices dropped during the 2016/17 
marketing year in the U.S. while global supplies increased464. The planted acreage of 8 major 
U.S. crops is reported to be 257 million acres in the past several years with anticipated declining 
acreage. On a global scale, 33 percent of the world’s land (ice-free) is used for croplands used 
for livestock feed production465. Increases in livestock density could entail growing risks for 
human proximity as 66 percent of emerging human diseases originate from animals. 
 Main players of the animal feed market include: Evonik, DuPont, Adisseo, BASF, 
ADM, and Nutreco. Evonik’s annual sales for 2016 were $12.9 billon with 30% of sales taking 
place in Europe. In terms of nutrition, the company produces specialty chemicals with rising 
prosperity in emerging markets while the leading market positions in superasorbents and DL-
methionine. DuPont’s Danisco Animal Nutrition is an industry leader in feed enzymes due to 
the innovation of carbohydrase products 25 years earlier. DuPont’s Danisco also competes in 
betaine, which increases lean meat yield, probiotics which reduce antibiotic dependence, and 
essential oils to stimulate feed intake and improve bodyweight gain in feed animals.  
 Divestitures in the pharmaceuticals business caused BASF’s 2016 animal nutrition 
seeds to fall by 3% and declined by EUR 66 million in this division. Europe is BASF’s largest 
market for animal nutrition sales at 40% with South America, Africa, and the Middle East at 
10%.   
 Challenges and implications for the sector consist of competition for raw materials 
between food, feed, and energy as it is believed animal protein production will double in an 
already food insecure world (for humans)466.  
 
2.2.8. Food Manufacturing/Processing 
 
The global food processing industry faces several challenges related to global inequalities, 
rising costs of ingredients, and social responsibility that can affect how they design products 
integrated into sustainable diets. At the beginning of the twentieth century, food security issues 
were addressed through solutions of food and crop production, but modern times require food 
processing to be integrated more sustainable into the production, distribution and retailing 
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components of supplied food467. For example, the food processing sector can benefit from 
designing more efficient supply chains that deliver safer perishables, design foods that provide 
high nutrition and low environmental impacts, and aligning their manufacturing processes with 
policy guidance468.  
 Not without scandal, the food processing industry has faced several meat scandals in 
recent years, which has exposed how companies tamper with compliance regulations, like the 
poor hygienic standards poultry processing plants and horsemeat scandals in the EU469 and 
tainted meat issues at Brazil’s largest food processing giants470. The food processing industry 
involves the processing and packaging of produce, meats, fish, animal feeds, fruit juices, and 
dairy products471. Additionally, the industry includes grain milling, crop cleaning, grading and 
packaging, animal slaughtering, seafood processing, freezing, canning operations, coffee, and 
tea, but excludes primary crop growers. As a mature sector with consistently positive 
investment returns, companies generate their revenue from the sale of food and ingredients to 
a variety of customers ranging from supermarkets, restaurants, and other players down the 
chain. This industry is valued at over $2 trillion globally with over 400,000 businesses472. 
 Geographically, the EU leads the global food processing production with a 44% 
turnover behind the US at 20% and China at 19%, according the EU Food and Drink Industry. 
Moreover, the complexity and length of food supply chains entangles food processing with 
numerous food safety risks, especially with consumer demand for more knowledge about food 
origins and more sustainable food production. The developing world is the biggest growth 
engine, as nations like China, India, Brazil and Russia change their eating habits like buying 
more packaged foods and consuming more meat due to wealth increases. Innovative 
technologies will continue to transform the food processing and packaging markets with the 
food processing equipment industry (processing machinery and equipment and packaging 
machinery and equipment) could reach $25.7 billion and $31.5 billion by 2020 with 
compounded annual growth rates of 4.2 percent473.  
 Key actors are: Tyson, Smithfield, JBS/Swift, Shaungui, Pilgrim’s Pride, Butterball, 
Sara Lee, Perdue, National Beef and Sanderson. In particular, JBS with USD 53.5 billion in 
revenue in 2016 is the world’s largest meat producer, while Pilgrim’s Pride as its chicken 
processor foreign subsidiary reaching USD 10 billion in revenue last year. Tyson Foods 
commands 24% of the beef market and produces and distributes other protein products such as 
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chicken, pork, and prepared foods with a total market cap of $13.2 billion. Its major facilities 
are in the US, India, China, Brazil, and Mexico. 42 percent of Tyson’s revenue came from the 
beef segment, 30 percent from the chicken segment, 14 percent from pork, and 10 percent from 
prepared foods during the fiscal year 2014474. In the US beef packaging industry, just four 
producers control 75% of the market share: Tyson, JBS USA, Cargill, and National Beef.  
 As consumer preference for individual food product packaging remains substantial, 
companies are producing packaged options in response with different materials. In addition, 
automated equipment and robotics are being introduced for efficiency and consistency 
reasoning like higher volume production potential. Recently, automation is changing the food 
processing industry even further solutions designed to improve productivity and drive 
profits475. Traceability and operating simplicity are two areas of specialty for automation like 
Omron’s Vision and Sensor Technology’s visual inspection system that “can avert product 
recalls, eliminate human error, reduce waste.” CSIRO’s shockwave can disrupt the structure of 
food, while its forward osmosis innovation is more gentle and cost effective than evaporation.   
 Nestle holds operations in 191 countries in seven categories of their product portfolio 
totalling 89 billion in sales in 2016: Powdered and Liquid Beverages ($19.8 billion in sales); 
Nutrition and Health Science ($15 billion in sales); Milk products and Ice cream ($14.3 billion); 
Prepared dishes and Cooking aids ($12 billion); PetCare ($12 billion); Confectionery ($8.7 
billion); and Water ($7.4 billion). Activities in Asia include USD 22 billion in revenue, with 
USD 40 billion in the Americas, and USD 26 billion in Europe. It includes 19% of activities 
related to powdered liquid beverages; 15% for nutrition, 14% for milk products and ice cream, 
12% for prepared dishes and cooking aids, 12% for pet care.. 
Unilever operates in more than 100 countries with over 70 percent of its volume in 
emerging markets, which provide the industry with strong growth. Through selling products in 
more than 190 countries, Unilever sells GBP 1 billion or more from its 13 brands: Axe, Dirt is 
Good (e.g. Omo), Dove, Family Goodness (e.g. Rama), Heartbrand (e.g. Wall’s), Hellmann’s, 
Knorr, Lipton, Lux, Magnum, Rexona, Sunsilk, Surf, but contains over 400 brands in total to 
operate globally and locally on an efficient scale. Due to intense competition, Unilever invests 
€1 billion annually on research and development and frequently collaborates with academia 
and suppliers. Unilever is organized into four categories: the largest is Personal Care (also its 
fastest growing area of the market), then Foods followed by Home Care, and Refreshment. 
Unilever is one of the big three global players in Personal Care. Personal care accounts for 38 
percent of its total business, and Unilever has invested in increasing participation in Egypt and 
China. Personal Care had a turnover of GBP 20 billion in 2016, with a focus on non-premium segments 
of the market. Recent acquisitions in this category include:  Dollar Shave Club in the male grooming 
segment  and Living Proof, the premium hair care business. In 2016 Food generated a turnover of GBP 
12.5 billion which is 24 percent of its turnover. Foods brands include global brands like Knorr and 
Hellmann, and local brands like Bango in Indonesia, Robertson’s in South Africa and Kissan in India. 
Sales were expanded in emerging markets at over 7 percent with strong growth in Latin America, 
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Africa, and South East Asia. Home Care, generated a turnover of GBP 10 billion in 2016 which is 19 
percent of its turnover. This includes brands like: Surf and Dirt is Good, and Sunglight and generates 
80 percent of its sales in emerging markets. Refreshments generated a turnover of GBP 10 billion in 
2016, which accounts for 19 percent of turnover. Major brands are: Heartbrand (e.g. Wall’s), Magnum 
and Lipton.  
 Danone’s products are available in 130 countries across 5 continents with a particular 
focus in emerging markets. The categories of Danone products include: medical nutrition, 
waters, early life nutrition, and fresh dairy products. 53 percent of group sales were in emerging 
markets in 2016 with strong positions in Indonesia, China, Russia, Mexico and Brazil. For 
example, the income from fresh dairy was around EUR 518 million, EUR 322 million for 
waters, EUR 403 million for early life, and EUR 137 million for medical nutrition. Danone 
operates frequently through acquisitions and partnerships to expand its portfolio of business 
and views Africa as the continent for future expansion. At the same times, North America is 
still a major growth market in all four categories with a heavy emphasis on dairy products, 
especially yogurt, in addition to water high water bottle consumption in the US. Brand 
innovation in waters resulted in a 2.9 percent increase in this category with consumers 
switching to healthier hydration options. Danone experiences over 80 percent of its sales in 
Africa, driven by a need for dairy products that can support limited refrigeration infrastructure. 
Finally, the fastest growing area of Medical Nutrition is baby food brands which experienced 
a 30 percent growth in 2016.  
 This year, Mars, part of Procter & Gamble Company, experienced USD 35 billion in 
global sales of consumer packaged goods in five segments: Beauty; Grooming; Health Care; 
Fabric Care and Home Care; and Baby, Feminine and Family Care. Products are sold in over 
180 countries through mass merchandisers, grocery stores, membership club stores, drug 
stores, department stores, salons, e-commerce and high-frequency stores In particular, sales to 
Walmart represent 14 percent of the total revenue, and net sales in the U.S. are around 35 
percent of the total net sales globally, with Europe at 39 percent, Asia at 18 percent, and Latin 
America at 10 percent.  
 Associated British Foods sells in more than 100 countries with operations in 50 
countries across Europe southern Africa, the Americas, Asia and Australia. It experienced GBP 
13.4 billion in revenue in five business segments: Grocery; Sugar; Agriculture; Ingredients; 
Retail. Grocery accounted for GBP 3,274 million in sales with major international brands 
being: Twinings and Ovaltine. The sugar category accounted for GBP 1,798 million in sales 
with the beet sugar factories in the UK which produce one million tons of sugar per year and 
Azucarera in Spain at 400,000 tons, with two beet sugar factories in northeast China at 160,000 
tons, while Africa’s Illova possess production facilities in six African countries and produces 
1.7 million tons. The agriculture category accounted for GBP 1,084 million in sales, while the 
ingredients possessed GBP 1, 294 million in sales with a focus on yeast and bakery ingredients 
with 49 plants in 26 countries. Retail accounted for GBP 5, 949 in sales with Primark as the 
major retail group with stores in UK, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Germany the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, and the US.  
 Cargill operates in the food ingredients and applications segment, animal nutrition & 
protein, origination and processing, and industrial and financial services with earnings of 
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around USD 1.64 billion. Animal nutrition was a strong global performer with a focus on value-
added protein and poultry in many regions with good results in grain and oil seeds in China 
and South America. The Food Ingredients & Applications segment saw improvements in the 
edible oils, malt and starches with acquisition in the chocolate business. Animal Nutrition & 
Protein was strong win turkey and value added protein in North America with an additional 
acquisition of salmon nutrition leader EWOS and another $500 million in acquisitions in the 
protein business. Origination & Processing performed strongly in South America and China, 
forming a joint venture to build a grain terminal in Ukraine on the Black Sea and expansions 
of oilseed processing facilities in Brazil. The Industrial & Financial Services consist of ocean 
shipping, energy, metals.  
Modes of entry for food and beverage processors in the BRICS is varied with Russia 
containing the most amount (10) successful greenfield projects from 2007-09 in the food and 
beverage sector and no recorded M&A deals, accounting for 8 percent of new industrial plant 
creation in the industry476. However, in Brazil, India, and South Africa joint ventures and M&A 
were more common modes of entry in the industry as they still stimulate linkages between the 
foreign investors and local partners. Because of cultural differences in food consumption, 
market penetration strategies for large MNEs like Kellogg’s and Unilever in Asia countries and 
India has been to leverage mass advertising campaigns to expand the product market which 
successfully began to displace the traditional substitute products477. For example, as breads, 
breakfast cereals and margarine are not readily consumed, in addition to low consumption of 
animal products in India due to cultural and religious reasons, foreign investors used marketing 
to re-shape the habits of consumers. Overall, the MNEs are attracted to these emerging 
economies that promise new “dynamic demographic trends” and large internal markets and 
urban population, since developed countries show signs of stagnating demographics and 
competition from cheap retailers through private labels478.  
 Of particular interest is the active role retailers play in some processing markets amd/or 
markets for fresh food in BRICS and other emergent/developing economies. Modern retail 
supermarket chains face barriers particular to India, such as maintaining a fresh supply of 
perishable produce in stores, which can be extremely challenging. Yet, the mere presence of 
these retailers in the Indian retail market can create  modernizing effects for farmers and 
agricultural production through the supermarkets’ need to ensure that new supply chains exist 
for quality standards purposes479. This in turn can create a mixture of combing traditional 
trading systems with the establishment of supply chains for the daily supply of very perishable 
products. In India, Future Group is the leading corporate retailer, but possesses a low share of 
food sales, and purchases 80 percent of its fresh produce through a system of farm collection 
and distribution centers480. Next, the retailer Reliance contains a greater share of fresh food 
                                                          
476 R. Rama. Foreign Multinational Enterprises in the Food and Beverages Industries of the BRICS, in W. Naude, 
A. Szirmai, & N. Haraguchi (eds.), Structural Change and Industrial Development in the BRICS (OUP, 2015), 
300-310. 
477 Ibid, p 305. 
478 Ibid. 
479 A. Trebbin, Linking small farmers to modern retail through producer organizations-experiences with producer 
companies in India. (2014) 45 Food Policy 45, 35-44. 
480 Ibid. 
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sales and uses a system of collection centers from farmers for 60% of its requirements, while 
the rest comes from AMPC markets481. Selling exclusively fruits and vegetables, Mother Dairy 
supplies its outlets SAFL by procuring 60% of fruit supplies from farmer associations and 20% 
from village aggregators and 20% from AMPC markets. Indian supermarkets face low sales in 
fresh food, but still require higher standards of quality than traditional supply chains, although 
the low volumes needed limit the procurement relationship.  
 The demand for higher quality product from supermarkets can encourage Indian 
farmers to adopt agricultural technology to improve hygienic practices, use better feed, and 
create higher yielding livestock482. Institutional innovations must nevertheless first take place 
before the system can change as a whole. For example, increased demand for products in dairy 
does not automatically trigger improved quality of those products in the value chains. Thus, 
the main implication is investing in costly upgrades to infrastructure to create better supply 
systems for dairy companies in India that enable better closer-farm processor links483. As such, 
the Indian dairy industry will need to focus on improving livestock quality and veterinary 
infrastructures and breeding practices for more productive milk yield484. Other imperatives are 
found to be: more available cattle feed inputs, increased credit flow e.g. working capital loans 
for fodder and feed to transition the dairying from traditional agri-residue, product innovation, 
and overcoming distribution challenges related to poor infrastructure. For the meat industry in 
India, this might entail revising the prices of inputs for feed, which have increased significantly 
in recent years, followed by clarity in the regulation of cattle slaughter (which is banned in 
most states), and more efficient livestock markets that are still based on traditional procurement 
from cattle brokers that operate once a week in unregulated markets485.  
 Changes in diet and increasing demands for pork are also driving transformations for 
China’s pork industries, which are highly undeveloped in terms of technology, labor conduct, 
and low market concentration486.  As an emerging economy, China’s pork value chain is deeply 
tied to small hog producers, and small scale operations in all areas such as butchers, breeders, 
finishers and processors. Therefore, the acquisition of Shuanghui, China’s largest pork 
processor, by Smithfield represents a modernization opportunity for the processor to increase 
its domestic standards, set by the multinational, and incorporate its strengths of stable and safe 
hog supplies, multiplying self-owned hog farms, and expanding contracts with large-scale 
commercial farms or pork sourced from the U.S.487 Shuanghui must decide whether increasing 
hog production in China is a sustainable solution in terms of environmental and space related 
costs and limitations, or if imported carcasses from the U.S. is a more viable solution. This also 
                                                          
481 AMPC markets are markets in agricultural products that are regulated under the Agricultural Produce Market 
Committee (APMC) Act enacted by State Governments. It is estimated that there are about 2477 principal 
regulated markets based on geography (the APMCs) and 4843 sub-market yards regulated by the respective 
APMCs in India. See http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/es2014-15/echapvol1-08.pdf . 
482 E. Janssen & J Swinnen, Technology adoption and value chains in developing countries: Evidence from dairy 
in India. (2017) Food Policy  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.005 
483 Ibid, p 10 
484 Boston Consulting Group,  Indian Agribusiness (BCG, July 2012). 
485 Ibid p 41 
486 Y. Zhang, & R. Xudong, et al, Organization, technology and management innovations through acquisition in 
China’s pork value chains: The case of Smithfield acquisition by Shuanghui. (2017) Food Policy, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.004  
487 Ibid p 10 
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means Shuanghui may adopt a largely American concept for high processed pork products to 
consumers with plans to open two new processing plants, and one American style processor 
that will produce Smithfield brand products488.   
 The knowledge and strategic transfer from the acquisition places Shuanghui in a 
position to create better management teams and leverage the already deeply vertically 
integrated pork value chain Smithfield operates, as vertical integration in the pork value chain 
is nonexistent in China. However, the new infusion of Smithfield imports into the Chinese 
market is not without reactions and could face some public policy concerns. In particular, China 
bans pork with ractopamine a feed additive very common in the U.S., but it is uncertain whether 
pork imports will ever fully meet these regulatory standards since Smithfield is the largest 
certified exporter to China. In order to compete with the acquisition, other leading Chinese 
pork processors are focusing on improving their brand image and adopting American style 
marketing concepts to keep the interest of the changing Chinese consumers’ preferences. 
Ultimately, the transformations taking place in China’s agrifood system may have important 
implications as the traditional village trader role will continue to be reduced and undermined 
in many areas and replaced with urban wholesale markets and supermarkets489. Moreover, 
consolidation and a more dynamic market creating rapid development in various segments is 
both revolutionary for the country, and undoubtedly private-sector led.  
 
2.2.9. Biofuel 
 
Biofuels refer to liquid transportation fuels derived from agricultural, forest, or other organic 
materials (like feedstock) and turned into ethanol and biodiesel490. The history of commercial 
interest in biofuels began in the 1970s as a response to OPECs oil export embargo and was 
pushed heavily in Brazil and the United States.491 A renewed interest for energy independence 
has compelled countries to combat fossil fuel prices and GHG emissions through the 
development of alternative energy sources. In the past forty years, Brazil has prioritized its 
ethanol programmes to incorporate it as part of the country’s fuel supply (moreso than in 
comparison to the U.S.). Biochemical and thermochemical processes create biomass that is 
used as the biofuel492. While Brazil and the U.S. lead in biofuel production worldwide, the 
European Union is in third place with Germany and France as its largest producers. In Europe, 
biofuel commercial production is based on sugar beet, wheat and rapeseed which are converted 
to bioethanol/ETBE and biodiesel493.  
 First generation biofuels are produced from crops, which has “caused greater emphasis 
to be placed on 2nd generation biofuels” produced from lingo-cellulosic feedstocks494, which 
                                                          
488 Ibid p 5 
489 T. Reardon & K. Chen et al, The quiet revolution in Asia’s rice value chains. (2014) Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences. p 110.  
490 UNCTAD, The Biofuels Market: Current Situation and Alternative Scenarios (UNCTAD, 2009), 1-14 
491 Ibid 
492 M. Balat, An Overview of Biofuels and Policies in the European Union. (2007) 2(2) Energy Sources 167-181. 
493 Ibid 
494 R.E. Sims, W. Mabee, J.N. Saddler & M. Taylor, An overview of second generation biofuel technologies. 
(2010) 101(6) Bioresource Technology 1570. 
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haven’t yet realized their full commercial deployment and still face challenges. Second 
generation biofuels are appealing in that, instead of using food for humans (food crops), 
production comes from feedstock. This plays into the sustainability value system in that waste 
can be used as fuel and re-cycled in the system e.g. using “waste vegetable oil” vs. virgin 
vegetable oil. Consequently, each generation of production requires a different extraction 
technology.  
 The current global biofuels market was reported to reach $6.6 billion dollars in 2016495. 
Drivers are favourable regulations and investments in the market for renewable energy, but 
production process limitations still exist. Key actors are: A2BE Carbon Capture LLC, Abengoa 
bioenergy, Algenol Biofuels, Bankchak Petroleum, Chemtex group, Clariant Produkte, GmbH, 
and Dupont Industrial Biosciences. A2BE Carbon Capture is focused on developing algae 
production systems through offering photo-bioreactor algae cultivation and technologies that 
can turn industrial CO2 emissions into algal biomass, and biofuels. Algenol Biofuels (as U.S. 
based company $3.1 million in sales) also specialized in low cost ethanol made from CO2 and 
seawater using algae which can produce over 6,000 gallons of ehtanal per acre per year 
compared to corn at 400496 and has begun developing projects throughout Southern China. 
Next, DuPont Industrial Sciences reported revenue of $392 million in 3Q16 at a 4.8% rise 
annually. 
 The growing international interest in biofuels is correlated with increased demands in 
feedstocks497. In terms of imports, Canada and the EU are the world’s largest with Brazil 
specializing in sugarcane-based ethanol exports. This new sweet spot for Brazil leverages its 
position as the world’s top sugar producer to diversify even more deeply into the biofuel 
industry498  
 In fact, a favourable market climate such as reduced feed costs and falling prices of 
crops in the U.S. are providing incentives for expansion499. Further innovations can reduce the 
cost of biofuel production in coming decades, but may remain under competitive with non-
renewable alternatives without a price on carbon emissions500. However, as the demand for 
electric cars rises, the forces of renewable energy could gain more momentum. Positive news 
is that a range of feedstocks can be turned into liquid biofuels creating a diverse playing field 
for the sector.  
 
2.2.10. Retail 
 
Several factors are driving food retailers towards trategic options like M&As such as stiff 
competition, challenging growth environment, and changing consumer preferences501. The 
latter has also encouraged the testing of “new concept to retain market share.” Online retailers, 
                                                          
495 J. Lamb, “Advanced Biofuels Market Size, Share, Report, Analysis, Trends & Forecast to 2023,” Reuters, July 
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496 USEPA 2009 
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warehouse clubs, mass retailers and grocery delivery services are re-shaping the way food retail 
market competition has taken place in modern times. In fact, many grocery chains have failed 
to adapt to a shift in consumer preferences towards more intimate shopping and less 
supermarket styled models in the developed world502.  
The sector has also been marked by increasing global consolidation. This wave of 
consolidation includes the acquisition of Roundy’s by Kroger (the largest pure play grocery in 
the U.S) and Pace Food Retails acquisition of Dean & DeLuca, and Amazon’s $13 billion 
acquisition of Whole Foods, indicating speciality food interests are gaining momentum. An 
even deeper analysis might convey that modern food markets are active at the local level of 
response to consumer wants which vary, based on income and cultural preferences in the scope 
of a more global food industry503.  
 The EU has seen increases in national level grocery retailing in the past 15 years504. The 
top grocery retailers in the EU are Schwarz Group, Aldi, Edeka, Rewe, Tesco, Carrefour which 
means 10 food retailers have accounted for 26 percent of the market share. In particular, 
Carrefour reached net sales of EUR 746 billion for 2016, while Tesco was at EUR 48 billion, 
and Aldi EUR 7.6 billion505  with a 12 percent increase. Wal-Mart wins $800 billion and 
possesses a 21 percent supermarket share in the U.S. 
 Currently, India has one of the world’s fastest growing economies and food retail sector 
was valued at $600billion in 2015 with estimated retail food sales at around $360billion or 60 
percent of the total retail sales506. However, grocery retail tends to be dominated by local 
players in most countries. It has even been argued that “every grocery retailer that has ventured 
overseas has failed as often as succeeded,” e.g. some industries face more difficulty 
internationalizing than others, although of course there are exceptions507.  
BRICS jurisdictions show rather different situations with reference to retail 
concentration. The importance of modern large retailers508 varies widely across these countries. 
While large retails have, for instance, recently surpassed local small groceries in terms of 
volumes of sales in Russia and Brazil, in India and China, by contrast, these modern retailers 
still hold a small share of the food sold on the market. 
 
Figure 2: Modern versus Traditional retail in BRICS 
 
Russia      Brazil 
                                                          
502 Ibid 
503 See M. Gehlar & A. Regmi, Factors Shaping Global Food Markets, New Directions in Global Food Markets / 
AIB-794 (Economic Research Service, USDA, 2002). 
504 R. Bell, R. Davies et al., ‘The changing structure of food retailing in Europe: the implications for strategy’, 
(1997) 30(6) Long Range Planing 853. 
505 A. Felsted, ‘Foreign grocers struggle in fast-moving China retail market’ Financial Times, (April 29, 2015), 
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506 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, India Retail Foods 2015, December 28, 2015,  Pub. IN5164, New Delhi. 
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Review (April 2012). 
508 Expressed in volumes of fresh and packaged food sold. 
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South Africa 
  
 
Source: our elaboration of data from Euromonitor 
 
BRICS supply chains also show other bottlenecks, such as ‘agroholdings’ in Russia509 and State 
regulated markets in India.510  Consequently, their policy responses have been adapted to local 
conditions. 
With regard to global MNEs, Walmart’s empire consists of supercenters, discount 
stores, neighborhood markets and other small formats and Sam’s Clubs with in the U.S. and 
international properties consisting of the following: Africa (408 properties), Argentina (108), 
Brazil (499), Central America (709), China (432), India (21), Japan (346), and Mexico 
(2,360)511. International competition takes place in several ways through merchandise price 
setting, locations, and even store hours against retailers operating in department, drug, solar 
stores, supermarkets, hypermarkets, home-improvement stores, and cash & carry operators. 
Internationally, Walmart has undergone an inorganic approach to geographic expansion via 
selective acquisitions and strategic alliances to accumulate new stores or to open new units. It 
                                                          
509 J. Wandel, ‘Business Groups and Competition in Post-Soviet Transition Economies: The Case of Russian 
“agroholdings”’ (2011) 24 The Review of Austrian Economics 403; J. Swinnen, K. Herck and others, ‘Food 
Security: Challenges and Opportunities for Eastern Europe and Central Asia’ (2012) 9 Asian Journal of 
Agriculture and Development 37. 
510 Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, Report on Agricultural Marketing, 2007, available at 
http://agricoop.nic.in/AnnualReport06-07/AGRICULTURAL%20MARKETING.pdf. 
511 See: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416916000079/wmtform10-kx1312016.htm 
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is also standard to introduce new formats for the new units like supercenters that have not 
previously operated in those markets. A variety of factors determines Walmart’s ability to 
effectively expand its international segment, such as local laws for building acquisition and site 
location, the ability to hire, train, and retain qualified personnel, and the availability of certain 
goods and local suppliers needed to expand products where there is an emphasis on locally 
sourced items. Nonetheless, as the world’s largest retailer, it has more overseas stores than it 
does in the United States with a reported total of 6,189 stores in the international segment 
versus the 4,987 in the US. 
 There are also a variety of barriers to geographic expansion related to cultural 
penetration and differences that make it difficult for Walmart’s concepts to connect with the 
consumer in some countries, in addition to foreign investment laws inhibiting market entry and 
the general legal and business environment of these markets. This raises concerns about 
Walmart’s ability to expand both inorganically and organically in the International segment, 
which is key to growing the business. As such, inorganic growth could face severe road blocks 
for the corporation if suitable acquisition candidates and prices are not identified consistently 
in the future. Inorganic expansion has worked well in the past due to the local knowledge 
existing operations already possess, but future successful integration of these acquisitions or 
alliances into Walmart’s existing operations depends largely on timing. Potentially, Walmart’s 
International segment will be adversely affected in terms of future financial performance 
because of this inability to effectively acquire operations.  
 Wholly-owned subsidiaries operating in retails are situated in Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, India, Japan and the UK, while majority-owned subsidiaries are 
operating in Africa, Central America and Mexico with joint ventures in China. Interestingly, 
26 percent of the consolidated net sales for the fiscal year 2016 came from Walmart 
International operations. However, the company faces challenges from the different regulatoy 
structures and frameworks in each jurisdiction. For example, Brazil is a federal state with 
complex local laws with multiple interpretations which make Walmart’s Brazilian subsidiaries 
subject to inherent uncertainty and materially adversity in terms of financial performance. 
Walmart also operates smaller units at around 2,400 square feet such as drugstores and 
convenience stores, the wholesale category containing the largest units at around 35,000 square 
feet to 70,000 square feet. The segment’s net sale for 2016 was USD 123.4 billion which has 
fallen from the previous years of 2015 and 2014. There are 176 distribution facilities in 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Central America, Chile, China, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and 
the United Kingdom with 77 percent of the International segment’s purchases passing through 
these facilities in 2016. Walmart’s major international competition is from multinationals and 
local supermarket chains like Carrefour SA, Metro AG, and Tesco, for example.  
 Despite the numerous barriers than can adversely affect future financial performance, 
Walmart’s international revenue grew at a CAGR of 7.3 percent from 2009-2014, but the 
profitability is lower due to high front-end costs related to expansion efforts. Walmart has 
announced a strategic review of its global assets, closing down 60 locations in Brazil of its 
Maxxi brand cash and carry stores and some supercenters for restructuring purposes512. 
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Originally, Walmart entered Brazil in 1995 with the acquisition of two retailers: Bompreço 
S.A. Supermercados do Nordeste and Sonae Distribuição Brasil S.A. which expanded 
operations in northeast and south Brazil resulting in a variety of brands—nine different 
store banners in total in Brazil.  
Costco Wholesale Corporation engages in the operation of membership warehouse 
in the U.S., Candad, U.K., Mexico, Japan, Australia, Spain and majority-owned 
subsidiaries in Taiwan and Korea. Membership warehouses operate based on the concept 
of offering low prices to members on private-label products and a selection of nationally 
branded merchandise which produces high sales volumes and rapid inventory turnover. 
This combines with volume purchasing, efficient distribution, and reduced handling in 
merchandise in warehouse facilities to create profitability at lower gross margins that other 
retailers513. The online business front operates websites in the U.S. Canada, U.K., and 
Mexico to provide customers with additional products not available in warehouses 
resulting in 3 percent of net sales attributed to online business for the past three years. 
There are a total of 686 warehouses: with (480) in the U.S., (89) in Mexico, (36) in the 
U.K., (27) in Japan, (12) in Korea, and (11) in Taiwan.  
 International competition is with global, national, and regional wholesalers and 
retailers like supermarkets, supercenters, department and specialty stores, gasoline 
stations, and internet retailers and is based on price, merchandise quality, and location and 
selection. Total revenue for 2015 was $84 billion in the US and $14 billion internationally 
with food representing 22 percent, sundrieds 21 percent, and hardlines 16 percent of sales.  
As such, Costco has largely focused on organic expansion through the operation of 
membership warehouses in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, U.K. Japan, Australia and Spain 
with majority owned subsidiaries in Taiwan and Korea.  
 In 2013, Costco expanded its operation organically by opening over 150 warehouse 
clubs globally to accelerate growth with an initial customer responses in these markets 
better than that in the U.S.514 In particular, the Asian market has seen an average of 30,000-
40,000 signups in the first eight to twelve weeks for its new warehouses while those figures 
were around 3,000-12,000 for the U.S. As such, net sales increased by 45 percent from 
2010-2014 which is immense in comparison to similar multinational competitors such as 
Walmart which experienced 21 percent growth during this same period 515.  Recent 
geographic expansion is taking place in France and Iceland516. In Iceland’s capital city, 20 
percent of households are now members of Costco’s local warehouse, a concept enjoyed 
in a country like Iceland where food and consumer goods prices are 70 percent higher than 
in the U.S., especially gasoline prices.  
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 Thus, Costco has been able to capture the interest of consumers in various national 
markets in offering price comparison points, for example. Costco intends to open 15 units 
in France by 2025, with its first French store opening with 30,000 members hoped for, but 
currently only 10,000 have been sold517. Due to the annual fee, French customers 
experience prices that are 20 to 40 percent lower than standard supermarkets. Strategically, 
Costco is raising annual membership fees in the U.S. and Canada.  
Kroger is one of the largest retailers in the world in terms of annual sales and 
operates over 2,800 stores across the US. This takes places through consumer product 
purchase in stores, fuel centers and online platforms. Last year, Kroger generated USD 4 
billion in sales from its convenience stores518. The company is active in inorganic growth 
expansion with several recent acquisitions such as a merger with Roundy’s, a chain with 
151 stores and 101 pharmacies across the US for $800 million in 2015, and a 2014 
acquisition of Harris Teeter a regional chain with 200 stores in the Southeastern US and 
mid-Atlantic markets for $2.4 billion. Thus, its expansion has been primarily in the US in 
terms of geography. In terms of online retail, Kroger merged with Vistacost.com in 2014 
which is a leader in online nutrition and healthy living with plans to growth its online 
space market through purchasing 10 percent of its common stock. Other recent mergers 
include: ModernHEALTH  in 2016 for $407 million through the purchase of 100 percent 
of its outstanding shares that will enable Kroger to expand its specialty pharmacy services 
in terms of geographic reach.   
 Kroger reported a total sales increase of 1.3 percent for 2015 due to supermarket 
sales and the inclusion of Roundy’s sales., with an increase of total sales in 2016 at 5 
percent due to the merger with ModernHEALTH. Currently, Kroger operates directly or 
through subsidiaries with 2,796 supermarkets with local banner names in which 2,255 had 
pharmacies and 1,445 had fuel centers519. In addition to supermarkets, Kroger operates 
through its subsidiaries consisting of 784 convenience stores, 319 fine jewelry stores and 
online retailers with 56 percent of convenience stores operated in company owned 
facilities. However, there are 4,000 owned or leased supermarkets, convenience stores, 
fine jewelry stores, distribution warehouses, food production plants via divisions, 
subsidiaries or affiliates located in the US, illustrating that the majority of the properties 
of its businesses are leased. In the US, Kroger operates 38 food production plants that 
consist of 17 dairies, 10 delis or bakery plants, 5 grocery production plants, two meat 
plants and two cheese plants with the food production plants producing 45 percent of the 
grocery units sold in supermarkets.  
Lidl, a German food-retailing chain, has experienced success in its international 
organic expansion in recent years, offering mostly own-brand goods and no premium-
priced products520.Lidl is owned by the Schwarz Groupand is Europe’s biggest retailer that 
keeps prices low with limited inventory and a slim selection of private label items. The 
                                                          
517 Forbes 2017. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/2017/05/30/costco-exceeds-expectations-
in-sales-and-earnings-will-open-15-units-in-france/#199a60f947b6 
518 Financial Times (2017). Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/787923be-ae99-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130 
519 See http://ir.kroger.com/sec-filings 
520 The Economist 2015. Available at: https://www.economist.com/news/business/21646224-german-
discounters-successful-business-model-only-stretches-so-far-tomorrow-not-quite 
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chain has expanded into the UK over the past several years, adversely affect the UK’s 
biggest supermarket chains by spurring price wars521.Other geographic expansion is taking 
place in the US with 12 cities already leased along the East Coast from New Jersey to 
Georgia. Currently, Lidl possess 10,000 stores in 26 European countries.  In 2015, Lidl 
acquired grocery delivery start-up Kochzauber which will provide knowledge in delivery 
fresh grocery items to compete with Amazon Fresh and the online grocery market concept. 
In the UK Lidl offers a network of 600 stores. 
 Aldi, which is divided into two legally separate but co-operating companies: Aldi 
Nord and Aldi Sud, is a Dutch-Belgian retailer that also runs U.S. supermarket chains Stop 
& Shop, Giant, Hannaford, and Food Lion522. For example, there are 1,100 Food Lion 
shops across the US and is furthering its inorganic expansion in the US with the acquisition 
of all 66 stores from Delhaize Group’s Bottom Dollar chain. Currently, it has 1,600 stores 
in 45 US states. Aldi reported increased sales by 22.6 percent in the past year in Britain 
with 600 stores in the UK523.   
Tesco currently has around 6,8099 shops globally is the world’ third largest retailer. 
It operates more than 3,000 stores across the UK and contains 25 percent of the UK market 
share, but is struggling to find new avenues for growth on the home turf leading to future 
geographic expansion abroad524. Tesco’s profits fell by 8.3 percent in the UK in 2016, 
resulting in a new focus on opening local convenience stores with plans to open 160 new 
ones in the UK. Competition concerns are raised over Tesco’s recent acquisition of 
wholesaler Booker Group from GBP for £3.7 billion which supplies hundreds of 
convenience stores that compete with Tesco’s small front shops 525. Booker supplies from 
that 5,000 stores under the Premier, Londis, Bugdens, and Family shopper brands, thus 
resulting in Tesco as a new major supplier serving 125,00 convenience stores and 468,000 
pubs and restaurants across Britain.  
 International geographic expansion has been inorganic and largely in the form of 
joint ventures. In 2014, Tesco completed a joint venture with China Resources Enterprise 
Limited to create the largest food retailer in China. This results in the combination of 
Tesco’s 131 outlets in the country with CRE’s 3,000 stores called Vanguard in which CRE 
has 80 percent of the new chain with Tesco investing around GBP 85 million 526. In 
addition, Tesco formed a joint venture with a unit of Tata Group in India and invested 
USD 140 million to be the first foreign supermarket in India 527. The India JV will operate 
in the hypermarket and Star Bazaar retail business in India. Strategically, the distribution 
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522 See Reuters 2014. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-tesco-india/tesco-confirms-joint-venture-with-
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center will provide wholesale products to traditional India retailers, restaurants, and kirana 
stores as well as small farmers and other suppliers with a new channel in the local market. 
Next, in 2002 Tesco launched in Malaysia and has 47 stores totaling GBP 937 in revenue 
which is its biggest overseas operated with 11 percent of the market share and is engaged 
in a partnership with Sime Darby. In South Korea, Tesco has 520 stores totaling in GBP 
5.3 billion in revenue and is the second largest grocer and is its most successful, especially 
its homeplush chain which has utilized virtual stores for customers. In Japan, Tesco 
possesses 121 stores that have now all been sold due to a difficult market.  
Metro Group, a Germany multi-channel food service provider, generates sales of 
EUR 59 billion in international retailing with operations in over 2,000 location in 29 
countries. Metro’s brands contribute to the performance of sales such as Metro/Makro 
Cash & Carry a leader in self-service wholesale trade, Media Markt and Saturn a leader in 
electronics retailing and Real hypermarkets. Metro Group uses inorganic geographic 
expansion such as the 2017 acquisition of Pro à Pro to penetrate deeper into the food 
service distribution in France which provides direct food delivery to a variety of customer 
groups with around 42,000 French customers and generates EUR 670 million in 2015. 
According to the annual report, geographic expansion has extended into the Middle East 
and major Asian cities with the take-over of Classic Fine Foods group, a leading Asian 
company in food delivery that directly supplies hotels, restaurants, and catering sectors 
with food products.  
 The Metro Cash & Carry is its biggest international business and is focusing on 
value creation in its national subsidiaries. In fact, the 2016 acquisition of RUNGIS by 
Metro group expanded its premium food supplier portfolio across six countries, especially 
the premium segment in Germany. RUNGIS’ acquisition will be executed in that Metro 
will allow RUNGIS to operate independently, but Metro will benefit from the extension 
of delivery business with direct contacts in premium foods for customers in hotels, 
restaurants, and catering sectors and various trading and logistic entities. Other countries 
involved in the RUNGIS acquisition are: Austria, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland and Spain.  
Target Corp. currently posses 1,802 stores in the US with sales generated USD 69 
million in 2016, a 5.8 percent decrease from the prior year. It is one of North America’s 
largest discount retailers with over USD 73 billion in annual revenue. California, Texas, 
Florida, Minnesota, and Illinois are the top give sales generating states. Geographic 
expansion into Canada was largely unsuccessful and resulted in a full exit in 2015  and 
certain other wholly owned subsidiaries of Target. Target has engaged in a variety of 
geographic expansion, with India operations in Embassy Manyata Tech Park and Embassy 
Golf Links. Other acquisitions include the CHEFS Catalog and assets of cooking.com to 
expand its e-commerce presence in the kitchenware market. Target allows both business 
to operate under their brand names, but combined to create a new, wholly owned 
subsidiary of Target.  
 Recently, Target acquired a San Francisco transportation technology company 
called Grad Junction to enhance its same day delivery business and is testing out new 
concepts in next-day delivery to compete with Amazon Prime Pantry, for example. 
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Therefore, inorganic expansion across the US is well suited for these ambit ions528. Further 
focus on organic expansion of CityTarget locations in big cities across the US will allow 
growth for the smaller format stores that have been unexposed to Target in general 529. 
Specifically, this will entail 11 new small format stores in New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis and is opening 32 new stores in 2017 in total.   
French retailer Auchan is a privately held hypermarket operator which is present in 
17 countries, making 75 percent of its revenue outside of France. Auchan is accelerating 
its inorganic geographic expansion with the 2017 acquisition of Karavan a local Ukrainian 
retailer, despite the fact it already possesses 11 hypermarkets in five Ukrainian cities. In 
2012 Auchan acquired Metro AG’s Real hypermarkets in eastern Europe for USD 1.4 
billion which has resulted in 18.7 percent of its global turnover ($52 billion) for central 
and eastern Europe in 2017.  
Carrefour operates in a multi-formal, omni channel model in food retail which 
enjoys global inorganic expansion through acquisitions. These operations include 12,000 
stores and e-commerce sites in more than 30 countries, with total sales of around EUR 103 
billion in 2016. Moreover, there has been an organic increase in sales by 3 percent with 
renewed growth in France. There are 5,670 stores in France, 3,873 in Europe (excluding 
France), 348 stores in Asia, and 1,092 stores in other countries. The formats of operation 
include: hypermarkets under the Carrefour banner for major shopping trips, supermarkets 
under the Carrefour Market, Bairro and Supeco banners, convenience stores like Carrefour 
Express, City, Contact, Bio, and Cash & carry for food service professionals for products 
at wholesale prices.   
 Its most recent acquisition was Spain’s Eroski stores which  includes 26 
hypermarkets, 8 shopping centers, 22 adjoining petrol stations, and will extend its presence 
in 27 new cities. Recent organic geographic expansion is the opening of Carrefour’s first 
hypermarket in Kazakhstan with franchisee Majid Al Futtaim Group in addition to Kenya’s 
first hypermarket store in Nairobi under the same franchisee. Within Europe, Carrefour 
has acquired Rue de Commerce a key player in non-food e-commerce, has acquired  86 
Billa supermarkets in Romania. In Brazil, it opened 12 new stores with a presence in all 
of the country’s states (134 stores in total for 2016), and is launching e-commerce business 
in the country as well.  
 China is a host to a variety of food retail expansion, as multinationals identify the 
Chinese market as a means of stronger and faster penetration. For example, Walmart plans 
to open 30 to 40 new stores in China and will upgrade over 50 stores currently there with 
net sales growing 5.4 percent in the past year. Walmart already opened 21 hypermarket 
stores, 3 Sam’s Clubs and 24 new stores in 2016530. Already, Walmart operates in 117 
cities across 25 provinces, but is finding it challenging to implement the right product mix. 
The challenges of expansion are related to supply chain efficiency, logistics, and physica l 
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infrastructure531. In terms of strategic importance, China is also a key market for Tesco 
which has utilized a joint venture to combine its retail practices with CRE’s local 
knowledge, buying GBP 2 billion worth of goods and services from China for Tesco 532. 
China’s e-commerce food retail front is also of interest to Metro Group which partnered 
with Alibaba in 2015 to expand into China. Metro Group opened a cross border e-shop on 
Alibaba Group’s Small Global platform to offer Chinese customers German products, 
according to an annual report. In addition, Metro operates in over 80 wholesale markets in 
China under METRO Cash & Carry, and will use the e-commerce to sell its private labels 
in dairy, coffee, chocolate and cosmetic goods. Auchan operates hypermarkets  in China 
under the Auchan Hypermarket China Group. 
 It is estimated that the size of the South African food and general retail industry is 
valued at R215 billion per year. Within this market, large players tend to benefit from 
economies of scale, so that discounts with suppliers are secured, resulting in major barriers to 
entry. As such, a South African Competition Commission inquiry into whether these barriers 
of entry are negatively impacting competition in the grocery retail sector of South Africa is 
currently ongoing533. The inquiry will further assess whether small businesses and independent 
retailers can develop in this environment of competitive constraints within the supply chain. 
Thus, the concern is that larger players in the grocery retail supply chain place strong 
competitive constraints on smaller players.  
 The grocery retail supply chain of South Africa is made up of a level of manufacturers, 
processors, and suppliers made up of well-known international brands such as British American 
Tobacco in addition to smaller manufacturers. The grocery manufacturers and suppliers 
penetrate the market through grocery retailers, wholesalers, and buyer groups via: (1) direct 
supply by grocery manufacturers and processors or (2) through wholesalers and independent 
grocery retailers that independently procure their products, providing an alternative route for 
the market and protection for smaller suppliers, and (3) through national supermarket chain 
internal distribution of grocery products to their stores534. The main buyer groups in South 
Africa are Unitrade Management Services (“UMS”), the Buying Exchange Company (“BEC”), 
the Independent Buying Consortium (“IBC”), the Independent Cash & Carry Group (“ICC”) 
and Elite Star Trading (“EST”). Buyer groups use collective buying power to secure cost 
savings and aggregate volume purchases by combing resources to make supply purchases. In 
short, buyer groups are a form of cooperation between buyers in terms of price, diversity, 
quality.  
 Major grocery retail chains in South Africa have invested in and use distribution centers 
that enable grocery manufacturers, processors, and suppliers to send their products to these 
                                                          
531 Forebes 2016. Available at: 
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centers, which are then sent to the chains’ individual stores. Next, national supermarket chains 
in South Africa use the format of serving customers in more rural and township areas. Here, 
80 to 90 percent of the food retail market is owned by the five largest players with Pick n Pay 
as the largest national grocery supermarket, followed by the SPAR Group, Woolsworths, 
Walmart owned Massmart, and Fruit and Veg City and include hypermarkets, convenience 
stores, and express stores. Independent grocery retailers operate in both the formal and informal 
sectors and provide access to low income consumers for grocery retail products535. The end 
users of grocery products are the consumers, which in South Africa means that large social 
inequalities exist with over 21 percent still living in extreme poverty unable to pay for basic 
nutrition.  
 India’s retail food market is placed within one of the fastest growing large economies 
with estimates that it will be the world’s third largest economy by 2025. This potential for 
growth is resulting in an increase of higher land or rental spaces, more stringent food and 
labeling laws, and rising capital costs for retail growth in the country, resulting in industry 
members devising different formats to ensure economies of scale536. A recent analysis shows 
that India’s total food and non-food retail sector is valued at USD 600 billion with retail food 
sales at around USD 360 billion at 60 percent of the total retail sales. The Government of India 
aims to protect its 12 million shopkeepers, who are responsible for 97 percent of all retail sales, 
through disabling foreign supermarkets to open shops in the country537. However, individual 
states possess the authority to deny or approve retail FDI. 
 Although European grocers are enticed by the fast rising consumer spending in 
emerging economies like India and stagnant, blanketed markets in their home countries in 
terms of supermarkets and hypermarkets, traditional trade is proving to remain the consumers’ 
preferred choice538. This is largely due to multinational grocers’ reliance on European grocery 
formats, which have not rooted well in emerging economies due to inherent barriers related to 
a lack of good road networks, car ownership, and a small middle class with less means for 
storing bulk groceries539. Therefore, emerging markets have a distinct identity that 
differentiates them from developed markets. Understanding how these demand and supply side 
factors shape the retail environment in these countries would enable the development of better 
suited food retail formats. Moreover, India’s government has clearly signalled protectionist 
public policies aimed to limit the growth of FDI retail540. Nonetheless, 85 percent of private 
consumption in India is on food, with food grains being the largest share541. Regional 
preferences for food also dominate the Indian market with over 10 kinds of rice that are tied 
strongly to these regional preferences.  
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Table 3: Largest retail chains in the world (in terms of revenue and countries in 
operation) 
 
Name of the Chain Retail 
Revenue 
(2014) US$B 
Countries in 
Operation 
Retail Revenue (2016) US 
$B 
 
476 28 482 
 
112 10 118 
 
98 1 109 
 
- 26 - 
 
63 13 53 
 
76 34 78 
 
- 17 - 
 
11 32 12.7 
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71 1 73 
 
49 13 45 
 
- 29 - 
 
3.7 11 4 
 
 1  
 
59 11 62 
 
45 2 40 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
2.3.Economic concentration and the emergence of industry global leaders 
 
Having described the various global actors in the different segments of the value chain, we will 
explore in this Section the business strategies followed for international expansion and 
dominance of the food value chain (in terms of attracting the highest percentage of the total 
surplus produced by the specific food value chain) and the way M&As and investment in 
technology may fit in this strategy. We will focus on the factors of production segment. 
 
2.3.1. Business Strategy: a focus on the factors of production segment of the food value 
chain 
 
The results of the conducted analysis of M&A activity, in particular in the factors of production 
segment of the food value chain show a shift in strategy from seeds acquisitions to acquisitions 
in the biotech and IT sectors. In biotech, the companies are rapidly developing microbial 
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products which can either become complementary to the existing products or serve as a 
replacement of traditional chemistry (i.e., pesticides products)542. The global pesticides industry 
accounts for USD 54,2bn (2013) and continues to grow steadily up to USD 75.9bn by 2019543. 
Microbial products are a new opportunity and potentially a game changer and a disrupting 
technology at the global scale. Although currently the industry is still in its infancy (less than 
USD 2bn of global sales in 2014), going forward it represents a huge potential, especially given 
the growing demand for organic farming globally. Realizing this, in 2014 Monsanto announced 
an alliance known as BIOAG Alliance with Novozymes, one of leaders in biotech industry. 
Novozymes is responsible for the production of the microbial products while Monsanto serves 
as the lead for field testing, registration, and commercialization for the Alliance’s products544. 
A clear diversification move for global leaders is happening in the so-called “digital 
agriculture” market. Precision agriculture (or “precision farming”) is a global trend that is 
rapidly growing. By precision farming experts understand a data analysis at the level of the 
square meter or even smaller to optimize the consumption of inputs (seeds, water, Fertilisers, 
pesticides, etc.), and to monitor the actual process of production.545 Precision agriculture, for 
instance, may use sensors to collect information from soil (various parameters such as the level 
of moisture, Fertilisers and pesticides, soil organic matter, various soil properties such as bulk 
density, texture, compaction, etc.), and satellite images about crop growth progress. It then 
would combine all information and use big data algorithms to analyse it, applying sophisticated 
mathematical models to plan and adjust in real-time for needed inputs to maximize the eventual 
crop yield.  
Precision agriculture is expected to revolutionize farming on a global scale within the next 
10-15 years. The leading companies are rapidly enhancing this competency. A recent 
acquisition of the Climate Corporation by Monsanto is a bet to diversify beyond the traditional 
seeds and pesticides business model. The software developed by the Climate Corporation is 
aimed to become a powerful decision-support system and a crop progress monitoring tool for 
a typical farmer546. Combined with the existing product portfolio of Monsanto (seeds, 
traditional and bio-pesticides, etc.), the data analysis and recommendation tool of the Climate 
Corporation will enable Monsanto to become an ultimate one stop-shop opportunity for a 
farmer. Monsanto intends to sell subscription to the software as a stand-alone service on a 
global scale. The other “big six” of the seeds industry – Syngenta, DuPont Pioneer, Bayer, 
BASF, and Dow – are rapidly catching up by developing their own IT-platforms547.  
                                                          
542 R. Fraley, Citi 2014 Basic Materials Conference, (3 December 2014), available at 
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The growth engine of a corporation (how companies grow, what causes rapid growth) has 
long been one of the most fascinating topics for scholars studying corporate strategy and 
general management, although its lessons are still relatively unclear. One of the possible 
explanations of corporate growth engine worth studying was proposed by Achi et al. and is 
known as “growth cycles / accelerators”548. Achi et al. studied 9450 publicly listed companies 
to find 41 companies that have grown dramatically over the previous ten years (growth rates in 
excess of 20 percent). They suggested that increasing returns driven by positive feedback loops 
are at the core of successfully growing companies. A number of generic self-reinforcing 
feedback loops common to the companies that experienced superior growth rates over a long 
time period was identified. The authors suggested that corporate management needs to combine 
several growth accelerators to win market share, lock-in customers, and eventually to get 
sustainable performance over a long timescale. The topic of corporate growth mechanisms 
through feedback loops and its implications for strategic management was discussed in the 
works of Morecroft (1985)549, Lyneis (1999)550, Sterman (2000)551, Warren (2004552, 2008553), 
Casadesus-Masanell, and Ricart (2007554), among others.  
In our opinion, this is a useful methodology for the analysis of the emergence of the 
global seed leaders over the last three decades. We think that considering the active mergers 
and acquisitions policy conducted by the “Big Six” as the only explanation of their rapid 
development is insufficient. Top factors that shaped the seed industry include: (1) 
consolidation, (2) R&D spending, (3) early adoption of the use of new promising genetics 
technology (i.e., RNA inhibition allowing selective control and the expression of individual 
genes), (4) vertical integration, (5) network externalities (sale of complementary products in 
addition to seeds – i.e., Monsanto’s corn seeds and “Roundup Ready”), (6) economies of scale 
from market expansion, and (7) product differentiation (seeds, pesticides, IT cloud-based 
decision support systems). Such factors are the core growth accelerators based on reinforcing 
feedback loops. Other accelerators fuelling the corporate engine of global seed and agriculture 
chemistry producers include IP rights protection, patent alliances to swap traits, market power 
resulting from increasing lobbying opportunities, etc.   
A mechanism of gaining a competitive advantage through key growth accelerators is 
examined in more detail below (Pictures 1-3) using a methodology of casual loops diagrams 
of system dynamics555.  
 
Figure 3: System dynamics (General) 
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Source: I. Lianos, D. Katalevsky & A. Ivanov (2016)556 
 
The most common growth accelerators for leading seed companies come from state-of-the-art  
research and development efforts resulting in advanced technologies (i.e., RNA inhibition, 
etc.), and products with a superior quality over competitors (i.e., seeds with higher yields or 
advanced resistance to insects), as well as substantial spending on marketing & distribution 
channels (Figure X). A diversified pipeline of high quality products increases the attractiveness 
of a company’s products to customers, thus increasing customer base, driving sales and 
revenues. Higher revenues allow strong R&D and marketing budgets, thus forming a powerful 
feedback loop based on the economic concept of increasing returns.  
 
Figure 4: System dynamics (Specific) 
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Source: I. Lianos, D. Katalevsky & A. Ivanov (2016)557 
 
As a company grows in size, it gets access to favorable capital raising options, thus 
enhancing opportunities for M&A (Figure X). Through acquisitions of promising start-ups or 
rivals with high potential products or advanced technologies the company adds to the existing 
product pipeline, driving further sales and revenues. This is another self-reinforcing growth 
cycle that was successfully employed by global seed and agrochemical companies over the last 
20 years. 
The market power of the “Big Six” (to become the Mighty Three) is further enhanced 
by the cross-licencing agreements for genetically modified seed traits between Monsanto, 
Syngenta, Bayer, DuPont, BASF and Dow558. This enables them to create additional barriers to 
entry for new market players by enhancing intellectual property and trait licensing agreements 
(i.e, swap of traits, generic trait agreement to manage regulatory regime after expiration of 
patents) between  them as well as litigating the expiration of patents (i.e., peaceful resolution 
of patent litigation between Monsanto and DuPont in 2013). The results obtained by Vergote 
and Grandjean559 suggest that in some cases such cooperation between rivals may lead to 
increased barriers to entry for those who are not part of the network. An example of such a case 
has been documented by Bekkers et al.560 through the analysis of Motorola’s successful attempt 
to create a group of dominant players in the GSM industry in 1980s through cross-licencing 
agreements. 
 
Figure 6: System dynamics (Close up) 
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Source: I. Lianos, D. Katalevsky & A. Ivanov (2016)561 
 
An established customer base serves as an attractiveness anchor for third-parties (i.e., 
competitors, leading NGOs, etc.) to cooperate (Picture 3). The companies become engaged in 
alliances and networks for joint R&D opportunities (research for new technologies, products – 
a good example is Monsanto-Novozymes alliance), IP-protection issues (cross-licensing 
agreements, joint patents, competitive framework after patent expiration policy, etc.), or major 
industry initiatives (i.e., construction of Svalbard Global Seed Vault).  
As the area under GMO plants continues to expand,562 the area under biotech crops 
increased every year from 1996 to 2014 and accounted for more than 180 million hectares in 
2014, leading seed production companies increasingly to gain market power. Eventually, a 
combination of several powerful positive feedback loops helps industry leaders to de facto 
lock-in sustainable competitive advantage and market dominance. Lobbying opportunities as 
well as sponsoring of NGOs, various interest groups, and the scientific community helps to 
shape a positive corporate image and to sustain market power, thus further maintaining the 
status quo. Combined altogether, the self-reinforcing feedback loops that drive growth 
accelerators for global seed industry leaders help them to create a superior competitive 
advantage over other industry rivals. 
 
2.3.2. The emergence of global actors across the food value chain 
 
The ongoing and projected mergers in the seed and agro-chem industry will greatly 
affect the future control of food production and innovation, which is essential in order to 
improve yields and feed the world. On the basis of 2015 pro-forma sales, the agro-chem 
                                                          
561 I. Lianos, D. Katalevsky & A. Ivanov, The global seed market, competition law and intellectual property rights: 
untying the Gordian knot, 2016 (2)  Concurrences, Article 78807. 
562 C. James, Global Status of Biotech/GM Crops, (Ithaca, NY, 2014) ISAAA Brief No. 49.  
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industry being valued at approximately 85€bn, Bayer/Monsanto will be the market leader  with 
23.1€bn, followed by Syntenta/ChemChina Ag with 14.8€bn in the second position, Dow Ag 
and Dupont Ag with 14.6€bn in the third position, and in fourth position BASF Ag with 5.8€bn. 
Note that, with the exception of BASF, which is only present in crop protection, all other 
market leaders are present in both crop protection as well as seeds and traits563. The following 
Figure provides a picture of the agrochem industry prior and after the mega merger process: 
 
Figure 7: Comparison before and after the most recent mega merger wave in agrochem 
 
 
Source: S. Bonny (2017)564 
 
We discuss the activity of the main global leaders that have dominated the factors of 
production segment of the global food value chain and constitute the firms with the most 
developed technological capabilities to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
fourth industrial revolution in this sector. 
Germany-headquartered Bayer AG is a “life science” company with core competences 
in the areas of health care and agriculture. Bayer has proceeded to a number of mergers and 
acquisitions in recent years. Although Bayer’s strength is in agrochemicals, it is present in 
seeds as well, in particular since its acquisition of Aventis and its AgrEvo subsidiary in 2002. 
                                                          
563 Bayer, Acquisition of Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture, Investor Presentation, June 2016, 
13. 
564 S. Bonny, Corporate Concentration and Technological Change in the Global Seed Industry, (2017) 9 
Sustainability 1632, Figure 9. Total sales in seeds and pesticides in 2016 in billion USD. Note that the figure does 
not take into account the recently announced acquisition of the seeds and non-selective pesticides business of 
Bayer by BASF. 
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Bayer is present in rice, cotton, oilseed rape / canola, and vegetable seeds, but also, at least 
before the merger transaction, it aimed to gain competitive positions in wheat and soybeans. 
Bayer controls popular seed brands, such as Arize for rice, Credenz for soybeans, Fibermax for 
cotton, InVigor for canola seeds, Nunhems for vegetable seeds, Stoneville for cotton seeds, 
seed treatment solutions, such as Gaucho, glyfosinate-ammomium based herbicides like 
Liberty and Basta, and fungicides, like Nativo. Since its acquisition of US organic pest control 
company AgraQuest in August 2012, Bayer Crop Science has heavily invested in establishing 
a Biologics (crop protection) platform. Bayer is also present in “digital farming”, projecting to 
at least invest €200m in this area between 2015 and 2020, and currently selling and testing 
products in ten countries565. 
US-based Monsanto is an agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation. Its 
Seed and Genomic segment produces germplasm, in particular row crop seeds (hybrid varieties 
and foundation seed) of corn, soybean, cotton, canola and other row crop seeds, as well as 
vegetable seeds, in particular open field and protected-culture seed for tomato, pepper, melon, 
cucumber, squash, beans, broccoli, onions and lettuce. Monsanto is a leader in germplasm 
positions in corn, soybeans, cotton and vegetables566. Furthermore, it disposes of a unique and 
patented seed chipping technology, which enables it to test improved seeds at the lab before 
the seed is even planted, thus reducing the time it takes to produce a new variety by more than 
two years567. Monsanto controls leading brands, such as Dekalb and Channel for corn, Asgrow 
for soybeans, Deltapine for cotton, Seminis and De Ruiter for vegetable seeds. Monsanto also 
develops biotechnology traits enabling crops to protect themselves from borers and rootworm 
and therefore assisting farmers in controlling insects and weeds. These products are distributed 
in various brands, such as SmartStax, YieldGard, YieldGard VT triple, VT triple PRO for corn, 
Intacta RR2 PRO for soybeans, Bollgard and Bollgard II for cotton. Its biotechnology traits 
enable crops, such as corn, soybeans, cotton and canola to be tolerant of Roundup branded and 
other glyphosate-based herbicides or dicamba herbicides and include brands such as Roundup 
Ready, RoundupReady 2 Yield, Roundup Ready 2 Xtend and Intacta RR2 PRO  (for soybeans), 
and Genuity. It disposes of advanced technologies for better control of weeds, insects and 
viruses with its RNA (genetic)568 spray technology (BioDirect Technology), without any 
“tinkering” with the plants’ genes being necessary, for instance with the use of a transgenic 
approach that would create a plant to deliver the RNA, and just with a topical application of 
                                                          
565 Bayer, Bayer’s commitment to innovation and sustainability will help shape the future of farming (Sept. 7 
2016), available at http://www.press.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/Bayers-commitment-to-innovation-
and-sustainability-will-help-shape-the-future-of-farming . 
566 Monsanto is no 1 in the US and Brazil with at least a 50% market share, no 1 in Argentina with 60% and no 2 
in the EU with 20% market share for corn with its DeKalb brand. Monsanto also controls a 40% market share in 
the US for soybean through its Asgrow brand, 40% in the US for cotton germplasm through its  brand Deltapine 
and is the global market leader with a 20% market share in vegetable seeds with its brands DeRuiter and Seminis 
: Monsanto, Accelerating the Future of Agriculture, Monsanto’s 8thWhistle Stop Investor Field Tour (August 17-
18, 2016) 16-20, available at https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/whistle_stop_viii_day-1-
session_materials.pdf  
567 C. Patterson, Monsanto's Seed Chipping Technology, AgAdvance (January 2013), available at 
http://www.agadvance.com/issues/jan-2013/monsantos-seed-chipping-technology.aspx . 
568 RNA interference (or RNAi) is a biological process where ribonucleic acid molecules inhibit gene expression 
or translation enabling the transfer of information from a gene to produce a protein. 
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the RNA569. Monsanto licences genetic material to other seed companies for their seed and 
forms the central node of a spider web of cross-licensing agreements between the ‘Big Six’.  
Monsanto has considerably expanded its activity through a number of M&As the last two 
decades. More recently, Monsanto acquired The Climate Corporation, which may omen a 
possible future integration strategy towards precision agricultural machinery equipment. 
“Precision farming” makes use of sensors to collect information from soil (various parameters 
such as the level of moisture, Fertilisers and pesticides, soil organic matter, various soil 
properties such as bulk density, texture, compaction, etc.), and satellite images about crop 
growth progress. It then combines all information using big data algorithms to analyse it, in 
order to plan and adjust in real-time the need for inputs (e.g. pesticides). It is promised that this 
may improve the crop yield, but it may also have the effect to lock in farmers in the Monsanto 
value chain, making them technologically dependent as Monsanto owns or controls the data 
generated.  
The recent acquisition of the Climate Corporation by Monsanto is a bet to diversify beyond 
the traditional seeds and pesticides business model. The software developed by the Climate 
Corporation is aimed to become a powerful decision-support system and a crop progress 
monitoring tool for a typical farmer570. The idea is also to use the power of analytics (Big Data) 
and advanced marker technology to accelerate yield gains and digitize field testing571. The 
combination of big data metagenomics, bio-informatics, machine learning, and predictive 
analytics may lead to the development of next-generation insect-control solutions by re-
targeting proteins572. Combined with the existing product portfolio of Monsanto (seeds, 
traditional and bio-pesticides, etc.), the data analysis and recommendation tool of the Climate 
Corporation will enable Monsanto to build an integrated ‘beyond the seeds’ platform to 
farmers, enabling it to exploit new sources of revenue relating to equipment, fertiliser, 
pesticides, and even software, providing “optimized seeding and fertility” insights to farmers 
through Climate FieldView and other products573. Monsanto intends to sell subscription to the 
software as a stand-alone service on a global scale. The other “big six” of the seeds industry – 
Syngenta, DuPont Pioneer, Bayer, BASF, and Dow – are rapidly catching up by developing 
their own IT-platforms574.  
US- based DowDuPont is a holding company formed through the merger of equals 
between The Dow Chemical Company and E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, effective 
                                                          
569 A. Regalado, The Next Great GMO Debate (August, 11, 2015), MIT Technology Review, available at 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/540136/the-next-great-gmo-debate/ . 
570 D. Friedberg, The Climate Corporation Platform Update (21 August 2014), available at 
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/whistle%20stop%20tour%20vii%20aug%202014/the_climate_
corporation_update.pdf.. 
571 W. Vogt, Soybean Breeding Takes on Big Data (November 16, 2016), available at 
http://www.farmindustrynews.com/soybeans/soybean-breeding-takes-big-data ; Monsanto, Accelerating the 
Future of Agriculture, Monsanto’s 8thWhistle Stop Investor Field Tour (August 17-18, 2016) 59, available at 
https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/whistle_stop_viii_day-1-session_materials.pdf  
572 Monsanto, Press Release (Sept. 6, 2016), available at http://news.monsanto.com/press-
release/corporate/monsanto-collaborates-second-genome-use-microbiome-technology-platform-accel . 
573 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 (2015) p. 12; J. Jansen, Unlocking Digital Ag and Seed 
Technology 6, available at http://files.constantcontact.com/fe439c1b001/3be810cd-551f-4ca4-8e4d-
f812e2aef91a.pdf?ver=1474384793000  
574 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 115.  
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31 August 2017. The business divisions at DowDuPont include 
the Agriculture division, Material Science division, and a Specialty Products division. The 
Agriculture division comprises of both products and technologies, in germplasm, seeds traits 
and crop protection. 
The seed solutions are present in alfalfa, canola, cereals, corn, cotton, rice, silage 
inoculants, sorghum, soybeans, sunflowers and wheat. DowDuPont crop protection offers a 
variety of solutions in areas such as cereals herbicides, corn and soybean herbicides, fungicides, 
insecticides, rice, seed-applied technologies, specialty crop herbicides, structural pest 
management. Some of the popular crop protection brands include Arylex Active, Enlist Duo, 
herbicide with Colex-D, Lumisena seed treatment, Vessarya disease control, Inatreq, Pyraxalt 
insect control, Rinskor Active and Zorvec. DowDuPont has seed offerings such as Enlist Corn, 
Enlist Cotton, Leptra insect protection in Latin America, Omega-9 Reduced Saturate 
Sunflower, ProPound Advanced Canola Meal, Stewarded, limited commercial launch of 
Pioneer brand Qrome products and Plenish Soybeans, Enlist E3 Conkesta, Soybean, Enlist E3 
Soybean and Enlist Soybean. 
One of the merging companies of DowDuPont is US- headquartered Dow Chemical 
Company, a multinational chemical corporation operating in five segments: Agricultural 
Sciences, Consumer Solutions, Infrastructure Solutions, Performance Materials & Chemicals 
and Performance Plastics. The agricultural sciences segment was present in both the crop 
protection and seeds. Popular seed brands included Agromen (under license from Agromen 
Sementes Agricolas Ltda),575 Brodbeck Seeds, Dairyland Seed, Dow Seeds, Myco-Gen Seeds, 
Nexera, Omega-9. The Dow solutions in the area of crop protection included insecticides, 
fungicides and herbicides. Insecticides brands comprised of Isoclast, Lorsban, Radiant, 
Sentricon, Tracer. Fungicides solutions included Dithane, Inatreq; popular herbicides brands 
consisted of: Arylex, Broadway, Clincher, Durango, Fencer, Garlon, Lontrel, Milestone. 
Dow also invested in technologies and seed traits in conjunction with other companies 
such as Monsanto. The products in this area included the popular Enlist, Enlist Duo, Exzact 
Precision Technology, POWERCORE Insect Trait Technology, Refuge Advanced Powered 
By Smartstax, Smartstax Insect Trait Technology. The Smartstax and POWERCORE were 
multi-event technology developed by Dow AgroSciences LLC with Monsanto. The Smartstax, 
the Smartstax logo, POWERCORE and the POWERCORE logo all belong to Monsanto 
Technology, LLC.576 
As a result of the DowDupont merger, Dow had to divest certain assets to gain 
regulatory approval in a number of countries. In Brazil for example, Dow sold to CITIC Agri 
Fund part of its local corn seed business for $1.1B, including seed processing plants and 
research centers, the Morgan seed brand, and license for the Dow Sementes Brand.577 
                                                          
575 The Dow Chemical Company, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016), 
http://www.dow-dupont.com/investors/dowdupont-filings-and-reports/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=11834973 
576 The Dow Chemical Company, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016), 
http://www.dow-dupont.com/investors/dowdupont-filings-and-reports/sec-filings-
details/default.aspx?FilingId=11834973 
577 http://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/dow-to-divest-a-portion-of-its-corn-hybrid-seed-business-in-
brazil-to-citic-agri-fund 
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The other merging company in the DowDuPont merger is US- E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company. The company consisted of six reportable segments: Agriculture, 
Electronics & Communications, Industrial Biosciences, Nutrition & Health, Performance 
Materials and Protection Solutions. DuPont’s agricultural businesses included DuPont Pioneer 
and DuPont Crop Protection. 
DuPont Pioneer expertise was in producing, developing and marketing a variety of 
seeds (hybrid corn seed and soybean seed varieties). DuPont Pioneer's research and 
development was directed at “integrating high yielding germplasm with …proprietary and/or 
licensed native”578 In 2016, DuPont invested 57 percent of the company's total research and 
development expense.579 Crop Protection served agriculture companies through a variety of 
products including herbicides and insecticides, as well as protection for field crops such as 
wheat, corn, soybean and rice and specialty crops such as fruit, nut, vine and vegetables. The 
main insecticide in the DuPont portfolio was DuPont Rynaxypyr. 
Regulatory approval for the DowDuPont merger in countries like the EU, US and 
Canada was conditional on the sale of certain assets including DuPont’s cereal broadleaf 
herbicides portfolio, DuPont’s insecticides portfolio consisting of Rynaxypyr, Cyazypyr and 
Indoxacarb, and DuPont’s Crop Protection R&D development pipeline and organization, with 
the exclusion of seed treatment, nematicides, and late-stage R&D programs.580 The approval 
was granted after DuPont divested these assets to FMC Corporation, in exchange of its Health 
& Nutrition business, including food ingredients and pharmaceutical excipients and $1.6B in 
consideration of the difference in the asset value of the swap.581 
Aside from the DowDuPont merger, other recent transactions by DuPont included the 
acquisition of San Francisco-based Granular, Inc., a provider of farm software and analytics 
tools through its products AcreValue and Farm Management Software, and the owner of 
AcreValue.com, the leading digital marketplace for farmland real estate. The acquisition 
marked further investments by DuPont in Digital Agriculture, with new tools to complement 
DuPont’s agronomic software business (Encirca services).582 
German-headquartered BASF, is a global company that operates in five segments 
including chemicals; performance products; functional materials and solutions; agricultural 
solutions; oil and gas. BASF’s agricultural solutions focuses primarily on crop protection. 
                                                          
578 DuPont, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016), http://www.dow-
dupont.com/investors/dowdupont-filings-and-reports/sec-filings-details/default.aspx?FilingId=11819730. 
579 DuPont, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016), http://www.dow-
dupont.com/investors/dowdupont-filings-and-reports/sec-filings-details/default.aspx?FilingId=11819730. 
580 DuPont, ‘Summary of Transactions with FMC: Divestiture of Certain Crop Protection Assets and Acquisition 
of FMC’s Health & Nutrition Business” (31 March 2017), 
http://s2.q4cdn.com/752917794/files/doc_presentations/2017/mar/DuPont-FMC-Transactions-Presentation.pdf. 
581 DuPont, ‘Summary of Transactions with FMC: Divestiture of Certain Crop Protection Assets and Acquisition 
of FMC’s Health & Nutrition Business” (31 March 2017), 
http://s2.q4cdn.com/752917794/files/doc_presentations/2017/mar/DuPont-FMC-Transactions-Presentation.pdf; 
Reuters, ‘DuPont, FMC win EU antitrust approval for asset swap deal’ (27 July 2017) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fmc-m-a-du-pont-eu/dupont-fmc-win-eu-antitrust-approval-for-asset-swap-
deal-idUSKBN1AC1F0. 
582 http://www.dupont.com/corporate-functions/media-center/press-releases/dupont-acquires-ag-software-
company-granular-to-accelerate-digital-ag-strategy.html; 
http://s21.q4cdn.com/813101928/files/doc_presentations/2017/09/DowDuPont-Inc.-Special-Call-transcript.pdf 
179 
 
Among its fertilisers, one of the popular products is Limus, an additive for urea-based 
Fertilisers. BASF’s herbicide solutions include the herbicide Engenia, an important component 
of dicamba and glyphosate-tolerant cropping systems for soy and cotton. A new series of 
products to cater for crop protection needs includes insecticides Inscalis and broflanilide, and 
new fungicide, Revysol.583 In recent years BASF has actively invested into functional crop care 
solutions and technologies. These include the Seltima formulation that ensures precise release 
of its fungicide active ingredient on rice crops and exclusively on the rice leaf’s surface and 
Cultivance production system, a combination of genetically modified soybeans and the 
corresponding herbicide. In 2016, BASF developed a digital platform (Maglis), which provides 
support to farmers in collecting, interpreting and monitoring a range of agricultural data. This 
complements collaborations with companies such as John Deere, to develop integrated IT 
applications for precision agriculture. For instance, farmers in Brazil can already make use of 
the DigiLab application for plant disease diagnostics and treatment.584 The focus by BASF on 
digital agriculture can also be seen by its recent acquisition of US-based company ZedX. This 
firm develops agronomic models that analyze weather, plant growth and infestation, and will 
also complement BASF’s online platform Maglis.585  
US-headquartered Deere & Company is a manufacturing company that has operations 
in three major business segments: agriculture and turf, construction and forestry, and financial 
services. The agriculture and turf segment products are categorized in five product platforms: 
crop harvesting (combines, cotton pickers & cotton strippers, sugarcane harvesters, related 
front-end harvesting equipment, sugarcane loaders and pull-behind scrapers); turf and utility; 
hay and forage (self-propelled forage harvesters and attachments, balers and mowers); crop 
care (tillage, seeding and application equipment, including sprayers, nutrient management and 
soil preparation machinery); and tractors. Deere has developed increasingly integrated 
agricultural management systems, which rely on advanced data collection and analytics in 
conjunction with GPS technologies.586 These technologies allow farmers control over soil 
management, and input costs and yields, while also providing interaction between owners of 
equipment and dealers in the field. In light of the key role of new technologies in precision 
farming, Deere has acquired Blue River Technology – a firm that has applied a combination of 
computer vision, robotics, and machine learning to agricultural spraying equipment. The 
acquisition for $305M replicates previous Deere’s strategic choices in precision farming, such 
as the acquisition of GPS technology firm NavCom Technology in 1999.587 Other recent 
acquisitions by Deere include the 80% interest in Hagie Manufacturing Company LLC in the 
                                                          
583 BASF Group, Annual Report 2016, http://report.basf.com/2016/en/ 
584 BASF Group, Annual Report 2016, http://report.basf.com/2016/en/ 
585 John Vogel, ‘Pennsylvania-based ZedX boosts BASF’s digital ag intelligence’ (11 May 2017) American 
Agriculturalist,  http://www.americanagriculturist.com/business/pennsylvania-based-zedx-boosts-basf-s-digital-
ag-intelligence;  
https://www.basf.com/en/company/news-and-media/news-releases/2017/04/p-17-192.html 
586 Deere & Company, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016) 
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000315189/b4e24d59-e4fe-4bd4-be0d-e245e947d601.pdf 
587 https://www.deere.com/en/our-company/news-and-announcements/news-releases/2017/corporate/2017sep06-
blue-river-technology/ 
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US, Monosem in France, and Mazzotti in Italy.588 Hagie Manufacturing Company is a U.S. 
market leader in high clearance sprayers while Monosem is a European market leader in 
precision planters.589 
Swiss-based Syngenta, is a leading pesticide supplier worldwide.590 Syngenta’s range 
of products includes herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, seedcare and seeds. In terms of sales, 
the popular brands include VIBRANCE, a fungicide for cereals, corn, diverse field crops, rice, 
soybean, specialty crops, vegetables; ELATUS & SOLATENOL, a fungicide for cereals, corn, 
diverse field crops, soybean, specialty crops, vegetables; FORTENZA & MINECTO, seedcare 
treatments for cereals, corn, diverse field crops, rice, soybean, specialty crops, vegetables; 
ADEPIDYN, a fungicide for cereals, corn, soybean, specialty crops, vegetables. 
In seeds, Syngenta introduced the largest number of genetically modified (GM) trait 
introductions in the industry between 2010 and 2014.591 New GM traits for soybean and corn 
are in the process for regulatory approval, and consist of OH2 soybean and corn molecular 
stacks for herbicide tolerance and corn rootworm. The largest crop for Syngenta is corn; its 
popular hybrid in this area is AGRISURE ARTESIAN, which offers drought protection and 
high yield in normal conditions. Syngenta has also developed methods of combining seeds and 
crop protection protocols, as can be seen both in the Water+ Intelligent Irrigation approach and 
in the GROMORE program for rice. In light of the development of technologies in crop 
protection, Syngenta has recently developed MAXVEG, a platform that combines chemistry 
and agronomy to maximize yields through safe, effective use of crop protection. In terms of 
mergers and acquisitions, Syngenta was the subject of a $43B takeover by Chemchina. The 
Chinese-based company is active in the pesticide markets in Europe through Adama, a wholly-
owned Israel-based subsidiary.592 As a result of regulatory approval processes ChemChina had 
to divest a number of assets in the herbicides and fungicides areas to avoid overlap in market. 
In the US, the divestiture has taken place through the acquisition by American Vanguard 
Corporation of Adama Agricultural Solutions’ US assets relating to crop protection product 
lines - Abamectin, Chlorothalonil and Paraquat.593 A similar divestiture has taken place in 
Mexico, through the acquisition by American Vanguard Corporation’s Mexican subsidiary of 
Syngenta’s selective herbicides for sugar cane and contact fungicide brands.594 In terms of post-
acquisitions plans, it would seem that Chemchina’s strategy might be the redistribution of crop 
                                                          
588 Deere & Company, Security and Exchange Commission form 10-K (31 December 2016) 
http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000315189/b4e24d59-e4fe-4bd4-be0d-e245e947d601.pdf 
589 Chloe Cornish, ‘John Deere ploughs a new furrow with algorithmic acquisition’, (11 September 2017) 
Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/3c7c84c4-94f3-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0; 
https://www.deere.com/en/our-company/news-and-announcements/news-releases/2017/corporate/2017jun27-
corporaterelease.html 
590 Syngenta, Annual Report 2016, https://www4.syngenta.com/annualreport2016 
591 Syngenta, Annual Report 2015, https://www4.syngenta.com/annualreport2015 
592 EU Commission Press Release, ‘Mergers: Commission clears ChemChina acquisition of Syngenta, subject to 
conditions’ (5 April 2017) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-882_en.htm. 
593Business Wire, ‘American Vanguard Enters into Agreement with Adama to Acquire Certain Crop Protection 
Assets in the U.S’ (5 April 2017) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170405005411/en/American-
Vanguard-Enters-Agreement-Adama-Acquire-Crop. 
594 See, http://www.american-
vanguard.com/NewsMedia/PressReleases/2017PressReleases/August23,2017PressRelease/tabid/427/Default.asp
x. 
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protection assets to its Adama subsidiary in order to compensate for the subsidiary’s antitrust 
related divestitures.595  
 
Table 4 – Companies in the agroindustry and their presence in the segments of the value 
chain 
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595 Andrew Marc Noel, ChemChina Said to Plan to Move New Assets to Adama Post-Syngenta, (10 April 2017) 
Bloomberg https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-10/chemchina-said-to-plan-to-move-new-assets-
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PART III: Legal Analysis 
 
Chapter 1: An holistic perspective on the relevant legal framework 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Justin Lindeboom, Claudio Lombardi & Amber Darr 
 
Public policy makers involved in the regulation of the global food value chain are confronted 
to a quite complex task, in view of the various legal and economic frameworks to which their 
action has to be integrated and the variety of governance tools at their disposal. The following 
sections provide the beginning of a competition law analysis that aims to integrate the variety 
of considerations competition law authorities are really confronted at when assessing their 
enforcement priorities and when exploring the type of analysis they will resort to in their 
competition law cases so that these become relevant for the specific institutional, economic 
and social context of their own jurisdiction. We think that such context-aware competition law 
analysis becomes essential if the aim of the authority is not just to promote some abstract 
principle of economic efficiency, but to ensure that the decisions reached have a broader claim 
of legitimacy than the community of competition law and economics experts, and that the 
authority maintains its influence and consequently its independence. This may be a day-to-day 
struggle in emerging and developing countries, which usually offer weaker institutional 
guarantees, in comparison to developed countries, as to the independence of competition 
authorities. These may also be subject to various social pressures, in particular in view of the 
fact that most of these jurisdictions have only recently adopted competition law. 
 
1.1.Polycentric competition law596 
 
Mainstream competition law has developed tools to study markets, or broader industrial 
sectors (e.g. the market investigation reference regime in the UK and in South Africa or sector 
enquiries in the EU), by making a conscious effort to analyse them as an insulated sector of 
activity, with its own rules, operating in a, more or less, competitive mode, and remaining 
largely aloof from politics or culture. This approach is not only justified by reasons of political 
or professional ideology, but may also have to do with the need of predictability and 
consistency, which are considered as forming the hallmarks of the rule of law. The latter could 
be jeopardised if competition authorities benefitted from a larger degree of discretion and 
values considered as external to competition law’s focus on allocative efficiency and price 
competition could form part of the analysis. Of course, things are not so simple as the 
boundaries of what can be considered as being within the normal scope of competition law or 
being outside of it, is a matter of social consensus. For instance, for a long period of time 
innovation was absent from the competition law assessment, which focused primarily on the 
protection of the competitive process or allocative efficiency. This trend seems to have changed 
the last two decades, with the adoption in 1995 of the US DOJ and FTC Guidelines for the 
                                                          
596 This Section partly draws on I. Lianos, Polycentric Competition Law (Current Legal Problems, forth. 2017). 
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licensing of IP597, the US Merger Guidelines, the EU Merger Guidelines and some recent 
decisions in the EU regarding the recent seed merger transactions (see Part IV). Dynamic 
analysis and the focus on innovation has become infused in the DNA of modern competition 
law. The complex assessment of the innovation incentives of the parties to the merger and the 
possible evolution of the industry seems to open the possibility to a more “polycentric” 
approach to the extent that this considers the effects of mergers and/or other conduct on the 
process of innovation, beyond the potential output and price effects on consumers (actual or 
future) in the affected relevant markets..  
In the context of an economic sector of strategic social importance, such as food, 
competition law forms part of a broader institutional framework, whose purpose is to cater for 
a number of public policy concerns, going beyond just ensuring the affordability of staple food 
and low prices. These could relate to the promotion of competition on quality, which is 
correlative to food safety, the adequate provision of national markets in food, in this case 
involving security of food supply concerns, free and fair market access for smallholders, thus 
guaranteeing public order and economic democracy, or the preservation of the ability of future 
generations to enjoy at least the same level of variety of food we currently benefit from, which 
brings forward the objective of biodiversity, of particular significance in the era of the 
Anthropocene. Furthermore, in the current context of climate change, sudden financial crises 
followed by cycles of economic depression and political turmoil High-impact, low-probability 
events (HILP)598, or “black swans, according to Nassim Taleb599, become an important element 
in the policy equation. One needs to recognize the increasing interconnectivity between social, 
economic, political and environmental spheres of life. Important ‘cascade effects’ may easily 
be divulged across the various spheres of economic activity, but also to the political and cultural 
spheres. The danger with the functionalist archetype of mainstream competition law is that it 
shapes the cognition of its actors in a way that makes them unable to engage with the wider 
picture, as they operate in the specific schema of price competition. 
This choice of cognitive closure is justified by the difficulty to develop legal 
institutions/instruments that would be easily administrable in view of the available resources 
so as to take into account broader concerns. It is also frequently contended that other areas of 
law, and forms of governance, such as regulation may be better suited to take into account these 
concerns. These arguments rely on the assumption that the only way these broader concerns 
may be taken into account is some form of quantitative and qualitative balancing. These are 
not, however, the only decision procedures available, as capping or lexicographic priority600 
may offer some adequate options. Some of these decision procedures are less demanding in 
                                                          
597 “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” issued on April 6, 1995, by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, recently updated by the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property issued on January 12, 2017 by the US Department of Justice and the US Federal 
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598 Bernice Lee, Felix Preston & Gemma Green, Preparing for High-Impact, Low Probability Events (Chatham 
House, 2012) available at 
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599 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Penguin, 2008). 
600 For a more in depth analysis of these decision procedures and their possible application in compettion law, see 
I. Lianos, Polycentric Competition Law, CLES Research paper 1/2018 (forth.). 
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terms of information gathering and processing than balancing. The additional assumption made 
is also that other institutional alternatives may be better suited for the task. This may well be 
true but it has to be confirmed after a careful comparative institutional analysis, which will 
assess the least imperfect option. It may also be possible that the relative weakness of other 
institutional alternatives may call for a more active role for competition authorities.  
This brings forward systemic resilience as the principal aim to be pursued by public 
authorities, and welcomes some holistic thinking in the traditionally compartimented approach 
followed by competition law. It becomes therefore important to go beyond established 
institutional “logics” and pre-established institutional moorings. At an abstract level, there are 
various strategies in order to organize this interplay and ensure effective problem-solving. 
“Framing struggles” recognize that there may be alternative approaches from different 
institutional arenas that could be relevant in a problem-solving activity, in particular when 
activities are situated at the intersection of multiple institutional spheres601. One may expect a 
clash of institutional logics, to the extent that the solution to the problem may be different, not 
necessarily diverging, should one choose one or another of these logics, thus rendering the 
issue “ripe” for a “framing struggle”. The object of this framing contest is clear: determine the 
dominant logic which will prevail in the specific context when the decision-maker takes a 
decision. It cannot always be assumed that competition law will emerge victorious from these 
framing contests. “Cross-institutional isomorphism” provides a different perspective602. The 
idea here is that in view of the alterity of the problem to be solved, for the specific institutional 
setting, it might make sense to borrow instruments and/or the overall logic from a different 
institutional realm and transplant them back, “repurposing them for the occasion”. Competition 
law can borrow from other areas of law, such as data protection, consumer protection or 
environmental law tools, repurposing them accordingly so as to fit the competition law field. 
For instance, it is possible to “Multiple performance” aims to allow for the integration of 
multiple frameworks that speak in many languages and articulate and maintain alternative 
conceptions of what is valuable or worthy603. As Granovetter observes, these multiple 
institutional frameworks can be used as resources for pragmatic actors, which may benefit from 
some degree of ambiguity and ambivalence when frames collide as part of conflicting visions 
and interests. It is important to offer to the actors some room for manoeuvre and to enable a 
discursive space to open where multiple principles of evaluation will be in play and benefit 
from productive friction. There are therefore many benefits in providing actors a “portfolio” of 
value frames from which they can draw creative and innovative solutions in a pragmatic way.  
Again here, there are two possible options. One would be to resort to alchemy and the 
subsequent transmutation of various values and tools coming from different legal fields. This 
may eventually lead to the integration of various “spheres” or “economies of worth” into a 
single theoretical framework, eventually facilitating commensurability and weighing. This is 
not an easy task and often requires a great level of abstraction and axiomatisation that may not 
necessarily be implemented by existing institutions, as it may demand new forms of combined 
expertise. A second approach would be to reconceptualise competition law in a way that would 
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better reflect its polycentric character, by introducing concepts and tools that engage more 
effectively with the complexity of economic interactions, a complex economy characterized by 
the overlapping and interpenetrating domains of economic networks, political networks, and 
social networks, whose functional domains of activity are linked to the extent that they are 
composed by multifunctional people participating in multiple networks. Networks act as 
catalysts for each other and enable actors to develop an ecology of strategies that may be 
deployed across the various networks in which these actors interact with each other. These may 
affect the structural position of the actors, in specific fields or overall. One needs therefore to 
take into account of these multi-networks strategies and focus on the connectedness between 
the various actors in different spheres of activity. Networks may also be affected by, what Brian 
Arthur calls, “sudden percolation”, to the extent that “a change occurring in one field may be 
propagated and continue to propagate in other fields as long as the various networks are densely 
connected”604. Important changes that appear localised and impact on just a few individual 
nodes may be felt right across the economy and other spheres of social activity. Interactions 
between closely connected networks may have a self-reinforcing effect and lead to the 
development of new structures and path dependencies that could give rise to non-linear 
systems. Third, to the extent that there is interaction between various agents and nonlinear 
feedback between the actors and their environment, the system of interactions that emerges is 
reflexive as agents frame their strategies observing the broader environment, assess their 
position in it and determine their actions in order to alter the environment according to their 
aims (e.g. improve their structural position across networks). 
To provide an example, a polycentric competition law approach would require a more 
holistic framework for the assessment of economic power, the trigger for any form of 
competition law intervention, to the extent that we want to take into account all the social costs 
(or benefits) engendered by a restriction of the competitive process, including effects on 
innovation, on privacy or on the protection of the environment, and to the extent that there is 
evidence that economic power is indispensable for these benefits or costs to occur. It is clear 
that the current analysis of market power, using the proxy of market shares and performed in 
the context of a relevant market, is inappropriate for analysing the competitive process in 
industries with dynamic competition. As Marc Granovettter discusses in his recent book on 
Economy and Society, economic power can be also based on dependence, on the control of 
legitimate authority and on the ability to control the agenda and the overall discourse605. 
Resource-dependence theories may complement our understanding of market power relations 
that are for the moment only focusing on direct economic power over consumers, and that the 
development of state capitalism in various parts of the world raise important questions as to 
the adequacy of our current narrow metrics in assessing economic power and bring forward the 
need to also account for power emerging out of control exercised by a State authority. Finally, 
one should take into account the power emerging out of central positioning in “structural 
holes”, and consider the social structure of competition606. Indeed, having ties that provide the 
only route through which resources or information can be transfered between network 
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segments that are otherwise disconnected from each other, in particular if this is within various 
spheres of activity, may provide invaluable strategic advantages over actors having few or no 
alternatives, and may easily convert this strategic positioning to economic power.  
In envisioning the way polycentric competition law may apply to global food value 
chains, the first step in the analysis would be to understand the complex governance of these 
value chains by public and private actors. 
 
1.2.The Governance of global value chains 
 
1.2.1. Public governance tools 
 
The globalization of food supply chains introduced a multilevel governance system,607 
relying on supranational organizations (such as the EU), international treaties and State 
regulation but also comprising private regulatory governance mechanisms that are 
complementary or alternative to public legislation. Indeed, private actors, including NGOs, 
play a fundamental role in the governance of the food value chain, in particular as they focus 
on the regulation of the organizational dimension of the supply chain. As a result, both public 
and private regulation have moved from regulating product standards to regulating process.608 
Regulators may intervene in the food market regulating specific links of the supply 
chain, for instance through urban planning and opening hours for the retail, or products 
labelling and food safety for the producers. They may also adopt macro-solutions insisting on 
the whole national economy, such as labour market regulation and competition policy.609 
Regulation raises compliance costs for firms.610 Such costs are partly passed-on to consumer 
and partly remain on the farmers.611 Regulation may also increase market fragmentation, thus 
diminishing the overall level of competitiveness.612 
Although the role of public governance is relatively limited in the global good value 
chain, private transnational regulation assumes a more fundamental coordinating role. 
International regulatory frameworks tend to be relatively limited in their effectiveness, as in 
some cases they are designed as soft law instruments and in many others they are limited to 
certain geographical regions. Businesses obviate to this lack of transnational state regulation 
designing more sophisticated contractual networks operating as private governance regimes.613 
                                                          
607 For a definition of multi-level governance systems, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-Level 
Governance and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001). 
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Public and private regulation often intervenes in specific sectors of the economy in 
order to offset or overcome market inefficiencies with various legal measures. There are 
different types of market inefficiency that may affect the global food value chain: i) insufficient 
competition manifested by the market dominance of one or more firms at a segment of the food 
value chain (bottleneck) affecting, for instance, the speed and magnitude of price changes 
transmission along the chain and/or innovation ; ii) informational asymmetry; iii) generation 
of significant negative externalities with regard to broader public policy objectives, in 
particular involving public goods such as environment and land surface, public health, 
consumer rights; and iv) ‘unfair’ effects, as deemed by policymakers, on the basis of their 
conception of appropriate distributional justice or allocative efficiency.614 For instance, 
agriculture becomes increasingly technology driven (biotech, crop protection, microbial 
solutions, big data and analytics software) capturing the significant part of the value added 
along the whole food pipeline (bottleneck distortion). To remain competitive and to stay in 
business farmers have to adapt the latest technologies including seeds. This makes farmers to 
become critically dependent on global agriculture technology providers with “in or out” 
consequences for farmers. At the same time, farmers labor is increasingly commoditized 
causing social tensions (i.e., a wave of India farming suicides claiming the reason for it on 
Monsanto GMO cotton seeds).615 
Policy responses have taken different forms with each State adopting a range of them, 
according to its own socio-economic context and institutional capabilities. Allan Fels and 
Matthew Lees distinguish four categories of policy responses in order to deal with situations 
of market dominance: 
 
Table 1: Policy responses to market dominance 
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Source: Fels & Lees (2015)616 
 
1.2.1.1 Market rules: competition law and beyond 
 
Competition authorities have been active on all fronts, using the various categories of 
legal measures set out above. The European Commission published in 2009 its Communication 
on ‘A better functioning food supply chain in Europe’617 that gave the way to a series of market 
studies aimed at assessing the degree of competitiveness in the European food market. A 
number of investigations by national competition authorities followed.618 Similarly, the 
informational asymmetry existing between consumers and suppliers has been a long time 
concern, legislators choosing to strengthen the requirements for product labelling in order to 
reduce this gap.619  
The high volatility of agri-food commodity prices and food prices has also been a matter 
for concern. As it has been shown by a number of studies, the price transmission of these 
fluctuations is not evenly distributed along the supply chain.620 In particular, it has been 
observed that cost shocks are only partly passed through the supply chain.621 Furthermore, a 
                                                          
616 A. Fels & M. Lees, Unconscionable conduct in the context of competition law with special reference to 
retailer/supplier relationships within Australia, Paper presented to the 10th ASCOLA Conference, 21-23 May 
2015, p. 28. 
617 Communication of the European Commission: A better functioning food supply chain in Europe (COM(2009) 
591). 
618 See for instance ECN, Report on Competition Law Enforcement and Market Monitoring Activities by European 
Competition Authorities in the Food Sector (2012). 
619 See, for instance, the Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on food product labelling. 
620 Pavel Vavra and Barry Goodwin, Analysis of Price Transmission Along the Food Chain (OECD Publishing 
2005); Henry W Kinnucan and Olan D Forker, ‘Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission for Major Dairy 
Products’ (1987) 69 American journal of agricultural economics 285; Backer and Miroudot (n 16); OECD, 
Competition in the Food Chain, vol DAF/COMP(2013)15 (OECD 2013). 
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fall in commodity prices does not necessarily lead to a correspondent decline of retail prices.622 
This asymmetric price pass-through is often completed at the expenses of farmers, who receive 
a lower share of the ‘food dollar’,623 and bear most of the risks related to price volatility. 
Although it has been suggested that the cause of this asymmetry lies mainly in the unbalanced 
market power generated by the high concentration at retail level, drawing such conclusion for 
policy reasons may conceal many other potential causes for the asymmetric price transmission 
in operation.624 For instance, it has been alleged that government intervention may contribute, 
in some instances, to generate an asymmetric transmission of prices625. The asymmetry of the 
transmission of price changes along the supply chain may also raise issues of fairness in the 
food supply chain626 justifying regulatory intervention based on reasons of distributional 
justice. 
In the course of the last decade, national and supranational competition authorities of 
the EU, US and to a certain extent, BRICS jurisdictions, have carried out a series of 
investigations into the food market.627 Many of these investigations have focused especially on 
the retail sector whose rapid consolidation process, occurring in the last two decades, has been 
considered to be a relevant factor for a possible abuse of dominant position.628 Although 
national competition authorities have examined the possible negative effects to competition 
from the high concentration and consolidation of the retail sector, in particular in groceries,629 
there is no systematic empirical evidence of a systemic threat to the competitiveness of markets 
originating from high levels of concentration at retail level.630  
 
Table 2: Overview of the main practices that may give rise to competition concerns 
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Source: European Commission (2008)631 
 
Some jurisdictions have also targeted superior bargaining power, irrespective of the 
existence of structural market power, when transactions on a competitive market are not 
mutually beneficial for the parties but one party is coerced into entering the transaction, because 
of a lack of economic alternative.  Furthermore, some jurisdictions have chosen imaginative 
instruments to deal with some of the competition problems arising out of the power of multi-
brand retailers, even if these do not dispose of market power. We will focus on the various 
forms of addressing superior bargaining power in Chapter 3 of this Part. 
 
1.2.1.2. Self-regulation or mixed public-private regulation, standard setting 
 
Self-regulation gained momentum with the advancement of globalization and the 
development of new technologies and processes when the pace of change and the global nature 
of supply chains generated, by consequence, an informal delegation of power to private 
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actors.632 Self-regulation originates from firms and industry groups active along the supply 
chain, as well as from NGOs and other civil society groups promoting specific policies in the 
market.633 Self-regulation may also manage the risks created by the supply chain,634 such as 
food safety or price shocks.635 Private governance solutions range from ex ante regulatory 
mechanisms (for example certifications) to ex post remedies to infringements of private 
standards.  
Self-regulatory provisions may establish rules, practices or processes636 addressing 
specific issues arising along the supply chain, in particular dealing with environmental and 
safety standards, as well as with social standards. The coexistence of public and private 
regulation in supply chains resolves therefore in a double interdependence, when the regulatory 
framework contributes to shape supply chains that adopt private regulation, which, in turn, 
affects public regulatory strategies. 637 
The reasons for the increasing importance of national and transnational private contracting in 
food markets are numerous. Among them we can list:  
a) differences in the bargaining power and the size of firms (sometimes translated in terms 
of market concentration, although the two things do not always correspond) between 
market actors;638  
b) market consolidation; 
c) changes in technology of commodities; 
d) improved transportations; 
e) changes in consumer demand; 
f) crises connected to product safety;639 
g) “the inability of States to deal with cross-boundary risk management”.640 
Self-regulation allows private actors to swiftly adapt their relationship to the changing 
market conditions. Moreover, especially in the case of transition countries, private regulation 
constitutes the means through which private businesses import higher regulatory standards in 
those jurisdictions. 
Standard setting leads to an important involvement of public and private actors and 
constitutes an example of hybrid public/private regulation. With regard to standard-setting 
                                                          
632  Fabrizio Cafaggi and Paola Iamiceli, Private Regulation and Industrial Organisation: The Network Approach 
(European University Institute 2012) <available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/23264/WP-LAW-
2012-21.pdf?sequence=1> 1. 
633 For instance, international organizations or associations (such as standards setters) and epistemic communities.  
634 Bridget M Hutter, ‘Understanding the New Regulatory Governance: Business Perspectives’ (2011) 33 Law & 
Policy 459. 
635 See the table below for an overview of the private standards in food safety and environmental protection 
adopted in BRICS countries. 
636 Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation’ [2010] EUI Working Paper Series 
RSCAS 2010/53 1. 
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organisations and standards related to plant protection, these are regulated either by 
international standards, set by intergovernmental organisations, or by governmental standards, 
set by national governments. On an international level, plant protection standards are set by the 
Commission on Phytosanitary Measures (CPM), which is established pursuant to the 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) from 1951, and deposited with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). IPPC consists of 183 parties, which 
includes 180 United Nations member states, the Cook Islands, Niue, and the European Union. 
The Convention is recognized by the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures as the only international standard setting body for plant health.641 The 
strategic objectives of the CPM are the following: 
• protecting sustainable agriculture and enhancing global food security through the 
prevention of pest spread; 
• protecting the environment, forests and biodiversity from plant pests; 
• facilitating economic and trade development through the promotion of harmonized 
scientifically based phytosanitary measures, and 
• developing phytosanitary capacity for members to accomplish the preceding three 
objectives.642 
The IPPC also provides for establishment of Regional Plant Protection Organizations (RPPO). 
RPPOs are inter-governmental organisations that coordinate the working of National Plant 
Protection Organisations (NPPOs) on a regional level and cooperate with the CPM in 
developing international standards for plant protection products.643 The functions of RPPOs 
include: 
• coordination and participation in activities among their NPPOs in order to promote and 
achieve the objectives of the IPPC   
• cooperation among regions for promoting harmonized phytosanitary measures  
• gathering and dissemination of information, in particular in relation with the IPPC   
• cooperation with the CPM and the IPPC Secretariat in developing and implementing 
international standards for phytosanitary measures.644 
There are currently 9 RPPOs: 
• Asia and Pacific Plant Protection Commission645 
• Comunidad Andina646 
• Comite de Sanidad Vegetal del Cono Sur647 
• European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization648 
• Inter-African Phytosanitary Council649 
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• Near East Plant Protection Organization650 
• North American Plant Protection Organization651 
• Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuaria652 
• Pacific Plant Protection Organization653 
Finally, each country generally has its own legislation regulating and implementing 
international standards on plant protection products. The EU, for example, has extensive 
pesticides database that are available for use in the EU.654 
With regard to seeds, seed standards generally relate to quality, safety and marketing of 
seeds. Seed standards are set by and international organisations, on an international level, and 
governments on a national level,  
At the international level, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) issues certification standards related to following types of plants: Grasses and 
Legumes; Crucifers and other Oil or Fibre species; Cereals; Maize and Sorghum; Sugar and 
Fodder Beet; Subterranean clover and similar species; and Vegetables.655 These standards are 
aimed to ensure varietal identity and purity of seeds through appropriate requirements and 
controls throughout the cropping, seed processing and labelling operations. Seeds complying 
with OECD standards are certified as “quality-guaranteed” and the aim is to facilitate 
international trade in seeds and removals of technical barriers to entry.656 To date, 58 countries 
participate in the OECD seed standardisation process.657 
On a national level, each country generally regulates its own requirements for quality, 
safety and marketing of seeds. In the EU, there is extensive legislation governing the 
registration, certification and marketing of seeds. Before placing on the market, seeds should 
first be registered and certified (certification should guarantee the identity, health and quality 
of seeds and propagating material before marketing).658 The EU also regulates marketing of 
seeds and provides for specific requirements for packaging, sealing, labelling and 
documentation.659 The US similarly has its own standards related to quality,660 and marketing 
of seeds.661 
 
1.2.1.3. Planning law, restrictions concerning trading hours and paternalistic regulation 
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The European Commission regards planning restrictions and opening hours as potential 
competition inhibitors, therefore worthy of careful analysis.662 From this perspective, planning 
regimes, by limiting the attribution of construction permits, may hinder the establishment of 
new stores hampering competition in the specific geographic area.663 Moreover, entry 
regulations in the retail sector may have a negative repercussion on the labour markets. A study 
conducted in Italy showed empirical evidence that regions adopting tight restrictions on 
opening of large stores benefit from less employment growth than geographical regions with 
less restrictions.664 Furthermore, an informal survey of the European Commission concluded 
that “planning regimes place more limited constraints on the extension of existing stores by 
retailers compared with new entry”.665 Most recently, the Australian Competition Policy 
Review, observed that “(r)emoving barriers to entry and other regulatory barriers would 
strengthen competition in the supermarket sector”, noting that “(p)lanning and zoning 
restrictions are limiting the growth of new entrants […] (and) more broadly affect the ability 
of independent supermarkets to compete”666. However, the negative impact on the performance 
of the retail and employment sectors, in some cases may be counterbalanced by objectives of 
environmental protection underlying the local planning policies. One could finally add 
paternalistic regulation limiting the distribution of certain categories of food products, for 
instance, state monopolies in the wholesaling or retailing of some or all categories of alcoholic 
beverages. 
 
1.2.1.4. The protection of consumers  
 
The development of consumer rights and of the legal field of consumer protection law 
constitutes one of the major legal innovations of the last five decades, starting with the 
Consumer Bill of Rights adopted by President Kennedy in 1962 in the US and the four basic 
rights recognized for consumers (the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to 
choose, the right to be heard). The UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, adopted by a UN 
General Assembly resolution in 1985, expanded the number of consumer rights to eight (adding 
the right to basic needs, including the right to food and water, the right to redress, the right to 
consumer education, the right to a healthy environment, a list that is continuously updated in 
order to correspond to evolving consumer needs and new technology). At the EU, a Council 
Resolution in 1975 set a preliminary programme for an EU consumer protection and 
information policy, providing for basic consumer rights. In 1985, the first consumer protection 
directives were adopted, following the introduction of a specific EU competence for consumer 
protection at the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The protection of consumers figures also as an 
                                                          
662 EC, ‘Commission Staff Working Document - The Functioning of the Food Supply Chain and Its Effects on 
Food Prices’ 20. 
663 ibid. 
664 Eliana Viviano, ‘Entry Regulations and Labour Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Italian Retail Trade 
Sector’ (2008) 15 Labour Economics 1200. 
665 Bukeviciute, Dierx and Ilzkovitz (n 152) 29. 
666 Ian Harper, Peter Anderson, Su McCluskey, Michael O’Bryan QC, Competition Policy Review, Final Report 
(March 2015), available at http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2015/03/Competition-policy-review-
report_online.pdf  , pp. 88-89. 
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important objective of the Union, following the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 12 TFEU provides 
that “consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Union policies and activities”. This article may be interpreted as requiring 
that the protection of the interest of the consumer should be an integral part of EU competition 
law and policy. Similar legislation granting rights to consumers, including the right to food and 
water exist in a number of jurisdictions667. 
Consumer protection in the food sector is mainly enacted by the establishment of safety 
standards. These safety standards cover: i) farmers’ production, including processes adopted 
and substances used for growing plants and feeding animals; ii) food processing; iii) food 
distribution; iv) labelling and information to consumers. Public regulation generally provides 
the legal framework in which private parties set an important number of private standards.  
 
Table 3: Consumer protection in BRICS 
 
 
Brazil Consumer protection 
Legislation Consumer Protection Code, Law 8.078/90  
Institutions Consumer Protection and Defense Authority, Ministry of 
Justice 
Standards 50 standards regulating production, processing and 
retailing.668 
 
 
Russia Consumer protection 
Legislation Law  N 2300-1 as of 07.02.1992 
                                                          
667 Although it is quite rare that constitutional texts refer to the consumer. See, for instance, Art. 51(1) of the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978 providing that “the public authorities shall guarantee the protection of consumers 
and users and shall by means of effective measures, safeguard their safety, health, and legitimate economic 
interests”. 
668 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
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Institutions Federal Service on Customers’ Rights Protection and Human 
Well-Being Surveillance  
Standards 25 standards regulating production, processing and 
retailing.669 
 
 
India Consumer protection 
Legislation Consumer Protections Act, 1986 
 
 
Institutions Department of Consumer Affairs 
http://consumeraffairs.nic.in/consumer/index.php 
 
Standards 48 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.670 
 
 
China Consumer protection 
Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of 
Consumer Rights and Interests (02-06-2006) 
Institutions State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/ 
 
                                                          
669 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
670 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
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Standards 49 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.671 
 
 
South 
Africa 
Consumer protection 
Legislatio
n 
Consumer Protection Act (Act 68 of 2008) 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/other/2011/3/consumer_protection_act.p
df 
 
Institution
s 
Consumer Affairs Committee of The Department of Trade and Industry  
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ 
 
Standards 44 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.672 
 
1.2.1.5. Unfair trading practices 
 
According to a European ‘High Level Forum on Better Functioning of the Supply Chain’ 
(HLF) report, a number of European national competition authorities discovered the existence 
of unfair practices in the food supply chain linked to imbalances of bargaining power between 
stakeholders.673 As it is reported by the HLF, “NCAs found that most of these practices do not 
fall within the scope of competition rules at EU level or in most Member States, as they did not 
affect consumer welfare. A few NCAs have proposed alternative solutions to tackle them, such 
as the application of national laws against unfair trading practices, or the adoption of codes 
of conduct or good practices with effective enforcement mechanisms. A few NCAs have also 
expressed concerns about the potential anti-competitive effects that some of these practices 
may have in the long term, should they ultimately negatively affect the competitive process in 
the supply chain or consumer welfare by reducing investment and innovation or limiting 
consumer choice”.674 In Europe, these concerns have resulted in the launch of the Supply Chain 
Initiative, under the auspices of the EU, which endorses the principles of fair contracting 
contained in the HLF Report and in the Green Paper on Unfair trading practices in the food and 
non-food supply chain in Europe,675 with the aim to establish a set of principles of good practice 
                                                          
671 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
672 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
673 EC (n 171). 
674 ibid. 
675 Green Paper on Unfair trading practices in the food and non-food supply chain in Europe (COM/2013/037). 
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for the food supply chain.676 The regulatory framework related to unfair competition in the 
food sector of the BRICS countries is instead rather diverse but may play a significant role in 
the future. 
 
1.2.1.6. Access to land and right to food 
 
The right to food is proclaimed and protected by international law. Article 25(1) of the 
Universal declaration of Human rights stipulates that “(e)veryone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food”. 
Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights also 
requires the States Parties to the Covenant to recognize “the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food”. Similar obligations are 
proclaimed by Articles 24 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The right to 
food is also protected by a number of regional treaties (e.g. and Article 11 of the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man) and national constitutions (e.g. for instance, in 
South Africa, in the landmark case Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Irene 
Grootboom and others concerning housing, the court rules that the Government had violated 
the Constitution by not making “reasonable” provision for persons in desperate need, the right 
to food enjoying a similar constitutional protection677). The World Summit organized by the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in 1996 emphasized the need 
to clarify the obligations arising from the right to food, as provided for under international 
human rights law. In response, the Committee on Economic, Social and Social Rights issued 
its general comment No. 12 (1999), providing a definition of the right to adequate food678.  
The right to food is about the way in which individuals may access food markets for the 
purpose inter alia of providing food for oneself.679 Right to food [is]…the right to have regular, 
permanent and unobstructed access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to 
quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food.680 In terms of United Nation’s 
General Comment 12681 economic accessibility applies ‘to any acquisition pattern or 
entitlement through which people procure their food’. Accessibility also ‘implies that personal 
and household financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet 
should be at a level such that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not 
threatened or compromised.’682 Under Article 2 of the International Convention of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the right to adequate food is a relative standard, subject 
                                                          
676 See http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/. 
677 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 
19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4 October 2000). 
678 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, Right to adequate food (Twentieth 
session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 62 (2003). 
679 Tristan Feunteun, ‘Cartels and the Right to Food: An Analysis of States’ Duties and Options’ [2015] Journal 
of International Economic Law. 342. 
680 ibid. 343. 
681 United Nations Economic and Social Council E/C.12/1999/5 12 May 1999 ‘The right to adequate food (art. 
11)’. 
682 Tristan Feunteun, ‘Cartels and the Right to Food: An Analysis of States’ Duties and Options’ [2015] Journal 
of International Economic Law. 342, 349. 
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to progressive realization according to the available resources of the state.683 The term 
“progressive realization” was interpreted and explained in General Comment No. 3:  
“… the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under 
the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful 
content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the 
real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light 
of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear 
obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It 
thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards 
that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require 
the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources” ￼684  
Further in terms of General Comment No. 3, there was a ‘minimum core obligation’ upon every 
state party to the ICESCR ‘to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential 
levels of each of the rights’. The minimum core obligation in respect of the right to food is the 
right to be provided essential foodstuffs. In order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must 
demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an 
effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.685  
The way the right to food may relate to competition law enforcement has become 
progressively apparent, but initially competition law was not considered as part of the toolbox 
that could lead to the realization of this largely programmatic right686. A number of developing 
countries, namely, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe, had submitted a proposal calling for a 
“food security box”, which recognized the specific food security needs and special situations 
of developing countries, although it did not mention the right to food. The proposal also asked 
for specific policy instruments including (a) choice of which products may be liberalized; (b) 
Re-evaluation of tariffs; (c) Flexibility in levels of domestic subsidies; (d) Protection against 
dumping and most importantly, (e) Protection against monopolies. Developing countries 
                                                          
683 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR 
“1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” [emphasis added] 
684 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html [accessed 29 August 2016] Para 9. 
685 ibid para 10. 
686 On the legal nature of the right to food and the contribution of competition law to its realization, see Amber 
Darr & Ioannis Lianos, The ‘Hunger Games’: Competition Law and the Right to Food, CLES Research paper 
4/2017 (forthcoming). 
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argued that they must be given an easily accessible mechanism to protect themselves against 
the abuse of monopoly power and to seek compensation.687 
Competition Policy increasingly came under discussion in the post 2000 discussion of the 
Millennium Development Goals, because it was believed that even though it was not mentioned 
explicitly, it was of considerable importance for the MDGs.688 This brought attention to 
competition law as a possible tool in order to achieve the broader aims of the right to food. But, 
of course, a lot of conceptual work had to be done in order to build this possible connection. 
In 2000, the Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food with the mandate, among others, to present recommendations on possible steps to achieve 
the full realization of the right to food, by the submission of annual reports to the Human Rights 
Council and the UN General Assembly and by preparing thematic reports. The Special 
Rapporteur may also lead country missions in order to examine the right to food in the country 
and propose recommendations to improve the situation. In 2004, FAO also adopted voluntary 
guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security, providing practical guidance to States in order to implement the right to 
adequate food689. All FAO member States have accepted the Guidelines by adopting them at 
the FAO Council in November 2004. In 2006, the Right to Food Unit was created to support 
members with the implementation of the Guidelines. In 2006, the UN General Assembly also 
decided that the Human Rights Council will undertake a universal periodic review of the 
fulfilment by each UN Member State of its human rights obligations and commitments, each 
country being reviewed every four years.   
The World Development Report 2008 ‘Agriculture for Development’ highlighted the need 
for competition policy and the establishment of regulatory institutions as priority areas for 
public action. In particular, the Report noted that greater access to assets for smallholders, level 
playing fields, and strong producer organizations to achieve scale and market power are 
necessary elements and that the opportunities offered by major changes in markets will work 
for the poor only if these complementary policies are in place.690 
Olivier de Schutter, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food from 2008 
to 2014 has played an important role in bringing competition to the forefront of the RTF debate. 
Arriving on the scene at a time of heightened awareness about the impact of concentration, 
particularly in the agribusiness sector, de Schutter advocated a rights approach for competition 
policy.  
A Fact Sheet on the Right to Adequate Food was published by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2010691. This Fact Sheet clarifies that food 
must be available, accessible and adequate, the latter concept requiring that food must satisfy 
dietary needs and being safe from adverse substances, such as contaminants from industrial or 
                                                          
687 United Nations General Assembly A/56/210 23rd July 2001 ‘Preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights on the right to food, Jean Ziegler’, para 85 
688 David Satterthwaite ed. ‘The Millennium Development Goals and Local Processes: Hitting the target or 
missing the point?’ “Policy coherence and the Millennium Development Goals” Maryanne Grieg-Gran p. 135 
689 Available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825e.pdf  
690 World Development Report 2008: ‘Agriculture for Development’, p. 134 
691 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Food, Factsheet no. 34, available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet34en.pdf  
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agricultural processes, including residues from pesticides, hormones or veterinary drugs. The 
right to food also implies that States should provide an enabling environment in which a person 
will live in conditions allowing him or her to produce food or to buy it (that is, land, seeds, 
water and other resource for production and money and access to the market for consumption 
purposes). The right to food provides entitlements to individuals to access adequate food and 
to the resources necessary for the sustainable enjoyment of food and imposes obligations to 
States to overcome hunger and malnutrition and realize food security for all. It is distinguished 
from the concept of food sovereignty, which is recognized under some national laws692, 
according to which peoples should be able to define their own mode of food production and 
determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant and protect domestic food production 
and regulate trade in order to achieve sustainable development objectives. The FAO Fact Sheet 
also details the implications of the right to food for specific groups of people, such as people 
living in rural and urban areas, indigenous peoples, women, and children.  
Among the various legal obligations that the right to food imposes on States, an 
important one is the duty of States to protect individuals’ enjoyment of the right to food against 
violations by third parties (including private enterprises and other entities), which involves the 
protection of sources of food from destruction and environmental damage, but also the 
obligation to ensure that food put on the market is safe and nutritious, States being required to 
develop and enforce food quality and safety standards and to ensure “fair and equal market 
practices”. States should also be active in fulfilling the right to food, including by the 
implementation of agrarian reform programs. Of particular interest is also the extent of the 
obligations imposed, as according to the first special rapporteur on the right to food, “to comply 
fully with their obligations […] States must also respect, protect and support the fulfilment of 
the right to food of people living in other territories”693, thus not only their citizens but also 
third parties subject to their jurisdiction, such as private companies that may violate the right 
to food in other countries. International law also imposes on States obligations to take steps to 
ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies (Article 11(2) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The High Commissioner’s Factsheet also 
adds that there is an increasing recognition by the Human Rights Council and its regional and 
international soft-law instruments that corporations themselves have a responsibility to respect 
human rights, including the right to food, which means that they should not infringe on the 
enjoyment of human rights and that effective remedies for victims should be in place. 
The high level of concentration in food supply chains and the bargaining power that 
ensues has been examined by a briefing note of the special rapporteur on the right to food, that 
is of particular interest for our study in view of the emphasis put on the “direct link between 
the ability of competition regimes to address abuses of buyer power in supply chains and the 
enjoyment of the right to adequate food”694. The special rapporteur highlighted the important 
concerns over agribusiness concentration that affect according to him the effective realization 
                                                          
692 2008 Constitution of Ecuador. 2008 Organic Law of Food Security and Food Sovereignty of Venezuela; 2007 
Constitution of Bolivia. 
693 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Adequate Food, Factsheet no. 34, p. 19. 
694 Olivier de Schutter, Addressing Concentration in Food Supply Chains, Briefing Note 03, December 2010, p. 
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of the right to adequate food. He noted that this concentration is not only limited to the retail 
sector, which has attracted a lot the attention of competition authorities eager to deal with the 
bargaining power of large supermarkets, in both developed and developing countries, but also 
extends to the production of agricultural commodities. The report provides some examples of 
the latter: 
“[…] (T)here are around 500 million consumers of coffee. Yet, just four firms carry out 
45% of all coffee roasting, and only four firms carry out 40% of all international coffee 
trading. Similarly, just three companies control over 80% of the world’s tea markets, 
and four companies control 40% of international trading in cocoa, 51% of cocoa 
grinding and 50% in confectionary manufacturing. There are additional examples: in 
the Brazilian soybean market, roughly 200,000 farmers attempt to sell to five main 
commodity traders; in the Ivorian cocoa industry, three large transnational commodity 
buyers (ADM, Cargill and Barry Callebaut) dominate; and in 1996, two transnational 
food and beverage companies (Nestlé and Parmalat) controlled 53% of the Brazilian 
dairy processing market, driving off a large number of cooperatives, which had to sell 
their facilities to these companies”695. 
According to the report, the downward pressure to producers’ income forces less 
efficient producers to merge, without however any cost savings arising out of these mergers 
and the consequent economies of scale being passed on to consumers, in view of the 
gatekeeping role of large commodity buyers and processors, as well as retailers. For instance, 
despite the fall in the farm prices for coffee beans by 80%, retail prices for coffee only dropped 
by 27%, while at the same time the profits of Starbucks and Nestlé, the main coffee retailer and 
coffee processor, increased considerably. The report also noted the practice of large retailers in 
the developed world to pass the cost of compliance with the retailer’s standards on hygiene, 
food safety and traceability to the coffee producers, thus increasing the costs of smaller farms 
and leading to the increase of large farms (horizontal concentration) as well as of those farms 
controlled directly by the coffee exporters (vertical integration).  
The social consequences of this concentration and of the downward pressure on farm 
prices are quite significant, with agricultural wages being depressed, child labour employed 
and proper environmental precautions dispensed with. Faced with a reality of decreasing 
revenues, small farmers are pressed to produce even more agricultural commodities in order to 
earn short-term income in an attempt to meet daily expenses, which leads to oversupply and 
the vicious circle of  further depression of prices,, sometimes even below the average cost of 
production. Large buyers in developed countries also demand high volume discounts, obliging 
the suppliers to raise the prices for other buyers, thus exacerbating the comparative competitive 
advantage of large retailers and leading to more concentration at the retail side of the market 
(the waterbed effect). Final consumers are also ultimately harmed by reductions in quality or 
choice and decreased levels of innovation by producers without enjoying the benefit, because 
of the gatekeeper effect of large supermarkets and industrial processors, of significantly lower 
prices. Consumer sovereignty also suffers from the ability of dominant buyers to dictate to 
consumers the choice of the products that come to market.  
                                                          
695 Ibid., p. 2. 
211 
 
The special rapporteur recommended that “competition law regimes should be 
improved to comport with general human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
and to facilitate the realization of human rights, including among others the right to food, the 
right to work and the right to development”696. More concretely this implies that countries 
exporting agricultural commodities should not adopt “competition laws focused on consumer 
welfare on the model proposed by the OECD”, but should instead seek to “ensure that, in the 
competition law regime that they set up, they offer a sufficient high level of protection of their 
producers against abuses of dominant positions by commodity buyers, food processors or 
retailers, as part of their obligation to protect the right to food under their jurisdiction”697. For 
the special rapporteur, “substantive competition laws should recognize that consumer harms 
arising from excessive buyer concentration are incipient and therefore indeterminate in 
character, but that this indeterminacy should not be a reason for failing to control such 
conduct”, a “more enriched conception of consumer welfare” being needed, “one that takes 
account of consumers’ interests in sustainability – rather than focusing purely upon short-term 
price changes”698. In view of the inability of major developed countries competition authorities 
to control excessive buyer power, because of the remoteness of the effects of such power on 
their consumers, according to the effects doctrine699, developing jurisdictions, in which the 
majority of impoverished farmers are located, should set up “credible competition authorities 
of their own”. Developed countries should also design competition law regimes that address 
                                                          
696 Ibid., p. 4. 
697 Ibid., p. 5. 
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699 The rapporteur notes that Section 6(a) of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) provides 
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Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 1945), in which the defendant, a US corporation, had imposed a foreign 
supplier-developer of tomato seeds, a  contractual clause preventing it from supplying any other buyer in the U.S. 
According to the US DOJ Antitrust Division, such clause would have made less likely possible innovations from 
the foreign supplier-developer in the creation of heartier tomato seeds that would allow consumers to enjoy higher 
quality, better tasting winter tomatoes. The judge dismissed these arguments noting that the “delay of possible 
innovations does not have a direct effect on American commerce”. The special rapporteur notes that the EU effects 
doctrine may catch this type of behavior as the EU courts have interpreted the requirement of the immediate and 
substantial effect in the EU broadly “to pertain not so much to economic effects, but to the structure of the market”. 
With regard to the US, it is well known that the 9th circuit in earlier cases had adopted a strict standard for 
directness of the effect on American commerce, as the effect must follow as “an immediate consequence of the 
defendant's activity” [US v LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004]. In 2012 the seventh circuit took 
a different approach in Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012), where it introduced the 
“ ‘reasonably proximate causal nexus' ” standard, which enables a more expansive interpretation of Section 6(a) 
of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA). This more expansive view was confirmed in the recent 
Motorola II judgment of the seventh circuit, Motorola Mobility v. AU Optrronics Corp., 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 
2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3745 (U.S. March 16, 2015), where the seventh circuit revisited a more 
restrictive interpretation of Section 6(a) in Motorola I, Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842 
(7th Cir. 2014) in which the court rejected the existence of a “direct” effect on U.S. commerce because of the fact 
that the anti-competitive behaviour was affecting intermediary and not final products. The second circuit has also 
adopted the more expansive “reasonably proximate causal nexus” standard in Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision 
Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395 (2d Cir. 2014) (conduct was considered as within the scope even if it affected 
intermediary products). In a recent judgment the Ninth circuit nevertheless insisted on the restrictive approach of 
“the immediate consequence test”: US v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 83 
U.S.L.W. 3745 (U.S. March 16, 2015). 
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the negative effects of high concentration and buyer power. According to the special 
rapporteur, 
“Developed countries […] should avoid creating high barriers to assert jurisdiction, as 
well as substantive rules of competition law that leave abusive buyer behaviour in 
developing countries unchecked. Reductions of consumer welfare resulting from 
abuses of buyer power occur only in the long-term, and as an indirect consequence of 
the appropriation of producer welfare. It is therefore inappropriate to focus competition 
regimes on consumer protection alone. Instead, developed countries, especially those 
where dominant agribusiness buyers are domiciled, should be more active in addressing 
the creation, maintenance and abuse of such buyer power, with a view not only to 
protecting the suppliers, particularly in developing countries, from the impacts of 
abuses of dominant positions, but also to ensuring the longer term stability of supply 
for consumers. 
Developing countries where food insecurity is widespread in the rural areas and where 
violations of the right to adequate food of small-scale farmers are common, may wish 
to create competition regimes that impose on buyers specific duties, or subject them to 
specific types of control, in certain supply chains or for certain commodities that are 
particularly important to the revenues of small-scale farmers, with a view to preventing 
types of conduct which result in harms to the welfare of producers”700. 
 
1.2.1.7. Sustainability, environmental protection and biodiversity 
 
Legal obligations arising out of environmental protection laws and sustainability norms 
included in international treaties and national constitutions also frame public action relating to 
the preservation of competition in the context of the food value chain. For instance, the EU 
treaties include a general integration clause at Article 7 TFEU, according to which “(t)he Union 
shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into 
account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers”. Sustainable development 
constitutes a fundamental objective pursued by the European Union, according to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. With regard to environmental protection, Article 11 TFEU provides that 
“(e)nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities” . The inclusion of these provisions 
should have led the Commission and arguably the Courts to grant more importance to broader 
public interest concerns in some circumstances, although these expectations have not been 
fulfilled by current practice. 
There is a variety of practices among jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions, including the EU, 
seem to prefer not to aggregate effects across markets and to balance competition with other 
public interests, to the extent that these public interest objectives cannot be taken into account 
in the competition assessment. For instance, in the EU, the Commission takes into account the 
positive welfare effects of an agreement as long as “the group of consumers affected by the 
restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are substantially the same”701. Yet, it also 
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accepts that such aggregation is possible for related relevant markets, such as downstream 
markets, where one can assume that the consumers affected would be substantially the same. 
The EU courts’ position on this issue seems more liberal. With regard to the application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU the General Court indicated in a case that it has regard to advantages 
arising from the agreement, not only for the specific relevant market but also for “every other 
market on which the agreement in question might have beneficial effects”702. Public interest 
objectives have occasionally outweighed the finding of a restriction of competition in the 
context of Article 101(1) TFEU, when an activity is (self-)regulated and the restraints are 
ancillary for its organization and operation703 Environmental policy aims have also been taken 
into account in the enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU in a number of cases704. The European 
Merger Control Regulation also allows for the consideration of public interest objectives705. 
Based on the horizontal integration clauses of the Treaty, perceived as indicating the 
preferences of EU citizens, the competition law decision-makers may also devise a social 
welfare function that takes into account additional dimensions of welfare, than price and 
quality, in case benefits brought for the public interests are quantifiable, but also beyond706. 
Other competition law regimes are also confronted with similar concerns relating to the choice 
between a more general framework of cost benefit analysis across markets or only within a 
relevant market. 
Biological diversity is protected at the international level by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity adopted in 1992. The Convention aims, among others, to achieve a fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources and regulates access to genetic sources and 
traditional knowledge. GMs are further regulated by the Carthagena Protocole on Biosafety, 
adopted in January 2000, which makes it clear that products from new technologies must be 
based on the precautionary principle. The aim to guarantee a fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from genetic resources is further implemented by the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources, a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, adopted in 2010 (entry into force in 2014). The Nagoya Protocol sets out core 
obligations for States contracting parties, including domestic-level access measures with the 
aim to create conditions to promote and encourage research contributing to biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use and benefit-sharing obligations for the benefits arising from 
the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications and commercialization, 
                                                          
702 Case T-86/95, Compagnie générale maritime and others v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2011, para. 130. 
703 Case C-309/99, Wouters and Others [2002] ECR I-1557; Case C-519/04, Meca-Medina and Majcen [2006] 
ECR I-6991.   
704 See, Commission Decision no. 94/986/EC, Philips/Osram [1994] OJ L 378/37, para. 27 “The use of cleaner 
facilities will result in less air pollution, and consequently in direct and indirect benefits for consumers from 
reduced negative externalities”; Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, CECED [1999] OJ L187/47, para. 55-
57; Commission Decision 2001/837/EC, DSD [2001] L 319/1, para. 148: “consumers will likewise benefit as a 
result of the improvement in environmental quality sought, essentially the reduction in the volume of packaging”.   
705 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L 
24/1, recital 23 (requiring the Commission to place its appraisal within the general framework of the fundamental 
objectives of the Treaties), thus allowing broader public interest concerns to be taken inton account in the appraisal 
process) . 
706 See, Commission Decision no. 2000/475/EC, CECED [1999] OJ L187/47, para. 55-57, taking into account 
collective benefits to the environment and balancing them against the restriction to competition, thus extending 
the competition assessment outside of the boundaries of the specific relevant market.  
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subject to mutually agreed terms (monetary or non-monetary). According to the Protocol, 
“(e)ach Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, with the 
aim of ensuring that benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources that are held by 
indigenous and local communities, in accordance with domestic legislation regarding the 
established rights of these indigenous and local communities over these genetic resources, are 
shared in a fair and equitable way with the communities concerned, based on mutually agreed 
terms”707. Indigenous and local communities may thus derive rights blocking the propertisation 
and commercialisation of indigenous genetic resources by multi-national corporations. 
 
1.2.1.8. GMO regulation 
 
Since the 1990s, many jurisdictions have put in place specific regulation of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), though they are widely diverging in strictness and complexity.  
 In the European Union, GMOs are regulated with a comprehensive legal framework,708 
which is aimed at (1) protecting human and animal health and the environment by introducing 
a safety assessment of the highest possible standards; (2) harmonising efficient, time-limited 
and transparent procedures for risk assessment and authorisation of GMOs; (3) ensuring clear 
labelling of GMOs placed on the market so that consumers and professionals (e.g. farmers) can 
make an informed choice; and (4) ensuring the traceability of GMOs placed on the market.709 
In accordance with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity which was signed on 15 May 2000 and came into effect on 11 September 2003, the 
EU legislative framework is based on the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle 
reflects a risk management strategy whereby the possibility that a given policy or action might 
cause harm to the public or the environment and the lack of scientific consensus on the issue is 
sufficient reason for not pursuing the policy or action in question, at least until more scientific 
knowledge becomes available.710 
Authorization for GMOs are available for cultivation and for food and feed purposes 
under Regulation 1829/2003 (food and feed)711 and Regulation 2001/18 (cultivation).712 
Applications for authorization for food and feed are sent to the relevant national authority, 
which forwards the application to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for a risk 
                                                          
707 Article 5 of the Nagoya Protocol. 
708 Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment; Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed; Directive (EU) 2015/412 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the 
possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory; Regulation (EC) 
1830/2003 concerning the traceabilityand labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability of food 
and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms; Directive 2009/41/EC on contained use of 
genetically modified micro-organisms; Regulation (EC) 1946/2003 on transboundary movements of GMOs. 
709 https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/legislation_en. 
710 See Article 191 TFEU. See further Anne I. Myhr, ‘The Precautionary Principle in GMO Regulations’ in Terje 
Traavik and Lim Li Ching (eds), Biosafety First – Holistic Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic 
Engineering and Genetically Modified Organisms (Third World Network and GenØk 2009). 
711 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on 
genetically modified food and feed [2003] OJ L268/1. 
712 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate 
release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC 
[2001] OJ L106/1. 
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assessment. EFSA evaluates the application based on risks for the environment, human health 
and animal safety, and may give recommendations on labelling or other conditions. On the 
basis of EFSA’s opinion, the European Commission will advise the Member States to either 
approve or reject the application. The Member States decide on the application in the Standing 
Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed by qualified majority. When the Committee 
fails to reach an approval or rejection decision (because of abstentions), the European 
Commission can convene an Appeal Committee which also decides by qualified majority. For 
authorization applications concerning GMO cultivation, EFSA defers the risk assessment to 
the relevant national authority of the country where the application is filed. If however at least 
one other Member State objects against the assessment report, EFSA will itself undertake a 
risk assessment. Both cultivation and food and feed authorizations are valid for a maximum of 
10 years, and are renewable.713 
 Between 2009 and 2011, the EU legislative framework for GMO regulation was 
evaluated by two consultancy firms. While the relevant authorities and other stakeholders 
showed support for the main objectives of the EU’s GMO regulation, it was also reported that 
GMO cultivation would benefit from more flexibility in the authorization process, that the 
authorization system could be more efficient, and that risk assessment should be more 
harmonized.714 
 Decision-making within the GMO authorization system has indeed been inefficient and 
ineffective, and has been described by Shaffer and Pollack as ‘a record of persistent conflict, 
bargaining from fixed positions, formal votes on nearly every proposed decision, substantial 
numbers of abstentions (representing a refusal to take a position) and ultimate deadlock’.715 In 
2013, the General Court of the European Union forced the European Commission to proceed 
in the authorization process of maize 1507, an insect-resistant genetically modified maize, after 
several years of delays, U-turns and inaction since the initial application in 2001.716 
 In the United States, regulation of GMOs is divided between the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), the Environmental Projection Agency (EPA), and the Department of 
Agriculture (USDA)’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.717 The FDA is responsible 
for food and feed safety and has the authority to remove foods from the market that are a threat 
to public health,718 and regulates food additives, which must be approved by the FDA before 
market access, unless the additive is ‘generally recognized as safe’.719 Genetically modified 
                                                          
713 See, https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation_en. 
714 See, https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation_en. 
715 M. Pollack and G. Shaffer, ‘Risk regulation, GMOs, and the limits of deliberation’ in D. Naurin and H. Wallace 
(eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Governments Play in Brussels (Palgrave MacMillan, 
2008), 161. 
716 Case T-164/10, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v European Commission, EU:T:2013:503. 
717 See generally e.g., Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States: 
A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics, Council on Foreign Relations (5 April 2013); K. 
Gostek, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms: How the United States' and the European Union's Regulations Affect 
the Economy’ (2016) 24 Michigan State International Law Review 761; 
718 Section 402(a)(1) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 342(a)(1). 
719 Section 409 of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 348. 
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foods generally do not require pre-approval by the FDA as they are classified as presumptively 
generally recognized as safe.720 There are no separate labelling requirements for GMO foods.721 
 The EPA regulates pesticides and microorganism developed through genetic 
engineering, regarding manufacture, sale and use. The USDA regulates the planting, 
importation, or transportation of GMO plants pursuant to the Plant Protection Act722 through 
an authorization system, whereby most GMO plants are classified as ‘regulated articles’ which 
require prior approval of the USDA before it may be introduced.723 
Russia has prohibited domestic sales and import of genetically modified organisms in 
2016.724 The cultivation and breeding of genetically modified plants and animals is prohibited, 
except in cases where they will be used in testing and scientific research725. Current legislation 
had allowed the use of genetically modified seeds in agriculture and required special labeling 
of food that was produced with GMOs. Because the introduction of GMO registration 
procedures had been postponed until July 2017, however, there was a de facto moratorium on 
production of genetically modified.726 
China ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on 8 June 2005, effective from 6 
September 2005. China has traditionally cautiously reviewed the introduction and development 
of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and GM products. The authorities actively 
promote fundamental research but strictly control the planting of GM crops. In its 2011 Five 
Year Plan for Development of Agricultural Science and Technology, the Ministry of 
Agriculture proposed to strengthen research involving genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs).727 In theory, crops that pass the safety tests are considered safe and can be planted. 
To date, China has approved seven GM crops: a varieties of tomato (1997), cotton (1997), 
petunia (1999), sweet pepper and chili pepper (1999), papaya (2006), rice (2009), and corn 
(2009).728 In addition, China has approved four imported GM crops (cotton, soybean, corn and 
canola) as raw materials for processing but they cannot be imported as seeds.  
                                                          
720 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php#Foodstuffs. 
721 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php#Foodstuffs.  
722 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2012). 
723 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php.  
724 Putin signed the law on GMO prohibition // RBC. 2016. URL: 
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/04/07/2016/577aa7bb9a794761a21c8d57.  
725 Moscow Bans GMO: Russia, the World’s Largest GMO-free Territory, Platform for the Development of 
Organic Agriculture // Global Research. 2016. URL: http://www.globalresearch.ca/moscow-bans-gmo-russia-the-
worlds-largest-gmo-free-territory-platform-for-the-development-of-organic-agriculture/5548448; Russian State 
Duma Passes Total Ban on GMO Crops and Animals // Sustainable Pulse. 2016. URL: 
http://sustainablepulse.com/2016/06/25/russian-parliament-passes-total-ban-on-gmo-crops-and-
animals/#.WPoJRxFZdp1; Where are GMOs grown and banned? // GMO FAQ. Agricultural biotechnology 
frequently asked questions. URL: https://gmo.geneticliteracyproject.org/FAQ/where-are-gmos-grown-and-
banned/. 
726 Russia: Full Ban on Food with GMOs // Library of Congress. 2016. URL: http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/russia-full-ban-on-food-with-gmos/; Law Proposal № 714809-6. On amending of the certain 
enactments on genetic engineering // ASOZD (the Automated System for Legislative Procedures). URL: 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=714809-6&02.  
727中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划纲要 [12th Five-Year Plan], Central Government 
of the People’s Republic of China website (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm (in 
Chinese); https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/china.php. 
728 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/china.php. 
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Brazil is the second largest producer of genetically modified (GM) crops in the world 
after the US: in the 2014/2015 planting season, around 90% of the soybean and corn crops was 
genetically modified.729 Law 11,105 of 24 March, 2005,730 sets out authorization, inspection 
and monitoring procedures for research and commercial release, production and marketing 
rules, cultivation regimes and restrictions on GMOs in foodstuffs. Article 6, VII, sole 
paragraph, prohibits the development and sale of seeds genetically modified to become sterile 
after the second generation, although there have been multiple legislative proposals to eliminate 
or condition this prohibition.  
South Africa’s GMO regulatory regime includes regulation of contained use, trial 
release, commercial release, and transboundary movement. The primary legislation is the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997, which was amended in 2006 in part to give effect 
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity which South Africa ratified in 2003.731 Additional 
laws which impose further rules on GMO-related activities include the National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act, the Consumer Protection Act, and the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics 
and Disinfectants Act.732 The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) is 
responsible for promoting responsible GMO-related activities; limiting harm to the 
environment as well as to human and animal health; and establishing standards for conducting 
risk assessments for GMO-related activities.733 
South Africa was the first country in Africa to approve commercial production of 
genetically modified crops. The first approval for the commercial use of a genetically modified 
crop was in 1997 for Monsanto’s MON810 Yield Guard insectresistant maize.734 According to 
the United Nations, South Africa currently has 2.3 million hectares of GM crops under 
cultivation of which 4.3 per cent in GM cotton, 17.7 per cent is GM soybean and 78.0 per cent 
is GM maize.735 South Africa is the ninth largest producer of GM crops in the world.736 It is a 
requirement that foodstuffs obtained through certain techniques of genetic modification be 
labelled as such before they are put on sale in the marketplace. The Consumer Protection Act 
imposes additional labelling requirements. It requires that “[a]ny person who produces, 
supplies, imports or packages any prescribed goods must display on, or in association with the 
package or those goods, a notice in the prescribed manner and form that that discloses the 
presence of any genetically modified ingredients or components of those in accordance with 
applicable regulations.” 
 
1.2.1.9. Agricultural Subsidies 
 
                                                          
729 http://www.soybeansandcorn.com/news/Dec11_14-20145-Brazilian-Soybean-Crop-is-91-GMO-Corn-88-
GMO  
730 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/l11105.htm 
731 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
732 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
733 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
734 http://www.biowatch.org.za/list.php?cat=GM%20crops 
735 http://unscn.org/files/Publications/Country_Case_Studies/UNSCN-Country-Case-Study-South-Africa-
FINAL.pdf 
736 African Centre for Biodiversity, The Bayer-Monsanto merger: Implications for South Africa’s agricultural 
future and its smallholder farmers.” February 2017.  
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Agricultural production is heavily subsidised in developed countries, in particular the European 
Union, United States and Japan. Philip H. Howard reports that direct subsidies globally amount 
to 1 billion US dollars per day usually weighted to the largest farms737. To this direct support, 
one should add indirect government subsidies for funding research and development to increase 
production, including university extension services for the promotion of new technologies, 
purchasing excess production, subsidies for insputs, such as fuel, irrigation, fertilisers, 
regulations that enable the externalisation of the cost of pollution or soil loss, and import tariffs 
increasing barriers to trade for competitors738. These large scale subsidization led to 
overproduction in certain cases. This led the European Union to reform its common agricultural 
policy in 1992 (the “MacSharry” reforms), 2003 (introducing a single payment scheme that 
does not proceed to payments according to a particular line of production of crop and livestock) 
and 2013 (integrating a more land-based approach and sustainable agriculture with 'green' 
direct payments), progressively shifting the common agricultural policy of the EU from product 
support (through prices) to producer support (through income support, direct payments and 
therefore decoupling subsidies from production, moving instead to subsidizing environmental 
protection, rural development (agro-tourism) and food safety and quality. There have been 
continuing discussions at the WTO level to reach agreement on the reduction or elimination of 
subsidies, but all efforts have failed so far, the latest one being the Doha Round in 2008. 
In the EU, support for farmers is primarily financed by the European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund (EAGF), which takes roughly 80% of the total budget of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The other 20% of the CAP budget goes into the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), aims to help farmers modernise their 
farms and become more competitive through rural development measures. 
The EAGF subsidizes farmers through (1) direct support and (2) market regulation 
measures. Direct support subsidies account for over 90% of the EAGF budget and roughly 70% 
of the total budget of the CAP.  
On average, direct payments amount to € 267 per eligible hectare.739 In 2016 the total 
budget for the EAGF was € 42 220.3 million, of which € 39 445.7 million was foreseen for 
direct payments to farmers.740  
Direct support is provided by direct payments to farmers which take the form of a basic income 
support based on the number of hectares farmed (basic payments).741 In addition, specific 
                                                          
737 Philip H. Howard, Concentration and Power in the Food System (Bloomsbury 2016) 90.  
738 Ibid. 
739 ‘Direct payments’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/direct-payments_en. 
740 Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the document report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council 10th financial report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 2016 Financial Year, SWD/2017/0285 final. 
741 Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 december 2013 
establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common 
agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 
[2013] OJ L347/608; ‘Direct support’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support_en  
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support schemes are available for ‘green farming’ or ‘greening’,742 and young farmers.743 Basic 
payments, green farming subsidies, and young farmers subsidies are mandatory part of the 
Member States’ allocated budget. Additionally, there are  four subsidy schemes which are 
voluntary for Member States: (4) redistributive payments aimed at small and middle-size farms, 
whereby farmers may be granted additional support for the first hectares of farmland; (5) 
additional income support for farming in areas with natural constraints, such as mountain areas; 
(6) simplified payment scheme for small farmers replacing the other schemes, offering 
payments up to €1250; and (7) support coupled to production for certain areas or sectors 
undergoing difficulties.744 
Direct payments are independent of the quantity  of output. Under the cross-compliance 
scheme, however, farmers have to comply to certain qualitative requirements as to public, 
animal and plant health, environment, and animal welfare.745 The requirements of cross-
compliance comprise (1) statutory management requirements (SMRs), which consist of 13 
legislative standards regarding environment, food safety, animal and plant health and animal 
welfare; and (2) good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAECs) which consist of 
standards related to soil protection, maintenance of soil organic matter and structure, avoiding 
the deterioration of habitats, and water management.746 The system of cross-compliance aims 
to ‘contribute to the development of sustainable agriculture through better awareness on the 
part of beneficiaries of the need to respect those basic standards’ and to make the CAP ‘more 
compatible with the expectation of society through improving consistency of that policy with 
the environment, public health, animal health, plant health and animal welfare policies’.747  
Green farming subsidies account for 30% of the direct payments budgets of the EU 
Member States. The green farming scheme aims to support farmers ‘in the transition towards 
more sustainable agricultural production models’.748 Farmers are eligible for green direct 
                                                          
742 ‘Greening’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/greening_en; Recital 37 of Regulation 
(EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 december 2013 establishing rules for 
direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 [2013] OJ L347/608 
: ‘One of the objectives of the new CAP is the enhancement of environmental performance through a mandatory 
“greening” component of direct payments which will support agricultural practices beneficial for the climate and 
the environment applicable throughout the Union’. 
743 ‘Young farmers’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-funding/young-farmers_en.  
744 ‘Direct payments’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/direct-payments_en.  
745 ‘Cross compliance’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/direct-support/cross-compliance_en.  
746 Arts. 93 and 94 of and Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy 
and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, 
(EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 [2013] OJ L347/549. See also Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No 809/2014 of 17 July 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system, rural 
development measures and cross compliance [2014] OJ L227/69; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 
640/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system and conditions for refusal or 
withdrawal of payments and administrative penalties applicable to direct payments, rural development support 
and cross compliance [2014] OJ L181/48.  
747 Recital 54 Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. 
748 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Review of greening after one year, SWD(2016) 
218 final. 
220 
 
payments when they meet obligations regarding crop diversification,749 maintaining permanent 
grassland,750 and maintaining ‘ecological focus areas’  which are areas dedicated to 
ecologically benificial elements such as fallow land, hedges and trees.751  
In the US, the United States’ federal farming subsidy scheme aims at helping farmers 
to manage the fluctuations in agricultural production and profitability while ensuring stable 
food supply. In practice support is highly biased in favour of the five major commodities: corn, 
soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice. Dairy and sugar are separately regulated through price and 
market controls.752 
Agricultural support can be tracked back to the nineteenth century, with the Morrill Act 
of 1862 and the Hatch Act of 1887. In the 1930s, direct support for farmers was introduced as 
part of the New Deal, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. At their lowest in 
1974, farm subsidies accounted for 2% of total farm income, and at their highest made up 47% 
of total farm income in 2000.753  
Historically, the US farming subsidy system has included direct payments and counter-
cyclical payments which were activated when market prices fell below a certain threshold. 
Direct payments were introduced in 1996 with the Freedom to Farm Act. Direct payments were 
initially introduced as a transition measure to make farmers less dependent on government 
subsidies. In 2002 the transitional character of direct payments was made permanent, and 
counter-cyclical payment were introduced. The Agricultural Act of 2014 eliminated direct 
payments754 and counter-cyclical payments,755 as well as the Average Crop Revenue Election 
                                                          
749 Art. 44(1) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013: ‘Where the arable land of the farmer covers between 10 and 30 
hectares and is not entirely cultivated with crops under water for a significant part of the year or for a significant 
part of the crop cycle, there shall be at least two different crops on that arable land. The main crop shall not cover 
more than 75 % of that arable land. Where the arable land of the farmer covers more than 30 hectares and is not 
entirely cultivated with crops under water for a significant part of the year or for a significant part of the crop 
cycle, there shall be at least three different crops on that arable land. The main crop shall not cover more than 75 
% of that arable land and the two main crops together shall not cover more than 95 % of that arable land’. 
750 Art. 45(1) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013: ‘Member States shall designate permanent grasslands which are 
environmentally sensitive in areas covered by Directives 92/43/EEC or 2009/147/EC [...] Farmers shall not 
convert or plough permanent grassland situated in areas designated by Member States under the first subparagraph 
and, where applicable, the second subparagraph’. 
751 Art. 46(1) Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013: ‘Where the arable land of a holding covers more than 15 hectares, 
the farmer shall ensure that, from 1 January 2015, an area corresponding to at least 5 % of the arable land of the 
holding that the farmer declared [...] is ecological focus area’. According to Art. 46(2), Member States must decide 
that one or more of the following are considered to be ecological focus areas: (a) land lying fallow; (b) terraces; 
(c) landscape features, including such features adjacent to the arable land of the holding which, by way of 
derogation from Article 43(1) of this Regulation, may include landscape features that are not included in the 
eligible area in accordance with point (c) of Article 76(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013; (d) buffer strips, 
including buffer strips covered by permanent grassland, provided that these are distinct from adjacent eligible 
agricultural area; (e) hectares of agro-forestry that receive, or have received, support under Article 44 of 
Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 and/or Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013; (f) strips of eligible hectares 
along forest edges; (g) areas with short rotation coppice with no use of mineral fertiliser and/or plant protection 
products; (h) afforested areas referred to in point (b)(ii) of Article 32(2) of this Regulation; (i) areas with catch 
crops, or green cover established by the planting and germination of seeds, subject to the application of weighting 
factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article; (j) areas with nitrogen-fixing crops.. 
752 ‘Farm subsidy primer’, Environmental Working Group, available at https://farm.ewg.org/subsidyprimer.php.  
753 ‘Farm subsidies over time’, The Washington Post, 2 July 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2006/07/02/GR2006070200024.html.  
754 Section 1101 Agricultural Act of 2014, H.R. 2642; P.L. 113-79 
755 Section 1102 Agricultural Act of 2014, H.R. 2642; P.L. 113-79. 
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Program (ACRE), which guaranteed eligible farmers a minimum total revenue. Under ACRE, 
farmers could give up 20% of their direct payment entitlements and some measure of price 
support, in exchange for payments which were only provided when revenue declined more than 
10% relative to a five-year average.756  
Since the introduction of the 2014 Act, all federal agricultural support now consists of 
variable payments. The Act covers over $ 950 billion in spending over 10 years, of which crop 
insurance accounts for $ 89.8 billion, commodity programmes account for $ 44.4 billion, and 
conservation subsidies accounts for $ 56 billion.  
Under the 2014 Act the primary source of farm subsidies is crop insurance under the 
Federal Crop Insurance Program. The 2014 Act also introduced a commodity programme 
comprising Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC), Price Loss Coverage (PLC), and marketing 
assistance loans (MAL), and provides additional farmer support through conservation 
programmes, and disaster aid.757 
The Federal Crop Insurance Program subsidizes farmers to purchase crop insurances 
from approved private insurers. Subsidies cover about 60% of the premium costs, reimburse 
insurance companies for their adinistrative and operating costs, and cover part of the payments 
for farmers to compensate yield or revenue losses. Farmers can choose among different 
insurance programmes including (1) yield protection, where a percentage the expected yield-
per-acre is insured based on certain market price); (2) revenue protection, where a percentage 
of the expected revenue-per-acre is insured based on market prices; and (3) revenue protection 
with harvest price option, where a percentage of the expected revenue-per-acre is insured either 
based on market prices or harvest prices, whichever is higher.758 According to the 
Congressional Research Service, corn, cotton, soybeans and wheat account for over two-thirds 
of all acres enrolled in crop insurance programmes.759 
The three commodity programmes of the 2014 Act together are projected at $ 44.4 
billion over a 10-year period. Farmers must choose between PLC and ARC payments. PLC 
payments are triggered when the national average price of a covered crop760 falls below the 
fixed reference price for that crop. The PLC payment is equal to the difference between the 
national average price and the reference price. ARC payments are triggered when a covered 
crop’s estimated average revenue (based on the crop yield multiplied by the national average 
price) falls below its guaranteed level, which is 86% of the historical average revenue per acre 
based on the last five years. 
                                                          
756 Roman Keeney, ‘The End of the Direct Payment Era in US Farm Policy’, Purdue Extension, EC-7774-W, 
available at https://www.extension.purdue.edu/extmedia/ec/ec-774-w.pdf.  
757 See e.g., Dennis A. Shields, ‘Farm Commodity Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79)’ (Congressional 
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758 See e.g., 'Crop insurance primer', Environmental Working Group, available at 
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R Street Policy Study No 92 (April 2017). 
759 Dennis A. Shield, ‘Federal Crop Insurance: Background and Issues’,Congressional Research Service (17 April 
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In addition, MALs are 9-month loans at harvest time which farmers can apply for in 
order to meet cash flow requirements without having to sell their crops when prices are at their 
lowest.  
The 2014 Act has introduced a $ 125000 per farm cap on subsidies from the commodity 
programmes PLC, ARC and MAL combined.761 PLC and ARC not available to upland cotton 
producers, for which there is a specific insurance programme under the Stacked Income 
Protection Plan. 
Agricultural subsidies are also quite prominent in Japan. The objectives of Japan’s 
agricultural policy are laid down in the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas.762 
The Law aims to stabilize and improve people’s lifestyle and develop the national economy 
(Article 1); secure a stable food supply at reasonable prices (Article 2(1)); maintain the 
multifunctional roles of agriculture, i.e. a stable production in ruralareas, conservation of land, 
water, and the formation of good landscape, etc (Article 3); promote sustainable agricultural 
development (Article 4); and develop rural areas through improvements of production 
conditions and infrastructure (Article 5).  
One of the key problems of Japanese agriculture is that 98% of all farms are smaller 
than 5 hectares. Fragmentation, small-scale farming and inefficient production have long been 
supported by regulations within a gentan system, under which farmers were subsidized to 
reduce rice crops, so as to increase the price of rice.763 ‘About 70% of Japan's farmers grow 
rice, but the crop represents only 20% of the total value of the country's agricultural output. 
This is due to the nation's declining rice consumption and falling rice prices. The majority of 
Japan's rice farmers are small operators with 1 or 2 hectares of paddies. Their average age is 
above 70. This means many rice farmers are past retirement age, and their profession in Japan 
is at risk of dying out’.764 
In 2005, the Farm Management Stabilization Programme aimed to promote more 
efficient and stable farming by providing payments to individual farmers managing at least 4 
hectare of land and community-based farm cooperatives managing more than 20 hectares.765 
In 2007, the Law on Farm Income Stabilization introduced three new direct payments 
for farmers as part of the Farm Management Stabilization Programme: (1) payments based on 
historical area planted; (2) payments based on commodity output, which seeks to encourage 
quality improvement of domestic products by differentiating the payment rate according to the 
product quality, like (1) only targeted at wheat, barley, soybeans, sugar beet and starch 
potatoes; and (3) payments compensating for 90% of the loss of income compared with the 
average income of the preceding five years for which rice is also eligible.766 The 2007 reform 
followed the guidelines of the WTO on trade-distorting subsidies. # 
In 2010, however, previous reforms were overturned by the new Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ) government and substituted for new direct payment programme called the Income 
                                                          
761 Section 1603 Agricultural Act 2014. 
762 English translation: http://www.maff.go.jp/e/basic_law/basiclaw_agri/basiclaw_agri.html.  
763 ‘Rice farming in Japan: Political staple’, The Economist, 2 December 2013. 
764 'Japan to stop coddling its rice farmers' (15 January 2017), available at https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-
Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-to-stop-coddling-its-rice-farmers. 
765 Ibid., p. 74. 
766 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Compensation Program (ICP). Under the ICP, fixed payments are provided to  farmers per acre 
farmed. The ICP also provides subsidies if market prices drop below production costs.767 In 
2010 the Japanese Government estimated an annual budget of 560 billion yen for ICP for 
rice,768 with an extention of ICP to other major crops adding an extimated 440 billion yen.769 
‘The LDP criticized the DPJ's direct income compensation payments system calling it a 
scattering of subsidies and pledged that it would abolish it. The DPJ granted direct income 
compensation payments even to small-scale part-time farmers who had very little agricultural 
income’.770 
In 2013, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had again gained power, it was 
announced that the gentan system would be abolished in 2018. In 2014, direct income 
compensation payments were already cut in half. In 2014, trade-distorting agricultural support 
was 8% lower than in 2012, still however amounting to ¥900 billion (US$9 billion at historical 
exchange rates for that period).771 Moreover, ‘two-thirds of the trade-distorting support 
provided by Tokyo counted towards its ceiling on the aggregate measure of support (AMS). 
This refers to highly trade-distorting payments such as input and output subsidies or market 
price support, dubbed “amber box” under WTO rules’.772 Government support further included 
‘¥75 billion in “blue box” payments. This refers to production-limiting payments that are 
considered less trade-distorting than the amber box, and therefore not currently subject to any 
limit under WTO rules’.773 
In 2018, production targets for rice acreage reduction will be completely abolished. 
However, cuts in these subsidies are compensated by an increase in other ‘gentan-type’ 
subsidies provided if rice as staple food is replaced with rice as animal feed.774 
Simiilar machanisms of support either through minimum agricultural prices, or support 
through agricultural insurance are also provided in BRICS countries. These various forms of 
support are detailed in the country reports. 
                                                          
767 Yoshihisa Godo, Evaluation of Japanese Agricultural Policy Reforms Under the WTO Agreement on 
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1.2.2. Private ordering/governance 
 
Particular commercial arrangements have developed so as to enhance cooperation at 
the horizontal and vertical level in the various segments of the food value chain. The emergence 
of commercial practices, such as slotting allowances and category management agreements are 
also illustrations of this increasing importance of retailer bargaining power that started to 
characterize the evolution of the distribution sector since the 1980s. 
 
1.2.2.9. Vertical integration 
 
The integration of small scale farmers into global value chains often happens through 
different forms of vertical coordination with commodity buyers. The level of vertical 
coordination between firms in the market may arrive to its extreme when one of the businesses 
vertically integrates the other business, or part of the economic activity related to that business. 
Vertical integration generally takes three alternative forms: i) backward integration; ii) forward 
integration; and iii) full vertical integration.775 Especially for BRICS jurisdictions, vertical 
integration has often been envisaged as a solution to the difficulties encountered by global 
producers or wholesalers in importing standards through coordination.776 Differently, in other 
cases, full integration has been promoted by national incumbents, as for instance, agro-holdings 
in Russia. 
 
1.2.2.10. Contract farming and purchasing agreements 
 
Contract farming is a relatively recent contractual scheme linking farmers and 
commodity buyers with the objective to regulate their relationship.777 Developing and 
transition economies are fostering through state legislation the adoption of this type of contract, 
as they aim at ensuring small farmers the access to global markets and guarantee higher 
standards and consistent supply to buyers.778 Contract farming aims at finding a middle way 
between spot market transactions, which often entails high transaction costs, and vertical 
integration, which might lead to high management costs.779 Two types of contract farming are 
usually distinguished between: production contract (PC) and marketing contract (MC).780 
Under production contract farming, farmers provide land, labour and capital, while the 
contractor provides credit and technical assistance, and controls key management decisions, in 
                                                          
775 Charles WL Hill and Gareth R Jones, Strategic Management: Theory : An Integrated Approach (2014). 
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exchange for agreements of quantity and quality of the products. Market contract farming is a 
looser form of contract farming where only the quantity and quality are agreed upon.781 The 
legal framework introduced by these contracts involves different levels of regulation, 
especially in global value chains. When foreign buyers are involved, domestic legislation on 
private contract law applies together with the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT), in most of the developing and transition countries as well 
as in developed countries. Domestic legislation may regulate contract farming through the 
general rules on contract law or on the basis of specific legislation on agricultural contracts.782 
Finally, some jurisdictions, such as Spain, provide a typified contractual arrangement, through 
specific legislation defining in particular contract farming.783 
Local governments have a fundamental role as facilitators of these agreements, as they 
have to help farmers to reach the contractual objectives by facilitating their access to land and 
agricultural inputs.784 On the other hand, local governments monitor the “correct 
implementation of the contract or the financial institutions that extend credit to farmers”.785 
Contract farming, in particular PC, is capable of mitigating market failures by providing 
high-quality technology and other inputs which particularly in developing countries would 
otherwise be unavailable. Contract farming is generally understood to improve production 
efficiency and farmers’ income, although it is less clear to what extent it improves net profit 
and farmers’ welfare because contract farming is usually applied to labour-intensive crops and 
products.786 
Contract farming might also increase inequality between larger and smaller suppliers, 
as there are concerns that it is biased towards larger firms because of smaller transaction costs 
in large-scale contracts, leading to the exclusion of smallholder farms.787 While empirical 
studies on potential exclusion of smallholder farms by contract farming is inconclusive, it has 
been argued that public sector support and NGO support in the form of training programmes is 
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indispensable in order to create significant benefits of contract farming for smallholder 
farmers.788 
Another concern with regard to contract farming is the effect of superior bargaining 
power of large downstream companies. Buyers need to ascertain that specific standards of 
production are respected, and may do so not only through monitoring activity but also by 
training farmers on the specific standards. It has been observed that the high degree of control 
enjoyed by the buyer may resemble, in some cases, to an employer-employee relationship, 
rather than to one between two independent contractors.789 The buyer has generally a higher 
bargaining power determined not only by concentration and the size of the firm, but also by 
information regarding formation of commodity prices on the market, which is often not 
available to farmers.790 It has been argued that superior bargaining power, in particular in 
contract farming models in which decision-making capacity is transferred to the contractors, 
increases the capability of contractors to extract rents from the value chain to the detriment of 
the farmers.791 Moreover, in contrast to spot market transactions, contract farming could make 
it easier for buyers to discriminate among their suppliers, in particular in the context of superior 
bargaining power and/or monopsony, as the buyer can negotiate individual contracts with 
different terms in conjunction with secret-keeping obligations.792 For example, ‘[i]n a case 
involving American cattle, a jury determined that the ability to offer individual contracts, 
combined with secrecy, resulted in a multibillion dollar reduction in revenue for disfavored 
sellers’.793 Lastly, contract farming in combination with unequal bargaining power may create 
additional lock-in effects as a result of specific investments or long-term contracts. Local 
governments, may remedy to some of these imbalances, without, however, hampering the 
freedom of contracting of the parties, if any real freedom is present. Discrimination among 
farmers might also be remedied by authorising farmers to consult advisors on their contract 
negotiations.794 
 Nonetheless, empirical research suggests that contract farming brings about noticeable 
benefits both for buyers/contractors as well as farmers. For example, India has had a long 
history of regulation limiting private investment and trade in various aspects of agriculture, 
which is only now being slowly removed. Until 2003, when reforms of the Agricultural 
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Produce Market Committee Act was initiated in many states,795 it was illegal in most states 
for businesses to purchase agricultural produce directly from farmers. Today, contract farming 
is emerging as a preferred mechanism through which agri-businesses can directly engage with 
farmers. The growth of contract farming in India in recent years has led authorities to regulate 
relationships between agricultural producers and suppliers or wholesalers. An expanding 
urban middle class and increasing commercial investment in agricultural retailing and 
processing are creating demand for more standardized, higher-quality agricultural produce. 
But underdeveloped supply chains and small farm sizes make sourcing such produce 
difficult.796  
PepsiCo was one of the earliest promoters of the contract-farming model in India. In 
1997, it set up a tomato processing plant in Punjab, not a traditional tomato growing area, and 
started tying up with local farmers to grow tomato varieties needed for ketchup. Independent 
studies confirmed increased yields and incomes for farmers partnering with PepsiCo. Studies 
also found that once better seed varieties, new technology and growing practices were 
introduced to a select group of farmers through contract farming, such practices spread to other 
farmers who were not directly involved in such efforts.  
Swinnen also points at empirical studies which demonstrate that once farmers are 
included in contract farming schemes they benefit significantly, not only from increased 
household income, decline in poverty and income stability, but also from production quality 
and innovation:797  
“The demand for higher quality products requires buyers to assist farmers in order to 
improve the quality of production, for example by providing the farmer with inputs on 
credit. In a context of weak contract enforcement, which is likely in many developing 
countries, this creates holdup opportunities for the farmer, who can decide to use the 
inputs but sell the high-value product to another buyer without paying back the credit 
that the first buyer offered him. In order to prevent this, buyers are forced to offer 
attractive contract terms in order to secure their returns to investment, for example by 
offering the farmer a price premium. Hence, poor suppliers can benefit from the 
introduction of quality standards in a weak contract enforcement context, even if all 
bargaining power lies with the buyer”.798 
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Further empirical research should clarify income effects on farmers and the sustainability of 
these effects, as there might be a publication bias towards successful instances of contract 
farming.799 
 
1.2.2.11. Asset sharing agreements 
 
The ownership of assets as well as of the business activities of a firm, involves at the same 
time the right to earn the profits and the responsibility for the risk that the business may incur 
in. Business owners have indeed the advantage of controlling the economic activity in each 
phase and earn the profits that the same activity generates. However, in some cases the level 
of risk may outweigh the benefits, to the extent that the owner prefers sharing risks and profits 
of the business. Parties may decide to establish through private contracting different forms of 
co-ownerships, depending of the risk distribution they intend to set up. In the agri-food supply 
chain the forms of co-ownership and asset sharing are several. Rent and wages paid for the 
management of assets, for instance, are a typical example of assets sharing in the chain800. 
Swinnen and Kuijpers have identified four models of institutional innovations of the value 
chain for technology transfer so as to share risks and profits.801 The first model is farm – 
processor/retailer contracting, where the buyer of the farm’s product finances the necessary 
technology as part of a contract that typically contains obligations for the farmer concerning 
the buyer’s standards. The technology that is provided can be rather simple, e.g. Fertilisers or 
animal feed – or involve more complex technological systems including advice and extension 
services.802 The second model is farm – technology company contracting and leasing, which 
means that technology companies themselves transfer their technology to farmers through 
credit schemes or leasing arrangements.803 Another model involves a more complex ‘triangular 
structure’, where risks are shared among multiple partners who are setting up joint programmes 
to set up technology or investment loans to farmers. These triangular structures are used with 
more complex or expensive technologies requiring more finance. For example, a processing 
company may provide a payment guarantee to a technology company which will sell a 
technology to a farmer, so as to enable the farmer to sell its products to the processing 
company.804 Lastly, according to the fourth model which uses special purpose verhicles 
(SPVs), a stand-alone company is joint owned by several actors, for example a processor and 
a financial institution and/or a technology company. This SPV will then contract with the 
farmers so as to allow multiple partners to share the risks and assets involved in trading with 
the farmer.805 
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1.2.2.12. Private labels 
 
Retailer power manifests itself increasingly with the use of private labels, which 
compete directly with leading manufacturers’ brands and other national brands and illustrate 
this shift in balance of power between retailers and suppliers806. However, empirical evidence 
of the negative welfare effects of private labels is lacking and is, at best, ambiguous, thus not 
giving clear directions to competition authorities for action807.  
Private label is a term referring to all products sold under a retailer’s brand, which could 
be the retailer’s own name (store brands) or a brand created by a manufacturer exclusively for 
the retailer, who defines the characteristics of the product (generic brands). Private label 
products are generally exclusively distributed by the retailer along with national brand 
products, which are marketed by manufacturers throughout the national market, not only in the 
specific retailers’ outlets. This brings a horizontal dimension in the relationship between 
suppliers and retailers, as private labels may compete for market share with national brands808. 
Private label brands’ market share has been constantly growing, in particular in the food 
sector’809 and represents a significant volume of retail sales in Europe. Private labels are 
generally perceived by consumers of being of lower price and quality than national brands. In 
addition, national labels benefit from a ‘reputation premium’, as a result of more extensive 
advertising than private labels and brand loyalty building. This leads to lower prices for private 
labels than equivalent, in terms of quality, national brand products. Despite this retail price 
differential, retailer’s gross margins for private labels are more important in comparison to 
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national brand products. It follows that the commercialisation of is thus more profitable for the 
retailers compared to that of national brands. This constitutes the main reason for the 
introduction of private labels by retailers and leads often to the exclusion of second-tier national 
brands from the market810. Two reasons explain the higher retail gross margins for retailers. 
Steiner notes that retailers with strong private labels have more leverage with manufacturers 
and this helps them to increase their gross margins811. Private labels may also enhance 
consumer loyalty to retail brands and therefore reinforce the horizontal market power of the 
retailers. This will in turn strengthen the retailers’ vertical bargaining power against national 
brand manufacturers and will enable them to obtain better deals that will increase their 
profits812. These distributional outcomes are ambiguous from the point of view of the 
consumers.  
The commercialization of private labels obviously increases consumer choice by 
offering a lower price substitute to the consumers. The system may also introduce an effective 
countervailing power for retailers against the market power of national brand owners. 
Nevertheless, private labels may also produce important anti-competitive effects, in particular 
if they finish by dominating the market. Consumer choice and product variety may be affected 
if private labels exclude all but the leading national brand. This may also increase retail prices 
for consumers. Private labels will increase search costs for consumers and will therefore offer 
the opportunity for a higher mark-up at the supply or retail level. 
Empirical studies have also showed that competition from private labels might not lead 
to lower prices for national brand products813. Consumers with a high degree of loyalty to the 
manufacturer’s brand will not benefit from the introduction of private label products: 
“(t)he trade-off for the national brand producer facing a private label is between 
exploiting the loyal consumers with a high price and competing for the switching 
consumers with a lower price. When the fraction of loyals is high, the national brand 
will concentrate on the loyal segment and a private label will be introduced at a lower 
price. On the other hand, when the fraction of loyals is relatively low, the national brand 
finds it optimal to offer an exclusivity contract to the retailer at a low price and no 
private label is introduced . . . If the national brand producer serves both loyal and 
switching consumers initially, the price of the national brand will be relatively low. In 
such a situation private label competition would lead to an increase in the price of the 
national brand. The reason is that the national brand producer decides not to serve the 
switching consumers to which the private label is offered and instead sets a high price 
to serve only loyal consumers . . . Loyal consumers are worse off due to a higher price 
on the national brand, while switching consumers are better off when offered a low-
                                                          
810 M B Ward and others, ‘Effects of the Private-Label Invasion in Foods Industries’ [2002] 84 American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 961, at 963. 
811 R L Steiner, ‘The Nature and Benefi ts of National Brand/Private Label Competition’ [2004] 24 Review of 
Industrial Organization 105, at 113-114. 
812 Ibid., at 112-113. 
813 T Staahl Gabrielsen and L Sørgard, ‘Private Labels, Price Rivalry, and Public Policy’ [2007] 51 European 
Economic Review 403, 404 
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price private label. It turns out that in some cases consumers on aggregate benefit from 
private label introduction, in other cases they are worse off”814. 
It follows that the effect of private labels on consumers is ambiguous and largely depends on 
the characteristics of consumer demand for the specific product. Restricting the commercial 
freedom of retailers may have, depending on the circumstances, a positive or a negative welfare 
effect for consumers. 
Consumer choice and product variety would also be affected if private labels exclude 
all but the leading national brand. The gatekeeper role of the retailers may lead to the exclusion 
of some national brands. As the European Commission remarked in its merger decision Procter 
& Gamble/Gillette, 
“(i)f a retailer refused to carry a brand of the parties, the brand would risk 
disappearing from the customers’ awareness. As a consequence, it would be 
detrimental to a leading brand of the parties to be excluded from a major retailer for 
a longer period, as it would entail significant losses in customer awareness, whilst 
the costs would be relatively minor for the retailer (whose sales with this brand 
represent only a small fraction of its turnover). It should also be noted that the 
parties’ overall sales represent on average not more than 2% of the retailers’ sales, 
while for the parties certain retailers represent 10% and more of the sales in a given 
country”. 
The Commission, however, also noted that this is unlikely to happen in practice as leading 
national brands (“must-stock brands”) may play a role of quality certification for the retailer in 
inter-store competition. Private labels change the power relation between suppliers and retailers 
to the benefit of the later. The retailers establish their control over the suppliers, which see no 
reason to develop their own brands and finally are marginalised as independent players in the 
market (they could still supply goods for the retailers’ private labels). It is not also clear what 
will be the effects of private labels for innovation. Copycat packaging is an important concern 
for suppliers of national brands and may lead to fewer investments for R&D and less 
innovation. Private labels may also be a source of buyer power, which in certain circumstances, 
if it is associated with selling power, may produce anticompetitive effects. 
 The EU Block Exemption Regulation 330/2010 on vertical agreements applies only in 
situations where the undertakings are competing distributors, for example independent retailers 
competing with supplier-owned outlets, but does not cover the situations where the supplier 
and the retailer are competing manufacturers. This excludes from the scope of the block 
exemption situations where the retailer sells private labels that compete with the national brand 
of a supplier, except in circumstances where the distributor provides specifications to a 
manufacturer to produce particular goods under the distributor’s brand name and both parties 
conclude a sub-contracting agreement 
 Private labels are also mentioned at Paragraph 116 of the Guidelines on Vertical 
restraints: the existence of own brands including private labels and the brand image of the 
undertaking concerned amongst final consumers are elements to be considered in assessing if 
one of the undertaking’s customers possess buyer power. Buyer power is viewed positively, as 
                                                          
814 Ibid., at 406. 
232 
 
it “may prevent the parties from exercising market power and thereby solve a competition 
problem that would otherwise have existed”, which “is particularly so when strong customers 
have the capacity and incentive to bring new sources of supply on to the market in the case of 
a small but permanent increase in relative prices”. Private labels are also mentioned a second 
time with regard to category management agreements that may lead to distortions of 
competition, According to Paragraph 210, “in most cases the distributor may not have an 
interest in limiting its choice of products, when the distributor also sells competing products 
under its own brand (private labels), the distributor may also have incentives to exclude certain 
suppliers, in particular intermediate range products”. 
 In Russia, the share of private labels in the line of products of retailers has been growing 
steadily in recent years. In 2017 the share of private labels of the big retailers has reached 10-
17% in their overall turnover,815 although this is still less than the share of private labels in 
many foreign countries (30-35%).816 The difference in price between private labels and 
analogous brands reaches 20-30% and many consumers switch to private labels in the low price 
categories where the brand is not of the utmost importance (sugar, cereals, milk, soft drinks, 
etc).817 Russian competition law and law on trading activities do not contain direct prohibition 
against private labels. However, this practice has attracted some attention of the competition 
authority. Back in 2011 during the expert panel on retail industry, FAS announced that it was 
planning to investigate the practice of the “brand squeezing”, by which it referred to the use of 
private labels as leverage to force independent producers to drop prices of their brands.818 The 
outcome of the investigation is unclear. 
 Also South Africa has seen the growth of private label products in supermarkets. Every 
major supermarket has a range of their own brand/private label products.819 The majority of 
Woolworths’ products are private labels. Shoprite has ‘Ritebrand’ and ‘Housebrand’ ranges in 
Checkers, which cover approximately 300 products.820 Pick n Pay’s private label is “No Name” 
brand and it is looking to expand its private label range. Food Lover’s Market has “Freshers” 
and “Food Lovers Signature”. SPAR has its own private label products. SPAR does not allow 
major suppliers to manufacture its own private label products but rather allows new and smaller 
suppliers to enter the supermarket supply chain.821 
                                                          
815 According to RBK and Kommersant the share of private labels of “Piatorochka” amounts to 17% of its 
turnover; “Diksi” – 15,5%; “Lenta” – 12%; “Magnit” – 11%; “Metro Cash and Carry” – 10,9% (Anastasiya 
Demidova, ‘Food retail chains are selling their names’ (23.03.2017, RBK) accessed at 
http://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/23/58d267cb9a7947df5d18c78d; Julia Bezrukova, ‘The retail chains use 
private labels to increase their income’ (09.08.2016, Kommersant), https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3059373 
accessed 20 April 2017. 
816 ibid. 
817 Kommersant (n 2577). 
818 FAS press release dated 28.10.2011, accessed at http://fas.gov.ru/press-center/fas-in-
media/detail.html?id=9994. 
819 Das Nair and Chisoro, “The expansion of regional supermarket chains and implications for local suppliers”, 
WIDER Working Paper 2017/26. The data available is incomplete and what follows is based on the best available 
data. 
820 Das Nair and Chisoro, “The expansion of regional supermarket chains and implications for local suppliers”, 
WIDER Working Paper 2017/26.  
 
821 Das Nair and Chisoro, “The expansion of regional supermarket chains and implications for local suppliers”, 
WIDER Working Paper 2016/169.  
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Morris and Kaplan note that Shoprite Checkers currently has about 8% of turnover as 
private label and this will soon double.822 South African supermarkets are moving in the 
direction of private labels as it is seen as key to their competitive edge in that it develops brand 
loyalty.823 Moreover, this furnishes supermarkets with more leverage with the large suppliers 
who have branded products.824 This is manifest in a recent example where Pick n Pay’s branded 
tomato sauce which within a few weeks of introduction claimed 15% of the overall local 
market.825  
Private labels operate differently for large and smaller volume producers.826 The use of 
private label by Pick n Pay and Shoprite, for example, often involves engaging large brand 
manufacturers to supply a specific large volume order which will be packaged in accordance 
with the private label specifications.827 Large supermarkets have sufficient influence to 
negotiate optimal deals under such circumstances. However, they are dependent on large brand 
manufacturers to supply the best quality.828 For small supermarkets, such as Food Lovers 
Markets, order sizes are limited – “if they use a large branded manufacturer it would be on the 
basis of picking up over runs, and the power relations then are too asymmetric.”829 As a result, 
small supermarkets opt for engaging with, and seeking out, small specialist manufacturers 
supplying their private label products.830  
 
1.2.2.13. Upfront Access Payments 
 
This category includes practices, such as slotting allowances, pay-to-stay fees, 
payments to have access to a distributor’s campaigns. 
There are conflicting stories on the rationale of upfront access payments and its 
potential anti-competitive or pro-competitive effects. Moreover, there is reportedly a high 
variability across product categories in the likelihood of paying fees and their magnitude.831For 
example, ‘[p]roducts that must be refrigerated (where shelf space is more scarce and product 
                                                          
822 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017.  
823 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
824 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
825 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
826 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
827 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
828 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
829 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
830 Kaplan, D & Morris, M, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
831 Federal Trade Commission, Slotting Allowances in the Retail Grocery Industry: Selected Case Studies in Five 
Product Categories (November 2003). 
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introductions more common) are more likely to pay fees and to pay higher fees. Products that 
are distributed through direct store delivery are less likely to pay fees and to pay lower fees.’832  
Some authors have advanced anti-competitive theories. Slotting fees might be a 
mechanism for manufacturers to raise rivals’ costs: dominant suppliers aim to secure a 
sufficient amount of shelf space in order to increase the costs and impose barriers to entry to 
potential upstream competitors833. Upfront payments provide dominant manufacturers an 
instrument to leverage their power against potential competitors by raising their cost of entry. 
Economies of scale or scope must of course be present at the supplier level and the shelf space 
should be foreclosed for a significant amount of time for the raising rivals’ costs strategy to 
succeed834. Small manufacturers are also disadvantaged in comparison to large manufacturers 
because they lack adequate access to capital markets and thus may not be able to pay the large 
upfront fees that are demanded by the retailers. It has been argued that “the dominant firm 
prefers to pay for scarce shelf space with slotting allowances rather than with wholesale price 
concessions because the former go directly to the retailers’ bottom line, whereas the latter are 
mitigated by retail price competition”; “by paying retailers with lump-sum money, the 
dominant firm can compensate retailers for their scarce shelf space without having to lower its 
wholesale price, which would reduce the overall available profit to be split”.835 Slotting 
allowances make exclusion by dominant firms of their competitive fringe profitable: “if the 
dominant firm had to pay for exclusion by offering retailers lower wholesale prices, exclusion 
would not be profitable”836. These theories of harm focus on the abuse of retailers’ buying 
power by dominant manufacturers that aim to exclude their smaller rivals in the upstream 
market. A possible generalization would be that upfront payments are welfare reducing if they 
are initiated by dominant manufacturers and unlikely to lead to exclusion, when they are 
initiated by powerful buyers.However, other theories emphasize the role of downstream market 
power in excluding competitors and limiting the distribution of small manufacturers’ products. 
Marx and Shaffer have recently argued that upfront payments may allow a retailer with 
bargaining power to earn positive profits while it prevents small manufacturers from obtaining 
distribution from another retailer: “the manufacturer will not want to trade with the rival retailer 
because of fears that if it did, the dominant retailer would cut back on some or all of its planned 
purchases”837. The welfare implications are that retail prices will be higher, because there is 
less competition at the retail level, and with fewer retailers buying from the small manufacturer, 
the choice in the marketplace will be reduced. Policy makers should thus be concerned also 
when slotting allowances are initiated by powerful retailers and should in this case not just 
                                                          
832 Ibid, 64. 
833 For an overview see, Paul N. Bloom, Gregory T. Gundlach & Joseph P. Cannon, Slotting Allowances and 
Fees: Schools of Thought and the Views of Practising Managers, (2000) 64(2) The Journal of Marketing 92-108, 
96-97. 
834 Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts , note however that “most slotting 
arrangements involve relatively short-term retailer shelf space commitments”, usually a period of six months to a 
year. They also note that some large retailers, such as Wal-Mart prefer receiving the single best wholesale price 
that suppliers can offer instead of slotting fees.  
835 Greg Shaffer, Slotting Allowances and Optimal Product Variety, (2005) 5(1) Advances in Economic Analysis 
& Policy, Article 3, at 3. 
836 Ibid., at 23. 
837 Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, Upfront Payments and Exclusion in Downstream Markets, (2007) 38 (3) Rand 
Journal of Economics 823-843, at 838.  
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prohibit slotting allowances, but also other means to achieve exclusion, such as an explicit 
exclusive dealing provision. 
Some jurisdictions indeed adopt a strict approach to slotting allowances in the food 
retail market. In Russia, for example, Article 9(13)(1) of the Federal law ‘On the Basic 
Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation’, which regulates 
relationships between food retail chains and food suppliers, prohibits food retail chains to 
require from their suppliers payment for the right to supply food products to the existing or 
newly opened retail facilities. According to FAS, prohibition of slotting allowances covers not 
only explicit cases, but also payments for any services delivered by the retail chain, which are 
imposed on suppliers by the retails chain and do not have the economic justification other than 
payment for access to the shelf space. Additional services rendered by the food retail chain to 
its suppliers (like promotional, marketing, logistics, packaging services) are subject to stringent 
rules: (i) they should be rendered on the basis of the separate agreement, and (ii) the aggregate 
amount of payment for such services together with payment for the purchase by a retailer from 
its suppliers certain quantities of the food products should not exceed 5 % (earlier 10%) of the 
price of the purchased goods.838 
In the US, slotting allowances and other access payments are generally widespread 
particularly in the food retail industry.839 However, slotting fees and other ‘pay-to-play’ fees 
are prohibited in the retail sale of alcoholic beverages since 1995.840 
Other authors advance the view that retailers employ three-part tariffs that combine 
slotting allowances (negative upfront payments made by the manufacturer even if the retailer 
does not buy anything afterwards) with two part-tariffs (the supplier charges wholesale prices 
and the retailers pay conditional fixed fees on actual trade) in order to achieve a monopolistic 
outcome and reduce retail competition841. This is not possible with a two-part tariff structure if 
the retailer has bargaining power, as in this case each retailer has an incentive to free-ride on it 
rival’s revenue by reducing its own prices. The story goes as follows: 
“(w)holesale prices above costs maintain retail prices at the monopoly level, while large 
conditional payments (corresponding to the retailers’ anticipated variable profits) 
protect retailers against opportunistic moves by their rivals: any price-cutting by one 
retailer would lead the others to ‘opt out’; upfront payments by the manufacturer 
(slotting allowances) can then be used to give ex ante each retailer its full contribution 
to the industry profits”842. 
Slotting allowances do not lead to the exclusion of efficient retailers but they allow firms to 
maintain monopoly prices in a situation in which competing manufacturers offer contracts to a 
common retailer. 
                                                          
838 Article 9(4) and (11) of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. 
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Other authors have argued that slotting fees constitute a facilitating practice to increase 
profit levels at the expense of suppliers and final consumers843. As Shaffer explains, 
“(i)n providing a means for retailers to commit contractually to high prices, a 
manufacturer indirectly raises retailer profits by eliminating their incentive for 
aggressive downstream pricing. Although manufacturers would prefer lower retail 
prices and hence greater sales, the competition among themselves for the scarce shelf 
space provides the incentive for such contracts”844. 
Some authors noted, however, that empirical evidence does not support this theory as retailer 
profits and prices did not increase, following the introduction of slotting allowances, and 
manufacturer profits did not fall, as they would have if retailers have been using slotting 
allowances to price discriminate845. 
To these anticompetitive stories for slotting allowances one could oppose an efficiency 
rationale. Slotting allowances enable retailers to manage efficiently a scarce resource, shelf 
space, and allocate it to its best possible use. They might serve as a signaling device for new 
products and “a basis for achieving efficient cost sharing and risk shifting among manufacturers 
and retailers”846. Slotting allowances moderate the risks of new product introductions and 
compensate retailers for the increasing costs of introducing and managing new products: they 
help equate an oversupply of new products with a less-than commensurate consumer demand 
for them847. Finally, some authors have advanced “the promotional services theory of slotting 
contracts”848. Retail shelf space is thought as a means to create incremental or promotional 
sales that would not occur otherwise and for which infra-marginal consumers would not be 
willing to pay, as they will purchase the product without promotional shelf space. The 
manufacturers want greater retailer promotional shelf space supplied for their products but 
retailers have sub-optimal incentives to provide it, as they would not take into account of the 
manufacturer’s profit margin on the incremental sales produced by the promotional shelf space, 
which is particularly problematic if the manufacturer is supplying a differentiated product. 
Upfront fees can thus be thought as a way to incentivize retailers to supply the optimal 
promotional shelf space and also as targeted discounts to marginal consumers, thereby 
increasing the marginal elasticity of demand. Manufacturers with the greatest profitability from 
incremental sales will be able to pay the most for shelf space and thus win the competition 
between suppliers for obtaining superior promotional shelf space. But why choose upfront 
payments, instead of a wholesale price reduction, that could arguably achieve a similar result 
and provide more information on the value of the shelf space provided by the retailer? Klein 
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and Wright explain that in the presence of inter-retailer price competition, retailers will be 
obliged to decrease their price more than they will increase incremental sales for the 
manufacturer, as they are selling to both marginal and infra-marginal consumers, the latter 
being ready to switch retailers if they find the product cheaper elsewhere, and thus any shelf 
payment through a lower wholesale price will be eroded849. The manufacturer will thus have 
to reduce even more considerably its wholesale price in order to create the equilibrium shelf 
space rental return. However, if the retailer competition is intense, Klein and Wright argue that 
there will be a point where a lower wholesale price will be an inappropriate way for a 
manufacturer to compensate retailers for the supply of promotional shelf space and the 
manufacturers will thus employ upfront payments. 
 
1.2.2.14. Category management 
 
Category management is a vertical partnership in which previously confidential 
information is shared between manufacturers and retailers in order to cut costs in distribution 
and increase the margin of both parties. The major impetus for this type of arrangement came 
from the supermarket industry as a response to the intense competition of warehouses and 
discounts stores. The category captain presents a plan-o-gram to the retailer suggesting a layout 
and a promotional plan for the entire category.  
In the agricultural value chain, category management are perceived as a form of 
modular linkage, as transaction-specific investments are generally low and the information 
shared can be codified relatively easily: ‘suppliers can be plugged into and taken out of value 
chains with ease’.850 There are different forms of category management arrangements, going 
from strong ones, when the category captain has joint responsibility with the retailer for 
category development and is entrusted all category decisions, to loose forms of category 
management, where the retailer also received second opinions and recommendations from 
other category captains or the role of the category captain is an advisory one851. 
Category management is efficiency-enhancing: it reduces the risk of retailers’ out of 
stock and inventories, speeds up delivering times, enables the retailers to plan their production 
schedules. Suppliers and retailers have complementary information on consumers’ needs and 
category management is a way to pool this information together for the benefit of consumers852. 
Alongside these various justifications, Klein and Wright have also advanced that category 
management is a way to ensure that the distributor provides a sufficient level of promotion 
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851 Debra M. Desrochers, Gregory T. Gundlach & Albert A. Foer, Analysis of Antitrust Challenges to Category 
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desired by the supplier853. The story is similar than the promotional services theory advanced 
for slotting contracts. The distributors do not supply the sufficient level of promotion desired 
by the supplier because they do not take into account of the supplier’s marginal profit when 
deciding what level of promotion to supply. Shelf space is a particular type of promotional 
service. Klein and Wright argue that category management is a substitute contractual device to 
a limited exclusivity provision in the distribution contract. The fundamental limitation on the 
degree of exclusivity is that the category captain is obliged to place rival brands on its plan-o-
grams and that the final decision regarding listing and the allocation of shelf space belongs to 
the retailer and not the category captain. The retailer has the incentive to hold up the 
manufacturer by providing insufficient shelf space and promotional effort. The suppliers 
provide payment to ensure sufficient shelf space, either by reducing their wholesale prices, or 
by paying upfront access fees (slotting allowances) or through the premium earned by the 
retailers because of an RPM clause. Category management allows the supplier to prevent 
retailer hold up, for example by selling the same shelf space twice, and ensures some return to 
the supplier in the form of a limited exclusive distribution for their products. There is, indeed, 
an implicit understanding that category captaincy is intended to privilege the brands of the 
category captain. This conceptualization of category management as a limited form of 
exclusive distribution has gained acceptance in the recent JT International South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd and BAT South Africa case of the South African Competition Tribunal854. 
The European Commission’s guidelines on vertical restraints do not embrace this 
conceptualization when they examine the possible positive effects of category management. It 
is certainly noted in the guidelines that category management is generally positive and can 
produce anti-competitive effects only in specific circumstances855. A similar positive 
assessment of the effects of such agreements on consumers was made by the Commission in 
its Procter & Gamble case in the context of EU merger control856. The Commission also notes 
in the vertical restraints guidelines that category management arrangements might also bring a 
number of efficiency gains: they may allow distributors to achieve economies of scale as they 
ensure that the optimal quantity of products is presented timely and directly on the shelves857. 
They may also enable suppliers to achieve economies of scale by allowing them to better 
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anticipate demand and to tailor their promotions accordingly858. However, no effort was made 
to develop a more holistic view of this practice, such as the “the promotional services theory” 
advanced by Klein and Wright. The reason might be that accepting this theory could provide 
room for a more lenient approach towards RPM, another mechanism of retailer promotional 
services compensation859, which is something the European Commission did not want to pursue 
in this revision of the Block exemption regulation on vertical agreements. 
Category management may “sometimes distort competition between suppliers, and 
finally result in anticompetitive foreclosure of other suppliers, where the category captain is 
able, due to its influence over the marketing decisions of the distributor, to limit or disadvantage 
the distribution of products of competing suppliers”860. This comes essentially from the conflict 
of interest between the supplier and the retailers, although the Commission notes that “in most 
cases the distributor may not have an interest in limiting its choice of products”861. Category 
managemement might, however, produce exclusionary effects to other suppliers, in particular 
when the category captain is able, due to its influence over the marketing decisions of the 
distributor, to limit or disadvantage the distribution of products of competing suppliers. The 
US litigation in Conwood v. US Tobacco Co.provides an illustration of this risk fo 
anticompetive effects, although one should note that the factual circumstances of this case are 
exceptional862. This conflict of interest is particularly acute when the distributor also sells 
private labels, in which case he has incentives to exclude certain suppliers, in particular 
intermediate national brands, as this is also noted in the Commission’s vertical restraints 
guidelines863. The Commission will assess this upstream foreclosure effect by analogy to the 
assessment of single branding obligations, and will integrate factors such as the market 
coverage of these agreements, the market position of competing suppliers and the possible 
cumulative use of such agreements864. 
The Commission also examined the possible collusive effects of category management 
agreements at the upstream and downstream level. This was an important concern in the UK 
Competition Commission (CoCo) supply of groceries in the UK market investigation865. The 
CoCo acknowledged that category management may provide increased opportunities to 
exchange information between suppliers, whether directly or indirectly via retailers. The report 
                                                          
858 See also, Case No COMP/M.3732 – Procter & Gamble/ Gillette, (2005), above, para. 150. 
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860 Vertical Restraints Guidelines, para. 210. 
861 Ibid. 
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865 UK Competition Commission, The Supply of groceries in the UK market investigation (April 30, 2008), 
available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2008/538grocery.htm . 
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reviewed category management in two product categories – fresh fruit and yogurt – and found 
varying degrees of supplier interaction as a result of category management relationships866. The 
Commission concluded that “the degree of interaction among suppliers arising from category 
management is a cause for concern”867. The European Commission also recognizes in the 
vertical restraints guidelines that “category management may also facilitate collusion between 
suppliers through increased opportunities to exchange via retailers sensitive market 
information, such as for instance information related to future pricing, promotional plans or 
advertising campaigns”868. The risk might be more significant if the retailers sell private labels 
and are thus competitors to the supplier/category captain. 
Furthermore, the Commission acknowledged in the vertical restraints guidelines that 
category management agreements may facilitate collusion between distributors when the same 
supplier serves as a category captain for all or most of the competing distributors on a market 
and provides these distributors with a common point of reference for their marketing 
decisions869. One could question the possibility of this anticompetitive effect happening, unless 
there is a widespread adoption of the same category captain by all retailers. The category 
captain may also only provide advice about stocking and presentation of the category and is 
not involved in setting the retail selling price. As the UK Competition Commission noted in its 
report in the groceries market investigation, this concern might be overstated as there was no 
evidence, from the case studies that category management activities were being used to 
facilitate, or had the effect of facilitating, collusion between grocery retailers870. 
 
1.2.2.15. Horizontal cooperation agreements and agricultural cooperatives 
 
Small and medium enterprises at any level of the supply chain may sometimes enter 
agreements although not optimal for their interests, for the sole reason that the other party has 
effectively exerted its higher bargaining power. Some SMEs often seek horizontal coordination 
in order to gain a better bargaining position and extract better contractual terms.  
Horizontal cooperation agreements can have various degrees of integration. In the context 
of agricultural cooperatives, transaction cost economists distinguish between bargaining 
associations, marketing cooperatives, new generation cooperatives, and horizontal integration, 
where the most cost-effective form of cooperation depends on the specific transaction 
characteristics.871 Bargaining associations are the most simple form of horizontal coordination, 
where farmers take a collective bargaining position vis-à-vis suppliers (e.g.  suppliers of 
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Fertilisers and seeds) or buyers (e.g. manufacturers) to increase their relative bargaining 
strength. Bargaining association are loose structures which involve little to no pooling of assets 
or significant control. Marketing cooperatives, in contrast, are engaged in storing, transporting, 
or processing as well, so as to counterbalance relative bargaining power more actively and meet 
requirements of buyers.872 As a result, marketing cooperatives require some degree of shared 
ownership of the shared activities, and require more investments from individual farmers.873 
New generation cooperatives refer to larger-scale cooperatives which are more centralized and 
regulated, and membership is closed.874 Finally, in the case of horizontal integration, farmers 
have unified assets in a single firm. 
The most diffuse form of horizontal coordination in the food value chain is the cooperative 
system among agricultural producers. This form of voluntary organization among producers 
receives large incentives from national and supra-national regulators, as a way to re-balance 
the food supply chain and foster its competitiveness.875 The European Commission launched a 
large study, called “Support for Farmers’ Cooperatives (SFC)”,876 where these objectives are 
systematized and has also provided guidance to farmers. However, horizontal cooperation in 
the food industry is not only taking place exclusively at the farm level. BRICS jurisdictions, 
again provide meaningful instances of different uses of such contractual networks. For 
example, in Brazil horizontal coordination has for a long time been used by small retailers in 
order to constitute buying groups and offset the high bargaining power of concentrated 
wholesalers. The effects of the creation of buying groups are double. On one hand, horizontal 
coordination raises the bargaining power of the group participants that will thus be able to 
obtain more favourable prices, which is presumed to be beneficial for consumers long term, 
because it preserves consumer choice.877 On the other hand, the interaction between horizontal 
and vertical effects of such coordination, may create a so-called “waterbed” effect. Here, the 
advantage acquired by the buying group which is able to bargain lower prices may bring the 
upstream supplier to raise costs for other weaker competitors in order to offset the loss.878 
 Other jurisdictions have also actively supported farmers to establish horizontal 
cooperatives so as to counterbalance market power upstream or downstream, either through 
immunity from competition law enforcement or other legislative and/or regulatory support. In 
1922, the United States Congress authorized a farmers’ producer cartel by allowing farmers to 
establish cooperatives that would negotiate prices with the buyers of farming products.879 
Likewise, industry-wide collective bargaining has been legalized in 1935 after industry-wide 
labour agreements had been previously subject to antitrust litigation.880 
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 In Russia, development of agricultural cooperations has been consistently declared as 
one of the priorities of the state agricultural policies in general, as well as of the FAS priorities 
in agricultural sector.881 Agricultural cooperatives receive state support in the form of subsidies 
provided from the federal and regional budgets for development of technical infrastructure, 
acquisition of equipment, organising of distributing and logistics centers, etc.  
 
1.2.2.16. Standardization and certification systems 
 
Both horizontal and vertical coordination have the object of regulating the process or the 
quality level of the production. In this case, parties often agree upon these aspects setting 
specific quality standards. Private standards have direct impact on the structure of the supply 
chain, as they define the relationships among the participants.882 In facilitating coordination of 
the agri-food value chain, standards transmit credible information on the quality and other 
characteristics of products.883 Standards may be the result of an agreement, also facilitated by 
specific organizations or NGOs, or may be imposed by a dominant firm (de facto standards). 
Private standards may thus be set alternatively by a lead firm or by agents external to the 
network.884  
Global value chain literature distinguishes between two motives for explicit coordination 
in value chains through private standard-setting: risk management and product differentiation. 
Standardization of factors including product quality, safety, processes, etc, allows firms to 
control risk. Secondly, firms can aim at lowering buyers’ information costs through standard-
setting, thereby differentiating their products.885 The impact of private standards thus also 
depends on the function they perform. In general, however the private standards set a new 
regulatory regime between the parties, which works in parallel to state legislation. Private 
standard-setting may go beyond public standardization regulations either by introducing 
additional parameters, for example by introducing a more stringent standard, or by introducing 
additional enforcement mechanisms to improve the achievement of the goals set by public 
regulation.886 Especially in developing and transition countries, private regulation stops being 
a mere complement to public standards, becoming the main source of regulation, especially 
when public regulation on product safety is particularly lax. The private regulation provides 
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also remedial solutions to the infringement of such standards, through the enforcement of 
contract and codes of conduct. Some authors see in the growth of private regulation also the 
effect of “increasing wealth transfer, shifting the value downstream while placing the costs of 
safety regulation further upstream on the supply chain”.887 Private standards may also have 
repercussions on the competitiveness of the market. Depending on how they are used, standards 
can indeed foster product differentiation or, on the opposite, bring product standardization. 
Private standards may be introduced by individual firms (e.g. Tesco’s ‘Nature’s Choice’ 
and Carrefour’s ‘Filières Qualité’), national collective organizations (e.g. the British Retail 
Consortium Global Standard), or international collective organizations (e.g. GlobalGAP, 
Marine Stewardship Council, and Forest Stewardship Council).888 Private standards may also 
pursue different goals and levels of protection depending on market circumstances and level of 
development. For example, in India private regulation emerged both in consortia and the efforts 
of NGOs and civil society groups. However, these private regulations are primarily designed 
to address the level of economic development in the country. For example, while regulations 
governing the Indian wet retail market may not be adequate according to US consumption 
standards, however, from the point of view of Indian consumers these regulations are adequate 
because anything more stringent would render the products too expensive for consumption.889 
A variety of third-party certification bodies are found in the food ecosystem. They establish 
standards for produce and grant compliant members particular benefits in the 
commercialisation of food (including for instance through labels).890 Third-party certification 
schemes normally refer to standards that range across the social, environmental and safety 
spheres (ie food safety, organic or fair trade and so forth).891 The certification providers that 
are discussed below feature strongly in the discussion on food standards, and have acquired 
recognition both among consumers and producers notwithstanding their generally voluntary 
nature.  
Fairtrade International is a non-profit organisation formed of 23 member organizations 
(three producer networks and 20 national Fairtrade organizations).892 Fairtrade offers the 
FAIRTRADE Certification Mark, in cases where an independent certifier (Flocert) finds 
compliance with Fairtrade Standards in social, environmental and economic factors.893 
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Participation is voluntary and there are currently Fairtrade Standards in relation to small 
producer organisations, hired labour, contract production, as well as trading, climate and 
textile.894 Flocert provides an online platform (named Fairtrace) that allows to track certified 
products throughout the supply chain,895 and an online tool to verify compliance with the 
Fairtrade Standards.896 
GLOBALG.A.P is a “private sector food safety certification” involved in the establishment 
and maintenance of good practices and standards in such areas as food safety and traceability, 
environment, workers’ safety, and animal welfare.897 Participation is voluntary and three 
certification products are available, namely GLOBALG.A.P.; localg.a.p; and 
GLOBALG.A.P.+ Add-on. GLOBALG.A.P. provides 40 standards in three areas: crops, 
livestock and aquaculture.898 GLOBALG.A.P. maintains a database system where certified 
producers can be identified on the basis of a unique code and reviewed in terms of compliance 
with the certification audits.899 Moreover, GLOBALG.A.P. offers access to a network of 140 
certification bodies900 that in turn must have received ISO 17065 accreditation.901 
UTZ Certified is a non-profit organisation that provides certification when certain 
conditions contained in its Code of Conduct and the Chain of Custody guidelines are met.902 
The UTZ standard applies, among others, to coffee, tea, cocoa and hazelnuts. The UTZ 
Certified Code of Conduct deals primarily with growth and harvest (building on issues such as 
safety, farm management, employee/environmental protection)903 while the Chain of Custody 
guidelines follow the whole supply chain process.904 Compliance is ensured through regular 
audits performed by independently accredited auditors, and a traceability system (the Good 
Inside Portal) allows to track all sales of certified products and each step involved in the 
production.905 UTZ Certified has recently announced a merger with another major global third-
party certifier, the Rainforest Alliance, which will eventually lead to a single global standard 
and certification body.906  
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The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is a global non-profit organisation involved 
primarily in the certification of fishing and seafood supplies.907 The MSC label is granted to 
fisheries that have been found to be compliant with the MSC Fisheries Standard as well as 
Chain of Custody Standard.908 Each fishery that meets the standard will have proven that it 
engages in a sustainable level of fishing activity (ie avoiding the overexploitation of the fish 
stocks), while minimising the impact on environmental biodiversity and maintaining effective 
management.909 Participation is voluntary and compliance with the required standard and 
criteria is assessed by independent certification bodies.910 
Private standard-setting is present in all segments of the value chain. For instance, with 
regard to seeds, the International Seed Testing Association (ISTA) is private, non-
governmental standard-setting organisation, that consists of laboratories and sampling entities 
and industry members from approximately 80 countries across the world.911 The objectives of 
ISTA are development, adoption and publication of standard procedures for sampling and 
testing seeds, and to promote uniform application of these procedures for evaluation of seeds 
moving in international trade.912 ISTA also works on promotion of research in the area of food 
science and technology, including sampling, testing, storing, processing, and distributing 
seeds.913 ISTA publishes International Rules for Seed Testing, that provide for harmonised and 
uniform seed testing methods. 
 
1.2.2.17. Transfer of technology and know-how agreements 
 
Transfer of technology refers to the transfer of tangible property itself and of technology rights 
such as patents, plant breeder’s certificates, trademarks and topographies of semiconductor 
products which allows the right holder to produce a particular product. Know-how can be 
defined as a package of practical information resulting from experience and teting, which is 
secret, substantial, i.e. significant and useful for the production of a particular product, and can 
be identified in manuals or another written form.914 
Technology transfers and know-how agreements can be used as mechanisms to ensure 
that agricultural research innovations reach farmers and have an impact on production 
processes. Spreading innovation within global value chains from advanced (international) 
companies to SMEs is widely thought to be beneficial for production growth through learning 
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and increasing skill sets.915 Developing countries generally do not have strong private innovate 
sectors that are prevalent in developed countries, so that public research organizations are a 
more important source of innovation.916 Moreover, private sector technology transfers might 
only be feasible for certain (high-value) market segments, because safeguards and contract 
compliance are often costly. Also, it is more likely that technologies that are non-specific to 
the relationship between the farmer and the technology supplier will be diverted after the 
transfer, making transfers of non-specific technology more risky than that of specific 
technologies.917 Macro-economic stability is also key in efficient functioning of technology 
transfers, as instability increases the risk of hold-up and investment risks.918 Notwithstanding 
these conditions for successful technology transfers, private technology transfers have become 
increasingly popular in developing countries also as a form of value chain development 
programmes. Special purpose vehicles which are owned by multiple partners in the value chain 
can be used to mitigate and spread assets and risks, among other models of value chain 
innovations.919 
 Technology licensing generally provides incentives for further innovation on part of the 
buyer.920 Buyers of technology have an incentive to reduce production costs, improve the final 
product or develop new products using the licensed technology.921 Uncertainty, risk aversion 
and seller anticipations influence the incentives for further innovation; higher buyer risk 
aversion is for example associated with a reduction in the buyer’s innovation incentives, while 
levels of future innovation are higher when the technology seller anticipates opportunities for 
future innovation.922 Risk aversion and innovation expectations are thus likely to affect the 
levels of future innovation through modification of the licensing agreement terms.923 
Technology licensing in the agricultural biotechnology industry have some unique 
elements in comparison with other kinds of license agreements.924 One single technology or 
product in agri-biotech often is often covered by multiple property types, such as utility patents, 
plant patents, plant breeder’s rights, trade secrets, trademarks and tangible biological property. 
Also, defining the freedom to operate must be clearly stated, for example whether the licensee 
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has the right to make crosses of a particular product, and how this affects royalty rates. These 
questions often lead to anti-royalty-stacking provisions in licensing agreements. Thirdly, agri-
biotech licensing agreements often contain philanthropic and humanitarian use clauses 
particularly if they concern crop that are important food staples in developing countries. Lastly, 
technology transfers often give rise to stewardship provisions which establish some form of 
ongoing oversight of commercial development and dissemination of the new technology.925 
 Public research institutions may be used to assist with technology transfers, including 
IP protection and licensing and transfer of tangible property rights. Such public/private 
partnerships can be organized in various ways, depending on the institutional objectives, type 
of technology involved, and local needs and resources. Bennett, Rajalahti and Pape-
Christiansen distinguish between four models of Technology Transfer Office (TTO) models in 
public institutions to assist innovation in agricultural innovation: (1) an independent TTO 
department within the research institution, which is mainly useful for institution with sufficient 
resources to carry the necessary investment requirements; (2) network-based TTOs where 
multiple institutions share costs and expertise so as to reach the necessary critical mass for 
technology transfer activity; (3) a subsidiary company where knowledge resources within an 
institution are sufficient but institutional culture is not conductive for entrepreneurial activity, 
and a subsidiary can take advantage of the available knowledge while maintaining its own 
operational flexibility; and (4) outsourcing of technology transfer, which minimizes 
investments but which also reduces revenue to the institution and which is particularly suitable 
for technology that can be used for high-value opportunities.926 These specific characteristics 
of technology licensing in the agricultural biotechnology industry require each license 
agreement to be unique and contain specific mechanism to safeguard the various interests and 
mutual agreement of both parties.  
 Technology transfer and know-how agreements can have both pro- and anti-
competitive effects. They can promote production efficiency and innovation by allowing 
innovators to earn returns that (partially) cover their research and development costs. They also 
foster the spread of technology and know-how so as to allow licencees to reduce production 
costs and develop new or improved products. Moreover, technology licensing agreements 
allow the technology of the licensor to be combined with the technology and the assets of the 
licensee. On the other hand, technology transfer and know-how agreements are capable of 
reducing intra- or inter-technology competition, for example when two companies cross-
license their technologies in combination with a market sharing agreement, or when a licensing 
agreement between non-competitors contains vertical price fixing clauses. 
 In EU competition law, technology transfer and know-how agreements are assessed 
under the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation.927 The Guidelines on the 
application of Article 101 TFEU to technology transfer agreements recognizes that ‘the vast 
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majority of those agreements are indeed pro-competitive’.928 The Block Exemption Regulation 
contains a general exemption from Article 101 TFEU for technology transfer agreements 
between competitors where their combined market share does not exceed 20% of the relevant 
market,929 and for technology transfer agreements between non-competitors where the market 
share of each of the parties does not exceed 30% on the respective relevant markets.930 Such 
agreements are deemed to benefit from the exemption in Article 101(3) TFEU. Where the 
market share of the parties exceeds the thresholds set out in Article 3 of the Block Exemption 
Regulation, the agreement must be assessed individually under Article 101(3) TFEU. Further, 
the Block Exemption Regulation is not applicable to agreements which contain the hardcore 
restrictions listed in Article 4, including market allocations, output limitation and vertical price 
restrictions. 
 It also seems that merger control has been recently used by the Russian FAS in order to 
organize a technology transfer to Russia-based agritech companies in the context of its merger 
remedy in the Bayer/Monsanto case931. 
  
  
                                                          
928 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
technology transfer agreements, [2014] OJ C89/3, para. 17. 
929 Article 2(1) and 3(1) Commission Regulation No 316/2014 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
categories of technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ L93/17. 
930 Article 2(1) and 3(2) Commission Regulation No 316/2014 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to 
categories of technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ L93/17. 
931 This case and the remedies imposed are discussed in Chapter 2 of Part IV in this Report. 
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2.1. The enforcement activity of the BRICS competition authorities in the food sector 
 
2.1.1 Enforcement statistics 
 
We have collected and coded 1105 merger cases and 282 infringement cases from the five 
BRICS jurisdictions during the period 2004-2017 concerning the various segments of the food 
value chain. Most of these cases concern the period between 2008-2017 (first quarter): 181 
infringement cases and 529 merger cases. In particular, for the period 2008-2017 we have 
coded 137 merger cases from South Africa, 47 merger cases from Russia, 78 merger cases from 
India, 20 merger cases from China, 247 merger cases from Brazil. For the same period, we 
have coded 60 infringement cases from South Africa, 48 infringement cases from Russia, 18 
infringement cases from India, 23 infringement cases from China, and 32 infringement cases 
from Brazil. 
Our results are still provisional as we are to finalize some additional coding and we 
expect to receive feedback from the BRICS competition authorities. However, we include these 
provisional statistics in order to provide the bigger picture on antitrust enforcement priorities 
and the segments of the food value chain that have attracted the interest of the BRICS 
competition authorities the last decade. 
 
2.1.1.1. Aggregate BRICS mergers 
 
Table 1: Distribution of supply chain types BRICS aggregate mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 1 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the food 
sector in the BRICS countries. Taking all BRICS countries into account, most merger cases 
concerned the processing supply chain level (24%) followed by retail (21%), factors of 
production (21%) and manufacturing (20%). Significantly fewer merger cases have been 
reported in the farming and grocery wholesale levels. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of products BRICS aggregate mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 2, the merger cases in the BRICS countries concerning the food sector are classified 
according to the type of products involved. As we can see, most of the single-product mergers 
concerned cereals (9%), alcoholic drinks (9%), confectionary (8%), meat, poultry and eggs 
(7%), and 6% soft drinks. Others single-product mergers are significantly less prevalent. The 
largest category of merger cases in the food sector, however, concerned multi-product activities 
and/or other product types (33%). 
 
2.1.1.2.Aggregate BRICS infringements 
 
Table 3: distribution of supply chain types BRICS aggregate infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 3 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in all BRICS countries combined according to the level of the supply chain involved. As we 
can see, almost half of all infringement cases concerned either the processing level (25%) or 
the retail level (24%). Only 15% of the infringement cases dealt with the factors of production 
(7%) and primary production (farming) (8%), while the overwhelming majority of 
infringement cases concerned supply chain levels more downstream.  
 
Table 4: distribution of infringement types by products BRICS aggregate infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 4 describes the various infringement types for each product category in the aggregate 
BRICS food sector infringement cases. While there is substantial variety among the product 
categories in the types of infringements, abuse of a dominant position cases are prevalent in 
most of the product categories (with the exception of e.g. corn, and fish and seafood). Notably 
vertical infringements are also a substantial part of the dairy, specialty crops, meat, poultry and 
eggs, confectionary, alcoholic drinks, soft drinks, fish and seafood, and multi-products / other 
products categories, accounting for roughly 15 to 40%. For some product categories, cartel 
infringements take up a very significant share of total infringements, for example in soybeans 
(only cartel infringement), sugar cane, and diverse field crops, whereas in other product 
categories there have been virtually no cartel cases (for example soft drinks and fish and 
seafood). 
 
Table 5: distribution of products BRICS aggregate infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 5 describes the aggregate BRICS infringement cases (antitrust) categorised according to 
product type. Compared with the aggregate BRICS merger cases (see Table 2), a substantially 
lower percentage of cases concerns multi-products and miscellaneous products (16% compared 
with 33% for merger cases). The largest product category is cereals which reflects almost a 
quarter (23%) of all infringement cases. Alcoholic drinks (12%), meat, poultry and eggs (9%) 
and dairy (8%) are far less prevalent in the infringement statistics, with the other product types 
taking an even lower share. Notably, there were no infringements in the soybean, rice, coffee, 
and beer product categories. 
 
Table 6: distribution of reasons for proceeding by infringement types BRICS aggregate 
5%
23%
0%
7%
0%
1%
8%
1%
3%
9%
4%
12%
0%
6%
0%
6%
16%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Distribution of products
259 
 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
Table 6 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in the 
BRICS countries for each infringement type. For all types of infringements, complaints have 
been the most prevalent reason for starting the procedure. All unilateral effects infringements 
procedures have been started because of a complaint, as well as almost vertical infringement 
cases. Sector inquiries have been a comparatively important reason for proceedings in abuse of 
a dominant position and cartel cases. Leniency is (virtually) excluded as a reason for starting 
proceedings for all infringement types. 
 
Table 7: infringement proceedings by infringement type BRICS aggregate  
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 7 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in the BRICS countries according 
to the type of infringement. The primary reason for starting infringement proceedings has been 
abuse of a dominant position. Horizontal cartel cases, horizontal non-cartel cases, and vertical 
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restrictions are the other main reasons for starting proceedings. Other types of infringement 
have only sparsely given rise to infringement proceedings. 
 
Table 8: distribution of infringement types BRICS aggregate infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 8 describes a categorization of the aggregate infringements in BRICS based on 
infringement types. Most infringements that were established concerned abuse of a dominant 
position (42.55%). Horizontal cartel infringements, horizontal non-cartel infringements, and 
vertical restrictions each account for just under 20% of total infringements in BRICS. 
 
2.1.1.3.Brazil mergers 
 
Table 9: distribution of supply chain types Brazil mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 9 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the food 
sector in Brazil. Of these merger cases, 40% applied to the processing level of the supply chain. 
This share of the processing level is substantially higher than that of the cases concerning 
factors of production. The other levels of the supply chain are far less prevalent, with grocery 
wholesale only accounting for 3% of the cases. 
 
Table 10: distribution of products Brazil mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 10, the merger cases in Brazil concerning the food sector are classified according to 
the type of products involved. Among single-product related mergers, confectionary (13%)and 
meat, poultry and eggs (9%) are most prevalent, with cereals, fruits and vegetables, and 
alcoholic drinks following with 8% each. However, the largest category of products is, by far, 
multi-products and other products, counting for 39% of all merger cases in Brazil. 
 
2.1.1.4.Brazil infringements 
 
Table 11: distribution of supply chain types Brazil infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 11 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in Brazil according to the level of the supply chain involved. Most infringement cases are 
situated in the more downstream levels of the supply chain, in particular grocery wholesale 
(25%), manufacturing (23%) and retail (21%). In contrast, factors of production and primary 
production (farming) have experienced significantly fewer antitrust enforcement cases with 4% 
and 10% of the total number of infringements cases respectively. 
 
Table 12: distribution of infringement types by products Brazil infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 12 describes the various infringement types for each product category in Brazil’s 
infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector. Among the product types there is 
wide divergence as to the types of infringement cases. Whereas for example there have only 
been non-cartel horizontal infringements in the fruits and vegetables (1 case) and confectionary 
product type (3 cases), the fish and seafood segment has only had 1 abuse of a dominant 
position case while there have only been cartel cases (4 in total) in cereals. 
 
Table 13: distribution of products Brazil infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 13 describes the infringement cases (antitrust) in Brazil categorised according to product 
type. Particularly notable is that almost half of all infringement cases concerned alcoholic 
drinks (18 cases, i.e. 46%). This percentage is far above that of any other single-product type. 
Cereals, dairy, and soft drinks each count for 8% (4 cases), and 15% of the cases (8 in total) 
concerned infringements regarding multi-products or other products not included. 
 
Table 14: distribution of reasons for proceeding by infringement types Brazil 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 14 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in Brazil 
for each infringement type. Cases concerning abuse of a dominant position and vertical 
restraints were all initiated following complaints, which was also the case in the majority of 
cartel cases. By contrast, non-cartel horizontal infringements have been instigated mostly ex 
officio. 
 
Table 15: infringement proceedings by infringement type Brazil  
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 15 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in Brazil according to the type 
of infringement. In Brazil, almost half of the total infringement proceedings concerned abuse 
of a dominant position. The second-largest category of infringement proceedings concerned 
horizontal cartel cases, and the other proceedings dealt with horizontal non-cartel cases and 
vertical restrictions. 
 
Table 16: distribution of infringement types Brazil infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 16 describes a categorization of the infringements in Brazil based on infringement types. 
Exactly half of the total number of infringements was an abuse of a dominant position 
(50.00%). Horizontal cartels infringements and vertical restraints each represented 19.23% of 
the total number of infringements, and horizontal non-cartel cases accounted for 11.54%. No 
other types of infringements have been found. 
 
2.1.1.5.Russia mergers 
 
Table 17: distribution of supply chain types Russia mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 17 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the 
food sector in Russia. The largest number of food sector mergers took place within primary 
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production (farming) (31%). With factors of production, processing, manufacturing and 
grocery wholesale levels each counting for 14% to 17%, the retail level had appreciably fewer 
merger activity with only 5% of the total number.  
 
Table 18: distribution of products Russia mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 18, the merger cases in Russia concerning the food sector are classified according to 
the type of products involved. Almost one-third of food sector mergers concerned the cereals 
market (32%), followed by meat (17%) and diverse field crops (10%). Only 7% of mergers in 
Russia concerned multi-products or other product, which is very low in comparison with the 
other BRICS jurisdictions (compare with table 10 (Brazil), table 26 (India), table 34 (China) 
and table 42 (South Africa)). 
 
2.1.1.6.Russia infringements 
 
Table 19: distribution of supply chain types Russia infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 19 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in Russia according to the level of the supply chain involved. What is particularly notable is 
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that over half of all infringements concerned the retail level (51%). Grocery wholesale (16%) 
and primary production (14%) have been far less subject to antitrust enforcement. There has 
been only 1 infringement case on the factors of production level (genomics), representing only 
slightly over 1%. 
 
Table 20: distribution of infringement types by products Russia infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 20 describes the various infringement types for each product category in Russia’s 
infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector. As for the other BRICS countries, 
there is wide variety among the product types in terms of the infringement types. For example, 
while non-cartel horizontal infringements take up a substantial share of infringements in the 
alcoholic drinks category, and to a lesser degree in fruits and vegetables, in other product types 
they are (almost) non-existent. By contrast, there have only cartel infringements in the sugar 
cane and fish and seafood product categories. Abuse of a dominant position is prevalent in 
other product types, including cereals, confectionary, and soft drinks. 
 
Table 21: distribution of products Russia infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 21 describes the infringement cases (antitrust) in Russia categorised according to product 
type. Most infringements took place in the cereals segment (34%), which is considerably more 
than in dairy (19%), meat, poultry and eggs (14%) and multi-products and other products (12%) 
categories. Multiple product types have not been subject to antitrust enforcement, including 
corn, rice, and coffee. 
 
Table 22: distribution of reasons for proceeding by infringement types Russia 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 22 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in Russia 
for each infringement type. Both of the two horizontal non-cartel infringement proceedings 
were instigated ex officio, while the only conglomerate (other) infringement proceedings was 
based on a complaint. Horizontal cartel and vertical infringement proceedings were based on a 
mix of complaints and sector inquiries, while the abuse of dominance cases were the result of 
complaints (11 cases), sector inquiries (12 cases) but also ex officio proceedings (8 cases). 
 
Table 23: infringement proceedings by infringement type Russia  
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 23 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in Russia according to the type 
of infringement. Almost three-quarters of the infringement proceedings were directed at abuse 
of dominance. Horizontal cartel cases are the second-largest category of infringement 
proceedings, with horizontal non-cartel, vertical restrictions and conglomerate cases having a 
significantly smaller share in enforcement activity. There have been no enforcement 
proceedings against coordinated effects, reduction of innovation, and unilateral effects 
infringements. 
 
Table 24: distribution of infringement types Russia infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 24 describes a categorization of the infringements in Russia based on infringement types. 
Almost two-thirds of the infringements were abuses of a dominant position. Horizontal cartel 
cases represented 12.33% of total infringements found, and horizontal non-cartel and vertical 
infringements each 10.96%. 
 
2.1.1.7.India mergers 
 
Table 25: distribution of supply chain types India mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 25 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the 
food sector in India. There have been no merger cases at the primary production (farming) level 
of the supply chain. Mergers are spread rather equally among the manufacturing (25%), factors 
of production (23%), grocery wholesale (20%) and retail (18%) levels, while the remaining 
14% took place at the processing level. 
 
Table 26: distribution of products India mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 26, the merger cases in India concerning the food sector are classified according to the 
type of products involved. Most mergers concerned multi-product or products not included 
(31%). Alcoholic drinks were involved in 15% of the cases, followed by dairy (11%), sugar 
cane (10%), and rice (8%). No mergers took place in corn, soybean, meat, poultry and eggs, 
beer and fish and seafood product categories. 
 
2.1.1.8.India infringements 
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Table 27: distribution of supply chain types India infringements
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 27 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in India according to the level of the supply chain involved. The division among supply chain 
levels is rather unequal, with more than a third of infringements taking place in retail (34%), 
in contrast to only 7% in manufacturing, 3% in processing and 0% in primary production. At 
the factors of production level as well as the grocery wholesale level, 28% of infringements 
took place. 
 
Table 28: distribution of types of infringement by product India infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 28 describes the various infringement types for each product category in India’s 
infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector. Horizontal cartel cases have been 
predominant in corn, soybean and rice products types. Most infringements in the meat, poultry 
and eggs, alcoholic drinks and beer concerned abuse of a dominant position. There has been 
one infringement regarding dairy products, which concerned unilateral effects. 
 
Table 29: distribution of products India infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 29 describes the infringement cases (antitrust) in India categorised according to product 
type. Specialty crops count for the largest share of infringements with 28%, followed by 
confectionary (21%) and soft drinks (14%).  
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Table 30: distribution of reasons for proceeding by infringement types India 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 30 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in India 
for each infringement type. Horizontal cartel infringement proceedings have been initiated 
prominently after sector inquiries and in some cases after complaints. Abuse of dominance, 
unilateral effects, and vertical restraints proceedings were almost exclusively the result of 
complaints. No leniency or ex officio proceedings have been reported. 
 
Table 31: infringement proceedings by infringement type India  
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 31 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in India according to the type of 
infringement. Just under half of all infringement proceedings dealt with abuse of a dominant 
position. More than a quarter of the proceedings concerned horizontal cartel cases, and vertical 
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restrictions were subject of just under a quarter of the proceedings. Notably, a small share of 
the infringement proceedings dealt with unilateral effects. 
 
Table 32: distribution of infringement types India infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 32 describes a categorization of the infringements in India based on infringement types. 
48.27% of the infringements established in India concerned abuse of a dominant position. 
Horizontal cartel cases were the subject of 27.59% of all infringements, and 20.69% dealt with 
vertical restrictions. Infringements related to unilateral effects, i.e. high prices and worse 
quality, were also (small) part of total infringements found. 
 
2.1.1.9.China mergers 
 
Table 33: distribution of supply chain types China mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
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Table 33 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the 
food sector in China. Close to three-quarters of mergers concerned either the factors of 
production level or the manufacturing level (35% each). Primary production and retail levels 
each counted for only 5% of merger cases, and processing and grocery wholesale both having 
a 10% share. 
 
Table 34: distribution of products China mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 34, the merger cases in China concerning the food sector are classified according to 
the type of products involved. The largest share of mergers dealt with multiple products or 
other products not listed specifically (40%). Of single-product mergers, the largest share is 
taken by cereals (20%), followed by beer (15%). There were no single-product mergers in the 
majority of product categories, including corn, sugar cane, coffee and fish and seafood. 
 
2.1.1.10.China infringements 
 
Table 35: distribution of supply chain types China infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 35 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in China according to the level of the supply chain involved. Almost half of all infringements 
concerned the grocery wholesale level of the supply chain (48%). The retail level follows with 
30%, with the other supply chain levels having only a small share of between 4% and 9%. 
Notably, there have been no infringements at the factors of production level. 
 
Table 36: distribution of types of infringements by product China infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 36 describes the various infringement types for each product category in China’s 
infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector. Only vertical infringements were 
found in the dairy and alcoholic drinks product category, and only abuse of dominance in the 
meat, poultry and eggs, and the confectionary types. Horizontal cartel infringements have been 
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reported in the fish and seafood as well as, for a small part, in the multi-products and other 
products category. 
 
Table 37: distribution of products China infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 37 describes the infringement cases (antitrust) in China categorised according to product 
type. Multi-products and other products not listed in the table take up the largest share of 
infringements with 61%. 13% of the infringements pertained to dairy, 9% to meat, poultry and 
eggs, also 9% to alcoholic drinks. Confectionary and fish and seafood product categories each 
counted for 4% of total infringements. 
 
Table 38: distribution of reasons for proceedings by infringement type China 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 38 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in China 
for each infringement type. All 5 vertical infringement proceedings were based on complaints. 
In the abuse of dominance and horizontal cartel cases, reasons for proceedings were a mix of 
complaints, leniency applications and sector inquiries. 
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Table 39: infringement proceedings by infringement type China 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 39 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in China according to the type 
of infringement. A majority of the infringement proceedings were initiated against alleged 
abuse of a dominant position. The rest of the proceedings were targeted at either horizontal 
cartel cases or vertical restrictions. There have been no infringements proceedings against 
coordinated effects, horizontal non-cartel cases, conglomerate infringements, reductions of 
innovation and unilateral effects. 
 
Table 40: distribution of infringement types China infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 40 describes a categorization of the infringements in China based on infringement types. 
A majority of 60.87% of total infringements concerned abuses of a dominant position. Vertical 
restrictions account for 21.74%, and horizontal cartel cases for 17.39% of total infringements 
in China.  
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2.1.1.11.South Africa mergers 
 
Table 41: distribution of supply chain types South Africa mergers 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 41 visualizes the distribution of supply chain types in all merger cases concerning the 
food sector in South Africa. Slightly over one-third of food sector merger cases took place at 
the manufacturing level of the supply chain (35%). The factors of production level accounted 
to 24%, followed by processing (18%) and retail (14%). Merger cases have been comparatively 
limited in primary production (2%) and grocery wholesale (6%). 
 
Table 42: distribution of products South Africa mergers 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
In table 42, the merger cases in South Africa concerning the food sector are classified according 
to the type of products involved. Compared with the other BRICS countries, distribution of 
product type mergers is relatively equal, with 9% share for cereals and fruits and vegetables 
each, and 8% for corn, sugar cane, meat, poultry and eggs, and alcoholic drinks each. Just under 
a quarter of merger cases concerned multi-products or other products not listed (23%). 
 
2.1.1.12. South Africa infringements 
 
Table 43: distribution of supply chain types South Africa infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 43 describes the distribution of infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector 
in South Africa according to the level of the supply chain involved. 49% of all food sector 
related infringements took place at the processing level, followed by the manufacturing level 
which accounts for 30%. The other supply chain levels are significantly less represented in 
antitrust enforcement, with for example the grocery wholesale and the retail levels only having 
2% and 4% of infringement cases respectively. 
 
Table 44: distribution of infringement type by products South Africa infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 44 describes the various infringement types for each product category in South Africa’s 
infringement cases (antitrust) concerning the food sector. Vertical infringements were 
relatively prevalent in the categories of alcoholic drinks, soft drinks, fish and seafood, and other 
(multi-) products.  Horizontal cartel infringements took a considerable share in the 
infringements in the soybean, dairy, and diverse field crops categories. 
 
Table 45: distribution of products South Africa infringements 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 45 describes the infringement cases (antitrust) in South Africa categorised according to 
product type. Among the single-product type infringements, most infringements concerned 
cereals (31.43%). Other substantial shares of infringements are taken by the product categories 
of corn, fruits and vegetables, meat, poultry and eggs, and fish and seafood. There have been 
no infringements in several product categories, including rice, sugar cane, coffee and beer. 
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Table 46: reasons for proceeding by infringement types South Africa 
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 46 provides a distribution of the reasons for starting infringement proceedings in South 
Africa for each infringement type. All proceedings have been initiated on the basis of 
complaints. 
 
Table 47: infringement proceedings by infringement type South Africa  
 
Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 47 provides a pie chart of the infringement proceedings in South Africa according to the 
type of infringement. In comparison with the other BRICS jurisdictions, abuse of dominance 
cases have been only a minor part of total infringement proceedings. The majority of 
infringement proceedings were targeted at horizontal infringements (cartel and non-cartel). Just 
under a quarter of proceedings dealt with vertical restrictions. There have been no infringement 
proceedings against other types of infringements, including reduction of innovation and 
unilateral effects. 
 
Table 48: distribution of infringement types South Africa infringements 
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Source: authors’ compiled statistics 
 
Table 48 describes a categorization of the infringements in South Africa based on infringement 
types. Horizontal infringements account for 59% of the total infringements found, with 21% 
cartel infringements and 38% non-cartel infringements. Vertical restrictions (23%) and abuse 
of a dominant position (18%) also take up an appreciable share of total infringements in the 
food sector. 
 
2.1.2. A bestiary of competition law enforcement interventions in the food sector in 
BRICS 
 
2.1.2.1. Cartels 
 
All BRICS countries have investigated cartels in the food sector. These cartels operated at 
different levels of the supply chain: for instance, in the cases considered for these sections, the 
Russian, Chinese, and South African competition authorities, investigated and penalized cartels 
at the manufacturing level, although cartels were also uncovered in Russia at the grocery 
wholesale level. Cartels prosecuted by the Competition Commission of India operated in the 
pesticides market, whereas those investigated by CADE operated at the processing level as 
well as the retail level. Interestingly, however, the majority of these cartels dealt with 
downstream food items, which may directly be transferred from shop to table: bread in Brazil 
and Russia, rice vermicelli in China and fish in South Africa. Only one Indian cartel case dealt 
with the upstream factors of production market (pesticides). Brazil, South Africa and Russia 
initiated the investigations into these cartels on the basis of complaints, whereas India and 
China led the enquiries into the cartels on their own initiative. Regardless, however, in each of 
the cases considered here, the investigations and proceedings led to a finding of guilt and 
culminated in fines against the cartelists. In a number of instances, these fines were also 
accompanied by cease and desist orders. 
More specifically, CADE suspected a cartel in the Bread industry in the town of 
Sobradinho, located in the surroundings of Brasilia. In 2001, CADE had received a complaint 
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from the local police and, after thorough investigations and hearings, in 2013 CADE arrived at 
the conclusion that several bakeries in the area had formed a cartel to fix the price of bread and 
to align their market practices generally. CADE consequently, fined 18 bakeries and their 
owners (totaling 19 individuals) in the sum of Brazilian Reals 650,000,000.00. 932 FAS also 
uncovered a cartel in the bread industry and in a 2016 decision held that the Joint stock 
company “Project “Svezhiy Khleb”, open joint stock company “Kurskkhleb” and closed joint 
stock company “Zheleznogorskiy khlebozavod”, which were competitors in the market of 
bread in the Kurskiy region, had entered into an oral agreement for sharing the product market, 
volume of sales, range of products and composition of buyers. They had also refused to enter 
into agreement with certain sellers and had created barriers to entry for other economic entities 
(eg LLC “Vash Khleb”) in the region. Accordingly, FAS fined each of these entities. 933  
In 2012, the Competition Commission of India held that of the four manufacturers of 
Aluminum Phosphide Tablets in India, which are used for the purpose of storing grains and act 
as insecticides, three, namely United Phosphorous Limited (UPL), Sandhya Organic Chemicals 
Private Limited (SOCL), and Excel Crop Care Limited (ECCL) who were supplying these 
tablets to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) had engaged in collusive bidding. In the tender 
floated by FCI, these companies had quoted the same price and on negotiation reduced it by 
the same margin. In the process, they had also doubled the price of these tablets. Investigation 
into the matter revealed that the parties had been quoting identical prices not only in FCI tenders 
but also in tenders floated by other government agencies. CCI, therefore, held that the 
companies had abused their dominant position and had also formed a cartel for the purpose of 
collusive bidding, which had led to appreciable adverse economic effects. CCI imposed penalty 
at a rate of 9% on average of three years turnover on the three parties and directed them to 
'cease and desist' from engaging in practices of manipulating process of bidding in any 
manner.934 
In 2014, China investigated and found a cartel between Nanning Xianyige Food Factory 
in the Guangxi region and 18 rice vermicelli manufacturers, which raised the price of rice 
vermicelli in the region. The case was decided by the National Development and Reform 
Commission of the region, which directed the parties to cease and desist their illegal practices 
and imposed a fine of 1% on the turnover of the preceding year. The NDRC also issued a 
warning to other rice vermicelli manufacturers. This was the first case to be decided under 
China’s new Anti-monopoly Law. 935  
The South African Competition Commission carried out a very thorough investigation 
of the South African Pelagic Fish Processors Association for price fixing and market allocation 
                                                          
932 Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n 08012.004039/2001-
68, Defendants: Panificadora e Confeitaria Eulálio – ME and others. Final Decision, Reporting Commissioner: 
Ana Frazão, 23 May 2012. 
933 Decisions by FAS of Kurskiy region, 21/07/2016, case №03-05/21-2016А with regard to Joint stock company 
“Project “Svezhiy Khleb” and case № 03-05/22-2016А with regard to Closed joint stock company 
“Zheleznogorskiy khlebozavod”. 
934 Order of the Competition Commission of India in Suo Motu Case no. 2/2011 in Re Aluminum Phosphide 
Tablets Manufacturers dated 23/04/2012 
935 Although NDRC did not publish its full decision online, it released an announcement relating to this case, 
which summarized the basic facts and Guangxi DRC's findings. The Chinese version of the announcement is 
available at NDRC's website at http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201402/t20140228_588558.html. 
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of pelagic fish, and for entering into exclusive supply agreements with trawlers to supply 
pelagic fish. The price fixing allegation stemmed from the Association implementing an 
industry-wide formula that linked payments to boat owners, skippers, and crew to the average 
annual fishmeal price that the industry reached. From 1999 to 2010, all industry participants 
utilized the formula whether they attended the Association’s meetings or not, where 
participants exchanged competitively sensitive information. The Association admitted to and 
agreed to cease committing the challenged conduct. It agreed to cooperate with the 
Commission and to implement a competition law compliance program. The Association finally 
agreed to pay an administrative penalty of South African Rand 16,800.00, which equaled nearly 
8% of the subscriptions that it collected from its members in 2010. The Commission also 
investigated and penalized individual members of the Associations under different orders. The 
settlement between the Competition Commission and the South African Pelagic Fish 
Processors Association was incorporated in an agreement filed before the South African 
Competition Tribunal. 936 
 
2.1.2.2. Pricing Abuses 
 
There are several interesting cases relating to pricing abuses. In 2010 in Brazil, CADE initiated 
an ex officio enquiry of excessive pricing abuse in the Poultry Farming sector after discovering 
from published reports, that the president of the Brazilian Association of Poultry Farming had 
recommended that the sector reduce its production by approximately 20% in order to avoid a 
decrease in prices. CADE considered the conduct to be illegal and fined the Association and 
its president to cease and desist from this conduct and to pay a fine of approximately Brazilian 
Real 1,000,000.00 only. 937 
In 2014, FAS in Russia received a complaint that an open joint stock company 
‘Zernoproduct’ was engaging in excessive pricing abuse in the grain and cereal sector by 
rendering the services of keeping and offloading the grains from the stocks of the interventional 
reserve created by the Ministry of Agriculture at an artificially high price which exceeded the 
prices of analogous services in other regions. After investigations and economic analysis, FAS 
established that the price for services of keeping and offloading the grains from the stocks of 
the interventional reserve set by OJSC “Zernoproduct” was monopolistically high. However, 
FAS did not impose a fine and merely obtained from it a commitment that it would reduce the 
price at which it was offering services. 938 
In a 2016 decision, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) held that members of 
the Indian Jute Mills Association had indulged in an excessive pricing abuse. CCI had initiated 
the investigation on the basis of a complaint received from the Indian Sugar Mills Association 
and others who were the primary consumers of bags produced by the Indian Jute Mills 
                                                          
936Decision of the Competition Tribunal Republic of South Africa Case No. CR213Mar14/SA066Jul16 In the 
matter of the Competition Commission v. The South African Pelagic Fish Processors Association dated 
29/07/2016. 
937 BRAZIL, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n 
08012.003623/2009-53 and Request n 08700.002933/2009-01, Defendants: União Brasileira de Avicultura 
(UBA) and Ariel Antônio Mendes. Final Decision, Reporting Commissioner: Carlos Ragazzo, 09 June 2010. 
938 Decision of Ivanovo FAS, 17/04/2014, case №02-08/2013-003 Open joint-stock company “Zernoproduct”. 
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Association. The complainants had argued that the Indian Jute Mills Association and its 
members was in the practice of fixing the price of jute packaging material by issuing a daily 
price bulletin. It was further argued that the prices imposed by the Jute Mills Association and 
its members were unfair and excessive price and limited technical development of market. 
After an investigation CCI found the Jute Mills Association and its members guilty of abusing 
their dominant position and engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. CCI directed the parties 
to cease and desist from indulging in these acts and imposed a penalty of 5% of the average 
turnover of the mills and the association in the last three years. 939 
In 2012, the NDRC of the Guizhou and Sichuan region in China provided information 
about a pricing abuse in the liquor sector. It reported that Moutai had issued a price limiting 
order to its distributors and had subsequently penalized six distributors for acting contrary to 
the price limiting order. In 2013, the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of NDRC 
and Guizhou Price Bureau commenced joint investigation of Moutai and Wuliangye. 
Subsequently, Moutai and Wuliangye cancelled relevant marketing policies that violated the 
antimonopoly law. Moutai also withdrew relevant penalty decisions and refunded the deposits 
of its distributors. Finally, by its decision of 22 February 2013, Guizhou Provincial Pricing 
Administration imposed a penalty of RMB 247 million (approximately USD 39.8 million) on 
Kweichow Moutai, the most famous Chinese state-owned producer of premium liquor, for 
administering resale price maintenance. On the same day, Sichuan PDRC released its decision 
to penalize Wuliangye, another state-owned premium liquor producer, in an amount of RMB 
202 million (about USD 32.6 million) for RPM as well. 940  
On 22 February 2013, Guizhou Provincial Pricing Administration released the decision 
to impose a penalty on Kweichow Moutai, the most famous Chinese state-owned producer of 
premium liquor, for administering resale price maintenance.941 In more detail, on 18 December 
2012, Moutai issued a price limiting order regarding the lowest retail price and bulk price of 
Moutai liquor. On 5 January 2013, Moutai internally announced penalty to six distributors for 
disobeying the lowest guidance prices. Of the six distributors, three Chongqing distributors 
were penalized by suspension of relevant contractual arrangement, retention of deposits and 
yellow-card warning, etc. Such distributors shall also resume the guidance prices. On 13 
January 2013, the Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of NDRC and 
Guizhou Price Bureau commenced joint investigation on Moutai and Wuliangye. NDRC held 
that Moutai’s RPM violated AML and required it to (a) cancel relevant marketing policies and 
rules that violate antimonopoly law (b) withdraw penalties to relevant distributors and (c) 
refund the retained deposits. Unlike other prior large ticket, this one was issued by the local 
Guizhou Price Bureau. Guizhou Price Bureau issued a 247 million ticket to Moutai and a 202 
                                                          
939 Competition Commission Of India Case No. 38 of 2011 Indian Sugar Mills Association and others v. Indian 
Jute Mills Association and others order dated 31/10/2014. 
940 The NDRC did not publish the full contents of these two sanctions. However, the case number and rulings may 
be deduced from the companies' announcements since both Moutai and Wuliangye are listed 
companies. Those sanctions are: Guizhou Price Bureau's administrative sanction (Qian Jia Chu [2013] No.1) 
against Kweichow Moutai; Sichuan DRC's administrative sanction (Chuan Fa Gai Jia Jian [2013] No.1) against 
Wuliangye. 
941 Kweichow Moutai case, 22 February 2013 
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million ticket for Wu Liangye which is the largest Anti-trust ticket. The total amount of Moutai 
and Wuliangye ticket is the biggest fine in antitrust enforcement practice. 
In South Africa, in 2011, the Animal feed producers notified the Competition 
Commission of South Africa (CCSA) of the possibility of an abuse on the part of Foskor by 
charging excessive prices for the sale of phosphoric acid, which constitutes an input to both 
livestock and poultry feed. The Commission determined that Foskor possessed the ability to 
sustain prices “substantially in excess” of the competitive level, to “the very limit” of its 
monopolistic power in the local market, and that the price that Foskor charged was “excessive 
and detrimental to consumers”. To respond to the Commission’s concerns, Foskor eliminated 
the 75% shipping rate from the local phosphoric acid price, thereby substantially lowering 
prices. Foskor additionally committed to adopt a competition law compliance program. The 
settlement between the Competition Commission and Foskor was recorded in an agreement 
filed before the Competition Tribunal.942  
 
2.1.2.3. Horizontal mergers 
 
2.1.2.3.1. Unilateral effects 
 
The BRICS competition authorities have reviewed numerous horizontal merger cases relating 
to all segments of the agro-food industry, involving both domestic and international firms. 
In Brazil, in 2008, CADE reviewed the acquisition by Monsanto, a market leader in all 
types of corn seeds, of Agroeste Sementes943. The report of the authority indicated some 
horizontal concentration in the market for hybrid corn, involving the technology, the 
incorporation into the seeds, the multiplication and the sale. Although barriers to entry were 
high and the variation of HHI level was significant, the authority considered that rivalry in the 
market (Syngenta, Pioneer and Dow) was enough to curb any anticompetitive effects. The final 
decision was approval of the transaction with the condition of restricting the non-competition 
clause to five years. Of course, unilateral effects were also raised in the context of the proposed 
purchase of Monsanto Co. by Bayer AG, two of the largest competitors in the world for soybean 
seeds and transgenic cotton, which is explored in another Section of this report944 
Turning to Russia, in 2017, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) granted the 
application of JSC “United Confectioners”, the largest confectionary holding in Russia and 
Eastern Europe, to acquire 42,43% of voting shares of the OJSC Moscow Confectionary 
Factory “Krasniy Octyabr” specialised in production of confectionary.945 “United 
Confectioners” is a vertically integrated holding including 19 factories, 8 logistic centers and 
the agro-holding cluster producing raw materials for the factories. Upon the acquisition, 100% 
of capital share of “Krasniy Octyabr” would belong to the entities constituting the same group 
with “United Confectioners”.  
                                                          
942 Decision of the Competition Tribunal of the Republic of South Africa in Case no. 43/CR/2010 in the matter 
between the Competition Commission of South Africa v. Foskor (Pty) Ltd order dated 28/02/2011. 
943 Agroeste Sementes 
944 Monsato/Bayer, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n AC 
08700.001097/2017-49, final decision pending as of 31 August 2017. 
945 2017 /M/ United Confectioners. JSC, FAS of Russia, No ЦА/6182/17, 2 February 2017. 
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With regard to China, MOFCOM conditionally approved in 2009 Pfizer’s proposed 
acquisition of Wyeth.946 MOFCOM concluded that Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth would 
substantively change the structure of market competition for swine mycoplasma pneumonia 
vaccine, resulting in restrictions on or elimination of competition. To support its conclusion, 
MOFCOM used specific data to demonstrate that the market share of the merged company and 
the resulting concentration in the market of swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine, which 
would be significantly increased and, consequently, render it more difficult for other companies 
to enter the relevant market. Thus, clearance of the proposed merger was conditional on the 
divestment of the business of Mycoplasma pneumoniae pneumonia vaccine 
The Competition Commission’s of South Africa analysis of the merger between Dow 
and Dupont in 2017 also greatly relied on the non-coordinated (unilateral) effects of the merger, 
following the existence of various horizontal overlaps between the merging companies in 
fungicides, herbicides, and insecticides.947 The decision is examined in more detail at a 
different Section of this Report. 
 
2.1.2.3.2. Coordinated effects 
 
Coordinated effects were brought forward by the Competition Commission of South Africa 
when it provisionally cleared the proposed merger by Dow of Dupont in 2017.948 The CCSA 
considered whether the merger would have produced coordinated effects in the maize seed 
market. The prevalence of cross-licensing agreements necessary to breed and develop traits 
would have facilitated coordination among the market participants. The agrochemical market 
further had undergone tremendous consolidation in the recent past. However, the Tribunal 
determined that the heterogeneity of traits and seeds materially would have inhibited 
coordination, as the market produced constant innovation. Additionally, licensing agreements 
normally do not indicate the costs of the licensee or otherwise reveal the prices of downstream 
products. The CCSA also considered unilateral and coordinated theories of harm on the 
sunflower market. As for the coordinated effects, the CCSA also conducted an extended 
analysis of the possibility that the merger would produce coordinated effects. As in the maize 
seed market, the relevant products were not homogenous, weakening the potential for 
coordination. Market participants competed in several markets and commonly met at CropLife, 
an industry association, factors that increased opportunities to exchange information and detect 
and punish deviations from agreed actions. Yet as the parties constantly innovated, the 
heterogeneity of fungicides rendered coordination untenable. Again, this decision is examined 
in greater detail in another Section of the report. 
 
2.1.2.4. Mergers with vertical foreclosure 
 
In Brazil, CADE has been exploring vertical foreclosure in various merger cases. Most notably, 
in 2011, CADE was notified of the proposed merger between Sadia and Perdigão, two Brazilian 
                                                          
946 Pfizer/Wyeth, MOFCOM, 29 September 2009 
947 Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Case No: LM030May16, DowDuPont Inc., 30 June 2017. 
948 Ibid. 
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top players in the food industry –and historical rivals– into Brasil Foods.949  They represented 
together between 50% and more than 80% of sales in the Brazilian market of processed food 
in each market. CADE undertook an extensive analysis of all the relevant markets. The report 
indicated that the operation could lead to high horizontal concentration, especially in the 
markets of margarine, sausages, ham, hamburgers, lasagnas, frozen pizza, kebabs and 
meatballs. There was also vertical integration and concerns on the increase of the purchase 
bargaining power. Entry and rivalry were not capable of compensating the market power 
created. The claimed efficiencies were not sufficient. The reporting Commissioner voted for 
the prohibition of the merger. The other Commissioners (majority) voted for its approval with 
several restrictions. During the same year, CADE also examined the proposed acquisition by 
Fresenius of Hosp Pharma.950  The report of the authority indicated that there was vertical 
integration in the market of parenteral nutrition and its components. Although Fresenius held 
a dominant position, there was no possibility of vertical foreclosure given that competitors 
could provide inputs and import products. Nonetheless, agreements included a non-competition 
clause requiring adjustment as to its geographical scope. The transaction was approved with 
the condition of restricting the clause to the a distance of 200 km from Sao Paulo. In 2006, 
CADE reviewed the proposed agreements for cooperation and licensing for the use of hybrid 
corn between Monsanto and Agromen.951 The report of the authority indicated that there was 
no horizontal concentration or vertical integration. The merger was approved without 
restrictions.   
Turning to India, in 2016, the CCI unconditionally approved the proposed acquisition 
of Anik Industries Limited by BSA International S.A952. The Acquirer proposed to acquire the 
Target's dairy business by way of slump sale. The Acquirer was a company incorporated in 
Belgium and functions in India through its subsidiary, Tirumala Milk Foods Pvt. Ltd. 
(Tirumala), which is engaged in the production and manufacture of liquid milk and milk 
products. The Target is engaged in three sectors i.e. dairy, power production and trading of 
coal and agro goods. The CCI held that there was a horizontal overlap between the parties in 
the (a) liquid milk and (b) ghee activities. In the Ghee market, the CCI recognized that the 
market comprised of organized and unorganized players and the geographic market was the 
entire territory of India. It was further observed that the players were unlikely to raise concerns 
and thus further market delineation was not required. The market shares of the parties were 
insignificant and vertical foreclosure was unlikely to occur.  
With regard to China, in 2006, MOFCOM conditionally approved the proposed 
acquisition of SAB Miller by Anheuser-Busch InBev pending on the divestment of 49% shares 
of China Resources Breweries CO., Ltd.953 In its competition analysis, MOFCOM considered 
four factors, including (a) the deal will further enhance ABI’s market controlling power, (b) 
                                                          
949 Sadia/ Perdigão, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n AC 
08012.004423/2009-18, 13 July 2011. 
950 Fresenius/Hosp Pharma, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings 
n AC 012.008526/2009-57, 29 June 2011. 
951 Monsanto/Agromen, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n 
AC 08012.009265/2005-69, 05 April 2006. 
952 B.S.A. International S.A./Anik Industries Ltd, CCI, C-2016/04/386, 23 June 2016. 
953 Anheuser-Busch InBev / SAB Miller, MOFCOM, 29 July 2016. 
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the deal between the two closely competing beer makers will lead to reduced competition, (c) 
the deal will increase barriers to entry, and (d) the deal will hurt downstream distributors. 
MOFCOM’s decision analysed the market structure and possible harm to downstream 
distributors. It found that most beer distributors are small in scale with limited coverage, and 
lack significant bargaining power. Post-merger, the undertaking would have the incentive and 
power to control the distribution channel and customers in order to raise the entry barriers to 
beer market. Due to reduced competition between ABI and CR Snow, the distributors’ 
bargaining power would be further weakened. Thus, the distributors would have less access to 
ABI’s incentive programs, and thereby their interests will be harmed. 
Vertical foreclosure was also an issue raised by the Competition Commission of South 
Africa in the analysis of the acquisition of Little Green beverages, a supplier of branded private 
label soft drinks in South Africa, by Main Street, a private investment fund that owned a 
shareholding in a corrugated packaging company.954 The CCSA expressed concerns that the 
merger raised some vertical foreclosure issues, in that LGB purchased packaging materials 
from Main Street’s packaging company. After LGB assured the Tribunal that it did not intend 
to shift its procurement to this company completely, the Tribunal held that the transaction was 
unlikely to produce input or customer foreclosure. The Tribunal approved the transaction and 
concluded that it was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any relevant 
market.  
 
2.1.2.5. Mergers with portfolio effects 
 
In Brazil, CADE examined portfolio effects in 2009, when considering the acquisition by 
Recofarma (a company owned by the multinational corporation Coca Cola) of Leao Junior, 
which is a company active in the tea and guarana business.955 The authority found high 
horizontal concentration in the markets of ready-to-drink tea (mate) and iced teas. Entry and 
rivalry would not be sufficient to curb anticompetitive effects, especially because of the brand 
loyalty observed in this market. The report analysed the specificities of the distribution chain 
for cold teas, in which a duopoly was established. Efficiencies were presented but they were 
not sufficient to dispel the competitive concerns. Given the portfolio power of Coca-Cola, 
CADE decided to propose structural restrictions which were, in the end, agreed by the parties. 
The final decision was approval with the condition of the sale of the brand Nestea from Coca-
Cola. 
In India, portfolio effects came up in the context of the assessment of the Dow/Dupont 
merger956. The CCI considered that the proposed merger had a conglomerate dimension, raising 
issues in several markets, such as crop protection products, R & D in crop protection products, 
seeds, purified CMC and material science. Whilst CCI was of the view that the merger did not 
have an adverse effect on competition in seeds and purified CMC, but it found potential adverse 
                                                          
954 Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Case No: LM168Nov16, Main Street 1438 (Pty) Ltd, 19 Jan. 2017. 
955Recofarma (Coca-Cola)/Leao Junior, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative 
Proceedings n AC 08012.001383/2007-91, 17 June 2009. 
956 Dow Chemical Company Ltd, Case No C-2016/05/400, 08 June 2017. 
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effect on competition in relation to crop protection products, R & D in crop protection products, 
and material science. Consequently, CCI recommended modifications to the merger, which 
were accepted by the parties. The decision is examined in more detail in a separate Section of 
the report. 
 
2.1.2.6. Public interest mergers 
 
The parallel consideration of public interest concerns in the merger control of South Africa is 
of course a well-known feature of South African regime957. One of the many examples of the 
consideration of public interest concerns in food sector mergers is the 2016 acquisition of 
Anheuser-Busch by SABMiller, the CCSA conditionally approving the proposed 
acquisition.958 In South Africa, AB InBev supplies beer products and SABMiller is the largest 
producer of beer products. The CCSA found that the proposed merger raised several 
competition and public interest concerns. To satisfy public interest concerns, the parties agreed 
to pay one billion rand mostly for agricultural development, but also for enterprise development 
and other objectives. The parties also agreed for five years to generally maintain the same 
employment level at SABMiller, and to meet benchmarks for local input purchases. 
 
2.1.2.7. Licensing agreements 
 
In 2015, CADE unconditionally approved the proposed licensing agreement granted by 
Monsanto to Embrapa, through which the latter would develop and sell corn seeds with the 
VTPro2 technology.959 The report of the authority indicates that there was no risk that the 
agreement would be detrimental to the competition in the market, since there was no exclusivity 
involved. 
Of particular interest is also CADE’s approval with restrictions in 2014 of four 
operations involving licensing agreements through which Monsanto do Brasil Ltda authorized 
other companies to develop, produce and sell, in Brazil, soybean seeds with Intact RR2 
PROTM technology, owned by Monsanto960. CADE conditioned the approval of the 
transactions to the change of clauses that gave Monsanto the possibility to influence the 
strategic decisions of the licensee companies. This influence did not only reach seed production 
with Intact technology but also extended to the total production of the licensee companies. The 
contractual provisions established a compensation mechanism for the licensee companies, 
based on sales of the Intact product and on the sales of certified seeds of Monsanto’s 
competitors. Had a licensee company chosen to expand its production by also using a patent 
                                                          
957 For an excellent study, see A. A. Raslan, Mixed Policy Objectives in Merger Control: What Can Developing 
Countries Learn from South Africa?, (2016) 39(4) World Competition 625 and the analysis provided in the country 
report on South Africa. 
958 Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV & SABMiller plc, Competition Tribunal of South Africa, Case No: 
LM211Jan16, 4 August 2016. 
959 Monsanto/Embrapa, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Administrative Proceedings n 
AC 08700.001226/2015-37, 24 March 2015. 
960 See CADE’s press release http://www.cade.gov.br/noticias/cade-aprova-com-restricoes-contrato-de-
licenciamento-entre-monsanto-e-bayer . 
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from a competing product, the compensation from what had been produced with Intact 
technology would have been reduced accordingly. Monsanto’s competitor should have then 
counterbalanced the offer by paying for the correspondent profit reduction. 
 
2.1.2.8. Joint Venture Agreements 
 
In 2015, the Competition Commission of South African brought three complaints against Astral 
Operations, having found that it was a dominant undertaking.961 In the Elite Complaint, it 
alleged that Astral entered a joint venture with a horizontal competitor, Country Bird, that 
foreclosed other suppliers of parent stock chicken by forcing Country Bird to source 90% of 
its requirements from the joint venture undertaking, Elite. The contract between the parties also 
restricted Country Bird from entering the upstream breeder market. The Commission finally 
alleged that the joint venture forced Elite to purchase feed requirements from a certain source, 
which foreclosed other suppliers of feed. Astral admitted that the joint venture violated 
competition law by preventing Country Bird from expanding within the broiler market and 
offering an alternative parent stock breed. Astral subsequently bought-out Country Bird’s 
interest in Elite. The Commission refrained from imposing a penalty for this offense. In a 
second complaint, termed Poultry Products, Astral admitted to price fixing and attempting to 
raise the price of fresh poultry in the Western Cape from 2003 to 2007. Astral undertook not 
to commit similar acts in the future and to pay an administrative penalty which represented 3% 
of its fresh poultry turnover in the Western Cape for 2008. In a third Complaint, entitled 
Breeding Stock, the Commission alleged that an association which included Astral allocated 
markets, exchanged sensitive information, and arranged for exclusive supply agreements and 
tying. The Commission accepted undertakings by Astral to submit information to the 
association in a certain format and to cooperate with ongoing investigations related to the above 
complaints. 
 
2.1.2.9. Standardization Agreements 
 
The Competition Commission of South Africa examined standardization agreements in a case 
brought in 2011, concerning the activities of an industry association for grain storage, a 
committee of which was staffed by representatives of most competitors. The CCSA alleged 
that the defendant Grain Silo Indus (GSI), exchanged cost information and recommended daily 
storage rates to another industry association, SAFEX962. SAFEX set a price benchmark for 
grain storage and sales transactions in the physical grain market on which participants in these 
separate markets relied. GSI also aggregated on a yearly basis the cost information that its 
members regularly submitted to it to facilitate circulating an annual average cost of running a 
grain storage business. While GSI argued that SAFEX needed uniform tariffs to function 
properly, the CCSA considered that having competitors providing grain storage services jointly 
determine the SAFEX tariffs through GSI amounted to horizontal price fixing. GSI admitted 
that it provided a forum where its members could share detailed cost information related to the 
                                                          
961 Astral Operations Ltd, Comp. Trib. of S. Africa, Case No: 015891, 12 November 2013. 
962 Grain Silo Indus (Pty) Ltd, Case No: 43/CR/Jun11, Comp. Trib. of S. Africa, 9 November 2011. 
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cost of operating a silo and of storing grain, that it therefore facilitated the joint determination 
of proposed SAFEX tariffs. GSI agreed to pay an administrative penalty of 94,556 rand, to 
cooperate in the prosecution of other conspiracy participants, and to implement a competition 
law compliance program. 
 
2.1.2.10. Agricultural Cooperatives  
 
Starting with China, in 2016, an abuse of dominance case was brought by the Huazhou Chen 
Yawang Farming Cooperative to the High People's Court of Guangdong Province, alleging that 
Huazhou Bayberry Food Ltd refused to continue to offer slaughter and wholesale facilities to 
Chen, because Huazhou Chen Yawang Farming Cooperative failed to get the requisite 
permission by the government963, although Huazhou Chen Yawang Farming Cooperative 
alleged that it had assured a business licence from the Huazhou Administration of Industry and 
Commerce. Maoming Intermediate Court held that the dispute concerned an abuse of dominant 
market position over which the Court did not have jurisdiction, and thus declined to hear the 
case. In the subsequent appeal, the High Court of the Guangdong province upheld that 
judgment. 
The Competition Commission of South Africa also examined agricultural cooperatives 
when it was seized in 2002, by a farmer’s complaint alleging that the Patensie cooperative, a 
packing and distribution association of farmers, prevented him from procuring packing services 
from another vendor.964 The CCSA alleged that the defendant’s Articles of Association 
constituted a horizontal agreement between farmers that fixed trading conditions and fined non-
compliance, including a requirement not to deal with competing packing and marketing 
vendors. According to the CCSA, this conduct qualified as collusion and abuse of dominance.  
The Competition Tribunal proceeded only with the abuse of dominance claim. It found 
that the individual members of the association could not control its business decisions, as no 
farmer held more than a 6% share of the association. The absence of a profit above costs also 
did not create a single economic entity. The Tribunal determined that the relevant product 
market consisted of farmers and the association exchanging services as buyers and sellers for 
the packing and marketing of citrus fruit. It identified a geographic market of the Gamtoos 
River Valley because of the significant costs associated with transporting fruit. The Tribunal 
held that the association dominated this market, holding at least a 70% share, which surpassed 
the 45% floor required to prove dominance. The South African Competition Act explicitly 
provides that companies may not “require or induce” customers or suppliers to cease or avoid 
dealing with competitors. The association’s Articles required members to supply their entire 
output to the association for packing and marketing, completely precluding farmers from 
dealing with other purveyors of these services. The Tribunal characterized this provision as a 
“naked restraint of trade” and an exclusionary act regardless of whether the Commission could 
establish anticompetitive effects; the Tribunal presumed effects based on dominance and the 
                                                          
963 Huazhou Chen Yawang Farming Cooperative v. Huazhou Food Ltd., Huazhou Bayberry Food Ltd., The High 
People's Court of Guangdong Province, 23 December 2016. 
964 Patensie Sitrus, Case No: 37/CR/Jun01, Comp. Trib. of S. Africa, 8 April 2002. 
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act itself. However, the Tribunal did not impose an administrative penalty. It rather voided the 
Articles of Association that compelled the exclusionary practice. 
 
2.2. A comparative analysis of the competition assessment of some recent merger 
transactions in the agrochemical sector 
 
The recently notified mergers in the seed and agro-chem industry, as well as those 
contemplated in other related sectors raise difficult questions that competition authorities 
around the world. Because of the importance of their market size, the decision reached by US 
and EU competition authorities were important for the merging parties, but the perspective of 
a number of other competition authorities in emerging and developing economies’, in particular 
in the BRICS, the BRICS competition authorities in some cases assessing the merger 
transactions before the EU and the US competition authorities had the chance to finalize their 
assessment. Hence, their decisions played an increasingly important role for the transactions, 
in particular with the adoption of some global remedies that took care of some of the most 
controversial competition law concerns raised by these transactions. 
The most recent merger wave started in July 2014 when Monsanto made a number of 
acquisition offers to Syngenta.  These offers were rejected, but the Monsanto bid triggered a 
number of other M&A transactions that were announced in 2015 and 2016 between the various 
market leaders in the factors of production segment. In November 2015, Syngenta accepted the 
offer of ChemChina (which owns ADAMA, one of the largest agrochemical companies in the 
world). In December 2015, Dupont and Dow announced their merger. In September 2016, 
Bayer put forward a merger deal with Monsanto. During the same month, a deal was announced 
between two of the leaders in the market for Fertilisers, Potash Corp and Agrium. In November 
2015, it was reported that Deere & Co. (the leader in agricultural machinery) has agreed to buy 
Monsanto’s precision farming business. This deal was opposed by the US Department of 
Justice as it would have led Deere to control a significant part of the already highly concentrated 
US high-speed precision planting systems market965. 
The global consolidation of the crop seeds & biotechnology, agricultural chemical, 
animal health and breeding industries, as well as agricultural machinery has been the focus of 
economic research, including, Hart (2000)966, King (2001)967, MacDonald et al. (2004)968, 
Fernandez-Cornejo 969, Fuglie et al. (2011)970, Moss (2013)971, the European Parliament 
                                                          
965 See, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/905571/download . 
966 N. E. Hart, The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of concentration in Input Supply, (2000) 18(1) 
Journal of Agribusiness 115-127. 
967 J. King, Concentration and Technology in Agricultural Input Industries, USDA, Agriculture Information 
Bulletin no. 763. 
968 J. MacDonald et al., Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of Agricultural 
Commodities, (2004) Agricultural Economic Report No. 837, 9. 
969 J. Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Agric. 
Info. Bull. No. 786 (2004), 4. 
970 K. Fuglie et al, Research Investments and Market Structure in the Food Processing, Agricultural Input, and 
Biofuel Industries Worldwide, USDA-ERS Economic Research Report No. 130 (2011).  
971 D. L. Moss, Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and Transgenic Seed, (2013) 58 South Dakota Law 
Review 543-559 
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(2014)972, Boston Consulting Group (2015)973, the ETC Group (2011974, 2015975), the European 
Commission (2015)976, US National Academy of Sciences (2015)977, Howard (2009978, 
2016)979. High concentration in the food industry is not unusual. This phenomenon has been 
extensively studied over the last several years. Howard argues that the rapid consolidation of 
the seed industry led to global dominance by a few companies, with Monsanto, Syngenta and 
DuPont being the most powerful980. At the time the mergers were notified it was estimated that 
“the Big Six” (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, Bayer, Dow) collectively controlled more 
than 75% of the global agrochemical market, 63% of the commercial seed market, and almost 
three quarters of R&D expenses in the seeds and pesticides sector (as the combined R&D 
budget of the Big Six was 15 times more than the USDA crop science research budget in 
2013)981. More in depth analysis of the structure of the seeds and agrochemical markets was 
provided in Part II. 
These mergers raised quite interesting questions as to the possible theories of harm 
analysed, the way the various competition authorities employed the relevant market tool for 
their assessment or price competition, and the extent to which they ignored it when examining 
other possible effects of the merger, the way markets were defined for different types of 
products, the role, if any, of public interest considerations, but also significant differences in 
the economic and legal context of each jurisdiction, the relevant product markets in some 
jurisdictions being less concentrated than in others, sometimes being linked to the fact that 
some markets are conventional seed markets, the commercialization of genetically modified or 
edited book being limited by extensive regulation, while other jurisdictions are more GMO-
friendly and one may observe a higher concentration of their market. 
It has been alleged that the large agrochemical companies that have initiated this merger 
wave are seeking to develop an “integrated offering of equipment and services for farmers,” 
enabling them to “gradually build a compelling one-stop solution that will allow them to 
compete for the lion’s share of the market. It is increasingly clear that market players in this 
industry have made the choice of positioning themselves as fully integrated providers, or the 
orchestrators of a network, or partners of an established network982, which may lead to the 
                                                          
972 I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study commissioned 
by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament. 
973 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector (April 2015), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/process-industries-innovation-crop-farming-2030-
reinvention-sector/ 
974 ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf. 
975 ETC Group, Outsmarting Nature, November 2015;  
976 European Commission, Overview of the Agricultural Sectors in the EU Study (2015). 
977 M. M. Nesheim, M. Oria and P. Tsai Yin (eds.), A Framework for Assessing Effects of the Food System, 
National Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 54 
978 Ph. H. Howard, Visualizing consolidation in the global seed industry: 1996-2008, (2009) Sustainability 
1(4):1266-1287. 
979 Ph. Howard, Concentration and Power in the Food System (Bloomsbury, 2016). 
980 Ph. H. Howard, Visualizing consolidation in the global seed industry: 1996-2008, (2009) Sustainability 
1(4):1266-1287; Ph. H. Howard, Seed industry structure, (2014), available at 
https://msu.edu/~howardp/seedindustry.html. 
981 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 115, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/breaking-bad-big-ag-mega-mergers-play, p.4.  
982 Id., p. 15. 
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development of bottlenecks in the food supply chain affecting consumers and other market 
actors, such as farmers.  This is particularly the case in the seed sector, where companies have 
been offering a package of genetic transformation technology and genomics, traits, seeds and 
chemicals983. As we have examined in Part I, it is possible to argue that this package of 
‘complementary’ products and technologies may form a system competing with other systems 
(‘systems competition’).984 
Hence, a question that had to be tackled, when determining the relevant markets affected 
by the mergers is if research, breeding and development/marketing of the various kinds of seeds 
be considered as part of the same or of different relevant markets? The answer to this question 
was not clear at the time these mergers were first assessed. For instance in the EU, the question 
has been left open in the Commission’s decision in Limagrain/KWS/Genective JV985, while in 
Syngenta/Monsanto’s sunflower seeds business, the Commission considered that breeding and 
commercialisation are two separate markets986, and in Syngenta CP/Advanta the Commission 
included both stages of the seed industry in one single relevant product market987. What about 
seed-herbicide packages, the seed/agrochem company selling cultivars with special tolerance 
to the parent agro-chem company’s herbicides? Would the Commission proceed to the same 
approach it employs in the context of tying cases, where the existence of independent suppliers 
in the manufacture and sale of the tied product may constitute serious evidence of the existence 
of a separate market for that product988? Of course, market definition issues will also concern 
the question of GM seed markets being defined as a separate market than conventional seeds, 
the Commission noting in Limagrain/KWS/Genective JV that “it is difficult to predict how the 
breeding and commercialisation of conventional and GM […] seeds will interact in the future”, 
substitutability depending “to a large degree on the future deregulation and overall regulatory 
environment for GM maize seeds in the EEA”989. 
One may also argue that the emergence of integrated technology/traits/seeds/chemicals 
platforms may place barriers to new entry, as companies wishing to enter the market(s) would 
need to offer an integrated solution to farmers. This may stifle disruptive innovation, if in the 
absence of the merger, firms were able to enter one or two segments of the market (e.g. research 
and breeding) without the need to offer an “integrated” platform product that would offer 
significant economies of scale, but would also require high fixed costs. Although traditional 
breeding methods required important resources and a considerable investment of time (because 
of long breeding cycles) and thus provided large economies of scale leading to the emergence 
of large market players, the latest genome-editing technologies, particularly CRISPR/Cas, may 
constitute more efficient and less resource intensive and time-consuming breeding methods, 
that offer opportunities for the emergence of more competitive and less integrated market 
                                                          
983 D. L. Moss, Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, AAI Submission, 
October 23, 2009, p. 2. 
984 M L Katz & C Shapiro, ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ [1994] 8(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 93. 
985 Case No COMP/M.6454 - LIMAGRAIN / KWS / GENECTIVE JV (2013), para. 23. 
986 Case No COMP/M.5675-Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business, C(2010) 7929 final, paras 76-89. 
987 Case No COMP/M.3465 - SYNGENTA CP / ADVANTA (2004), para. 12. 
988 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601, paras 917 & 922. 
989 Case No COMP/M.6454 - LIMAGRAIN / KWS / GENECTIVE JV (2013), para. 30. 
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structures in the traits/seeds segment(s). Competition in this context may also occur between 
platforms and within platforms. Competition authorities should make efforts to promote inter-
platform competition, but also intra-platform competition. But in this case, how to define the 
relevant market, or the space where competition takes place, in order to complete the analysis 
of the possible effects of an actual or potential restriction of competition? 
The mergers also raised quite important questions as to the level of concentration one 
needs to take into account when assessing the effect of a series of mergers affecting the same 
industry. The issue came forward in particular in the EU case concerning Dow/Dupont and will 
certainly also come up with the ongoing Bayer/Monsanto transaction.  
Market structure and concentration is, of course, just one step in the assessment of 
mergers and is followed by a more thorough analysis of the possible anticompetitive effects 
and efficiencies, if the level of concentration resulting from the merger raises concerns, in view 
of the specific thresholds in each jurisdiction triggering a more careful scrutiny. In the EU, the 
assessment as to whether a merger would give rise to a Significant Impediment of Effective 
Competition (SIEC) is based on a counterfactual analysis where the post-merger scenario is 
compared to a hypothetical scenario absent the merger in question. The latter is normally taken 
to be the same as the situation before the merger is consummated.990 However, the Commission 
may take into account future changes to the market that can “reasonably be foreseen”.991 The 
identification of the proper counterfactual can be complicated by the fact that there can be more 
than one merger occurring in parallel in the same relevant market. Under the mandatory 
notification regime, the Commission does not factor into the counterfactual analysis the merger 
notified after the one under assessment.992 On the basis of the identified counterfactual, the 
Commission then proceeds with the definition of the relevant product and geographic 
market.993 The Commission tackled the issue in the Dow/Dupont merger, as following the 
notification of the transaction, the Commission received notification of the acquisition of 
Syngenta by ChemChina and Bayer announced that it had reached agreement to acquire 
Monsanto. At the time of the review of the merger the Commission’s review of the acquisition 
of Syngenta by ChemChina was still ongoing. In a manner “consistent with its previous 
practice” the Commission assessed the transaction “according to a priority principle (‘first 
come, first served approach’) based on the date of notification994. Citing its previous decisional 
practice on this issue995, the Commission noted: 
                                                          
990 Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2004] OJ C31/6, para 9. 
991 Ibid. 
992 See, eg, TUI/First Choice Case COMP/M.4600 [2007], paras 66–68; TomTom/Tele Atlas Case COMP/M.4854 
[2008], paras 187 and 188.  
993 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2004] OJ C31/6, para 10. 
994 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), para. 136. 
995 Commission Decisions in Case M.6214 – Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (2011); Case M.6203 – Western 
Digital/Viviti Technologies (2011); Case M.4942 – Nokia/Navteq (2008); Case M.4854 – TomTom/Tele Atlas 
(2008); Case M.4601 – Karstadtquelle/My Travel (2007) and Case M.4600 – TUI/First Choice (2007). See also, 
Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, EU:T:2002:146, para.82 ("the level of competition obtaining in the 
relevant market at the time when the transaction is notified is a decisive factor in establishing whether a collective 
dominant position has been created for the purposes of Regulation No 4064/89"), as well as Case T-2/93, Air 
France v. Commission, EU:T:1994:55, paras 70-72;Case C-347/00, Verband der freien Rohrwerke and Others v. 
Commission, EU:T:2003:188, para. 170. 
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 “(137) It should be recalled that assessing the competitive effects of a proposed 
transaction under the Merger Regulation involves a comparison of the competitive 
conditions that would result from the notified merger with the conditions that would 
have prevailed in absence of the merger. The competitive conditions existing at the time 
of notification constitute, as a general rule, the relevant framework for evaluating the 
effects of a transaction. 
However, in some circumstances the Commission may take into account future changes 
to the market that can reasonably be predicted. 
(138) The Commission considers from these principles and the general scheme of the 
Merger Regulation that a party that is the first to notify a transaction should have it 
assessed on its own merits as to whether it would significantly impede effective 
competition in the internal market or in a substantial part thereof. This first to notify a 
transaction should therefore be entitled to have its operation decided first (for example, 
declared compatible with the internal market) within the applicable time limits of the 
Merger Regulation. It is therefore not necessary or appropriate to take into account 
future changes to the market conditions resulting from subsequently notified 
transactions that require approval from the Commission. 
(139) Therefore, in the circumstances of this Decision, the Transaction, which was 
notified to the Commission first, should be assessed in the light of the competitive 
situation that prevailed at the time of its notification, disregarding the potential changes 
that may be brought by the proposed ChemChina/Syngenta and Bayer/Monsanto 
transactions”.996 
This issue has not been addressed in the decisions of the other competition authorities we have 
been able to identify and process.   
We will structure the discussion in two sub-Sections. The first will delve into the more 
conventional competition law analysis performed by the competition authorities of the BRICS 
countries, EU and the US on these mergers regarding the effects of the notified transactions on 
price (the so called product competition). As it will become clear, with regard to this more 
conventional competition law analysis, the authorities seem to take a similar approach, 
implementing well-known principles of market definition and competition assessment, or for 
the analysis of efficiencies, even if, of course, one may expect some limited differences, due, 
for instance, to the specificity of the product and geographic markets explored, the level of 
concentration in each jurisdiction and their overal perception on the contestability of these 
markets. In contrast, the approach followed by the competition authorities in question with 
regard to the assessment of the effect on innovation is quite different (innovation competition). 
Some authorities have engaged in depth with the possible effects on innovation and explored 
new approaches in dealing with these effects, some have flagged up the issue but preferred not 
to take a specific standpoint for this case, while others have preferred, for various reasons, to 
focus their analysis on the more conventional competition law issues of product competition, 
sometimes even ignoring possible effects on innovation. 
 
                                                          
996 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), paras 137-139. 
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2.2.1. Assessment of product competition 
 
As the mergers involved different segments of the value chain, the competition authorities, the 
mergers raised a number of concerns, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate. The analysis  
 
2.2.1.1. The nature of these mergers : horizontal, vertical, conglomerate 
 
The three mergers led to significant overlaps between the merging entities, restricting 
competition between competitors, and raising mainly risks for unilateral (non-coordinated) 
effects in various product markets. Connnected to this horizontal dimension, the mergers also 
raised issues of vertical and/or conglomerate nature.  
To take the example of the Bayer/Monsanto merger, the existence of horizontal 
overlaps between Bayer and Monsanto, raises important risks for actual and potential 
competition.  
Firstly, both companies compete in the seeds sector for various crops, in view of 
Bayer’s presence in the seeds segment, since its acquisition of Aventis in 2002. For instance, 
the two companies compete “head-to-head” in seed and traits for cottonseed and soybeans997. 
Secondly, there are considerable overlaps in the pesticides segment of the value chain. 
Monsanto manufactures the glyphosate-based Roundup Ready brand herbicides and other 
herbicides, such as the Harness® brand for cotton and corn. Bayer produces Liberty, a 
glyfosinate-ammonium based pesticide that not only directly competes with Roundup, but also 
constitutes the main challenger in this market, in view of the recent concerns raised by the 
World Health Organization’s International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), that re-
classified glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” and the difficulties to extend the 
authorisation of glyphosate in the EU998. These overlaps may give rise to an important degree 
of horizontal consolidation, when two companies compete in the same relevant geographic 
markets.  
Thirdly, although pesticides and seed treatment may be considered as complements to 
seeds and traits, and hence forming separate product markets, the development of genetically 
modified (GM) seeds with traits will lead to some form of substitution between GM seeds and 
pesticides. For example, this substitution effect becomes clear if one takes into account that Bt-
corn varieties are registered as pesticides with the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)999. The development of GM plant varieties resistant to certain diseases may also lead to 
a substitution effect between GM-plants and certain herbicides that aim to control weeds that 
are usually harbouring diseases. To this extent, the merger could be considered as limiting a 
source of actual and potential competition for pesticide firms.  
                                                          
997 AAI, Food & Water Watch, National Farmers Union, Proposed Merger of Monsanto and Bayer, (2017, July 
26th), 6 & 12, available at https://nfu.org/2017/07/26/aai-fww-and-nfu-say-monsanto-bayer-merger-puts-competition-farmers-and-consumers-at-risk/ 
998 For a summary see European Parliament, Renewing authorisation for glyphosate, (April 7, 2016), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/580894/EPRS_ATA%282016%29580894_EN.pdf. 
999 See, https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/pip/smartstax-factsheet.pdf. 
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Fourthly, the two companies may have or develop overlaps in “digital farming”, both 
disposing of leading innovation capabilities and R&D technology platforms1000. Monsanto is 
quite active in tools for precision planting and high-tech weather prediction through its 
subsidiary Climate Corporation1001, while Bayer’s “digital farming” unit is active in soil 
analytics and decision support tools for farmers, such as weather analytics, crop yield models, 
pest and disease models, product data (mode of action, genetics)1002. The situation in this 
emerging but crucial, from a strategic perspective, market is even more complex in view of the 
links between the merging entities and their competitors in this segment of the agricultural 
value chain, following the global licensing agreement in October 2016 between Monsanto and 
Dow AgroSciences on the Exzact Precision Technology Genome-Editing Platform for research 
and commercial development of new crop solutions across Monsanto Company’s research 
portfolio1003. 
The non-horizontal dimension of the merger refers to the fact that the merging entity 
may have the ability and the incentive to foreclose competitors in upstream or downstream 
situated markets in the seeds, as well as in the crop protection value chain, and to produce 
exclusionary “portfolio effects”  arising from the combination of the complementary businesses 
of Monsanto and Bayer in traits, seeds, pesticides, herbicides, and digital farming to the 
detriment of final consumers, in this case farmers.  
Vertical integration is conventionally seen more positively than on horizontal overlaps 
in view of the belief that vertical integration may lead to efficiencies. However, vertical 
integration may be problematic for competition, if it enables the new entity to strategically 
foreclose competitors1004, by offering packaged solutions in the seed and traits value chain and 
in the agrochemical supply chain, therefore increasing prices and/or reducing consumer choice. 
Looking, more specifically, to the seed and traits value chain, to the extent that there is an 
upstream market for the development and commercialisation of traits and a downstream market 
for the breeding of traited seeds, and that the treatment of seeds can be considered as an 
upstream market to the downstream supply of seeds, the merging entity may have the incentive 
to engage in a foreclosure strategy against rivals downstream and/or upstream. As each trait 
offers “unique characteristics to the particular seeds”, it cannot be excluded that “each company 
would have a monopoly on the trait developed”, in particular as this is also protected by patents 
                                                          
1000 AAI, Food & Water Watch, National Farmers Union, Proposed Merger of Monsanto and Bayer, (2017, July 
26th), 6; Bayer, Investor Handout (Septemebr 14, 2016), 14. 
1001 Fortune, Monsanto’s Climate Corp to Expand Digital Farming Platform (August 17, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/17/monsantos-climate-corp-to-expand-digital-farming-platform/ ; M. Stern, Digital 
Agriculture, (Speech, 2015), available at https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/05/digital-ag-
stern_2015.11.17.pdf . Monsanto has a significant presence in digital farming in Europe with the acquisition in 
November 2016 of Vitafields, a European farm management software company based in Tallinn, Estonia and 
present in seven European countries: Monsanto, The Climate Corporation Acquires VitalFields to Expand Digital 
Agriculture Innovation for European Farmer (November 21, 2016), available at http://news.monsanto.com/press-
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1002 For more information, see http://www.digitalfarming.bayer.com/ . 
1003 Dow AgroSciences Press Release, Monsanto and Dow AgroSciences Announce Global Licensing Agreement 
on Exzact Precision Technology Genome-Editing Platform (October 3, 2016), available at 
https://www.dowagro.com/en-us/newsroom/pressreleases/2016/10/monsanto-dow-agrosciences-global-
licensing-agreement-exzact#.WY2qwoVOKUk . 
1004 M. Whinston, Lectures on Antitrust Economics (MIT, 2007). 
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and that other companies can only obtain access to it through licensing agreements1005. 
Monsanto has a strong position in traits and, as highlighted above, forms the central node of 
the network of licensing agreements between the Big Six. The new entity will therefore have 
the ability to foreclose rivals from access to the traits licensed, and its incentive to foreclose 
will depend on a comparison of the revenues derived from foreclosure strategies with the 
foregone revenues derived from licensing to its downstream competitors. 
It is also possible to conceive the two value chains as forming in reality one: a 
technological platform/system consisting of, for instance, a non-selective herbicide tolerant 
traited seed and a corresponding non-selective herbicide, which are used in combination in 
order to provide farmers the best protection against weeds. When farmers make decisions on 
which seeds to plant they make their choice on the basis of the various systems available for 
the specific crop, after which they are locked in the specific “technological pathway” provided 
by this system1006. For instance, a Liberty herbicide is formulated to work in conjunction with 
the Liberty Link traits, which is the glufosinate ammonium tolerate trait. Hence, seed 
companies and crop protection firms will not be able to compete with the merging entity’s 
platform “unless they are vertically integrated seed and crop protection firms who develop 
traits, breed seeds and develop active ingredients for herbicides” and they develop “their own 
traits for non-selective herbicide tolerance or license traits from the merging parties”1007. 
The merger finally includes a conglomerate dimension, in view of Monsanto’s and 
Bayer’s presence in the seeds, crop protection and digital agriculture/smart farming value 
chains. In particular developing a new value chain, possibly integrating the three value chains 
on the basis of Big Data appears one of the main reasons motivating the merger transaction. It 
is clear that the acquisition of the Climate Corporation’s data science engine and extensive field 
research networks was Bayer’s principal drive to the merger1008. The aim is to transform its 
core business from producing seeds, herbicides/pesticides and other products to providing an 
inclusive package of services to farmers, guiding their choice in the “40 interlocked decisions 
that inexorably a grower is going to make every single year”1009. 
 
2.2.1.2. Dow/Dupont 
 
Dow and DuPont signed an agreement on December 11, 2015, stipulating that the two 
companies will combine in a "merger of equals", and name the new company being named 
DowDuPont Inc. The existing shareholders of Dow and DuPont will hold approximately 50% 
equity, respectively of the new entities emerging after the merger. The merged entity would 
have a market capitalisation of approximately USD 130 billion. At a later stage, Dow and 
                                                          
1005 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 117, para. 
364. 
1006 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case 2017Feb004 (Bayer/Monsanto) (May 3, 2017), p. 105, para. 
317 
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DuPont declared their intention to create from their combined activities three separate publicly 
traded companies focusing on agriculture, material science and specialty products respectively. 
In agriculture, the merged entity would become the number 1 global integrated crop protection 
and seeds player and the number 2 global seeds player.The Dow/Dupont merger was examined 
in depth in the United States, the European Union, South Africa, China and Brazil. The Russian 
FAS approved the merger without conditions and it was not possible to identify any specific 
analytical framework was used so as to arrive to this decision. The Brazilian case is examined 
in depth in a case study, which also explores the remedial part of the case, an issue that we 
have not yet systematically examined in this report, as we are still waiting final decisions on 
these mergers from all the authorities involved. The parties were arguing that the merger would 
create value, efficiencies, and synergies worth $3 billion annually, and growth synergies worth 
$1 billion, as the parties had complementary product offerings. The parties also pointed to 
corporate synergies that reduced leverage service costs and that would enable procurement 
synergies, together amounting to $3.5 to $4.1 billion. 
 
Dow/DuPont merger transaction 
Country Notification/Investigation 
date 
Decision date 
United States 15 June 2017 28 Sept. 2017 
European Union 22 June 2016 27 Mar. 2017 
Brazil 12 August 2016 17 Mayb 2017 
Russia NA 27 July 2017 
India 19 May 2016 8 June 2017 
China 21 March 2016 29 April 2017 
South Africa 10 May 2016 7 Mar. 2017 
 
 
2.2.1.2.1. United States 
 
In June 2017, the Department of Justice, along with the offices of three state attorneys general, 
the States of Iowa, Mississippi and Montana, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the merger transaction between Dow and Dupont, 
and to accept the settlement reached1010. Following an investigation of the merger starting in 
April 2017, the DOJ Antitrust division considered that, absent the remedies agreed, the merger 
would have likely reduced competition between two of only a handful of chemical companies 
that manufacture certain types of crop protection chemicals, potentially harming U.S. farmers 
and consumers. In addition, the merger would have given the merged company a monopoly 
over ethylene derivatives known as acid copolymers and ionomers, which are also used to 
manufacture many products, including food packaging.  The Complaint alleged that the 
acquisition would likely reduce or eliminate competition in the markets for broadleaf 
                                                          
1010 Complaint, U.S. v. Dow Chem.-Dupont, Case 1:17-cv-01176 (15 June 2017) [U.S. Dow Complaint]. For the 
discussion on the settlement, see https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/973941/download.  
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herbicides for winter wheat and chewing pest insecticides, and would tend to create a monopoly 
in the markets for acid copolymers and ionomers, in the United States in violation of Section 7 
of the Clayton Act. That loss of competition likely would result in increased prices and a 
reduction in service and innovation for the consumers.1011  
The DOJ’s complaint alleged that Dow and DuPont are two of only a few significant 
competitors in the markets for broadleaf herbicides for winter wheat and insecticides for 
chewing pests. In particular, DuPont’s Finesse-formulated herbicide products (active 
ingredients Metsulfuron Methyl and Chlorsulfuron Methyl), is the market leading broadleaf 
herbicide for winter wheat, and Dow had recently introduced a new broadleaf herbicide called 
Quelex to compete with Finesse.  DuPont’s Rynaxypyr line of products, which are marketed 
in the United States under the brand names Altacor, Coragen, and Prevathon, are also the top 
selling insecticides for chewing pests, and compete with Dow’s methoxyfenozide products, 
sold in the United States under the Intrepid brand, and Dow’s spinetoram products, sold under 
the Delegate and Radiant brands.  The complaint alleged that the loss of competition between 
Dow and DuPont would result in higher prices, less favorable contractual terms, and a reduced 
incentive to innovate for each of these products.1012 
The DOJ separated Crop protection chemicals into three broad categories that have 
different qualities and attributes: herbicides (to combat weeds); insecticides (to combat insect 
pests); and fungicides (to combat microbial disease). The following relevant markets were 
defined: 
- the development, manufacture, and sale of broadleaf herbicides sold in the United 
States labelled and registered for use on winter wheat is a line of commerce and relevant 
market within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
- the development, manufacture, and sale of chewing pest insecticides sold in the United 
States is a line of commerce and relevant market within the meaning of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act1013 
When assessing the anticompetitive effects of the merger, the DOJ found that Dow 
Chemical and DuPont compete head-to-head for the development, manufacture, and sale of 
broadleaf herbicides for winter wheat. Competition between Dow and Dupont has benefited 
farmers through lower prices, more effective solutions, and superior service, and has also 
spurred research, development, and marketing of new and improved broadleaf herbicides for 
winter wheat. It was found that the merger would substantially lessen competition, leading to 
higher prices, less favorable contractual terms, and a reduced incentive to spend significant 
resources in developing new products.1014 
Similar effects would take place in the insecticides for chewing pests market, in 
particular as the combined company would control nearly seventy-five percent of the market 
in the United States. It was further noted that Dow Chemical and DuPont’s closest competitor 
sells competing products that are mixed with DuPont’s Rynaxypyr, for which the competitor 
has a license. As a result, specialty crop farmers would have little alternative but to accept 
                                                          
1011 U.S. Dow Compl., ¶¶ 4-5, 66. 
1012 Ibid., ¶¶ 22, 25-26. 
1013 Ibid., ¶¶ 29, 32. 
1014 Ibid., ¶¶ 33, 35. 
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increased prices post-merger. A combined Dow Chemical and DuPont would have the 
incentive and ability to eliminate or restrict financial and other incentives to customers, 
extinguishing this competition and those tangible and valuable benefits to customers. The 
difficulty of entry in these markets was duly highlighted, in particular the barriers to entry 
resulting from the discovery, development, testing, registration, and commercial launch of a 
new herbicide or insecticide can take ten to fifteen years and can cost well over $150 million 
dollars.1015 
A settlement was reached involving the divestiture of DuPont’s market-leading Finesse 
and Rynaxypyr crop protection products, so as to preserve vigorous competition in the sale of 
these products and benefit farmers and consumers. Under the proposed Final Judgment, 
DuPont was required to divest its Finesse-formulated herbicide products (active ingredients 
Metsulfuron Methyl and Chlorsulfuron Methyl), and its Rynaxypyrformulated insecticide 
products, along with the assets used to develop, manufacture, and sell those products. Dow 
Chemical was required to divest some of its ionomers manufacturing units and associated 
assets.1016 
Interestingly, the DOJ press release noted the close cooperation between the Antitrust 
Division of the DOJ and the European Commission in the course of their respective 
investigations. At the time the DOJ considered the case, the European Commission had already 
approved the merger on the condition of certain divestitures including several products also 
divested in the US DOJ Antitrust Division’s proposed settlement, as well as Dupont’s assets 
used for research and development of new crop protection chemicals.  The US DOJ press 
release mentions that “(l)ike the European Commission, the Antitrust Division examined the 
effect of the merger on development of new crop protection chemicals but, in the context of 
this investigation, the market conditions in the United States did not provide a basis for a similar 
conclusion at this time”1017. 
 
2.2.1.2.2. European Union 
 
When examining the Dow/Dupont merger, the European Commission focused on 
several general factors in assessing competitive effects, including market shares, whether the 
merger eliminated a significant and close competitor (rather than the closest competitor), entry 
barriers, and the existence and strength of alternative suppliers. Producers in this industry have 
maintained pricing power despite patent expiry or generic entry1018. 
With regard to herbicides, the Commission noted how regulation influences the ability of 
alternative crop protection products to substitute for existing products, since the Commission 
must authorize the AI used in a product, and each member state separately must authorize the 
crop protection product incorporating the AI. The relevant crops for this market examined in 
the EU case were cereals, rice, pastures, oilseed, rape, sunflower, beets, and corn. The 
                                                          
1015 Ibid., ¶¶ 37, 40. 
1016 Proposed Final Judgment, U.S. v. Dow Chem.-Dupont, Case 1.17-cv-01176-APM, ¶ A, p. 10 (28 Sept. 2017). 
1017 See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-divestiture-certain-herbicides-insecticides-
and-plastics . 
1018 See Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), paras 423-24, 433, 522 
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Commission segmented this market according to selection and non-selective crop protection 
products, by crop, by the specific weed targeted, and by the timing of when farmers apply the 
herbicide. The Commission found that products with different Modes of Action (MoA) and 
different chemical classes still directly competed1019.  
For cereal herbicides, and more specifically post-emergence broadleaf selective cereal 
herbicides, the combined market share of the parties would exceed 50% in many EEA 
countries. The parties would have commanding positions in France (60-70%), Germany (60-
70%), and the UK (50-60%). In the pre-emergence broadleaf selective cereal herbicide market, 
the parties would control 30-40% of combined sales at the EEA level, and have high shares in 
certain EEA countries. The Commission found noteworthy that the relevant market share levels 
may have underestimated the parties’ strength in these markets because they did not incorporate 
the impact of new products that likely would reach the market. The Commission specifically 
highlighted the expected success of Dow’s new Arylex AI. The Commission additionally found 
that Dow and Dupont were close and important competitors in these markets, even if not closest 
competitors, as determined by market participants. The Commission considered the degree of 
closeness as a relevant, though not decisive, factor in the competitive analysis. As an additional 
factor assessed to determine market strength, the Commission found that Dow and Dupont 
offered the main AIs that farmers used in the latter stages of the growing season. The 
Commission also separately analysed the competitive restraints imposed by rivals in the 
herbicide market, finding that no other leading crop protection rivals focused on broadleaf 
weed herbicides for cereals. Rivals further had limited pipeline products that would be able to 
exert competitive pressure on Dow/Dupont in the foreseeable future. The Commission 
concluded that the transaction likely would produce a significant impediment to effect 
competition in the cereal herbicide market, segmenting this conclusion into several categories. 
In the post-emergence broadleaf selective cereal herbicides market, the Commission found the 
transaction would create a dominant position in several member states. The Commission 
separately determined that the transaction would strengthen a dominant position in Norway 
(70-80%), the Netherlands (50-60%), and Lithuania (50-60%). The Commission lastly stated 
that the transaction would eliminate an important competitive restraint in Romania (40-50%), 
Hungary (40-50%), Bulgaria (40-50%), and Spain (40-50%)1020.The Commission continued to 
draw the same distinctions for the pre-emergence broadleaf selective cereal herbicide market, 
the post-emergence cross-spectrum selective cereal herbicides market, and the pre-emergence 
cross-spectrum selective cereal herbicide market1021. 
The Commission next assessed the rice herbicide market, focusing on Italy, Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal. Dow produced the leading rice herbicide worldwide, Penoxsulam. The 
Commission noted that more customers viewed BASF and Bayer as Dow’s closest rival in rice 
herbicides compared to Dupont, though market participants acknowledged that the parties were 
close competitors that exerted some competitive pressure on each other. The transaction would 
produce high combined market shares in selective cross-spectrum post-emergence rice 
herbicides, with pipeline products strengthening the parties’ position. The resistance of pests 
                                                          
1019 Ibid., ¶¶ 577, 581, 643, 655. 
1020 Ibid, paras 657, 702-704, 707, 730, 746, 770-71, 783, 791, 808, 810-812 
1021 Ibid., paras 818, 820, 824-25, 830, 834.  
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to herbicides posed problems for producers in this segment, causing them commonly to mix 
AIs. Few rice herbicides competed with the parties’ offerings, and rivals would not exert 
competitive pressure on Dow/Dupont due to pipeline products1022. 
In the pasture herbicide market, Dow sold products in most EEA countries, while Dupont 
produced only in Germany and Poland. Customers opined that three other rivals, Nufarm, 
Bayer, or BASF, constituted Dow’s closest competitor rather than Dupont, and the parties 
argued that they faced competition from generics given that the relevant AIs were off-patent. 
The Commission determined that the transaction would produce high market shares throughout 
the EEA of at least 50-60% in all countries except France (20-30%) and Austria (20-30%), and 
market participants acknowledged that the parties represented close competitors. Competitors 
exerted limited restraint in this market, both in terms of actual and potential competition, which 
mainly derived from generic substitutes. The parties’ closest rival had only a 5-10% market 
share. The Commission concluded that the transaction either would create or strengthen a 
dominant position1023. 
In the oilseed rape herbicide market, a defining characteristic consisted of the fact that 
farmers had to target weeds at an early stage. Dow sold three existing products and had a fourth 
potential blockbuster product scheduled to hit the market soon. Dupont had an effective AI that 
it sold under two brand names. BASF sold the leading product, no longer patent-protected. The 
parties argued that generics exerted competitive restraint in this market. Customers viewed 
BASF, Syngenta, or Bayer as Dow’s closest competitor. Yet the parties offered alternative 
products or solutions, and market participants considered that the parties were close 
competitors. Several market participants stated that the parties each sold an indispensable 
product in this segment, and market information suggested that both contributed significant 
innovation, as few other rivals had new products in their pipelines. The Commission decided 
that competitive restraints were limited, particularly from other R&D-integrated players, none 
of which had a market share greater than 5%. Contrary to the parties’ claims, generic rivals did 
not restrain the parties’ market power materially, since the largest had only a 5-10% market 
share. The Commission concluded that the transaction would lead to a strengthening of Dow’s 
dominant position because it eliminated Dupont as a potential competitor in all EEA countries 
except for Austria1024. 
In the market for sunflower herbicides, the parties argued that their combined market shares 
would not exceed 10-20%. The Commission stated that Dupont held 90-100% of the market 
for selective broadleaf post-emergence sunflower herbicides in the EEA. The Commission also 
identified the threat that Dupont was leveraging its market power in sunflower seeds to gain a 
benefit in the sunflower herbicide market. In addition to their corresponding low market shares 
in the specific market identified by the Commission, the parties’ rivals had few new products 
in their pipelines that might exert pricing pressure within a few years. The leading generic had 
only a 0-5% market share, and after the transaction, it would constitute the only competitor 
                                                          
1022 Ibid., paras 839, 844, 862, 868, 870, 879, 887, 893, 896-97, 901. 
1023 Ibid., paras 928, 952-53, 959, 971, 976, 981, 983-84, 988, 994-95, 998. 
1024 Ibid., paras 1003, 1006-1010, 1013, 1020-21, 1048-49, 1051-52, 1061, 1063, 1077. 
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with a 5-10% market share in just six of the twelve EEA countries where Dupont had a 
dominant position1025. 
As the parties’ combined market share in the beet herbicide market amounted to only 20-
30% in Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands respectively, the Commission 
determined that the transaction unlikely would significantly impede effective competition1026. 
In the corn herbicide market, Dow had a small corn herbicide portfolio prior to the 
transaction, and the Commission determined that the transaction raised the potential for 
anticompetitive effects only in the Austrian market, where the parties would attain a 30-40% 
market share. It nevertheless concluded that the transaction unlikely would significantly 
impede effective competition1027. 
  With regard to insecticides, the Commission distinguished between older and newer 
insecticides, as the older products had a more indiscriminate effect on insects, in some cases 
harming beneficial insects such as bees. Dow’s insecticide portfolio consisted of four products; 
Dupont sold two products. Syngenta constituted the largest insecticide producer in the EEA, 
holding a 20-30% market share. Bayer represented the second largest insecticide producer in 
the EEA, having a 10-20% market share. The Commission decided to segment insecticides 
primarily by crop, but also as to whether they had foliar or soil application, and finally 
according to the pests targeted. Respondents to the Commission’s market investigation 
recommended this approach. Farmers chose insecticides based on their effectiveness in 
controlling the targeted pest, and based on the relevant crop. The Commission stated that 
market share figures for insecticides did not accurately portray market power, underestimating 
the parties’ positions, since both Dow and Dupont immediately after the decision were 
scheduled to introduce new insecticides throughout the EEA.  
The Commission projected that both Dow and Dupont likely would gain significant market 
share from rivals over the following two years due to the success of two products launched by 
Dow and one product launched by Dupont. Conversely, the Commission also found that the 
leading rivals to the merging parties were planning to withdraw several AIs because of 
regulatory reasons. Bayer and Syngenta, particularly, likely would lose market share. Aside 
from these developments, the transaction would enable the parties to become the leading 
insecticide producer for several specialty crops, including fruits and vegetables, which 
represented the largest markets in the EEA for insecticides. The Commission determined that 
the parties were important and close competitors, and that market participants perceived a 
material overlap in the spectrum of pests that the parties’ portfolios targeted. Despite the market 
share figures, the Commission argued that after the transaction, the parties would have the 
strongest insecticide portfolio across the EEA, in terms of controlling the newest and most 
effective AIs. This advantage risked enabling the parties to raise and control prices. The leading 
market producers targeted different pests, and in the case of Bayer, which did compete with 
two products in the same market, both faced regulatory issues. Similarly, while Syngenta also 
targeted some of the same pests, most of its products were old, suffered from curtailed 
effectiveness due to resistance, and were under regulatory pressure. Examining the leading 
                                                          
1025 Ibid. paras 1094, 1101, 1113, 1126-1127, 1133. 
1026 Ibid., paras 1144, 1146. 
1027 Ibid., paras 1154, 1157-1159. 
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producers’ product pipelines, the Commission found that because third-parties would introduce 
only one AI designed to combat the pests that the merging parties targeted, the parties would 
face insufficient competitive restraint post-transaction. While some of the parties’ product 
utilized off-patent AIs, registration costs across insecticide markets would prevent generics 
from competing in the multitude of different insecticide markets1028. 
At the specific crop level in national markets, starting with pome fruit, the combined entity 
would become a market leader in several EEA countries with market shares significantly larger 
than those of the other R&D-integrated players. Related to this finding, the parties were 
important and close competitors, and rivals imposed limited restraint. The only rival that 
attained a significant market share, Bayer in Slovakia, confronted regulatory pressure and an 
expiring registration in 20181029. 
In the insecticide market for stone fruits, the transaction would enable the merging parties 
to become a market leader in Greece with a 30-40% market share, and notwithstanding 
Dupont’s absence on the Spanish market, Dow then controlled 80-90% of the market, 
suggesting it offered the only effective product for this pest. The Commission found the parties 
were close and important competitors since both the parties’ main AIs effectively targeted the 
same pests in this segment, while Syngenta offered a less effective alternative. Notably, the 
Commission determined that the transaction likely would cause a significant impediment to 
effective competition in Spain on this segment notwithstanding the fact that, pre-transaction, 
only Dow offered products. The transaction presented no market share accretion1030. 
In the insecticide market for citrus fruit, the transaction would enable the parties to exercise 
a leading position in Italy, and in Spain where Dow possessed a dominant position holding 60-
70% of the market, the transaction would strengthen Dow’s dominant position, as the parties 
were scheduled to introduce new products in both markets. The Commission determined that 
the parties were important and close competitors, pointing to the fact that in Italy the transaction 
combined the two leading suppliers of insecticides for a certain pest in citrus. For another pest, 
Syngenta sold a rival product burdened from severe regulatory pressure. Rivals in this category 
held low and fragmented market shares1031. 
In the insecticide market for grapes, the transaction would enable the parties to exercise 
market power in the Czech Republic (90-100%), Austria (70-80%), Hungary (50-60%), and 
Greece (50-60%). In Germany, Italy, and Spain, the merged entity would be competing against 
only one other major rival. The transaction would enable the parties to significantly increase 
their market shares due to introducing new products in France, Italy, Greece, Poland, Germany, 
and Spain. As the parties directly competed on this market, the Commission found they were 
close and important competitors. Rivals held low and fragmented market shares, and the parties 
restrained each other pre-transaction more than rivals constrained them. The Commission 
recognized that Syngenta’s offering yielded inferior results compared to the parties’ products, 
and the AI supporting BASF’s alternative product faced severe regulatory pressure, suggesting 
                                                          
1028 Ibid., paras 1172-73, 1177, 1192, 1205, 1217-1218, 1220-21, 1224, 1233, 1236, 1238, 1243, 1250, 1271-73, 
1276, 1308-9, 1313, 1340-41, 1345. 
1029 Ibid., paras 1351, 1353, 1364, 1367, 1371. 
1030 Ibid., paras 1374, 1376-78, 1384, 1390, 1395 
1031 Ibid., paras 1398, 1400, 1402, 1409-10. 
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BASF’s market share in France and Germany overstated its position. The Commission 
concluded that the transaction likely would significantly impede effective competition in 
Hungary, Greece, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and that the transaction would create 
dominant positions in Austria and the Czech Republic1032. 
In the insecticide market for vegetables (solanacea), despite a 20-30% market share post-
transaction, the Commission determined that the transaction would allow the parties to achieve 
a leading market position targeting lepidoptera, and it would significantly impede effective 
competition. The parties planned to introduce a product that the Commission determined would 
substantially increase their market share, while the Commission expected the shares of rivals 
to fall because their products featured AIs under regulatory pressure. The Commission found 
that the parties were important and close competitors, while rivals held low and fragmented 
market shares and offered less effective products. In Italy, the transaction joined the only main 
competitors to Syngenta offering insecticides for lepidoptera. The Commission concluded that 
the transaction significantly would impede effective competition for insecticides targeting 
lepidoptera, diptera, hemiptera, and thrips1033. 
In the insecticide market for vegetables (leafy/legumes), the Commission reached a similar 
conclusion concerning Spain based on similar facts. The transaction would enable the parties 
to attain a leading position selling insecticides targeting lepidoptera, with a 40-50% market 
share. Rivals held low and fragmented shares on that market. Based on this evidence, the 
Commission concluded that the transaction would significantly impede effective 
competition1034. 
In the insecticide market for vegetables (brassicas), the transaction affected the Spanish and 
French markets. In Spain, it would create a leading position targeting lepidoptera, enabling a 
market share of 80-90%. Syngenta would represent the only main competitor, and it would 
have a mere 20-30% of the market. In France, the transaction would place the combined entity 
in the number two position behind Syngenta, the market leader. The Commission found the 
parties were close and important competitors: In France, the parties represented the second and 
third leading producers in the market pre-transaction. Other rivals than Syngenta held low and 
fragmented market shares in both markets. The Commission determined that the transaction 
would significantly impede effective competition in France because it eliminated an important 
competitive restraint, and in Spain because it created a dominant position1035. 
In the last insecticide market for vegetables (other), the Commission found the parties were 
important and close competitors in this segment, while rivals imposed limited competitive 
restraints as they had low and fragmented market shares. Concerning insecticide for hemiptera 
in Italy, Bayer represented the only other main player, with generics weakened by significant 
competitive pressure. Despite a combined market share of just 20-30%, the Commission 
determined that the transaction would significantly impede effective competition because it 
would join two of three main R&D-integrated producers and thus eliminate an important 
competitive restraint. The Commission also found that the transaction would significantly 
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impede effective competition in Spain, Greece (both markets), the Netherlands, and the Czech 
Republic in insecticides targeting other pests. The Commission again found liability in Greece 
despite no overlap between the parties’ offerings pre-transaction, on the basis that Dupont’s 
products were the main effective choice for eliminating lepidoptera1036. 
In the insecticide market for potatoes, the Commission determined that the parties were 
important and close competitors, and that rivals exercised weak competitive restraints as 
reflected in their low and fragmented market shares. It concluded that the transaction likely 
would significantly impede effective competition in Greece, the UK, Bulgaria, and Spain, 
where existing producers were losing market share due to regulatory pressure on their 
products1037. 
In the insecticide market for corn in Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the 
Commission determined that competitors held low and fragmented market shares and thus 
imposed limited restraints, and ultimately concluded that the transaction would significantly 
impede effective competition, particularly where the transaction would strengthen a dominant 
position in the Czech Republic (80-90%) and in Austria (90-100%)1038. 
 In the insecticide market for oilseed rape, the Commission determined that the transaction 
would not significantly impede effective competition1039. 
In the insecticide market for cotton, the Commission found that the combined entity would 
be able to exercise market power in Greece after attaining a 50-60% market share. It further 
found that the parties were important and close competitors pre-transaction, and that rivals 
exerted weak competitive restraints, as demonstrated by their low and fragmented market 
shares. The transaction would significantly impede effective competition1040.  
The Commission then turned to the analysis of the market for nematicides. Nematicides 
target nematodes, which are agricultural pests, specifically microscopic roundworms or 
parasites. In the EEA, nematodes mainly pose a problem for potatoes, fruits & vegetables, 
flowers, and tobacco, as well as cereals, and thus implicate markets in Spain, Italy, and the UK. 
Fumigants sterilize the soil, killing diseases, other insects and weeds as well as nematodes. As 
they can kill crops, farmers apply nematicides before planting. Non-fumigant chemical 
nematicides constitute an alternative that target only nematodes, that farmers can apply to the 
crop, that work less effectively, yet that cost less than fumigants. Farmers usually select this 
class of nematicides below certain levels of infestation and for lower-value crops. The 
Commission uses the terms “nematistatics” and “nematistats” to refer to chemicals that 
paralyze rather than kill nematodes, thus neutralizing their ability to target crops. The 
Commission stated that the EEA has made available only a few AIs for nematode control, that 
many of the parties’ AIs face regulatory pressure such as a risk of substitution, and that the 
EEA likely will restrict AI use or remove many from the market in subsequent years. Dow sold 
an expensive soil fumigant, AI 1,3-dichloropropene, long off-patent and no longer approved in 
the EEA, though it receives Emergency Use Permits (EUPs) regularly in EEA countries such 
                                                          
1036 Ibid., paras 1508, 1513, 1515, 1518-19. 
1037 Ibid., paras 1526, 1531, 1536, 1538-40. 
1038 Ibid., paras 1548 & 1552. 
1039 Ibid., para 1557. 
1040 Ibid., paras 1560, 1563, 1566. 
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as Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy. Dupont sold the non-fumigant chemical nematicide AI 
oxamyl, which paralyzes nematodes, costs less, and works less effectively. A rival supplied a 
generic version of AI 1,3-dichloropropene1041. 
The Commission defined the relevant market by looking at the specific crop-pest 
combination that corresponded to a specific treatment need for the farmer. The Commission 
attempted to group all chemical solutions available to a farmer to address a specific nematode 
problem as applied to a certain crop, which can vary with nematode species. The Commission 
included soil fumigants and non-fumigants in the nematicide market, finding them 
differentiated products. The relevant market shares were unreliable and indeterminate as an 
indicator of market power. Dow controlled 40-50% of fumigant nematicides, making it the 
leader in this category. The Commission credited a market participant’s view that Dow’s 
fumigant represented an indispensable product because of its efficacy. Dupont held 40-50% of 
the non-fumigant chemical nematicide category in the EEA. The Commission determined that 
these elements were insufficient for finding that the transaction significantly impeded effective 
competition1042. 
The Commission proceeded to assess proof that rivals imposed limited competitive 
restraint. Minor market players owned the main competing products, which exhibited lower 
efficacy and operated in niche segments. The parties argued that regulatory pressure would 
create an opening for innovation and competition, yet the Commission stated that it would 
consider as relevant only AIs with a high likelihood of reaching the market. Taken together, 
these elements again were insufficient to support liability1043. 
The Commission also explored the effect of the merger with regard to the production of 
fungicides. Fungicides constitute agrochemicals that control diseases, particularly fungi. In the 
EEA, fungicides mainly target cereals, fruits & vegetables, and rice. Concerning fruits & 
vegetables, grapes and vines require fungicides the most. Fungicides implicate the timing of 
application, since different diseases attack different crops at different growth stages, on which 
the effectiveness of an AI might depend. Most products can work effectively for limited 
junctures when applied to each crop. Due to both the timing issue and resistance management, 
fungicide producers, for most products, mixed several AIs with different Modes of Action 
(MoAs). This practice aimed to limit resistance development and to broaden spectrum to 
address the maximum number of disease problems given the few available treatment 
opportunities. Producers also rotated AIs. Picoxystrobin constituted Dupont’s most important 
and effective fungicide. Yet overall the parties maintained a limited portfolio of fungicide AIs 
and thus sought to cooperate with more dominant companies, particularly by securing third-
party AIs for mixtures. Generics operated in this market but did not constrain the global R&D-
integrated players because of limited market reach and relatively weak product portfolios1044. 
In defining markets for agrochemicals, the Commission started by examining the specific 
crop-pest combination corresponding to the specific treatment that the farmer needs. From the 
demand-side, different disease patterns attack different cereal crops. A decision to account for 
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the type of disease by defining the market according to the crop-disease combination is 
appropriate because this factor determines the farmer’s need for treatment. Distinct diseases 
afflicting a crop generally demand different treatments. Crop protection stakeholders 
responding to the Commission’s market investigation approved of distinguishing between 
fungicides by crops and by disease1045. 
Turning specifically to cereals, as resistance to fungicide has become commonplace even 
for newer products, the leading fungicides typically combine at least two AIs. Yet the leading 
producers have no products with new MoAs in their pipeline, except for Dow and Dupont. The 
merger thus eliminated the potential competition that would have existed when the parties 
released their new products, giving them prospective pricing power. The Commission also 
acknowledged that the present market leaders would have the incentive and ability to preserve 
their positions, rendering the likelihood of future dominance difficult to discern. To 
demonstrate a significant impediment of effective competition based on pipeline products, the 
Commission needed to establish both that those products materially would have enhanced the 
parties’ market power, and that the greater market power adversely would have affected 
competition rather than enabling the parties to compete more effectively against the market 
leaders. While the parties had reason to believe that their pipeline products would have 
generated considerable sales and would have exhibited good efficacy, identifying the exact 
level of resistance pressure on forthcoming AIs raises immense uncertainty, as resistance can 
evolve differently based on how the relevant chemicals react in different environments and 
geographies. Regulatory uncertainty also would complicate the analysis. The Commission 
instead relied on a more conventional assessment: For the downstream grouping of cereal 
septoria, wheat, and barley fungicides, both Dow and Dupont had limited market shares. The 
Commission found that this evidence insufficiently established that the transaction likely 
would significantly impede effective competition, and reached an overall conclusion that 
accorded with this result1046. 
The Commission next assessed cereal powdery mildew fungicides in the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and the UK, where the parties’ combined market share would not have amounted to 
more than 20-30%. The Commission noted that Dow’s quinoxyfen likely would lose its 
regulatory approval in the EEA. Based on this evidence, the Commission determined that the 
transaction unlikely would significantly impede effective competition in these markets1047. 
Examining the cereal fungicide market in Slovenia, the Commission found that the 
transaction would enable the parties to hold a mere 20-30% market share. This evidence did 
not support finding that the transaction would significantly impede effective competition1048.  
In the rice blast market, given its diminutive size relative to larger markets in Asia, 
particularly Japan, the cost of registering a product relative to projected sales often did not 
justify significant investment within the EEA, which explained the availability of few AIs in 
the EEA, despite the existence of many more in Asia. The Commission found that Dow had 
dominance in the EEA prior to the transaction, especially in Greece and Italy, and that Syngenta 
                                                          
1045 Ibid., paras 1758-59, 1761-63, 1765, 1769. 
1046 Ibid., paras 1773, 1775, 1781-84, 1795, 1810, 1812, 1823, 1825-26, 1828, 1832. 
1047 Ibid., paras 1837-1839. 
1048 Ibid., paras 1841, 1843. 
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placed a distant second in a duopoly market. Dow exerted less dominance in Spain. In 2015, 
Dow controlled 60-70% of the market in Italy and 80-90% of the market in Greece, while in 
Spain it had a 40-50% market share. The parties argued that the merger did not affect the EEA 
market since Dupont did not sell rice blast fungicides in 2014 and 2015. Dow’s leading product, 
tricyclazole, benefitted from EUPs every year when requested because it constituted an 
indispensable fungicide to combat rice blast, the standard treatment worldwide, with no other 
AI providing a similar level of protection. Dow also sold a less effective fungicide used in the 
EEA rice blast market. Dupont registered picoxystrobin in 2015/2016, and the Commission 
found that the product would have enabled Dupont to build a strong market position. The 
combined entity would have two of the three effective molecules then available. The 
transaction thus strengthened Dow’s dominant position, by both eliminating potential 
competition and by permitting the parties to mix their AIs, further increasing the efficacy of 
their products. The Commission concluded that the transaction would significantly impede 
effective competition in Italy, Greece, and Spain, where the parties represented important and 
close actual competitors1049. 
In the markets for rice sheath blight in Italy, Spain, and Greece, the parties did not have a 
presence and Dupont did not sell at all in these markets. Competitors had dominant positions. 
The Commission concluded that the transaction unlikely would substantially impede effective 
competition1050.  
In the markets for vegetable and flower fungicides in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
with the transaction creating market shares of 30-40% in the Czech Republic and 50-60% in 
Slovakia, the Commission determined that the transaction unlikely would significantly impede 
effective competition1051. 
In the markets for grape/vine fungicides in Austria, Hungary, and the UK, with the 
transaction enabling the parties to attain market shares of 20-30% in both Austria and Hungary, 
and possibly 60-70% in the UK based on conflicting sources, the Commission still found that 
the transaction unlikely would significantly impede effective competition1052. 
With regard to vertical effects, the first issue concerned the definition of the relevant 
markets, in view of the fact that in its Syngenta/Monsanto sunflower seed business merger, the 
Commission had made a distinction between (i) the upstream market for the trading, usually 
through exchanges and licences, of seed varieties (parental lines and hybrids) and (ii) the 
downstream market for the trading of seeds, also identifying separate relevant product markets 
for each crop seed so that, for example, sunflower seeds constitute a product market separate 
from those for other seeds1053. The Commission distinguished two levels: the upstream market 
for the trading of seed varieties, where the main players are seed companies and breeders and 
the downstream market for the commercialisation of seeds, with a further segmentation for 
each type of crop seeds, distributors or farmers being there the key stakeholders1054. The 
Commission left open the question whether the market could be further segmented on the basis 
                                                          
1049 Ibid., paras 1848, 1850-52, 1857-59, 1869, 1872, 1877, 1879, 1881, 1889, 1897. 1910-11, 1914-15, 1918-19. 
1050 Ibid., paras 1923-1925. 
1051 Ibid., paras 1928, 1930. 
1052 Ibid., paras 1932, 1933, 1935. 
1053 Commission Decision in Case M.5675 – Syngenta/Monsanto's Sunflower Seed Business (2010), para. 76. 
1054 Ibid., para. 3301 
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of whether seeds are genetically modified, as this was not relevant for the case, in view of the 
fact that the merging entities’ activities do not overlap in the sale of GM seeds, only DuPont 
selling a limited amoung of GM maize seeds in Europe1055 The relevant geographic markets 
was  the trading of seed varieties at the EEA level and the markets for the commercialisation 
of seeds at the national level1056. An analysis of the position of the parties in various crops, 
such as maize, sunflower, cotton did not raise any specific concerns. Nonetheless, the 
Commission examined issues arising from the vertical overlap between Dow and DuPont, 
which are active both in the upstream market for the trading of seed varieties as well as in the 
downstream market for the trading of seeds, in particular for each of cotton, maize, oilseed 
rape, and sunflower seeds. According to the Commission “(s)uch affected markets would be 
susceptible to raise competition concerns should they be likely to lead to a material foreclosure 
of competitors in the upstream market for the licensing of seed varieties or in the downstream 
market for the trading of seeds”1057.  
In order to assess the existence of an eventual foreclosure effect, the Commission examined 
the existence of input or customer foreclosure. With regard to input foreclosure, the 
Commission found that Dow and DuPont are not significant licensors of seed varieties to third 
parties in Europe and that a number of seed competitors that are currently licensing to third 
parties their seed varieties. The breeder exception rule in the EU also allows seed companies 
to rely on the germplasm of competitors for crossing and selection so that the need to in-license 
is often limited to the instances in which finished varieties are needed to fill a portfolio gap1058. 
Furthermore, the Commission found that “seed companies tend to rely on their own seed 
varieties more than in the past, with the possible exception of sunflower seeds, and aim at in-
licensing seed varieties only to meet specific needs”1059. Similar conclusions were reached with 
regard to customer foreclosure1060. The vertical relations between the merging parties between 
the upstream markets for the trading of seed varieties and the downstream markets for the 
trading of seeds were not found to raise any concerns as to the existence of a significant 
impediment of effective competition. 
 
2.2.1.2.3. South Africa 
 
In South Africa, Dow distributed sunflower seeds and agrochemicals, such as insecticides, 
herbicides, and fungicides. The target, DuPont, distributed maize and sunflower seeds and 
agrochemicals. In its decision, the CCSA identified horizontal overlap in fungicides, 
herbicides, and insecticides1061. In the national maize seed market, the CCSA determined that 
the transaction would prevent competition in the breeding, production, and supply of 
commercial maize seeds that would have occurred in South Africa absent the merger, since 
                                                          
1055 Ibid., para. 3303. 
1056 Ibid., para. 3304. 
1057 Ibid., para. 3388. 
1058 Ibid., para. 3394. 
1059 Ibid., para. 3395. 
1060 Ibid., para. 3405. 
1061 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case No: LM030May16, DowDuPont Inc., (30 June 2017), 
Executive Summary paras 4-8. 
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Dow had tangible plans to enter this market and would have competitively restrained Monsanto 
and DuPont. In the national market for the distribution of sunflower seeds, the merger would 
create an entity with a market share of 54.3% and an accretion of 53.9%. The CCSA did not 
find anticompetitive effects because the merger did not change the structure of the market. In 
the national market for the distribution of purified CMC, the merged entity would hold 22.8% 
of the market, a gain of 6.6%. The CCSA similarly concluded that the merger did not change 
the structure of the market. In regional markets for the distribution of insecticides, and 
specifically chewing insects, the merged entity would have a market share of 97.4%, with an 
accretion of 90.2%. The CCSA determined that this result would enable the joined entity to 
exercise market power, as no viable alternatives would remain in the market.1062.  
The CCSA also considered whether the merger would have produced coordinated effects 
in the maize seed market, which is examined in the following Section on non-horizontal 
aspects. The prevalence of cross-licensing agreements necessary to breed and develop traits 
would have facilitated coordination among the market participants. The agrochemical market 
further had undergone tremendous consolidation in the recent past. However, the CCSA 
determined that the heterogeneity of traits and seeds materially would have inhibited 
coordination, as the market produced constant innovation. Additionally, licensing agreements 
normally do not indicate the costs of the licensee or otherwise reveal the prices of downstream 
products1063. 
The CCSA first focused on the maize seed market. Dupont constituted the largest provider 
of genetically-modified (GM) seeds in South Africa, having attained a market share of 50%. 
Maize seed breeding requires three components: a multiplicity of robust genetics (germplasm), 
advanced breeding technologies, and biotechnology traits. A germplasm encapsulates the 
material in a seed, consisting of DNA that determines its characteristics, including the yield of 
the crop. Developing traits involves inserting foreign genes into a seed so that, during the 
breeding process, the seed ultimately yields desired characteristics. Companies often register 
traits as intellectual property. Only after the development and regulatory approval of seeds do 
companies multiply the seed paradigm for the market. The last stage of production involves 
selling the seeds either directly or through independent agricultural businesses to farmers. The 
merger would contract the trait development market from six companies to four. Due to the 
desirability and prevalence of stacked traits, companies often cross-license their trait portfolios. 
The CCSA recognized two stages that comprised maize seed production: (1) development & 
breeding and (2) production and distribution. At the breeding stage of maize seeds the parties’ 
activities did not overlap in the relevant geographic market, South Africa1064. 
The maize seeds markets supported little demand-side substitutability. In conducting 
business, maize farmers focused on seed performance and the price they would receive for their 
crop. Seed prices exerted much fainter influence on their purchase decisions. Between seeds of 
the same variety, moreover, competition proceeded more on performance than price. South 
African farmers did substitute sunflower seed for maize hybrid seed, and while substitution 
proceeded between GM and non-GM hybrid maize, 80% of all hybrid maize that South African 
                                                          
1062 Ibid., Executive Summary paras 11-12, 15-16, 19-21.  
1063 Ibid., paras 107, 114, 117-118, 123. 
1064 Ibid., paras 32, 35-36, 38-39, 41, 44, 46, 50, 73. 
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farmers grew consisted of GM seed. By contrast, on the supply-side, producers could not easily 
substitute between GM and non-GM hybrid maize seed, since the GM market featured a 
specific regulatory framework, and producing GM seeds required significant investment on the 
development side, in terms of producing traits that often rely on foreign organisms1065. 
The CCSA recognized a theory of harm in the maize seed market that centered on removing 
a potential entrant. No other viable entrants could have constrained the incumbents in this 
instance. Dow had begun planning since 2001 to enter the South African maize seed market 
and introduce hybrids and biotechnology traits as it surmised that its South American 
germplasm would function effectively in South Africa, given that the two regions shared 
similar climatic conditions, and that it could achieve a market share of 20%. Dow even tested 
its hybrids containing PowerCore and Enlist traits. It would have been a credible competitor to 
Monsanto and Dupont; instead, the merger produced an entity with a market share of nearly 
60%, far ahead of rivals1066. 
The CCSA next evaluated the distribution level of the sunflower seed market at the national 
level. Dupont distributed sunflower seeds in South Africa, while Dow did not develop or breed 
sunflower seeds in South Africa but imported them through a joint-venture relationship. The 
price difference between sunflower seeds and other agronomic crops ranged from 11% to 45%, 
suggesting sunflower seeds constituted its own market. Yet on the supply-side, producers 
readily could substitute between sunflower seeds and alternatives1067. 
The CCSA considered unilateral and coordinated theories of harm on the sunflower market. 
While the merger would produce a market share of 54.3% and an accretion of 53.9%, Dow 
held less than 1% of the market pre-merger. Such shares did not reflect adverse unilateral 
effects. As in the maize seed market, the relevant products were not homogenous, weakening 
the potential for coordination1068. 
Turning to the purified CMC (carboxymethylecellulose) market, the CCSA stated that 
agrichemical companies used this semi-synthetic powder to control the viscosity and rheology 
(the study of the flow of matter) of fluids “as a thickener, stabilizer, or suspending agent”. 
While the CCSA would not opine on demand-side substitutability between purified CMC and 
guar, it found limited demand-side substitutability between technical grade CMC and purified 
CMC. The CCSA further determined that chemical companies could not manufacture CMC 
and guar concurrently, nor could they substitute between purified CMC and technical grade 
CMC beyond a limited extent. The parties’ activities overlapped only in the narrow national 
market for the distribution of purified CMC. Unilateral effects were not significant as the 
merged entity held about one-fifth of the market in 2014, and the market did not materially 
change due to the merger1069. 
The CCSA then assessed the agrochemicals market, predominantly referring to the 
following pesticides: herbicides, insecticides and fungicides. According to the CCSA, research 
and development costs in this market were high, comparable to the pharmaceutical industry, 
                                                          
1065 Ibid., paras 58-62. 
1066 Ibid., paras 74, 77, 81-82, 88, 97, 102, 104. 
1067 Ibid., paras 133, 137-138, 141, 143, 145, 151. 
1068 Ibid., paras 154, 158, 164. 
1069 Ibid., paras 166, 177, 179, 181, 184, 188, 193, 198, 200. 
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and complying with regulatory requirements was expensive. Pesticides posed health risks such 
as toxicity to humans and animals. By the time a pesticide hit the market in South Africa, patent 
rights would extend for only seven years. Registering a pesticide for a certain crop could take 
five to seven years at a cost of 4 million rand. Entering the pesticide market also would require 
the dominant undertaking to license downstream rivals knowing that they would compete 
directly with its own operations. The merger would produce the second largest global 
agrochemical company. The CCSA found the following characteristics of pesticides important. 
Companies produced insecticides targeting pests, such as sucking or chewing insects. Sucking 
insects feed on sap, while chewing insects deconstruct and digest plant components. This 
difference is relevant because insecticide companies have more difficulty controlling sucking 
insects. With herbicides, non-selective herbicides clear fields of weeds, while selective 
herbicides can kill weeds amidst crops. Of the parties’ insecticides, only Runner 240 SC, 
belonging to Dupont, competed with Dow’s four products on the pest-chewing segments1070. 
Considering demand-side substitutability, farmers can use pesticides only for the crops for 
which producers registered them, and producers design pesticides for specific pests and crops. 
Further hindering demand-side substitutability, producers have designed pesticides for 
different stages of the crops’ life cycle. Farmers additionally must implement resistance 
management, given that pests develop resistance to single pesticides when used for extended 
periods. As a result, farmers use different pesticides which often complement each other rather 
than compete. Demand substitutability can occur only at a market definition based on insect 
per crop1071. 
As to supply-side substitutability, it did not occur between broad spectrum insecticides and 
narrow spectrum insecticides. The parties additionally applied different chemistry to produce 
insecticides, as Dow, for example, used “old chemistry” to target all insects within a narrow 
category, while Dupont utilized “new chemistry” to target specific insects. Due to these 
dynamics, the Commission limited its analysis of insecticides to the market for chewing 
insecticides applied to fruits (citrus and deciduous) and vegetables. The CCSA also defined 
regional markets in crops1072. 
The leading theory of harm in the agrochemicals market again consisted of unilateral effects 
focused on higher prices. The merger would create an entity with a market share of 97.4%, 
increasing Dow’s share of the chewing insecticide market for fruits and vegetables by 90.2%. 
The CCSA stated that because of this figure alone, the merged entity likely would exert 
significant market power, and could increase prices unilaterally; the merger essentially created 
a monopoly1073. 
In the market for herbicides, the CCSA assessed competitive effects for oil seeds and winter 
cereals, which supported regional market definitions. The CCSA focused on whether the 
merger would enable the combined entity to increase the prices for herbicides. The parties 
would attain a 14.3% market share for oilseeds and a 23.4% market share for winter cereals. 
                                                          
1070 Ibid., paras 205-209, 213, 219, 221, 232, 266-267. 
1071 Ibid., paras 234-236, 240-241. 
1072 Ibid., paras 242, 244, 248, 255. 
1073 Ibid., paras 256-257, 261-262, 272. 
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The market share figures convinced the CCSA that adequate competition would persist in the 
market post-merger1074. 
In the market for fungicides, the CCSA stated that it would assess competitive effects in 
regions on a crop by crop basis. The parties’ activities overlapped in supplying fungicides to 
fruits and vegetables, specifically grapes, oilseeds, tomatoes, and cucurbits. Post-merger, the 
joined-entity would have 10.6% of the grape fungicide market, 25.0% of the oilseed fungicide 
market, 17.5% of the tomato fungicide market, 29.4% of the cucurbits fungicide market. The 
CCSA found the merger would not significantly weaken competition. The CCSA considered 
entry barriers only at the distribution level. In addition to the entry barriers associated with 
registering new fungicides, entry barriers also consisted of relationships that distributors and 
agents had built with farmers, as farmers rarely switched between distributors, even when 
distributors switched fungicide manufacturers. Taken together, the CCSA viewed the entry 
barriers as “insurmountable”1075.  
The CCSA also noted that the merger could produce conglomerate effects that could harm 
competition, as the merged entity could bundle insecticides with other products such as seeds. 
In regional markets for the distribution of herbicides, the merger would create a 14.3% market 
share in oilseed herbicides and a 23.4% market share for herbicides in winter cereals, a result 
with which the CCSA did not express concern. In regional markets for the distribution of 
fungicides, the merger would produce a 10.6% market share for grape fungicides, 25% for 
oilseed fungicides, 17.5% for tomato fungicides, and 29.4% for cucurbits fungicides. These 
market shares did not raise competitive concerns. In the national market for the distribution of 
HiPEDs (High Pressurized Ethylene Derivatives), the parties would acquire a 1.2% market 
share from the merger1076. 
The CCSA also conducted an extended analysis of the possibility that the merger would 
produce coordinated effects. Market participants competed in several markets and commonly 
met at CropLife, an industry association, factors that increased opportunities to exchange 
information and detect and punish deviations from agreed actions. Yet as the parties constantly 
innovated, the heterogeneity of fungicides rendered coordination untenable1077. 
Lastly, in the national market for HiPEDs, inputs used to produce plastic products, the 
merging parties supplied the South African market through imports, making the distribution 
level of the value chain relevant for assessing competitive effects. The CCSA narrowed the 
product analysis to LDPE and LDPE derivatives, which, given the varying prices that applied 
to these products, suggested the existence of separate markets. The CCSA concluded that each 
HiPED product constituted a separate market and were not substitutable, yet the CCSA 
determined that the merger would not produce competitive concerns regardless of how it 
defined the markets, given that the joined entity would have a market share of 1.2% post-
merger1078. 
                                                          
1074 Ibid., paras 282, 284, 286, 290. 
1075 Ibid., paras 298, 300, 303, 307, 310, 314, 316. 
1076 Ibid., paras 11-12, 15-16, 19-21, 23-24, 25, 30. 
1077 Ibid., paras 317, 319, 325, 328, 330, 338. 
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As the primary condition to approving the merger, the parties agreed to divest the 
Divestment Business in South Africa which included pipeline, IP rights, personnel, and 
facilities used by Dupont for its R&D activities worldwide. To address concerns in the 
commercial maize seed market, the CCSA accepted a proposed remedy to license to 
independent third parties all the hybrids that Dow had tested in South Africa since 2013, since 
the remedy improved the chances of discovering high yielding hybrids. The CCSA similarly 
accepted remedies that the parties proposed related to chewing insecticides for citrus and 
vegetables, which involved a Global Divestiture of DuPont’s nine herbicide Als, its three 
insecticide Als, and its global research & development organization. Furthermore, for three 
years after the completion of the merger, the parties could not sell any new products that 
matched or had substantially the same formulation composition as the products it divested. The 
Purchaser had to display the financial resources and expertise, and have the incentive to 
maintain and develop the Divestment Business as a viable competitor to the merging parties. It 
already must have operated in the crop protection industry and must be able to demonstrate a 
track record of discovering or developing new AIs1079. 
 
2.2.1.2.4. China 
 
The merger was also assessed by the Chinese competition authorities, in particular MOFCOM, 
which approved it with conditions, including diverstiture and additional transaction 
obligations, in April 20171080. The competition law assessment included, in a nutshell, that the 
merger would eliminate and restrict competition in the market of selective herbicide for rice, 
and the market of pesticide for rice, as following the transaction, the two parties will account 
for almost 40% market share in the Chinese market of selective herbicide for rice.  MOFCOM 
considered that selective herbicides are generally used for particular crops, therefore, those 
selective herbicides suitable for different crops constitute separate commodity markets1081. It 
also came to the decision that pesticides and germicides suitable for different crops constitute 
separate relevant product markets, because of the obvious differences between common pests 
and pathogenic bacteria of different crops1082.  Referring to the high HHI following the merger, 
MOFCOM noted that the transaction would reduce or eliminate competition between two 
competitors among a few competitors in the global and Chinese market in agrochemical 
products1083.  MOFCOM also considered the entry barriers in the market, such as funds, 
technology, and R&D capability, which would have made it difficult for new entrants to enter 
timely and impose efficient competitive pressure on the new entity1084. MOFCOM also found 
an adverse effect on the innovation market, as well as effects on the downstream distributors 
                                                          
1079 Ibid., Annexure A ¶¶ 3.2, 3.7, 3.16.2-3.16.3. 
1080see 中华人民共和国商务部公告2017年 第25号MOFCOM Announcement No. 25 of 2017  (April 29, 2017), 
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201705/20170502577349.shtml. 
1081 Ibid., para 7. 
1082 Ibid., paras 8-9. 
1083 Ibid., paras 39-40.  
1084 Ibid., paras 32, 36, 41, 44. 
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of the parties, which would have been either integrated or could possibly have been eliminated 
altogether1085.  
With regard to the definition of the relevant markets in the part of the decision 
concerning agrochemicals, MOFCOM found that Dow and DuPont had lateral overlaps in  nine 
markets: selective herbicides for grain and rice, pesticides for vegetables, fruit trees, rice, and 
cotton, and germicides for vegetables, fruit trees and potatoes. MOFCOM distinguished 
selective herbicides from non-selective herbicides, as the former are suitable for different crops 
and constitute separate product markets. Similarly, with regard to pesticides, the authority 
noted the obvious difference between common pests of different crops, noting that pesticides 
for different crops contain different active ingredients and ratios thereof, which results in the 
limited effectiveness or even ineffectiveness of a pesticide suitable for a particular crop when 
applied to other crops. Consequently, MOFCOM found that pesticides suitable for different 
crops constitute separate relevant product markets. Similar findings also applied for 
germicides, as the germicides suitable for different crops contain different active ingredients 
and ratios, and may target particular pathogenic bacteria, hence the finding that germicides 
suitable for different crops constitute separate relevant product markets. 1086 
The Chinese authorities defined the market as being national, in view of the fact that 
selective herbicides for grain and rice, pesticides for vegetables, fruit trees, rice, and cotton, 
and germicides for vegetables, fruit trees and potatoes need have registered with the relevant 
authorities in China. Their composition and application methods also depend on the 
environment, climate, soil characteristics, topography and the way the farmers apply them, 
which can be quite specific to the jurisdiction. Chinese customers and agricultural platform 
companies usually procure their products in China, which is the relevant geographic market. 
1087 
MOFCOM reviewed the resulting economic concentration in terms of relevant market 
concentration rates, market share and market control of the undertakings participating in the 
merger, keeping an eye on the impact of the merger on market access and technological 
progress as well as consumers and other relevant undertakings in accordance with Article 27 
of the Anti-monopoly Law. The authority came to the conclusion that the transaction could 
produce adverse effects eliminating and restricting competition in the Chinese market of 
selective herbicide for rice and pesticide for rice.1088 This was based on a number of findings 
by the authority. First, the global agrochemical market has a high degree of concentration, with 
six companies accounting for 77% market share. These firms are strong in R&D, benefit from 
a rich portfolio of products and patents and show financial strength. In view of these 
characteristics and their focus on R&D, they constitute a different business model from 
generics that have a more limited R&D capacity and are mainly engaged in the production and 
development of generic drugs, or from “pesticide preparation enterprises” which buy active 
                                                          
1085 Ibid., para 33. The merger would also have adverse effects on the global markets of acid copolymer and 
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in this report. 
1086 Ibid., paras 7-9. 
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components from the Big Six in order to produce their own products1089. Second, prior to the 
transaction, Dow has long been ranked first in the Chinese market of selective herbicide for 
rice, with the second to the seventh competitors accounting for less than 50% market share on 
aggregate. The selective herbicide for rice penoxsulam launched by Dow in 2005 has been 
quite successful, achieving the largest ever sales volume in the Chinese market of selective 
herbicide for rice. There are no effective substitutes for Dow's selective herbicides for rice, 
hence the profit margins are much higher than the industry average. Third, DuPont is a major 
innovator in the Chinese market of selective herbicide for rice. It benefits from the advantage 
that its products are launched overseas and may enter the Chinese market. According to 
MOFCOM, following the completion of the transaction, both parties to the transaction will 
account for almost 40% of the Chinese market of selective herbicide for rice, their market 
forces and research and development capabilities will be integrated; and their market control 
will be further enhanced1090.  
The authority also noted that in view of barriers to entry it would be difficult for a new 
competitor to enter the market in the short term. In particular, Funding and technology research 
and development capability are decisive factors for competing effectively in the market of 
selective herbicide for rice. Due to the declining new active ingredient screening success rates, 
and the increasing research and development costs, shortened patent protection periods and 
stricter requirements of environmental protection, in recent years, it becomes quite difficult to 
launch new products and the cycles of innovation are constantly extending. The ranking of the 
top seven undertakings in the market has been relatively stable, without new effective 
competitors coming in the market the last decade. This of courses reduces the competitive 
pressure on both parties after the concentration1091.  
The authority also found that the transaction would have adverse effects in the market 
of pesticide for rice. DuPont has been steadily ranked first in the Chinese market of pesticide 
for rice between 2011 and 2015. Its market share was usually almost two times that of the 
second competitor and its “ultrahigh” profit margin that is much higher than the industry 
average over more than ten years were thought of as indicators of its economic power1092. Dow 
also shows strength in R&D in the Chinese market of pesticide for rice. It has been able to 
launch active ingredients and new product reserves are significantly more quickly than other 
competitors, showing its great market potential. Dow’s pesticide product for rice sulfoxaflor is 
one of the major pesticides used for rice crops in China, no other product being available in 
China that can compete with it effectively. Dupont has developed Triflumezopyrim which has 
received the requisite authorisations and is about to be launched in the Chinese market. The 
experimental results show that the drug is "highly efficient and rapid at low dosage and 
environmentally friendly"1093. According to MOFCOM, following the transaction, both parties 
will be able to integrate their market and R&D capabilities further consolidating their existing 
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leading position in the market, in particular with the combination of the product portfolio of 
sulfoxaflor and triflumezopyrim1094.  
According to the Chinese merger watchdog, it will be quite unlikely for new 
competitors to enter the pesticides market for rice, in particular in view of the declining rate of 
success rates for new active ingredients, the increasing research and development costs, 
shortened patent protection periods and stricter requirements of environmental protection 
standards. As a result, the top seven competitors in the Chinese pesticides market for rice were 
basically stable during the period between 2011 and 20151095.  
With regard to vertical anticompetitive effects, MOFCOM found that the transaction 
could damage the interests of downstream distributors. Indeed, distributors of selective 
herbicides for rice rely on the merging parties in terms of product pricing, promotion input and 
technical services and are thus in a relatively weak bargaining position. In accordance with the 
revised Administrative Regulations on Agricultural Chemicals of the People's Republic of 
China, distributors will have to take responsibility for the quality (including safety) of 
agricultural chemicals. This increases the dependence of downstream distributors on producers 
and this makes them more willing to distribute products of well-known multinational 
corporations, such as the merging parties. Following completion of the transaction, the 
competition between Dow and DuPont in the market for selective herbicides for rice will be 
eliminated. As their distributors in major Chinese provinces did not overlap before the merger, 
their original distributors may be integrated or eliminated, hence the bargaining position of 
their distributors will be further weakened and their interests damaged1096. Similar findings 
were made with regard to pesticides for rice1097. 
Given that the concentration of undertakings may have the effect of eliminating and 
restricting competition in the Chinese markets of selective herbicide for rice and pesticide for 
rice, MOFCOM conditionally approved the concentration, requiring Dow and DuPont to 
divest, with regard to herbicides for rice cultures, the active ingredients metsulfuron-methyl 
and azimsulfuron and cyantraniliprole, and regarding pesticides for rice, chlorantraniliprole 
and indoxacarb, including all related tangible and intangible assets as well as the employees 
involved.1098 Remedies also included the obligation on the new entity to provide access, within 
a period of five years since the closing of the transaction, and on a non-exclusive basis to the 
hybrid active ingerdients/active ingredients of bensulfuron methyl, bensulfuron methyl + 
carfentrazone ethyl, and pyrazosulfuron ethyl as well as DuPont's existing preparations that 
only contain the above hybrid active ingredients/active ingredients in China at reasonable 
prices (i.e. no higher than the average price over the past 12 months) to Chinese undertakings 
making such request, to the extent these conform to the Chinese regulatory framework, in 
particular regarding registration and authorisation of active ingredients. Similar requirements 
were provided for access to Dow’s trifuralin (sulfoxaflor). With regard to the vertical concerns 
MOFCOM prohibited to the merged entity for a period of 5 years since the conditional approval 
                                                          
1094 Ibid., para 36 
1095 Ibid. 
1096 Ibid., para 34 
1097 Ibid., para 38 
1098 Ibid., paras 48-49, 53-56 
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of the transaction, from imposing on Chinese distributors exclusive obligations to sell a number 
of pesticides and herbicides1099.  
 
2.2.1.2.5. India 
 
On 19 May 2016, the Competition CCI of India (CCI) received a joint notice of merger from 
Dow Chemical Company (Dow), E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont), 
DowDuPont Inc. (DowDuPont), Diamond Merger Sub Inc. (Diamond Merger Sub), and Orion 
Merger Sub Inc. (Orion Merger Sub) whereby the Parties informed the CCI that they had 
entered into a Merger Agreement on 11 December 2015 in order to merge the businesses of 
Dow and DuPont and to create three independent companies dealing in agriculture material 
sciences and specialty products.1100  On 19 January 2017, the CCI, after considering the notice 
issued a show cause notice (SCN) to the parties to address potential competition concerns 
arising from the proposed merger.1101 
The parties initially responded to the SCN on 20 February 2017 and amended their 
response on 1 and 2 March 2017. After examining the response, the CCI formed the view that 
the proposed merger was likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) 
in markets in India and, therefore, directed the parties to publish the proposed merger for the 
knowledge and information of persons likely to be affected by the proposed merger and of the 
public generally.1102 Accordingly, on 18 March 2017, the parties published the details of the 
merger and the CCI allowed until 10 April 2017 for receipt of comments.1103 In its meeting on 
28 April 2017, the CCI evaluated the proposed merger in light of the initial application, the 
response of the parties and the comments of stakeholders and the general public.1104 
In order to carry out its assessment of competition concerns arising from the proposed 
merger, the CCI noted that the Parties are involved in manufacture and sale of (a) crop 
protection products;1105 (b) research and development in crop protection products;1106 (c) 
seeds;1107 (d) specialty chemical;1108 and (e) material sciences.1109  In this case note we do not 
address the analysis of the material science markets. 
                                                          
1099 Ibid., paras 50-52 
1100 Order dated 8 June 2017 in respect of Combination Registration No. C-2016/05/400), paras 1-2.  
1101 Ibid para 18.  
1102 Ibid para 21.  
1103 Ibid para 22.  
1104 Ibid para 23.  
1105 Ibid para 27(A). The CCI observed that Parties have a portfolio of insecticides, fungicides and herbicides 
effective on multiple pests / fungus / weeds, infesting many common crops (e.g. cereals, fruits, vegetables etc.). 
it also noted that the Parties have an overlap in insecticides, fungicides and herbicides.   
1106 ibid para 27(B). The CCI noted that Dow and DuPont are engaged in R & D and maintain facilities across the 
globe. The CCI also observed that this may have an effect on new products coming into India.  
1107 Ibid para 27 (C). The CCI observed that the operations of the parties overlap in the manufacture and sale of 
non-genetically modified corn seeds in India.  
1108 Ibid para 27 (D). The CCI noted the overlap Purified carboxymethylcellulose (Purified CMC).  
1109 Ibid para 27 (E). The CCI observed that the activities of the parties overlap in certain hydrocarbonsandethylene 
derivatives products (‘Co-polymers’), specifically Acid Copolymers, Acrylate Co-polymers, and MAH Grafted 
Polymers. 
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Whilst the CCI identified the territory of India as the relevant geographic market for all 
products,1110 it identified the relevant product market as follows.  
In relation to crop protection products, the CCI observed that the each specific 
combination of crop, class of insect and fungicides has its own separate relevant product 
market. It also noted that herbicides may be classified into selective and non- selective 
categories.1111 The CCI further observed that for analysis of substitutability of insecticides, 
fungicides, and herbicides, the application method to the crop, whether the product is patented 
or not, and active ingredients, formulation and mode of action of may also be relevant.1112  
In relation to seeds, the CCI identified an overlap in the non-GM corn seeds. It, 
therefore, stated that given seeds for different crops have different characteristics and differ in 
their intended use, non-GM corn seeds constitute a separate relevant product market.1113 
In respect of Purified CMC, the CCI noted that the product is used in food, 
pharmaceuticals and personal care products. However, it stopped short of defining the market 
due to the small presence of the parties in these products.1114  
The CCI carried out assessment of each of the overlapping relevant market(s). 
Considering factors such as low combined market shares of the Parties (market share of DuPont 
and Dow are 30-35 percent and 5-10 percent, respectively, for the year 2014);1115 low 
increment as a result of the proposed combination (moderately concentrated with the pre- 
merger HHI of 1825-1830, increasing to 2205-2210, post-combination with increment of 375-
380)1116 and presence of several competitors and other competing products of competitors 
(other competitors in the relevant market are distantly placed e.g. Syngenta (15-20 percent), 
Rallis (10-15 percent), UPL (5-10 percent), Nagarjuna (0-5 percent), Bayer (0-5 percent)1117 
the CCI did not find competition concerns in any relevant market except in the market - 
Fungicides for grapes which target fungus ‘Ascomycota’ in India.1118  
In respect of the impact of the merger on R & D in crop protection products in India, 
the CCI observed that a considerable research and development activity of the Parties related 
to crop protection products occurs outside India which may lessen post-merger, and thereby, 
adversely affect the Indian crop protection market.1119 However, the CCI also noted that the 
parties have offered global divestiture to the European CCI relating to (i) herbicides, (ii) 
insecticides, and (iii) R & D1120 and observed that this remedy was sufficient to meet 
competition concerns relating to R & D in these products in India.1121   The CCI directed the 
parties to keep it informed of the progress of or any changes to the divestment.1122 
                                                          
1110 Ibid. para 30.02. 
1111 Ibid para 29.1.1.2.  
1112 ibid para 29.1.1.3 
1113 ibid para 29.1.2.1 
1114 ibid para 29.1.3.1 
1115 ibid para 30.1.2. 
1116 ibid.  
1117 ibid.  
1118 ibid para 30.1.3. 
1119 ibid para 30.1.4. 
1120 ibid para 30.1.5. 
1121 ibid para 30.1.8.  
1122 ibid para 30.1.9.  
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With regard to the competition assessment of seeds, the CCI had already noted that the 
only overlap in the activities of the parties in seeds was in relation to GM corn seeds in India 
where the combined market share of the parties was approximately 25-30 percent. However, 
the post-merger increment in these shares was negligible. The CCI also noted the presence of 
several other players such as Monsanto, Syngenta, Kaveri Seeds, Nuziveedu Seeds and CP 
Seeds in producing and supplying non-GM corn seeds in India. 1123 The CCI further noted that 
the parties were not engaged in commercial licensing of the technology for producing GM corn 
seeds.1124 In relation to the interdependence of seeds and agrochemicals and the parties did not 
offer any crop seed,1125 which has a trait that would make it tolerant to a particular agrochemical 
in India. The CCI, therefore, concluded that the proposed merger was not likely to have AAEC 
in the seed market.1126  
In respect of Purified CMC, the CCI noted that the Indian market is import based, in 
which the share of Dow is insignificant and there are also a number of other competitors.1127  
Therefore, the proposed merger is not likely to have AAEC in the market for Purified CMC in 
India.1128   
The CCI approved the merger on the basis of the following modifications, which the 
parties accepted unconditionally. With regard to the agrichem products, the CCI directed the 
parties to (i) provide an undertaking that they are not and will not re-enter the 
commercialization of Flusilasole AI and the products /formulations containing Flusilasole AI 
in India for specified period of from the date of the undertaking;1129 (ii) to file an application 
with the Central Insecticide Board & Registration Committee (CIB & RC) for immediate 
withdrawal of DuPont’s registration of products/formulations containing Flusilasole AI, to 
immediately file CIB & RC’s acknowledgement of such communication with the CCI and to 
give an undertaking not to register with the CIB&RC, and to give an undertaking that it would 
not register any such product for a specified period; 1130 (iii) to file an application with the 
Trade Mark Registry in India, to cancel DuPont’s trademark for NUSTAR and to surrender it 
and to immediately file Trade Mark Registry’s acknowledgement of such communication with 
the CCI;1131 and (iv) to give an undertaking not to sell or export Flusilasole AI or any 
products/formulations containing Flusilasole AI in India either directly or indirectly through 
their affiliates.1132 Parties were also directed to bind their subsidiaries and affiliates and to 
inform all relevant government departments of their commitments.1133 
 
2.2.1.2.6. Brazil 
 
                                                          
1123 ibid para 30.2.1. 
1124 ibid para 30.2.2 
1125 ibid para 30.2.3.  
1126 ibid para 30.2.4.  
1127 Ibid para 30.3.1. 
1128 ibid para 30.3.2. 
1129 Ibid para 34.1.2(i) 
1130 Ibid para 34.1.2(ii) 
1131 Ibid para 34.1.2(iii) 
1132 Ibid para 34.1.2(iv) 
1133 Ibid para 34.1.2(v) and (vi).  
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Given the complexity of the case, the case reached the in-depth second phase of analysis in 
merger control. Both companies had substantial activities in Brazil and CADE undertook an 
extensive analysis of all the relevant markets.1134 
CADE reached the conclusion that the merger could lead to horizontal concentration in the 
markets of pesticides. These were divided into several relevant markets: 
• pesticide inputs in the world market (including active ingredients, according to their 
uses, halopyridine and co-formulant propylene glycol); 
• insecticides, according to their uses; 
• herbicides, according to their uses; 
• fungicides, according to their uses;  
• acaricides, according to their uses; 
• seed treatment; 
• plant growth regulators. 
While the markets of acaricides and plant growth regulators did not raise concerns, 
relevant horizontal concentration was found in the other markets. Barriers to entry were 
considered to be high, given the regulatory requirements, high investment in R & D, brand 
power for consumers, scope economies and access to distribution channels.1135 As to rivalry, 
the analysis led to the conclusion that in the markets of fungicides (for potatoes, peach and 
grapes), no concerns arose. As to insecticides and herbicides, the analysis of the relevant market 
of insecticides for chewing insects (mainly, lepidoptera) and for apples revealed concerns but 
the global divestments package that was proposed was adequate to dispel them.1136 The vertical 
integration between pesticides and their inputs and ingredients was not considered problematic: 
a market foreclosure strategy would be ineffective, since DuPont acquired all Dow`s supply, 
which sold a small quantity to DuPont.1137 
 The authority undertook a more careful analysis of the seeds markets and developed 
jurisdiction-specific remedies. The analysis was carried out in the following alternative 
scenarios for the relevant markets:1138 
• national market of corn seeds in general (conventional and GM) as well as more 
strict scenarios divided by the type of corn (simple, double and triple); 
• national market of soybean seeds in general (conventional and GM) as well as 
more strict scenarios divided by the type of corn (simple, double and triple); 
• national market of corn seeds divided by the type of corn (simple, double and 
triple) for grain production; 
• national market of corn seeds divided by the type of corn (simple, double and 
triple) for ensilage; 
                                                          
1134 The merger did not raise competition concerns in the market of specialized products for health, nutrition, 
electronics and communication, where the two entities were present. Specifically, horizontal concentration and 
vertical integration had been identified in food fibres, food texturizers, semiconductor encapsulation technology, 
dry photo-resistant films, post recording waste removal products, but they did not lead to problems in Brazil. Ibid 
para 30-40. 
1135 Ibid para 82-85. 
1136 Ibid para 96-99. 
1137 Ibid para 104-108. 
1138 Ibid para 125. 
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• national market for licencing of corn germplasm; 
• world market of R&D in GM corn seeds; 
• world market of R&D in GM soybean seeds; 
• national market for licencing of GM corn seeds; 
• National market for licencing of GM soybean seeds. 
There was horizontal concentration in the markets of soybeans and corn seeds. CADE 
found that the market of soybeans seeds led to concentration; however, the combined entity’s 
market share was no more than 10% and HHI variation not over 200, thus, insufficient to raise 
concerns.1139 In the market for corn seeds (specifically, simple and triple hybrid corn), CADE 
found a high degree of horizontal concentration. It also decided that the destination (grain 
production or ensilage) should not be relevant for the analysis.  
As to simple hybrid corn, the resulting market shares calculated by turnover were 
around 40-50%. The HHI pre-operation was between 2600-3000 and the HHI variation was 
around 600-800.1140 As to triple hybrid corn, the resulting market shares calculated by turnover 
were between 70-80%. The HHI pre-operation was around 3000-3200 and the HHI variation 
was around 600-800.1141 In those markets, CADE considered that barriers to entry were high 
due to: the need for investment in R&D, in marketing and distribution to access the market and 
in the maintenance of an adequate improvement programme; the cost and time to fulfil 
regulatory procedures; the long cycle of investments; brand recognition and the requirement of 
staff expertise.1142  
As to rivalry, most competitors could not deviate their supply in response to an increase 
in price.1143 The authority analysed the role of brands, the new entity’s control of valuable 
germplasm banks, its research and development strength, including its patent portfolio and its 
presence in distribution to conclude that rivalry in the corn seeds market was not sufficient to 
dispel concerns.1144 Specific remedies were deemed to be necessary. There was no analysis of 
efficiencies since the parties proposed an agreement. As to the vertical integration between 
licensing, development and production of seeds, CADE did not however raise any concerns: a 
market foreclosure strategy either upstream or downstream would be ineffective.1145  
The reporting Commissioner voted in favour of conditionally approving the operation. 
Given the fact that the merger transaction was between foreign undertakings, it was reported 
in the decision that the remedies were coordinated with other jurisdictions. The remedies were 
mostly structural and involved (with regard to the part of the decision on agrochemical markets) 
                                                          
1139 Ibid para 129. 
1140 Para 280 of the Superintendence Report. BRAZIL, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – 
CADE, Merger Case n 08700.005937/2016-61, Parties: The Dow Chemical Company and EI Du Pont de 
Nemours and Company. Superintendence Report on Seeds, 4 May 2017, available at 
< http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/documento_consulta_externa.php?OCglvmlfNSHxzhPz7bTu2
U4F2xF5pnlCll1mtYJvYgGcDWM6PSuNvbj_mSM7E00vCyBQ44lmyaYJe-vk0hI-GQ,,> accessed 7 
November 2017. 
1141 Ibid, para 336 and 351. 
1142 CADE Final Decision, see note above, para 135-137. 
1143 Ibid para 143-144. 
1144 Ibid para 148-156. 
1145 Ibid para 157-159. 
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• the transfer of some herbicides and insecticides inputs1146 and products1147; 
• the divestment of some R&D assets; 
• the transfer of germplasm banks of corn under certain limitations; 
• the transfer of corn pipeline hybrids and commercial hybrids; 
• the sale of corn industrial facilities; 
• the transfer of corn R&D centres; 
• the transfer of brands, staff and sales force. 
It was mentioned that the businesses should be transferred to an independent experienced 
market player with capacity to operate and to be an effective rival. More in depth analysis of 
CADE’s decision is included in the Section of this report dealing with case study on agrochem 
mergers in Brazil. 
 
2.2.1.3. ChemChina/Syngenta 
 
This $43 billion takeover deal, announced in February 2016, brings together Syngenta, one of 
one of the leading agriculture companies in the world and a major innovator in this sector, and 
ChemChina, a Chinese corporation with sole control of ADAMA Agricultural Solutions Ltd, 
an Israel-based corporation, manufacturing, formulating and selling agricultural chemical 
products in the U.S, constituting mostly generic supplier. The transaction was assessed by a 
number of jurisdictions, which approved it either conditionally or unconditionally. For 
instance, the merger was approved unconditionally in Russia, while in India Syngenta and 
ChemChina announced that their deal was “deemed approved” by the CCI, due to the expiry 
of the statutory maximum of the 210 day review period from merger filing. As of the date of 
writing, no decision or press release was found at the CCI’s website. 
 
ChemChina/Syngenta merger transaction 
Country Notification/Investigation 
date 
Decision date 
United States N.A N.A. 
European Union 23 Sept. 2016 5 Apr. 2017 
Brazil 5 September 2016 24 February 2017 
Russia NA 13 July 2016 
India C-2016/08/424 (Date not 
known) 
C-2016/03/380  (Date not 
known) 
Approved. Date not known 
 
Pending 
China N.A. 12 April 2017 
                                                          
1146Active ingredients of herbicides for cereals, oilseed rape, sunflower, rice and pasture: Thifensulfuron Methyl, 
Tribenuron Methyl, Metsulfuron Methyl, Chlorsulfuron Methyl, Triflusulfuron Methyl, Lenacil, Flupyrsulfuron 
Methyl, Ethametsulfuron Methyl and Azimsulfuron; Active Ingredients of Insecticides: Ciantraniliprole, 
Clorantraniliprole and Indoxacarbe. 
1147 Herbicides: Ally (Dupont); Insecticides: ALTACOR® 35WG, PREMIO® 20SC, BENEVIA® 100 OD, 
VERIMARK® 200 SC, AVATAR, RUMO, AVAUNT 150. 
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South Africa N.A. N.A. 
 
2.2.1.3.1. United States 
 
Following a complaint by the US Federal Trade Commission, the FTC and the merging entities 
reached an agreement in April 2017 for the transaction to go forward with the imposition of a 
remedial package.  
The complaint of the FTC defined the relevant market as formulated crop protection 
products based on the active ingredients paraquat, abamectin, and chlorothalonil. Paraquat is a 
non-selective “burndown” herbicide, which is a cheap solution in order to get rid of weeds at 
the end of the farming season. Abamectin is an insecticide used to kill mites, psyllid, and 
leafminers, merely used in citrus and tree nut crops, any alternatives to this product being 
significantly more expensive because they are patent-protected or less effective. Finally, 
Chlorothalonil is a broad-spectrum fungicide used primarily in peanuts and potatoes. The 
FTC’s complaint noted that the markets for formulated crop protection products using the 
active ingredients paraquat, abamectin, and chlorothalonil in the United States are highly 
concentrated, with Syngenta being the market leader in each of the three product markets, while 
ADAMA being either the largest or the second largest generic supplier. In particular, the FTC 
estimated that the merged entity’s market share following the transaction would be over 60% 
in formulated crop protection products with the active ingredient paraquat. The combined 
market would have reached 80% for the formulated crop protection products with the active 
ingredient abamectin share, ADAMA being the generic market leader in abamectin-based 
products. Finally, the combined market share post-transaction in formulated crop protection 
products with the active ingredient chlorothalonil would have been over 40%, ADAMA being 
the second largest generic supplier in this market. 
The FTC further noted the low likelihood of entry of new competitors that could 
effectively counteract the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the markets in the 
foreseeable future, referring to support this allegation to the relatively stable market shares of 
ADAM for an extended period of time. 
According to the FTC, without the proposed remedial package, the transaction would 
have removed an important competitive constraint on ADAMA, thereby increasing the 
likelihood that the merged entity will unilaterally exercise market power in the relevant markets 
and that customers in the United States would be forced to pay higher prices or accept reduced 
service for crop protection formulations based on the abovementioned active ingredients. 
Indeed, Syngenta owns the branded version of each of the pesticide products based on the three 
active ingredients in question, giving it significant market shares in the United States, while 
ChemChina’s subsidiary ADAMA focuses on generic pesticides and is either the first- or 
second-largest generic supplier in the United States for each of these products. 
FTC and the merging companies convened a consent agreement requiring ChemChina 
to sell all rights and assets of ADAMA’s U.S. paraquat, abamectin and chlorothalonil crop 
protection businesses to California-based agrochemical company AMVAC.  
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2.2.1.3.2. European Union 
 
The European Commission opened an in depth investigation of the merger in October 2016, 
considering that should the transaction as notified go ahead it would have reduced competition 
in a number of existing markets for pesticides (in particular fungicides, herbicides, insecticides 
and seed treatment products. The Commission also expressed concerns that the transaction 
would reduce competition for plant growth regulators, which are products used in agriculture 
to slow or stimulate a crop's growth and development. The Commission's investigation focused 
on competition for existing pesticides, since ChemChina does not compete with Syngenta for 
the development of new and innovative pesticides. Hence, the Commission did not assess the 
possible effects of the merger transaction on innovation, given that generic suppliers do not 
compete in innovation of new Active Ingredients (Ai) s or in formulations based on patented 
AIs. Instead they compete mainly in solo and mixture products based on off-patent AIs1148. 
The Commission's investigation showed that the parties would have held high combined 
market shares for a number of pesticides and for certain plant growth regulators, with few other 
competitors remaining. This effect was reinforced by the fact that Adama is a close and 
important generic competitor of Syngenta in many of these markets. The Commission 
concluded that the takeover would have significantly impeded effective competition in a 
number of relevant markets. 
Quite interestingly, the Commission referred in its decision to the “value chain” for crop 
protection products (including lawn and garden products), the chain englobing four stages: 
discovery, development, mixture/formulation, distribution. The Commission clearly 
distinguished between the integrated research and development ("R&D") players that are active 
at all four stages of the value chain and have a global presence, and other players, including 
generic suppliers or undertakings only present in one of the segments of the crop protection 
value chain, noting that these two groups of economic actors are characterized by different 
capabilities in the production chain for crop protection products and are active at different 
stages of the value chain1149. Not only are generic players not present in the upstream discovery 
and development of new AIs and therefore do not compete in the discovery of new AIs, but 
also they are usually excluded from the patent strategies adopted by the major R&D players, 
which at the early stages of the research process, commonly seek ‘compound patent’ on new 
AIs, providing the patentee the exclusive right to manufacture the AI, to incorporate that AI 
into formulated products and to put those formulated products on the market for the first 
time”1150. Generic players cannot therefore use patent-protected AIs to produce new 
formulations that compete with those of the patent holder. Furthermore, “R&D companies 
commonly adopt a ‘post-patent strategy’, which involves employing tools to maximise the 
profitability of their AIs and avoid generic competition, even after the expiry of the compound 
patent”1151. Hence, the space where generic suppliers compete with “R&D companies” is fairly 
small and “even when generic companies appear to hold a substantial share of the market, that 
                                                          
1148 Ibid., para. 44. 
1149 Ibid., paras 29-37 and 41-49. 
1150 Ibid., para. 42. 
1151 Ibid., para. 43. 
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share is dependent on access to AIs which tend to be originated by large R&D players”1152. 
The Commission included various other categories of economic actors, than just generic, in its 
category of “other players”:  
• “pure” generic players (such as Sipcam, Gowan, Belchim), “which generally 
operate on specific regions or relatively few countries, focus primarily on selling 
‘me too’/copycat products or products which are relatively un-differentiated from 
the original product, either under their own name or as private label products for 
distributors”1153. 
• “differentiated” generic players (such as, Adama, Nufarm, Arysta/Chemtura, 
FMC/Cheminova), which “operate globally and try to differentiate themselves from 
the ;pure’ generic players by, in addition to producing ‘me too’ versions, also 
creating alternative mixtures which are not simply copies but attempt to offer 
differentiated benefits to existing products already available in the market”1154. The 
Commission notes that Adama constitutes the only generic player with a substantial 
geographic coverage across the EEA1155. 
• “generic active ingredient producers" which are players based in India and Chin, 
and “which do not generally try to market or register products themselves outside 
their home countries” and they “only sell AIs to other players that carry out all the 
formulation, registration, and marketing”1156 
• other agrochemical players that are active in the research of new AIs but do not 
engage in development (such as, Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd., Nihon Nohyaku Co. 
Ltd., Kumiai Chemical Industry Co. Ltd., Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha and Mitsui 
Chemicals Inc, which are “active in the discovery of new AIs in certain market 
segments, but do not compete across the board with the main integrated R&D 
players and tend to focus on offering products based on off-patent AIs, like the 
generic players”1157 
The Commission found that there are 7 main generic players active globally, with  6 generic 
players being active in the EU1158. The Commission noted the important barriers to entry in 
this industry, as the launch of a new AI requires significant time and financial resources due to 
the rigorous testing that the AI must undergo before being commercialised (the average costs 
being $286 million and the development and commercialisation taking approximately 10 
years)1159. According to the Commission, barriers to entry include “building inventive 
capability, regulatory costs, development skills, expense of research, cost of investment, risk, 
difficulty to obtain high enough market access, time for registration, and demanding technical 
                                                          
1152 Ibid., para. 48. 
1153 Ibid., para. 34. 
1154 Ibid., para. 34. 
1155 Ibid., para. 70. The Commission also noted that other generic suppliers “do not significantly lag behind”: Ibid., 
para. 78. 
1156 Ibid. 
1157 Ibid., para. 37. 
1158 Ibid., paras 35-36. 
1159 Ibid., paras 30 & 38. 
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requirements”1160, which further delay the entry of a generic in a market, usually for a period 
between 1-5 years (sometimes longer), after a product becomes off patent1161. 
 
Figure 1: Value Chain in the production of crop protection products: Key players 
 
 
Source: Commission Decision, ChemChina/Syngenta (2017)1162 
 
Moving to the analysis of the economic concentration in the affected markets, the Commission 
noted that Syngenta was the leading integrated R&D player in crop protection markets at the 
global level and the second biggest agrochemical company in the European market, with 
market shares of about 30-40% in herbicides and fungicides, and 10-20% in insecticides and 
seed treatment, with a leading crop protection portfolio and AIs1163. 
 
Table 49: Share of crop protection economic actors (2015 EEA agrochemical sales by 
crop protection product) 
                                                          
1160 Ibid., para. 39. 
1161 Ibid., para. 40. 
1162 Ibid., para. 31. 
1163 Ibid., paras 52-57. 
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Source: Commission Decision, ChemChina/Syngenta (2017)1164 
 
The case was also particularly interesting because of the fact that ChemChina is a state-owned 
undertaking. The Commission acknowledged that by virtue of Article 106 TFEU the principle 
of non-discrimination between public and private undertakings applies and that “undertakings 
making up an economic unit with independent power of decision, irrespective of the way in 
which their capital is held or of the rules of administrative supervision applicable to them”1165. 
The issue was raised because Chinese SOEs are managed in China by an administrative body 
named Central SASAC, which is the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council through which the Central Government supervises and 
manages the state-owned assets of its State owned enterprises. The Commission did not decide 
on the issue as for the purpose of the Transaction, whether ChemChina is regarded as one 
economic entity with other companies owned by the Chinese Central Government or not, did 
not have an impact for the competitive assessment. The Commission left the question open and 
considered the most restrictive approach under which ChemChina is regarded as one economic 
entity with other companies owned by the Chinese Central Government1166. 
In defining the relevant markets, because each raw material exhibited a different 
chemical structure, because each raw material specifically constituted an active ingredient (AI), 
and because each AI had to undergo a registration process, which authorizes only the exact AIs 
submitted, the Commission found distinct markets both for each raw material and for each 
AI.1167 The Commission went on to define markets in the various crop-protection products such 
as herbicides and fungicides largely based on crop and pest that farmers wished to target, in 
addition to the timing of application.1168 Concerning geographic markets, the Commission 
identified worldwide markets for raw materials and AIs, but national markets for the various 
crop-protection products.1169 
                                                          
1164 Ibid., para. 52. 
1165 Ibid., para. 81. 
1166 Ibid., para. 88. 
1167 Ibid., paras 95-96, 101-102. 
1168 See, e.g., paras 108, 121, 143. 
1169 Ibid., paras 161, 166, 174. 
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In undertaking a competitive assessment of horizontal overlap in the market for active 
ingredients, the Commission stated that in assessing competitive effects in all markets, it would 
consider whether the transaction eliminated important constraints that the parties previously 
had exerted both on each other and on remaining competitors. The Commission would look to 
whether the parties were close competitors in particular markets, meaning that anticompetitive 
effects could follow even if the parties were not closest competitors.1170 The Commission 
narrowed the analysis at the EEA level to seven AIs and determined the transaction would not 
significantly strengthen the parties’ market position, noting low market shares, an incremental 
increase in market share of less than 5% for six AIs, and the presence of many alternative 
suppliers for each of the seven AIs.1171 
The Commission next conducted a competitive assessment of the vertical relationship 
between AIs and crop protection products, and between raw materials and AIs. Starting with 
AIs and crop protection products, the Commission stated that input foreclosure requires a 
significant degree of market power in the upstream market, and that the parties unlikely would 
have sufficient dominance in the AIs where the parties’ activities overlap.1172 The Commission 
reached the same conclusion concerning customer foreclosure because the transaction would 
not generate the market power necessary in the various crop protection products to support 
such an exclusionary strategy, and because ChemChina would not be able to purchase 
anywhere near Syngenta’s share of worldwide demand in the AIs that it produced.1173 Turning 
to raw materials and AIs, the Commission excluded the possibility of both input and customer 
foreclosure, since Syngenta purchased only 5-10% of its raw materials from ChemChina, and 
since Syngenta represented less than 1% of ChemChina’s sales of the relevant raw 
materials.1174 
After dismissing concerns in the lawn and garden markets,1175 the Commission 
extensively examined horizontal overlap in crop protection markets. It found 712 markets 
where the activities of the parties overlapped, and 464 where their combined market shares 
exceeded 20%.1176 The Commission stated it would examine scores computed using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), setting the benchmark for whether accretion raised 
competitive concern depending on whether the relevant market share fell above or below 50%. 
In the actual assessment, however, the Commission did not make this factor determinative. As 
another broad set of criteria that the Commission considered as a type of safe harbour, the 
transaction would not raise competitive concern if the combined market shares of the parties 
fell below 30% and at least three other alternative competitors supplied the market.1177 Instead 
of exhaustively setting-out results for the many markets that the Commission considered, the 
following paragraphs briefly will discuss the varied factors that the Commission assessed in 
                                                          
1170 Ibid., para. 178, 182. 
1171 Ibid., paras 198, 204, 210, 219. 
1172 Ibid., paras 224, 230, 236. 
1173 Ibid., para. 255, 262. 
1174 Ibid., para. 282, 298. 
1175 Ibid., paras 302, 306. 
1176 Ibid., para. 320. 
1177 Ibid., paras 322, 324. 
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determining competitive effects, particularly emphasizing markets where low market share 
figures traditionally would end the analysis. 
As the Commission said it would, it placed considerable weight on whether the parties 
competed head-to-head in the relevant market prior to the merger.1178 It also looked closely at 
the incremental increase in market share that the merger created, with shares below 5% usually 
not raising competitive concern. Occasionally, the Commission did not find anticompetitive 
effects despite the transaction producing both high market shares and significant accretion. In 
the Cereals-Wheat-Fungicides-Leafspots market in Greece, for example, the merger permitted 
the parties to attain a 50-60% market share, which had increased by 20-30%. Yet the 
Commission noted that BASF held a sizable share as well (30-40%), and that Bayer was also 
active on the market (< 5%). The presence of either or both integrated crop-protection 
companies and generics on a given market mitigated the effect of higher market shares. The 
Commission also placed considerable weight on potential barriers to entry and expansion, 
which were minor in this example because at least 5 companies held fungicide product 
registrations for wheat in Greece and thus could respond to price fluctuations without incurring 
the significant costs in terms of money and time to register new products. The parties in this 
example lastly did not share active ingredients, suggesting product differentiation.1179 
More frequently, the Commission found liability despite market share levels that, when 
viewed perhaps in other markets, would raise little concern. The relative position of rivals 
mattered to the Commission: In the Cereals-Barley-Fungicide-Leafspots market in Slovakia, 
the transaction created a market leader with a 40-50% share, yet the nearest competitor had a 
share nearly 50% lower.1180 In the Cereals-Wheat-Insecticides-Foliar-Broad Spectrum market 
in Italy, the transaction generated a 30-40% market share. While Bayer (10-20%) and BASF 
(5-10%) remained on the market, the Commission noted the combined entity would be twice 
as large as its nearest rival. The merger boosted the market share of the parties by 10-20%, and 
left only one generic producer on the market. The Commission found that the transaction 
removed a “dynamic” rival from the market, Adama, which between 2013 and 2015 materially 
had increased sales. The Commission determined that the parties were close competitors, 
whose products were in the same chemical class, indicating a similar mode of action. Adama 
had planned to launch new formulations over the short-term and had products in its pipeline 
that suggested the combined entity’s market share would not decrease.1181 The Commission 
thus found a significant impediment to effective competition based largely on the likely 
development of the market after the merger. 
Most strikingly, in several instances the Commission determined that liability existed 
in markets where the combined entity’s share fell below 30%. Consider, for example, the 
market for Oilseed Rape-Fungicides-Leaves/Leafspots in Estonia. The merger created an entity 
with the third-largest share of the market, at 20-30%, with Bayer (40-50%) and BASF (30-
40%) retaining stronger positions. The transaction increased the combined entity’s market 
share by 10-20% and eliminated the only generic company active on the market, Adama, which 
                                                          
1178 See, e.g., ibid., para. 341. 
1179 Ibid., para. 359-60, 362-64. 
1180 Ibid., para. 431. 
1181 Ibid., paras 507-508, 510-513. 
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had recently entered the market. The Commission determined that the parties were close 
competitors that competed directly with several products, and that the parties were planning to 
launch new formulations and mixtures that would maintain or enhance their market 
position.1182 The Commission acknowledged the low market share, but stated that between the 
closeness of the parties’ products, pipeline products, and the growth plans of the entities, it 
considered that the market share levels did not fully incorporate the degree to which the parties 
restrained each other, and the future market strength of the combined entity.1183 
 
2.2.1.3.3. Brazil 
 
Syngenta had substantial activities in Brazil while ChemChina was less present in the country 
compared to other jurisdictions. CADE undertook an extensive analysis of all the relevant 
markets. In the sector of inputs for pesticides, CADE decided that each ingredient should 
considered a relevant market with a global scope.1184 The markets of pesticides were considered 
to be composed by several relevant markets: insecticides (divided by culture, type of 
application and pest group), non-selective and selective herbicides (divided by culture and type 
of herbs) and fungicides (divided by culture).1185 There was also the relevant market for 
insecticides and herbicides for seed treatment and pesticides for after-harvest treatment, 
according to the culture.1186 Urban and garden pest control products were also considered a 
relevant market in a national level.1187  
CADE evaluated horizontal concentration in each of these relevant markets. In most of 
them, the resulting concentration was below 20% or between 20% and 30%. Generally, CADE 
undertook further investigation in relation to the markets in which the resulting concentration 
was above 20% and the HHI variation was over 200, as follows:1188 
• cotton (selective herbicides); 
• potatoes (selective herbicides); 
• coffee (selective herbicides, and certain insecticides); 
• sugarcane (selective herbicides); 
• citric products (selective herbicides and after-harvest treatment); 
• industrial vegetables (selective herbicides for beans); 
• corn (certain insecticides, fungicides); 
• other specialties (insecticides for peanuts and others); 
• soybeans (insecticides); 
• tomatoes (selective herbicides); 
• wheat (insecticides, selective herbicides and fungicides). 
                                                          
1182 Ibid., paras 965, 966, 968-71. 
1183 Ibid., para. 972. For markets that resemble this one, see ibid., paras 981, 1002, 1010, 1048, 1090, 1105, 1344, 
1464, 1619, 1939. 
1184 Ibid para 58-67. 
1185 Ibid para 76-101. 
1186 Ibid para 102-110. 
1187 Ibid para 116-129. 
1188 Ibid para 304. 
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The analysis centred on whether a possible increase in price in those markets would be 
balanced by the presence of current or future rivals. Entry was not considered to be timely, 
given the necessary authorisation to offer pesticides in Brazil, which required extensive 
regulatory analysis.1189 Moreover, CADE considered there were extensive barriers to entry, due 
to the fact that entry has to take place in several markets at the same time for it to be 
profitable.1190  
On the other hand, rivalry was deemed to be sufficient to displace concerns. 
Competitors could increase production at least in 10%.1191 CADE considered that the 
companies had different profiles in terms of innovation. While Syngenta invested in research 
and development to develop new products, ChemChina mostly relied on inputs in the public 
domain.1192 Other competitors had a strong portfolio and could therefore effectively compete 
and have access to distributors.1193 Syngenta had 20%-30% of the pesticides market in Brazil 
and ChemChina less than 10%, the resulting market share would be less than 30% and the 
rivals, with different profiles, would have 70% of the market.1194 Eventual complaints could be 
dealt within the framework of the rules regarding anticompetitive conduct, and thus would not 
raise concerns in the context of the ex ante merger control.1195 
The vertical integration between inputs and pesticides and between pesticides and seeds 
produced by Syngenta was not considered problematic: some of them were pre-existent and 
there would be no incentive for market foreclosure.1196 CADE`s Superintendence approved the 
operation without restrictions; hence there was no need for the CADE’s Tribunal decision. 
 
2.2.1.3.4. India 
 
The CCI approved the merger1197. CNAC is the agrochemical division of ChemChina, which 
manufactures and sells generic active ingredients and formulated products used for crop 
protection as well as non-agrochemical crop products for home and garden and pest control 
operations.  Syngenta is a global concern, operating in the crop protection and seeds business. 
It is involved in the research, development, manufacture and marketing of agrochemical 
products, active ingredients  sold on a standalone basis, and in flowers, turf and landscape, and 
professional pest management products. China National Chemical Corporation 
(“ChemChina”), through its subsidiary CNAC proposed to acquire shares and indirect sole 
control of Syngenta. The market for formulated products in India was identified as the relevant 
market for the proposed merger. China National Chemical Corporation (CNAC) and Syngenta 
                                                          
1189 Ibid para 310-319. 
1190 Ibid para 330-332. 
1191 Ibid para 337. 
1192 Ibid para 349-355. 
1193 Ibid para 820-890. 
1194 Ibid para 888. 
1195 Ibid para 891. 
1196 Ibid para 140-157. 
1197 CCI, China National Agrochemical Corporation & Syngenta AG, C-2016/08/424 
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filed two merger notifications before CCI.  The first of these applications stands approved due 
to the expiry of the statutory period1198 whilst the other is still pending before it.1199  
CNAC is the agrochemical division of ChemChina, which manufactures and sells 
generic active ingredients and formulated products used for crop protection as well as non-
agrochemical crop products for home and garden and pest control operations.  Syngenta is a 
global concern, operating in the crop protection and seeds business. It is involved in the 
research, development, manufacture and marketing of agrochemical products, active 
ingredients  sold on a standalone basis, and in flowers, turf and landscape, and professional 
pest management products. China National Chemical Corporation (“ChemChina”), through its 
subsidiary CNAC proposed to acquire shares and indirect sole control of Syngenta. In the 
notice filed before CCI, the relevant market was stated to be ‘the market for formulated 
products in India’ which may be deemed to refer to formulated products used for crop 
protection referred to elsewhere in the notice. 
 
2.2.1.3.5. South Africa 
 
 The CCSA has conditionally approved the intermediate merger between China National 
Agrochemical Corporation (‘ChemChina’) and Syngenta. The CCSA found that ChemChina 
focuses on the discovery, development, manufacture and sale of broad and diversified line of 
agrochemicals or crop protection products and in South Africa it operates through Adama 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd which is involved in the testing and registration of agrochemical 
products. Syngenta is active in the agricultural sector, particularly in seed and crop protection 
products in over ninety countries. In South Africa, Syngenta has a formulation plant in Brits in 
the North West, where it manufactures agrochemicals. According to the CCSA, the proposed 
transaction was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in any of the affected 
markets. This was based on the fact that there were other suppliers of agrochemicals and seed 
treatment products that customers can turn to, post-merger. However, the CCSA was concerned 
that the merger may result in the merging parties importing all their products at the expense of 
using the manufacturing plant situated in North West in South Africa. This was considered as 
having an adverse effect on the agrochemicals sector and was also likely to lead to job losses.  
In order to address these concerns, the CCSA has imposed a condition that requires the merging 
parties not to relocate the manufacturing plant from North West for a certain period. 
 
2.2.1.3.6. China 
 
The merger was unconditionally approved by MOFCOM on April 12nd 2017 1200. 
                                                          
1198 CCI, China National Agrochemical Corporation & Syngenta AG, C-2016/08/424. Section 31(11) of the Indian 
Competition Act 2002 states that if CCI does not, on the expiry of a period of ninety working days from the date 
of publication referred to in sub-section (2) of section 29, pass an order or issue direction in accordance with the 
provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (7), the combination shall be deemed to have been 
approved by CCI.  
1199 CCI, China National Agrochemical Corporation & Syngenta AG C-2016/03/380 
1200 MOFCOM, 2017年第二季度无条件批准经营者集中案件列表, (April 12, 2017), available at 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/201707/20170702603665.shtml  . 
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2.2.1.4. Bayer/Monsanto 
 
The transaction brings together Germany-headquartered Bayer AG, a “life science” company 
with core competences in the areas of health care and agriculture, and US-based Monsanto is 
an agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation in a merger that would create the 
global leader in Agriculture Industry. The merger was notified in a number of jurisdictions, 
some of which have already approved it with conditions, while the process of approval is still 
ongoing in other jurisdictions. 
 
Bayer/Monsanto merger transaction 
Country Notification/Investigation 
date 
Decision date 
United States --N.A.   
European Union June 30, 2017 N.A.  
Brazil 21 February 2017 pending 
Russia NA 8 November 2017 
India C-2016/10/446, and C-
2017/08/523 (dates not 
known) 
Pending 
China NA pending 
South Africa 1 Feb. 2017 3 May 2017 
 
2.2.1.4.1. Brazil 
 
Upon notification of the merger transaction, on 21st February 2017, CADE decided in a 
preliminary report in July 2017, that the merger was complex and started to undertake an 
extensive analysis of all the relevant markets. Both Bayer and Monsanto have substantial 
activities in Brazil. In October 2017, CADE`s Superintendence issued its report and 
recommended objections to the transaction. Based on market shares and HHI variation, the 
following relevant market were further investigated: 
• Soybeans biotechnology (R & D of GM varieties in the world and licensing of GM 
varieties in Brazil);  
• Improvement, production and commercialisation of soybean seeds in Brazil;  
• Cotton biotechnology (R & D of GM varieties in the world and licensing of GM 
varieties in Brazil);  
• Improvement, production and commercialisation of cotton seeds in Brazil;  
• Improvement, production and commercialisation of melon seeds in Brazil;  
• Improvement, production and commercialisation of tomato seeds in Brazil.1201  
                                                          
1201 See note above BRAZIL, Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, Merger Case n 
08700.001097/2017-49, Parties: Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and Monsanto Company. Objection Recommendation, 
General Superintendence, 03 October 2017, available at 
< http://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/institucional/pesquisa/documento_consulta_externa.php?hfmv1NAFovfv4EqNdKFi
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Entry was not considered to be timely in any of the markets.1202 Barriers to entry were 
considered high in all the relevant markets, due to the cost and time involved to engage in R & 
D, the need for specialized work and the presence of strict regulatory requirements.1203 
Particularly, CADE’s Superintendence considered that both companies had activities in other 
parts of the chain, such as the development of seeds, genomics and pesticides and also had 
extensive R&D capabilities in pesticides.1204 This indicated that entry of competitors was quite 
difficult, given the portfolio power of the new entity and its extensive ties to distributors. 
In the markets of melon and tomato seeds, there was effective rivalry capable of 
dispelling concerns.1205 In all the other markets related to cotton and soybeans, rivalry was not 
considered to be sufficient to counterbalance market power. Among the reasons, one can 
mention that (i) the parties are the only players capable of operating in an integrated way with 
biotechnology, production and commercialisation (ii) all the other players depend on the 
technology of other parties; (iii) the parties have stronger brands and capacity to invest in 
marketing compared to its rivals.1206  
For example, in the market of soybeans seeds, although the HHI variation was not 
substantial and that Bayer had not obtained a relevant market share, the resulting market share 
is 30%-40%. While Monsanto is the largest player in both technology and seeds for soybeans 
in Brazil, there were indications that Bayer would increase its focus on the country. In the 
cotton market, although Monsanto had not obtained a relevant market share, it is the third 
player in the market and the resulting participation would be around 60-70%. In any case, both 
parties had significant R & D pipelines for improvement of cotton and soybeans. 
As to the non-horizontal effects, a varied of vertical relations were identified by 
CADE’s Superintendence. Among them, the cross-integration between the development of GM 
soybeans and cotton and the improvement, production and sale was considered to be 
harmful.1207 Both companies had the incentive to limit the access of rivals to its technology 
given the dominance of Monsanto in the soybeans technology and the high resulting market 
shares upstream and downstream in both cotton technology and seeds.1208 
Conglomerate effects were also analysed. The need to enter the sector in two or more 
markets at the same time and the possibility by new entity of offering bundles of 
complementary products gave rise to concerns, which potentialised the horizontal effects.1209 
The analysis of efficiencies was not published, but the Superintendence was of the opinion that 
they were not sufficient to balance the market power created.1210 
Based on those considerations, CADE’s Superintendence objected to the transaction 
and sent the case for a final decision by the CADE’s Tribunal. 
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2.2.1.4.2. South Africa 
 
The Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) was the first to be officially notified of 
this global transaction on 1 February 2017. The transaction was conditionally approved on 3 
May 2017. The acquirer, Bayer, sold a variety of products that protected crops in South Africa, 
including fungicides, insecticides, herbicides, and seed treatment products. Bayer also sold 
vegetable seeds, cotton seeds, and canola. The target, Monsanto, supplied seeds, bio-
technology traits, and crop-protection products in South Africa. Within the category of crop-
protection, Monsanto sold only herbicides. Yet Monsanto sold a wide variety of seeds, such as 
vegetable seeds, maize seeds, soybean seeds, and cotton seeds. Both companies actively 
researched and developed bio-technology traits that serve as critical inputs to genetically-
modified (GM) seeds and agrochemicals.  
The merger implicated both horizontal and vertical overlaps. Horizontally, both parties sold 
herbicides, GM cotton seeds, and vegetable seeds, and both parties developed bio-technology 
traits for cotton, maize, and soybean seeds. Vertically, Bayer manufactured herbicides for third 
parties utilizing a toll manufacturing arrangement, and it conducted a seed treatment business, 
coating seeds with insecticides and fungicides. Monsanto licensed maize, cotton, and soybean 
seed traits.  
The CCSA arrived to a conclusion in May 20171211. Quite interestingly, the CCSA took 
into account the value chain both for crop protection products and seeds/traits and considered 
that Bayer and Monsanto are potential competitors to each other pre-merger at various levels 
of the seed and crop protection value chain, and although they are not present at all levels of 
the seed and crop protection value chains in South Africa, they compete globally along the 
entire value chain in terms of seeds and herbicides.  
The CCSA recognized the following horizontal markets: (1) a national market for the 
wholesale distribution of cotton seeds; (2) a national market for the distribution of vegetable 
seeds; (3) a national market for the supply of selective herbicides; and (4) a national market for 
the supply of non-selective herbicides for non-GM crops. The CCSA further recognized the 
following vertical markets: (1) an “upstream market for the development and 
commercialization of maize seed traits with global and national dynamics”; (2) an “upstream 
market for the development and commercialization of cotton seed traits with global and 
national dynamics”; (3) an “upstream market for the development and commercialization of 
soybean seed traits with global and national dynamics”; (4) an upstream national market for 
seed treatment; (5) a downstream national market for the supply of treated seeds; (6) an 
upstream national market for the toll manufacturing of herbicides; and (7) a downstream 
national market for the supply of herbicides. 
The CCSA found unilateral effects in the cotton seed market but not in the vegetable seed 
market because of a minimal market share accretion and the strength of existing competitors. 
In the selective herbicide market, several viable alternatives negated potential unilateral effects. 
For a similar reason, specifically a low combined market share, the transaction did not raise 
                                                          
1211 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case No: 2017Feb0004, Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, (3 May 2017). 
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unilateral effects in the non-selective herbicide market for non-GM crops. The CCSA did 
determine that the transaction produced unilateral effects related to removing a potential 
competitor, in that Bayer’s Liberty system exerted significant competitive constraint on 
Monsanto’s system. The CCSA evaluated vertical effects in the seed treatment market, finding 
little concern since Bayer did not have a strong incentive to engage in input foreclosure. 
Customers of Bayer also could find alternative sources of supply in the market for toll 
manufacturing services. While Monsanto had the ability to foreclose access to traits post-
merger, it would not have an incentive to do so, since the licensing of traits constituted a highly 
profitable business. The CCSA additionally held that the merger produced portfolio effects, 
enabling the parties to offer new bundled products and to develop new traits for their seeds that 
rivals could not compete against when offering alternative agrochemical products. Portfolio 
effects also enhanced entry barriers. As to coordinated effects, the heterogeneity of the products 
offered due to constant innovation ultimately made coordination difficult1212. 
More specifically, with regard to the horizontal dimension of the merger, the CCSA found 
that to compete in the market for developing traits, an entity would have to incur a large up-
front investment in the necessary technology, facilities, and personnel that acts as a material 
entry barrier. Similarly, active companies can seek intellectual property protection for traits 
that prevent duplication for twenty years in the case of patents. The registration process also 
constructs substantial entry barriers. To conduct a field trial, a party must request a release that 
takes 120 days, and field trials transpire over a minimum of two planting seasons. After a 
successful field trial, a party must seek a general release, a process that takes 270 days. The 
entity would have to pay 3,892 rand per GMO for a trial release, and 30,231 rand per GMO for 
a general release. Given recent consolidation in the industry, the trait development market will 
contain four rather than six viable entities. Parties wishing to compete in the seed breeding 
business often must license traits from the four producers. When stacking traits, a developer 
can register and license the stack to third parties. Technological systems or platforms represent 
common products in the agrochemical business and consist of seeds containing both herbicide-
tolerant traits and the corresponding herbicides to which the seed reacts. Such platforms enable 
a farmer to spray herbicide on a crop that otherwise would harm the crop. In the trait 
development market, Bayer did not breed seeds in South Africa, eliminating the possibility for 
horizontal overlap1213. 
The parties did compete in distributing cotton and vegetable seeds in South Africa. In a 
national cotton seed geographic market, the parties competed in selling GM cotton seeds. The 
CCSA determined that demand-side substitutability between the different varieties of cotton 
seeds existed but depended on the region where the farmer planted the seeds. Due to the high 
entry barriers associated with trait development outlined above, the CCSA stated that 
agrochemical companies did not engage in supply-side substitutability1214. 
Turning to vegetable seeds, the CCSA held that the parties competed in distributing various 
vegetable seeds and in producing and distributing onion seeds in a national South African 
market. Demand-side substitution did not occur because farmers used each seed for a specific 
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purpose and could not substitute seed types, which translated into separate markets for each 
seed. Supply-side substitution did occur as agrochemical companies could sell any seed 
available, and farmers did switch between seed companies1215. 
As to the herbicide market, the CCSA distinguished between non-selective herbicides that 
could clear entire fields of weeds and selective herbicides that killed only weeds but not the 
surrounding crops. Because of this functional difference, the two herbicides each constituted 
an individual market. With demand-side substitution, farmers could substitute between 
selective herbicides with the same active ingredients, using the products interchangeably. In 
terms of this transaction, the parties’ selective herbicides featured different active ingredients 
that they registered for specific crops. The merger did not raise competitive concern on the 
market for selective herbicides1216. 
In the market for non-selective herbicides, the CCSA noted that the parties’ products each 
contained only one active ingredient. Bayer utilized Basta which employed glufosinate 
ammonium, and Monsanto supplied various RoundUp products that used glyphosate. The 
CCSA found that demand-side substitution generally did not exist between these two active 
ingredients, given that using them interchangeably would wipe-out the crops that they were 
supposed to protect. However, weed resistance to the glyphosate altered that conclusion to an 
extent, as farmers have switched between the ingredients to ameliorate the effects of resistance. 
Basta qualified as a contact herbicide that burned plants only where contact occurred, as 
compared to RoundUp, which killed plants that it contacted at the root. As an important 
distinguishing characteristic, Bayer charged a higher price for Basta relative to the price 
Monsanto changed for RoundUp. Because of this price difference, farmers applied Basta only 
when RoundUp proved ineffectual or harmful to crops. The CCSA ultimately found no 
horizontal overlap between non-selective herbicides for GM-seeds, since farmers generally did 
not use glufosinate ammonium herbicide for maize, cotton, or soybean crops. Horizontal 
overlap did exist between non-selective herbicides for non-GM seeds in the markets for fruits 
& grapes, sugarcane, and vegetables and flowers1217. 
The CCSA evaluated systems of traits separately, as the decision of which GM seed to plant 
committed farmers to a particular “technological pathway” associated with a specific system. 
Between the merging parties, Bayer’s Liberty herbicide constituted a glufosinate ammonium 
based herbicide that worked in conjunction with the Liberty Link traits and the corresponding 
glufosinate ammonium tolerate trait. Basta technically could perform the same function as 
Liberty since the active ingredients of the two herbicides performed the same function. Generic 
herbicides also competed in the systems market, and quality differences between the products 
were insignificant1218. 
The CCSA defined the market for traits as the development of crop-specific traits. As to 
demand-side substitutability, agrochemical companies registered traits on a crop-specific basis, 
which supported a market on a per crop, per trait property basis. Due to the presence of multiple 
properties within a stacked seed, the CCSA only considered the market for traits on a per crop 
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basis. Farmers dictated the demand for varieties of traits, which generally eliminated 
substitutability between seed traits for different crops. Maize seed traits, soybean seed traits, 
and cotton seed traits thus all constituted separate markets. From the perspective of supply-side 
substitutability, the technical skill, research, and time necessary to develop new traits 
significantly weakened the prospect of switching between developing traits for different crops. 
Companies more likely would license traits from competitors rather than developing alternative 
traits. Unlike many of the other relevant markets, the trait market had both global and national 
characteristics1219. 
The CCSA next assessed the various theories of harm, starting with unilateral effects, which 
produce higher prices or lower quality or variety. Removing a potential competitor counts as a 
unilateral effect. In markets where innovation exerts a competitive restraint, eliminating a rival 
with a small market share can harm competition if it has promising pipeline products. The 
CCSA applied this analysis to the removal of Bayer as a potential competitor in the market for 
developing traits. Bayer had traits that it had not registered and commercialized in South 
Africa, and the CCSA considered Bayer as a significant player in developing traits. Despite 
Bayer’s absence from the market, Bayer acted as a potential competitor in the South African 
trait market due to the large sunk costs required to develop traits that already existed. While 
registration still constituted an entry barrier for Bayer, the CCSA asserted that Bayer’s maize, 
cotton, and soybean traits still competed against Monsanto’s alternative traits. In the trait 
system market, while Monsanto alone had registered its glyphosate-based system, glufosinate 
ammonium systems were available in other jurisdictions. Post-merger, the competitive restraint 
that Bayer could have exerted on Monsanto with its glufosinate ammonium system would no 
longer exist1220. 
In the market for cotton seeds, Bayer and Monsanto were the only two entities supplying 
seeds to the market. By significantly reducing competitive restraints in this market, the CCSA 
determined that the merger would eliminate the incentive of the parties to supply cotton seeds 
of superior quality, and to produce superior innovation. The merger further would reduce buyer 
power by eliminating a significant competitor. In the vegetable seed market, on the other hand, 
several viable distributors remained in the market, neutralizing the possibility of unilateral 
effects. The CCSA reached a similar conclusion for the herbicide market, finding several viable 
alternatives in addition to the extensive use of generics that would weaken unilateral effects1221. 
In assessing vertical effects related to the seed treatment market, the CCSA stated that 
market participants could procure seed treatment services from companies other than Bayer, 
and that Bayer would not have an incentive to forgo profitable business by foreclosing its 
services. The CCSA also considered whether the transaction might foreclose competitors of 
Bayer that supplied seed treatment to Monsanto. The CCSA did not find customer foreclosure 
likely. It then assessed the effects of the merger on the toll manufacturing of herbicide market, 
inquiring whether the transaction would enable Bayer to restrict access to toll manufactured 
                                                          
1219 Ibid., paras 229-230, 232-233, 237-238, 244. 
1220 Ibid., paras 246, 249-250, 308, 312, 317, 319, 323. 
1221 Ibid., paras 262, 269, 274, 281, 288-289, 292. 
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herbicides for third parties. The CCSA discounted the possibility of input foreclosure because 
other upstream toll manufacturers sufficiently would restrain Bayer1222. 
The CCSA further evaluated potential vertical effects in the trait market for maize and 
soybeans, where developing traits occurred upstream, and breeding traited seeds occurred 
downstream. The first issue involved determining whether Monsanto had the ability to 
foreclose downstream rivals from access to its maize traits, and the CCSA found that it did. As 
to whether Monsanto had an incentive to block access to its traits, the CCSACCSA concluded 
that it did not. As Bayer did not license traits in South Africa prior to the merger, Monsanto 
would not be gaining any market share accretion due to the merger that might have justified a 
foreclosure strategy. Licensing traits constituted a lucrative business for Monsanto. Concerning 
the cotton trait market, Bayer and Monsanto were the only two companies supplying cotton 
seeds to South Africa. This meant that the merger could not foreclose downstream rivals 
because no other breeders needed to license cotton seed traits from the merged entity1223. 
The CCSA also considered portfolio effects that the merger might produce. Portfolio effects 
consist of how a merger changes the incentives of the merged entity to offer tied or bundled 
products post-merger due to an expansion in the company’s product range. Portfolio effects 
most often occur when a merger joins complementary products of which the merged entity has 
market power in at least one product. This merger implicated possible portfolio effects because 
of the complementarity between seeds and agrochemicals. The CCSA determined that the 
merged entity would have the ability to exercise portfolio effects due to its market power in the 
development of traits used as complements to the agrochemicals that both parties produced. 
The parties’ internal documents had detailed a strategy to provide integrated crop solutions to 
farmers, and the parties offered technological platforms consisting of three distinct products or 
services — biotechnology traits, seed production, and agrochemicals — used together and 
designed to increase yield and produce more sophisticated plant varieties. Competing with such 
platforms would require entering both the traits and agrochemical markets, which would 
demand perhaps prohibitive capital investment. Portfolio effects also could entail offering new 
bundled input packages by stacking traits. The CCSA argued that generic competitors in the 
non-selective herbicide market were particularly at risk, as the merged entity likely would 
bundle its dominant traits with herbicide to foreclose generics. Portfolio effects ultimately 
would harm farmers by enabling higher seed prices, jeopardizing the ability of small farmers 
to remain competitive1224. 
The CCSA lastly evaluated the potential for coordinated effects. Factors enabling 
coordination included cross licensing agreements between all major rivals, high entry barriers, 
recent consolidation, and multi-market contact. Yet the relevant products were not 
homogeneous; rather, they embodied constant and significant innovation that would make 
agreeing to terms and monitoring difficult. The CCSA concluded that the merger unlikely 
would produce coordination1225. 
                                                          
1222 Ibid., paras 334, 338, 342, 346, 351, 355. 
1223 Ibid., paras 362, 370, 375-376, 378, 381-383. 
1224 Ibid., paras 393-394, 406, 411, 414, 417, 425, 433, 437 
1225 Ibid., paras 446, 455, 458-459, 461-462. 
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As to remedies, the CCSA ordered Bayer to divest its cotton business, and to sell its Liberty 
Link trait business and its Liberty business. It was thought that this global divestiture remedy 
for the Liberty Link traits business (including the divestment of the corresponding Liberty 
herbicide) and Liberty business (the system) will address the removal of a potential competition 
concern and the exclusionary portfolio effects of the merger1226. This remedy would also ensure 
that the cross licensing between Bayer and Monsanto and other entities will not perpetuate, as 
a new purchaser will fill the position of Bayer in all existing business operations1227. The buyer 
would have to commit to commercialize the Liberty Link and Liberty products in South Africa 
or license a third-party to commercialize the products in South Africa1228. 
 
2.2.1.4.3. Russia 
 
The Russian FAS took notice of the importance of the merging entities as two of the main 
global competitors in a variety of areas of the factors of production segment of the food value 
chain. FAS noted that Bayer has business activities in pharmaceuticals, consumer health, and 
crop science, the company being a world leader in production of insecticides and fungicides. 
The agricultural sector represents a significant part of the total profits of the company. Bayer 
also offers a platform based solution for pesticides integrated with biotechnology seeds 
(Liberty Link). In 2002 Bayer acquired two agro tech companies, Aventis and Nunhems, and 
became one of the world leading companies in the selection of new crop varieties and seed 
suppliers for agricultural producers. In recent years Bayer has also been actively involved in 
smart agriculture. In 2015, Bayer purchased the digital agricultural platform Zoner, and in 
2016, it acquired ProPlant. Bayer has also recently announced the commercial launch in 2018 
of complex digital solutions in the agricultural sector, named Xarvio. Furthermore, Bayer is a 
vertically integrated company which is also involved in different partnerships with equipment 
manufacturers, such as Bosch.  
As for Monsanto, FAS noted that it is present in crop protection, digital farming, crop 
production, science research in farming and agrochemicals. In 1996 Monsanto acquired 
Agrocetus and Dekalb, and between 2005 and 2008, it also acquired Seminis and De Ruiter. In 
2012, Monsanto acquired Precision Planting, and in 2013, it acquired Climate Corporation. In 
2016, Monsanto acquired Vital Fields. Between 2013 and 2016 Monsanto acquired 
TargetGene, RossetaGene and GrassRobots. Currently, Monsanto is a world leading high tech 
company in the production of corn and soya seeds, including other vegetable crops. The 
company also provides services on paid access to plant genetic information. These business 
segments represent a significant part of the total profits of the company. Monsanto is also a 
leading producer of the universal herbicide glyphosate and its digital solutions in agricultural 
sector (FieldView) is considered as one of the best in the world. 
The FAS considered that the merger transaction would affect markets of high tech 
products for agro manufactures. Interestingly, in assessing the merger the Russian competition 
watchdog did not follow a static approach focusing on market definition in the various product 
                                                          
1226 Ibid., para. 531. 
1227 Ibid., para. 526 
1228 Ibid., paras 497, 500, 502, 506-507, 526, 529, 531, 534. 
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markets, but took a dynamic perspective defining as the affected markets the “integrated 
agritech markets” because separate seeds, agrochemicals and digital solutions are not any more 
that important for the competitive dynamic in this sector due to ongoing technological change. 
Hence, it seems that the FAS’s decision is more focused on the effect of the merger transaction 
on innovation competition, than on the sole impact of the merger on product competition. This 
aspect of the decision of the FAS is further explored in the Section on innovation competition. 
This dynamic perspective notwithstanding, the FAS proceeded to analyse the markets of 
seeds, agricultural chemistry, and digital farming, while noting the fact that the emerging 
market is integrated agro tech solutions. All these markets were considered by the FAS Russia 
in the context of the global value chain approach, with a particular focus on the effects of the 
merger on Russian agro manufactures (consumers of agricultural products) (vertical 
competition), as well as on potential competitors of Bayer and Monsanto in the field of 
supplying such products to agro manufactures (horizontal competition). According to the 
authority, in view of the dynamic perspective taken it was important to analyse the 
transformation dynamics of such markets, taking a global perspective, in view of the effect of 
the global transformation of the sector to the alteration of the competitive environment in 
Russia in the short and medium term. 
In particular, FAS Russia found that the merger affected the Russian market of highly-
productive seeds material, which depends on the latest technologies and involves access to big 
data about genetics (data and data analytics). The merger had also effects on the crop protection 
market, as well as on the market for digital solutions for agriculture. We will analyze these 
effects in the Section dedicated to innovation competition. 
According to FAS, the merger transaction would create the world leading company in 
the markets of plant protection, seeds and genetic traits. On the basis of 2015, the consolidated 
company would become the largest in the world for herbicides and insecticides, as well as for 
seeds and genetic materials, and the second largest in the world for fungicides. According to 
FAS, as a result of the transaction, there will be a higher degree of concentration in the seed 
market in particular for certain types of crops will also vary, the new entity reaching a 
significant market share in the market for cotton, in the market for soybean, in the market for 
vegetables in the market for corn. This market position indicates, according to FAS, the 
possible emergence of a dominant position of the consolidated company in these markets in 
the near future. The share of vegetable seeds was also found significant and could indicate the 
existence of considerable market power. 
In analysing the merger transaction, the FAS did not only take into account the current 
position of the merging companies in the relevant markets, but also the most likely changes in 
the structure of these market as well as to the state of competition in a short and medium term 
perspective, in view of the technological and social transformations occurring in the food 
sector. Hence, the authority considered that the analysis of the merger transaction should not 
only be based on the consideration of combined shares of companies at the relevant markets, 
but also factor in the unique opportunities for the new entity to significantly increase its market 
power presented by the ongoing changes in the industry, transformation which is partly framed 
by the strategies followed by the various economic actors, including the merged entity. This 
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part of the decision will also be analysed in the Section on innovation competition and non-
horizontal effects. 
FAS examined the following possible theories of harm: (i) the “probable” foreclosure of 
potential and existing rivals who do not dispose of the ability to operate in the integrated 
agritech platform markets on the global scale, (ii) a substantial increase in the entry barriers 
and the probability of anticompetitive conduct within this tight oligopolistic market, (iii) an 
“increase in the probability” of collusion, in view of the limited number of players of global 
presence in the industry. The situation was made worse, with regard to the last two concerns, 
in view of the immunity IP rights benefit in Russia from antitrust enforcement with regard to 
both unilateral conduct and licensing agreements.  
Turning back to the more “conventional” competition analysis of horizontal effects, FAS 
took into account the appearance of new and increasing barriers to entry in the market in view 
of the establishment of digital platforms integrating the supply of key agricultural inputs, as 
well as the increasing risks of collusion in view of the fact that the market will become a tight 
oligopoly dominated by a few (three) global actors offering the full range of modern 
agricultural technologies and an integrated platform for farmers. FAS also considered that these 
companies were also closely linked by mutual licensing agreements on intellectual property 
and other partnership agreements, thus raising the risk of possible anticompetitive agreements 
or concerted actions that would suppress possible potential competitors by closing their access 
to certain key technologies or data, ultimately leading to the exploitation of consumers. As 
there were three global actors, it would be more difficult to track collusive arrangements. We 
explore the remedies imposed in the relevant Section of the Report dealing with innovation 
competition as these mostly aim to address these concerns. 
 
2.2.2. Non-conventional merger assessment: Innovation competition and broader 
public interest concerns 
 
2.2.2.1. Innovation competition 
 
The recent merger cases also offered the opportunity to competition authorities to test more 
dynamic approaches in assessing possible restrictions on innovation competition, going beyond 
a simple analysis of the effect of the merger on product market competition, technology market 
competition, or even innovation market competition. Innovation competition concerns took a 
prominent role in the MOFCOM’s Dow/DuPont merger case, the EU’s Dow/Dupont merger 
case, the CCSA’s Bayer/Monsanto case and in the FAS’s Bayer/Monsanto case. Although 
recognizing the innovation competition concerns raised by the mergers, other authorities did 
not focus that much in their decision on this issue may be in view of the fact that there were 
few R&D activities of the merging parties taking place in their jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.2.1.1. MOFCOM’s Dow/Dupont merger decision 
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MOFCOM considered that the transaction could have an adverse impact on technological 
progress in the market of selective herbicide for rice1229. Prior to the merger, Dow and DuPont 
were respectively major innovation forces in the market of selective herbicide for rice and 
pesticides for rice. They competed in their research and development fields, made large 
investments in research and development and had a relatively strong innovation capability and 
rich product reserves. It was considered that the merger transaction would eliminate the basis 
for competition between both parties, and thus lead to a reduction in technological research and 
development expenses, to a decrease in  their innovative efforts in the fields where there was 
parallel innovation (with the same target products), and to delays in the launch of new products. 
Hence, it would produce adverse effect on the “market of technological progress” for the 
relevant products. The remedial package included an obligation to divest DuPont's research 
and development products for selective herbicide for rice, as well as a divestiture of DuPont’s 
global technology departments and regional development departments related to selective 
herbicide for rice. It was further ordered that DuPont divests global technology departments 
and regional development departments related to pesticide for rice. 
 
2.2.2.1.2. The EU Dow/Dupont merger decision 
 
In the EU Dow/Dupont case, the Commission focused its assessment both on 
innovation competition at the level of innovation spaces within the crop protection industry 
and on innovation competition at the industry level. In particular, the Commission looked  
“(1) At the level of innovation spaces, the overlaps between the Parties' lines of research 
and early pipeline products as well as between lines of research and early pipeline 
products of a Party that will compete in a market where the other Party is an existing or 
potential supplier; and 
(2) At the industry level, the overlap between the Parties' respective global R&D 
organisations, that is the resources, personnel, facilities, and other tangible and 
intangible assets dedicated to research, development and registration of new active 
ingredients (including lines of research, field testing facilities, registration 
capabilities)”1230. 
The Commission also distinguished between lines of research, which comprise the set of 
scientists, patents, assets, equipment and chemical class(es) which are dedicated to a given 
discovery target whose final output are successive pipeline AIs targeting a given innovation 
space, early pipeline products, that is, products which are intermediate results of lines of 
research, which have already been selected among leads, but with a lower likelihood of success 
than development products and still in the discovery or predevelopment stage and pipeline 
products in the development stage whose likelihood of being successfully launched is between 
80 to 90%1231. 
                                                          
1229中华人民共和国商务部公告2017年 第25号MOFCOM Announcement No. 25 of 2017  (April 29, 2017). 
1230 Ibid., para. 1957. 
1231 Ibid., paras 1958-1960. 
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 The Commission dedicated several hundred pages of its lengthy decision on innovation 
competition. Referring to paragraphs 8, 24 and 38 of the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(HMG), the Commission held that  
“(1989) The Merger Regulation sets up a legal framework that is not limited to the 
assessment of price effects, but under which the Commission is bound to conduct an 
appraisal of the likely effect of concentration in light of a number of criteria […] 
(1990) Innovation is an important criterion relevant in order to conduct the 
appraisal”1232. 
The Commission derived from this focus on innovation competition that the framework in the 
HMG dealing with the non-coordinated (unilateral) effects of mergers could also apply in order 
to assess mergers affecting other parameters of competition than price, such as innovation 
competition1233. Hence, the Commission needs to assess whether the transaction reduces 
important constraints on one or more sellers and significantly impede effective innovation 
competition considering both the loss of competition between the merging firms, and the 
reduction of competitive pressure on other non-merging firms. According to the Commission , 
“(o)verall, the loss of product variety brought about by less innovation harms consumers by 
depriving them of choice, and reducing competition on rival products”.1234 
 This innovation-focused framework influenced of course one of the theories of harm 
put forward by the Commission in this case, harm to innovation. More importantly, the 
Commission linked the existence of rivalry/competition with the promotion of innovation. As 
it is tellingly put forward in the Commission’s decision, 
“(2000) […] the Commission considers that the market features of the crop protection 
industry suggest that rivalry (or competition) is likely an important factor driving 
innovation, and that a merger between important rival innovators is likely to lead to a 
reduction in innovation”1235. 
Many reasons were given for what could be characterized as the Commission’s prior belief or 
starting point in this case, essentially linked to some of the “features” of the market. 
“(i) individual crop protection product markets are contestable on the basis of 
innovation; (ii) given the strong Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in the crop 
protection industry, the original innovator can be expected to reap the benefits from its 
innovation, by preventing rivals from imitating the successful innovation (that is, 
appropriability is high); (iii) innovation is mostly based on product innovation; (iv) 
consolidation between rival innovators is unlikely to be associated with efficiencies 
([…]); and (v) the fear of cannibalisation of own existing products is a disincentive to 
innovate which is likely to be reinforced by a merger between rival innovators”1236. 
The Commission also relied on a body of theoretical and empirical economic literature that 
raised doubts over the Schumpeterian linkage between monopolistic profits and innovation 
(this literature is further examined and discussed in Part IV, Chapter 2 of this Report), and 
                                                          
1232 Ibid., paras 1989-1990. 
1233 Ibid., para. 1994. 
1234 Ibid., para. 1998. 
1235 Ibid., para. 2000. 
1236 Ibid., para. 2001. 
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empirical evidence that “in the past, concentration in the industry was accompanied by a 
decrease in innovation”1237. The Commission also found that concentration was not also high 
at the industry level, but also at the level of innovation spaces1238. The concept of “innovation 
space” constitutes an intermediate level of consideration of a space where competitive activity 
takes place, in addition to that of product relevant market downstream, technology market 
upstream, or at the level of the industry1239. According to the Commission, 
“(2162) […] (T)he R&D players do not innovate for all the product markets composing 
When setting up their innovation capabilities and conducting their research, they target 
specific innovation spaces which are upstream of lucrative product markets and product 
markets which are of strategic interest for the R&D player in question.1602 In order to 
assess innovation competition, it is thus important to consider the spaces in which this 
innovation competition occurs”1240. 
The aim here is to delineate spaces where innovation competition takes place and to develop a 
structured approach that will enable the Commission to assess the existence of competitive 
constraints to the merging parties. This assessment requires: 
“[…] (F)irst of all the identification of those companies which, at an industry level, 
have the assets and capabilities to discover and develop new products which, as a result 
of the R&D effort, can be brought to the market. This analysis would identify the 
industry players who are capable to bring innovation to the crop protection markets 
overall. Against this background, it is possible to assess whether, through increased 
concentration and in light of high barriers to entry, the Transaction would be likely to 
reduce innovation output in the crop protection industry overall. 
Secondly, and at another level, however, it is also relevant to identify and analyse those 
spaces in which innovation competition occurs in the crop protection industry, so as to 
assess whether the Transaction would significantly impede innovation competition in 
such spaces”1241. 
These “innovation spaces” are getting smaller in the crop protection industry, in view of the 
increasing regulatory hurdles, which require crop protection products to be ever more selective, 
compared to the past1242. The Commission rejected the view of the parties that the choice was 
either focusing on the effect of the merger on specific relevant markets, such as upstream 
technology market and the relevant product markets or the assessment of innovation in the 
industry in general, noting that the early leads pursued do not indicate clearly what specific 
type of downstream product will materialise with the final Active Ingredient, which makes it 
necessary to assess innovation competition in innovation spaces, corresponding to small 
groupings of crop/pest combinations1243. 
 The Commission then noted the oligopolistic nature of the industry dominated by five 
integrated crop protection R&D players, following an unprecedented wave of consolidation in 
                                                          
1237 Ibid., para 2003. See also 2157-2158 and the discussion in Section 8.5. of the Commission’s decision. 
1238  
1239 Ibid., paras 2159-2162. 
1240 Ibid., para 2162. 
1241 Ibid., paras 2163-2164. 
1242 Ibid., para 2166. 
1243 Ibid., paras 2171 & 2191 
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the industry since the mid-1990s1244. In contrast to other industry players, these players have 
scale, assets, capabilities, disposing the possibility to access to markets to pursue R&D globally 
and are integrated throughout the entire R&D pipeline1245. Although the Commission noted the 
existence of other companies that are active to some extent in R&D, it found that these were 
not comparable to the five global R&D-integrated players as regards innovation 
competition1246.The Commission further noted that Monsanto was not a strong player in the 
crop protection industry as its most significant activity as regards crop protection innovation 
has been the introduction of one extremely successful AI (Glyphosate) more than thirty years 
ago, this “decades old innovation still constituting the core of its crop protection revenues, its 
patent share in the market being fairly insignificant1247. In contrast, Dow’s herbicides patent 
share for new active ingredients was in the range of 30-40%, Syngenta's patent share in the 
range of 20-30%, Bayer's patent share in the range of 10-20 to 20-30%, and DuPont's patent 
share in the range of 5-10 to 10-20%1248. The Commission similarly proceeded to analyse the 
competitive constraint with regard to innovation brought by Isagro and a number of Japanese 
companies present in the industry, concluding that these were not active in the discovery and 
development of new AIs, or were distant competitors of the merging parties. Quantitative 
metrics on the basis of patent applications confirmed that the five global R&D-integrated 
players play a predominant role in crop protection innovation1249. 
The Commission further noted that industry shares tend to underestimate the expected 
non-coordinated effects of the merger given the significant cross shareholding between the 
main players, an issue that will be analysed in Chapter 4 of this Part1250. 
Moving beyond the industry level, the Commission noted that concentration of R&D-
integrated players at specific innovation spaces is even higher leading to tighter oligopolistic 
markets. Indeed, not all the R&D integrated companies are present in each innovation space 
and are present in all the downstream markets for formulated products. Despite being active at 
an industry level, each R&D player only competes in some markets for formulated products 
and therefore develops innovation efforts aiming at introducing new products in downstream 
markets for formulated products in some innovation spaces, but not all. As the Commission 
notes, “(o)therwise, they would be present with a product in all the downstream markets”1251. 
This implies that at each innovation space level fewer than the Big 5 players are competing, 
and therefore concentration is likely to be higher at this level than at the overall industry 
level1252. 
On the basis of these findings the Commission held that the merger would bring 
together two competitors which pre-merger were more important innovation competitors at 
industry level than their downstream market shares and their R&D expenditure shares 
                                                          
1244 Section 8.6.2. of the Commission’s Dow/DuPont decision. 
1245 Ibid., paras 2205 & 2209. 
1246 Ibid., para. 2228. 
1247 Ibid., para. 2232. 
1248 Ibid., para. 2236. 
1249 Section 8.6.3.5. of the Commission’s Dow/DuPont decision. 
1250 Ibid., Section 8.6.4. 
1251 Ibid., para. 2363. 
1252 The Commission explains this higher degree of concentration in innovation spaces for various reasons detailed 
in paras 2365-2393. 
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suggest1253. The Commission observed that the merging parties are important innovators in the 
crop protection industry with ambitious targets in terms the number and quality of new AIs and 
that their shares of patents (including citations of patents, which was thought as the most 
relevant criterion to assess the quality of patents) and new active ingredients shares (based on 
turnover on downstream markets), at industry level are higher than their downstream shares 
and their R&D expenditure shares suggest1254.  
The closeness of Dow and Dupont as competitors in several innovation spaces was also 
an element considered by the Commission. To determine closeness, in terms of competitive 
pressure for innovation competition, the Commission took into account current product 
overlaps as well as overlaps in their lines of research and early pipeline products1255. In doing 
so, the Commission explored the current lines of research and early pipeline products of the 
Parties which overlap and that could therefore risk being discontinued, deferred or redirect by 
the merged entity, thus leading to an effect on innovation. The Commission examined overlaps 
in a number of innovation spaces, such as broadleaf weed herbicides where Dow and DuPont 
were the only companies with a clear focus in this broader group of herbicides1256. The analysis 
of herbicide pipeline products from competitors that may reach the market beyond 2022 also 
confirmed that none of them had the potential to pose a serious threat to the market position of 
the merging parties in Europe1257. Similar findings were made for a series of insecticides1258 
and fungicides1259. 
The Commission next proceeded in exploring if the merged entity would have 
incentives to reduce innovation efforts on overlapping lines of research and early pipeline 
products on the innovation spaces where the merging parties currently compete1260. In order to 
assess these incentives the Commission referred to economics theory suggesting that a merger 
bringing together two competing early pipeline products (or lines of research) or an early 
pipeline product (or line of research) positioned to compete with an existing product may lead 
to a reduction on the efforts to continue with those overlapping early pipeline products (or lines 
of research) if the early pipeline product (or line of research) of one of the merging parties was 
likely to capture significant revenues from the competing product of the other merging party 
(be it another early pipeline product – or line of research - or products currently marketed), 
each company’s research posing an externality to the other’s1261. According to the Commission, 
“(t)his adverse externality is internalized post-merger – from the perspective of each innovator, 
the expected loss of profits on the products of the other merging firm adds to the opportunity 
cost of innovating –, making it more likely that an early pipeline product (or line of research) 
is suppressed, deferred or re directed (particularly in the presence of significant development 
and commercialisation costs)”1262. Similar cannibalization concerns could also arise if a 
                                                          
1253 Section 8.7 of the Commission’s Dow/DuPont decision. 
1254 Sections 8.7.1. & 8.7.2. of the Commission’s Dow/DuPont decision. 
1255 Ibid., para. 2601. 
1256 Ibid., para. 2645. 
1257 Ibid., para. 2699. 
1258 Ibid., para. 2729. 
1259 Ibid., para. 2842. 
1260 Section 8.9 of the Dow/DuPont decision. 
1261 Ibid., paras 3017-3018. 
1262 Ibid., paras 3018 & 3024. 
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merging party’s early pipeline product overlaps with an early pipeline product of the other 
merging party, the Commission concluding that this will reduce the incentives for the merged 
entity to continue with both lines of research and early pipeline products with the same intensity 
as each of the merging parties would in the absence of the merger1263. Consumers are harmed 
“by both the loss of product variety, and the reduced intensity of future product market 
competition in the markets where the discontinued/deferred/redirected early pipeline product 
would have been introduced but for the merger”1264. Although the Commission was not be able 
to identify in this case precisely which early pipeline products or lines of research the merging 
parties would likely discontinue, defer or re-direct, it was considered probable that the early 
pipeline products and lines of research where the parties were close innovation competitors 
would be the those for which the merging parties would have less incentive to innovate1265. 
The Commission also noted that “discontinuation of an early pipeline product or line of 
research is more likely to occur the higher the expected sales which that early pipeline product 
from the merged entity would capture (if launched) from another existing or future product of 
the merged entity”1266. 
 In the same vein, the Commission noted that the merged entity would have lower 
incentives to achieve the same overall level of innovation as the merging parties pre-merger, 
in view of the fact that “rivalry at the innovation stage is a crucial driver of the incentives to 
innovate”1267. According to the Commission, 
“[…] on highly concentrated innovation driven industries with very high barriers to 
entry such as the crop protection industry, the internalisation of the effects of innovation 
competition between the parties of a merger between important innovators would likely 
lead to noticeable reductions in the innovation efforts of the parties in relation to any 
future products that would otherwise be introduced in the absence of the 
transaction”1268. 
This theory of harm goes beyond the “short-term” harm to innovation competition that 
would likely come with the discontinuation of overlapping lines of research and early pipeline 
products which target the same innovation spaces1269. It consists in a medium and long-term 
theory of harm that would result from the lower overall incentives of the merged entity to 
innovate as compared to the merging parties separately before the transaction and the 
“structural effect of the transaction”, the merged entity the merged entity pursuing less 
discovery work, less lines of research, less development and registration work and ultimately 
bringing less innovative AIs to the market than the merging parties would have done absent 
the transaction1270. To the extent that “lowered innovation incentives can manifest themselves 
in (i) lower innovation efforts reflected for example in less financial resources, less scientists, 
less physical assets devoted to innovation, and (ii) lower internal innovation output targets”, 
                                                          
1263 Ibid., para. 3022. 
1264 Ibid., para. 3019. 
1265 Ibid., para. 3025 
1266 Ibid. & 3053. 
1267 Ibid., para. 3054. 
1268 Ibid., para. 3055. 
1269 Ibid., para. 3056.  
1270 Ibid., para. 3057. 
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the Commission explored the parties’ post-integration planning documents and the synergies 
put forward by the merging parties which were  set from the beginning to be more focused on 
cost cutting than on creating value (as more than 70% of the announced synergies were cost-
based)1271. 
The Commission also found unlikely a sufficiently strong countervailing reaction of 
innovation competitors as the combination of efforts of players with discovery capabilities and 
of players with development capability would not offset the reduction of output resulting from 
the transaction1272. It was not to be expected that third-party R&D-integrated players would 
increase their R&D expenditure and R&D targets following a concentration, in particular in 
view of the finding that the past consolidation of the industry seems to have harmed innovation 
competition in the crop protection industry1273. 
The efficiency gains put forward by the parties have not also been proved or 
substantiated. In particular, the Commission took issue with the claim of the parties that the 
loss of competition between tem would have increased their incentives to innovate. This 
argument was carefully distinguished from the separate issue that a reduction in imitation (or 
free-riding) by rival firms may generate an offsetting pro-innovation effect (by allowing the 
merging parties to internalise a positive externality that was not being internalised absent the 
merger), as in this case  “a reduction in imitation risk does not automatically follow from a loss 
of competition between the merging parties and can - at least in principle - be achieved by 
strong (enforcement of) IPR, high degree of secrecy or other business strategies by the industry 
participants”1274. 
The harm to innovation would be significant to the extent that unilateral (non-coordinated) 
effects are expected to be more pronounced if the merger brings together two out of a limited 
number of large, qualitatively and highly effective R&D-integrated players” and “effects are 
also stronger if the merging parties are close competitors in terms of their likely innovation 
trajectories or in the product markets targeted with their innovation1275. 
Because innovation is an important parameter of competition the Commission arrived 
to the conclusion that as a result of its non-coordinated effects on innovation, the transaction 
significantly impeded effective competition within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Merger 
Regulation. 
The Dow/Dupont merger also offered the opportunity to the Commission to analyse for 
the first time the emerging technology of gene-editing. Indeed, both Dow and DuPont are 
developing gene editing technologies, Dow the EXZACT Precision Technology (EXZACT), a 
zinc finger nuclease technology (ZFN), while DuPont is present in the CRISPR/Cas9 
technology. DuPont has also been developing its CRISPR-Cas technology since 2012, on the 
basis of third party licenses and collaborations as well as proprietary IPRs1276. 
The decision was also the first time the Commission had to assess market definition in 
relation to gene editing. Although the Commission noted that there are four main families of 
                                                          
1271 Ibid., para. 3071. 
1272 Section 8.10.6 of the Dow/DuPont decision. 
1273 Ibid., para. 3242. 
1274 Ibid., para. 3275. 
1275 Ibid., para. 3287. 
1276 Ibid., paras. 3408-3409. 
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engineered nucleases being developed for application in crops: meganucleases, ZFNs, 
transcription activator-like effect or based nucleases (TALENs), and the CRISPR-Cas system, 
it considered that, for the purposes of the decision, the exact scope of the relevant product 
market for gene editing would be left open as the merger would not significantly impede 
effective competition in the internal market irrespective of whether the different families of 
engineered nucleases are considered to belong to the same relevant product market1277. The 
geographic dimension of the market of gene editing was also thought to be worldwide in scope 
although again the exact scope of the relevant geographic market for gene editing was left 
open1278. 
The Commission then proceeded to the assessment of non-coordinated effects in seed 
gene-editing. First it found that the merging parties’ products are not close competitors and 
may even be considered complementary. The Commission accepted the merging parties’ 
argument that CRISPR/Cas9 and EXZACT do not compete closely with each other, in that the 
former is a lower precision (and also lower cost) technology, used predominantly for gene 
deletion and modification, while EXZACT is a high precision (and high cost) technology used 
predominantly for gene stacking/trait insertion1279. Second, it held that there are several 
alternative gene editing tools available, with several seed companies developing gene editing 
technologies for agriculture1280. Hence, the Commission found that despite CRISPR/Cas9 
being currently the best gene editing technology for seeds, there are several other alternatives 
that the merging parties’ competitors have access to, including similar CRISPR/Cas9 
technologies from other sources, and therefore the ZFN of Dow is not the only or even the best 
alternative available to DuPont's CRISPR/Cas91281. The Commission also found that there was 
no reason to worry about the merging parties’ incentives to license gene editing technologies 
to rival seed companies or, in any event, to license them at terms that would be less attractive 
than those offered pre-merger. 
It would also be unlikely that the merger strengthen the merging parties' IPR portfolio 
in relation to CRISPR/Cas technologies to the extent that Dow has no patents on the actual 
CRISPR enzymes, and therefore could not impede the development or use of the technology, 
and there has been an exponential proliferation of CRISPR patent filings, with many 
agricultural companies using CRISPR technology for the development of plant products 
without any need of licensing Dow’s IP. The Commission concluded that there was no risk for 
a significant impediment of effective competition in gene-editing. 
The Commission considered that the remedies it imposed in order to take into account 
the horizontal unilateral effects concerns in product market competition, and which involved 
the divestiture of an R&D division, were also able to deal with the innovation competition 
concerns, From this perspective the purchaser of the crop protection divested business will be 
able to replace DuPont as a global, fully R&D integrated competitor in the crop protection 
industry, and in particular in the areas where Dow and DuPont overlap, thus maintaining the 
                                                          
1277 Ibid., para. 3414.  
1278 Ibid., para. 3415. 
1279 Ibid., para. 3418. 
1280 Ibid., paras 3427 & 3434. 
1281 Ibid., para. 3435. 
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rivalry with Dow’s R&D activities that would otherwise have been eliminated by the 
merger1282. The divestiture will include all DuPont's assets and personnel dedicated to the 
discovery of new AIs as well as all patents, know-how and any other IP owned by DuPont 
related to its global R&D Organisation and crop protection pipeline1283. The Crop Protection 
Divested Business will therefore be able to replicate the competitive constraint previously 
exerted by DuPont. 
 
2.2.2.1.3. The Competition Commission’s of South Africa Bayer/Monsanto case 
 
The CCSA considered the fact that both Bayer and Monsanto are among the industry leaders 
in terms of global spend on R&D for traits and concluded that this “reinforces the magnitude 
of R&D development capabilities and initiatives that will not be consolidated within the 
merged entity”1284. The merger raised concerns with regard to the removal of potential 
competition at the level of platform or “system competition” (“as traits and herbicide tolerant 
traits are used as a ‘system’ to provide farmers with the best protection against weeds in order 
to generate high crop yields”)1285. Indeed, the decision of farmers on which FM seed to plant 
“locks farmers into” a “technological pathway where only a specific system can be used”1286. 
The CCSA found that other seed and crop protection forms will not be able to compete with 
the merging parties’ platform “unless they are vertically integrated seed and crop protection 
firms who develop traits, breed seeds and develop active ingredients for herbicides” and that 
their only options are either “to develop their own traits for non-selective herbicide tolerance 
or license traits from the merging parties”1287. Hence, the CCSA concluded that the removal of 
a potential competitor which would have competed with Monsanto’s dominant glyphosate 
based technological system could be problematic from a competition law perspective1288. 
Although this is not explicitly referred to in the decision, the main concern seems to be 
innovation competition in this market and the lock in of farmers to a specific technology.  
 Similar concerns, that implicitly raise an innovation competition issue, were raised with 
regard to the exclusionary portfolio strategies of the merged entity, in particular as it could 
have the ability to block rivals from becoming effective competitors in the “provision of 
technological platforms (or ‘systems’) to farmers in South Africa”, given the market power of 
the merged entity in the development and production of traits1289. These technological 
indivisible packages of traits, seed and chemicals are marketed by firms to be sold and used 
together. By coupling this offer, the CCSA found that the merged entity could increase its 
rivals’ “innovation costs” in the seed industry, as competitors will have to develop new 
technological platforms in response to any new bundled product offerings by the parties in 
                                                          
1282 Ibid., para. 4032. 
1283 Ibid., para. 4035. 
1284 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case No: 2017Feb0004, Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, (3 May 2017). 
1285 Ibid., para. 316. 
1286 Ibid., para. 317. 
1287 Ibid., para. 320. 
1288 Ibid., para. 324. 
1289 Ibid., para. 407. 
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order to be able to compete with the merged entity for the same customer base1290. At the same 
time, the exclusion of competitors from the market and the entrenchment of the dominant 
position of Monsanto’s technological platform following the merger with Bayer, will reduce 
the merged entity’s spending on innovation, therefore leading to a reduction of the level of 
innovation in the market, to the detriment of farmers1291. The fact that Monsanto’s patent on 
glyphosate has expired and that it is possible for farmers to procure from generic herbicide 
manufacturers was not considered a sufficient consideration to question the bundling issue, as 
farmers still have strong incentives to continue to use Monsanto’s glyphosate-based herbicide 
for Monsanto’s tolerant traits, as in case they use generics they will lose any claims for 
compensation against Monsanto in case the seed underperforms1292. This further ties farmers 
to Monsanto’s technological platform. Third parties certainly have the possibility to license the 
traits from the merging parties, but such licensing agreements have restrictions which limit 
their ability to become effective competitors in the provision of technological platforms1293. 
Despite the focus being partly on innovation competition, the CCSA emphasised the potential 
price increases the bundling of the new entity’s offer could produce to the detriment of farmers 
as the principal competition concern raised by portfolio effects. 
 
2.2.2.1.4. The Russian FAS Bayer/Monsanto decision 
 
An important aspect of the FAS decision was the perception that merged entity will be capable 
to offer to farmers genetic material (seeds), a full range of plant protection products, as well as 
digital management solutions that simplify the process of organizing agricultural production. 
Although these products were, until recently, separate markets, following the first wave of 
economic concentration, which was held in the late 90's-early 2000’s, many solutions in this 
area had become interdependent (package or system competition). 
Bayer and Monsanto are vertically integrated high-tech companies, active in research and 
development, distribution and the sale of products to end consumers. According to FAS, the 
high intensity of innovation and the rapidly changing business models in the markets for these 
products require analysis, not only at the level of the various product markets affected by the 
merger, but also at the level of the “integrated market of agricultural technological solutions”. 
With regard to the effect on innovation, FAS focused on the risks for competition in the market 
for digital solutions in agriculture. According to the FAS, the merger raises the risk of the 
emergence of a closed digital platform that will dominate the market and which will eventually 
reduce competition by squeezing out from the market alternative digital solutions from other 
companies. The control over the digital platform by the merging parties could influence the 
decision of agricultural producers to acquire other means of production (from seeds to 
agrochemicals). The decrease of innovative activity in the field of digital farming could also 
create barriers to entry into the market for digital platforms. It could also have the potential to 
cut down the research activity of competitors, as these will lose the incentive of competing 
                                                          
1290 Ibid., paras 418-420 & 424 
1291 Ibid., para. 420. 
1292 Ibid., para. 426. 
1293 Ibid., para. 430. 
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with the industry leaders. A closed and dominant digital platform will also become an important 
barrier to entry for the emergence of new small innovative projects in the fields of selection or 
agro chemistry, which could have been integrated without difficulty into open digital platforms. 
The decision does not provide further details about the assessment of the incentives and of the 
ability of the leading digital platform to foreclose the access of smaller competitors in their 
platform. 
According to FAS, the new entity resulting from the merger would have access to 
accumulated data on genetic information, and will control technologies of accelerated 
selection, including technologies of gene editing, which enable the accelerated selection of 
certain given characteristics by means of digital algorithms and big data, including historical 
data. The control of these technologies and the significant market share of the merging entities 
in the relevant product markets provide, according to the FAS, the merged entity with the power 
to influence the decisions of agriculture producers, raising strategic barriers to entry into these 
markets for other companies which do not dispose of the same access to technologies, and 
therefore to significantly increase its share on the full range of the relevant markets. Indeed, 
the creation of a digital platform integrating the supply of key agricultural inputs makes it 
“virtually impossible” for independent producers of agrochemicals or seeds to enter the market, 
as well as for individual agronomic digital services not integrated into such a platform to have 
access to a critical installed base of consumers. According to FAS, in markets that are heavily 
dependent on ongoing technological transformation and innovation competition, market power 
should be conceived as the projection of the innovation potential of the merging entity. The 
joint merged entity would become a dominant player in a number of global product markets 
like genomic markers for some crops, digital farming solutions and even some seeds markets 
as well and would get an ultimate advantage in the agritech markets as it would combine a 
complex technological capability of the global scale that other companies lack. The 
consolidation of the R&D resources of Bayer and Monsanto and of their innovative potential 
will enable the merged entity to “dramatically increase” its market power in the relevant 
commodity markets, through various exclusionary strategies. In view of the established 
immunity from antitrust regulation for both the exercise of IP rights in the unilateral conduct 
context and also with regard to anticompetitive licensing agreements, this conduct could not 
be dealt ex post, by the antitrust law provisions, therefore, according to the FAS decision, 
making it necessary to deal with the possible situations of abuse of this market power ex ante 
through merger control. 
Finding that the merger would lead to a substantial elimination of competition, FAS 
considered the adoption of remedies that would aim to ensure that the Russian agro-
technological companies and research centers would be guaranteed an effective access to key 
data and genetic information necessary for the creation of a more competitive offer in the 
agricultural production sector in Russia. The FAS decision imposes a number of access 
remedies (to the relevant genomic resources and the digital platforms data and algorithms) as 
well as compulsory technological transfer to the Russian agritech players with the aim to boost 
competition and make the competitive environment in this sector more dynamic and vibrant. 
The compulsory licensing remedies cover the crops where market competition in Russia is the 
least developed. Providing such a technological transfer and access of Bayer and Monsanto 
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should be, according to the decision aimed at achieving the goal of overcoming the identified 
negative consequences for the state of competition created by the higher degree of economic 
concentration in this market and would aim to “compensate” the negative effects for 
competition resulting from the merger transaction.  
The decision organized this “technology transfer” by establishing a monitoring 
mechanism that would be managed by a non-profit organization, the “Centre for Technological 
Transfer”, established in the context of a Higher Education Institution, the “National Research 
University Higher School of Economics”. This monitoring trustee would ensure the efficient 
transfer by the new entity of the newest technologies in the field of selective pesticides, as well 
as access to the relevant banks of genetic information (genetic markers) and the parent lines of 
the relevant crops to Russian business entities making such request, when this is necessary for 
the creation of new highly productive varieties/ hybrids of wheat, soybean, corn, sugar beet, 
tomatoes, cucumber, white cabbage. Russian business entities, selected by the Center of 
Technological Transfer on the basis of criteria agreed with the FAS Russia and on the basis of 
non-discriminatory conditions, should also benefit from a non-discriminatory access to the 
existing data files (on soil, climate, etc.), on the basis of which the forecast models of digital 
agronomic platforms for precision farming have been built, as well as to digital agronomical 
platforms for precision farming and provision of telematics services.  
Non-discriminatory access principles will be elaborated by the merged entity together 
with the Center of Technological Transfer within one year after concluding the contract. These 
rules should be also agreed by the FAS Russia. Similar conduct remedies apply to the packaged 
solutions for agricultural producers, which were formed on the basis of digital agronomic 
platforms for precision farming, in terms of delivery of mineral Fertilisers, seeds, plant 
protection products and agricultural machinery. The scope, form and regulation of technology 
transfer in each specific case will be determined by an agreement between the merged entity 
and the Russian business entity, the recipient of technology, as well as the Center of 
Technological Transfer.  
The fee for the transfer of technology protected by intellectual property rights will be 
paid from the revenue of the Russian business entity – recipient of technology – following the 
introduction of a new variety / hybrid. It is further specified that the fee should not exceed 50% 
of the amount of the fee that is assigned in comparable market conditions. The volume and 
form of access to databases will be determined by the agreement between the merged entity, 
the Russian business entity – recipient of technology-and the Center of Technological Transfer 
in each specific case, and will be based on universal access protocols elaborated by the merged 
entity and agreed by the Center of Technological Transfer. The contract will also establish the 
rules of interaction between the Center of Technological Transfer and the merged entity, the 
contract including provisions on the responsibility of the parties in case of failure to fulfil their 
obligations, the imposition of penalties, the amount of which will bear a “preventive character” 
It is further convened that the merged entity will finance the Centre of Technological 
Transfer in an amount comparable to the funding of such organizations at the territory of the 
European Union and will support the activities of the administrative and managing staff of the 
Centre of Technological Transfer, as well as providing the possibility of involving international 
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experts with the necessary expertise to ensure the transfer of technology, access to the databases 
and telematics services. 
  
2.2.2.2. Public interest concerns 
 
The public interest assessment of mergers is a feature of the South African merger control 
and the seed mergers could not be an exception. 
In the Dow/DuPont case in South Africa, the CCSA looked to public interest concerns with 
regard to the effects of the merger on employment, as well to its impact on a broader economic 
sector. The CCSA found that the parties did not contemplate job losses due to the transaction, 
as they did not plan to combine their South African businesses1294. With regard to the impact 
on an economic sector, the CCSA explored the effect of the merger transaction on warehousing 
and logistics companies and on R&D activities in South Africa. With regard to the first, it found 
no impact. With regard to the second, the CCSA considered the issue as to whether the merged 
entity would shut-down the two breeding facilities it controlled in South Africa and import 
seeds from its operations located in other countries as important. The Commission’s view was 
that “there may be change in incentives arising as a result of the merger in relation to the 
continuance of the existing R&D facilities in South Africa” as Dow is “a large global company 
with research facilities elsewhere in the world” and “may have incentives to discontinue or 
relocate existing R&D facilities currently operated in South Africa1295. The CCSA was 
particularly worried as some investments and upgrades made to one of the facilities were 
developed as a culmination of remedies imposed to DuPont in the context of another merger 
decision of the CCSA1296. As a condition to approving the merger, the parties committed to 
maintaining DuPont’s two South African breeding facilities1297. 
Public interest concerns were also raised in the Bayer/Monsanto case in South Africa. With 
regard to employment concerns, the CCSA found that the transaction likely would result in the 
retrenchment of twenty skilled employees, causing it to impose a condition that restricted any 
further retrenchments due to the merger for a period of three years1298. With regard to the effect 
of the merger on a particular industrial sector or region, the CCSA examined the effect of the 
merger on a number of various corporate responsibility projects, its impact on distributors and 
small scale farmers. As Monsanto had been involved in various development projects, the 
CCSA ordered that the merged entity continue with such initiatives for three years after the 
merger, and five years for projects that otherwise would have gone beyond the three-year 
period1299.  
In contrast, in the EU public interest concerns in particular about the protection of the 
environment and biodiversity were explicitly excluded from consideration in the pending 
                                                          
1294 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case No: LM030May16, DowDuPont Inc., (30 June 2017), paras 
371-372. 
1295 Ibid., para. 384. 
1296 Ibid., para. 385. 
1297 Ibid., paras 370, 373, 382-385. 
1298 Competition Commission of South Africa, Case No: 2017Feb0004, Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, (3 May 2017). 
1299 Ibid., para. 502. 
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assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto merger transaction, the European Commissioner releasing 
a letter in which it unequivocally declared that “(t)he Commission's mandate under the 
European merger control rules is to assess the merger solely from a competition 
perspective”1300. 
 
2.3. Case study: The Dow Chemical Company/DuPont merger case in Brazil: 
anatomy of a competition assessment1301  
 
Patricia Semensato Cabral1302, Yedda Beatriz Seixas1303, Mariane Cortat de Campos Melo1304 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
 
The industry of products for crop protection and seeds has gone through consolidation 
waves in the last few years. Nowadays, we are witnessing another one of the mentioned waves; 
in the last few years, some important mega mergers between global competitors took place, 
such as Syngenta control acquisition by CNAC1305, the acquisition of Monsanto by Bayer1306 
and the DuPont and Dow Chemical merger1307. The following paper aims to present a summary 
of the Administrative Council for Economic Defense – Cade’s decision1308, the Brazilian 
competition authority, on the Dow and DuPont case, with special attention to the corn seeds 
market.  
On December 2015, Dow and DuPont announced their intention to combine in a merger 
of equals. After the closing of the transaction, the new company would be named DowDuPont 
and would have a combined market capitalization of approximately $130 billion at 
announcement1309. The Parties claimed that this would be a “highly synergistic transaction” 
expected to deliver “approximately $3 billion in cost synergies, with 100 percent of the run-
rate cost synergies achieved within the first 24 months following the closing of the 
transaction”1310. The case was notified to CADE on October 2016, and the authority rendered 
                                                          
1300 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2762_en.htm . 
1301 Merger case 08700.005937/2016-61. All opinions registered in this paper are personal, and should not be 
taken as Cade’s official positioning. 
1302 Masters in Economics, University of Brasilia, and antitrust specialist, Fundação Getúlio Vargas. Head of 
Merger and Antitrust Unity 1 at CADE’s General Superintendence. E-mail: patricia.cabral@cade.gov.br . 
1303 Masters in Business Administration, University of Brasilia. Deputy Head of Merger and Antitrust Unity 1 at 
CADE’s General Superintendence. E-mail: Yedda.seixas@cade.gov.br . 
1304 PhD candidate and Masters in Business Administration, University of Brasilia. Works as case handler at 
Merger and Antitrust Unity 1 at CADE’s General Superintendence. E-mail: mariane.melo@cade.gov.br . 
1305 Merger case 08700.006269/2016-90, approved without restrictions by CADE on February 24th, 2017.  
1306 Merger case 08700.001097/2017-49, currently being analysed at Cade. 
1307 Merger case 08700.005937/2016-61, approved with restrictions by CADE on May 17th, h2017.  
1308 The Administrative Council for Economic Defense - CADE is an agency with jurisdiction over the Brazilian 
territory, being composed by an Administrative Tribunal, a General Superintendence and a Department of 
Economic Studies. 
1309 Available on http://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/DuPont-and-dow-to-combine-in-merger-of-
equals . Last access on 13/9/2017. 
1310 Available on http://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/DuPont-and-dow-to-combine-in-merger-of-
equals . Last access on 13/9/2017 
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its final decision on May 2017. Besides Brazil, at least another 24 jurisdictions around the 
world examined the transaction.1311  
Despite the claim that the merger consisted of the “combination of two highly 
complementary global leaders”1312, there were several overlaps regarding Dow and DuPont 
activities, in the following segments: material science, agriculture (seeds and crop protection) 
and specialty products. Regarding the material science and crop protection markets, the parties 
presented substantial global remedies that were considered sufficient to address competition 
concerns expressed by several antitrust authorities. These remedies were also considered 
sufficient by Cade, addressing possible anticompetitive effects for the Brazilian market in crop 
protection and material science.  
Notwithstanding, the transaction raised competition concerns in a specific market in 
Brazil, not being reached by the global remedies: the corn seeds market. This situation 
demanded additional remedies tailored to the Brazilian context. In the following sections, we 
will present the key points considered in the analysis (section 2.3.2) and the final remedies 
presented on Cade’s decision (section 2.3.3.). 
 
2.3.2. Cade`s analysis on the possible effects of the merger on the corn seeds 
market in Brazil 
 
2.3.2.1. Brazilian corn seed market overview  
 
As is indicated in Cade’s General Superintendence report on the case 1313, corn is the 
most representative crop sale on the global commercial seeds market. The Seeds and Seedlings 
Brazilian Association (Abrasem, in its portuguese acronym) reports that Brazil is the third 
biggest global player on corn seeds production, with 4 million tons of seeds produced in the 
2015/2016 cycle, amounting to R$ 10 billions per year1314. 
Corn crops are widespread in Brazil, be it for its multiple functions in rural property 
(such as poultry, pork, meat and other animals’ feeds) or for Brazilian farming tradition of this 
cereal. The seed is the main input for the corn crop, resulting that “farming characteristics, such 
as productive potential, stability, pest resistance and crop adequacy to the farming system and 
to climate and soil conditions must be taken into account, in order for the farming process to 
become more competitive1315. 
                                                          
1311 According to the Parties in the files of the case. 
1312 Available on http://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/DuPont-and-dow-to-combine-in-merger-of-
equals . Last access on 13/9/2017. 
1313 Parecer 2/2017/CGAA1/SGA1/SG, de 4/5/2017. According to the Brazilian competition Law (Law 
12529/2011), the General Superintendence is responsible for the investigation phase in mergers and in 
anticompetitive conducts (both cartels and unilateral). At the end of the investigation, the Superintendence renders 
a reasoned opinion (“Parecer técnico”). If the Superintendence understands that a certain merger does not raise 
any competition concern, this opinion accounts for a final decision, unless that (i) third parties refers to CADE 
Administrative Tribunal or (ii) the Administrative Tribunal decides to review the Superintendence analysis. On 
the other hand, if the Superintendence understands that the case can not be approved without remedies, or that the 
merger should be blocked, the case is necessarily referred to the Tribunal, who will be responsible for the final 
decision. 
1314 Available on http://www.abrates.org.br/noticia/mercado-de-sementes-movimenta-r-10-bi-ao-ano-no-brasil.  
1315 Cuz et al (2015). Available on https://ainfo.cnptia.embrapa.br/digital/bitstream/item/140279/1/doc-184.pdf. 
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There are two processes employed, in the corn seeds segment, to generate more 
competitive seeds: (i) conventional breeding and (ii) transgenesis, or genetic engeneering. The 
conventional breeding technique employs crossbreeding among plants of the same species, in 
order to select specific aimed characteristics; in this process, a good quality germplasm – that 
is, a good collection of genetic material – is essential. When the transgenesis technique is 
chosen, the specimens receives, through genetic engineering, on or more genes from another 
organism. Examples of transgenesis are the Bt corn technique (Bacillus thuringiensis), which 
introduces the genetic material of this bacillus in the corn DNA, in order to acquire insect 
resistance. Genetically modified seeds represent more than 91% of the Brazilian corn seed 
market.  
The picture bellow, provided by Dow and DuPont in the files of the merge case analysed 
by Cade, illustrates the corn seed industry organization:  
 
Figure 2: The corn seed industry organization 
 
 
Source: Dow/DuPont in the files of the case 08700.005937/2016-61. 
  
The first step, breeding of new varieties, consists of the development of new hybrids, 
and may last from seven to ten years1316. Regarding genetically modified seeds, biotech traits 
are introduced, to provide seeds with specific wanted characteristics, such as insects or 
herbicide resistance.  
About commercial seeds production and commercialization, it is worthy to mention 
that, before a new hybrid (conventional or transgenic) can be marketed, it needs to register the 
hybrid and obtain sanitary authorization from the competent authorities. This registering 
process does not provide any sort of intellectual property rights. In addition, although plant 
specimens cannot be covered by patent per se, the Brazilian patenting system allows for the 
protection of technological inventions regarding transgenic events introduction.  
 
2.3.2.2. Relevant markets affected by the merger 
  
                                                          
1316 Parecer 2/2017/CGAA1/SGA1/SG (4/5/2017), paragraph 24. 
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Both Dow and Dupont are active in the corn seeds market in Brazil. DuPont develops 
and commercializes corn seeds under the brands Pioneer and BioGene. Dow markets corn 
seeds under the brands Dow Sementes, Morgan, Agromen  and Coodetec.  
CADE understood that the merger would not result in significant market concentration 
on transgenic events for corn seeds, since DuPont developed only the Hercules IR event, in 
partnership with Dow, and is not active in this segment in Brazil. DuPont informed that it has 
not commercialized any proprietary transgenic event for corn seeds in the country in the last 
10 years. Furthermore, even though Dow is a relevant player in transgenic events for corn seeds 
in Brazil, no causal connection between the merger and market concentration was 
established. Therefore, the analysis of the horizontal effects of the transaction was focused on 
the corn seeds production and commercialization segment of the market, without further 
discussions on the transgenic events market. Some potential vertical relations were 
discussed1317, but no competition concern arose from any of them. 
When defining the relevant market, CADE did not distinguish between genetically 
modified and conventional corn seeds. An eventual differentiation would bring little practical 
effects for the analysis, for the Brazilian market is composed mostly of transgenic seeds (more 
than 90%). However, other segmentations were considered, for the reasons explored bellow.  
Hybrid corn seeds are created after the breeding of inbred lines. Often, hybrid corn 
seeds generate plants with high resistance and production, and with a uniform-sized spike. This 
can generate more productive and efficient corn crops.  
There are three types of hybrid seeds: simple, double and triple. Simple hybrids are 
obtained after the breeding of two inbred lines, also known as "parental". Double hybrids are 
obtained from the breeding of two simple hybrids, and triple hybrids are the result of the 
breeding of one inbred line and a simple hybrid.  
The Parties argued that the relevant market should include corn seeds in general, 
without any segmentation by kind of hybrid, because: (i) different hybrid types were substitutes 
both on supply and demand sides; (ii) farmers choose the seed type based on productivity, not 
on the breeding type employed to obtain that seed variety. It happens that several market 
players consulted by CADE pointed at important distinctions between hybrids. First, price 
differences were expressive: in average, simple hybrids prices are superior to the triple hybrids 
prices, which, for their turn, are superior to double hybrids prices. Also, simple hybrids are 
perceived as more productive and more sophisticated in terms of technological level.  
Another segmentation considered in CADE’s assessment was the distinction between 
hybrids for grain production or for ensilage. Some market players reported that seeds used for 
ensilage and for grains could be, in fact, diverse market niches which provide different results 
for farmers. Although this distinction was not sufficient to define relevant markets in a more 
restrictive way, concentration scenarios on grain and on ensilage were considered.  
In sum, even though a precise relevant market definition was left open, the assessment 
of the Brazilian authority took into account the segmentations related above, which are: simple, 
double and triple corn hybrids, with further segmentation based on ensilage or grain production, 
                                                          
1317 Namely, (i) germplasm licensing and corn seeds; (ii) biotech traits licensing and corn seeds; (iii) other potential 
relations involving pesticides and seeds. 
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all in the national geographic scenario. In all of the scenarios considered, the merger raised 
competition concerns. 
 
2.3.2.3. CADE’s competition assessment 
 
The merger generated substantial concentration on all the aforementioned scenarios. 
From Cade´s assessment, considering the corn seeds market broadly defined, without further 
segmentation, both Dow and DuPont held 20%-30%, each, of the market in the year previous 
to the operation, resulting in a combined market share of 40-50%. Concentration levels would 
be smaller regarding simple hybrids (Dow: 10-20%; DuPont: 20-30%; combined market share: 
30-40%), but considerably higher when considering the triple hybrids (Dow: 60-70%; DuPont: 
0-10%; combined market share: 70-80%)1318. Scenarios where grains are split from ensilage 
resulted in shares similar to the previous mentioned, from 40-50% up to 70-80%, in the case 
of triple hybrids for grains.  
Besides Dow and DuPont, the corn seeds market (not segmented by hybrid type) in 
Brazil had only two more competitors with relevant market shares. The first is Monsanto, with 
a market share of 40-50% in the year previous to the merger. The second one is Syngenta, with 
a market share of 10-20% in the year previous to the merger. Other competitors do not have a 
relevant market share. Thus, based on public data made available on Cade`s decision, corn seed 
market C4 (without hybrid segmentation) would be of 90-100%, and C2, 80-90%1319, pointing 
a highly concentrated market.  
Besides the evidence leading to a highly concentrated market, another factor was 
essential to Cade´s assessment: Dow and DuPont strong positioning in corn seed breeding 
activities. Although there were relevant difficulties in establishing objective criteria that 
allowed comparisons between the Parties’ germplasm banks, CADE considered there were 
enough elements to conclude that Dow and DuPont had a privileged position in both areas. Not 
all competitors, especially those without relevant market shares, own such high quality 
germplasm banks, in terms of size, variety and range. This context reinforces the fact that the 
Parties, especially after the operation, would hold considerable market power. 
The markets discussed are characterized by relevant barriers to entry. The most 
important were the need for high investments in Research and Development, investment needs 
in order to gain market access (distribution and marketing), high investment need in order to 
maintain a breeding program, slow and expensive regulatory procedures, access to good 
germplasm and transgenic events, long term investment return, turnover capital needed to 
finance sales’ deadlines, timeframe for brand recognition, specialized manpower needs.  
Also, entry takes a considerable time, usually more than what is acceptable as a timely 
entry for the purpose of a competition assessment. As CADE’s public decision shows, 
competitors estimated in more than 2 years the time needed to enter the market; if the 
competitor chooses to start its own breeding program, the timeframe goes up to 10 years. 
Therefore, considering the existence of entry barriers and the estimated timeframe for a new 
                                                          
1318 There is no overlap between Dow and DuPont on the double hybrids segment. 
1319 Parecer técnico 2/2017/CGAA1/SGA1/SG, de 4/5/2017, paragraph 286. 
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competitor entry, CADE concluded that new entries were not sufficient to counter Dow and 
DuPont joined market power after the operation.  
 
2.3.2.4. Remedies adopted 
 
As mentioned, Dow and DuPont proposed the divestments of a considerable set of 
assets worldwide. These divestments were sufficient to address the competition concerns of the 
material Science and crop protection markets, both in Brazil.1320 1321  
In order to address Brazil’s concerns, the Parties presented an additional remedy. This 
remedy consists, in general lines, in divestments of assets related to Dow’s corn seed market, 
the most important being the transfer of a copy of the germplasm bank belonging to DAS 
Sementes, the transfer of a part of Dow’s Pipeline and Commercial Hybrids, productive units, 
transfer of research centers, brands, manpower and sales team. According to Dow, “the assets 
being divested generated revenues in 2016 of approximately $287 million”1322. 
It is interesting to observe that concerns with innovation capabilities of the buyer are 
present in the design of the remedy for the Brazilian corn seeds market. In this sense, the 
package to be divested included, besides the transferring of present market share (commercial 
hybrids, brands, sales team and productive units), a set of assets considered by CADE as being 
sufficient to “allow the new competitor to maintain himself as a relevant competition force in 
the medium and long term”1323. Those assets necessary to sustain the new competitors position 
in the market consists in essential assets to build R&D capacity, such as good quality 
germplasm bank, research centers and personnel. 
On August 2nd 2017, CADE approved the buyer for the divested assets. The technical 
assessment that subsided Cade’s decision1324 does not mention the buyer’s identity due to 
confidentiality issues, but Dow has declared that part of the before mentioned assets was bought 
by the Chinese conglomerate CITIC Agri Fund. Cade´s assessment concluded that the buyer 
meets the criteria established in the approved remedy, as follows: independency and no 
connections with the Parties and its affiliates; financial resources; proven experience in the 
                                                          
1320 As stated by the European Commission (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm), the parties 
offered a set of commitments. The parties proposed to divest a significant part of DuPont's existing pesticide 
business, including its R&D organisation, in particular: (i) “globally, DuPont's herbicides for cereals, oilseed rape, 
sunflower, rice and pasture (thifensulfuron, tribenuron, metsulfuron, chlorsulfuron, triflusulfuron, lenacil, 
flupyrsulfuron, ethametsulfuron and azimsulfuron) and insecticides for chewing insect and sucking insect control 
for fruits and vegetables etc. (indoxacarb, cyazypyr and rynaxypyr). They will also divest all tangible and 
intangible assets underpinning the divested products (including the facilities where the products are manufactured) 
and relevant personnel”; (ii) “an exclusive license to DuPont's product for rice cultivation in the European 
Economic Area to address the more limited concerns relating to fungicides”; (iii) “DuPont's global R&D 
organisation, with the exception of a few limited assets that support the part of DuPont's pesticide business, which 
is not being divested”. In relation to Material Science (certain petrochemical products),  Dow proposed to divest 
“its two manufacturing facilities for acid co-polymers in Spain and in the US, as well as the contract with a third 
party through which it sources ionomers that it sells to its customers.”  
1321 The crop protection business was acquired by FMC Corporation (merger case 08700.003377/2017-91, 
approved by CADE by 11/7/2017). The material Science bussiness was acquired by SK Global Chemical Co. 
LTD (merger case 08700.001886/2017-80 approved by CADE by 20/4/2017). 
1322http://www.dow.com/en-us/news/press-releases/dow-to-divest-a-portion-of-its-corn-hybrid-seed-business-in-
brazil-to-citic-agri-fund .  
1323 Parecer técnico 2/2017/CGAA1/SGA1/SG, de 4/5/2017. 
1324 Parecer 85/2017/UCD/PFE-CADE-CADE/PGF/AGU, de 2/8/2017. 
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corn seed market or similar; incentives to develop the Divested Venture as a competitive force, 
viable and active in the market; and no competitive concerns prima facie.  
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Chapter 3: Superior Bargaining power and the Boundaries of Competition Law 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Claudio Lombardi & Justin Lindeboom with Christina Kanakari 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Two subsequent developments have ensured that food issues have recently gained prominence 
in the work of competition authorities. First, the considerable rise of the price of commodities, 
including food, in 2008, led to increasing demands for intervention from public authorities in 
order to curb the phenomenon of food inflation.1325 Food inflation trends seem, however, to 
have since been reversed, the prices of commodities decreasing sharply the last few months of 
2015.1326 Second, additional concerns have been raised by the perception that retailers have 
gained considerable power over the upstream parts of the supply chain, in particular processors 
but also farmers. Individual or collective retailer power has been at the centre of the attention 
of public authorities in Europe,1327 with certain investigations being recently carried out at the 
national level.1328 As a recent study commissioned by the European Commission shows, the 
top 10 European retailers have seen their market share grow from 26% of total EU grocery in 
2000 to almost 31% in 2011, the overall concentration of retailers increasing in virtually all 
Member States.1329 The international expansion of some retail brands across Europe, but also 
in non-European markets, has led to a general decrease in the importance of home markets for 
top European retailers in terms of the domestic share of European grocery banner sales.1330 
Retailer power also manifests itself increasingly with the use of private labels, which compete 
                                                          
1325 It was reported that inflation from 2005 to 2011 saw food prices increase by around 22% on average across 
OECD countries. However, there has been substantial variation: relatively low levels of food inflation in the US 
(14%) through to higher levels in Turkey (67%) and Mexico (48%). These variations even occur within countries 
participating to more homogeneous (from a trade perspective) blocks (e.g. EU): OECD, Competition in the Food 
Chain, vol. DAF/COMP(2013)15 (OECD 2013). 
1326 The FAO Food Price Index averaged 155.7 points in August 2015, down 8.5 points (5.2%) from July, the 
sharpest monthly drop since December 2008: FAO, Food Price Index, available at 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en. 
1327 See the study commissioned by the OFT: P. Dobson, M. Waterson and A. Chu, The Welfare Consequences 
of the Exercise of Buyer Power, OFT, September 1998, Research Paper 16; OECD, Buying Power of 
Multiproduct Retailers, 1999; European Commission, Buyer Power and its Impact in the Food Retail Distribution 
Sector of the European Union, 1999; UK Competition Commission, Supermarkets: A report on the supply of 
groceries from multiple stores in the United Kingdom, 2000, Cm. 4842. 
1328 UK Competition Commission, The supply of groceries in the UK market investigation, April 2008; OFT, 
Grocery Market – Proposed Decision to Make a Market Investigation Reference, March 2006, at 42-49; 
A. Svetlicinii, The Croatian Competition Authority issues a report on competition on the food retail market in 
2008, 16 July 2009, e-Competitions, No. 28749, www.concurrences.com; H. P. Nehl, The Austrian competition 
authority concludes general inquiry in the highly concentrated food distribution sector while highlighting 
indications of strong buyer power (Branchenuntersuchung Lebensmittelhandel), 18 June 2007, e-Competitions, 
No. 13981, www.concurrences.com;  
1329 European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the 
EU Food Sector, (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf, 50-52. 
This is driven by higher concentration of modern retail. 
1330 European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the 
EU Food Sector, (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf, 55.  
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directly with leading manufacturers’ brands and other national brands and illustrate this shift 
in the balance of power between retailers and suppliers.1331 
 Concerns over the rising power of retailers in the food sector have led many competition 
authorities to use existing rules or adopt new rules on superior bargaining power, these rules 
either forming part of competition law statutes or of other functional equivalents.1332 These 
different rules stay relatively opaque as to the definition of the concept of superior bargaining 
power, the common characteristic (and presumably) advantage of these provisions being that 
they may potentially impose competition law related duties to undertakings not disposing of a 
dominant position or a significant market power, for unilateral conduct, which would have 
otherwise not been subject to competition law related duties under the traditional rules of abuse 
of a dominant position. The concept of superior (or unequal) bargaining power is also a well-
known concept in the fields of contract law and unfair competition law,1333  where it has given 
rise to a considerable literature attempting to unveil its theoretical underpinnings.1334 Authors 
usually contrast the use of this concept in these areas of law, where the focus is on the 
unfairness of the process of exchange, with the efforts to integrate this rule in the field of 
competition law, where the emphasis is usually put on outcomes, such as efficiency or 
consumer welfare. The underlying objective of contract law or unfair competition statutes 
consists in regulating the contest between contracting parties and ensuring a relatively 
equalized landscape of bargaining capacity, bargaining power being interpreted as the interplay 
of the parties’ actual power relationship in an exchange transaction.1335 On the contrary, 
                                                          
1331 D. R. Desai, I. Lianos and S. Weber Waller, Brands, Competition Law and IP (CUP, 2015); A. Ezrachi and 
U. Bernitz, Private Labels, Branded Goods and Competition Policy: The Changing Landscape of Retail 
Competition (OUP 2009); A. Ezrachi, Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private Labels, 
and Competition Law, (2010) 33(2) World Competition 257-274; A. Foer, Introduction to Symposium on Buyer 
Power and Antitrust, 72 Antitrust L.J. 505 (2005); L. Vogel, Competition Law and Buying Power, 19(1) ECLR 4 
(1998). 
1332 For a comparative analysis of rules on superior bargaining power, see ICN, Report on Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position (2008), available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc386.pdf. 
1333 See, for instance, for contract law, at the EU level, Article 4:109 (ex -art. 6.109) of the Principles of European 
Contract Law 2002 on excessive benefit or unfair advantage  because at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
“was dependent on or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in economic distress or had urgent 
needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill”; Principle 10 of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR) concerning restrictions to the principle of the freedom of contract because of 
inequality of bargaining power (even in the context of B2B relations) and the contract law sub-doctrines that 
explicitly or implicitly incorporate bargaining power such as unconscionability, duress, undue influence, the parol 
evidence rule and public policy. On unfair competition, again at the E.U.E.U. level, see Green Paper on unfair 
trading practices in the business-to-business food and non-food supply chain in Europe COM(2013) 37; 
Communication of the Commission, Tackling unfair trading practices in the business-to-business food supply 
chain, COM(2014) 472 final. 
1334 See in particular the seminal cases Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy [1974] EWCA Civ 8 (EWCA (Civ)); Macaulay 
v. Schroeder Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 WLR; and the following critical and explanatory appraisal by S. N. Thal, 
Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, (1988) 8 Oxford J. 
Legal Stud. 17; M. J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics 
in the House of Lords [1976] University of Toronto L. J. 359; L. A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: 
An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law (1998) 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 265; 
and more recently A. Choi and G. Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design [2012] Va. L. 
Rev. 1665. 
1335 Yet, it is important to note that regulatory interventions in order to rebalance contractual inequality are still 
designed as exceptions to the principle of the freedom of contract and the certainty of the contract, especially in 
371 
 
competition law defines bargaining power more generally, in terms of the ability of an 
undertaking to introduce a deviation from the price or quantity obtained from the competitive 
situation in the market in which the transaction takes place. In this context, buying power 
denotes the ability of a buyer to achieve more favourable terms than those available to other 
buyers or what would otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions. This 
approach emphasizes the gain resulting from the presence of bargaining power relative to a 
situation in which it is absent (not necessarily that of perfect competition),1336 focusing on 
market structure and concentration.1337 
 It is usually thought that superior (or unequal) bargaining power may constitute a 
competition law problem as long as it leads to negative welfare effects in terms of pricing, 
choice or innovation, these “competition law concerns” being carefully distinguished from 
“non-competition” law concerns.1338 Two views are usually advanced with regard to the 
interaction of provisions on superior bargaining power and competition law. First, considerable 
effort has been spent in order to mould the concept of superior bargaining power into the 
competition law and economics traditional framework by bringing adjustments to traditional 
competition law concepts such as relevant market and market power1339 or focusing 
competition law enforcement on “buying power.” Second, new provisions on superior 
bargaining power or economic dependence, introduced in the competition law statutes by some 
jurisdictions, are typically examined from the perspective of efficiency and consumer welfare 
and usually relegated to the outer boundaries of competition law provisions on abuse of a 
dominant position, for instance on the basis of an error cost analysis,1340 or the perception that 
                                                          
B2B contracts, where a very limited power to rebalance the contractual arrangement is generally left to the 
discretion of the judge. 
1336 See, R. Clarke, S. Davies, P. W. Dobson and M. Waterson, Buyer Power and Competition in European Food 
Retailing  (Edward Elgar 2002).  
1337 J. T. Dunlop and B. Higgins, Bargaining Power and Market Structures, (1942) L(1) The Journal of Political 
Economy 1, 4-5; R. G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, (2005) 72 Antitrust Law J. 589. 
1338 Recent empirical work has relativized the impact of the superior bargaining power of retailers, as this is 
exemplified by rising consolidation and increasing concentration levels, on price: see E. Ciapanna and C. 
Rondinelli, Retail Market Structure and Consumer prices in the Euro Area, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 1744, 
December 2014 (observing that larger concentration of retailers on the purchasing side of the procurement market 
is associated with lower consumer prices). See also, European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact 
of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector, (2014), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf (noting that consumer choice was not affected 
by the rise of concentration levels at retail, although innovation may have been).  
1339 See, for instance, § 20 of the German Act against Restraints of Competition on “relative and superior market 
power” (relative und absolute Marktmach). 
1340 See, for instance, F. Wagner von Papp, Unilateral conduct by non-dominant firms: a comparative reappraisal, 
ASCOLA Tokyo Conference (2015), (on file with the author, shortly available at the SSRN) conducting an “error 
cost analysis” and advancing the view that dominance, and consequently the definition of a relevant market, is a 
necessary condition for a superior bargaining power to be considered as a competition law problem and 
recognising the countervailing impact that subsidiary contract law enforcement would have on error costs. An 
error cost analysis conducted in abstracto may underestimate the transaction costs associated with the use of the 
specific legal process, which may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in some cases may be less important 
in the context of competition law enforcement than other alternatives. Error cost analysis may also lead to the “sin 
of single institutional analysis” see, K. N. Komesar Law’s Limits, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
as it will emphasize the defects of one institutional alternative (e.g. competition law) on some aspects to argue for 
an expansive role of another, probably equally defective in some other aspects, institutional choice: contract law 
or unfair competition law statutes.  
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fairness concerns have little role to play in modern competition law.1341 Provisions on superior 
bargaining power are examined from a public choice perspective as a by-product of the political 
pressure of organised interests of small and medium undertakings or farmers, leading to the 
adoption of mainly redistributive statutes that restrict competition and presumably economic 
efficiency. From this angle, the existence of a superior bargaining power of retailers in the 
procurement markets does not necessarily give rise to market power at the selling side, harming 
final consumers.  
 Price transmission from producer to consumer prices seems to have worked so far in favour 
of final consumers, as producer price increases during the period of the recent rise of 
commodity prices in 2008 have been partially absorbed by the food retail sector through a 
reduction of profit margins, at least in the old Member States.1342 It remains to be seen if the 
most recent decrease of food prices will also be passed on to consumers or if we will face a 
situation of asymmetric price transmission from producer to consumer food prices.1343 
Similarly, the recent Modern Retail Study of the European Commission noted that the increase 
in the overall retail concentration has been counter-balanced to a certain extent by consolidation 
in the processing and manufacturing industries for certain products, such as coffee, frozen 
ready cooked meals, baby food1344. Finally, critics of the concept of superior bargaining power 
usually explain that the complexity of the problems raised by unequal bargaining power 
between retailers and suppliers cannot be solved by competition law and a more integrated 
framework is needed, combining the enforcement of competition law, when there is conduct 
that enters its scope, but also unfair trading practices laws, provisions of contract law and more 
generally civil law (tort law, European sales law), which aim to deal with abusive use of 
unequal bargaining power, and finally, soft law and self-regulatory initiatives by the industry 
that have emerged in several Member States.1345 The argument is often made that competition 
law may be less effective in dealing with the problem than these other areas of law, without, 
however, that conclusion being based on a thorough comparative institutional analysis that also 
examines the institutional and social norms related constraints that may limit the remedial 
potential of other areas of law to deal with the problem.1346 
                                                          
1341 See, for instance, P. Akman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law (Hart Pub. 2012), Ch. 4. 
1342 L. Bukeviciute, A. Dierx and F. Ilzkovitz, The functioning of the food supply chain and its effect on food 
prices in the European Union, (2009) European Economy, Occasional Papers 47, 14. 
1343 Asymmetric transmission is often linked to the existence of market power at a level of the value chain: OECD, 
Food Price Formation, October 2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/site/agrfcn/meetings/agrfcn-7-food-price-
formation-paper-october-2015.pdf; in a 2009 report for the European Commission, L. Bukeviciute, A. Dierx and 
F. Ilzkovitz, The functioning of the food supply chain and its effect on food prices in the European Union, (2009) 
European Economy, Occasional Papers 47, 18, noted that for the euro area, “the magnitude of the transmission 
is similar in the case of a price increase and a price decrease.” 
1344 European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the 
EU Food Sector, (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf, 218, 
304-377. 
1345 On a discussion of the possible combinations between these different tools across Member States, see Final 
Report, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business – to Business Unfair Trading Practices in the Retail 
Supply Chain, Final Report (26 February 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/retail/docs/140711-study-utp-legal-framework_en.pdf. 
1346 These may, for instance, relate to inefficient judicial systems with few capabilities to engage with the 
economic underpinnings of superior bargaining power, in comparison to the more expert competition authorities, 
entrenched power relations that make it difficult for suppliers to bring contractual disputes against retailer 
networks and raise a contract law point based on economic duress or unconscionability against a partner with 
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3.2. Theoretical foundations 
 
Albeit the many attempts at a definition of bargaining power1347, bargaining power is one word 
but many things1348. For what it is concerned with the exercise of bargaining power in business 
relationships between agri-food market actors, bargaining power reveals in particular two 
relevant facets. 
The first type of conduct interests the formation of the contract and its execution. The 
unbalance of bargaining power between market actors may help explaining why businesses, 
that traditional contract law presumes to be well informed and able to bargain, accept non-
favourable conditions1349. 
The second aspect regards the market conditions preexisting to the conclusion of the 
contract. These market conditions may be referred to the whole relevant market1350, or to the 
specific business relationship affected by the agreement. The condition of dominance, indeed, 
originates from the economics of the market (market shares of the dominant firm) or as a 
consequence of relational ties.  
                                                          
superior bargaining power, a complaint to the competition authority offering in this case a better option, in view 
of the far-reaching remedies that a competition law violation may give rise to and that neither contract law nor 
unfair competition law offer. Even if private enforcement of competition law is more frequently used in these 
instances, competition authorities focusing on cartels as their enforcement priority, it might still be preferable 
from the point of view of the parties, in view of the general hostility of contract law judges to legal intervention 
in order to rebalance contractual inequality.  
1347 See in particular the seminal cases Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1974] EWCA Civ 8 (EWCA (Civ)); Macaulay 
v Schroeder Publishing Co Ltd [1974] 1 WLR; and the following critical and explanatory appraisal by Spencer 
Nathan Thal, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining Contractual Unfairness, The’ 
(1988) 8 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 17; Michael J Trebilcock, ‘The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-
Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords’ [1976] University of Toronto Law Journal 359; Larry A DiMatteo, 
‘Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract 
Law’ (1998) 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 265; and more recently Daniel D Barnhizer, ‘Bargaining Power in Contract 
Theory’ [2005] in Visions of Contract Theory Rationality, Bargaining, and Interpretation <Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578578> accessed 20 August 2015. 
1348 See, inter alia,  Albert Choi and George Triantis, ‘The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design’ [2012] 
Virginia Law Review 1665 who report about some of the detractors of a broad spectrum use of the theory,  in 
particular David A Lax and James Sebenius, Manager as Negotiator (Simon and Schuster 1987); Duncan 
Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory 
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1981) 41 Md. L. Rev. 563; Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 
(Aspen Law & Business 1986), who however, later smoothed his view using the concept of unequal bargaing 
power in business relationships, for instance here William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘Should Indirect 
Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick’ 
[1979] The University of Chicago Law Review 602, 833. 
1349 See, for instance, The Government Bill on the Amendment of the Finnish Competition Act, HE 197/2012, pp. 
9–13, which, facing high levels of concentration of retailers, considers abuse of buying power conducts such as 
imposition of unreasonable contract terms, tying, bundling, exclusive dealing et similia. Similarly, Hungary, 
Germany, Italy, France, to cite only some, have adopted specific provisions tackling such type of abuses of 
superior bargaining power leading to unfair contract terms. 
1350 Here the common definition of dominance would find application. See, for instance, the one given by the 
CJEU in the United Brands and Hoffmann-La Roche cases as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by 
affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers”; Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Case 27/76, United Brands v. 
Commission, [1978] E.C.R. 207 at para. 65 and Judgment of the European Court of Justice, Hoffmann La Roche 
v. Commission, 85/76, [1979] E.C.R.-461 at para. 38. 
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The indefiniteness of the expression bargaining power is, at the same time, a critical 
problem and an advantage that several jurisdiction use to address issues crossing the boundaries 
of private law and competition regulation. The perception is that the abuse of contractual terms 
in a business relationship or the imposition of such terms creates conditions and effects in the 
market that should be addressed under a holistic approach, enabling the use of both contractual 
and competition law remedies1351.  
The food market presents plenty of alternatives for holdup and anticompetitive 
behaviours1352. Farmers generally undertake specialized capital investments to provide the 
products at the local and international standards, under contractual arrangement with buyers. 
In particular, in markets of perishable products with few buyers, this contractual relationship 
easily turns into an economic dependence of the farmer to the buyer1353. Perishable products 
introduce a new element to the equation, that is, the holdup due to lack of alternatives for 
logistic reasons1354. Some products, such as chicken or sugar beets1355, have to be marketed 
locally, as they cannot be shipped far without losing much of their value. Processors and local 
buyers can therefore use this opportunity to impose low prices on the farmer on non favourable 
proprietary provisions. For instance, it has been reported that iin the U.S. “grower cares for the 
chickens, and usually provides land and housing facilities, utilities, labor, and other operating 
expenses, such as repairs and maintenance . . . The contractor provides chicks, feed, veterinary 
supplies and services, management services or field personnel, and transportation for the birds 
to and from the farm” 1356. On the basis of this model, integrators own livestock, while farmers 
receive a rent for growing it1357. Integrators compete downstream, as retailers can easily shift 
                                                          
1351 This is, for instance, the vision endorsed by the Italian Legislator, who adopted specific laws on abuse of 
economic dependence affecting the market, and furthermore, strengthened the regulation fixing specific rules for 
contracts trading agricultural goods and foodstuffs. 
1352 James M MacDonald and Penni Korb, ‘Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts In 2008’ (2011) EIB-72. 
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Econ. Res. Serv. 
1353 At this regard, Swinnen and Valdeplas, explain that in some cases may be true the opposite, a situation where 
the firm dominant in the relevant market is subject to the holdup of small farmers in which the firm has invested.  
1354 M James M MacDonald and Penni Korb, ‘Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts In 2008’ (2011) EIB-
72. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Econ. Res. Serv give several examples of opportunistic behaviours in the 
agricultural market. 
1355 Ibid 3. 
1356 USDA, Contracting in the Poultry Industry, 1999, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/256039/aib748c_1_.pdf. 
1357 Purdue statement: “Our chickens and turkeys are raised on local farms by independent farmers under written 
contract with Perdue. (…) Perdue has been contracting with farmers since the 1950s, and currently has contracts 
with more than 2,200 farm partners. (...)Under the contract growing relationship, Perdue delivers day-old chicks 
to the farms and provides feed, veterinary care and advice. Producers, in turn, are responsible for providing 
housing that meets Perdue's standards for poultry welfare and biosecurity, and for caring for the birds on a daily 
basis. Our flock supervisors, veterinarians and poultry welfare officers - backed by an advanced team of scientists 
and laboratory technicians working with the industry's leading research and analytical equipment - assist our 
producers. (…) We do have high standards for how we expect our birds to be raised. That's the only way to 
consistently deliver a quality, wholesome product and to ensure the health and welfare of our birds and 
environmental sustainability across our supply chain. We work with our producers to ensure adherence to our 
strict standards for food safety, bird health, poultry welfare and environmental stewardship. 
A poultry operation is like any other business in that producers need to reinvest in their operations to remain 
competitive. In addition, standards related to food safety, bird health and welfare and environmental stewardship 
change over time as a result of, among other things, advances in animal husbandry, changing consumer and 
customer expectations and new laws and regulations. However, Perdue often provides no-interest financing and 
other incentives to assist our producers with necessary upgrades”, available at 
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from a one to another, since there is few (if no) product differentiation1358. However, they do 
not compete upstream, as they impose similar contract to farmers. 
It is a constant feature of all disciplines involved in the analysis of the operation of capitalist 
economies that the concept of power takes a primary role in understanding the logic of 
individual strategy as well as collective action. To the extent that this action takes place in the 
context of markets where various forms of exchange take place, it becomes essential to 
understand the constitutive elements and various dimensions of economic power as various 
forms of legal regulation have developed with the aim to sustain the performativity and 
legitimacy of the capitalist mode of production and exchange. This comparative analysis, 
across various legal spheres, is further complicated by the complexity of the concept of 
power,1359 confusion over its exact meaning in each context, and the different approaches 
employed by social scientists in analysing relations of economic power to the extent that these 
are manifested in situations of market exchange.  
For instance, sociologists and economists have developed different approaches to the 
concept of power. If for economists, markets are primarily processes for price formation, the 
price helping to allocate scarce resources in an efficient manner, (market) power being the 
ability to increase prices and consequently to allocate scare resources in an inefficient manner, 
sociologists focus on social relations and institutions in markets, analysing the way market 
actors interact with each other when producing or exchanging products.1360   
From a sociological perspective, in Max Weber’s classic definition, power denotes a 
situation in which there is “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this 
probability rests”.1361 This definition may present various problems in view of the focus on the 
volitional element, the “will” of a specific actor, as opposed to the “resistance” of another, thus 
indicating that some form of coercion is exercised on one actor by another. The concept of 
coercion is notoriously complex and ambiguous. Most theoretical accounts of coercion appear 
to be either over- or under-inclusive. Philosopher Robert Nozick has famously provided a 
conceptual framework for thinking about coercion, indicating a list of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for judging the truth of the claim that P has coerced Q. According to Nozick, 
coercion occurs when 
“1. P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A; 
2. P communicates a claim to Q; 
                                                          
http://www.perduefarms.com/News_Room/Statements_and_Comments/details.asp?id=537&title=Statement%2
0on%20Poultry%20House%20Contracts#sthash.GlzhYvcG.dpuf. 
1358 USDA, Contracting in the Poultry Industry, 1999, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/256039/aib748c_1_.pdf. 
1359 See e.g., P. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis, 2nd edn (Manchester University Press 2002); S. Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan 2004); P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, ‘The Two Faces of 
Power’ (1962) 56 American Political Science Review 941; T. Wartenberg, The Forms of Power: From Domination 
to Transformation (Temple University Press 1990). 
1360 For a discussion, see M. Grannoveter, Society and Economy: Framework and Principles (Harvard University 
Press, 2017), 91; R. Swedberg, An Introduction and Agenda, in V. Nee & R. Swedberg (eds.), The Economic 
Sociology of Capitalism (Princeton University Press, 2005), 4, 11. 
1361 M. Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization (1947, Free Press, first published 1922), 152. 
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3. P’s claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring about some 
consequence that would make Q’s A-ing less desirable to Q than Q’s not A-ing; 
4. P’s claim is credible to Q; 
5. Q does not do A; 
6. Part of Q’s reason for not doing A is to lessen the likelihood that P will bring 
about the consequence announced in (3)”.1362 
Nozick associated coercion with proposals (conditional threats or offers), excluding direct 
uses of force or violence and considered that coercion takes place only when the coercee 
acquiesces to it, thus making coercion explicitly dependent on the coercee’s choice to take, or 
not to take, a specific action A. The focus of his definition of coercion is therefore on how the 
coercee is affected by coercion, for instance through an alteration of its intentions or 
dispositions, rather than what the coercer does. For Nozick, coercion operates through the will 
of the coercee. However, if one is to take into account as coercion any alteration of the 
coercee’s costs and benefits to acting, it is inevitable that the definition of “economic coercion” 
will be extremely vague, as one should have to perform a causation analysis for each alteration 
of costs and benefits in order to determine if the coercee’s action would have occurred “but 
for” the action of the coercer. What is more, practically every form of action in markets is based 
at a minimum on implicit “coercion” in Nozick’s sense by all participants: for instance in a 
cartel, typically all participants at least implicitly threaten to act competitively (or perhaps even 
‘hypercompetitively’) if the others do not comply with the cartel agreement; and the implicit 
threat by the other cartel participants is the reason for each participant to abide by the cartel 
agreement.1363 A similar conclusion may also apply in a monopoly situation. A monopolist will 
not charge the higher prices he can get (an infinite price for his product), if this will have as a 
possible effect of reducing demand for his product leading only to consumers that have the 
highest willingness to pay to continue buying it. For instance, assuming that there is a state 
monopoly for selling beer with a high alcoholic content, and the monopoly decides to triple the 
price of beer, one may expect that many consumers will stop purchasing high alcoholic beer 
and switch to low alcoholic beer or another type of drink (thus exercising some form of implicit 
coercion to the monopolist). There is a point where pricing above will lead to a loss of 
customers that will be so large that it will outweigh the gain in profit from this specific 
transaction. So the sky is not the limit for monopoly price rises. A monopolist’s power to charge 
a high price is ultimately function of the elasticity of demand for its product, that is, the 
possibility that his product may be substituted by another one (cross-price elasticity). Nozick’s 
broad definition is therefore unhelpful.  
Others have taken a more conventional view on coercion, considering that this occurs when 
it also takes the form of direct force, the coercee being acted upon.1364 However, it is also 
unclear if coercion may be limited to a specific action that was taken, or not taken, by the 
coercee. There might, indeed, be difficulties in identifying precisely the actions the description 
                                                          
1362 R. Nozick, ‘Coercion’, in P. Suppes, and M. White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor 
of Ernest Nagel, (Sidney Morgenbesser, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), 440–472, 441-445. 
1363 Cf. C. Beaton-Wells, ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review’ (2013) 41 Australian 
Business Law Review 171, 184: “However, threats between rivals are common in the cut and thrust of business. 
Something more than a threat should be required.” 
1364 See, G. Lamond, ‘Coercion and the Nature of Law’ (2001) 7 Legal Theory 35. 
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of coercion will include, thus distinguishing between coerced acts from non-coerced ones. One 
may address this issue by taking a subjective perspective, focusing on how the coercee 
perceives her situation at the time of the exercise of coercion, which will however introduce 
further sources of uncertainty in determining the coerced acts, and thus would introduce further 
complications.  
Another option would be to distinguish the different conditional threats or actions of the 
coercer by looking to the relationship these have to some baseline representing the situation of 
the coercee prior to the proposal, this being the “normal or natural expected course of events”, 
the latter concept being interpreted either as a normative (moral) baseline, or as a non-
normative (predictive) one. But what is the “normal or natural expected course of events” in 
the course of a market? In the absence of a theoretical model on how markets should operate, 
the line distinguishing what constitutes coercion from what is “normal” behaviour becomes 
blurred. In case one focuses on economic efficiency, that is increasing the size of the economic 
pie, “normal” behaviour will be that which brings this precise effect. A similar consequentialist 
approach may be adopted if one takes a equality perspective that focuses on an equal or “fair” 
allocation of the economic pie between the various market actors. Defining “coercion” is a 
particularly complex endeavour, as various possible moral baselines may be constructed for 
judging whether a conditional threat/proposal “coerces” someone to adopt an action, and there 
are various ways to take into account what the recipient of the conditional threat/offer would 
want. 
It is possible to adopt a narrower definition of coercion that would not only focus on the fact 
that someone threatens someone else in case his demand is denied, but also requiring that the 
coercer will make the alleged “coercee” worse off than he ought to be. But again, the criterion 
remains unclear as it is dependent on the moral baseline chosen. Some authors have, in addition, 
required for coercion to exist that the choice forced upon the coercee be such that he has no 
reasonable choice but to accept it.1365 The absence of another choice may provide a more 
workable definition of coercion, but again it would require some consideration of the relative 
bargaining positions of the parties, past imbalances of power, the eventual dependence of one 
party from another, that it may be impossible or undesirable to consider. Focusing on the level 
of pressure exerted to the alleged “coercee’s” market autonomy, looking to the power, intention 
and activity of coercers, may also be problematic, as it is not a priori clear which is the 
boundary for compulsion to be considered sufficiently strong so as to make the “coercee’s” 
choice involuntary (“coerced”).  However, this scheme is also difficult to apply in practice as 
it can be interpreted in various ways leading either to an absurdly narrow understanding of 
coercion, or to one that is too broad as it would cover mutually beneficial business transactions. 
The absence of alternative “reasonable choices” can easily entail a conception of coercion 
that is too narrow, particularly as applied to exercises of market power. It can be argued that in 
the absence of a threat that is genuinely life-threatening, the alleged coercee arguably always 
has the choice to resist the threat notwithstanding the fact that this choice might make him 
worse off. A series of hypothetical examples testing the demarcation between coercion and 
non-coercion would then lead to regress, leaving only direct threats to life and liberty as 
                                                          
1365 A. Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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instances of coercion. Such a narrow understanding of coercion is advanced by Friedrich A. 
Hayek. Hayek takes the difference between a free man and a slave as his heuristic starting point 
in order to argue that “[c]oercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another 
man's will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose [...] Coercion implies, however, that I 
still choose but that my mind is made someone else’s tool, because the alternatives before me 
have been so manipulated that the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes for 
me the least painful one.”1366 Consequently, Hayek argues that substantial market power or 
monopoly could rarely result in true coercion. A monopolist could only exercise true coercion 
if he where, for example, the owner of the only spring in an oasis, leaving other settlers no 
choice but to do whatever the spring owner required of them if they want to survive.1367 
Hayek’s conception of coercion is thus clearly unhelpful, as it would only cover threats to deny 
goods that are crucial to one’s existence.1368 
By contrast, a broader understanding of the absence of reasonable choices would entail  that 
an extremely tempting offer, such as sharing the profits of a long-term joint venture, may be 
considered as exercising a pressure similar to a conditional threat by a monopolist of a scarce 
resource to deny access to this facility at a reasonable rate, to the extent that in both cases the 
presumed “coercer” is manipulating the incentives (or opportunity costs) that the presumed 
“coercee” associates with various courses of action, but one may not want that to be considered 
as a form of economic coercion, as this would eventually lead to a quite broad interpretation of 
the term, eventually including also situations of mutually beneficial cooperation. 
To the extent that the voluntary, or not, character of an exchange may not constitute an 
adequate criterion to define (economic) power, it may be more relevant to focus on indirect 
methods of observing power, such as the process through which economic power is manifested 
as well as its various sources or various manifestations of power deemed relevant for the 
specific circumstances. Some conceptual presumptions about the nature of power are obviously 
inevitable in order to select the sources and manifestations that are deemed relevant. For 
example, Steven Lukes’ influential “three dimensional” approach to power focuses on 
someone’s ability to affect other people’s conduct, taking the conflictual aspect of power as a 
starting point: A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s 
interests.1369 Similarly, Michel Foucault argued that “if we speak of the structures or the 
mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over 
others”, stressing the relational component of power.1370 In contrast, Peter Morriss argues that 
our primary understanding of power is the ability to effect outcomes, rather than the ability to 
affect other people.1371 The conceptual distinction between “power-over” and “power-to” 
affects the degree to which empirical facts are relevant in identifying the exercise of power. 
However, one can take also a more empirical, inductive approach focused on the extension 
                                                          
1366 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1960), 133. 
1367 Ibid, 136. 
1368 See e.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, “Hayek's Conception of Freedom, Coercion, and the Rule of Law” (1980) 6 
Reason Papers 37-52. 
1369 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 37. 
1370 M. Foucault, ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’, in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd edn (University of Chicago Press 1983), 217. 
1371 P. Morriss, Power: A Philosophical Analysis (Manchester University Press 2002), chapter 5. 
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(reference) rather than the intension (meaning) of power.1372 Such as approach would, albeit of 
course not without any presumptions on “power-over” and “power-to” conceptions, focus on 
the properties of actors that affect their power to either influence other actors’ conduct and/or 
to affect outcomes directly. 
Process-based definitions of power focus on the bargaining process and aim to identify 
situations in which there is some form of asymmetry or inequality on the ability of the actors 
to influence each other’s course of conduct. In economics, the analysis of bargaining power is 
intrinsically related to the issue of how actors may divide the joint gains resulting from their 
cooperation, the so called bargaining problem. Bargaining power will conventionally refer to 
the relative share of the total surplus gained by an actor in the bargaining problem. People enter 
into cooperation with other people to the extent that this cooperation my produce a joint surplus 
that would not be possible absent that cooperation. Assuming that individuals have the 
incentive to cooperate with others, and consequently limit their freedom of action to a certain 
extent, in order to increase their welfare, this joint surplus will be “the difference between the 
benefits (net of direct costs) each gains from the joint activity and the benefits each would 
receive in their next best alternative”.1373 Each participant in a joint project should therefore 
receive benefits at least as great as in their next best alternative, so as to maintain their incentive 
to participate to the joint project (the so called participation constraint).1374 A long as the 
“participation constraints” of all participants to the cooperative project are satisfied, the 
question of distribution is settled in an economically efficient way.1375  What matters is not the 
distributive outcome as such, for instance that each participant enjoys an equal share of the 
joint profit, but the fact that each participant has been able to get a payoff equivalent to their 
next best alternative. Absent this rent from the joint surplus collected by the participants, these 
will have no incentive to enter into the joint activity at the first place.  
It is possible to imagine that a single participant could gain the most important part of the 
joint profit if, for instance, he makes take-it or leave-it offers to the rest of the participants that 
are only “barely superior to their next best alternatives”.1376 To the extent that the joint surplus 
is net of the participants’ next best alternatives, the allocational outcome will be deemed Pareto 
optimal (economic efficient). However, this outcome may not be considered fair to the extent 
that it leads to an unequal allocation of the joint profit, should one consider that fairness 
requires that the joint surplus produced should be allocated equally between the participants. 
However, distributive justice concerns are not of essence to welfare economic analysis, which 
carefully separates questions of efficiency from questions of distributive justice. This 
separation is explained by number of crucial assumptions. The first is what has been called “the 
Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics”, according to which if one assumes that 
all individuals and producers are selfish price takers, then almost any Pareto optimal 
equilibrium can be supported via the competitive mechanism, provided appropriate lump sum 
taxes and transfers are imposed on individuals and firms. The main idea is that in the long run 
                                                          
1372 E.g. K. Dowding, Power (Open University Press 1996). 
1373 Ibid., 168 
1374 S. Bowles, Microeconomics – Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution (Princeton Univ. Press, 2004), 171. 
1375 Ibid., 171. 
1376 Ibid. 
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the competitive process will eliminate any benefit from the joint surplus that is higher than the 
participation constraints of each of the participants. This further assumes that “only competitive 
equilibrium transactions take place”, a quite heroic assumption which in the best case scenario 
only holds at the very long term.1377 A second assumption is that allocational outcomes may 
not have effect on distributional outcomes, which is also quite unlikely, as the existing 
allocation of resources determines the next best alternative for each of the participants and 
consequently the distribution of the joint surplus. Conversely, conflicts relating to the fair 
distribution of rents may contribute to inefficiency to the extent that resources may be spent on 
advancing distributional claims and rent-seeking deviating resources away from productive 
activities. Participants may also be driven in their selection for technologies and the 
organisation of their activity to activities that increase their share of the joint surplus, rather 
than those increasing the size of the joint surplus. A third assumption is that the participants to 
the cooperation are able to write complete and costlessly enforceable contracts regulating all 
aspects of their private interactions and consequently the costs and benefits of their 
cooperation. This is of course only possible in theory. Finally, it is possible that joint surplus 
generating activities may be blocked following intense conflicts over the distribution of the 
joint surplus and “bargaining breakdowns leading to foregone mutual beneficial 
opportunities”.1378 
The situation of economic dependence between two firms may precede their business 
relationship, coincide with the contract that incepts such relationship, or arise in the execution 
of the contract. The economic dependence can be defined as a situation of unbalance in the 
business relationship between two firms, which makes impossible or excessively difficult for 
one to continue with the business without the other.  The abuse of economic dependence 
generally take the form of a refuse to purchase or sell, or the one of an arbitrary interruption of 
business relationships. Economic scholars have, since long, analysed these contractual 
dynamics, especially under the theory of ‘incomplete contracts’1379. Inter alia, this theory 
explains that, since parties are not generally able to foresee all the possible evolution of their 
business relationship, when one of the parties gains a position of superior bargaining power, it 
will likely exploit this situation. Based on this theory, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, designed 
an economic model explaining that the intention of the opportunistic behaviour not necessarily 
preexist to the formation of the contract1380. This is the case where there is a competitive market 
where the two firms bargain the contract in power parity1381 but nonetheless the investments 
done by one of them turn this firm into economic dependence, exposing that firm to holdup 
                                                          
1377 Ibid., 172. 
1378 Ibid., 173. 
1379 Oliver Hart and John Moore, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation’ [1988] Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society 755; Oliver Hart and John Moore, ‘Foundations of Incomplete Contracts’ (1999) 66 The 
Review of Economic Studies 115; Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules’ [1989] Yale Law Journal 87; Jean Tirole, ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do 
We Stand?’ (1999) 67 Econometrica 741. 
1380 Benjamin Klein, Robert G Crawford and Armen A Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process’ [1978] Journal of law and economics 297. 
1381 Hence, each of them decides choses the ‘best option’. 
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from the business partner. In these cases, it is argued that vertical integration is both a solution 
to opportunistic holdup1382 and a more convenient alternative to contracting1383. 
We may have, on the other hand, an economic dependence created by market conditions 
precedent to the stipulation of the contract, which forced one of the parties to accept the terms 
imposed by the dominant firms and undertake specific investments. The abuse of economic 
dependence deriving from a superior market power may trigger the application of both contract 
law and competition law or other rules specifically designed to deal with situations of economic 
dependence.  
The definition of an economic dependency situation is dependent on the dimension of 
economic power the specific regime puts forward.  
Neoclassical price theory has focused on market power, that is, the ability of an 
undertaking to charge higer prices and reduce output profitably. This presupposes that the 
undertaking holds power over consumers, who are dependent on the specific undertaking’s 
offer, as they cannot substitute this offer with one from another competing undertaking on the 
specific relevant market. Neoclassical price theory (NPT) provides the tools to determine the 
situations where substitution is possible, that is that there is cross price elasticity of demand 
between different products that will form part of the same relevant market. NPT therefore 
defines bargaining power more generally, in terms of the ability of an undertaking to introduce 
a deviation from the price or quantity obtained from the competitive situation in the market in 
which the transaction takes place. In this context, buying power denotes the ability of a buyer 
to achieve more favourable terms than those available to other buyers or it would otherwise be 
expected under normal competitive conditions. The approach emphasizes the gain resulting 
from the presence of bargaining power relative to a situation in which it is absent (not 
necessarily that of perfect competition)1384, thus focusing on the market structure and 
concentration1385. A typical definition of buyer power in terms of concentration is the following 
one provided by Roger Noll: 
“[B]uyer power” refers to the circumstances in which the demand side of a market is 
sufficiently concentrated that buyers can exercise market power over sellers. A buyer 
has market power if the buyer can force sellers to reduce price below the level that 
would emerge in a competitive market. Thus buyer power arises from monopsony (one 
buyer) or oligopsony (a few buyers), and is the mirror image of monopoly or 
oligopoly”1386. 
In the standard model of monopsony, the supply side of a market is perfectly 
competitive and is represented by an upward-sloping supply curve. As a mirror image of a 
monopolist’s behaviour, a monopsonist can take advantage of his market power by reducing 
his demand. The lower price obtained by the buyer reflects the lower marginal cost of supply. 
                                                          
1382 Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole, ‘Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure’ [1990] Brookings papers on 
economic activity. Microeconomics 205; Ronald H Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
1383 As a response to a situation in which “quasi rents” are created, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (n 16). 
1384 See, Roger Clarke, Stephen Davies, Paul W. Dobson & Michael Waterson, Buyer Power and Competition in 
European Food Retailing, 2 (2002). 
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One may nevertheless take a broader perspective on bargaining power. For instance, an OECD 
report in 1998 provided the following definition: 
“[A] retailer is defined to have buyer power if, in relation to at least one supplier, it can 
credibly threaten to impose a long term opportunity cost (i.e. harm or withheld benefit) 
which, were the threat carried out, would be significantly disproportionate to any 
resulting long term opportunity cost to itself”1387.  
The bargaining power in this context emanates from the ability of one side of the market 
to obtain a concession from the other side, by threatening to impose a cost, or withdrawing a 
benefit. Hence, here it is the threat and not the act (as for a monopsony) of reducing the 
quantities of purchase that gives rise to bargaining power. As it was also explained in a 
document prepared by the German Competition Authority, literature often interprets buyer 
power as bargaining power and examines it within the context of bargaining theory models, 
“with the consequence that, for instance, demand-side market power is not expressed by a 
strategic reduction of quantities, but in bilaterally negotiated individual prices and rebates as 
well as other purchase conditions”1388. 
 What are the competitive effects of monopsony power and bargaining power1389? With 
regard to the upstream side, as the monopsonist restricts its input purchases to reduce prices 
below competitive levels, there might be allocative inefficiency and the buyer may extract 
supplier surplus. With regard to the downstream side, there is no allocative inefficiency if the 
monopsonist discriminates perfectly. Consumers do not benefit though from reduced input 
prices as these do not lead to reduced output prices that are passed to output buyers, to the 
extent that “the monopsonist may control the price it pays for an input but cannot control the 
quantity of the input offered for sale at that price”1390. Although monopsony is considered as 
the mirror image of monopoly, buyer-side conduct is regularly treated more leniently than 
equivalent conduct on the selling side. This relies on the idea that serving large buyers may 
involve lower distribution costs and lower production costs, leading to important discounts, as 
the larger the buyer the more credible would be its threat to integrate backwards and produce 
the good itself1391.  
One may also distinguish between buyer power, which denotes the ability of buyers to 
obtain advantageous terms of trade from their suppliers and countervailing power, which 
characterizes the presence of strong buyers mitigating or even fully averting adverse 
consequences for consumer surplus or total welfare that would otherwise arise from the 
exercise of market power at the supply side. Countervailing power on the buyer side may be 
                                                          
1387 OECD, Buyer Power of Large Scale Multiproduct Retailers, 6 (1998) 
1388 Bundeskartellamt, Buyer Power in Competition law: Status and Perspectives, Meeting of the Working Group 
on Competition Law on 18 September 2008. See also, Paul W. Dobson, Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from 
the British Grocery Trade, 72 Antitrust Law J. 532 (2005) , “(b)uyer power gives retailers more than just the 
ability to extract discounts and obtain low prices from suppliers; buyer power may manifest itself in the contractual 
obligations that retailers may be able to place on suppliers”. 
1389 For a detailed analysis, see Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Monopsony in Law and Economics 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
1390 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Complications in the Antitrust Reponse to Monopoly, in I. Lianos & D. Sokol (eds.), The 
Global Limits of Competition Law (Stanford University press, 2012), 54, at 58. 
1391 David Sheffman and Pablo Spiller, Buyers’ strategies, entry barriers, and competition, (1992) 30 Economic 
Inquiry, 418. 
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an important force offsetting suppliers’ increased market power1392. The economic analysis of 
bilateral monopoly or oligopoly, the situation where a lawful monopolist confronts a lawful 
monopsony, does not offer clear directions. While some authors argue that bilateral monopoly 
produces welfare effects that are superior to those of monopoly or monopsony and that it does 
not raise any competition concerns1393, others doubt on the possibility of bilateral bargaining 
to reliably reach an efficient outcome, because of the pervasive presence of private information 
and incomplete contracts1394. 
This theoretical discussion has practical interest for competition law enforcement. 
Although agricultural cooperatives may fall within the scope of competition law, joint 
purchasing agreements, such as cooperatives, are usually considered positively, as they usually 
aim at the creation of countervailing buying power which can lead to lower prices or better 
quality products or services for consumers. 
With regard to the definition of the relevant concept of economic power, some scholars 
have tried to draw a clear boundary between bargaining power, which is considered a contract 
law issue, and monopoly power, which is viewed as a competition law issue, what we will call 
the separation thesis. In particular, Trebilcock believes that it is fundamental to differentiate 
‘situational monopolies’ from ‘structural monopolies’1395. Situational monopolies are 
transitory states of imbalance in the bargaining position of the parties to an agreement, which 
can be subject to exploitation. The ‘situational monopolist’ (in Trebilcock’s terms) may take 
advantage of the business partner by charging prices that are higher than its ‘reference price’. 
For instance, Trebilcock imagines a situation where ‘A has violated his own reference price in 
opportunistically taking advantage of B’s temporary dependency’1396. For Trebilcock, these 
monopolies should be regulated by contract law. On the other hand, structural monopolies are 
those that antitrust law should target, as the dominance of the monopolist is market-wide and 
non-transitory. Here, the dominant firm enjoys a market power that precedes the negotiation of 
the specific bargain and that impacts on all the market actors1397. However, it has already been 
noted that when the relevant market is narrowly defined, as it may happen in EU competition 
law, the two situations are indistinguishable and therefore the distinction may lose 
significance1398. Trebilcock maintains that while the problem of competition law is to 
                                                          
1392 The term was first coined by John Kenneth Galbraith to describe the power developed on one side of the 
market as a way to counter the market power on the other side of the market. John Kenneth Galbraith, American 
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952). See also, Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 
Countervailing power revisited, (1996)14 International Journal of Industrial Organization 507; Paul W. Dobson 
& Michael Waterson, Countervailing Power and Consumer Prices, (1997) 107 Economic Journal 418 ; and Zhiqi 
Chen, Dominant Retailers and Countervailing Power Hypothesis, (2003) 34 Rand Journal of Economics 612. 
1393 Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, (2007) 74 Antitrust law Journal 521; Roger D. Blair & 
Christina Depasquale, Bilateral Monopoly and Antitrust Policy, in Roger D. Blair & Daniel Sokol (ed.), Oxford 
Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 2015) 364, 377. 
1394 Jonathan B. Baker, Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Merger to Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer, (2008) 75 
Antitrust Law Journal 637. 
1395 M J Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press 1997); Michael J Trebilcock, 
‘The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords’ [1976] 
University of Toronto Law Journal 359. 
1396 M Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract, 94. 
1397 Id. 96. 
1398 P. Akman, ‘The Relationship between Economic Duress and Abuse of a Dominant Position’ [2014] Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 99, 113. 
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determine and remedy to market failures, contract deals with contracting failures, which in the 
particular case of duress, relates to the coercion of voluntariness that may happen in ‘situational 
monopolies’. This is particularly the case for long term contracts where exploitation of a 
‘bilateral monopoly’ is likely to occur1399.  
One may also attempt to define economic dependence more broadly, not only focusing 
on consumer, but also on other economic actors that may be subject to economic power and 
which need to be protected, for a public policy reason. One may think of farmers, small 
suppliers, or even specific categories of vulnerable consumers. In this context, one may refer 
to resource dependency theories of Emmerson and other sociologists, such as Cook, who focus 
on the network position of the economic actors in order to determine the power-dependence of 
one versus the other, the underlying idea being that “the power of A over B is equal to, and 
based upon, the dependence of B upon A”1400. These intellectual foundations of economic 
power will be related to the concept of relational market power that has been developed in 
some competition law literature and we aim in the final version of this paper to include a 
Section exploring the way this intellectual foundation of economic power may work, and the 
measurement tools it provides, for instance through advanced social network analysis. Social 
exchange theory based conceptualization of economic dependence have already been 
suggested by some scholars, in particular in the context of gauging economic power the food 
sector1401, but the intellectual foundations have not been explored in depth and what remains 
to be done is to develop an overall theory of economic dependence, in particulal in a network 
context, that would assist us to determine the comparative institutional advantage (or 
disadvantage) of competition law, versus other areas of law (contract law, unfair competition, 
fairness-driven ad hoc legislative interventions to deal with situations of economic dependence. 
 
3.3. Superior bargaining power and competition law and policy in the food sector 
 
Several national antitrust authorities have recently delved into the concept of superior 
bargaining power in the food-retail sector and commissioned studies in order to better 
operationalize superior bargaining power in competition law enforcement and develop 
measurement tools.1402 Competition law does not only regulate the exercise of bargaining 
                                                          
1399 Id. 111. In this connection, Akman recalls Hovenkamp arguing that “[s]imple bilateral monopoly is not an 
antitrust problem because bilateral monopoly has no consequences for market prices and output” in Herbert 
Hovenkamp, ‘Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis’ (2010) 57 The Antitrust 
Bulletin 613, 14. 
1400 R.M. Emmerson, Power-dependence relations, (1962) 27(1) American Sociological Review 31, 33; K.S. Cook 
& R.M. Emerson, Power, equity and commitment in exchange networks, (1978) 43(5) American Sociological 
Review 721. 
1401 H.S. James, M.K. Hendrickson, Ph. H. Howard, Networks, power and Dependency in the Agrifood Industry, 
in In: James, Jr. H. (eds) The Ethics and Economics of Agrifood Competition. (The International Library of 
Environmental, Agricultural and Food Ethics, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht, 2013). 
1402 See, for instance, Competition Commission, The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation, 
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
20140402141250/http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-
inquiry/rep_pub/reports/2008/fulltext/538. 
pdf; Italian Competition Authority, Indagine Conoscitiva Sul Settore Della GDO’ (2013) IC43, available at 
http://www.agcm.it/indagini-conoscitive-db.html; Bundeskartellamt, Sektoruntersuchung Nachfragemacht Im 
Lebensmitteleinzelhandel (2014) B2-15/11 BKartA, available at http://www. 
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power in the context of a contractual relationship, bilateral or other looser forms of cooperation, 
but also when this is purely “unilateral”, although only in situations where there is a dominant 
position. Certainly, the concept of ‘dominant position’ has been more and more assimilated to 
the concept of “market power”, which hinges mainly on the calculation of market shares of the 
undertaking and its ability to raise prices and reduce output or other parameters of competition 
(innovation, quality, variety), as the outcomes-oriented definition of neoclassical price theory 
advanced. However, the way competition authorities define “dominant position” has been quite 
broad and may include situations of what has been characterized as “non-structural market 
power”, including situations of superior bargaining power.  
 Indeed, both theory and practice that structural market power is often not necessary for 
having relative market power toward one or more trading partners. Market shares as low as 10–
20% may be sufficient in some cases to maintain a superior bargaining position.1403 Research 
also suggests that superior bargaining positions of retailers are widespread particularly in the 
food sector, negatively affecting in particular upstream farmers and SMEs.1404 Farmers 
typically are confronted with high levels of concentration both upstream (input markets for 
agricultural production, e.g. seeds, Fertilisers and crops) and downstream (e.g. manufactoring 
and retailers, in particular vertically integrated multinationals), such that they face superior 
bargaining positions both ways.1405  
The theory of non-structural market power has been criticized by some authors as not 
being sufficiently substantial to constitute market power under competition law, and that it 
should therefore be excluded from competition law assessment1406. Two reasons are advanced 
for this criticism: (i) enforcement agency budgets and judicial resources are scarce and thus, it 
does not make sense to squander them in attacks on market power over low sales volumes, as 
it is the case for relational market power and (ii) there are no procedures or specific 
methodology for measuring the extent of market imperfections, thus permitting the intervention 
of the competition authority in situations of significant relational market power.  
                                                          
bundeskartellamt.de/Sektoruntersuchung_LEH.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7; Autorité de la concurrence, 
Opinion 15-A-06 of 31 March 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector, 
available at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/15a06.pdf; Finnish competition authority, Study on 
Trade in Groceries – How Does Buyer Power Affect The Relations between the Trade and Industry?’ (2012) 1 
FCA reports, available at http://www.kkv.fi/globalassets/kkv-suomi/julkaisut/selvitykset/2012/en/fca-reports-1-
2012-study-on-trade-in-groceries.pdf. 
 
1403 See J.B. Kirkwood, ‘Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for 
Buyer Induced Price Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?’ (2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 625, 637–44; W.S. 
Grimes, ‘Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition and the Atomistic Seller’ (2005) 72 
Antitrust Law Journal 563, 569; P.W. Dobson, ‘Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the British Grocery Trade’ 
(2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 529, 535; Z. Chen, ‘Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy’ (2007) 
22 Research in Law and Economics 17, 31;  
1404 Myriam Vander Stichele and Bob Young, The Abuse of Supermarket Buyer Power in the EU Food Retail 
Sector Preliminary Survey of Evidence (March 2009). 
1405 E.g. OECD, ‘Spotlight on Global Value Chains: Does it Mean Shutting Out Small Producers?’ in Promoting 
Pro-Poor Growth: Agriculture (Paris, OECD, 2006), 58; U. Schwager, ‘Competition Issues Affecting the 
Agricultural Sector in Selected Developing Countries: Key Findings From Selected UNCTAD Market Studies’ 
in M. Gal, M. Bakhoum, J. Drexl, E. Fox and D.Gerber (eds.), Economic Characteristics of Developing 
Jurisdictions: Their Implications For Competiton Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 153-176. 
1406 B Klein, ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak’ (1994) 3 Supreme Court Economic 
Review 43. 
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Despite these criticisms, the concept of relational market power is integrated in modern 
competition law assessment in two ways. First, the competition law of some States takes 
directly into account the existence of a situation of ʻeconomic dependencyʼ in the enforcement 
of competition law, even in the absence of neoclassical market power.1407 For example, section 
20(2) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) (GWB) extends the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position 
to undertakings which do not possess market power in the structural, neoclassical sense, but do 
have “relative market power” (relative Marktmacht) in their contractual relationships with 
small and medium enterprises which depend on them. Thus, market power is defined within 
the bilateral relationship between suppliers and buyers.1408 Other juridictions having specific 
provisions on the abuse of economic dependence based on a concept of relative dominance / 
market power include France,1409 Italy,1410 Portugal,1411 Czechia1412 and Greece.1413 In 
Japan1414 and Korea,1415 traditional competition law provisions are supplemented with a 
prohibition of abuse of a superior bargaining position, which have a similar rationale.1416  
Second, non-structural factors might be taken into account indirectly, in assessing the 
existence of a dominant position, either by narrowing down the relevant market definition 
(excluding the price constraints imposed on the specific after-sales services by competing 
manufacturers under the assumption that consumers take into account the cost of after-sales 
services when they purchase a product) or by considering it as an additional factor reinforcing 
the finding of a dominant position, even if the firm does not have high market shares. For 
instance, the incorporation of such non-structural factors can be seen in the theory of an 
obligatory partner in EU competition law. In Swiss competition law, Article 4 II of the Swiss 
Cartel Act defines dominance broadly which also includes a situation of relative dominance 
towards one or more suppliers or customers. Consequently, a distinction is made between a 
dominant position in de neoclassical sense and a situation in which a company has customers 
which are economically dependent upon it even though the company does not have market 
power vis-à-vis its competitors.1417 Other jurisdictions which include a broader concept of 
dominance not necessarily based on a neoclassical understanding of market power include 
China and India.1418 
                                                          
1407 See generally and for discussion, M Bakhoum, ‘Abuse without Dominance in Competition Law: Abuse of 
Economic Dependence and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and 
Competition Research Paper No. 15-15. 
1408 Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht. Band 2. GWB Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht (Beck 
2007), § 20. 
1409 Article L 420-2 of the French Commercial Code. 
1410 Article 9 of the Italian Law on Industrial Subcontracting. 
1411 Article 12 Portuguese Competition Act. 
1412 T. Fiala, ‘Czech Republic: Anti-competitive Practices – Economic Dependence Act’ (2014) 35 European 
Competition Law Review 5. 
1413 E. Truli, ‘Relative Dominance and the Protection of the Weaker Party: Enforcing the Economic Dependence 
Provisions and the Example of Greece’ (2017) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 
1414 Article 2 (9)(v) of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade. 
1415 Article 23(4)(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
1416 See further section 3.3.3. below. 
1417 See Swiss Competition Commission, Decision CoopForte [2005] RPW/DPC I 146, in which Coop, the second 
supermarket chain in Switzerland, demanded a sum equal to 0.5% of the billing value from its suppliers. 
1418 See further section 3.3.3 below. 
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The debate over the inclusion or separation thesis notwithstanding, we will explore the 
various instances in which superior bargaining power considerations were included in 
competition law analysis, starting with the thorny issue of measuring superior bargaining 
power, the lack of appropriate,, and predictable, measurement being one of the major concerns 
of those arguing that this concept should not be integrated in competition law. 
 
3.3.1. Measuring superior bargaining power 
 
The attention of the competition law enforcers historically lingers on size and market share or 
concentration of the negotiating parties in order to define their power relations.1419 However, 
scholarly studies on contracts and negotiations take a game/bargaining theory approach arguing 
that, for the outcome of negotiation, even more important than market shares or the size of 
negotiating parties is the existence of “threat points” enabling one of the parties to seek a “best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA).1420 Indeed, the negotiating party holding a 
BATNA has the possibility to resort to a valid alternative to the negotiation in progress or to 
the contract concluded, preventing hold-up and threats to cease negotiation. In conceiving the 
bargaining model one may take a Nash cooperative bargaining solution as the axiomatic 
starting point,1421 or resort to a non-cooperative or sequential bargaining model which will 
attempt to factor in the costs of the delay to agreement, and extend this analysis from bilateral 
bargaining to n-person bargaining.1422 Although it is not clear if the results will be the same 
under each of these models, their common feature, in contrast to industrial organization theory, 
is that bargaining power is perceived as a concept that can be measured with reference to a 
specific bargaining relation in a specific context and it is not dependent on structural analysis 
(for instance the existence of monopsony or oligopsony). Bargaining power may also impact 
on price as well as on non-price terms.1423 Measuring bargaining power is a difficult exercise 
that scholars and law enforcers have tried to engage with, adopting diverse approaches.  
 Attempts to measure bargaining power in the context of the food sector have focused 
particularly on the demand side bargaining power. Buyer power must not be conflated with 
monopsony and can take a variety of forms. Carstensen contends that “[t]he continuum of buyer 
power is a function of the following factors:  
(1) the buyer’s market options for its output;  
(2) the producer’s ease of switching outlets or product lines;  
                                                          
1419 This is for instance the approach by the Commission in its last report for the HLF, European Commission, DG 
COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food Sector: Final Report, 
available at http://ec. europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf.  
1420 A. Renda and others, Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Retail Supply Chain, Final Report (2014) DG MARKT/2012/049/E 25, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
retail/docs/140711-study-utp-legal-framework_en.pdf; I. Ayres and B. J Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a 
Barrier to Negotiation (1996) 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1631. 
1421 Most of these studies have relied on this type of model so far. 
1422 See, for instance, J. Sutton, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction, (1986) LIII Review of 
Economic Studies 709-724; K. Binmore, M. J. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, Non-Cooperative Models of Bargaining, 
Chapter 7 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (Elsevier, 1992), 179-225.  
1423 A. Choi and G. Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design (2012) Va. L. Rev. 1665. 
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(3) the quantities that the buyer takes from any one producer as a percentage of its purchases 
of that input; and  
(4) the percentage of its own output that a producer sells to a single buyer.”1424  
In its report on the supply of groceries, the UK Competition Commission investigated the 
degree of buyer power of grocery retailers vis-à-vis suppliers. The Commission tries to define 
“buyer power” tautologically as being able to  “obtain a better deal from its suppliers in terms 
of prices, product quality or purchasing terms, for example, compared with grocery retailers 
that do not have buyer power”. In its assessment of the grocery sector, the possession of buyer 
power by grocery retailers is assessed by looking at four types of evidence:  
(1) the relative size of grocery retailers compared to suppliers; 
(2) the prices and margins that suppliers are able to negotiate with grocery retailers; 
(3) the share of the retail price that is earned by grocery retailers and others; and  
(4) a review of e-mail correspondence between two retailers and their suppliers, including 
e.g. evidence of below-cost selling by suppliers that would be difficult be difficult to 
explain in the absence of retailer buyer power. 
 In Japan, abuse of a superior bargaining position is prohibited by the Antimonopoly Act.1425 
In its Guidelines Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the Antimonopoly 
Act, the Japan Fair Trade Commission defines a superior bargaining position as follows. Party 
A has a superior bargaining position over Party B in the following situation: (1) Party A makes 
a request that is substantially disadvantageous for Party B. and (2) Party B would be unable to 
avoid accepting such a request on the grounds that Party B has difficulty in continuing the 
transaction with Party A and thereby Party B’s business management would be substantially 
impeded. 
 The existence of a superior bargaining position is determined by considering four sets of 
facts, taking into account both structural and non-structural factors: 
1. The degree of dependence by Party B on the transactions with Party A, which if Party 
B is the supplier is measured with reference to the amount of sales by Party B to Party 
A, divided by Party B’s total amount of sales; 
2. The structural market position of Party A, i.e. its market share and ranking; 
3. The possibility of Party B to change its business by starting or increasing its transactions 
with another party other than Party A, for instance based on Party B’s specific 
investments for its transactions with Party A; 
4. Other factors indicating the need for Party B to carry out transactions with Party A, 
including for example the amount of transactions with Party A and the relative business 
size of Party A.1426 
 In 2014, the German Bundeskartellamt concluded an in-depth study in the food retail sector, 
where it attempted to measure superior bargaining power (“demand side power” – 
                                                          
1424 Peter C. Carstensen, Competition Policy and the Control of Buyer Power. A Global Issue (Edward Elgar 
2017), ch. 3. 
1425 Article 2 (9)(v) of the Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade. 
1426 Japan Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines Concerning Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the 
Antimonopoly Act (30 November 2010), p. 5-6, available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/101130GL.pdf. 
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“Nachfragemacht”) econometrically by exploring the conditions of its existence.1427 The 
conditions of bargaining power were converted into independent variables used for the 
econometric assessment. The selection of the independent variables was performed on the basis 
of a survey. In particular, the Bundeskartellamt looked into the procurement market of branded 
products for several reasons, including the fact that they form the core business of retailers, 
they are at the center of the majority of competition complaints and they are easier to compare 
and identify.1428 The authority initially divided the products object of negotiations into four 
categories: “product category,” xxx“must-stock items,” “items listed at a discounter” and 
“high-turnover items.” Furthermore, they identified seven procurement markets with different 
market structures. In order to identify and order the branded products forming the statistical 
population belonging to the sample, the authority used the European Article Number (EAN). 
The authority then interviewed the retailers and manufacturers about the results of their 
negotiations on each EAN article. In particular, the Bundeskartellamt inquired about the 
switching possibilities to alternative negotiating partners and about the overall competitive 
environment. The authority noted that negotiations between producers and merchants take 
place once a year. In these negotiations producers and merchants bargain over the conditions 
for the business relationships of the following year. Yet, the Bundeskartellamt also 
acknowledged that the sole focus on procurement volumes is not sufficiently differentiated to 
provide valid conclusions for the definition and measurement of demand-side bargaining 
power. For its econometric assessment, the Bundeskartellamt considered different 
determinants in order to describe the individual bargaining position of each party and did not 
base itself only on market concentration and the existence of a monopsony or an oligopsony. 
The bargaining model construed on the basis of this theoretical approach can be summarized 
as following: 
K [conditions of superior bargaining power] = f (x [amount ordered]; D1-6 [bargaining 
determinants, which indicates the “Drohpunkte” (threat points), that is, the best alternative 
to negotiate ])1429.  
These are the following: 
                                                          
1427 Bundeskartellamt, Sektoruntersuchung Nachfragemacht Im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel (2014) B2-15/11 
BKartA, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/Sektoruntersuchung_LEH.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7 (hereinafter 
Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report) 
1428 The other market identified by the Bundeskartellamt is the one of private labels, which the authority describes 
as characterized by a different “bargaining logic,” although deeply influencing the negotiations for branded 
products. Private labels are usually bargained through tenders, while branded products are traded with annual 
negotiations. However, in its econometric study the Bundeskartellamt states that “private labels are actually 
considered in the assessment of the “competitive environment” of the branded products,” see Bundeskartellamt, 
Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 8. In this connection the 
Bundeskartellamt observes that private labels are often considered as part of a different market with respect to 
branded products. However, they can be often used in negotiations to put pressure on manufacturers of branded 
products, at 11. 
1429   Hence, the Bundeskartellamt especially focusses on the walk-away point in the specific negotiation and how 
it is influenced by different factors for each party. 
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• Alternative distribution paths for producer p (other than with retailer r) or even 
alternative production paths (switching to different product) = outside options of 
producer;1430 
• Outside options of retailer: importance of the product for the retailer (is delisting a 
credible threat?);1431 
• Brand strength: if consumers expect certain brands, then delisting is improbable;1432 
• Competition by other producers/brands which creates opportunities for r to 
circumvent p;1433 
• r’s own brands (“Handelsmarken”): these must be substitutable for brands of p, and 
p must not be (by chance) the actual producer of r’s own brands; the Report notes the 
trend towards private labels even in the premium segment;1434 
• Buyer cooperation: bundling buying power1435. 
 The conditions adopted for this analysis were not only price terms but also non-price terms, 
such as deadline for payment and agreements on delivery. A fundamental stage of the 
Bundeskartellamt’s assessment was the reckoning of the importance of a retailer for its 
suppliers and the evaluation of the “outside options” of both parties. The definition of “outside 
option” given by the authority resembles closely to the one of the BATNA, “the better a party’s 
outside options, the better the conditions that party is able to negotiate.”1436 Not surprisingly, 
the Bundeskartellamt concluded in this study that the purchasing volumes “have a decisive 
impact on the negotiating conditions,”1437 and therefore constitute one of the main advantages 
of major retailers vis-à-vis their smaller competitors in negotiations. Furthermore, the authority 
determined that the well-known branded products “the delisting of which would most likely 
result in a disproportionate decline in turnover for that retail company, has the effect that its 
manufacturer is able to achieve better conditions.”1438  In such cases, the producer is in a 
stronger bargaining position, since the retailer has no BATNA.1439 
                                                          
1430 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 321. 
1431 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 322. 
1432 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 323. 
1433 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 324. However the Bundeskartellamt states that this is only true if two 
conditions are assumed. Firstly the other brand has to pose a sufficient substitution to the article which is the 
subject of the negotiations and secondly that the producer of the relevant article is not also the producer of the 
alternative trade brand. The Bundeskartellamt  measures the value of this influence with the help of a survey in 
which the undertakings were asked to assess the importance of alternative brands. Furthermore the survey asked 
for an assessment of the substitutability of the specific article through the alternative on a scale from 0% to 100 
%.. 
1434 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report, 324-325. 
1435   Membership in a buyer group reduces the outside-options of the supplier and thereby may lead to better 
conditions for the demand side. The impact of the membership is measured by adding a variable which is 1 for 
“yes” and 0 for “no”. In a second step it is measured whether an undertaking is a “big” or a “small” member of 
such a group. Thereby a variable only gets the value one, when the undertaking is not the one with the highest 
turnover in the group. 
1436 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10.  
1437 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10. 
1438 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 10. 
1439 However, these so-called “must-have” products accounted only to 6% of the sample adopted by the authority 
that, according to the same authority, can be reasonably taken as representative of the whole food-retail national 
market. 
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 In a 2012 sector inquiry, the Italian Competition Authority studied the bargaining power of 
retailers and suppliers on the basis of three different “clusters” of undertakings, reaching 
comparable results.1440 These “clusters” were obtained by comparing several data, including 
the overall turnover, the number of retailers supplied, the “strength” of the brand (especially in 
the specific geographic area). In particular, these three groups or “clusters” were: i) 
undertakings with high bargaining power; ii) undertakings with medium bargaining power and 
iii) undertakings with low bargaining power.1441 The data published by the ICA relatively 
differs from that of the Bundeskartellamt, but still shows a situation of prevalence of retailers’ 
superior bargaining position, irrespective of market concentration levels. On the basis of their 
clusters, the ICA concluded that in the 23.4% of their sample, the supplier holds a strong 
bargaining position (not necessarily stronger than the retailer) and is not economically 
dependent on the retailer. In the 48.8% of cases, the suppliers showed an intermediate degree 
of dependence from the retailers. Finally, the 27.8% of the sample highlighted a high level of 
dependence.1442 It is worth observing that both the Italian and German retail sectors are 
moderately concentrated, if compared to others such as the Finnish, Latvian or Swedish.1443 
 Both studies by the German and the Italian competition authorities engage with what may 
be considered as captive value chains in the GVC approach terminology and attempt to develop 
appropriate measurement tools for superior bargaining power. Competition authorities have 
also attempted to gauge with superior bargaining power in exploring certain conduct that 
reinforces retail power vis-à-vis farmers or processors. 
 
3.3.2. Purchasing cooperation agreements and superior bargaining power 
 
Competition authorities around the world have increasingly looked into buying alliances and 
joint purchasing agreements concluded between major retail chains, these agreements 
becoming more common following the food crisis of 2008. Group purchasing organisations 
(“GPOs”) may take different forms of governance structure depending on the level of 
integration they select, spanning from jointly controlled companies to looser forms of 
cooperation, collectively referred to as “joint purchasing arrangements”1444. From the point of 
view of the size of retailers, group purchasing organisations are generally of two types. The 
first type consists in a multilateral agreement formed by retailers of the same size which by 
bundling their purchase volumes intend to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
suppliers. Recently, however, antitrust authorities registered a tendency to form purchasing 
groups where there is one dominant retailer and several smaller retailers.1445 In this type of 
                                                          
1440 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector (2012). 
1441 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector (2012), 162. 
1442 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector (2012), 162. 
1443 European Commission, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU Food 
Sector, 131. 
1444 European Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements, vol OJ [2011] C 11, 194, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF. 
1445 See, for instance, Italian Competition Authority, Case I768 Centrale Italiana S.c a r.l; Bundeskartellamt, 
Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 5; Autorité de la concurrence, 
Opinion 15-A-06 of 31 March 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector. 
392 
 
agreements, the smaller retailers generally issue mandate contracts to the “head” of the 
purchasing cooperation in order to negotiate the conditions of procurement for the whole 
organisation. These forms of cooperation generally include several other conditions in order to 
coordinate selling practices and share information, especially about procurement costs.1446  
 The findings of the national competition authorities corroborate the view that these 
purchasing cooperation agreements have, in many cases, an almost negligible effect on the 
bargaining power of the major retailers, while, in the short term, they improve the bargaining 
position of the smaller retailers.1447 This is true even when, as it is apparently the case, the head 
of the purchasing organisation does not pass on the benefit of the bargain in whole.1448 Yet 
these agreements may also lead to long-term forms of cooperation, including the sharing of 
sensitive information, and may create the conditions for the economic dependence of the 
smaller retailers that often structure their business model to the one dictated by the cooperation 
agreement.1449 In addition, the coordination of the selling practices may cause the 
"homogenization" of the assortments and of the services offered by the undertakings 
participating to the buying alliance, thus dampening competition.1450  
 In analysing these agreements the competition authorities had departed from a strict 
application of the concept of dominance and adopted a broad understanding of market 
distortions. Bargaining power does not necessarily depend on the market share owned by a 
specific firm in the relevant market, neither on the level of concentration. If a producer owns 
an important share of the market but, nonetheless, has to bargain with retailers disposing of 
valid alternatives to the negotiation, such as other substitutable brands or private label products, 
the bargaining power of that producer will most probably be limited. On the other hand, a 
concentrated local retail market, where a retailer holds an important share, may still be open to 
balanced negotiations, if the producers have valid “outside alternatives,” both nationally and 
internationally, instead of negotiating with that retailer. For instance, the extent of the 
geographic presence at national and international level of the retail chain is able to considerably 
influence the negotiations, since its demand is difficult to be substituted and it is particularly 
relevant to reach economies of scale, possibly creating a situation of economic dependence of 
the supplier.1451 In France, the Autorité de la concurrence explored allegations of abuse of 
superior bargaining power when examining three different cooperation agreements among the 
six most important French retailers (Système U/Auchan, ITM/Casino, Carrefour/Cora).1452 The 
Autorité pointed out that these agreements may fall within the scope of the prohibition of 
anticompetitive agreements, in view of the exchange of sensitive information between 
competitors and/or can be addressed according to abuse of economic dependence provisions. 
With regard to the latter, the Autorité found that the narrow approach adopted so far with regard 
                                                          
1446 This is for instance the situation described by the ICA in the Case Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l. 
1447 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report; Italian Competition Authority Case Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l.; Autorité 
de la concurrence, Opinion 15-A-06 of 31 March 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food 
Retail Sector. 
1448 Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Report; Case I768 Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l. 
1449 Bundeskartellamt, Summary of the Final Report of the Sector Inquiry into the Food Retail Sector, 19. 
1450 Case I768 Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l.  
1451 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 212. 
1452 Autorité de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector. 
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to the definition and measurement of economic dependence led to under-enforcement of these 
provisions and called for “an amendment to the procedure aimed at establishing the existence 
of abuses of economic dependency in order to make it more effective.”1453 
 
3.3.3. Abuse of economic dependence provisions 
Competition authorities also focus on the implementation of specific provisions on abuse of 
economic dependence, which may emerge in various situations. In the first scenario, two firms 
bargain the contract in power parity and in a competitive market, but nonetheless the 
investments made by one of them put this firm into a situation of economic dependence, 
exposing it to hold-up from its business partner. In the second scenario, the economic 
dependence may result from market conditions pre-existing to the stipulation of the contract, 
which forced one of the parties to accept the terms imposed by the other party and to undertake 
specific investments. With regard to its causes, the situation of economic dependence may 
derive from the absence of “outside options” for one of the business parties, or from high 
switching costs.1454 The food market presents plenty of opportunities for hold-up and 
anticompetitive conduct engendered by situations of economic dependence.1455 Farmers 
generally undertake specialized capital investments to provide the products at the local and 
international standards, under contractual arrangement with buyers. In particular, in markets of 
perishable products with few buyers, this contractual relationship easily turns into an economic 
dependence of the farmer to the buyer. Moreover, the particular conditions of the market of 
perishable products may be the cause of hold-up due to lack of alternatives for logistic reasons. 
Indeed, some products, such as chicken or sugar beets, have to be marketed locally, as they 
cannot be shipped far without losing much of their value. Processors and local buyers can 
therefore use this opportunity to impose low prices on farmers or non-favourable conditions.  
 Provisions on abuse of a situation of economic dependence is a well-known feature of some 
competition law regimes in Europe and Japan/Korea, and to some extent the theory may have 
influenced EU competition law’s theory of “obligatory trading partner”. There are also 
provisions about abuse of economic dependence in some BRICS countries. 
 
3.3.3.1. Abuse of economic dependence provisions in European competition laws 
 
As mentioned above, Section 20(2) of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition contains an extension of the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence. 
German law distinguishes between various forms of economic dependence, namely 
dependence based on a strongly branded product or range of products (sortimentsbedingte 
Abhängigkeit), business-related dependency arising out of a long-standing business 
                                                          
1453 Autorité de la concurrence, Press Release: Opinion 15-A-06 of 31 March 2015 Concerning the Joint 
Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector, 7, available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/15a06.pdf, xxxin French.  
1454 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 200. 
1455 J. M. MacDonald and P. Korb, Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 (2011) EIB-72. U.S. Dept.  
of Agriculture, Econ. Res. Serv. Economic Information Bulletin No. 72. 
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relationship between the SME and the undertaking concerned (unternehmensbedingte 
Abhängigkeit), shortage dependence which pertains to the scarcity of a product 
(mangelbedingte Abhängigkeit) and technical dependence (technisch bedingte 
Abhängigkeit).1456 In an early case law on abuse of economic dependence, the German Federal 
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) observed that a situation of economic dependence is 
manifested by “insufficient and unacceptable means of switching to other undertakings”, which 
may also be the case when there is “lively competition” on the market.1457 
French law also contains specific rules concerning abuse of economic dependence. 
Article L 420-2 of the Commercial Code prohibits abusive exploitation by a company of a 
customer or supplier that is economically dependent on that company, whenever this abuse is 
susceptible to affect the functioning or structure of competition. However, the last condition 
indicates that the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence does not function fully 
independent of a neoclassical economic conception of competition law. As a result, 
enforcement of Article L 420-2 in vertical relationships is more difficult1458 and the provision 
cannot be equated with Article 20(2) GWB. The Autorité de la Concurrence applied the 
provision on abuse of economic dependence in the Carrefour case.1459 Food retailer Carrefour 
had created a network of contractual relationships with distributors with the effect of creating 
interlinked dependency relationships. Carrefour concluded franchise agreements with 
individual distributors lasting seven years, and with one month difference in signing date, 
agreements with the same distributors on the commercialization of Carrefour’s products. These 
agreements contained several obligations for the individual distributors and other provisions 
allowing Carrefour to coordinate its distribution, including a one-year cancellation notice, the 
right of Carrefour to veto decisions including on capital cession, loyalty rebates and arbitration 
clauses. The Competition Authority however concluded that each of the agreement should be 
assessed individually and found no situation of economic dependence as the content of the 
agreements was part of the contractual freedom of the parties.1460 
Italian law also contains a provision on the prohibition of abuse of economic 
dependence (abuso di dipendenza economica) which is however not formally part of Italian 
competition law. While the initial draft law qualified abuse of economic dependence as equal 
to abuse of a dominance position in the ‘traditional’ sense, any reference to dominance has 
been removed from the law, following a opposition by the Italian Antitrust Authority.1461 The 
scope of application of the provision is, moreover, still unclear with widely diverging 
interpretations in the case law; while some courts argued that abuse of economic dependence 
                                                          
1456 P. Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance? Market Power, Market Dominance, and Abuse of 
Economic Dependence’ in M.O. Mackenrodt, B.C. Gallego and S. Enchelmaier (eds), Abuse of Dominant 
Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008), 61–62. 
1457 Bundesgerichtshof, Rossignol, BGH NJW 1976, 801 (1975). 
1458 Ibid., 63–65. 
1459 Autorité de la Concurrence, Décision n° 10-D-08 du 3 mars 2010 relative à des pratiques mises en œuvre par 
Carrefour dans le secteur du commerce d’alimentation générale de proximité. 
1460 For a critical analysis of the decision, see L. Boy, ‘Abus de dépendance économique: Reculer pour mieux 
sauter?’ [2010] n° 23, Revue Lamy Concurrence, 93; and M. Bakhoum, ‘Abuse without Dominance in 
Competition Law: Abuse of Economic Dependence and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance’, Max Planck 
Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 15-15, 6-7. 
1461 AGCM, Opinion of 20 June 1995 on Industrial Subscontracting; and Opinion of 10 February 1998 on 
Industrial Subscontracting. See further Këllezi, ‘Abuse below the Threshold of Dominance?’, 68–69. 
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is only applicable to subcontracting agreements, in light of its legislative context and literal 
meaning, other courts have held that the prohibition may apply to all kinds of interactions 
between undertakings or agreements that are similar to subcontracting agreements.1462 
Focusing on the relations between supplier and buyer, the Italian competition authority 
identifies four broad categories of economic dependence: i) dependence on assortment of the 
retailer, typically linked to branded products, which defines the lack of alternatives to a 
particular product or group of products; ii) dependence for shortage of supply sources, where  
the economic dependence originates from a situation of temporary lack of the specific product 
on the market; iii) dependence of the supplier, due to the fact that the supplier produces a 
significant share of its sales with a single buyer; iv) dependence on trade relations, in which 
the dependence originates from the significant asset-specific investments made by a contractor 
in order to fulfil its commitments and the difficulty to redeploy those investments for other 
purposes.1463, 1464  
By contrast, in its study into the  joint purchasing agreements in the food retail sector, 
the French competition authority considers four different criteria for determining a situation of 
economic dependence: i) the importance of the share of revenue generated by that supplier with 
the distributor; ii) the importance of the distributor in the marketing of the products concerned; 
iii) the absence of deliberate choice of supplier to concentrate its sales from the distributor; iv) 
the absence of alternative solutions supplier.1465 
However, both authorities conclude that this situation of economic dependence often 
gives rise to opportunistic hold-ups from the party enjoying superior bargaining position. In 
particular, these authorities observe that often retailers request contract modifications or 
additions to dependent suppliers, threatening to delist the supplier’s product or to impose other 
forms of retaliation.1466 In its sector inquiry, the ICA observed that the 67% of the respondent 
suppliers reported requests of modifications or additions to the supply contracts during their 
executions.1467 In several cases, the request of the retailer to modify or add contract terms also 
regarded discount terms and expenditures, which were already been negotiated, having 
therefore a retroactive effect.1468 From the sample adopted, the authority stressed that the 74% 
                                                          
1462 For an overview of this case law, see Valeria Falce, ‘The Italian Regulation against the abuse of economic 
dependence’, paper presented at the 10th ASCOLA Conference (Tokyo 21-23 May 2015). 
1463 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 201. 
1464 See further, Valeria Falce, ‘Abuse of Economic Dependence and Competition Law Remedies: A Sound 
Interpretation of the Italian Regulation’ (2015) 36 European Competition Law Review 71. 
1465 Autorité de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector, 
72. 
1466 Autorité de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector, 
81; Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 200. 
1467 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 163. In detail, the respondents replied 
that this coercive modification of the contract happens: for the 45% “sometimes,” for the 18% “often”, and for the 
4% “always.”  
1468 In this regard, the ICA points out that “[i]t is particularly interesting to note that the majority of respondents 
(74%) perceive, always or sometimes, these requests for unilateral modification of contract terms as binding for 
the supplier, which is exposed in the event of rejection, to specific retaliation, such as ‘delisting’ (that is, the 
exclusion from the list of suppliers), total or only for some products, or an unjustified worsening of the conditions 
for the following procurement period” (our translation). The ICA, therefore, acknowledges that 20% of 
respondents stated that they accept the requests “always,” 37% “often,” 38% said they accept them “sometimes,” 
and only 5% said they accept them “never,” at 163.  
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of the respondents who refused to modify the contract accordingly to the retailer’s request, 
reported having suffered retaliation, either by delisting (62% of respondents), or by “clear and 
unjustified worsening of contract terms for the following procurement period”1469 (59% of 
respondents), or by adoption of both delisting and worsening of contract terms (47% of 
respondents). Moreover, according to this study, framework procurement contracts are often 
stipulated after the start of the supply period,1470 and the following contracts detailing the 
procurement agreement are almost always negotiated during the supply period,1471 leaving 
therefore ample margin for the integration of the contract by the dominant party. 
These findings seem to support those studies claiming that the adoption of incomplete 
agreements (such as framework contracts), which parties detail during the execution, exposes 
the economic dependent undertaking to opportunistic hold-ups.1472 In 2011, the Spanish 
National Commission for Competition (now “CNMC”), published a report on the relations 
between manufacturers and retailers in the food sector, with the aim to describe the status quo 
of the relations between retailers and suppliers and analyse the impact on competition of the 
alleged bargaining power of large distributors.1473 The CNC found that the contracts linking 
suppliers with retail chains were occasionally left incomplete as for the consideration required, 
thus producing uncertainty, inefficient transfer of risk on the suppliers and a reduction of intra-
brand competition.1474 
Moving outside the EU, both Japan and Korea regulate the abuse of a superior 
bargaining position, serving goals similar to the provisions on abuse of economic dependence. 
The Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prohibits unfair business practices 
including “making a trade with a transacting partner by unfairly taking advantage of his 
position in the business area”.1475 The Korea Fair Trade Commission examines the possible 
                                                          
1469 These procurement contracts were generally annual and subject to renegotiation every year. 
1470 In their sample, the 35% of respondents always negotiate the framework agreement before the start of the 
supply period, the 19% declared that this happens “often,” and the 45% admitted that this happens only 
“sometimes”; see Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 162. 
1471 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 163. 
1472 O. E Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979) Journal of 
law and economics 233; B. Klein, R. G. Crawford and A. A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, 
and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978) Journal of law and economics 297. Based on this theory, Klein, 
Crawford and Alchian designed an economic model explaining that the intention of an opportunistic behaviour 
does not necessarily preexist to the formation of the contract, as it may also result from an asset-specific 
investment of the business partner. 
1473 Comision Nacional de la Competencia, Report on the Relations between Manufacturers and Retailers in the 
Food Sector, available at: 
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/Informes/InformesyEstudiossectoriales/tabid/228/Default.aspx. 
1474 OECD, Latin American Competition Forum, Competition Issues in the Groceries Sector: Focus on Conduct – 
Contribution from Spain, 3, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/LACF(2015)5&docLang
uage=En,. In the wake of the CNC’s recommendations, the Spanish Parliament approved the Law 12/2013 on 
measures to improve the functioning of the food supply chain (LCA), with the threefold aim to detail the 
conditions and characteristics of contracts between retailers and suppliers, lay down a “black list” of prohibited 
“abusive” practices, and empower the newly created Food Industry Information and Control Agency (AICA) to 
fine undertakings that fail to comply with these requirements. The Spanish Competition authority is highly critical 
of this new system where its competence overlaps in some cases with that of the Ministry responsible in the 
specific sector and with the new competences of the AICA, alleging that this has created a futile duplication of 
norms and institutions. 
1475 Article 23(1)(4) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. 
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existence of a superior bargaining position mainly in light whether and how feasible the 
transaction counterparty may “find” a “replacement” for the current business relationship. 
Since revising its Guidelines in 2015, it has added that a superior bargaining position requires 
a continuing transaction relationship to emphasise a “lock-in” effect and “considerable” 
dependence of the opposite party on the party allegedly having a superior bargaining 
position.1476 Examples of abuse of superior bargaining position include forced purchases, 
imposing sales targets, imposing any disadvantages, and interference with business 
management.1477 
In Japan, Article 2(9)(v) of the Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) prohibits as unfair trade 
practices: 
 
“engaging in any act specified in one of the following by making use of one's superior 
bargaining position over the counterparty unjustly, in light of normal business practices: 
(a) causing the counterparty in continuous transactions (including a party with whom 
one newly intends to engage in continuous transactions; the same applies in (b) below) 
to purchase goods or services other than those to which the relevant transactions pertain 
(b) causing the counterparty in continuous transactions to provide money, services or 
other economic benefits 
(c) refusing to receive goods in transactions with the counterparty, causing the 
counterparty to take back such goods after receiving them from the counterparty, 
delaying payment to the counterparty or reducing the amount of payment, or otherwise 
establishing or changing trade terms or executing transactions in a way disadvantageous 
to the counterparty”. 
Certain other practices not listed under this section may also be designated as unfair 
trading practices.1478 Moreover, sector-specific designations have been made, for example for 
the newspaper section and large-scale retailers.1479 While abuse of a superior bargaining 
position is a longstanding part of Japanese competition law, its use and function is still widely 
debated. Most commentators seem to argue that it is anomaly in the Anti Monopoly Act that is 
not necessarily in line with the goals of competition law.1480 However, the regulation of 
superior bargaining power can be justified with reference to the specific characteristics of the 
Japanese legal system in which weaker contractual parties might not be able to protect 
themselves against opportunistic behavior by parties with greater bargaining power, thus 
                                                          
1476 KFTC, Guidelines on the Review of Unfair Trade Practices. See also T.K. Cheng and M.S. Gal, ‘Superior 
Bargaining power: Dealing with Aggregate Concentration Concerns’, paper presented at the 10th ASCOLA 
conference (Tokyo, 21-23 May 2015). 
1477 Ibid. 
1478 Article 2(9)(vi) AMA. 
1479 See further Florian Wagner-von Papp, ‘Unilateral Conduct by Non-Dominant Firms: A Comparative 
Reappraisal’, paper presented at the 10th ASCOLA conference (Tokyo, 21-23 May 2015). 
1480 See e.g. M. Wakui and T.K. Cheng, ‘Regulating Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under the Japanese 
Competition Law: An Anomaly or a Necessity?’ (2015) 0 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1; Shigekazu 
Imamura, Dokusen kinshi ho nyumon [Introduction to Antimonopoly Law] (Yuhikaku Publishing 1993). 
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justifying the prohibition of abuse of superior bargaining power as a supplement to standard 
contract law.1481 
 
3.3.3.2. Abuse of economic dependence in BRICS 
 
As of current, none of the BRICS countries’ general competition law frameworks 
contain specific provisions on abuse of economic dependence or superior bargaining power. 
However, at least in Brazil, India, Russia and China, the general competition law provisions 
on abuse of a dominant position could be applied to sanction abuse of economic dependence. 
A comparative analysis of these countries reveals diverse approaches to the issues of 
dominance and abuse of power or economic dependence. While some of them openly accept 
the use of the concepts of “bargaining power” and “economic dependence” as a possible 
alternative to market share/NPT inspired market power tests (for example India and China), 
other have adopted a NPT approach, based on the calculation of the market share in order to 
determine dominance on a relevant market (Russia and Brazil).  
Brazilian law does not explicitly contemplate any rule on abuse of economic 
dependence, abuse of superior bargaining power or the concept of obligatory trading 
partner.1482 However, the CADE maintains that it would be possible to sanction an undertaking 
for abuse of superior bargaining power, as the “claim could be based on any of these effects / 
purposes, even though there is not a clear definition of the infraction”.1483 Article 36 of the 
Brazilian Competition Act indeed provides a non-exhaustive list of violations, thus leaving 
room for miscellaneous infringements including abuse of economic dependence.1484 However, 
CADE has been careful to not intervene in the freedom of contract, in relation to conduct within 
the sphere of private relations. In 2009, for instance, CADE analysed whether AMBEV had 
imposed quotas, engaged in resale price maintenance with its distributors and sold directly to 
supermarkets, among other practices.1485 CADE decided that there was no infringement related 
to the distribution network, since those were private matters and discontinued the proceedings.  
 Looking at the express violations in Article 36, it seems possible to subsume abuse of 
economic dependence under “arbitrary increase of profits” (indent III), since it operates 
independently of a “restraint of free competition” (indent I), control of the relevant market 
(indent II), or abuse of dominance (indent IV). In practice, however, CADE has been quite 
reluctant to refer to this indent to base infringements in general. 
                                                          
1481 For this argument, see M. Wakui and T.K. Cheng, ‘Regulating Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position under 
the Japanese Competition Law: An Anomaly or a Necessity?’ (2015) 0 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, 27-
31. 
1482 ICN, ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position’ (2008) 10. 
1483 ibid 12.  
1484 “The acts which under any circumstance have as an objective or may have the following effects shall be 
considered violations to the economic order, regardless of fault, even if not achieved: 
I - to limit, restrain or in any way injure free competition or free initiative;  
II - to control the relevant market of goods or services; 
III – to arbitrarily increase profits; and 
IV - to exercise a dominant position abusively”. 
1485 PA 08012.004363/2000-89, decided on 28 October 2009. 
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Abuse of economic dependence could also be regarded as an abuse of a dominant 
position. However, the Brazilian Competition Act maintains a structural interpretation of 
dominance,1486 such that economic dependence or superior bargaining power vis-à-vis a trading 
partner alone seems insufficient. Correspondingly, while CADE has already examined cases 
dealing with abuse of economic dependence and has reasoned about the connection between 
dependency and market power, no infringement has ever been found based exclusively on 
economic dependence, devoid of general market conditions. As Berardo and Becker state, 
“CADE highlighted that dependency, i.e. one seller depending exclusively or almost exclusively 
on purchases made by one purchaser, does not in itself necessarily correspond to buying 
power, which obviously depends on aggregate market output and purchases”.1487 
Likewise, India has no specific rules on abuse of economic dependence or superior 
bargaining power. However, contrary to Brazil, Indian competition law give a broader 
definition of a dominant position, which includes non-structural factors. According to the 
Explanation of Article 4 of the Indian Competition Act, in considering a dominant position, the 
Competition Commission shall take into consideration, amongst other factors, the economic 
power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors, the dependence of 
consumers on the enterprise, and countervailing buyer power.1488 Indeed, the CCI has clarified 
that “the market share of an enterprise is ‘only one of the factors that decides whether an 
enterprise is dominant or not, but that factor alone cannot be decisive proof of dominance”1489. 
In a number of cases before it, the CCI has identified the existence of unequal bargaining power 
                                                          
1486 Article 36 § 2 of the Brazilian Competition Act: “A dominant position is assumed when a company or group 
of companies is able to unilaterally or jointly change market conditions or when it controls 20% (twenty percent) 
or more of the relevant market, provided that such percentage may be modified by Cade for specific sectors of the 
economy”.  
1487 Jose Carlos da Matta Berardo, and Bruno Bastos Becker,  in Pierre Kobel, Pranvera Këllezi and Bruce 
Kilpatrick (eds), Antitrust in the Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility 
(2015) 101. 
1488 Article 4 Explanation (a) defines dominant position as follows:  
 “a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables it to— 
(i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or 
(ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour”.  
In considering dominance, the Competition Commission has to take into consideration, as for Art. 19(4), the 
following factors: 
(a) market share of the enterprise; 
(b) size and resources of the enterprise; 
(c) size and importance of the competitors; 
(d) economic power of the enterprise including commercial advantages over competitors; 
(e) vertical integration of the enterprises or sale or service network of such enterprises; 
(f) dependence of consumers on the enterprise; 
(g) monopoly or dominant position whether acquired as a result of any statute or by virtue of being a Government 
company or a public sector undertaking or otherwise; 
(h) entry barriers including barriers such as regulatory barriers, financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing 
entry barriers, technical entry barriers, economies of scale, high cost of substitutable goods or service for 
consumers; 
(i) countervailing buying power; 
(j) market structure and size of market;  
(k) social obligations and social costs; 
(I) relative advantage, by way of the contribution to the economic development, by the enterprise enjoying a 
dominant position having or likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition; 
(m) any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant for the inquiry”. 
1489 Mr Ramakant Kini v Dr L H Hiranandani Hospital, Powai, Mumbai, Case No.39 of 2012, 14. 
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between parties to contracts,1490 whereas in several other cases parties themselves have pressed 
this principle.1491 Regardless, however, CCI has not specifically addressed superior bargaining 
power issues in its orders until now.    
Somewhat similarly, Article 17 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) (中华人民
共和国反垄断法) provides that the assessment of the existence of a dominant position depends 
on many factors, beyond market shares, such as the extent to which other undertakings rely on 
the undertaking in question, thus indirectly referring to situations of economic dependence1492. 
Until now, however, to our knowledge there have not been any cases implementing the 
dependence perspective in interpreting Article 18 AML. 
Nonetheless, explicit incorporation of abuse of superior bargaining power provisions is 
debated currently both with respect to the AML as well as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.1493 
An amendment of the AML was initiated in 2015 by the National Development and Reform 
Commission; one of the main issues touched upon by the amendment is whether the provision 
on superior bargaining power should be added to the AML. The draft amendment (to which 
SAIC contributed) was published by the Legislative Affairs Office of the Administration in 
February 2016 for public consultation.  
The inclusion of a provision to govern superior bargaining power into the AML has 
long been suggested by the majority of Chinese scholars and the recent amendments ignited 
again the debate. Most Chinese scholars support the view that superior bargaining power (SPB) 
should be regulated by Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML),1494 although some are more 
critical.1495  
With respect to the inclusion of abuse of economic dependency (or of superior 
bargaining power), Russian general competition law seems to follow an approach similar to 
Brazil. In principle, Article 10 of the Competition Act makes it possible to sanction certain 
forms of abuse of economic dependence by dominant undertakings, such as imposing 
contractual terms unprofitable for the counteragent, unjustified production reduction, and 
unjustified refusal to deal.1496 
                                                          
1490Belaire Owners’ Association Vs. DLF Limited, HUDA &Ors. (Case No. 19/2010) – Abuse of Dominant 
Position in Real Estate Industry.  
1491 M/s Rajarhat Welfare Association &Anr.  v/s DLF Commercial Complexes Ltd. &Ors. (Case No. 10 of 2011 
, Dated: 25.05.2011) at Para 2.6; Case No. 13 & 21 of 2010 and Case No. 55 of 2012 at par 5.24. 
1492 Article 10, SAIC Rules on Abuse of Dominance; Article 18, NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly Conduct. 
1493 With regard to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, see section 3.3.6 below. 
1494 See, for instance, Prof. Yanbei MENG 孟雁北：《滥用相对经济优势地位行为的反垄断法研究》，载《
法学家》2004 年第6 期 ; Prof. Shiying XU, http://qiduojun.csu.edu.cn/shichangguizhifa/512.html (explaining 
that that Article 18 AML should offer the basis for relevant regulation); and Dr. Qiang YU 
(http://www.cqvip.com/qk/89400a/201604/74909067504849544852484856.html), arguing  that it is necessary to 
apply anti-monopoly law to superior bargaining power because, firstly, abuse of a superior bargaining power 
distorts the product value chain and, finally, leads to higher prices or a decline in product quality.  
1495 For example Prof. Jian Li, 
(http://xdfx.chinajournal.net.cn/EditorCN/WebPublication/paperDigest.aspx?paperID=XDFX200503014&isCn
ki=ck01) argued that the theory SPB has major defects, and its inclusion into competition law will produce 
negative implications to the theoretical analysis and legal practice for both antitrust law and unfair competition 
law, resulting in theoretical and practical chaos. 
1496 Article 10 Competition Law:  
“[…] 3) imposing contractual terms upon a counteragent which are unprofitable for the latter or not connected 
with the subject of agreement (economically or technologically unjustified and (or) not provided for directly by 
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 However, as in Brazil, the concept of dominance is to a large extent interpreted with 
respect to the structure of the market as a whole, taking market shares as a principal starting 
point.1497 Thus, the evaluation of bargaining power of market actors or the assessment of 
economic dependence that might be established between some of them, seems not to be a factor 
triggering the application of Russian competition law rules1498. Indeed, the Russian antitrust 
authority has confirmed that they reject the application of a notion of abuse of superior 
bargaining power of economic dependence independent from the analysis of the market power 
of the dominant firm, as “only a company(s) with substantial degree of market power can 
effectively exploit vertically integrated upstream and downstream trade partners and, therefore, 
general behavioral legal provisions for market dominant firms suffice”1499.  
 With respect to the food sector specifically, Article 13 of the Federal Law on the Basic 
Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation of 25 December 
2009, seems to leave open the possibility of abuse of economic dependence or superior 
bargaining power. Article 13 deals exclusively with the supply of food products and provides 
a list of conducts that may fall foul of competition regulation, some of which, such as creating 
and imposing discriminatory conditions to contractual counterparties, seem to operate 
independently from the assessment imposed by Article 5 of the Antimonopoly law.1500 Hence, 
                                                          
the Federal Laws, statutory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation, statutory legal acts of the 
Government of the Russian Federation, statutory legal acts of the authorized federal executive authorities or 
judicial acts, requirements for transferring financial assets, other property, including property rights, as well as 
consent to conclude a contract on conditions of including in it provisions, concerning the goods in which the 
counteragent is not interested and other requirements); 
4) economically or technologically unjustified reduction or cutting off the production of goods if there is demand 
for the goods or orders for their delivery are placed and there is possibility of its profitable production, as well as 
if such reduction or cutting off the production of goods are not provided for directly by the Federal Laws, statutory 
legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation, statutory legal acts of the Government of the Russian 
Federation, statutory legal acts of the authorized federal executive authorities or judicial acts; 
5) economically or technologically unjustified refusal or evasion form concluding a contract with individual 
purchasers (customers) in the case when there are possibilities for production or delivery of the relevant goods as 
well as if such a refusal or evasion is not provided for directly by the Federal Laws, statutory legal acts of the 
President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, authorized federal executive 
authorities or judicial acts”. 
 
1497 Article 5 of the Russian Antimonopoly Law: “The position of an economic entity (except financial 
organizations) is recognized as dominant:  
1) whose share in the certain goods market exceeds fifty per cent if only in the course of examination of the case 
of violation of the antimonopoly legislation or in the course of exercising state control over economic 
concentration it would be established that despite the excess of the aforementioned quantity position of the 
economic entity in the goods market is not dominant; 
2) whose share in the certain goods market is less than fifty per cent in case the dominance of this economic entity 
was established by the antimonopoly body proceeding from stable or subjected to insignificant changes share of 
the economic entity in the market as compared to the shares of its competitors in this goods market, opportunities 
for access to this goods market of new competitors, or proceeding from other criteria characterizing goods 
market”. 
1498 At first glance, the Russian competition law seems to be solidly based on structural underpinnings of the 
analysis of dominance. 
1499 ICN, ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position’ (2008) 17. 
1500 Article 13 of the Federal Law on the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian 
Federation:  
“Antimonopoly Rules for Economic Entities Involved in Trading Activities and Economic Entities Supplying 
Food Products 
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it may be possible to argue that, at least potentially, the FAS is enabled to deal with cases of 
abuse of economic dependence or superior bargaining power in the market of supply of food 
products. 
 South Africa does not have separate provisions on abuse of economic dependence, and 
maintains a structural definition of dominance based primarily on market shares.1501 However, 
merger assessment allows for a justification on public policy grounds. In considering whether 
a merger can or cannot be justified on public policy grounds, the South African Competition 
Commission must take into account “the effect that the merger will have on (a) a particular 
industrial sector or region; (b) employment; (c) the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and (d) the 
ability of national industries to compete in international markets.”1502 
 
Table 1: Abuse of economic dependence and abuse of superior bargaining power in BRICS 
                                                          
1. Economic entities, involved in trading activities for sale of food products through organization of a trade 
network, and economic entities, supplying food products to trade networks, are forbidden to: 
1) Create discriminatory conditions including: 
a) Preventing entry/exit of other economic entity to/from the market; 
b) Violating pricing procedures established by normative legal acts; 
2) Impose conditions upon a counteragent: 
a) On prohibiting the economic entity to enter into contracts for supply of food products with other economic 
entities involved in similar activities as well as other economic entities on similar or other conditions; 
b) On liability for failure to honor the obligations of the economic entity for supplies of food products on 
conditions that are better than conditions for other economic entities involved in similar activities; 
c) On providing information by the economic entity to the counteragent about contracts concluded by the 
economic entity with other economic entities involved in similar activities; 
d) On paying the fee by the economic entity, supplying food products, for the right to supply such goods to the 
economic entity, involved in trading activities through organizing a trade network, in operational or newly opened 
trading facilities; 
e) On paying the fee for changing the range of food products by the economic entity; 
f) On reducing the prices by the economic entity, supplying food products, to the level, when with mark-up 
(surcharge) added, the price shall not exceed the minimum price for such goods in the trade by economic entities 
involved in similar activities; 
g) On compensating damages by the economic entity, supplying food products, caused by loss of or damages to 
such goods after transfer of ownership for such goods, except when losses or damages were caused due to the 
fault of the economic entity, supplying such goods; 
h) On compensating the costs, not related to execution of the contract for supply of food products and further sale 
of a particular consignment of such goods, by an economic entity; 
i) On returning the food products that were not sold upon expiry of the designated period, to the economic entity 
that had supplied such goods, except when returning such goods is allowed or is provided for by the law of the 
Russian Federation; 
j) Other conditions if they contain essential signs of the conditions provided for by sub-clauses "а" - "i" of this 
Clause; 
k) Exercise wholesale trade under a commission agent agreement or a mixed agreement with elements of a 
commission agent agreement. 
2. An economic entity can present evidence that its actions (omissions) specified in Part 1 of this Article (except 
actions specified in Clause 2 Part 1 Article 1 of this Article) can be allowed under Part 1 Article 13 of No.135-FZ 
Federal Law “On Protection of Competition” of 26th July 2006 (further on referred to as the Federal Law “On 
Protection of Competition”)”. 
1501 Article 7 of the Competition Act, which reads: “A firm is dominant in a market if – (a) it has at least 45% of 
that market; (b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not have 
market power; or (c) it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.” Article 7(c) could theoretically 
be understood as including instances of relative market power and superior bargaining power. 
1502 Article 12A(3) of the Competition Act. 
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 Abuse of economic dependence 
without structural market power 
Superior bargaining power / 
Public policy 
Brazil No  No1503  
Russia No No1504 
India Yes (vis-à-vis consumers)1505 Yes1506 
China Potentially Potentially 
South Africa No Yes1507 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
3.3.4. Mergers and effects-based analyses integrating superior bargaining 
power generated unilateral effects 
 
The criterion of a “significant impediment of effective competition” in merger control also 
offers some flexibility in order to assess unilateral effects that may be provoked by superior 
bargaining power. In the Edeka case, concerning the proposed acquisition of Kaiser’s 
Tengelmann by Edeka, the Bundeskartellamt observed that although the target company had 
low market shares at the national level, in some regions, it was the strongest and closest 
competitor of the two major groups, Edeka and Rewe, with local and regional market shares 
between 10% and 30%.1508Moreover, on the procurement side the Bundeskartellamt researched 
11 procurement markets in various groceries. Edeka’s market share accounted for up to 35% 
depending on the procurement market, with Kaiser’s accounting for only 2-5%. However, 
Edeka was the strongest competitor of the three leading retailer groups – Edeka, Rewe and 
Scharz – already having a strong bargaining position in the procurement market. The merger 
would lead to the elimination of one of the few independent competitors, further increasing 
concentration of the demand structure. The resulting loss of competitive pressure and the 
increase of economic dependency of suppliers on the three leading retailer groups would 
furthermore be reinforced by the fact that Kaiser’s was a member of a purchasing cooperation 
which formed a direct alternative to the leading retailers for manufacturers. For these reasons, 
the Bundeskartellamt concluded that the acquisition of Kaiser by Edeka would have created a 
                                                          
1503 According to one of CADE’s spokesman, it would be however possible to take into consideration a case of 
superior bargaining power under the present regulation, see ICN, ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining 
Position’ (2008) 12. 
1504 Although Article 13 of the Federal Law "On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in 
the Russian Federation" of 25 December 2009, available here: 
http://en.fas.gov.ru/legislation/legislation_50728.html, applies standards not directly related to market 
dominance.  
1505 Article 4.2 (a)(f) Competition Act. 
1506 Article 4.2 (a) of the Competition Act. 
1507 Public policy exception, limited to mergers, see Article 12A.  
1508 Bundeskartellamt, Case B2-96/14 Edeka/Kaiser’s Tengelmann, available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/DE/Entscheidungen/Fusionskontrolle/2015/B2-96-
14.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. 
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significant impediment to effective competition (“SIEC”) despite the absence of dominance 
post-merger.. 
 The SIEC test does not require market dominance, thus allowing the authority to impede a 
merger also in cases of non-coordinated or unilateral effects resulting from the dissolution of 
an important competitor. These effects have to be evaluated for both the downstream and the 
upstream markets. With particular reference to the procurement sector, the U.K. Competition 
Commission considered that the further imbalance of the bargaining positions created by the 
merger may lower the “levels of investment in new products or manufacturing techniques” and 
produce “adverse effects on product innovation and diversity.”1509 Moreover, in more than one 
occasion, the EU Commission has warned against the possible anticompetitive effects that 
superior buyer power may create in the downstream sector, due to the discounts that the new 
merged entity is able to obtain to the detriment of competitors.1510 
 European antitrust authorities have engaged with several other potentially anticompetitive 
effects following an abuse of superior bargaining power, such as “waterbed effects” or 
“spiraling effects,”1511 or the foreclosure and collusive effects caused by category 
management1512 or by slotting allowances.1513 The recent study commissioned by the European 
Commission on The Economic Impact of Modern Retail also raises the possibility that retail 
concentration at local level may produce negative aggregate dynamic effects, through the 
reduction of the incentives of suppliers to innovate.1514 
 In the US, considerations of bargaining power have been paramount in several merger cases. 
For instance, in ProMedica the FTC blocked the merger between ProMedica, a major health 
care system in Ohio and a local community hospital. Post-merger ProMedica would have a 
market share of 58.3% in the acute-care inpatient service market and 80.5% in the inpatient 
obstetrical services market. The district court examined the effects on competition with 
significant emphasis to the bargaining leverage resulting from the merger, noting that “the 
respective degrees of bargaining leverage are determined by how each party would fare if no 
agreement were reached […] Failure to reach an agreement depends on the hospital’s and 
                                                          
1509 UK Competition Comm, Safeway plc Inquiry, 2003, § 1.22(d). 
1510 See, for instance, EC Commission, Carrefour/Promodes, COMP M/16847, 2 December 1999; Kesko/Tuko 
IV/M.78420 November 1996. 
1511 Both analysed by the Bundeskartellamt Food Retail Sector Inquiry, 25; Autorité de la concurrence, Opinion 
Concerning the Joint Purchasing Agreements in the Food Retail Sector, 56. The “waterbed effects” may result 
from a merger downstream which leads to marginal costs reductions and lower input prices for the merged entity, 
which sees its output rising, while at the same time raising the input prices of the merged entity’s competitors, 
leading to an adverse effect on final consumers. On the “waterbed effects,” see, R. Inderst and T. Valletti, Buyer 
Power and the “Waterbed Effect” (2011) 59(1) Journal of Industrial Economics, 1-20; P. Dobson and R. Inderst, 
Differential Buyer Power and the Waterbed Effect: Do Strong Buyers Benefit or Harm Consumers? (2007) 28(7) 
ECLR, 393-400; A. Majumdar, Waterbed Effects and Buying Mergers, CCP Working Paper 05-7 (2007). 
1512 Finnish competition authority, Study on Trade in Groceries, 26. 
1513 Italian Competition Authority, Market Investigation in the Retail Sector, 133. 
1514 European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the 
EU Food Sector, (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf, 36. 
However, the study also found that “a large imbalance away from suppliers and towards modern retailers was 
generally found to be associated with more innovation, reflecting in particular the finding that greater supplier 
concentration was associated with less innovation,” although it was also noted that the Member States in the 
sample did not include those with the highest level of national retailer concentration. The methodology of 
measuring the level of innovation followed in this study was also quite narrow as innovation essentially referred 
to the introduction of “new EAN products” (EAN being European Article Number). 
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health plan’s respective “walk-away” points.”1515 It also considered the relevance of 
ProMedica’s relative bargaining power toward particular trading partners, noting that “a 
hospital may have greater bargaining power with respect to some of its services by virtue of 
the attractiveness of its offerings and/or the lack of alternative providers for those services. […] 
A hospital with enhanced bargaining power for certain services can also exploit the bargaining 
power across additional services, leading to higher rates for any number of the hospital’s 
services.”1516 The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the anti-competitive effect of the 
merger and the FTC’s divestiture order.1517 
 The SIEC test is not the only mechanism to integrate superior bargaining power in the 
assessment of mergers and acquisitions. In South Africa, superior bargaining power was taken 
into account in the Wal-Mart/Massmart case via the public interest provision in the 
Competition Act.1518 In September 2010, Wal-Mart announced that it intended to acquire a 
controlling interest in Massmart, a wholesaler and retailer in South Africa. Wal-Mart had no 
presence in South Africa and Massmort had a market share of at most 25% of certain segments 
of the relevant market and was smaller than the two key competitors, Checkers and Pick n Pay. 
While the South African Competition Commission initially cleared the merger without 
conditions,1519 on appeal the CAC identified several public interest concerns as a result of Wal-
Mart’s enormous global purchasing power. The CAC considered there was a threat of loss of 
sales and employment by local supplies as Massmart would have incentive to make use of Wal-
Mart’s global procurement network, substituting local supplies for imported supplies. 
Notwithstanding the limited structural market power, the global value chain dimension of the 
case would result in superior bargaining power of Massmart post-merger vis-à-vis small, 
medium and micro sized suppliers. The CAC held that the public interest provision in the 
Competition Act should not be used as a surrogate for industrial policy and subjected the 
merger to the condition that a solution should be identified to counteract the merger-specific 
risks of the transaction, particularly the impact on local small, medium and micro producers 
and their interactions with the global value chain of the merged entity.1520 
 In conclusion, distortion of negotiations via abuse of superior bargaining position may 
happen at any node of the value chain and may take different forms. The NCAs have started to 
analyse how and to what extent superior bargaining power can distort competition and to 
develop tools and methods for its measurement. 
 
3.3.5. Dealing with Superior Bargaining power outcomes (price discrimination) 
via specific legislation of general application (not “mainstream” competition 
law)  
 
                                                          
1515 FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., 2011-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,395 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011), paras 
52-53. 
1516 Ibid para 67. 
1517 ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. F.T.C., 2014 WL 1584835 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014). 
1518 Article 12A of the 1998 Competition Act. 
1519 Commission case number: 2010Nov5445. 
1520 Competition Appeal Court: 110/CAC/Jun11 and 111/CAC/Jun11 (9 March and 9 October 2012). 
406 
 
Vigorous competition can depend on charging different prices to customers. Buyer-induced 
price discrimination can harm consumer welfare by limiting choice, raising rivals’ costs, 
lowering incentives to compete and serve consumers, and enhancing market power. Buyers can 
induce price discrimination without market power, to the extent that they have bargaining 
power in a particular transaction. Much of the discussion in the U.S. concerning price 
discrimination has centered on whether a plaintiff must allege injury to competition, and what 
that might entail. Courts may presume injury in vertical cases, and even when plaintiffs must 
establish the fact, they need only show the diversion of sales or profits. The Supreme Court has 
narrowed the claim by requiring rivals to compete for the same customer1521.  
The Act June 19, 19361522, also known as the Robinson-Patman Act (RP Act), 
introduced a ban on price discrimination in the American antitrust regulation. The Act forbids 
price differentiation for goods of like grade or quality sold to competing buyers. By the mid-
1930s the trend toward vertical integration was on the rise and the hostility against 
concentration, especially in the retail sector, raised in parallel1523. It was the eve of the Great 
Depression, which hit particularly hard on small businesses. This added to the fact that for 
many the Clayton Act was not well equipped to protect smaller retailers from the buying power 
of large concentrated retailers and, therefore, it was necessary to “curb and prohibit all devices 
by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their 
greater purchasing power.”1524. The U.S. Congress enacted the price discrimination laws in 
response to two perceived threats to competition. The first threat involved the ability of large 
suppliers to price discriminate on a regional basis and thereby underprice, weaken, and 
ultimately eliminate local competitors. The second threat focused on the ability of large buyers 
to negotiate materially lower prices from suppliers relative to smaller rivals, the result of which 
could suppress competition.1525 While Congress did not link fairness concerns to Neoclassical 
Price Theory, undertakings cannot price discriminate in perfectly competitive markets.1526 
Paradoxically, while the Act was at least partially targeted at price discrimination 
induced by large buyers negotiating more favourable terms with their SME suppliers, the RP 
Act only contains one section on the liability of buyers. § 2(f) prohibits the knowing 
inducement or receipt of discriminatory prices, but this liability is generally derivative, 
requiring first a preliminary finding of seller liability.1527 For this reason, § 2(f) can hardly be 
used to combat industry-wide price discrimination where downstream companies possess 
superior bargaining power vis-à-vis all or most suppliers, as the supplier would typically have 
a meeting competition-defence.1528 
                                                          
1521 See infra … 
1522 15 USC 13 (2012) (unofficial date by which Act is current), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscprint.html. 
1523 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870-1970 (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 222. 
1524 FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960). 
1525 Joseph P. Bauer & Earl W. Kintner, The Robinson-Patman Act: A Look Backwards, A View Forward, 31 
ANTITRUST BULLETIN 571, 579 (1986), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335063.  
1526 See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law & Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern 
Economies: Time for Reconciliation? p. 16, Research Paper No. 08-21, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1188722. 
1527 D.E. Ray, ‘Buyer Liability Under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act’ (1981) 15 University of Richmond 
Law Review 547. 
1528 Cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 78 (1979). 
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The Robinson-Patman Act purportedly filled a void left by the Sherman Act.1529 To 
apply, the Sherman Act requires an agreement between two or more persons, or the existence 
or likelihood of monopoly power. The RP Act can remedy and deter unilateral pricing that 
causes anticompetitive or unfair results in the absence of monopoly.1530 The Act does not aim 
solely to promote efficiency. Congress sought to help small businesses, as a source of social 
and political welfare in society. Yet the Act does not shield small businesses from the price-
cuts that larger undertakings can effectuate because of scale economies or efficiencies in 
operation or distribution.1531 An undertaking will charge different prices because it can, due to 
market power, or because higher costs associated with conducting business dictate charging 
higher prices to a particular set of customers.1532 
Courts have interpreted the RP Act to address price differences, not necessarily 
economic price discrimination, which occurs when an undertaking earns varying rates of return 
selling to distinct customers. The undertaking sets a different ratio of price to marginal cost on 
different sales.1533 American courts have carved out from the Act two different types of price 
differences. The firsts, also called primary-line cases, entail a differentiation of prices through 
discounts among competing sellers1534 and it is generally the result of predatory pricing1535. 
Secondary line cases are instead the result of a discrimination among the seller’s customers, 
for which some are ‘favored’ and other ‘disfavored’ according to the pricing conditions of the 
seller1536. 
The Act provides two affirmative defenses. § 2(a) sets-out a cost defense, while § 2(b) 
institutes a meeting competition defense. The cost defense arises more frequently because of 
its link to efficiency. The defense allows suppliers to pass-on to buyers cost savings realized 
due to the buyer’s efficiency. A seller can avoid liability by demonstrating that it “had a higher 
                                                          
1529 The RP Act does not address promotional services squarely. Plaintiffs have attempted to avoid the competitive 
injury requirement and defenses applicable under § 2(a) by arguing that courts should evaluate certain promotional 
services under § 2(e). The FTC has argued that for § 2(e) to apply, a “seller must offer [a] special package size 
primarily to convey a promotional message.” Brief of Amicus Curiae the Federal Trade Commission in Support 
of Defendants-Appellants & Reversal, Woodman’s Food Market, Inc. v. The Clorox Co. & Clorox Sales, No. 15-
3001, pp. 3, 9 (7th Cir. 2015). The issue can arise under § 2(a) and the meeting competition defense, since 
companies might argue that they did not price discriminate and that they provided the same value to customers 
even if the company charged different prices, to the extent that promotional assistance accounted for the shortfall. 
See Richard M. Steuer, Crossing the Streams of Price & Promotion Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 27(1) 
ANTITRUST 64, 65, 67 (Fall 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184291.   
1530 See Bauer & Kintner, supra n.3 at 587-88. 
1531 Id. 588-89. 
1532 E. Thomas Sullivan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Howard A. Shelanski & Christopher Leslie, Secondary-Line 
Differential Pricing & the Robinson-Patman Act, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2013-138, p. 15, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2319067. 
1533 Id. at p. 1. For price discrimination to apply, § 2(a) states that different prices must apply to products of “like 
grade or quality”. In FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FTC can 
determine grade from product characteristics rather than consumer preferences. The Court found the requirement 
satisfied because Borden was selling identical milk at different prices simply based on whether the milk carried 
the Borden label or a private label. Sullivan et al., supra n.8 at pp. 35-36. 
1534 D Daniel Sokol, ‘Analyzing Robinson-Patman’ (2015) 83 The George Washington Law Review 264, 2070. 
1535 See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 176 (2006): "Primary-line cases 
entail conduct-most conspicuously, predatory pricing-that injures competition at the level of the discriminating 
seller and its direct competitors.". 
1536 Id.: "Secondary-line cases ... involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating 
seller's customers ...; cases in this category typically refer to 'favored' and 'disfavored' purchasers."  
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marginal cost with respect to the disfavored buyer than [it] did for the favored buyer.”1537 The 
defense creates an incentive for buyers to enhance productive efficiency, as they strive to earn 
individual discounts that might follow from such cost savings.1538 
Courts have interpreted the Robinson-Patman (RP) Act to require a low threshold for 
competitive harm. A plaintiff can establish price discrimination with evidence of a mere price 
difference. 
The existence of price discrimination does not extensively reveal the health of 
competition in a particular market, but only that perfect competition does not exist, which 
hardly indicates the presence of monopoly power.1539 Even if price discrimination weakens or 
excludes a rival, intensified competition can produce identical consequences.1540 
The meeting competition defense may apply haphazardly or invite collusion, since a 
defendant first must ascertain whether a rival has offered a lower price.1541 A seller may call 
upon the defense only when it has a good faith belief that a rival has offered a discount below 
its asking price to a particular customer. Sellers cannot rely on mere rumors of price 
concessions.1542 The seller can establish a good faith belief by gathering documentary evidence, 
market data, and assessing the reasonableness of the claim in terms that include the seller’s 
previous experience with particular buyers.1543 Courts do not want sellers verifying price quotes 
with rivals, since secrecy encourages competition and contributes a critical obstacle to rivals 
stabilizing industry prices.1544 
Critics also have argued that the Act features disproportionate remedies. The Federal 
Trade Commission can secure “broad injunctive relief of long duration,” and private parties 
can recover treble damages.1545 Non-dominant companies may respond by refraining from 
pricing activities that generally benefit consumers.1546 
In particular, the Act likely inhibits three common instances of procompetitive price 
discrimination: (1) price reductions to select customers in oligopolistic markets; (2) price 
reductions offered in new territories to facilitate entry; and (3) discounts targeted at distributors 
that operate efficiently or that innovate.1547 
With the first instance concerning oligopolistic markets, an undertaking might earn 
additional profits by offering lower prices to an individual customer to win its business. The 
incentive to provide a lower price would dissipate, however, if the undertaking had to offer a 
                                                          
1537 Id., p. 38. 
1538 See Kirkwood, supra n.2, p. 38. 
1539 Cooper et al., supra n.44, p. 44.  
1540 Id., p. 49. In a footnote, the U.S. Supreme Court once stated that a plaintiff can establish competitive injury 
from price discrimination by showing the favored buyer “passed on” the discount by offering a lower retail price. 
Yet the pass-through does not indicate concentration in the supplier market, and pass-through invariably would 
occur in a perfectly competitive buyer market. See Alexei Alexandrov & Sergei Koulayev, Using the Economics 
of Pass Through in Proving Antitrust Injury in Robinson-Patman Cases, pp. 1, 13, (discussing J. Truett Payne, 
451 U.S. at __ n.4 (pin-cite not provided)), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555952.  
1541 See Bauer & Kintner, supra n.3 at 582. 
1542 See Sullivan et al., supra n.8 at pp. 43-44 (quoting U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, __ (1978) 
(pin-cite not provided)). 
1543 Id., pp. 44-45 (quoting U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at __ (pin-cite not provided)). 
1544 Id., p. 45 (quoting U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at __ (pin-cite not provided)). 
1545 Id. 582-83. 
1546 See id. 583. 
1547 Id. 
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general price reduction, because lower prices to all customers would curtail overall profits.1548 
In any event, rivals likely would match a market-wide price reduction, blocking the undertaking 
from gaining new customers. Critics have asserted that absent the RP Act, companies more 
frequently would lower prices selectively, which would initiate the competitive responses that 
would reduce prices economy-wide.1549 
In the second instance, to overcome brand loyalty and switching costs when entering a 
new market, an undertaking similarly may have to lower price below the market level or add 
promotional benefits, such as altering quantity or quality. The undertaking regularly could not 
recover the costs and reduced profits associated with lowering prices and altering product 
features across all markets in which it operates. In response to RP Act enforcement, the 
undertaking likely would expand more reticently.1550 
Thirdly, the ability to reward efficient distribution promotes competition among 
distributors, and between brands. Prohibiting vertical price discrimination deters 
experimentation and promotional activities downstream. It also can increase final prices, 
assuming an adequate pass-through rate from distributors to consumers.1551  
To bypass the prohibition on price discrimination and to ensure products qualify as 
differing grades and quality, undertakings wishing to expand production or to incentivize 
certain activities might differentiate their products inefficiently, ultimately placing upward 
pricing pressure on products.1552 Price discrimination laws allegedly further inhibit the 
bargaining process by preventing buyers from requesting price concessions that decrease retail 
prices.1553 A general consensus has formed in the United States that the RP Act often can shift 
the beneficiaries of enforcement “from consumers to less efficient competitors”.1554 Because 
Congress may have intended for the Act to serve this objective, courts risk defying the explicit 
will of Congress by interpreting the Act differently.1555 
Recognizing that the RP Act may not maximize societal welfare and to avoid conflict 
between the judiciary and the legislature, U.S. enforcement agencies precipitously have 
curtailed RP Act enforcement. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations through 1968, 
RP allegations accounted for 64.7% of all non-merger cases. That percentage fell to 5.1% from 
1968 to 1976 during the Nixon/Ford administrations, and has never increased again. Since the 
Reagan administration from 1981 to 1988, the enforcement percentage has hovered at, or 
reached, zero.1556 
                                                          
1548 See id. 584; see also Kirkwood, supra n.2 at p. 28 & n.100 (quoting Monahan’s Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, 
Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 527-28 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (“If suppliers must cut prices to all competing dealers or to 
none … they may well decide not to cut prices at all.”)). 
1549 Bauer & Kintner, supra n.3 at 584. 
1550 See id. 
1551 See id. 585. Price discounts to incentivize efficient dealer activity does not harm the less effective dealer and 
competition; rather, it structurally induces competition. Sullivan et al., supra n.8 at p. 25. 
1552 See id. 585-86. 
1553 Gifford & Kudrle, supra n.4 at p. 13. 
1554 Sokol, supra n.14 at 2066. 
1555 Id. 2082. 
1556 Id. 2072 & n.62 (citing Timothy J. Muris, How History Can Inform Practice in Modern U.S. Competition 
Policy, p. 10 (2004), http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working-papers/04-20.pdf). As of the late 
1980s, private litigants continued to file a multitude of Robinson-Patman claims, of which courts decided dozens 
of actions each year. Bauer & Kintner, supra n.3 at 607-608. 
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According to Hovenkamp “Almost any general policy of preventing price 
discrimination in oligopolistic markets would be socially harmful. Indeed, two of the most 
damaging effects of the Robinson-Patman Act are that it (1) makes cartel “cheating” more 
difficult by penalizing individual price cuts; and more generally, (2) destroys the incentive for 
oligopolists to compete more aggressively by pursuing marginal sales”1557. Moreover, he 
observes “A statute is not bad, however, simply because it manifests a distributive rather than 
an efficiency concern and requires consumers to pay the bill. Many statutes do that, and one 
function of the legislative process is to protect people whom the free market protects poorly”. 
He points out that the Robinson-Patman has failed to filfil its own objectives as it does not 
effectively protect small businesses, which (paradoxically) sometimes run afoul of the act, and 
because the act is often “quite hostile toward economic competition”1558. 
There are no specific statutes in the BRICS countries equivalent to the Robinson-
Patman Act, but in Russia Article 13 of the Federal Law on Basic Principles of State Regulation 
of Trading Activities potentially could have a somewhat similar effect, although this is 
speculative. 
 
3.3.6. Opening up the floodgates? Unfair commercial practices as a competition 
law issue 
 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was introduced by the Congress in 1914 and 
declares that the FTC has the power to condemn “unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce”1559. In addition 
to this already broad prerogative, based on the same Section 5, the FTC is also “empowered 
and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations (…) from using unfair methods 
of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce”1560. Hence, Section 5 provides an open-ended enforcement mandate to the FTC, 
which can condemn and also prevent the use of unfair methods of competition.  
The contingences of the first years of the 20th century led the Congress to assign the 
FTC more extensive powers1561. The authority of the rule of reason as applied in Standard Oil 
was harshly questioned by members of the Congress that intended to remedy to the perceived 
shortcomings of the Sherman Act vesting the Commission with ‘public policy’ powers1562 on 
the ground of it being an “administrative body under the control of the legislature”1563. By 
examining the legislative history of Section 5, Averitt came to the conclusion that “[t]he 
                                                          
1557 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice (2016) 774. 
1558 ibid 774–775. 
1559 15 USC § 45(a)(1). 
1560 15 USC § 45(a)(2). 
1561 “There are many forms of combination, and many practices in business which have been so unequivocally 
condemned by the Supreme Court that as to them and their like the statute is so clear that no person can be in any 
doubt respecting what is lawful and what is unlawful; but as the statute is now construed there are ... many other 
practices that seriously interfere with competition, and are plainly opposed to the public welfare, concerning which 
it is impossible to predict with any certainty whether they will be held to be due or undue restraints of trade”,  S. 
REP, No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., at xiv, see Neil W Averitt, ‘The Meaning of Unfair Methods of Competition 
in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act’ (1980) 21 BcL REv. 227, 232. 
1562 ibid 277. 
1563 ibid 299. 
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language of the statute was therefore made deliberately broad to provide, in all instances, for 
adequate protection against harms to competition”1564. The Congress intended to design an 
instrument which would be broad enough to be used ex ante, to prevent the monopolization of 
a market, whereas under the Sherman Act remedies were actionable only when monopolization 
had already taken place. Several other commentators echo this view observing that “section 5 
invites legislators to demand that the FTC attack conduct that escapes the reach of prevailing 
judicial interpretations of the other antitrust laws”1565. 
However, the legislative intent of the draftsmen has had limited impact on the 
discussion over the future of Section 5, given the polarization of the approaches in two main 
factions. 
Among to the advocates of the expansive approach to Section 5, there is who highlights 
the possibility to tackle ‘incipient’ harms to competition and other anticompetitive conducts 
which are now falling outside the Sherman Act. In particular, as for § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
this broader power could be used to overcome the limitation of the existence of a “contract, 
combination, or conspiracy”, leaving out of its scope other collusive practices such as parallel 
conducts in oligopolistic markets1566. Moreover, § 2 may be interpreted more similarly to what 
Article 102 TFEU is in the EU, in order to prosecute abuses of dominant position, rather than 
being restricted to conducts that monpolise the market1567. Lande also proposed to expand the 
reach of Section 5, however in a different way, which is by using the ‘consumer choice 
approach’1568. 
By contrast, an opposing view supports a restrictive interpretation of Section 5, mainly 
justified by the unpredictability of an otherwise too broad and undefined concept of unfairness. 
In particular, the then Commissioner Joshua Wright has in different instances proposed the 
adoption of an illegality test according to which, under Section 5, a practice “generates harm 
to competition as understood by the traditional antitrust laws and generates no cognizable 
efficiencies”1569. This author has urged the adoption of a principled approach to Section 5, 
warning against the danger that without a clarification on the interpretation, the FTC “can 
extract easy settlements whenever it desires by simply asserting that conduct is unfair”1570. In 
sum, he believes that the authority of the FTC under Section 5 should be confined within the 
limits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and should consider only economic efficiency effects 
within the consumer harm standard1571. However, the critics of such narrow interpretation of 
                                                          
1564 ibid 279. 
1565 William E Kovacic and Marc Winerman, ‘The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent Agency: 
Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness’ (2014) 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2085, 2093; Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘The 
Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act’ (2010) 62 Fla. L. Rev. 871, 3. 
1566 Hovenkamp, ‘The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act’ (n 177) 5. 
1567 ibid 12–14. 
1568 Robert H Lande, ‘Should Section 5 Guidelines Focus on Economic Efficiency or Consumer Choice?’ 4 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437966> accessed 21 July 2017; Neil W Averitt and 
Robert H Lande, ‘Using the" Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 
175. 
1569 Joshua D Wright, ‘Revisiting Antitrust Institutions: The Case for Guidelines to Recalibrate the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Authority’ (2013) 4 Concurrences 1. 
1570 ibid. 
1571 Joshua Wright, ‘Recalibrating Section 5: A Response to the CPI Symposium’ (2013) 12 Antitrust Chronicle 
<https://ideas.repec.org/a/cpi/atchrn/12.2.2013i=13042.html> accessed 21 July 2017; Wright, ‘Revisiting 
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Section 5 observed that this would go against the legislative intent of the draftsmen1572 and that 
this would translate “the § 5 proscription of “unfair methods of competition” into something 
like “methods of competition that fail to create even an iota of efficiency”1573. 
The case law does not provide any clear guidance on the interpretation of Section 5 
enforcement. While, for instance, in Brown Shoe the Supreme Court stated that the 
Commission has power to “arrest trade restraints in their incipiency”1574 and therefore had no 
obligation to prove future harm to competition1575, in Gratz it gave central importance to the 
anticompetitiveness of the conduct1576.  
Despite the broad formulation of the law, Section 5 cases are relatively scarce. 
Especially since the 1980s the FTC limited the application of Section 5 to conducts showing a 
strong deceptive, coercive or oppressive character1577. In other words, the FTC has exercised a 
high degree of self-restraint to the extent that some critics talked about under enforcement of 
the law and deviation from the Congress’s original intent1578.  
After a long debate over the meaning and interpretation of Section 5 FTC, in 2015 the 
Federal Trade Commission released the much-awaited Statement of Enforcement Principles 
Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Guidance 
paper)1579. The document is the result of a compromise1580 between those who wanted Section 
5 to be limited to economic efficiency1581 and those who instead advocated for a more 
expansive approach1582. Proponents of opposing views, however, converged at least on one 
ground, which was the necessity of clarifying the interpretation of Section 5. The Guidance 
paper, although particularly brief in its formulation, attempted at a clarification of the norm 
stating that:  
                                                          
Antitrust Institutions: The Case for Guidelines to Recalibrate the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 Unfair 
Methods of Competition Authority’ (n 181); Jan M Rybnicek and Joshua D Wright, ‘Defining Section 5 of the 
FTC Act: The Failure of the Common Law Method and the Case for Formal Agency Guidelines’ (2014) 1287 
George Mason Law Review <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496748> accessed 21 July 
2017. 
1572 Lande (n 180). 
1573 Albert Foer, ‘On the Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-Minded Goal of Antitrust’ (2015) 60 The 
Antitrust Bulletin 103, 4–5. 
1574 FTC v Brown Shoe Co, Inc, 384 US 316, 322 (1966). For other 'expansionist decisions', see Hovenkamp, ‘The 
Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act’ (n 177) 5, footnote 24. 
1575 Hovenkamp, ‘The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act’ (n 177) 4–5; Richard A Posner, ‘The 
Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective’ (2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 761, 766. 
1576 FTC v Gratz, 253 US 421 (1920). 
1577 Tim Wu, ‘’Section 5 and “Unfair Methods of Competition”: Testimony Before the Senate Antitrust 
Committee’ (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No 14-508; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper 
No 542 2016) ID 2760162 5 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2760162>. 
1578 ibid 2. 
1579 Federal Register, Vol. 80, No. 182, September 21, 2015. 
1580 Robert H Lande, ‘Joshua Wright: Embodying the Spirit of Bipartisanship’ 
<https://truthonthemarket.com/2015/08/25/joshua-wright-embodying-the-spirit-of-bipartisanship/>. 
1581 Wright, ‘Recalibrating Section 5’ (n 183); Rybnicek and Wright (n 183); Joshua D Wright, ‘Proposed Policy 
Statement Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act’ (US 
FTC 2013); Joshua D Wright and Angela Diveley, ‘Unfair Methods of Competition after the 2015 Commission 
Statement’ [2015] WThe Antitrust Source (October 2015); George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 
15-25; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 15-39. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2664953>. 
1582 Lande (n 180). 
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“In deciding whether to challenge an act or practice as an unfair method of 
competition in violation of Section 5 on a standalone basis, the Commission 
adheres to the following principles: 
• the Commission will be guided by the public policy underlying the antitrust 
laws, namely, the promotion of consumer welfare; 
• the act or practice will be evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of 
reason, that is, an act or practice challenged by the Commission must cause, or 
be likely to cause, harm to competition or the competitive process, taking into 
account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business justifications; and 
• the Commission is less likely to challenge an act or practice as an unfair 
method of competition on a standalone basis if enforcement of the Sherman or 
Clayton Act is sufficient to address the competitive harm arising from the act or 
practice.”.Firstly, the Commission has clarified what kind of public policy 
concern can be considered in enforcing Section 5, limiting the scope to 
consumer welfare. This is not a negligible limitation, as Section 5 was initially 
envisaged also as an instrument designed to protect a wider array of public 
interest concerns. The congressional debates reveal indeed that under Section 5 
the FTC has the power to consider social and political (public policy) issues, 
along with economic values1583. As reported by Averitt, the Commission was 
initially supposed to apply public policy powers by considering a number of 
legal, economic, commercial and social factors, such as courts decisions, 
academic papers, commercial customs and other ‘habits of trade’, 1584 thereby 
constantly updating its understanding of ‘unfair competition’ under Section 5.  
In this vein, Kovacic and Winerman observe that “[i]n theory, Section 5 had the 
potential to help make the Commission the preeminent vehicle for setting competition 
policy in the United States”1585. They indeed maintain that thanks to its distinctive 
research and data collection powers, and constant exposure to competition law 
problems, it would be the best placed to determine the “appropriate standards of 
liability”, give guidance to courts on how to “frame and apply antitrust rules”, and 
“develop apply and assess doctrine”1586. However, the actual formulation of the 
Guidance paper limits this power to set policy standards, tying the action of the FTC to 
the promotion of consumer welfare1587.  
                                                          
1583 Averitt (n 173) 283. 
1584 The public policy standard includes a number of factors, some of which were already listed by Senator 
Cummins during the Congressional debates “It will be the duty of the [Commission] to consult the decisions of 
the courts, the learning of the time, the custom of' merchants, the habits of trade, the writings of studious and 
thoughtful men, all of which go to make up our understanding of the words 'unfair competition.' It will be the duty 
of the commission to apply those words in that sense precisely as it is now, the duty of the court to apply the words 
'undue restraint of trade' in the sense in which we commonly understand that phrase” 51 Come. RFC. 13048 
(1914). 
1585 William E Kovacic and Marc Winerman, ‘Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act’ (2010) 76 Antitrust Law Journal 929, 932. 
1586 ibid. 
1587 Although this standard may potentially include a number of different economic and non-economic factors, 
see ICN, ‘Discussion Document “Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare’’”’ (2011) 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc857.pdf>; Albert A Foer and others, ‘The 
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Finally, the Guidance paper disposes that the Section 5 will be interpreted with 
an approach akin to the rule of reason, thus returning a central role to the harm to 
competition and to the competitive process1588. 
The actual formulation of Section 5, as interpreted by the Guidelines, still leaves 
some leeway to the FTC to condemn conducts which are de facto assimilated to an 
abuse of superior bargaining power. Once established the presence of an 
anticompetitive harm, it would be still possible for the FTC to challenge an act or 
practice as an unfair method of competition on a standalone basis, if the Sherman or 
Clayton Acts cannot address the anticompetitive harm arising from that conduct.  
At state level, there are a number of laws addressing specific abuses of superior 
bargaining power, such as the California’s Franchise Investment Law1589 and the 
Vehicle Code1590, or the New York’s Franchise Act1591 and the Franchised Motor 
Vehicle Dealer Act1592. At Federal level, on the opposite, there are no specific laws 
specifically dealing with such abuses. Thanks to the still broad powers envisaged by 
Section 5, the FTC may prevent and condemn some of the unfair conducts characterised 
by such abuses. Determining when an act is unfair under Section 5 is not as 
straightforward and the recent Guidelines do not clarify this point. The interpretation 
of ‘unfairness’ has been changing throughout the decades also according to the policy 
and general sentiment of the FTC and courts. In 1964, for instance, in the Cigarette 
Rule SBP, the FTC stretching the meaning of the word through extensive interpretation, 
decided that “an act or practice is "unfair": (I) whether the practice "offends public 
policy" as set forth in "statutes, the common law, or otherwise"; (2) "whether it is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous"; (3) "whether it causes substantial 
injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen)."”1593 The following 
decades, however, saw a succession of decision tending to narrower interpretation of 
the term1594. Despite the remaining uncertainty around the definition of ‘unfairness’ 
under Section 5, if there is harm to competition, the Commission could condemn abuses 
                                                          
Goals of Antitrust: Thoughts on Consumer Welfare in the US’ [2006] Chapters 
<https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/3692_21.html> accessed 29 July 2017; Gregory J Werden, ‘Consumer 
Welfare and Competition Policy’ in Josef Drexl, Wolfgang Kerber and Rupprecht Podszun (eds), Competition 
Policy and the Economic Approach, Cheltenham: Elgar (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011)..  
1588 Despite the narrowing of the scope of Section 5, Commissioner (now Acting Chairman) Maureen K. 
Ohlhausen published a dissenting statement on the basis of the fact that the Guidelines still leave too much 
uncertainty in the application of Section 5. 
1589 At: 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=CORP&division=5.&title=
4.&part=&chapter=&article=. 
1590 At: 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCde=VEH&division=2.&title=&
part=&chapter=6.&article=. 
1591 New York General Business Law §§680-95. 
1592 New York Vehicle & Traffic Law §§460-73. See for a comment and report of these State laws, Yee Wah 
Chin, ‘What Role for Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position Laws?’ (2016) 256 NYLJ 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2806417> accessed 31 July 2017. 
1593 J Howard Beales III, ‘The Federal Trade Commission’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection’ (2003) 22 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 192, 192–193. 
1594 Beales III (n 231). 
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of superior bargaining power, disregarding the analysis of monopolisation of the 
relevant market and the strict requirements of the Sherman Act. 
Based on this new ‘hype’ due to the discussion around its meaning, 
interpretation and enforcement, Section 5 may potentially find new life to complement 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, covering anticompetitive conducts that they actually 
fail to oversee, including anticompetitive abuses of superior bargaining power. 
In China, including of a prohibition of abuse of superior bargaining power in the Anti­
Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (AUCL) 中华人民共和国反不正
当竞争法 has been subject of recent discussion. On 25 February 2016, the Legislative Affairs 
Office of the State Council published the amended draft of the AUCL, in which the abuse of 
superior bargaining power as a prohibited act had been added. 
The draft amendment defines superior bargaining power as where “in a certain 
transaction, a business operator holds a comparatively advantageous position as to capital, 
technology, market access, sales channel and raw material purchase etc., which renders the 
trading counterparty to be  dependent on this business operator, (this manifested by) the 
difficulty (it has) to switch to other business operators”. Article 6 of the draft AUCL also 
identified five forms of abuse of superior bargaining power as unfair trade: (1). restricting a 
trading counterparty to certain trading partners without any justifiable reasons; (2). restricting 
a trading counterparty to designated products without any justifiable reasons; (3). restricting a 
trading counterparty to certain trading conditions when dealing with other operators without 
any justifiable reasons; (4). charging unreasonable fees or unreasonably requesting other 
economic benefits from trading counterparties; and (5). imposing other unreasonable 
conditions. 
However, most Chinese academics have argued against the incorporation of abuse of 
superior bargaining power into the AUCL, inter alia because this would fall under the scope of 
the AML and possible concerns about false positives.1595 In this regard, it is important to 
observe that the relations between the AUCL and the AML remain subtle at present. It seems 
unlikely that this amendment will ultimately become part of the revised AUCL. The proposed 
amendment of the AUCL was reviewed by the Chinese National People’s Congress for the first 
time in February 2017. When the Congress subsequently published the bill for public 
comments after the first reading, the regulation of SPR in Article 6 had been deleted.  
In India, unfair commercial practices may be taken into account in determining abuse 
of a dominant position. Article 4.2(a) of the 2002 Competition Act qualifies such abuse as 
imposing directly or indirectly unfair or discriminatory conditions or prices, which could 
address vertical restrictions of competition consisting of unfair contractual terms. 
                                                          
1595See e.g. the views of Guangyao XU 
(http://kns.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFQ&dbname=CJFDLAST2016&filename=JGLS20160
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(http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=1510167962&Db=qikan). See, by contrast, Xianli WANG, 
who is in favour of regulating superior bargaining power under the AUCL because “in practice it is hard to regulate 
SPB-abuse according to the clause of AML and SPB is basically the same with dominant position” 
(http://law.sjtu.edu.cn/Detail17930.aspx). 
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3.3.7. Status-based protections of specific groups from superior bargaining 
power competition law 
 
Farmers and SMEs are particularly affected by instances of superior bargaining power in light 
of global value chains, international distribution networks and high levels of concentration 
upstream as well as downstream. Based on three UNCTAD market studies of agricultural 
markets in developing countries, Ulla Schwager noted that the farming sector is fragmented, 
with only a few large and medium-sized producers and a large number of small businesses. 
High levels of concentration are present in downstream markets (manufacturing, distribution, 
and retail) and also in upstream input markets, such as fertiliser and crop suppliers.1596 It has 
been argued that competition law should specifically address the freedom of competition of 
farmers, particularly in developing countries, as this could be of higher relevance than just 
protecting consumer welfare.1597 However, protecting farmers and SMEs may be an objective 
of competition law also outside developing jurisdictions in light of various instances of superior 
bargaining power and economic dependence as noted in the sections above. High levels of 
concentration are reported in various input markets also in the EU. For instance, a single 
company controls 45 percent of the wheat market in the UK; while 5 companies control 95% 
of the EU vegetable seed market. The maize seed sector, a vital part of the EU seed market is 
controlled by 5 companies whose collective market share amounts to 51.4%: the maize 
varieties of DuPont Pioneer accounting for a 12.2% market share, Syngenta for 11.5%, 
Limagrain for 9,7%, Monsanto for 8,95%, and KWS for 8,9%, from a total of 4975 maize 
varieties registered in the European Common Catalogue.1598 Further merger activity in the seed 
and other inputs markets will further weaken the bargaining position of farmers vis-à-vis 
suppliers. The rise of “contract agriculture”1599 has led farmers to enter into “take it or leave it” 
long-term exchanges with only a few companies controlling germplasm. This may reinforce 
their technological dependence vis-à-vis a small number of agro-chem companies, rendering 
switching to another (new) product or package of products particularly difficult, even if new 
entrants may offer more personalized service and products developed for local soils and 
climates.1600 
                                                          
1596 U. Schwager, ‘Competition Issues Affecting the Agricultural Sector in Selected Developing Countries: Key 
Findings From Selected UNCTAD Market Studies’ in M. Gal, M. Bakhoum, J. Drexl, E. Fox and D.Gerber (eds.), 
Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications For Competiton Law (Edward Elgar 
2015), 153-176,  referring to tobacco cultivation in Malawi, rice production in Nicaragua and corn production in 
Mexico. 
1597 See e.g., J. Drexl, ‘Consumer Welfare and Consumer Harm: Adjusting Competition Law and Policies to the 
Need of Developing Jurisdictions’, in M. Gal, M. Bakhoum, J. Drexl, E. Fox and D. Gerber (eds.), Economic 
Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 265-
295. 
1598 I. Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study commissioned 
by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament. 
1599 N. E. Hart, ‘The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of Concentration in Input Supply’ (2000) 18(1) 
Journal of Agribusiness 115-127; J. McDonald et al., ‘Contracts, Markets, and Prices: Organizing the Production 
and Use of Agricultural Commodities’ (2004) Agricultural Economic Report No. 837 9, available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/284610/aer8371.pdf. 
1600 See Ioannis Lianos with Dmitry Katalevsky, ‘Merger Activity in the Factors of Production Segments of the 
Food Value Chain: A Critical Assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto Merger’, CLES Policy Paper Series 2017/1. 
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Indeed, in several jurisdictions specific solutions addressing the application of 
competition laws have been put in place for certain sectors and in order to protect specific 
groups with a significant potential for being harmed by an exercise of superior bargaining 
power, in particular in the food sector. These groups may be farmers, small and medium 
undertakings (SMEs) (in particular suppliers) or final consumers. 
For instance, on the basis of Article 42 TFEU, the EU legislator set up an exception to 
the application of competition laws in the milk sector, allowing milk farmers to coordinate and 
act collectively in the market of supply, in order to improve their bargaining power1601. The 
Regulation also introduces specific safeguards which empower the NCAs and the Commission 
to intervene if these agreements have a negative impact on competition or SMEs in the dairy 
sector1602. This regulation argues that the imbalance of bargaining power in the dairy supply 
chain can lead to unfair commercial practices and that this is documented by an uneven price 
transmission along the supply chain1603. This, in turn, may endanger the well-functioning of 
the internal market. Surprisingly, therefore, the EC draws market-wide conclusions regarding 
a problem otherwise described as a non-structural and therefore occasional. 
Some jurisdictions have also chosen imaginative instruments to deal with some of the 
competition problems arising out of the power of multi-brand retailers, even if these do not 
dispose of market power.  
In its 2000 Grocery Report, the UK Competition Commission found that five leading 
supermarkets, each having at least an 8% share of grocery purchases for resale had sufficient 
buying power for a number of their practices adversely distorting competition in the supplier 
mainly but also retail markets for the supply of groceries. The UK Competition Commission 
remedied this competition concern by requiring each supermarket meeting the 8% criterion to 
give undertakings to comply with a Code of Practice addressing the anticompetitive conduct 
identified and an independent dispute resolution system.1604 The Groceries Supply Code of 
Practice (GSCOP), published by the UK Competition Commission (now the Competition and 
Markets Authority, CMA) in August 2009, provides that retailers may not require suppliers to 
pay for shelf space, although payments may be allowable for promotions of new product 
listings, where the payments are proportional to the risk incurred by the retailer in stocking the 
new line.1605 The GSCOP is the result of the UK Competition Commission’s investigation of 
the groceries market between May 2006 and April 2008. The Commission suggested the 
adoption of the GSCOP, an improved version of the existing Supply Code of Practice, together 
with an Ombudsman to ensure effective enforcement of the new provisions for suppliers and 
retailers.  
The GSCOP came into force in February 2010 and imposes legally binding obligations 
on the UK’s ten largest supermarket retailers – principally those with an annual £1 billion 
turnover (the so called ‘Designated Retailers’). The Grocery Code Adjudicator Act 2013 came 
into force on 25 June 2013, formally establishing the role of the Grocery Code Adjudicator. 
                                                          
1601 Regulation (EU) No 261/2012. 
1602 Article 126c. 
1603 Recital (5). 
1604 Competition Commission, Grocery Report 2000, Summary and Conclusions, paras 1.10–1.11.  
1605 GSCOP, Part 5, 12. See also, Competition Commission, A Report on the supply of groceries from multiple 
stores in the United Kingdom (2000). 
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The Adjudicator oversees the implementation and enforcement of the GSCOP, investigating 
whether a Designated Retailer has breached GSCOP and taking enforcement action by making 
recommendations, requiring information to be published, or imposing financial penalties if the 
investigation reveals a breach of GSCOP by a Designated Retailer and requiring a Designated 
Retailer to pay some or all of the costs of an investigation (including enforcement costs). 
Similar provisions have been added to the Irish draft code of Practice for Grocery Goods 
Undertakings, published in August 2009.1606 The Australian government has also recently 
announced that it had prescribed a new food and grocery code of conduct to address issues 
between grocery retailers and suppliers.1607 
In Italy, the legislator has decided to regulate in detail the contractual relationship 
between agricultural producers and business buyers. In particular, Article 62 of the law 27/2012 
establishes that business-to-business contracts of purchase of agricultural products have to be 
in written form and must contain a set of compulsory information about the parties and the 
object of the agreement. Article 62.8 of the law 27/2012 provides the Italian Antitrust Authority 
(ICA) the power to punish a conduct resulting in “an unwarranted exercise of bargaining 
power on the demand side at the expense of suppliers.”1608 Therefore, in addition to its power 
to intervene in cases of abuses of dominant position and economic dependence, the ICA can 
now intervene in commercial relationships of a vertical nature in the agro-food industry, even 
in the absence of a dominant position, provided that the contract produces an appreciable 
adverse effect on the market. Article 62.8, prohibits the stronger contracting party from 
imposing unfair conditions on the counterparty. This law, in particular, regards the form and 
content of contracts between undertakings in the food industry. Art. 62.8 targets indeed 
business to business contracts having as object the sale of agricultural products and foodstuff, 
prescribing that they “shall be in writing and shall indicate term, quantities, characteristics of 
the good, price, delivery mode and payment method”. This provision also identifies a number 
of prohibited conducts in trade relations between operators, such as the imposition of unfair, 
retroactive and discriminatory contractual conditions1609. On July 9, 2015, the ICA concluded 
the first procedure based on the application of Article 62.8, against the retailer Eurospin, for 
                                                          
1606 See, H Mullan, ‘Banning payments for slotting and shelf-space: Ireland set to follow the United Kingdom’s 
example’ [2010] 31 ECLR 151. 
1607 B Billson (Minister for Small Business) 2015, Grocery Code to improve relationships between retailers, 
wholesalers and suppliers, media release 2 March, Canberra. 
1608 ICA, Agri-foodstuffs: according to the Antitrust, the market power of the organized mass distribution getting 
stronger, conflicting relationships with suppliers and uncertain effects on consumers, IC43, available at 
http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-releases/2101-ic43-agri-foodstuffs-according-to-the-antitrust-the-
market-power-of-the-organized-mass-distribution-getting-stronger-conflicting-relationships-with-suppliers-and-
uncertain-effects-on-consumers.html. 
1609 Article 62.2: The following commercial practices are expressively prohibited: 
a) direct or indirect imposition of conditions on the purchase, on the sale or other conditions unduly burdensome 
or retroactive; 
b) application of substantially different conditions to different counterparties for the provision of comparable 
goods and services; 
c) subjecting continued business relations to the performance of obligations which have no connection, by nature 
or by commercial practice, with the objective of the contracts or relationships; 
d) a request for undue and unilateral performance obligations, not justified by the nature or content of the business 
relations; 
e) any other unfair commercial practice considered so taking into account the complex business relationships that 
characterise the food supply. 
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allegedly imposing upon its suppliers the half-yearly payment of two unjustifiably large sums 
which did not correspond to any service provided to them by the group.1610 The ICA concluded, 
however, that the business conduct put in place by Eurospin did not constitute an infringement 
of Article 62.8.  The contested contractual terms were indeed fairly negotiated and not imposed. 
Moreover, the ICA observed that the relative costs were proportioned to the service offered by 
Eurospin. 
Therefore, the ICA, besides its power to intervene in cases of abuses of dominant 
position, can now intervene in commercial relationships of vertical nature in the agro-food 
industry, different from an abuse of dominant position, provided that the contract produces an 
appreciable adverse effect on the market.  
In the context of the BRICS countries, most competition law regimes have no specific 
exemptions for the agro-food industry, with the exception of China. Competition law in Brazil 
does not include any a priori sectorial exclusions or exemptions.1611 Therefore, anti-
competitive conduct in the food sector is analysed no differently from other sector and 
irrespective of the level of the chain or its vertical/horizontal nature. Also mergers in the food 
chain are scrutinised in the same way as all the other economic sectors, if they reach the 
turnover requirements of the law. Likewise, the Indian Competition Law Act does not contain 
any exemptions for the agro-food sector or agricultural co-operatives specifically.1612 While 
section 54 allows Central Government to exempt specific groups from the scope of the Act, 
this power has not been exercised in respect of agricultural co-operatives. Also Russian 
competition law currently does not set forth any specific exemptions from antitrust scrutiny for 
the agricultural sector. However, the FAS has explicitly pointed at the necessity of 
strengthening the bargaining position of farmers in contract negotiations.1613 Development of 
agricultural cooperations has been consistently declared as one of the priorities of the state 
agricultural policies in general, as well as of the FAS priorities in agricultural sector.1614 
Agricultural cooperations are exempted from the restrictions imposed by Article 14 of the 
Federal law “On the Trading Activities” on dominant retail chains whose market share exceeds 
25% in the relevant geographic market.1615 Agricultural cooperatives also receive state support 
                                                          
1610 Italian Competition Authority Eurospin Italia S.p.A. decision No. 25551 of 9 July 2015. 
1611 There are, however, some particularities of regulated sectors such as telecommunication; oil and gas; 
electricity; surface, civil and air transportation; and health. See OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil - A 
Peer Review (OECD Pub 2010). In the case of banking, there is a pending discussion in the Supreme Court of 
whether the Central Bank would be the authority with exclusive competence to analyse mergers in the financial 
sector. 
1612 Agricultural co-operatives are included in the definition of ‘person’ in the Indian Competition Act. See Article 
2(l)(v) ‘an association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India; 
2(l)(viii) ‘a co-operative society registered under any law relating to cooperative societies’; and 2(l)(x) ‘every 
artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses’. 
 
1613 FAS press release dated 20.05.2016, http://fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=45796. 
1614 ‘Strategy of the Sustainable Development of the Agricultural Territories of the Russian Federation to 2030‘ 
adopted by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 02 February 2015 N151-r; FAS press 
release dated 27.02.2017 at http://fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=49039. 
1615Paragraph 1 Article 14 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. Article 14 prohibits food retail chain 
whose market share exceeds 25% of the volume of all food products sold during the previous year in the territory 
of the region or local district to acquire or lease additional premises for trading within the relevant territory on 
any ground, including commissioning of new objects. 
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in the form of subsidies provided from the federal and regional budgets for development of 
technical infrastructure, acquisition of equipment, organising of distributing and logistics 
centers, etc. As a result, the number of agricultural cooperatives has increased from 2006 to 
2013 by five times and as of 01 January 2014 amounted to 6913.1616 
 By contrast, China has a broad, though not unlimited, exemption for actors in the agro-
food sector. Article 56 AML provides that the AML does not apply to the association or 
cooperation by agricultural producers or rural economic organizations “in their business 
activities of production, processing, sale, transportation, storage of farm products, etc”.1617 The 
competition law exemption for agro-food sectors generally refers to the provisions included in 
Chapter 2 of the AML, including Article 13 on anti-competitive collaboration between 
competitors, Article 14 on anti-competitive collaboration between suppliers and dealers, and 
Article 16, which prohibits industrial organisations to organise concerted anticompetitive 
practices. In addition, the departmental regulation Provisions against Pricing Abuse1618 反价
格垄断规, which was enacted pursuant to AML and primarily forbids anticompetitive pricing 
collaboration, price related administrative abuse, and pricing abuses, repeats Article 56 AML, 
negating the application of section 1 of Article 3: “a price fixing agreement reached by business 
operators”.1619  
While Chinese competition law offers exemptions for “association or cooperation by 
agricultural producers or rural economic organizations in their business activities of 
production, processing, sale, transportation, storage of farm products, etc”,1620 there is no 
exemption for the other three main areas that are governed by Chinese competition law, i.e. 
distribution cartels, merger control, and abuse of a dominant position. As regards superior 
bargaining power, as noted above it is not yet fully certain whether abuse of superior bargaining 
power to harm food production, distribution, and consumption constitutes an infringement of 
Chinese competition law in the first place, although the AML does not exclude this. Should 
abuse of superior bargaining power fall under the scope of Article 18 of the AML, it is also not 
yet known whether such abuse would also be subject to the competition law exemption for 
agro-food groups. 
 Notwithstanding the limited exemptions for agro-food groups provided in the BRICS 
countries, all in all the developments in various competition law jurisdictions indicate the 
emergence of a “fairness-driven competition law”1621, in particular in areas of social 
significance, such as the food sector, which breaks with the traditional apathy of competition 
law with vertical restraints. The allocation of the total surplus value of the vertical relation 
between the supplier(s) and the retailer(s) is usually considered by the proponents of the 
economic approach to competition law as a distributive justice issue that should not be of 
interest for competition law, but could eventually be dealt under other legal regimes, for 
                                                          
1616‘Strategy of the Sustainable Development of the Agricultural Territories of the Russian Federation to 2030’ (n 
84). 
1617 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
1618 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm 
1619 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm 
1620 Article 54 of AML. http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-
02/14/content_21917139.htm. 
1621 I. Lianos & C. Lombardi, forth. 
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instance contract law, unfair competition law etc.1622 Although it is clear that the competition 
policy followed with regard to vertical restraints has moved towards a more economic approach 
around the world, focusing on the effect vertical restraints have on economic efficiency, 
consumer welfare or the objective of market integration in the EU1623, some competition 
authorities have taken a broader perspective, espousing other goals than just economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare.1624 Our claim is that competition authorities should not only 
focus on restrictions on inter-brand or intra-brand competition, but also address restrictions of 
the vertical competition between the supplier(s) and the retailer(s), to the extent that a an 
unequal or unfair distribution of the surplus value across the various segments of the value 
chain may affect economic efficiency and the short-term as well as the long-term interests of 
the consumers, in particular if one of the parties disposes of a powerful market position 
upstream or downstream, even if this does not amount to a dominant position. Concerns over 
inequality and the role competition law could eventually play in this context1625 may also justify 
claims for a ‘fairer’ distribution of the total surplus value resulting from investments and 
innovation and for an increasing focus of competition law enforcement on the way the total 
value is allocated between the various segments of the vertical chain.  
 
3.3.8. Consumer protection 
 
Consumer protection in the food sector is mainly enacted by the establishment of safety 
standards. These safety standards cover: i) farmers’ production, including processes adopted 
and substances used for growing plants and feeding animals; ii) food processing; iii) food 
distribution; iv) labelling and information to consumers. Public regulation generally provides 
the legal framework in which private parties set an important number of private standards. 
Surveillance of compliance with the legislation is generally assigned to public regulators. 
For instance, in Brazil the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA) exercises 
health surveillance on the production and marketing of products and services, including 
                                                          
1622 See, for instance, the position of AG Van Themaat in Case C-161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia 
de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 414, noting that ‘the question whether or not a franchise agreement 
results in a fair division of costs and benefits as between franchisor and franchisee is not in itself relevant to the 
question whether Article [101(1) TFEU] is applicable’. 
1623 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para 7. 
1624 It is noteworthy that the protection of the ‘buyer’s freedom as regards choice of sources of supply” or the 
protection of competitors’ access to the market, are also among the elements considered as among the objectives 
of EU Competition Law: Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, 
para 26. See also, C-49/07 Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR 
I-4863, para 51 (‘A system of undistorted competition, such as that provided for by the Treaty, can be guaranteed 
only if equality of opportunity is secured as between the various economic operators’) and Opinion of AG J 
Kokott, Case C-49/07, para 100. In British Airways and Michelin II, confirmed by the European Courts, the 
European Commission’s decisions both found that rebate schemes (as well as being exclusionary and 
discriminatory) were ‘unfair’ to the affected travel agents and dealers: Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v 
Commission [2007] ECR I-2331; See also, Opinion of AG Kokott in C-95/04P; Case T-203/01 Manufacture 
française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission (Michelin II)  [2003] ECR II-4071, paras 110 and 240 (noting 
that as a result of its loyalty- inducing character, the quantity rebate scheme ‘limited the dealers’ choice of supplier 
and made access to the market more difficult for competitors’). Although this case law mainly concerns the 
implementation of Article 102 TFEU, it indicates that EU competition law enshrines a multi-value system of 
competition law. 
1625 See our analysis in Chapter 1. 
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technologies, processes and ingredients that pose health risks.1626 It has the power to regulate 
the importation of products and to perform sanitary inspections at the points of entry to the 
territory, to issue general regulations in the form of Resolutions and individual decisions to 
prohibit the sale of products, and to determine the recollection from the market of unsafe 
foodstuffs. Regulation includes, inter alia Resolution 26/2015 for foodstuffs labelling (which 
entered into force in 2016). The industry is now under an obligation to include information in 
clear language on all ingredients which may produce allergies. There has also been a public 
consultation on labelling related to lactose and lactose diet1627 and also a related children’s 
food, who may be oversensitive to some minerals.1628 
In Russia, food and health surveillance in the Russian Federation is implemented by the 
Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare 
(Rospotrebnadzor). As follows from Article 1 of the Provision on the Federal Service for 
Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Welfare Person, Rospotrebnadzor is 
responsible for the development and implementation of the state policy and normative legal 
regulation in the sphere of consumer protection, and for the development and approval of state 
sanitary epidemiological rules and hygienic standards. It is also responsible for the organization 
and implementation of the state sanitary-epidemiological surveillance and supervision in the 
field of consumer protection1629. 
In South Africa, the Department of Health is responsible for ensuring food safety. As 
part of its functions, it oversees the administration of food legislation, which includes 
publicizing regulations for food safety, labelling food, and evaluating risk assessments for the 
DAFF that are related to agricultural chemicals and food produced through biotechnology.1630  
South Africa’s food regulation is particularly vigorous with regard to GMO use, 
including contained use, trial release, commercial release, and transboundary movement. The 
primary legislation is the Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997 and its Regulations in 
addition to miscellaneous laws that impose further rules on GMO-related activities, including 
the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, the Consumer Protection Act, and 
the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act.1631 The Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries is responsible for promoting responsible GMO-related activities; limiting harm 
to the environment as well as to human and animal health; and establishing standards for 
conducting risk assessments for GMO-related activities.1632 Foodstuffs obtained through 
certain techniques of genetic modification are required to be labelled as such before they are 
put on sale in the marketplace. The Consumer Protection Act imposes additional labelling 
requirements. It requires that “[a]ny person who produces, supplies, imports or packages any 
prescribed goods must display on, or in association with the package or those goods, a notice 
                                                          
1626 http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/contact-us  
1627 http://www.brasil.gov.br/saude/2016/09/anvisa-ira-consultar-populacao-sobre-rotulagem-de-alimentos-com-
e-sem-lactose  
1628 http://www.brasil.gov.br/saude/2016/06/anvisa-abre-consulta-sobre-limite-toxicologico-em-comida  
1629Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 30, 2004 No. 322. URL: 
http://base.garant.ru/12136005/. 
1630 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
1631 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
1632 https://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/south-africa.php#_ftn6 
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in the prescribed manner and form that that discloses the presence of any genetically modified 
ingredients or components of those in accordance with applicable regulations.” 
 
Table 2: Overview of consumer protection standards in BRICS countries 
 
Brazil Consumer protection 
Legislation Consumer Protection Code, Law 8.078/90  
Institutions Consumer Protection and Defense Authority, Ministry of 
Justice 
Standards 50 standards regulating production, processing and 
retailing.1633 
 
 
India Consumer protection 
Legislation Consumer Protections Act, 1986 
 
 
Institutions Department of Consumer Affairs 
http://consumeraffairs.nic.in/consumer/index.php 
 
Standards 48 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.1634 
 
 
China Consumer protection 
                                                          
1633 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
1634 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
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Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of 
Consumer Rights and Interests (02-06-2006) 
Institutions State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/ 
 
Standards 49 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.1635 
 
 
South 
Africa 
Consumer protection 
Legislatio
n 
Consumer Protection Act (Act 68 of 2008) 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/other/2011/3/consumer_protection_act.p
df 
 
Institution
s 
Consumer Affairs Committee of The Department of Trade and Industry  
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ 
 
Standards 44 standards regulating production, processing and  retailing.1636 
 
 
 
Brazil Consumer protection 
Legislation Consumer Defence Code, 1990 (Law No. 8,078) 
 
 
                                                          
1635 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
1636 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
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Institutions Consumer and Protection Defense Department 
Standards Standards regulating production, processing and retailing.1637  
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
3.4. Beyond competition law: Superior bargaining power and the food value chain 
(contract law, unfair competition law) 
 
3.4.1. Contract law 
 
3.4.1.1. Foundations 
 
Classical contract law is based on the idea that each individual benefits from a private 
sphere in which its autonomy cannot be curtailed by the intervention of the state or other forms 
of coercion, no one having the authority to impose obligations or liabilities that have not been 
voluntarily assumed by the individual through contract. Freedom of contract assumed away 
power, the contract to which the individual expressly agreed to defining the contours of the 
individual’s obligations. Formalism in the interpretation of the provisions of such contract was 
thus the natural extension of the crucial assumption of the absence of power, and the fact that 
the contractual provisions represented the preferences and choice of the individuals that had 
consented to it. Courts were therefore to mechanically apply formal contract rules, thus 
protecting the individual's right to voluntarily engage in contractual obligations vis-à-vis other 
individuals. Such theoretical construction of the concept of contract was based on the 
understanding that the individuals engaging in these economic transactions supported by the 
legal contractual form did not dispose of the ability to impose their will on their contractual 
partners, something that would have denied the voluntary character of the transaction and 
consequently the inference that the contractual provisions were the pure result of their choice 
to enter into the specific economic transaction, and expressed their preferences as to the type 
of relation they wish to establish with their partner. This assumption of correspondence 
between choice, preferences and contractual freedom was crucially necessary as all 
transactions in a capitalist economy involved the creation of value, the joint surplus generated 
by such exchange/cooperation (we do not distinguish between the two concepts for the time 
being), and consequently raised the issue of the allocation of such value between the parties to 
the (contractual) transaction.1638  Neoclassical economics gave rise to what has been 
characterized as the era of “neoclassical contract”.1639 
                                                          
1637 See http://www.standardsmap.org. 
1638 Adam Smith 
1639  
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Both civil law and common law jurisdictions recognise the importance of bargaining power 
in a transaction. It is possible that during the formation or the subsequent execution of a 
contract, the party enjoying a superior bargaining power may force its counterparty to accept 
or implement terms of the contract that are unfavourable to its interests. In the food-retail 
sector, for instance, it may happen that supermarkets impose conditions, such as slotting 
allowances, slotting fees, pay-to-stay fees, shelf-placement fees, exclusive distribution, 
restrictions of sale, etc., which are detrimental to the supplier but that are nonetheless accepted. 
If the contract and the factual situation fulfil a number of strict conditions described by the law, 
the common law judge can annul or modify the unlawful contract terms. By the same token, in 
civil law jurisdictions, the judge can annul or, in some cases, modify the terms of the contract 
accepted under vitiation of the original intent of the parties. Although there is hardly any grand 
theory of “unequal” or “superior” bargaining power in contract law,1640 at several instances the 
various legal systems examined (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and 
Italy) include  
 
Table 2: Superior bargaining power theories in contract law 
 
Country Theory 
U.S. Equitable doctrines (such as (Estoppel, Undue influence, 
Unconscionability, Marshalling, Subrogation, Laches 
Hotchpot Equitable conversion1641) 
U.K. Equitable doctrines (Estoppel, Undue influence, 
Unconscionability, Marshalling Subrogation Laches 
Hotchpot Equitable conversion) 
Germany Good faith, mistake; duress; misrepresentation and the 
exceptio doli generalis 
France Good faith, mistake; duress; misrepresentation and the 
exceptio doli generalis, abuse of the right 
Italy Good faith, mistake; duress; misrepresentation and the 
exceptio doli generalis, abuse of the right 
Brazil Good faith; public interest; abuse of the right; damages; 
potestative clause; adjustment of a disproportional 
obligation; equitable reduction of the penal clause; 
excessive onerousness; enrichment- without cause; mistake 
and ignorance; duress; exceptio doli generalis 
Russia Good faith; abuse of the right; excessive onerousness 
India Mistake; misrepresentation; fraud; coercion; undue 
influence 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
                                                          
1640 Daniel D. Barnhizer, ‘Inequality of Bargaining Power’, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 139 (2005). 
1641 See infra. 
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It appears that contract laws generally set rules to determine which factors influence bargaining 
power. Courts tend to presume equality of bargaining power in B2B contracts, and also assume 
informational symmetry.  
 
3.4.1.2. The many facets of superior bargaining power in contract law 
 
Contractual freedom is a general and widely accepted principle1642. It follows that, any 
limitation to contractual freedom of private and public entities should be justified by specific 
public or private interests.   For a contract to be valid, it is essential that the parties give their 
consent and that this consent is not vitiated by means of mistake, duress, undue influence, 
unsconscionable conduct, or any other illegal conduct that the law identifies as a vitiating 
factor1643. While the mistake is an erroneous belief at contracting that certain facts are true, the 
equitable remedies of duress, undue influence and unconscionability target a conduct that, 
transcending the fairness of the bargain, exploits a ‘vantage position’ at the expenses of the 
other contractual party. Often this conduct is made possible by a situation of unbalance in the 
bargaining power of the parties to the contract. But the normative and conceptual basis for the 
examination of these cases tend to widely differ throughout Europe, the United States and 
BRICS countries.   
As mentioned above, the respective contract law in some BRICS countries such as 
Brazil, the Russian Federation and India sets out rules to determine which factors influence 
bargaining power. More specifically, Russian contract law deals with the superior bargaining 
power concept as part of the general mechanism to protect weaker parties in contracts. The 
protection of the weaker party has been primarily based on special legislation on consumer 
rights and Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Art. 428 of the Code is applicable also to contracts that 
are not contracts of adhesion but where conditions of such agreements are determined by one 
of the parties while the other party due to obvious inequality in bargaining power is put in a 
position that substantially prevents it from negotiating other content of certain contract terms. 
Russian legislation has also included traditional means to protect the weaker party that is 
affected by the monopolist such as Art. 10 of the Civil Code which refers to the general 
prohibition of abuse of rights and Art. 169 of the Civil Code which fixes the invalidity of a 
legal transaction made with a purpose contrary to the basis of the legal order and morality. 
Russian contract law enables the assessment of the level of competition on a certain 
market in order to determine whether it is possible to apply the superior bargaining power 
concept. In certain cases, courts have used Art. 428 as an additional criterion to qualify the 
dominant position of the market actor.1644 
However, it is worth noting that the enforcement of these rules has been relatively rare 
and mostly in cases when the adversely affected party is a consumer. Commercial courts 
interfere into B2B transaction on the basis of Art. 428 only in exceptional cases, that is when 
                                                          
1642 In Europe it is enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as part of 
the ‘freedom to conduct a business’ 
1643 Generally, the remedy prescribed by law for vitiated contracts is the voidability of the contract concerned. 
1644 Case NoA53-16802/2010; Case NoA60-29999/2011; Case NoA60-816/2011; Case NoA51-5351/2010. 
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the imbalance in superior bargaining power was clearly disproportional. Also, the party, 
claiming for the application of Art. 148, shall display initiative in negotiations. 
With regards to Brazilian contract law, it is centred upon the principle of bargaining 
power, though limited to the application of general concepts such as good faith and public 
interest.1645 The objective good faith has the function of a general clause and serves as an 
interpretative tool. Generally, Brazilian courts intervene on the basis of the constitutional 
principle of social justice. Brazilian courts treat cases involving abuse of superior bargaining 
power using different provisions of contract law such as potestative clauses, the concept of 
damage, the abuse of right, the adjustment of a disproportional obligation equitable, reduction 
of the penal clause, excessive onerousness, enrichment without cause. The Roman law doctrine 
is also applicable namely mistake, ignorance, duress and exceptio doli generalis. 
However, in cases of B2B contracts it is assumed that both parties enter the contract 
with the minimum knowledge available to avoid substantial mistakes, and thus, the Roman law 
doctrine is not applicable. Overall, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence 
(‘CADE’) has been careful to not intervene in the freedom of contract, in relation to conduct 
within the sphere of private relations.  
When assessing bargaining power, Indian contract law provides for all the general 
remedies to the defects of consent, namely mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, undue 
influence. However, a situation of unequal bargaining power between parties does not affect 
the validity of the contract even if it results into an agreement containing provision disparity 
and the claimant has to prove that the contract was concluded in defect of consent. Thus, in 
case of unconscionability, undue influence must be proved, since mere unconscionability 
cannot avoid a contract.1646 However, evidence of the unconscionable conduct reverts the 
burden of proof on the party that has a “dominating position”. In a number of cases, the 
Supreme Court of India has identified the existence of unequal bargaining power between 
parties to contracts.1647 Regardless, however, CCI has not specifically addressed superior 
bargaining power issues in its orders. 
 
3.4.1.2.1. Unconscionability 
 
This is a doctrine that is usually met in common law jurisdictions. The theory of 
unconscionability originated as an equitable relief in a contract suit in US law. As such, 
unconscionability is a discretionary bar that works as a ‘safety net’ that the judge generally 
uses when other remedies are not applicable1648. The UCC § 2–302, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 208 guarantees judicial protection against contracts that are “seriously unfair”1649, 
                                                          
1645 Lucia Iwasa 
1646 Kesavulu Naidu v. Arithulai Ammal (1912) 36 ILR Mad 533. 
1647 Belaire Owners ’Association Vs. DLF Limited, HUDA &Ors. (Case No. 19/2010) – Abuse of Dominant 
Position in Real Estate Industry.  
1648 Arthur Allen Leff, ‘Unconscionability and the Code. The Emperor’s New Clause’ (1967) 115 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 485; Richard A Epstein, ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’ (1975) 18 The 
Journal of Law & Economics 293; Edward Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts (Little, Brown 1990) 188; 
Gareth Spark, Vitiation of Contracts (Cambridge 2013). 
1649 The draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code declares: 
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and for many scholars this constitutes the normative basis for the application of 
unconscionability in the US1650. On this basis, American judges and scholars identified two 
types of unconscionability1651, procedural and substantive. The conceptualisation of this 
distinction is attributed to Arthur Leff, who first divided the concept of unconscionability 
defining procedural unconscionability as “bargaining naughtiness” and substantive 
unconscionability as “evils in the resulting of contract”1652.  
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the circumstances that made excessively 
difficult for a party to protect herself1653, as for instance in case of a take-it-or-leave-it clause 
that had no chances to refuse1654. Therefore, it focuses on the formation of the contract and on 
the formation of the consent inherent to the conclusion of the contract. Procedural 
unconscionability may depend for instance on the absence of negotiation (as in cases of 
standards form contracts1655) or on the existence of a monopoly,1656 which leaves no bargaining 
alternative or leeway for substitution. American judges have extended this approach to all the 
situations where there is absence of competition or limited competition that translates into 
“absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties with contract terms which are 
unreasonably favorable to the other party”1657.  
                                                          
“The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the 
particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one- sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the contract. (. . .) The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and 
unfair surprise and not of the disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power”, UCC § 2-
302 (Official Uniform Comment). More broadly, the ‘conundrum’ of whether the (un)balance between the 
exchange values can determine the validity of a contract was already posed in Roman law. Under the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis the typical (limited contract types) Roman law approach to contracts was combined with the formality of 
the consensus. In particular, the stipulatio was valid also when the offer and the acceptance were not balanced, 
the express consent being the relevant requisite. However, the Roman law developed also the concept of ‘bona 
fides’ (good faith). Moreover, in the postclassical period the introduction of the laesio enormis signed a first 
important limitation to the freedom of contract. However, the modern conceptualization of the contract as a 
consensual agreement came only in the 18th Century with the ‘Pandettistic’ movement. 
1650 Peter Cane & Mark V Tushnet, The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press 2005) 10, 
914. 
1651 Leff (n 2). 
1652 ibid 487. Leff argued that the section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code was ill drafted because it did 
not consider the fact that unconscionability, as all other contract law “defenses” (in particular he mentions fraud, 
duress, mistake, impossibility and illegality) can be classified by referring to the process of contracting or to the 
result of the contract . This distinction between procedural and subtantive, Leff believes, would have helped the 
draftsmen of the UCC to fully “appreciate the significance of the unconscionability concept’s necessary 
procedure-substance dichotomy and that such failure is one of the primary reasons for section 2-302’s final 
amorphous unintelligibility and its accompanying commentary’s final irrelevance”, Ibid., 488. 
1653 Nichols v. YJ USA Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22450 (D. Tex. 2009). 
1654 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1607-09 (2003); see also Jonathan 
E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate: Judicial and Legislative Application of 
Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 925, 947- 48 (1991). 
1655 See Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999), here the court observes that there was “no 
meaningful choice” on the part of the buyer, since the contract was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
1656 Epstein (n 2). 
1657 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445,449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Ezra Friedman, ‘Competition and 
Unconscionability’ [2013] American law and economics review 444; Russell B Korobkin, 
‘A’Traditional’and’Behavioral’Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Company’ (2004) 26 University of Hawaii Law Review 441. Korobkin recalls also a labour law case where the 
the California Supreme Court found unconscionable a term in an employment contract because the job (the seller’s 
product) was particularly important to the employee (the buyer), see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare 
Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669 690 (Cal . 2000). 
430 
 
On the other hand, substantive unconscionability refers to the contractual terms that are 
“overly-harsh” or “one sided” 1658. In other words, the terms have to be unfair, unreasonable or 
exploitative. Examples of unfair terms may be: unfair price1659, unfair disclaimers, promoting 
default, waiver of defences, acceleration of payments, repossession of goods without prior 
hearings and overall imbalance1660.  In general, it is possible to say that a contract is 
substantively unconscionable if there is an imbalance in the contract caused by a gross disparity 
in the values exchanged.  
However, substantive and procedural unconscionability are not as neatly separated as it 
may seem. Procedural unconscionability indeed is often used as a clue or a prerequisite to 
determine substantive unconscionability in contract terms. The Comment of the Restatement 
Second explicitly recognises the unbalance of power in the bargaining process as an indication 
of the existence of a possible defect in the contract. The “defects in the bargaining process” 
may therefore corroborate the gross disparity in contract terms to apply the remedy of 
unconscionability1661. 
American scholars are divided on the function of unconscionability as a condition for 
the vitiation of the contract. While some scholars observe that one-sided contracts may arise in 
                                                          
1658 Lemke v. Arrowood, 2000 WI App 32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
1659 In this respect, Browne and Biksacky report that “In unfair price unconscionability cases, one party asserts 
that the price to be paid is grossly disproportionate to the value of the good or service received in exchange. See, 
e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). In Murphy, the court declared a contract 
was unconscionable because a buyer paid $1 ,268 for a television worth $499. !d. at 173. Another case affirmed 
it was unconscionable for a seller to charge $4,322 for windows that only cost the seller $1,080.50. Sho-Pro oflnd., 
Inc. v. Brown, 585 N.E.2d 1357, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). In another case, a contract was orally negotiated in 
Spanish, but the contract was written in English. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (Civ. Ct. 
1966). The written contract charged the buyer three times the value of an appliance, and the court subsequently 
invalidated the contract on unconscionability grounds. Id. at 759. After an extensive empirical analysis of price 
unconscionability cases, Darr notes that high price alone is only a necessary condition. Darr, supra note 25, at 
1844. He explains: Neither process problems nor enforcement problems are sufficient in all cases to find 
unconscionability when price is high. If the contract price is high compared to the reference price the court selects, 
there is evidence of overreaching, and if market mechanisms are unlikely to rectify the situation, the courts are 
likely to intervene. 
Absent any one of these factors, the opposite result appears likely.  
Id. DiMatteo and Rich explain unfair price contracts are often referred to as '"per se unconscionab[le]"' because 
the imbalance in consideration is so severe as to be considered unconscionable on its face. Larry A. DiMatteo & 
Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1067, 1091 (2006) (quoting M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757,789 
(1969)). The authors further explain that many state legislatures also use the principles of unconscionability to 
stop unfair price gouging in contracts and sales. Specifically, eighteen states, including New York and Florida, 
have anti-price-gouging statutes with sixteen triggered by a declaration of a state of emergency or natural disaster. 
See M Neil Browne and Lauren Biksacky, ‘Unconscionability and the Contingent Assumptions of Contract 
Theory’ [2013] Mich. St. L. Rev. 211, 220 at footnote 52. 
1660 ibid. 
1661 The Comment c to §208 reads: “Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain, but gross 
disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that a contract is unconscionable 
and may be sufficient ground, without more, for denying specific performance See §§79, 364. Such a disparity 
may also corroborate indications of defects in the bargaining process, or may affect the remedy to be granted when 
there is a violation of a more specific rule. Theoretically it is possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a 
whole, even though there is no weakness in the bargaining process and no single term which is in itself 
unconscionable. Ordinarily, however, an unconscionable contract involves other factors as well as overall 
imbalance”. 
431 
 
competitive markets and that this one-sidedness induces efficient outcomes1662, others justify 
the application of the unconscionability doctrine arguing that ‘sellers’ have a profit incentive 
to take advantage of their position, and in some cases of the bounded rationality of the ‘buyer’, 
proposing inefficient contract terms1663. 
Most US courts require both procedural and substantive unconscionability to be present, 
while for some others it suffices that either of the elements is established1664. Moreover, in 
some cases American courts have considered the inherent imbalance of market power in order 
to decide whether the one-sidedness of a contract made it unconscionable, stating that “[t]he 
greater the ... inequality of bargaining power, the less unreasonable the risk reallocation which 
will be tolerated”1665 . The point made here is that monopolist or monopsonist power can be 
used to exert pressure and impose unfavourable contract terms. In general, American courts 
tend to apply a balancing test based on the evaluation of the facts of each case1666. Arthur 
Corbin's test for substantive unconscionability, which asks whether the terms at issue are "so 
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time 
and place", has been widely influential with courts1667.  In this regard, Radin admits that 
"[a]pplication of the doctrine of unconscionability is a process of relentless case-by-case 
adjudication, with many discretionary judgment calls in each case. Perhaps with the exception 
of truly egregious cases, outcomes are extremely unpredictable"1668. Also Oakley observes that 
the U.S. courts' ad hoc approach to unconscionability "makes it hard to know ahead of time 
which terms will be found fair and which will be deemed unfair" and "encourages contract 
drafters to take advantage of ambiguities"1669. 
This discretionary power, allowed also to disentangle the evaluation of 
unconscionability from the examination of bargaining power. According to the Restatement, 
"[a] bar gain is not unconscionable merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining 
position .... But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably 
                                                          
1662See for instance Lucian A Bebchuk and Richard A Posner, ‘One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer 
Markets’ (2005) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 827, observing that this one-sidedness induces “efficient outcomes, 
should contingencies arise during the performance of the contract, than a more “balanced” contract that because 
of imperfect enforcement could create costs as a consequence of consumers’ enforcing protective provisions in 
the contract”. 
1663 Korobkin (n 11). See also, on bounded rationality and the application of the unconscionability doctrine, Bubb, 
Ryan, and Alex Kauffman. 2009. “Consumer Biases and Firm Ownership”, Working Paper. Available at:  
ttps://files.nyu.edu/rb165/public/papers/ BubbKaufman ConsumerBiasesandFirmOwnership.pdf, DellaVigna, 
Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2004. “Contract Design and Self- Control: Theory and Evidence,” 119 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 353–402, Bar-Gill, Oren, and Rebecca Stone. 2012. “Pricing Misperception: Explaining 
Pricing Structure in the Cellular Service Market,” 9 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 430–56. 
1664 Brian A Blum, Contracts (2013) 414. 
1665 A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. 135 Cal.App.3d 473,487 (1982). 
1666 See, e.g., Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 799, 807 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) ("There is no set rule as 
to what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate; the question depends on the facts of each case." (quoting 
Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)). 
1667 See Nancy Kim, Evolving Business and Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic 
Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. L. REv. 506, 551 (2005) (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§ 128 (1952)). 
1668 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law (Princeton 
University Press 2013) 125. 
1669 Robert L. Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 
HOuS. L. REv. 1041, 1061 (2005). 
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favorable to the stronger party" may support a finding of unconscionability in the bargaining 
process”1670. In other words, gross inequality of bargaining power is a factor contributing to 
procedural unconscionability, but it is rarely sufficient on its own. 
In the UK the doctrine of unconscionability was developed as a concept of equity and 
does not hinge on a general and abstract norm as in the U.S.1671. The theory has been revisited 
by the courts1672, however it remains wrapped in a number of “unresolved issues” related to its 
definition1673.  
The basic elements of the doctrine were set out in Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil 
(Great Britain) Ltd, where Mr Peter Millett QC asserted that: “[f]irst, one party has been at a 
serious disadvantage to the other, whether through poverty, or ignorance, or lack of advice, or 
otherwise, so that circumstances existed of which unfair advantage could be taken . . . Second, 
this weakness of the one party has been exploited by the other in some morally culpable manner 
. . . And third, the resulting transaction has been, not merely hard or improvident, but 
overreaching and oppressive.”1674. However, there is no consensus or an authoritative statement 
as to what is the role of each element and if there is a hierarchy among them1675.  
Although the role of substantive unfairness is debated, the unfairness of the transaction 
or of the relation caused by an unconscionable conduct is often posed in contract law disputes. 
The term unconscionable is therefore also a descriptor to define a certain conduct (the 
exploitative conduct) or situation (in particular the weakness in the complainant), and it can be 
adapted to disparate factual situations. For instance, English courts have declared 
unconscionable the improper and unethical use of commercially sensitive data1676, the 
liquidation of a sum for a breach of contract (deemed unconscionable and exorbitant)1677  and 
the failure to provide any assistance to the business partner, opposition to the scheme, and 
resort to forgery and false evidence1678. Moreover, the theory of unconscionability has been 
used to remedy to the exploitation of the weakness of one party to a contract1679. 
                                                          
1670 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. d (1979). 
1671 However, an unconscionable conduct may be punished depending on the factual situation and the norm it 
violates. The doctrine of unconscionability was first introduced in England to protect in equity the expectant heirs 
and has been then extended to other contractual relationships in Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 ChD 312.  
1672 See eg., Alec Lobb v. Total Oil [1985] 1 All ER 303, CA., Crédit Lyonnais v. Burch (1997) 29 HLR 513, CA 
and Portman BS v. Dusangh [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221, CA. 
1673 Spark (n 2) 279. 
1674 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312. Following literature has developed this theory by establishing four different 
elements: “(1) weakness in the complainant; (2) unconscionable conduct by the defendant; (3) substantive 
unfairness; and (4) absence of advice for the complainant”, ibid. 
1675 ibid. While, for instance, Chen-Wishart maintains that “[m]ere undervalue is insufficient, the contract must 
be overreaching and oppressive or entail such substantial undervalue that it “shocks the conscience of the court.” 
(Mindy Chen-Wishart, ‘The Nature of Vitiating Factors in Contract Law’ [2015] Philosophical Foundations of 
Contract Law, Oxford University Press) therefore advocating for a central role of substantial unfairness, others, 
in contrast, believe that “substantive unfairness is not a prerequisite of the doctrine” (Spark (n 17) 209). Finally, 
other voices among jurists contend that unconscionability is mainly about “transactional imbalance” and that 
substantive unfairness is not a necessary requisite of the conduct, see David Capper, ‘Undue Influence and 
Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’(1998)’ 114 LQR 479, 486. 
1676 Personal Management Solutions Ltd v Brakes Bros Ltd [2014] EWHC 3495 (QB). 
1677 ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] EWCA Civ 402. 
1678 Borrelli v Ting [2010] UKPC 21. 
1679 For instance, in the case Clark v. Malpas (1862) 4 De GF & J 401, the court concluded that the contract was 
unconscionable because “a poor and illiterate man was induced to enter into a transaction of an unusual nature, 
without proper independent advice, and in great haste”, see Alec Lobb v. Total Oil [1985] 1 All ER 303, CA. 
433 
 
There is no unconscionability doctrine in civil law countries. However, the examination 
of the illegal conduct of the parties and the imbalance of bargaining power between them that 
brings to a severe distortion (vitiating factor) of their contractual relationship is generally 
analysed through the good faith criterion. Good faith, in its several facets, fulfils a similar 
function to the one of equity (and therefore also unconscionability) in common law. Good faith 
is indeed a limit to all those conducts trespassing the boundaries of ‘fairness’, which the 
judiciary can use in order to devoid or annul the contract and order compensation. Most civil 
law systems distinguish between objective and subjective good faith. Quite clearly, the latter 
refers to the state of mind (subjective) of the agent: in this case, ignorance of illegality of the 
action would save him from any accusation. Objective good faith refers instead to general 
standards of conduct that the contracting parties have to adopt during negotiations and in the 
execution of the contract. For instance, in Germany and Italy this theoretical framework has 
evolved into the formulation of two concepts of (respectively) “treu und glauben” and 
“correttezza”. By contrast, the French legal system does not distinguish between subjective and 
objective good faith. 
 
3.4.1.2.2. Economic Duress 
 
The theory of duress originated as an equitable relief to protect a person that entered a 
contract or performed an action as a consequence of a threat (i.e. physical duress)1680. It was 
then developed to include also illegitimate threats (e.g. to breach an existing contract or to 
commit a tort) to a person that has no practical alternatives to the terms imposed1681. So, besides 
duress to persons and duress to goods, the common law developed a third type of duress called 
‘economic duress’. This type of duress “arises where one party uses his superior economic 
power in an ‘illegitimate’ way so as to coerce the other contracting party to agree to a particular 
set of terms”1682. In other words the relevant case law on economic duress shows that this 
remedy can be invoked subject to two conditions, the coercion of the will and the exertion of 
an illegitimate pressure on the victim of the ‘wrong of duress’. With regard to the proof of 
duress, two main elements are required, causation and illegitimate pressure. The commercial 
pressure has to be causally linked to the decision of the victim to enter the contract or perform 
an action, that otherwise would have not entered or performed. Secondly, the pressure has to 
be illegitimate. This is generally a thorny aspect of the proof, but courts have provided guidance 
                                                          
1680 Skeate v Beale (1840) 11 Ad & El 983, 113 ER 688. 
1681 See Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 366 
(HL). 
1682 Ewan McKendrick, Contract Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 358, interpreting the relevant jurisprudence. 
Kerr J first outlined and applied this doctrine in The Siboen and The Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 293 where he 
stated “if I should be compelled to sign a lease or some other contract for a nominal but legally sufficient 
consideration under an imminent threat of having my house burnt down or a valuable picture slashed through 
without any threat of physical violence to anyone, I do not think that the law would uphold the agreement... The 
true question is ultimately whether or not the agreement in question is to be regarded as having been concluded 
voluntarily.”. Later, in the case Privy Council in R v. Attorney-General for England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22 
Lord Hoffmann detailed this doctrine stating that the economic duress contains two essential elements: a) pressure 
amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; b) illegitimacy of the pressure. 
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on the elements of the illegitimate pressure1683. However, no clear definition or principle of 
legitimacy has been developed. It has been noted that the legitimacy may refer to the conduct 
of the wrongdoer as well as to the adequacy of the consent1684. 
 
3.4.2. Unfair competition law 
 
According to a European ‘High Level Forum on Better Functioning of the Supply Chain’ 
(HLF) report, a number of European national competition authorities discovered the existence 
of unfair practices in the food supply chain linked to imbalances of bargaining power between 
stakeholders.1685 As it is reported by the HLF, “NCAs found that most of these practices do not 
fall within the scope of competition rules at EU level or in most Member States, as they did not 
affect consumer welfare. A few NCAs have proposed alternative solutions to tackle them, such 
as the application of national laws against unfair trading practices, or the adoption of codes 
of conduct or good practices with effective enforcement mechanisms. A few NCAs have also 
expressed concerns about the potential anti-competitive effects that some of these practices 
may have in the long term, should they ultimately negatively affect the competitive process in 
the supply chain or consumer welfare by reducing investment and innovation or limiting 
consumer choice”.1686 In Europe, these concerns have resulted in the launch of the Supply 
Chain Initiative, under the auspices of the EU, which endorses the principles of fair contracting 
contained in the HLF Report and in the Green Paper on Unfair trading practices in the food and 
non-food supply chain in Europe,1687 with the aim to establish a set of principles of good 
practice for the food supply chain.1688 The regulatory framework related to unfair competition 
in the food sector of the BRICS countries is instead rather diverse. 
For example, in the Russian Federation, the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) plays 
a prominent role in monitoring and ensuring the protection of competition in the Russian food 
market. It now encompasses not only protection of competition, but also various spheres of 
economic regulations. FAS regulates and oversees the activities of natural monopolies; 
performs control over the public procurement procedures and foreign investments in the 
Russian Federation; oversees compliance with the regulations on advertising activities. In its 
activities FAS is subject to Russian competition law, which comprises two principal legal acts, 
the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” and the Federal law “On the Basic Principles 
of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation”. With a view to defining 
priorities in promotion of competition in the Russian Federation, FAS has devised the ‘National 
Plan on Development of Competition in 2017-2018’ with particular focus on a number of 
industries including agriculture. 
Brazil has a wide network of regulations in the food sector which is spread in several 
levels of hierarchy, organs and autonomous agencies. Unfair competition in the food sector is 
                                                          
1683 Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd [2001] B.L.R. 1; 74 Con. L.R. 144 , per Dyson, J. 
1684 David Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’(1998)’ 114 LQR 479, 172. 
. 
1685 EC (n 171). 
1686 ibid. 
1687 Green Paper on Unfair trading practices in the food and non-food supply chain in Europe (COM/2013/037). 
1688 See http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/. 
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assessed in the same way as all the other economic sectors. Competition law in Brazil has gone 
through some important changes in the past five years when the New Law 12,529 of 30 
November, 20111689 came into force on May 29, replacing the old Law 8,884, of 1994. 
Competition law is enforced by a single authority system under the umbrella of the 
Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE), with a subsidiary role by the Ministry 
of Finance in the promotion of competition. In general, the main regulatory bodies in the food 
sector include the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency-ANVISA and the National Food 
Supply Company (CONAB) which regulates the supply of the Brazilian internal market. Also, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) regulates, classifies and 
inspects agricultural products in Brazil, including imported foodstuffs. 
In Mainland China, the regulation of food value chains is particularly complex. The 
main bodies responsible for regulating unfair competition in the food sector are the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC). In a nutshell, NDRC is the competent authority for the macro control and 
regulation of the Chinese economy, whilst NDRC’s affiliation, the Bureau of Price Supervision 
and Antimonopoly, is one of the three Chinese antitrust enforcement agencies and its 
jurisdiction covers unilateral and collective anticompetitive conduct cases concerning price. 
With regards to SAIC, it is the competent authority in charge of market supervision, regulation 
and related administrative law enforcement. The SAIC and its local subsidiaries are responsible 
for law enforcements in enterprise registration, antitrust and anti-unfair competition, 
advertising industry, consumer protection and trademark protection. The SAIC and local AIC 
system is responsible for enforcing Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law with regard to monopolistic agreements, abuse of market dominant position, 
and practices to eliminate or restrict competition through abuse of administrative power.  
The basic regulatory framework of food value chains has been set by several laws and 
national policies. As the food value chain is a novel concept to both Chinese academics and 
regulators, there is no specific law or policy that regulates it as an integrated phenomenon, and 
thus, the regulation of different segments of a food value chain differs substantially. The most 
significant competition law legislation is the Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of 
China (AML) 2008.1690 Article 56 AML provides that the AML does not apply to the 
association or cooperation by agricultural producers or rural economic organizations in their 
business activities of production, processing, sale, transportation, storage of farm products, 
etc.1691 The competition law exemption for agro-food sectors generally targets the provisions 
included in AML Chapter 2, that is, Article 16 prohibiting industrial organisations from 
organising concerted anticompetitive practices, and Article 13 prohibiting competitors from 
concluding monopoly agreements. It is noted that although Chinese competition law offers 
these exemptions, competition law enforcement in the areas of distribution cartels, merger 
control, and abuse of a dominant position in the agricultural sector receive no exemption. 
                                                          
1689 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12529.htm  
 
1690 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
1691 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
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On 13 Oct 2006, MOFCOM, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration 
for Industry & Commerce, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Development & 
Reform Commission jointly enacted a department regulation entitled Administrative Measures 
for Fair Transactions between Retailers and suppliers which specifies some forms of abuse of 
superior bargaining power.1692 In 2011, MOFCOM issued a Work plan against large scale 
retailers and suppliers’ illegal charge.1693 On 25 February 2016, the Legislative Affairs Office 
of the State Council published the amending draft of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the 
People's Republic of China (AUCL). The AUCL added the abuse of superior bargaining power 
as a prohibited act and no exemption for agro-food issues is mentioned in the draft amendment. 
In India, the central government has vast powers to regulate the food sector. The Indian 
food sector is governed by multiple laws and regulations that govern different links in the food 
value chain. Unfair trading practices are covered under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
Until 2002, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), which was enacted 
to prevent monopolies and restrictive trade practices, was the foremost legislation to deal with 
unfair trade practices in the country. In 2002, the Competition Act, repealed the MRTP Act, 
and cases pending before the MRTP Commission were transferred to the Competition 
Commission of India (CCI). However, the Competition Act did not contain any provision 
expressly dealing with unfair trading practices, and therefore, these were addressed under the 
provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which was already dealing with unfair trade 
practices.  
In South Africa, the agriculture industry has a long history of intense state intervention. 
The apartheid government extensively regulated the production and marketing of agricultural 
products through state sanctioned ‘control boards’ established by the Marketing Act of 1937 
(consolidated in 1968). The Marketing Act instituted a system of controls which regulated the 
movement, pricing, quality standards and marketing supply of the majority of agricultural 
production. The first democratic government liberalised the sector and introduced a reformed 
competition legislation. Unfair competition in the food sector is assessed in the same way as 
all the other economic sectors. In general, the Competition Act applies a consumer welfare 
standard in the assessment of abuse of dominance and merger cases. In November 2015, the 
Competition Commission established a market into the grocery  retail section which is designed 
to focus on the role of supermarket chains in townships, particularly in peri urban and rural 
areas.1694 
 
Table 3: Unfair Competition Laws in BRICS  
                                                          
1692 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/200610/20061003442804.shtml 
1693 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/redht/201112/20111207899504   
1694 The inquiry has conducted some public hearings but has produced no report as at the time of the completion 
of this paper. It has provided transcripts of the hearings conducted on the Competition Commission’s website 
www.compcom.co.za/ retail market inquiry 
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1695 OECD & Inter-American Development Bank, Competition Law and Policy in Latin America – p[eer reviews 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru (OECD & IADB, 2006), 95-96; P. Kobel, P. Këllezi, Bruce 
Kilpatrick (eds.), Antitrust in the Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (Springer, 2015), 96-97. 
Brazil1695 Unfair Competition Unfair Competition in Food 
sector 
Legislation 1. Federal Constitution of 1988 (Art. 173, (4)) 
2. Law No. 12,529/11, Art. 36 
3. Law No. 9,279/96 (The Industrial Property 
Law), Art. 195 
4. Law No. 8,078/90 (Consumer Defence Code) 
 
No specific legislation on 
unfair competition in the food 
sector. 
Substance 1. Art. 173(4) of the Federal Constitution 
provides that “the law shall repress the abuse 
of economic power that aims at the 
domination of markets, the elimination of 
competition and the arbitrary increase of 
profits” 
2. The Competition Law No.12,529/11 sets 
forth the basic framework for anticompetitive 
conduct (Art. 36). 
3. The Industrial Property Law defines the 
crime of “Unfair Competition” which covers 
commercial disparagement, false branding, 
fraudulent diversion of trade, advertising 
designed to cause brand confusion, violation 
of trademark rights, commercial bribery, 
illegitimate appropriation or disclosure of 
trade secrets, false patent claims (Art. 195). 
4. The Consumer Defence Code regulates such 
marketing practices as deceptive advertising, 
false warranties, door to door sales, 
telemarketing, abusive price increases. 
1. The Brazilian 
Competition Law No. 
12,529/2011 does not 
set forth any type of 
sector-specific 
exemptions or rules on 
unfair competition. 
2. The Industrial Property 
Law No. 9,279/96 
prohibits unfair 
competition practices 
and is also general in 
scope without sector-
specific rules (Art.195).  
3. As a result the general 
rules on the prohibition 
of unfair competition 
and anticompetitive 
practices apply 
indistinctly to all 
market sectors. 
Institutions 1. Administrative Council for Economic 
Defence (CADE) 
2. Secretary for Economic Monitoring of the 
Ministry of Finance (SEAE) 
3. Consumer Protection and Defence 
Department (DPDC) 
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India1696 Unfair Competition Unfair Competition in Food 
sector 
Legislation 1. Consumer Protection Act, 1986  
(Art. 2(1)(r)) 
2. Competition Act, 2002 (Art. 4(2), Art. 
66(4)) 
 
Food Safety and Standards Act, 
2006  
Substance 1. Consumer Protection Act, 1986:  
a. Definition of Unfair Trade 
Practice: Art. 2(1)(r) of the Act 
defines Unfair Trade Practice to 
mean “a trade practice which, for 
the purpose of promoting the sale, 
use or supply of any goods or for 
the provision of any service, adopts 
any unfair method or unfair or 
deceptive practice” 
b. Consumer Protection Act has 
created a quasi-judicial system to 
deal with the consumer related 
issues, i.e. the District Forums, the 
Central Consumer Protection 
Council, the State Commission or 
the National Commission with 
final appeal lying before the 
Supreme Court of India.  
 
2. Competition Act 2002: 
a. Art. 4(2): “There shall be an abuse 
of dominant position, if an 
enterprise or a group: (a) directly or 
indirectly, imposes unfair or 
discriminatory— 
(i) condition in purchase or sale 
of goods or service; or 
(ii) price in purchase or sale 
(including predatory price) of 
goods or service”. 
b. Art. 66 (4) transferred authority on 
the unfair trade practice to the 
National Commission established 
under Consumer Act 1986. Under 
Art. 66(4) Competition Act 2002 
“all cases pertaining to unfair trade 
practices shall stand transferred to 
the National Commission 
Food Safety and Standards Act, 
2006: 
1. Art. 18 (f)(i) “General 
principles of Food 
Safety”: The Food 
Authority shall, while 
framing regulations or 
specifying standards under 
this Act, “ensure prevention 
of fraudulent, deceptive or 
unfair trade practices which 
may mislead or harm the 
consumer”. 
 
2. Art. 24 “Restrictions of 
advertisement and 
prohibition as to unfair 
trade practices. 
 
“(1) No advertisement shall 
be made of any food which 
is misleading or deceiving 
or contravenes the 
provisions of this Act, the 
rules and regulations made 
thereunder. 
 
(2) No person shall engage 
himself in any unfair trade 
practice for purpose of 
promoting the sale, supply, 
use and consumption of 
articles of food or adopt any 
unfair or deceptive practice 
including the practice of 
making any statement, 
whether orally or in writing 
or by visible representation 
which – 
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1696 R. Mathur & U. S. Mehta, Unfair Trade Practices and Institutional Challenges in India: An Analysis, GIZ 
Stakeholder Consultation Workshop (New Delhi, April 1-2, 2013). 
constituted under the Consumer 
Protection Act, 1986”.  
c. One exception – “All cases 
pertaining to unfair trade practices 
referred to in clause (x) of 
subsection (1) of section 36A of the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1969 and pending 
before the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission shall stand transferred 
to the Appellate Tribunal”. 
 
(a) falsely represents that 
the foods are of a particular 
standard, quality, quantity 
or grade-composition; 
(b) makes a false or 
misleading representation 
concerning the need for, or 
the usefulness; 
(c) gives to the public any 
guarantee of the efficacy 
that is not based on an 
adequate or scientific 
justification thereof.” 
Institutions Consumer Protection Act 1986: 
1. District Consumer Forums (Art. 9 
(a), 14 (f)) 
2. Central Consumer Protection 
Council (Art. 6 (e)) 
3. State Commission (Art.  9(b)) 
4.  National Commission (Art. 21) 
Competition Act 2002: 
1. Competition Commission of India 
(CCI) (Arts. 18, 19) 
2. Appellate Tribunal (Art. 66(4)) 
Food Safety and Standards 
Authority of India  
http://www.fssai.gov.in/AboutFSS
AI/FSSAct.aspx 
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Russia1697 Unfair Competition Unfair Competition in Food 
sector 
Legislation Federal Law No. 135-FZ “On The Protection 
of Competition”, 2006  
http://en.fas.gov.ru/legislation/legislation_5091
5.html  
 
General Provisions of the Federal 
Law “On The Protection of 
Competition”, 2006 
Substance Federal Law “On The Protection of 
Competition”, 2006 
 
Article 14 “Prohibition of Unfair Competition”: 
 
“1. Unfair competition is not permitted, 
including: 
 
1) dissemination of false, inaccurate, or 
distorted information, which can inflict losses 
on economic entity or cause damage to its 
business reputation; 
2) misrepresentation concerning the nature, 
method, and place of manufacture, consumer 
characteristics, quality and quantity of а 
commodity or concerning its producers; 
3) incorrect comparison of the products by an 
economic entity, manufactured or sold by it, 
with the products manufactured or sold by other 
economic entities; 
4) sale, exchange or other way of input of a 
commodity into circulation if there was illegal 
use of the results of intellectual activity and 
equalized to them means of individualization of 
a legal person, means of individualization of 
production, works, services; 
5) illegal receipt, use, and disclosure of 
information constituting commercial, official or 
other protected by law secret. 
 
2. Unfair competition, related to acquisition and 
use of exclusive rights for the means of 
individualization of a legal person, means of 
individualization of production, works, and 
services is not permitted. 
 
3. Decision of the Federal Antimonopoly body 
concerning violation of the provisions of Part 2 
of this Article concerning acquisition and use of 
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1697 OECD, Competition Law and Policy in the Russian Federation (OECD, 2013). 
exclusive rights to a trademark is sent by an 
interested Party to the federal executive 
authority for intellectual property for 
recognizing invalid the legal protection granted 
to this trademark.” 
Institutions Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS) – 
established in 2004 
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service 
(FAS) 
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China Unfair Competition Unfair Competition in Food 
sector 
Legislation Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic 
of China (AML), 2008 
 
General Provisions of the Anti-
monopoly Law of the People's 
Republic of China (AML), 2008 
 
Substance  
Chapter III Abuse of Market Dominance 
 
Art. 17: “A business operator with a dominant 
market position shall not abuse its dominant 
market position to conduct following acts: 
(1) selling commodities at unfairly high prices 
or buying commodities at unfairly low prices; 
(2) selling products at prices below cost without 
any justifiable cause; 
(3) refusing to trade with a trading party without 
any justifiable cause; 
(4) requiring a trading party to trade exclusively 
with itself or trade exclusively with a designated 
business operator(s) without any justifiable 
cause; 
(5) tying products or imposing unreasonable 
trading conditions at the time of trading without 
any justifiable cause; 
(6) applying dissimilar prices or other 
transaction terms to counterparties with equal 
standing; 
(7) other conducts determined as abuse of a 
dominant position by the Anti-monopoly 
Authority under the State Council”. 
 
The Anti-monopoly Law 2008 
does not cover the agricultural 
sector. 
 
According to Art. 56 “This Law 
does not govern the ally or 
concerted actions of agricultural 
producers and rural economic 
organizations in the economic 
activities such as production, 
processing, sales, transportation 
and storage of agricultural 
products.” 
 
Institutions 1. State Administration for Industry & 
Commerce (SAIC) 
2. National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 
3. Bureau of Price Supervision and 
Antimonopoly 
4. Local Administration for Industry & 
Commerce (AIC) 
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Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
Our provisional conclusion is that there is need to develop a proper concept of superior 
bargaining power in competition law in order to deal with the situations of bargaining power 
South 
Africa1698 
Unfair Competition Unfair Competition in Food 
sector 
Legislation 1. Competition Act, 1998 
2. Consumer Protection Act No 68 
(CPA), 2008  
 
 
Substance   
Competition Act, 1998:  
 
Art 8: “Abuse of dominance prohibited It is 
prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of 
consumers; 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an 
essential facility when it is economically 
feasible to do so; 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an 
act listed in paragraph (d), if the anti-
competitive effect of that act outweighs its 
technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain; or  
(d) engage in any of the following exclusionary 
acts, unless the firm concerned can show 
technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gains which outweigh the anti-
competitive effect of its act (…)”. 
Consumer Protection Act No 68, 2008 
 
Section 48 of the CPA deals with unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust contract terms. 
Section 51 sets out the prohibited transactions, 
agreements, terms or conditions. 
 
Institutions 1. National Consumer Commission (NCC) 
2. Competition Commission (Art. 21(1) of 
the Competition Act) 
3. Competition Tribunal (Art. 27 of the 
Competition Act) 
4. Competition Appeal Court (Art. 37 of 
the Competition Act) 
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and constrained choice that will emerge out of the increasing concentration of agrochem, seed 
and processing. It is possible that other areas of law may provide more adequate tools, but no 
presumption on their superiorioty as options should be made before a careful comparative 
institutional analysis. We believe that addressing the structural disparities of bargaining power 
is essential in order to ensure efficiency and fairness and that competition law may offer, in 
some cases, a better alternative than contract law, or unfair competition law, in order to deal 
with these situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1698 T. Hartzenberg, Competition Policy and Practice in South Africa: Promoting Competition for Development 
Symposium on Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries, (2005-2006) 26 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 667, 667-668. 
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Chapter 4: Financialisation of the food chain, common ownership and competition law 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Alina Velias, Dmitry Katalevsky & George Ovchinikov 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The financialisation of the economy has led to an increasing role for institutional investors in 
the global economy. The possible anticompetitive incentives created by presence of cross 
ownership and common ownership in concentrated markets have been long recognised in 
theoretical literature (Rotemberg, 1984; Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; Reynolds and Snapp, 
1986; Gordon, 1990; O’Brien and Salop, 2000; Gilo, 2000; Gilo et al., 2006)1699; but lacked 
sufficient empirical evidence1700. Recent empirical analyses of the U.S. airline industry (Azar, 
Schmalz, and Tecu 20161701; and banking industry (Azar, Raina, and Schmalz, 20161702) 
measured the potential (large) effect of the common ownership price levels rising above the 
competitive ones. Posner, Scott Morton and Weyl note that  
‘(i)nstitutional investors owned 70-80% of the US stock market, up from 7% in 1950. 
When combined, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street constitute the single largest 
shareholder of at least 40% of all public companies in the US. They constitute the 
largest owner in nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 500, up from 25% in 2000. 
The fraction of US public firms held by institutional investors who simultaneously hold 
large blocks of other same-industry firms increased from less than 10% in 1980 to about 
60% in 2010’1703.  
Although the role of institutional investors is more limited in Europe, similar concerns may 
also be expressed. These findings resulted in even greater policy concern (Council of Economic 
                                                          
1699 J J Rotemberg, ‘Financial Transaction Costs and Industrial Performance’, (1984) Mass. Inst. of Tech., Alfred 
P. Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 1554-84; T Bresnahan & S C Salop, ‘Quantifying The Competitive 
Effects of Production Joint Ventures’, (1986) 4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 155;  R J Reynolds & B R Snapp, ‘The 
Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures’, (1986) 4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 141; Roger H. 
Gordon, ‘Do Publicly Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?’, (1990). Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 3303; D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest 
and Corporate Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; E A Posner, F Scott Morton, & E Glen Weyl, ‘A Proposal 
to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors’ forth. Antitrust Law Journal; D Gilo, ‘The 
Anticompetitive Effects of Passive Investment’, (2000) 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1; D Gilo, YMoshe, & Y Spiegel, ‘Partial 
Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion’, (2006), 37 RAND J. Econ. 81;  
1700 See, the concerns expressed by S C Salop & D P O’Brien, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial 
Interest and Corporate Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559 
1701 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345; further – AST(2016) 
1702 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252; further – ARS(2016) 
1703 E A Posner, F Scott Morton, & E Glen Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional 
Investors’, forth. Antitrust law Journal (November 29, 2016). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 787. Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=2872754 . 
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Advisors, 20161704; Elhauge, 20161705), proposals for legislative intervention (Posner, Scott 
Morton and Weyl, 20171706), and criticism of the findings (Rock and Rubinfeld, 2017a1707; 
Rock and Rubinfeld, 2017b1708).  
 
4.2. Economic Framework 
 
We consider four major mechanisms through which common ownership may be 
causing adverse effects to the economy, namely: (1)  unilateral/non-coordinated effects; (2) 
coordinated effects (tacit collusion); (3) vertical foreclosure through raising rivals’ costs 
strategies and (4) vertical exploitative behaviour (gaining higher profit margins at the expense 
of reduced margins for the competitive segment of the value chain). 
The possible unilateral effects of the common ownership on the economy is an actively 
debated topic. We analyse it in-depth and also discuss the way it may be feeding into a possible 
effect on coordinated effects, exacerbating the possibility for tacit coordination in the market. 
We then move on to exploring whether the presence of institutional investors may be feeding 
into the third, wider area of exploitative behaviour across the entire value chain rather than 
within an individual segment of the market. Here we consider the established mechanisms of 
foreclosure available to the vertically integrated investors – and iscuss them in context of the 
recent evidence of increased financialisation of the food markets and negative effects on the 
farmer segment. We highlight the lack of insight into specifically the role of common 
ownership exploiting the same mechanisms and draw directions for further research.  
 
4.2.1. The theoretical possibility of non-coordinated effects 
 
In the first section of this chapter, we review the theoretical and the empirical evidence 
and the counterarguments that emerged in the current (heated) debate on the unilateral effects 
of common ownership. We conclude that there is acute need for research into other markets 
characterised by presence of financial investors and vital effects on consumers – such as food 
market. We also sympathise with the concerns raised about possible distortive nature of 
regulatory intervention, and argue for the need of better methodology and evaluation of 
thresholds at which regulators should intervene. We do dismiss the arguments that claim that 
the presence of financial investors does not pose a concern for anti-monopolistic regulation – 
and we lay out why we think their arguments address problems which can be dealt with the 
                                                          
1704 Council of Economic Advisors (2016): “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Available 
online 
1705 E Elhauge, ‘Horizontal Shareholding’, (2016). 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267  
1706 E A Posner, F M Scott Morton, & E G Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional 
Investors’ (March 22, 2017). Antitrust Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2872754 
1707 E B Rock & D L Rubinfeld, ‘Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate 
Governance’ (March 1, 2017). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-05. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855; further - RR(2017a) 
1708 EB Rock & DL Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust for Institutional Investors’ (July 2017). NYU Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 17-23; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998296; further - RR(2017b) 
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improved methodology, but do not undermine the theoretical rooting of the problem per se. 
Our focus is the indications that only separate owners have interest in aggressive competitive 
strategy. Crowding them out of the most powerful shareholders can make the firm lose 
incentives and corporate support for the competitive strategy. 
We then turn to the way competition authorities have engaged so far with the possible 
anticompetitive effects of minority shareholdings, and in particular common ownership by the 
same financial investors of competing firms in the same relevant market. We also examine the 
proposals made for legislative changes that would engage more seriously with the issues raised 
by common ownership. 
The last part proceeds to an empirical analysis of the presence of financial investors 
and common ownership in the global food value chain. This is an area with considerable 
common ownership and this raises inevitably the question of the way competition authorities 
might take this into account when assessing merger activity. In the context of the seed and 
agrochem mergers, the issue was raised by the Competition Commission of South Africa, for 
the Dow/Dupont and Bayer/Monsanto cases, although the CCSA did not engage thoroughly 
with it, and in a more prominent way in the European Commission’s decision in Dow/Dupont. 
Policy makers’ concern with common ownership is driven by it potentially leading 
to monopolistic outcomes, a deadweight loss for the economy, and particularly negative 
outcomes for the consumers. The legislation in its current state does not have an explicit 
measure for common ownership in prevention of monopolistic outcomes. However, recent 
developments in measurement of the market concentration attempt to incorporate the degree of 
common ownership into equation (AST, 2016; ARS, 2016) and there are calls for creating 
thresholds at which these concentrations should be considered anticompetitive (Posner, Scott 
Morton and Weyl, 2017))1709. Evidence based on these recent developments has already been 
applied on the markets.  
 
4.2.1.1. Evaluating Market share 
 
Competition authorities have long used commonly agreed measures of market 
concentration to evaluate between-company acquisitions. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm j competing in a 
market, and then summing the resulting numbers.  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑗
2
𝑗
 
                                                          
1709 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345; J Azar, R Raina, & M C 
Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252; EA Posner, FM Scott 
Morton, & EG Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors’ (March 22, 
2017). Antitrust Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872754 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2872754 
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HHI can be close to zero when a market is comprised of many firms of small size and 
reaches a maximum of 10,000 when a market is controlled by a single firm.  
The operational thresholds for the HHI are relatively well-defined. Under the US horizontal 
merger guidelines, the safe harbour threshold is an HHI below 1,500. For HHI levels between 
1,500 and 2,500, a merger leading to an increase of more than 100 points normally warrants 
additional scrutiny. Above 2,500, an increase between 100 and 200 triggers additional scrutiny, 
whereas for increases above 200 points there is a rebuttable presumption of anticompetitive 
effects. In contrast, an increase below 100 points is generally considered unproblematic1710. 
The 200 points threshold also marks the point beyond which, if two parties intended to merge, 
the burden of proof that the merger does not lead to enhanced market power shifts to the 
merging parties (as opposed to the competition authority). Consequently, in the recent 
evidence, acquisitions of less than 25% but at least 15% have been judged to be in violation of 
the Clayton Act. (Salop and O’Brien, 2000)1711. The European Commission takes a similar 
perspective noting that ‘while the absolute level of the HHI can give an initial indication of the 
competitive pressure in the market post-merger, the change in the HHI (known as the ‘delta’) 
is a useful proxy for the change in concentration directly brought about by the merger’.1712 HHI 
values are used to screen out mergers unlikely to give rise to anticompetitive concerns. 
According to the General Court in Sun Chemical Group BV and others v Commission, ‘the 
greater the margin by which those thresholds are exceeded, the more the HHI values will be 
indicative of competition concerns’.1713 In particular, the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
stipulate that the Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
market with a post-merger HHI below 1,000, these markets normally not requiring extensive 
analysis1714. The Commission is also unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
merger with a post-merger HHI between 1,000 and 2,000 and a delta below 250, or a merger 
with a post-merger HHI above 2,000 and a delta below 150, with the exception of certain 
special circumstances, one of which being that there are significant cross-shareholdings among 
the market participants1715. 
The HHI index in its current formulation only captures the shares of the market 
controlled by a single firm, and is agnostic to any cross ownership and common ownership 
aspects of such holding. Theoretical literature has long argued that shareholders with 
diversified portfolios have an interest in the maximization of joint portfolio profits as opposed 
to individual firm profits, thus predicting that diversification can reduce competition in product 
markets. Examples of mechanisms include: internalising between-firm (vertical or horizontal) 
externalities (Hansen and Lott, 19961716) risk-sharing considerations (Admati, Pfleiderer, and 
                                                          
1710 See DoJ/FTC’s 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, p 19. 
1711 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; 
1712 See DoJ/FTC’s 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines, p 19. 
1713 Case T-282/06 Sun Chemical Group Bv and others v Commission [2007] ECR II-2149, para 138. 
1714 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2004] OJ C31/7 
1715 Ibid., para. 20. 
1716 R G Hansen & JR Lott, (1996), ‘Externalities and corporate objectives in a world with diversified 
shareholder/consumers’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(1), 43-68. 
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Zechner, 19941717), legal ownership over companies being separated from its control (Berle 
and Means, 19911718). Recent literature proposes methods for incorporating these consideration 
into the measurement indexes and resulting anti-monopolistic legislation. 
 
4.2.1.2. Cross-ownership 
 
O’Brien and Salop (2000), building on Bresnahan and Salop (1986)1719 define a 
framework where firms do not collude, either expressly or tacitly, yet the incentives driven by 
the cross ownership yield an anticompetitive outcome. In this framework, each firm sets its 
price independently and unilaterally, that is, on the assumption that its pricing decision will 
have no effect on the prices charged by its competitors. The key element of the framework is 
that the objective function of the firm’s manager takes into account to which extent a firm’s 
most powerful owners are also owners of natural competitors, and vice versa. The 
anticompetitive outcome in the framework is driven by the two aspects of the cross ownership: 
the financial and the control ones.  
The financial mechanism is purely structural: cross ownership links the fortunes of 
actual or potential competitors, producing a positive correlation among their profits. The 
manager of the firm A thus has financial interest in other firms’ profits that enters his incentives 
through the cross ownership, although this may warrant some more subtle analysis. For 
instance, if firm A owns some stock in firm B and the manager is judged on the total profit of 
firm A, then indeed A’s manager will behave less aggressively with B. However if the stock in 
A is only owned by some of the owners in A, then A’s manager only cares if these specific 
owners exert significant control on A. The linking of profits gives each firm an incentive to 
compete less vigorously and adopt behaviour more conducive to joint profit maximization than 
otherwise would be the case (for the full framework of financial interest and corporate control 
see Reynolds and Snapp, 19861720). 
A second reason the acquisition might diminish competition arises if the acquisition 
gives firm A some degree of corporate control over the management of other firms. This 
concerns situations where a firm would exercise its corporate governance powers in other firms 
in the market to restrain these firms’ competitive actions against its profits (for detailed 
discussion, see O’Brien and Waehrer, 20171721).  
O’Brien and Salop (2000) formalise methodologies1722 for evaluating partial ownership 
acquisitions in application to both major models that describe individual firms incentives in 
                                                          
1717 A R Admati, P Pfleiderer, & J Zechner, (1994). ‘Large shareholder activism, risk sharing, and financial market 
equilibrium’. journal of Political Economy, 102(6), 1097-1130. 
1718 A A Berle & G G C Means,  (1991). The modern corporation and private property. Transaction publishers. 
1719 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559;; T Bresnahan & S C Salop, ‘Quantifying The Competitive Effects of 
Production Joint Ventures’, (1986) 4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 155 
1720 R J Reynolds & B R Snapp, ‘The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures’, (1986) 
4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 141 
1721 D P O'Brien & K Waehrer, ‘The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less than We Think’,  
(February 23, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922677 
1722 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; 
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oligopolistic markets. Cournot model (competition on quantity) is addressed by modified HHI 
(or MHHI). Bertrand model (competition on price) is captured by the Price Pressure Index, or 
PPI (which builds on the past work on diversion ratios of the firm’s sales to its merger partner, 
Shapiro, 19951723).  
The financial incentive is more striking from the point of view of the economic theory. 
It suggests that the cross ownership has the capability to distort the incentives of the firms away 
from competition towards maximising a weighted sum of the owners’ financial returns – 
through the returns from the firm itself but also through the returns from the other firms in the 
same market. This does not require any action from the cross owners1724.  
The O’Brien and Salop (2000) model incorporates both financial and control incentives 
through the assumption that the firm’s manager weighs the interests of the firm’s owners in the 
way that incorporates both their financial interest and their control over the firm1725. The firm’s 
manager then the objective function which includes the weighted owners’ earnings. The weight 
on each owner’s profit in the manager’s objective function can be interpreted as a measure of 
the degree of control or influence the owner has over the firm’s managers. For example, in a 
case where the owner has no control over the manager, her weight in the manager’s objective 
function consists only of her financial interest. This weight is consequently lower than the 
weight of an owner with the same ownership percentage (i.e. the same financial interest) but 
also with control over the governance (i.e. voting shares).  
O’Brien and Salop (2000) (building on Bresnahan and Salop (1986)1726) propose the 
MHHI (modified HHI) index to capture the above effects. The MHHI comprises the initial 
market share HHI and the MHHI increases (the "deltas") which caused by the partial ownership 
transactions. The newly acquired financial interest of firm i in firm j is defined by the fraction 
(~) of entitlement of firm i to the profits of firm j. Analogously, the newly acquired corporate 
control is defined by the fraction (~) gained by firm i over firm j. Finally, these are weighted 
the pre-acquisition market shares of Si and Sj respectively.  
The authors present a range of possible MHHI reflecting the cases from silent 
financial interest to total control. The general formula for the MHHI used in the subsequent 
literature is given without an assumption on the degree of control:  
 
 
MHHI =  𝐻𝐻𝐼 +  ∑  ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑘
𝑘≠𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
 
The MHHI is mentioned in footnote 25 of the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines. It has also 
been presented in details in the context of the 2013 public consultation “Towards more 
                                                          
1723 C Shapiro, ‘Mergers with differentiated products’, (1995), Antitrust, 10, 23. 
1724 Although one may also raise the question on why would a manager maximise such a weighted sum rather than 
care only about those in control. 
1725 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; 
1726D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; T Bresnahan & S C Salop, ‘Quantifying The Competitive Effects of 
Production Joint Ventures’, (1986) 4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 155 
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effective EU merger control” and extensively referred to in the annex I to the Commission staff 
working document “Towards more effective EU merger control”1727. In Case M.6541 – 
Glencore / Xstrata, the minority stake of Glencore in Xstrata was taken into account in 
measuring the increase in concentration in the EEA production of all grades of zinc metal, as 
well as in the concentration in their EEA supply1728. With regard to the case law, the MHHI, 
or implicitly referred to, has been used in  Cases M.1383 – Exxon / Mobil78 and M.1715 – 
Alcan / Pechiney1729, in which a series of equity cross-holding between the parties and their 
competitors affected the competitive assessment, in Case M.2283 – Schneider / Legrand1730, in 
order to assess the adverse effect on competition caused by Schneider’s stake in Legrand,  and 
in Case M.6576 – Munksjö / Ahlstrom1731, in order to assess the impact of common 
shareholders on control in relation to the design of the remedy proposal1732. The test was also 
referred to in the recent Dow/Dupont merger of the European Commission, which will be 
examined in the last Section of this Chapter1733. 
Much of the debate in the subsequent sections concerns whether this is an appropriate 
measure to enforce. In our opinion, the value of this formulation lies primarily in capturing the 
mechanism of the possible effect of cross-ownership on market competition – whilst the exact 
measurement of the effect is open to debate. 
 
4.2.1.3. Common ownership 
 
Until recently, there has not been a theoretical framework for evaluating the common 
ownership effects on the market processes described above. The recent theoretical work by 
Azar (2017) attempts to fill this gap by developing a model of a firm behaviour in an 
oligopolistic setting where the firm aggregates and shareholder objectives, including the 
common ownership1734. The framework posits the following premise: a common shareholder 
with equal shares in all firms in the market cannot benefit from competition and therefore will 
not encourage it. The mechanisms supporting this premise are hypothesised as follows. If one 
firm competes aggressively for market share, this share comes at the expense of the other firms 
in the market. The decrease in revenues for the other firms is, however, greater than the increase 
in revenues for the aggressively competitive firm. For example, in a simplest version of 
oligopolistic market, two firms A and B are of equal size. If A undercuts B’s price to attract 
customers from B, it gains market share and many more products at this slightly reduced price. 
The average price on the market is lower, while the total number of customers remains the 
                                                          
1727 Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2016/part2_en.pdf 
1728 Case M.6541 – Glencore/Xstrata, OJ C109, 11.4.2014, page 1.] 
1729  
1730 Case M.2283 – Schneider / Legrand, OJ L101, 6.4.2004, p. 134–148 
1731 , Case M.6576 – Munksjö/Ahlstrom, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6576 20130524 20600 4231067 EN.pdf . 
1732 Case M.1715 – Alcan/Pechiney, withdrawn on 14 March 2000, Decision in Case M.2283 – Schneider / 
Legrand, OJ L101, 6.4.2004, pages 134–148, Case M.6576 – Munksjö/Ahlstrom, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6576 20130524 20600 4231067 EN.pdf 
1733 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), Annex 5, paras 61-79. 
1734 J Azar, ‘A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification’ (November 8, 2011). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1993364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993364 
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same. Hence, the effect on the total producer rents on the market is negative. Consequently, an 
investor holding equal-sized stakes in both A and B enjoys greater total (i.e. portfolio) profits 
when the firms set prices or quantities as if they were two divisions of a monopoly. The authors 
conclude that only separate owners have interest in aggressive competitive strategy. Crowding 
them out of the most powerful shareholders makes the firm lose support for the competitive 
strategy.  
The measurement indexes developed in the paper follow premises similar to O’Brien 
and Salop (2000)1735 and consequently arrive at the same functional form. Since the MHHI in 
its original form ignores beneficial ownership by financial investors. AST(2016) modify the 
MHHI to take into account beneficial ownership by financial investors, which in most cases 
are industry outsiders1736. In this version of the index, all the holdings of the financial investors 
are included into “delta” part of the calculation of the index as follows. 
For a firm j and its share of the market sj, the HHI is given by ∑ sj
2
j . The total market 
concentration MHHI is then composed of the market share, HHI, and the common ownership 
concentration, MHHI, as follows: 
 
 
∑   
𝑗
∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑘
𝑠𝑘
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑖
=  ∑ 𝑠𝑗
2
𝑗
+ ∑  ∑ 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑘
𝑘≠𝑗𝑗
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
 
 
where 𝛽𝑖𝑗is the ownership share of firm j accruing to shareholder i, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 the control share 
of firm j exercised by shareholder i, and k indexes firm j’s competitors. HHI captures the 
number and relative size of competitors; MHHI captures the density of the ownership 
network, i.e. to which extent these competitors are connected by common ownership and 
control links.  
Note that in this model the economic incentive remains independent of any coordination 
or communications among the firms. The basic anticompetitive effects arise from the fact that 
interlocking shareholdings diminish each individual firm’s incentives to cut prices or expand 
output by increasing the costs of taking away sales from rivals. 
Also note that managers actively demanding reduced competition to drive up profit 
margins in the portfolio is not a single possible incentive and, this, not a necessary requirement 
for this model. In fact, managers may be driven by the desire for “quiet life” (Hicks, 1935; for 
recent empirical evidence see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 20031737). This can result in omission 
to explicitly demand or incentivize tougher competition between portfolio firms, thus also 
leading to an equilibrium with reduced competition and sustained high margins. 
                                                          
1735 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate 
Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 559; 
1736 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345 
1737  Hicks, (1935). ‘Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly’. Econometrica: Journal of the 
Econometric Society, 1-20; M Bertrand & S Mullainathan, (2003). ‘Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance 
and managerial preferences’. Journal of political Economy, 111(5), 1043-1075. 
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4.2.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
The emerging branch of empirical research has recently demonstrated links between 
common ownership and industry-level profit margins (Azar, 20121738) and firm-level 
profitability and market shares (He and Huang, 20141739). The two most concern-raising studies 
find effects of common ownership on product prices. AST(2016)1740 apply the common-
ownership adjusted MHHI to the U.S airline industry. They find (1) common ownership 
concentration at levels that they consider likely to yield regulatory concerns, and (2) the effect 
of the common ownership on the airfares estimated in the range of 3-12 percent. Similarly, 
ARS(2016)1741 use a generalised HHI (GHHI) that encompasses both cross ownership and 
common ownership in the U.S. banking sector and find a causal link between this measure and 
the higher prices for banking products. 
The empirical evidence lends itself nicely to a split into two parts – evidence of 
concentrated common ownership in the industry, and the evidence of the link between such 
concentration and higher prices. 
AST (2016)1742 demonstrate that, conversely, the ownership structure of most of the 
large US airlines (barring Virgin Airlines) shows that there are no owners with significant 
influence - the largest shares of stock a single investor would hold are under 20%. The authors 
use this fact to support their claim that there are no owners with significant influence who are 
interested in competition between these airlines.  
For the concentration of common ownership, AST (2016)1743 calculate that for the 
average airline route, the HHI has ranged over time from approximately 5000 to 5400 and 
ΔMHHI has ranged from approximately 1000 to 2600, resulting in MHHIs ranging from 
approximately 6000 to 8000. Authors then analyse their findings on the MHHI from the 
perspective if the same logic currently used towards HHI worldwide was applied to MHHI. 
I.e., if the regulator were to consequentially apply this logic to changes of market concentration 
that are due to common ownership, asset managers would have to prove that the common 
ownership links that their holdings or acquisitions create do not affect market prices. If the 
proposition of identical mapping of the HHI guideline to the MHHI, the figures for the latter 
that study identifies are more than two to three times the federal guidelines’ HHI threshold of 
2500 and ΔMHHIs that are five to thirteen times greater than the guidelines’ ΔHHI threshold 
                                                          
1738 J Azar, ‘A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification’ (November 8, 2011). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1993364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993364 
1739 J He & J Huang, ‘Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Evidence from Institutional 
Blockholdings’ (January 13, 2016). Forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2380426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380426 
1740 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345 
1741 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252 
1742 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345 
1743 Ibid. 
463 
 
of 200. The airline stock acquisitions that produced an average MHHI of 5000–5400 and 
average ΔMHHI of 1000–2600 should thus presumed highly likely to have anticompetitive 
effects. 
ARS (2016)1744 show a similar common ownership pattern for the US banks. Among 
the top-five beneficial owners for all the six largest banks, three companies are always the same 
(Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street), and Berkshire Hathaway or Fidelity are present in 
most of the cases. Applying the GHHI index that accounts for the cross ownership and common 
ownership, ARS (2016)1745 show that considering ownership significantly increases county-
level banking concentration in the U.S. banking industry. 
Whilst the acceptable levels of market concentration can be debated (and will be 
debated in the section below), the rise of industry prices above the competition level poses the 
main concern for the policy makers. AST (2016)1746 find that after controlling the market 
concentration captured by HHI and the other known determinants and relating common 
ownership and prices within the same firm, time, and industry (which reduces the amount of 
confounding variation) - the common ownership concentration, as measured by MHHI, has 
explanatory power over the ticket prices, estimated at an increment of 3-12 percent of the price. 
In line with these effects, ARS (2016)1747 find that the GHHI has a positive and highly 
significant effect on fees and thresholds for interest-bearing checking accounts (but not on the 
interest rate spreads for the accounts). They estimate an $0.80-$1.16 higher average fee growth 
and a $900-$1,200 higher threshold growth for the top tercile countries in their dataset. These 
are the first empirical results that explicitly link common ownership and higher prices in two 
different industries. 
 
4.2.3. Criticism 
 
Extending the OS model to account for common ownership and the empirical 
application of this model posit serious challenges. We review three types of criticism directed 
at the (1) appropriateness of the choice of measure of common ownership, (2) methods of 
empirical estimation of the effect common ownership on prices, and (3) the mechanism linking 
common ownership with reduced incentives to compete. It is easy to note, that the (1) and (2) 
are methodological concerns that call for improvement of the models and estimation 
techniques, whereas the (3) casts doubt on the issue of common ownership per se. We agree 
with the need for further methodological improvements, but we are not convinced by the 
arguments that try to do away with the issue itself. 
 
                                                          
1744 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252 
1745 Ibid. 
1746 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345 
1747 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252 
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4.2.3.1. Measurement 
 
RR (2017a)1748 raise concern whether the proposed measurement is appropriate –i.e. 
whether common ownership element of the MHHI should be given the same weight as the 
market concentration HHI. They present an exercise on potential large differences arising from 
varying the way in which the common ownership enters the equation for market concentration. 
For two major institutional investors, each holding a 10 percent ownership share in all the 
airlines the MHHIΔ will equal 125 in the O’Brien-Salop framework. This calculation assumes 
that each airline will choose its output on the assumption that it will internalize 10 percent of 
the profits generated by each of the other airlines. Under an assumption that the institutional 
investors’ stock holdings give them one-way control, the MHHIΔ would increase to 750. By 
contrast, if the airline managers do not account for the effect of their strategy on institutional 
investors’ other holdings, the MHHIΔ would be zero. RR (2017a)1749 thus state that the MHHI 
framework is extremely sensitive to the extent to which managers will take into account the 
effects on their shareholders other investments. Applying the O’Brien and Salop model to 
another example of one investor holding 30% compared to three investors each holding 10%, 
they disagree that single ownership of 30% should be treated equally to 3 investors owning 
10% each. The second example also raises the questions of endogeneity of the 30%, but likely 
not the 10% holding – discussed in greater detail below.  
Indeed, in their empirical test ARS (2017)1750 assume that the DOJ/FTC Merger 
Guidelines’ emphasis on the importance of HHIs in investigation into potential anticompetitive 
effects maps directly to the MHHI framework. This is a very strong assumption to make, and 
further research is needed to develop informative measurement techniques. This criticism feeds 
directly into the methodological challenges for the policy making, whilst it does not undermine 
the model itself. 
In summary, the value of the MHHIΔ in its current formulation is questionable and 
needs further improvement. In particular, to establish the extent to which it is capable of 
affecting the competition and whether same or lower threshold should be applied compared to 
market concentration, HHI. 
 
4.2.3.2. Methodology of the empirical estimation of links between common ownership and 
prices 
 
The multiple factors that can influence both common ownership and price-cost margins 
across firms or industries pose significant methodological challenges to interpreting the 
correlations between the two as causal links.  
                                                          
1748 EB Rock & DL Rubinfeld, ‘Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate 
Governance’ (March 1, 2017). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-05. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855 
1749 Ibid. 
1750 1750 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
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O’Brien and Waehrer (2017)1751 raise the concern of possible endogeneity (or, reverse 
causality) of the MHHI. If factors other than common ownership affect both price and the 
MHHI, the empirical finding of the relationship between price and the MHHI would not reflect 
the relationship between price and common ownership, but both of these with the omitted 
variable. The authors argue that all three concentration measures of the MHHI equation are 
endogenous variables that depend on the same exogenous factors that affect equilibrium prices. 
For example, marginal cost reduction of a single firm in a symmetric oligopoly increases the 
market share of the firm that experiences the cost reduction and increases the HHI. However, 
the cost reduction typically reduces price. Thus, regressions of price on the MHHI are likely to 
show a relationship even if common ownership has no actual causal effect on price.  
O’Brien and Waehrer (2017)1752 also challenge the inconsistency between the empirical 
specifications of the AST (2016) estimates for the MHHI and the economic theory. In 
particular, they show that, theoretically, MHHI may rise or fall with an increase in common 
ownership that is asserted to affect price. Therefore, a positive relationship between the MHHI 
and price does not necessarily imply a positive relationship between common ownership and 
price. 
Gramlich and Grundl (2017)1753 attempt applying an alternative methodology which 
places fewer restrictions on the nature of competition. They directly analyse the weights that 
firms place on each other’s’ profits rather than measures of industry concentration (MHHI and 
GHHI) used in APS(2017) and ARS(2017)1754. The effects they find are somewhat consistent 
with the APS(2017) and ARS(2017)1755, but the sign of the effect is not robust, and implied 
magnitudes of the effects that are found are small. 
We believe that these methodological concerns reflect the underlying need for 
continued examination of empirical data and refinement of methodologies that allow to 
produce robust, unbiased result, informative for relevant policy-making.   
 
4.2.3.3. Possibility of the undecoordinated effect of common ownership feeding into the 
coordinated effect on horizontal competition  
 
RR (2017a)1756 challenge ‘the ability of shareholders to influence managers to soften 
competition so as to maximize investors’ portfolio value’. The financial incentives mechanism 
cited extensively in the literature makes it clear that shareholders do not have to actively 
                                                          
1751 D P O'Brien & K Waehrer, ‘The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We Know Less than We Think’,  
(February 23, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922677 
1752 Ibid. 
1753 J Gramlich, & S Grundl, ‘Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’. (April 21, 2017). FEDS 
Working Paper No. 2017-029. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2017.029r1 
1754 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
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influence the managers; common knowledge of their preferences is a sufficient condition. 
RR (2017a)1757 also doubt feasibility of firm managers taking into account holdings of 
shareholders in their competitors. They deem this not feasible because of: (1) substantial 
heterogeneity among the holdings of the largest shareholders, (2) dynamic nature of the 
investor portfolios.  
We are not convinced by this argument, since both heterogeneity of shareholders and 
dynamic portfolios appear commensurable with the model. Firstly, there is no consensus about 
the level of market concentration that triggers this incentive mechanism – thus “substantial 
heterogeneity” in the eyes of R&R (2017a)1758 may well be enough concentration in the 
objective function of the firm’s manager. The authors give a following example of differential 
incentives within a shareholder circle: ‘At the end of 2016, PRIMECAP had differentially 
weighted holdings of the airlines: 2.85% of Delta, 11.78% of Southwest, 8.97% of American, 
6.27% of United, 4.95% of Alaska Air and 5.91% of JetBlue. T. Rowe Price, by contrast, held 
13.99% of American and 10.14% of Alaska Air, smaller holdings of 1.26% of Southwest and 
2.25% of United, and nothing in Delta and JetBlue.  PRIMECAP might argue for Southwest 
and JetBlue to undercut Delta and United if that would be in the unilateral interest of Southwest 
and JetBlue, respectively. T. Rowe Price, by contrast, would likely object were United Airlines 
management to take into account the effect of its strategy on Delta and JetBlue because it is 
only invested in United and Southwest.’ We believe that the premises of this argument still boil 
down to the measurement of expected profits and the precise way they enter the PRIMECAP’s 
incentives and, consequently, incentives of the firms in which it holds shares. To predict 
PRIMECAP strategy we need to understand which outcome (competitive or non-competitive) 
outweighs, considered both over the short and the long term.  
As for dynamic portfolios, RR (2017a)1759 claim that ‘holdings change quite 
dramatically over time, making it impossible to count on incentives of others’. To exemplify, 
they compare top ten shareholdings in Southwest as of March 31, 2013 with the shareholdings 
in Southwest as of 2016Q4. They highlight that while PRIMECAP was the largest shareholder 
at both times, Berkshire Hathaway acquired its 7% sometime between the two periods. T. Rowe 
Price, by contrast, reduced its holding from 5.3% to 1.26% while Fidelity increased its holding 
from 3% to 5.53%. In our view, the overarching model applied by AST (2016)1760 assumes that 
the firm’s manager maximises a weighted aggregate of investor interests – which can feasibly 
include dynamic expectations over fluctuations in shareholdings. Furthermore, we find it 
plainly surprising that in the current day markets largely driven by analytics, forecasting, and 
feasibility studies for potential scenarios R&R (2017a)1761 consider complexity a feasible 
challenge.  
                                                          
1757 Ibid. 
1758 Ibid. 
1759 EB Rock & DL Rubinfeld, ‘Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate 
Governance’ (March 1, 2017). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-05. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855 
1760 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252 
1761 EB Rock & DL Rubinfeld, ‘Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement in Corporate 
Governance’ (March 1, 2017). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-05. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855 
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R&R (2017a)1762 also refer to vertical integration as a potential source of complexity 
that interferes with manager’s ability to aggregate investor interests. In their example, 
BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street also manage funds that own shares of the airlines’ 
suppliers (e.g., Exxon, Boeing) and customers (e.g. GE, GM, and IBM). We see this not as a 
viable criticism of the model – the mechanisms affecting manager’s decision-making can 
potentially allow for a more complex way of how the portfolio structure enters their objective 
function. We view it as another reason to conduct further research specifically into the 
mechanisms of common ownership in vertically integrated holdings. 
This brings us to back to the broader picture of this debate. The policy makers are 
ultimately concerned about the possibility of anticompetitive outcomes arising from common 
ownership.  The outcome the research in this area aims to define and prevent is ultimately the 
conditions under which ‘firms may be able to collude with each other to create and abuse 
market power, for example by agreeing to raise prices or by restricting output (thereby raising 
prices) to consumers or by restricting wage growth for workers’1763 
Given the current state of the literature, we feel in the position to call for further 
empirical research and theoretical investigation into the complex structures of (horizontal and 
vertical) common ownership in market value chains and its effect on competitor firms, 
suppliers and consumers. 
 
4.2.3.4. Common ownership as a vertical issue? 
 
In addition to the horizontal collusion concerns that may arise out of common 
ownership by financial investors, one needs also to explore the risks that the presence of the 
same financial investors in all concentrated segments of the food value chain may create for 
the development of practices leading to the reduction of the margins of the only segment of the 
food value chain that is not overly concentrated, farming. One may argue that the transmission 
mechanism here is simpler, to the extent that squeezing farmers’ margins is something that 
managers of firms situated upstream want to do anyway, so the issue of owners controlling 
managers is less important than in the context of horizontal non-coordinated effects. A manager 
of an upstream input supplier may also have more incentives to squeeze if he knows others will 
not try to steal its business by being “nicer”.  
The question one may ask is what would be the incentives of the common investors in 
case the restriction of vertical competition, that is competition between the various segments 
of the value chain for a larger share of the total surplus value produced by the value chain, 
could increase their profits to the detriment of the farmers’ segment of the value chain? One 
may argue that there could be two types of concerns here. First, in case the financial investor 
is present in both the upstream input and the farming sector, as some of them undoubtedly are, 
this may raise vertical foreclosure effects which are similar to those expressed in the context 
of margin squeeze. Margin squeeze requires the ability to act directly in the downstream 
market, hence the financial investor should also be present in the farming segment. Second, in 
                                                          
1762 Ibid. 
1763 Council of Economic Advisors (2016): “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Available 
online 
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case the financial investor is present only in the segments situated upstream and downstream 
from the farming segment, there might be an exploitative concern, with regard to the restriction 
of vertical competition over the total surplus value and the squeezing of the margins of the non-
concentrated framework, that of farmers. One should nevertheless bear in mind that the aim 
pursued here will be different, in comparison to the margin squeeze exclusionary context, as it 
will consist more in extracting/capturing a higher share of the joint profit of the cooperation 
between the different segments of the food value chain than in excluding a competitor upstream 
or downstream. One should therefore examine the incentives and the ability of financial 
investors to rely on their common ownership of the other segments of the value chain (in 
particular factors of production and processing) in order to extract this additional revenue and 
to marginalise vertical competition from the non-concentrated segment of the food value chain, 
thus reducing the profitability of farming.  
 
4.2.3.4.1 Mechanisms of a classic foreclosure in vertical market structure 
 
From an economic perspective, margin squeeze supposes the existence of a vertically 
integrated firm with a dominant position in an upstream market and which prevents its (non-
vertically integrated) rival in a downstream market from achieving ʻan economically viable 
price-cost marginʼ1764 (see Figure 1). Margin squeeze may also result from a reduction of 
vertical competition, should, for instance  
 
Figure 1: Classic market structure in which a margin squeeze might arise1765 
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1764 R O’Donoghue and J Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Pub, 2nd ed, 2013) 366. 
1765 OECD, Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP(2009)36, 25. 
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According to the EU case law, there is margin squeeze if the spread between the 
wholesale prices upstream and the retail prices to end users downstream practiced by the 
dominant undertaking were either negative or insufficient to cover the specific costs at the 
upstream level which the dominant undertaking has to incur in order to supply its own retail 
services to end users, so that that spread does not allow a competitor which is as efficient as 
that undertaking to compete for the supply of those services to end users1766. This margin 
squeeze leads the dominant underttaking’s actual or potential equally efficient rivals to operate 
on the retail market only at a loss or at artificially reduced levels of profitability. Hence margin 
squeeze covers both situations of negative and positive margins. 
Economists identify different rationales/theories of harm for (anticompetitive) margin 
squeeze.  
First, the behaviour may be the result of an exclusionary practice, which may either be 
based on predation, or on anticompetitive foreclosure.  
A predation theory of harm would involve a profit sacrifice in the first phase and 
recoupment in the second phase. This is the only available theory of harm in case the wholesale 
price is set by regulators on a strictly cost-basis. Application of a predatory pricing theory of 
harm would involve that the competition authority or court examine ʻwhether the dominant 
firm’s own downstream business would be profitable if it had to pay the same actual input 
prices as third partiesʼ, that is ʻa test of downstream predatory pricing in the context of vertical 
integrationʼ.1767  
The focus here would be on the analysis of downstream competition between the 
dominant undertaking and its competitor(s). There are, however, also notable differences 
between margin squeeze and predatory pricing: first, although in predation cases competition 
authorities look to all costs of the dominant undertaking, they only look at the costs in the 
downstream market and the upstream price for margin squeeze; second, margin squeeze does 
not involve that the dominant undertaking is losing money overall, as it might be able to gain 
profits upstream rather than downstream and the margin squeeze may be overall profitable for 
the vertically integrated undertaking. Hence, it is not necessary to examine the recoupment of 
this ʻsacrificeʼ by the dominant undertaking, as it may well be that the undertaking recoups its 
losses more or less simultaneously throughout the period of the abuse of margin squeeze.1768 
The existence of a ʻsacrificeʼ in margin squeeze cases may however take different forms, such 
as the opportunity cost for each unit not sold to downstream competitors, because of the high 
price of the bottleneck input, this opportunity cost being sometimes quite large if the wholesale 
price is above the upstream marginal cost (eg in presence of large economies of scale). 
                                                          
1766 Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, paras 25-26, 32-34. 
1767 R O’Donoghue and J Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Pub, 2nd ed, 2013) 397. 
1768 Ibid., 398. 
PDown 
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An anticompetitive foreclosure theory of harm may involve a vertical foreclosure, 
which would arise when ʻthe bottleneck good is either used as an input (eg an infrastructure) 
by a potentially competitive downstream industry (input foreclosure) […], or when the 
bottleneck is needed to access final consumers (customer foreclosure)”.1769 A distinct 
possibility is horizontal foreclosure, which ʻarises when the monopolized good is sold directly 
to customers, who use it in conjunction with complementary goods (eg system goods or 
aftersale services), involving scenarios in which the integrated undertaking attempts to protect 
its upstream monopoly or core market from potential competition by downstream customers 
or its market position in an adjacent market. Although most of the scenarios involving margin 
squeeze examined by EU and national competition authorities and courts involved vertical 
foreclosure, as ʻmargin squeeze allegations are typically made in network industries where a 
vertically integrated operator supplies access to its network to downstream competitorsʼ, one 
cannot exclude the horizontal foreclosure scenario as well. Vertical foreclosure may involve 
the leverage theory of harm, the margin squeeze being explained by the anticompetitive motive 
to monopolize the downstream market, or to dampen competition in the downstream market. 
The vertical foreclosure theory was subject to criticism by the Chicago school of antitrust 
economics, which argued that there is a single monopoly profit to be made overall from end to 
end in the vertically integrated structure, and that the bottleneck monopolist may earn the entire 
monopoly profit simply by charging the monopoly margin at the upstream (bottleneck input) 
level and, consequently, leveraging market power from the bottleneck input market to the 
downstream market is not the main rationale for adopting such practices, and that these may 
be explained by efficiency reasons.1770 The single monopoly profit theorem was criticized by 
post-Chicago antitrust economists, observing the very strict assumptions under which it may 
apply and the fact that in the absence of exclusionary practices the upstream monopolist cannot 
fully exert its monopoly power.1771 The horizontal foreclosure argument will often take the 
form of maintenance of monopoly theory of harm or defensive leveraging. 
 Second, margin squeeze may arise as ʻa by-product of pure exploitation of upstream 
market power by a vertically integrated firmʼ, the upstream monopolist raising prices above 
the competitive level in order to ʻappropriate some of the value created by downstream 
firmsʼ.1772 By raising its price upstream the bottleneck monopolist will reduce the profits of 
downstream competitors which will be captured by the monopolist upstream (excessive pricing 
theory of harm). Of course, the monopolist should never charge prices that are so high as to 
eliminate its downstream rivals, because this will eliminate the wholesale profits made by 
selling the bottleneck input to them, the vertically integrated undertaking deriving revenue from 
two sources: the wholesale level and the retail level. This exploitative strategy makes sense in 
particular when the downstream rivals are differentiated from the vertically integrated firm’s 
                                                          
1769 B Jullien, P Rey and C Saavedra, The Economics of Margin Squeeze, IDEI mimeo (March 2014) 11. 
1770 More on the ʻsingle monopoly profitʼ argument, XXX. 
1771 See, our analysis, XXX. 
1772 B Jullien, P Rey and C Saavedra, The Economics of Margin Squeeze, IDEI mimeo (March 2014) 19. In 
contrast, Chicago school of economics would disagree with the characterization of such conduct as abusive 
behavior. The single-monopoly profit theorem posits that the upstream monopolist can extract its rent by charging 
downstream rivals.  Hence it is hard to claim this is about abuse of dominance to the extent that that is what they 
would expect a dominant operator to do. 
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downstream unit. For example, downstream rivals may preside a niche market segment, or may 
offer better customer service, thus being able to sell at a premium compared to the vertically 
intergrated firm’s downstream price. Yet, exploitative wholesale pricing may reduce the 
competitiveness of downstream competitors, thus providing the monopolist a ʻprice umbrellaʼ, 
enabling him to raise prices at the downstream level, or increase the profits of its downstream 
unit (raising rivals’ costs theory). 
In addition to these anticompetitive harm narratives, economists also acknowledge that 
a margin squeeze conduct may also generate plausible efficiency gains, such as dynamic 
pricing in markets with network effects and switching costs, promotional efforts for experience 
or credence goods, emergent markets, or even the motivation to use margin squeeze in order to 
meet competition. It is also often argued that the likelihood of error in identifying a margin 
squeeze is high as competition authorities and courts may not take into account other possible 
justification for the finding that downstream costs exceed the difference between upstream and 
downstream prices, such as industry shakeouts or temporary responses to bad market 
conditions, or the fact that the company may be undertaking legitimate investments in order to 
enhance its future profitability. 
 As it is not possible to always observe the price at which the firm sells its bottleneck 
input to its downstream sector, or because of the possibility of a fully integrated firm to shift 
apparent profits around within the upstream and downstream components of the same firm 
(through transactions or transfer pricing), the price at which the integrated firm sells its 
bottleneck input are inferred or imputed. The process is explained in the following excerpt: 
“The most important element of a margin squeeze concerns the methodology to be 
applied to identify (or impute) an abuse. This raises several issues. First, what legal test 
should be applied to determine whether the dominant firm’s upstream and downstream 
prices cause the activities of a downstream rival to be uneconomic, i.e. either loss-
making or insufficient to provide a “reasonable profit”. The most commonly-applied 
test is whether the dominant firm’s own downstream operations would make a profit if 
they had to pay the same input price as rivals. A second, related issue is whether a 
different test based on the costs of a “reasonably efficient entrant” can also be applied. 
Third, the relevant cost standard to be applied to the dominant firm’s downstream 
operations needs to be identified. Fourth, because margin squeeze concerns the price 
spread, or margin, one must look not only at costs but also at profitability, and it is 
necessary to apply a specific methodology in this regard. Finally, it needs to be ensured 
that the compared inputs, costs, and downstream revenues are truly comparable. […] 
A number of alternative tests could be envisaged in order to ascertain whether the 
dominant firm’s prices would unlawfully exclude downstream rivals: (1) whether the 
dominant firm’s own downstream operations could trade profitably on the basis of the 
wholesale price charged to third parties for the relevant input; (2) whether the dominant 
firm’s downstream rivals could trade profitably on the basis of the wholesale price 
charged by the dominant firm; (3) whether some notional or hypothetical “reasonably 
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efficient operator” could trade profitably on the basis of the dominant firm’s input 
prices; or (4) a combination of some or all of the preceding tests”1773. 
With regard to the above imputation tests, the one focusing on the dominant firm’s own 
costs is only concerned with margin squeeze conduct that may exclude firms that are as 
efficient as the dominant undertaking, that it the excluded rivals have costs than the dominant 
firm (the Dominant undertaking’s own costs test). The test is practical as the dominant firm 
cannot know its rivals’ costs but only its own costs. 1774 Another imputation test would focus 
on the costs of a reasonably efficient competitor, which will find abusive a margin that is 
insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient competitor to obtain a normal profit, for instance 
the downstream rival’s costs (the reasonable efficient competitor test). The second test may 
lead to the application of competition law if the margin squeeze excludes a less efficient rival 
than the dominant firm, as long as this is a ʻreasonably efficientʼ competitor.1775 Hence, the test 
involves a crucial choice as to the degree of efficiency it is reasonable to expect from rivals 
and emphasizes the competitive process, rather than efficiency as such, as the test facilitates 
the maintenance of competitors even less efficient than the dominant undertaking in the market. 
 The application of the equally efficient competitor test involves the consideration of all 
product-specific costs that the dominant firm incurs at the downstream market, exploring 
whether given these cost the dominant undertaking would remain profitable on the basis of the 
bottleneck input price it charges its competitors. Long-run average incremental costs constitute 
the most commonly applied cost benchmark in margin squeeze cases and refer to the product-
specific costs linked with the total volume of output of the relevant product. As it is explained 
by the Commission, the choice of this cost benchmark  
ʻ[…] is in accordance with economic theory and the Commission's decisional practice 
where the ability of competitors to operate profitably in the long term was assessed. In 
order to assess whether the prices that the dominant firm applies over time are such that 
they can foreclose equally efficient competitors the costs considered must include the 
total costs which are incremental to the provision of the product/service. These are also 
the prices which form the basis of the firm's decision to investʼ.1776 
 Finally, margin squeeze claims involve some profitability analysis, which ʻentails 
assessing whether the vertically integrated dominant firm's own downstream operations could 
operate profitably on the basis of the upstream price charged to its competitors by its upstream 
operating armʼ.1777 This is performed either by employing a ʻ period by periodʼ approach, which 
ʻcompares for every year (or for shorter periods) the observed revenues and costs extracted 
                                                          
1773 R O’Donoghue and J Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart Pub, 2nd ed, 2013) 376 
1774 However, it could be argued that the Dominant undertaking can observe downstream rivals’ prices. This may 
be relevant where the downstream rival is differentiated and able to seel at a premium compared to the downstream 
price charged by the Dominant undertaking. Under these circumstances, failure to pass the as-efficient competitor 
test might not necessarily establish exclusionary intent, as the higher wholesale price charged to the downstream 
rival might be aimed at extracting the premium thereof, thus being exploitative in nature.  
1775 Where there are downstream economies of scale (ie, due to large fixed advertising costs) for example, the 
Dominant undertaking’s downstream costs might be adjusted upward to reflect the fact that the rival is operating 
at a lower scale. However, this treatment of downstream scale economies may amount to consider them as an 
anticompetitive entry barrier, which may be contentious. 
1776 European Commission, Contribution to the OECD, Margin Squeeze, DAF/COMP/WP2/WD(2009)32, 6. 
1777 Ibid., 6 
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from the dominant firm's accounts in which investment expenditure have been amortised over 
appropriate periodsʼ, or by using a discounted cash flow (ʻDCFʼ) approach, which ʻconsists in 
assessing the overall profitability over an adequate period (in general several years) in order to 
take account not only of current revenues but also of future revenues flowing from current 
investmentsʼ. 
 The question whether such foreclosure can be fuelled by the presence of institutional 
investors in most segments of the value chain is a truly underexplored area. We now review 
evidence from a range of papers analysing food (and several others) value chains with high 
concentrations of market power within many segments of the chain – and the correlated 
evidence of harm to the market.    
 
4.2.3.4.2 Empirical evidence on possible vertical exploitation from the food value chain 
 
Currently in the literature there is no clarity whether common ownership increase the 
opportunities for margin squeeze. There is however a number of studies that link general 
financialisation of the markets with shifting balance of power and, consequently, shifts of profit 
margins. Specifically for food industry, Isakson (2014) argues that financialisation of food 
markets led to (1) food retailers becoming the dominant players on the market, (2) food retailers 
activity being dictated by the finance capital, (3) exploitation of food workers and push down 
on the wages resulting from the financialisation, (4) small-scale farmers being most affected 
since they are the segment that remains most vulnerable to market volatility1778. The incentives 
the financialised segments create for the downstream segments make it economically 
unfeasible for the farmers to surpass interacting with them; at the same time, the costs of this 
financialisation have been (arguably) passed on to the farmers in the following segments of the 
value chain (for detailed overview see Isakson, 2014)1779.  
Food retailing. Retailers provide an inventory management model which is attractive 
for the downstream clients. It poses low demand on funds for inventory and storage, as well as 
1-3 months delay in payment to the supplying farmers – which frees up these funds for financial 
activities, that benefit shareholders. At the same time, retailers move the cost of providing this 
attractive model is shifted to the farmers, who receive late payments whilst having to comply 
with the “just in time” inventory demand.  
Agricultural risk. Same patterns are observed in the market for agricultural risk. Bush 
(2012)1780 develops an interesting argument where the expectations created by the speculative 
derivatives market increase the volatility of the real market – which affects smaller-scale 
farmers directly, and also makes it more expensive for the farmers to hedge their risks1781.   
                                                          
1778 S R Isakson ‘Food and finance: The financial transformation of agro-food supply chains’. (2014). Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 41(5), 749-775. 
 
1779 S R Isakson ‘Food and finance: The financial transformation of agro-food supply chains’. (2014). Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 41(5), 749-775. 
 
1781 S B Bush, ‘Derivatives and development: a political economy of global finance, farming, and poverty’. (2012),  
New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
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Food trade and processing. Murphy et al (2012)1782 highlight how foor retailers are 
increasingly engaged in a variety of financial activities where they leverage on their first-hand 
knowledge of the market conditions to drive profit for their clients. They provide an example 
of the world’s four largest grain traders – Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill and 
Louis Dreyfus (or, as they are collectively referred to, the ABCDs) – provide all established 
investment vehicles that allow external investors to speculate on agricultural commodities and 
other dimensions of food production. They state 
  ‘Due to their dominance of agricultural trade and their direct contact with food suppliers, the 
ABCDs are among the first to know about supply conditions, making their financial products 
particularly attractive to investors wishing to speculate on agricultural derivatives markets. 
Indeed, operating under the slogan ‘monetize our expertise’, Louis Dreyfus’ hedge fund, the 
Alpha Fund, expanded rapidly, growing some 20-fold within its first two years and, ultimately, 
refusing to accept new investors because the fund had grown so large after a mere three years 
of operation.’  
Given how profitable such hedge funds prove to be, Meyer (2009)1783 argues that the 
incentives in the market are currently shifter from the actual products to catering to speculators’ 
interest in price movements.  
Agricultural inputs and land. Market segments producing inputs such as land, seeds, 
fertilisers and machinery have seen an increasing inflow of investors over the past years 
(HiQuest, 2010)1784. Althought the “price-cost squeeze’ in this segment is the most 
understudies, it is argued that entrance of the investors was associated with raised prices, 
increased volatility, and greater barriers for the traditional farming models (e.g. moving from 
land-ownership to land-leasing) in these markets as well1785. 
In our view the evidence above makes a strong case for need to investigate the role of 
financialisation of food markets and, specifically, to what extent the described ‘profit-cost 
squeezes’ may be inabled by presense of the same institutional investors in all segments of the 
value chain apart from the faming. Another important issue to note is that most (or even all) of 
the processes described above can be posited as efficiency gains enabled by the development 
of the market. However, this raises a question of whether such efficiency gains at the expense 
of agriculture are firstly, sustainable, and, secondly – normatively appropriate. We discuss 
these in the next section. 
 
4.2.3.4.3. Effect of margin squeeze on long-term sustainability 
 
These concerns may be raised not only by common ownership, but more broadly by the 
financialisation of agricultural production, as most of the food value chains have been 
                                                          
1782 S Murphy, D Burch, J Clapp ‘Cereal Secrets: The World’s Largest Grain Traders and Global Agriculture’. 
(2012), Oxfam Research Reports. Oxford: Oxfam International. 
1783 J Mayer, ‘The growing interdependence between financial and commodity markets’. UNCTAD Discussion 
Paper No. 195. Geneva: United Nations Trade and Development Conference. 
1784 HighQuest Partners. ‘Private Financial Sector Investment in Farmland and Agricultural Infrastructure’. 
(2010). OECD Food, Agriculture, and Fisheries Papers, No. 33, OECD Publishing. 
1785 S R Isakson ‘Food and finance: The financial transformation of agro-food supply chains’. (2014). Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 41(5), 749-775. 
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financialised over recent years – apart from the farming segment of them (at least, to a 
considerable extent). As we are witnessing major power concentration alongside the different 
segments of the value chain, there is a major issue rising on the entire vertical of this chain – 
institutional investors having mechanisms that allow them to extract margins at every point of 
the food value chain, at the expense of the farming sector. Whilst this arrangement can be 
argued as optimal and efficient on the case-to-case basis, there are two issues with the overall 
picture. Firstly, whether such an arrangement poses a threat of negative effects on the farming 
industry in the long-term. Here we discuss the question of sharing the total surplus from the 
perspective of possibility to use this surplus to innovate, invest into sustainable practices and 
create buffers against economic shocks. The second issue is more normative: whether the 
system that creates instruments and incentives that allow institutional investors to gradually 
gain market power and extract the greater share of profit margins is a fair and sustainable 
system. We finally stress that the issue of the same investors being present in most segments 
of the chain is under researched, which makes it unclear to what extent it may be feeding into 
the presented adverse effects on the market.  
The lack of reliable profit stream can be a disincentive to look for long-term sustainable 
investment. At the same time, it has been shown that institutional investors do not provide a 
replacement incentives for sustainability through their economic decision-making1786. For 
example, the public consultation by European Commission on how the institutional investors 
factor in the environmental, social and governance (ESG) information and performance of 
companies or assets into investment decisions showed that the majority of investors did not 
consider that their fiduciary duty regarding ESG was not clear enough, creating reasons to not 
consider it in investment decisions1787. Recent study of supply chains of four food commodities 
selected for global economic importance and their potentially adverse impact on the 
environment (tuna, shrimp, soy and beef) finds multiple ties between the major financial 
institutions holding shares in the chains – and shows that passive investors engage less in 
sustainability issues compared with active investors1788. Thus, part of the investor profits in the 
value chain may be obtain at the expense of withdrawing incentives and the profit margins 
required for long-term sustainable production.  
Another sustainability question is whether the farming industry receives a sufficient 
share of the total surplus to be robust to economic shocks, if profit margins are (arguably) 
squeezed at the farmers’ end, this can prevent them from building saving buffers that allow 
them to survive a year of bad weather shocks. There exist instruments such as impact investing 
designed to include the issues of sustainability into the set of incentives for the institutional 
investors (see a detailed discussion by Rogalska, 2016)1789. We believe there is a need for a 
policy-driven discussion on including such incentives on a regulatory basis. 
                                                          
1786 A P van Duijn, R Beukers, R B Cowan, L O Judge, W van der Pijl, L Römgens,... & t Steinweg, ‘Financial 
value-chain analysis’ (2016).  (No. 2016-028). LEI Wageningen UR. 
1787 European Commission (2016), “Summary of the responses to the public consultation on Long-term and 
sustainable investment”, Brussels, October 2016 JUST/A3 
1788 Apart from the retail banks which often have developed sustainability policies. Authors, however, note that 
this financing is largely drawn on syndicated loans and this changes the dynamics of these banks’ leverage 
1789 M Rogalska, “Globalisation and Financialisation of the Economy Impact Investing at Scale as a 
Promising Response”. (2016) weatherhead Centre for International affairs, Harvard University 
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In the current market, the firms and the investors are efficiently and rationally following 
their incentives, reaping off profits in the ways that caters to their client interests. Further 
evaluation is needed to understand whether this is a sustainable way forward, or whether the 
cost-cutting and other activities enabled my market power concentration reduce the incentives 
and the profit surplus available for the farmers to innovate, invest into sustainable practices and 
withstand economic shocks.  This also raises a normative question: is it appropriate that most 
of the total surplus is extracted by the institutional investors, and what long-term effects it will 
have. Finally, the additional incentives present for the investors that hold shares in several 
segments of the market is the yet less researched issue. 
 
4.2.3.4.4. Evaluating the effects of financialisation on the economy: evidence and 
controversy  
 
 The effects of financialisation of most of the segments of the value chain has been 
linked to a range of observable market trends which are argued to have a long-term adverse 
effect on the economy; the controversy of these effects being driven by firms pursuing their 
shareholder interests in an optimal way deserves a separate discussion we develop in the 
following section. We again stress that whilst it is not unlikely to expect the same incentive 
mechanisms of common ownership present in horizontal markets to play a role on vertical as 
well, the research in these area is needed.  
Burch and Lawrence (2009, 2013)1790 analyse how private equity takeovers of 
supermarkets transform the food retail sector. They use a case-study of private equity 
consortium’s takeover of the Somerfield Supermarkets (UK) to identify four strategies that 
financial actors are employing as a means of realizing shareholder value: (1) narrowing the 
retailer’s product line and reducing the number of suppliers, thereby streamlining the sourcing 
process (including the closure of some distribution centers) and reducing costs; (2) reducing 
the number of employees (many of whom previously worked in the distribution centers) and 
increasing the workload (i.e. rate of exploitation) of the remaining workers; (3) disregarding 
previous commitments to environmental quality and the well-being of food producers in the 
global South, including Somerfield’s withdrawal from the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), 
which sets labor standards for developing country suppliers, and (4) de-bundling and 
repackaging assets, including the introduction of an operating company/property company 
(opco/propco) arrangement, whereby Somerfield sold its real estate properties to a newly 
created subsidiary of itself that, in turn, leased the property back to Somerfield. These 
transformations are argued to worsen the economic situation of specific groups in the market 
(farmers, labour force), and create long-term threats to the country’s economy (environmental 
sustainability); at the same time, however, these can be seen as efficient steps taken by the 
company to reduce costs and maximise its shareholders returns in the context of the current 
globalised market.  
                                                          
1790 B Burch & G Lawrence, ‘Towards a third food regime: behind the transformation. Agriculture and Human 
Values’, (2009). 26(4), 267–279; B Burch & G Lawrence, Financialization in agri-food supply chains: private 
equity and the transformation of the retail sector’. (2013). Agriculture and Human Values 30(2), 247–258. 
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There is a number of techniques that can provide measurements for the effects above; 
a more complex issue is, however, creating a framework for evaluating these longer-term 
effects against the shorter-term increases in investors profits that firms achieve through these 
activities. Specifically, studies use scanner and retail data measure prices at different stages of 
the value chain (for example, see Villas-Boas, 2007a; Villas-Boas, 2007b1791. Similar approach 
has been taken to measure changes in labour market that can be attributed to the increased 
saturation of common ownership. A greater challenge is, however, to evaluate these effects 
against the value driven by the institutional investors to their clients, which also include large 
parts of the society (e.g. pension funds). We thus believe there is a need for a coherent 
evaluative framework to allow quantifying and comparing such long-term effects for the 
economy against the shorter-term benefits for the shareholders against each other and make 
meaningful recommendations for regulative purposes.  
Another important long-term effect of financialisation is the withdrawal of value added 
sectors from the economy. For example, Ashman, Mohamed and Newman (2013) explore the 
case study Anglo American PLC, by far the most important South African company1792. In the 
1990s Anglo American had 100 subsidiaries in South Africa, manufacturing accounted for 
about 30 per cent of its revenues, and its activities collectively accounted for over 40 per cent 
of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange market capitalization. By 2007 however, following the 
process restructuring Anglo had either moved or sold a large number of its segments that were 
considered very important for the South African economy. Specifically, it shifted offshore the 
engineering and design segments of Boart Longyear (which produces tools and equipment and 
services for the international mining industry) – this was considered an important area of capital 
and transport equipment where South Africa had built a technological lead due to innovation 
in mining and minerals processing. Similarly, in 2012 Anglo shifted the high value-added and 
higher technology parts of its paper and packaging business to Europe leaving South Africa 
with low value-added production and exports and more reliant on importing higher value added 
manufactured products that had been produced in the country. Similarly to the previous 
example, these actions bring undeniable benefits to the market shareholders and, crucially, can 
be argued optimal in pursuing the investor interest.  The longer-term threats that these actions 
pose to the overall competitiveness of the economy are much more difficult to quantify, posing 
a challenge for evaluating the two against each other.  
A more short-term piece of evidence that can be helpful in identifying the path of the 
negative effect of financialisation on the market is the mismatch between the industry 
performance and the shareholder returns. Ashman, Mohamed and Newman (2013) refer to a 
recent study by PWC which highlights the trend for share prices of mining companies to not 
reflect changes in commodities prices (PWC 2012)1793. PWC reports that  
                                                          
1791 S B Villas-Boas, ‘Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: Inference with limited data.’ S. 
(2007). The Review of Economic Studies, 74(2), 625-652.; S B Villas-Boas, ‘Using retail data for upstream merger 
analysis.’ (2007). joclec, 3(4), 689-715. 
1792 S Ashman, S Mohamed, & S Newman, ‘Financialisation of the South African economy: Impact on the 
economic growth path and employment’. (2013) , Discussion Paper. United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs. 
1793 Price Waterhouse Coopers , ‘Mine: The Growing Disconnect’. (2012),  PWC, London. 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/mining/publications/mining/mine-the-growingdisconnect.jhtml 
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  “2011 was a year of a growing disconnect for the mining industry. Mining company stocks 
significantly underperformed the broader markets and lost value despite record profits, and the 
disconnect between share values and many commodity prices widened (PWC, 2012, p. 1).”  
Their report on global mining in 2012 shows even more problems, lower profits and 
lower share prices for the global mining industry (PWC, 2013). Such disconnect may be more 
readily observable in the food value chain: for example, if the shocks on the production side 
(e.g. reduction in crops) coexist with continuously high returns to the shareholders. – this may 
be a signal for the regulators to raise their concerns about how these shocks are absorbed within 
the value chain.  
This brings us to the more general questions of market functioning in the modern world. 
The way we currently think about corporate governance does not fully account for the fact that 
most investors are diversified. This has already been seen as an issue in mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, in the context of common ownership, a company may not be 
incentivised to bargain over the split of the merger premium. A diversified investor holding a 
proportional amount of both companies' shares, does not care about the most competitive split, 
since it does not necessarily maximise the overall value of their holding. For example,  if both 
companies act in the best interest of such an investor, they would minimise the expenses on 
legal and negotiating costs, avoid pushing one of the companies to raise debt to pay more, and 
not run the risk of one of the companies exiting the deal due to disagreement about the split of 
the benefits – because all these actions reduce the benefits of the diversified shareholder, 
compared to the benefits of a non-competitive merger. Additionally, the current management 
of the companies has been academically and professionally trained to think in the context of 
the modern portfolio theory. From this perspective, both economic and legal researchers need 
to incorporate this understanding into the way the market and its incentives are analysed and 
regulated. 
The potential issues that institutional investors create for the less concentrated segments 
of the value chain, such as farmers, also raises a broader question. Diversified institutional 
investing offers many advantages and much of society relies on them. For one, pension funds 
are able to hedge the risks, benefit from the low-cost management for the capital, and guarantee 
its clients long-term returns. At the same time, there are multiple indications that there may be 
anticompetitive incentives inherent in this system. This raises a number of important research 
directions: what methods and what evidence we need to conclude whether it is indeed what is 
happening, what changes we can and should make while keeping the balance of the positives 
that institutional investment brings.  To enable policy interventions, we need to establish 
whether the potential costs to the economy outweighs the well-established benefits of 
diversification. We also need to establish the method of quantifying the costs of possibly 
lowering the competition and squeezing the margins of more vulnerable players of the value 
chain (such as farmers). There is also need for value judgement on what is the fair allocation 
of the surplus in the market and whether it should be extracted by the party that is better placed 
to extract it – or shared more equally. Finally, there appears need to undertake further research 
into the way that uncoordinated effect of common ownership may be entering the incentives 
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of institutional investors present in several segments of the value chain. Specifically, pursuing 
interests of same shareholders in more than a single segment of a value chain may lead to a 
greatly exacerbated scale of squeezing the margins, since firms may not have incentives to 
undercut each other not only horizontally but also vertically. Furthermore, the incentive to 
maximise the common owners’ profit margins may lead individual sectors to neglect the 
activity that is optimal within the sector.  
 It is important to note that despite the argument about common ownership creating 
wrong incentives – within the system firms and shareholders are responding correctly to the 
current market incentives.  Managers aren't acting against shareholders' interests, and 
shareholders are focused on the long-term returns. Managers are pursuing the best way of 
maximizing the value of their shareholders' portfolios. And those shareholders are investing 
rationally and correctly in diversified portfolios that maximize risk-adjusted return. Yet the 
functioning of this system in its current state created a negative externality for the wider 
economy. In our view this tension indicates the need for further thorough investigation into 
what incentives the current economic and legal framework creates, possible outcomes of these 
incentives and the ways to alter the framework to achieve the desired improvements. 
 
4.2.3.5.Common ownership and coordinated effects 
 
4.2.3.5.1. Overview: coordinated effects 
 
Economic effects of minority shareholding on market competition have recently come 
into focus of regulatory bodies and academic research (Council of Economic Advisors, 
20161794; Elhauge, 20161795; Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu 20161796; Azar, Raina, and Schmalz, 
20161797). Current antitrust rules provide limited guidance as to how agencies or courts should 
review the risks for competition associated with the acquisition of a passive minority interest 
(OECD, 20081798). The definition of common shareholding currently used for the purposes of 
corporate law and finance to evaluate threat to competition focuses on direct effects: 
corporate/economic control, or incentives as short-run unilateral effects. It largely ignores 
indirect and informal influence and incentives such as strategic effects and long-run market 
interactions (for a comprehensive overview, see Tzanaki, forth.) that have potential for 
fostering tacit collusion. 
The main question of possible coordinated effects of common ownership can be 
formulated in lay terms as follows. The current assumption under which common ownership 
is of no concern to regulators posits that holding equity in a large proportion of largest players 
                                                          
1794 Council of Economic Advisors (2016): “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Available online 
1795 E Elhauge, ‘Horizontal Shareholding’, (2016). 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267  
1796 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). Journal of Finance, 
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345; further – AST(2016) 
1797 J Azar, R Raina, & M C Schmalz, ‘Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition’. (July 23, 2016). Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252; further – ARS(2016) 
1798 OECD, ‘Antitrust Issues Involving Minority Shareholdings and Interlocking Directorates’ (n 15) 21 
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of an oligopolistic market simply allows the institutional investors to hedge their risks over the 
outcomes of a standard oligopolistic competition. Individual firms in the portfolio undercut 
each other, yielding profits and losses to individual players, and on balance this portfolio yields 
an average constant stream of standard oligopoly-competition size profit for the institutional 
investors. The current concern is that an alternative state of the world is possible, where 
presence of institutional investors provides either incentives or mechanisms that distort the 
competitive behaviour of firms in a way that allows tacit collusion and, thus, collusive profits 
in the market. We present evidence supporting this concern – for both incentives, and 
mechanisms. 
The next crucial step for a regulator is to define the set of parameters that facilitate these 
anticompetitive effects: features of the market in which they can arise, the relationship between 
the size of common ownership and the size of the coordinated effects on market price, role of 
the number, and comparative size of the firms in the market. After defining the potential 
coordinated effects we then go on to discussing such parameters that are crucial for regulatory 
attention and further research.  
Passive ownership is associated with two main theories of harm1799:  Unilateral effects, 
and coordinated effects, which relate to a change in the market structure or nature of 
competition that enables independent competitors to coordinate their behaviour in order to 
reach and sustain collusion which in turn leads to higher prices. Theoretical frameworks are 
currently developed with a focus on cross ownership. However, Ezrachi and Gilo (2006) 
suggest that ‘When a firm’s controlling shareholder invests in this firm’s competitor, the 
potential unilateral and coordinated anticompetitive effects are similar to those involving 
passive investment among the rivals themselves. Since the controlling shareholder partly 
identifies with the profits and losses of the rival firm, the controller tends to make his own firm 
compete less vigorously.’ 
For unilateral effects, Ezrachi and Gilo (2006)1800 give a following standard example. 
Suppose firm A passively invests in firm B. This passive investment could cause prices to go 
up relative to the case without passive investment. Absent passive investment, firm A would 
hesitate to raise the price of its brand, out of fear that such an increased price (although it would 
increase firm A’s revenue per unit) would cause firm A to lose too many customers to firm B. 
However, if firm A passively invests in firm B, a price raise may become profitable. Although 
some of the customers may switch to firm B, firm A shares some of firm B’s profits. Hence, 
the competitive constraints that prevented firm A from raising the price of its product diminish 
when firm A, through passive investment, absorbs part of firm B’s profits. O’Brien and Salop 
(2000), building on Bresnahan and Salop (1986) 1801 formulate how not only cross ownership 
                                                          
1799 Guidelines on the Assessement of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/05 (“EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines”), para 22.  
1800 Ezrachi, Ariel, and David Gilo. "EC competition law and the regulation of passive investments among competitors." Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 26, no. 2 (2006): 327-349. 
Harvard  
1801 D P O’Brien & S C Salop, ‘Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control’ [2000] 67 Antitrust L.J. 
559;; T Bresnahan & S C Salop, ‘Quantifying The Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures’, (1986) 4 Inter’l J. Ind. Org. 155 
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but crucially, common ownership can give rise to the same unilateral effects through creating 
interdependence between individual firms’ objective functions.  
Coordinated effects are less straight-forward and can occur through several different 
mechanisms we discuss in detail below. The general route of harm to competition is, however, 
making undercutting less desirable for a firm that would otherwise undercut. As Tzanaki 
(forth.) rightly points out, the repeated nature of the interaction between the firms is currently 
not taken into account by the regulatory assessment of the markets – whilst it has the power to 
drastically change the outcomes of the interaction, compared to the single stage equilibria.  
The simples example would be a situation where, even if it is in firm’s individual profit-
based interest to undercut, the losses that this undercutting brings onto other firms are absorbed 
will be absorbed through held share in them. Here, the key question is what factors promote or 
discourage collusive outcome. We will argue that common ownership is a factor that facilitates 
collusive outcome.  
All classic models of dynamic oligopoly1802 are affected by the  folk theorem – any 
outcome from collusive to competitive (including all asymmetric ones) are outcomes of a Nash 
equilibrium if the discount factor in the industry is close enough to one (Kreps, 19901803) – i.e. 
if firms care enough about the future payoffs as well as the payoffs in the current period to 
make “punishment” for deviating from the agreed upon static equilibrium effective. It is nearly 
irrelevant whether it is prices or quantities that firms are choosing in a given round: each firm 
can pick the collusive price and threaten to drop it to Cournot price if one of the other firms 
deviates; similarly, rivals can be choosing quantities and still sustain prices a-la Bertrand 
equilibrium (Abreu, 19861804). We review two types of theories on tacit collusion enabled by 
partial acquisitions: 1) models of severe dissuasive punishment for deviating firms (prisoner 
dilemma); 2) models that contain mechanisms that allows for all firms to have no incentive to 
deviate (assurance game). 
 
4.2.3.5.2. Collusive outcomes in dynamic setting 
 
We first discuss a model that showcases how dynamic setting in general is more 
conducive to collusion. firms interact repeatedly, they may then be able to maintain higher 
prices by tacitly agreeing that any deviation from the collusive path would trigger some 
retaliation. For being sustainable, retaliation must be sufficiently likely and costly to outweigh 
the short-term benefits from “cheating” on the collusive path.  
                                                          
1802 For respective-name models see Cournot (1838); Bertrand (1883); von Stackelberg (1934); and for kinked 
demand – Hall and Hitch (1939), and Sweezy (1939). 
1803 Kreps, D.M., 1990. A course in microeconomic theory (Vol. 41). Princeton, NJ: Princeton university 
press. 
1804 Abreu, D., 1986. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 39(1), pp.191-225. 
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Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (19861805) show possibility for collusive asymmetric 
equilibria that maximise the total profit in the industry. They extend this model to include an 
empirically plausible constraint of imperfect monitoring (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 
19901806) showing that solutions for supergames (dynamic repetition of interaction over a 
number of periods) can be derived from the solutions of the static problems (interaction in a 
single period).  
In this model firms cannot directly observe each others’ output; they base their 
decisions on past period’s market price, which has a stochastic element to it – thus, mot fully 
reflecting the aggregate output of the rivals. Firms produce some quantity q lower than 
Cournot-Nash quantity, thus getting collusive profits. In this model, there are two reasons for 
the market price to be lower than expected when all firms abide by collusion. Price drops either 
due to the stochastic noise, which is outside of firms’ control. Alternatively, at least one firm 
is chiselling at the agreement, producing quantities above q and reaping larger profits at its 
profit increases by more than the market price drops. To prevent the chiselling from brining 
the equilibrium price to the Cournot-Nash level, the firms set a trigger price 𝑝 . If the market 
price drops to this trigger price, firms enter the ‘punishment’ producing Cournot-Nash 
quantities for T periods. After T periods they revert to the collusive quantity q until the market 
price drops to the trigger level again. The more noise there is on the market the more often the 
market price will fall beyond the trigger level despite all firms abiding by the agreement. Cartel 
members can choose the parameters q, 𝑝 and T that yield the greatest total discounted profit. 
The key principle for reaching the maximum – after every market iteration, the value of the 
remaining equilibrium must be the extreme point of the equilibrium value set. In layman terms, 
the expected collusive profits should be the highest, compared to profits from the alternative 
strategies. The value of the equilibrium depends on the parameters of the model: such as cost 
of monitoring, and the amount of noise. In application of this model to the common ownership 
setting we argue that is reduces the cost of monitoring and the level of noise, thus increasing 
the value of the collusive equilibrium.  
 
4.2.3.5.3. Challenges to the model of collusive outcome 
 
There are two main arguments challenging applicability of this model in practice. 
Firstly, multiplicity of equilibria in asymmetric markets (i.e. firms facing different marginal 
costs, and different levels of common ownership) raises a question of whether the firms can in 
practice coordinate on a single equilibrium, and sustain this equilibrium in a noisy market with 
imperfect information (i.e. where firms cannot directly observe each other’s output or price, 
but only derive it from the market outcome). Theory predicts possibility of collusive outcomes, 
but does not spell out which ones will emerge (Tirole, 1988). The fact that dynamic models of 
infinitely repeated games produce no unique equilibrium posits problems for model-based 
                                                          
1805 Abreu, D., Pearce, D. and Stacchetti, E., 1986. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. Journal 
of Economic Theory, 39(1), pp.251-269.  
1806 Abreu, D., Pearce, D. and Stacchetti, E., 1990. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with 
imperfect monitoring. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pp.1041-1063. 
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predictions and relevant legislation (Ayres, 19901807). For folk theorem application for local 
equilibria need to know how equilibrium expectations move with changes in the parameters.  
Secondly, some authors (e.g. Tzanaki, forthcoming) raise a question of whether the 
collusive equilibrium can be sustained by the threat of punishment. Individual firms always 
have an incentive to chisel at the agreement – to achieve higher individual profits. The greater 
the noise in the market, the higher their chances are to blame the deviations from the collusive 
agreement on this noise - the greater is the incentive to chisel. We now discuss these limitations 
in application to the common ownership. We also discuss potential strategies of defining 
parameters that can lead to robust collusive equilibria for specific markets in the section on 
agent-based modelling. 
 
4.2.3.5.4. Application to Common Ownership  
 
Transparency of information.  Common ownership can be seen as an additional instrument 
allowing the firms to reduce the costs of monitoring the abiding by the agreement. If common 
investors are present in all firms in the market, the fluctuations in market price can be attributed 
to solely the exogenous shocks, reducing the need for punishment when price falls below the 
expectation due to such shock. Increased transparency due to presence of common ownership 
thus has potential to increase level of tacit collusion in the market by reducing the cost of 
monitoring and removing the need for trigger price. Specifically, in an asymmetric setting it is 
unclear which equilibria to look coordinate on. Additionally, for a firm which finds its profits 
lower than expected, it does not necessarily know whether it is a) noise outside of rivals’ 
control, b) mistake of the rivals concerning the nature of the agreement (i.e. which of the 
equilibria the coordination is on); c) chiselling by the rivals. Common ownership can, arguably, 
reduce the amount of uncertainty in such a system. As Kreps (1990) states, one expects 
oligopolistic firms to collude as much as the circumstances permit. Everything else held equal, 
they will act more collusively when there is less noise, than when there is more. One would 
expect greater levels of collusion in the industries where institutions allow for more precise 
monitoring of rivals.  
Evolution of the equilibrium, coordination on a single equilibrium in asymmetric setting. 
One could speculate that the common ownership could be the trigger for the evolution of the 
collusive equilibrium that is currently missing from the models that assume that this 
equilibrium is triggered exogenously but do not specify the path. It is plausible that changes in 
concentration of common ownership in the market could be used to model the shift in the 
market from a competitive to a collusive equilibrium. In fact, we discuss a model that has a 
flavour of this approach in the forthcoming section, considering share-buying as a signal of a 
change in firm’s payoffs in the first, pre-collusive stage of the game.  
Credibility of punishment. Features of the above model lend themselves nicely to the 
common ownership setting – since it allows to maximise total profit in the industry, which is 
in the interest of an investor holding equity across the firms. Question remains whether a firm 
finds it credible that its cheating on the collusive agreement will lead to other firms reverting 
                                                          
1807 Ian Ayres, ‘Playing Games with the Law’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 1291, 1310–1311 
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to the competitive strategy for the rest of the game. Tzanaki (forth.) argues that the mechanism 
supporting collusion (severe punishments) may not be credible if post-deviation it is not in the 
self-interest of the undertaking threatening punishment against any deviating rival. In the 
following sections we discuss how in the context of common ownership the outcome must 
depend on the assumed strategies of the players, and the structure of the payoffs for the 
investors. Tzanaki (forth.) further presents the alternative conceptualisation of collusion in 
which firms signal to each other intentions to collude by acquiring shares in each other 
(common ownership, Gilo, 1997) which changes their payoff structure. We discuss the 
proposed way in which the conclusions from this model may be stretched to the case of 
common ownership.  
 
4.2.3.5.5. Partial Ownership Increasing the Parameter of Attractiveness of Long-Run 
Collusive Outcome  
  
Previous model assumed common shareholdings as given. We now discuss a model which 
treats shareholding acquisition is viewed as an “endogenous decision variable” in the preceding 
stage of the game. The crucial difference is that in this formulation a firm that conduct an 
acquisition alters its payoff structure in the way that leads to incurring a loss if other firms do 
not collude – making this new payoff structure public knowledge.  
Consider a standard setup where each firm follows a tit-for-tat strategy: it charges 
monopoly price 𝑝𝑚 in any period t if in every period preceding t neither firm has deviated from 
𝑝𝑚. If there was a deviation from 𝑝𝑚 in the preceding period, each firm reverts to charging c 
(marginal cost) forever. Gilo (1997) proposes the following manner of treating partial 
ownership (PO) as an endogenous variable in this setting. At a first stage firms simultaneously 
select PO levels in one another – anticipating the effect of this cross ownership on the second 
stage. Second stage is an infinitely repeated price game (a la Bertrand). Consider a symmetric 
case, where Bertrand prediction is that two firms will split the market equally, at an equal price 
𝑝 =  𝑝1 =  𝑝2 equal to marginal cost c. PO does not changing this static equilibrium – it enters 
the firm’s strategy by affecting the dynamic repetition of this static game through affecting the 
discount factor in the industry. 
Gilo (1997) argues that for cross ownership levels x and y, the monopolist price 𝑝𝑚 is 
sustainable for the discount factor  being above or equal the following threshold (critical 
discount factor) 𝑐 
 ≥ max {
1
2
−  
𝑥
2(1 − 𝑦)
,
1
2
−  
𝑦
2(1 − 𝑥)
} ≡ 𝑐 
In lay terms, PO affects the discount parameter which makes the short-term gain from the 
deviation smaller than the resulting long-term loss – imposing an incentive-compatible 
constraint on undercutting. Conversely, as each firm owns close to a half of another firm, the 
𝑐  approaches zero – i.e. collusion is very sustainable. Note that without PO, 𝑐 =
1
2
, i.e. as 
long as firms care enough about the future profits  ( ≥
1
2
) from the collusive outcome AND 
they believe those profits are not attainable unless they collude in the current period – collusive 
outcome is attainable without PO. PO makes it more attainable, lowering the extent of how 
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much the firms need to care about the future profits from collusion.  
 Interestingly, this part of the argument does not seem resolve the issue of how 
enforceable retaliation is – since it holds under the assumption of the exogenously set 
commitment to the tit-for-tat strategy. What it does - is formulate how common ownership 
increases the attractiveness of the long-term collusive outcome over the short-term cheating 
outcome. From this perspective, discount factor is not the only way PO can be entering the 
firms’ incentives. For example, we may choose to not assume ex ante that the repetition of the 
price-game stage is infinite, but instead assume that it is long enough for the firms to be 
attracted to the collusive outcome until the latter periods of the supergame (for finite horizon 
games with multiple equilibria in the stage game and cooperative or reputational equilibria see 
Benoit and Krishna (1985); for a theoretical formulation and an empirical example of finitely 
repeated prisoner dilemma, see Embrey, Fréchette, and Yuksel, 20151808). In this setting, PO 
may enter as a variable that increases the expected length of the horizon – i.e. if shares are 
bought in the firms, these firms are expected to interact longer than average.  
 
4.2.3.5.6. Signalling through commitment 
 
Gilo (1997) further assumes that acquiring PO involves a sunk transaction cost 𝑐𝑝(𝑥) 
for the level x of PO. Hence, if a firm incurs this sunk cost, it has an intention to coordinate on 
the collusive outcome. If it was planning to undercut, it would have not acquired the PO. If we 
denote price paid for acquisition of the PO as T(x), the firm will prefer to pay the price as long 
as the profit from the collusive outcome is greater or equal1809 this price, thus: 
𝑇(𝑥) ≤  
1
1 − 𝛿
𝜋𝑚
2
𝑥 
This conclusion becomes even stronger when cost asymmetric scenarios are 
considered. It is not profitable for a lower cost (larger) firm to acquire part in larger cost 
(smaller) firm (Farrel and Shapiro, 1990) unless we allow for repeated interaction and tacit 
collusion – in which case even fully passive partial ownership of higher cost firm by the lower 
cost firm can be mutually beneficial (Gilo, ).  
The preliminary condition of this model is that firm incurs a positive loss in deviating 
from the collusive price – but only firm 1 which initiates the acquisition: 𝑠1
∗𝜙1
∗ +
𝑥(1 −  𝑠1
∗)𝜙2
∗ > 𝑘. This preliminary condition is easier met with PO, since without PO x is 
zero.  
For collusive profit 𝜙𝑖
∗  and market shares 𝑠𝑖
∗, without the CO collusive outcome is 
sustainable as long as: 
𝑠1
∗𝜙1
∗ > 𝑘 , 
where k is firm’s profit in a static (one period) Bertrand equilibrium and  is large enough. 
These preliminary conditions guarantee that firm 1’s loss from deviating from the collusive 
price is positive, authors show that it is possible to find a set of (k, ) pairs under which the 
collusive outcome is sustainable. Note: this condition may not be met when asymmetry is large- 
i.e. one firms cost advantage is large enough for the static Bertrand result to outweigh the 
                                                          
1808 Embrey, Matthew, Guillaume R. Fréchette, and Sevgi Yuksel. "Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma." (2015).  
1809 See p.12 and fn 12 of Gilo (1997) for variations of perfectly functioning market (under strict equality) and positive profits 
486 
 
collusive profit under any .1810 If now allowing for PO, collusive outcome is still sustainable 
for a set of (k, ) pairs – PO lowers the critical discount factor 𝑐 , as long as 𝜙1
∗ > 𝑘. If 𝜙1
∗ < 𝑘 
preliminary condition will never be met – firm 1 would not be incurring a positive loss from 
the deviation, hence it will deviate under any , with or without partial ownership. Generally, 
the smaller is firm 1’s cost advantage (i.e. the lower the k) and the larger are the profits 
produced by firm 1 under collusion (𝜙1
∗) the more PO facilitates tacit collusion. Crucially, the 
authors show that the preliminary condition 𝑠1
∗𝜙1
∗ + 𝑥(1 −  𝑠1
∗)𝜙2
∗ > 𝑘 is easier met for the 
higher levels of x – i.e. the more firms acquire each other’s shares, the easier it is for the profits 
from the collusive outcome to outweigh gains from deviation. Since k correlates with firm 1’s 
cost advantage, PO facilitates more sustainable tacit collusion under higher cost advantages. 
Importantly, the acquisition in the initial stage signals the preference for collusive 
outcome at the first iteration of the price-game. This results in a more sustainable equilibrium, 
since if the first iteration of the price game is left to chance further assumptions need to be 
made on how many non-collusive stages a firm is prepared to tolerate before it defaults into 
competitive strategy for the rest of the game (e.g. in the first round firm 1 observes if the other 
one colludes– if yes, they continue colluding, if not –firm 1 gives the other firm another chance 
in the next period). 
 
4.2.3.5.7. Application of signalling through commitment to common ownership  
 
From the first glance, the model discussed above lends itself nicely for the extension 
from the cross ownership to common ownership (CO). Indeed, applying it to CO appears to 
remove the need for bilateral investment – i.e. for each major competitor to hold share in 
another competitor. Institutional investors will commonly hold shares in all the major firms. 
However, the assumption of the sunk cost of transaction (or, alternatively, legal constraints, 
imperfect financial and capital markets causing non-positive returns on investment1811) 
becomes more challenging. Arguably, it should be less costly for the institutional investors to 
switch ownership between the firms in the industry, than it is for the firms themselves. Whilst 
for the firms PO is a secondary activity, that they may choose to engage into on the side of 
operating in the market, for the investors acquisition of shares is their primary activity, costs 
for which should be expected to be optimised better than for the firms.  
On the other hand, one could argue that a sunk cost is borne when the institutional 
investor enters the industry. This would create an even more extreme signalling case – as soon 
as the institutional investor enters the industry and common ownership commences, it signals 
commitment for collusion to the firms in the industry. This, in turn, raises a question about the 
parameters faced by the investors entering at later stages – which requires further dynamic 
analysis. 
Tzanaki (forth.) makes an interesting point on distinction between the first and the 
second models discussed: 
 ‘i) the commitment model creates space for a superior mutually acceptable bargain, whereas 
the punishment model forces a collusive equilibrium via the threat of reverting to an inferior 
                                                          
1810 Tirole, 1988 (272-273) 
1811 See fn 11 in Gilo (1997) 
487 
 
mutually destructive state; ii) in the bargaining model, the key is whether the acquirer’s 
commitment is credible, whereas in the punishment model, the key is whether the threat of 
retaliation against the deviating rival is credible.’ 
I might be wrong but it is still not clear to me how the loss incurred in the first period 
introduces more credibility into the system; the greater commitment to collusion to me seems 
to be driven by the firms’ commitment to the tit-for-tat strategy and the sequential formulation 
of the model – which makes either of the commitments credible. For example, one can devise 
a game where commitment to potential loss at the beginning comes not from acquiring a share 
of PO, but from a costly punishment in the first several rounds of the price game – aimed to 
develop a reputation that will support the further collusive tit-for-tat equilibrium. The burden 
of credibility shifts to sticking with tit-for-tat – hence the certainty that once foregone payoff 
from the collusive action will not be attainable again. Perhaps what she has in mind is the range 
of the strategies that a firm is considering for the game – with and without the common 
ownership in the market.  
The question remains – even if you publically committed to the tit-for-tat and incurred 
an ex ante loss, if the other players deviate, do you go through and charge a price equivalent of 
marginal cost for infinity? If firms are rational, they know that a firm that chiselled once and 
did not experience punishment will continue chiselling, making a collusive equilibrium not 
sustainable. If it is not sustainable, they will revert to the competitive equilibrium. Punishment 
in this case is really the withdrawal of the opportunity to obtain anything above the competitive-
level profit. 
There are further questions that need to be clarified for this setup to be applicable, namely: 
- Would we consider institutional investors to incur a potential ‘loss’ when acquiring equity? 
Given that they hedging is a major part of their operations, is this incentive quantitatively 
identical to that of cross-ownership or not?  
- Should the expected higher profits (from the collusive outcome) be absorbed in the cost of 
acquiring the equity? Furthermore, how do costs of acquiring equity develop? For 
example, if the current set of institutional investors is making large profits due to tacit 
collusion – how does this affect the price faced by newly entering institutional investor?  
- Do the long-term horizons of institutional investors match with the long-term horizons of 
firms in which these investors are acquiring equity? If they do not match, the transition of 
incentive mechanism from cross ownership to common ownership is less trivial.  
- Firm that buys equity signals commitment to collusive outcome but also, potentially, 
effectively proposes the split of the surplus based on how much equity it is buying and, 
therefore, at what threshold of the market price it will revert to competitive outcome and 
incur a loss. This raises questions of what happens if more than one firm proposes different 
split. 
 
4.2.3.5.8. Agent based programming  
 
Agent-based modelling (an attractive way of finding equilibria in complex problems 
involving strategic behaviour) has been successfully used to gauge the effect of different 
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market parameters on tacit collusion in general (Govender, 20161812), and specifically for 
oligopolistic market structures (Kimbrough and Murphy, 20091813) and even establish robust 
equilibria in complex strategies involving mark-up pricing specifically in oligopolistic 
electricity markets (Newbery, 20121814).  
In the complex settings such as effect of common ownership in asymmetric settings, 
agent based programming can help derive critical parameters such as size of common 
ownership which, holding other market parameters constant, is capable of tilting the market 
outcome towards a collusive equilibrium. It may also have potential in exploring the further 
questions we discuss regarding the practical implications of the models – such as modelling 
the outcomes of entry of investors at different stages of the game, and potential further 
asymmetry in costs and profit splits driven by the common ownership. 
Based on the theory discussed above, the conditions for a sustainable collusion in oligopolistic 
markets are likely to depend on: 
- how attractive is collusive profit compared to the competitive equilibrium profit 
- how much investors care about the long-term profits compared to the short-term 
- the positive losses arising from deviation from collusive price are derived from the 
appropriate combinations of the first two points 
Common ownership is likely to enter in these factors through: 
- lowering the industry discount rate 
- increasing the attractiveness of the collusive outcome profit 
- extending expected interaction horizon 
Conditions conducive to collusion that regulator may be incorporating into decision-making: 
non-extreme asymmetry, degree of common ownership, degree of transaction costs, horizon 
and discounting factor. Note that these effects are achievable for completely passive (no voting 
rights) PO – which are currently treated very leniently by the regulators (as compared to 
acquisitions of shares with voting rights which undergo antitrust scrutiny).  
 
4.3. Legal Framework 
 
Cross-shareholding and common ownership is often raised as a concern in order to indicate 
that the current concentration indicators based on control may not necessarily represent the 
potential restriction of competition that may occur through the action of passive investors 
controlling minority shareholdings in various companies in the relevant sector or market 
segment. We will first examine the anticompetitive issues raised by minority shareholdings, 
before turning to those raised by common ownership. 
 
4.3.1. Anticompetitive issues raised by minority shareholdings. 
 
In the EU, only those transactions that result in a lasting change in the structure of the 
market fall within the scope the substantive law provision of the EU Merger Regulation 
                                                          
1812 Govender, R., 2016. The detection of tacit collusion using agent-based modelling (Doctoral dissertation, University of Johannesburg) 
1813 Kimbrough, S.O. and Murphy, F.H., 2009. Learning to collude tacitly on production levels by oligopolistic agents. Computational 
Economics, 33(1), pp.47-78. 
1814 Newbery, D., 2012. The roubstness of agent-based models of electricity wholesale markets.  
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(EUMR) prohibiting a concentration in case it poduces a significant impediment of effective 
competition and satisfies the conditions of Article 3 EUMR.1815 There are primarily two types 
of concentrations: i) those arising from a proper M&A transaction between previously 
independent firms;1816 and ii) those arising from the acquisition of control.1817 In the former 
case, either two or more firms merge and thus cease to exist as separate legal entities, or the 
target firm is absorbed, and thus ceases to exist as a legal entity, whilst the acquiring firm 
retains its legal identity.1818 In the latter case, whilst the target firm does not cease to exist as a 
separate legal entity, its control is transferred in a lasting way to another firm or to more firms 
jointly.1819  
According to Article 3(2) EUMR, control means being able to exercise decisive influence 
on a firm, most commonly, by virtue of a controlling shareholding, which can be lower than 
50% where the rest of the shareholders are dispersed.1820 Control can therefore be execised on 
a de jure basis, by virtue of a majority of voting rights, or on a de facto basis, where the 
remaining shareholdings are fragmented so unable to veto the relatively larger shareholder.1821 
Hence, control does not cover only the case where the acquiring undertaking controls a majority 
of voting rights which confer the power to take strategic decisions, but also where it is merely 
possible to veto strategic decisions, the latter being labelled negative sole control.1822 Control 
can also be acquired on a contractual basis, provided there is a very long duration and the 
contract confers control over the management and the resources despite the fact that property 
rights or shares are not transferred.1823 The transfer of control can refer to just part of a firm, as 
long as it confers a market presence to which a market turnover can be clearly attributed.1824 
In Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho,1825 AAC, a diversified South African company 
involved in mining, finance, commerce and industry, acquired a shareholding of 24.13% of 
Lonrho, a UK company active in mining, agriculture, trading and property. The Commission 
amalgamated the shareholding that AAC would acquire in Lonrho with that of two other 
shareholders, on account of the fact that the latter would vote their shares as instructed by AAC. 
In this light, it examined whether AAC would acquire on a de facto basis solely or jointly with 
these two shareholders the possibility to exercise decisive influence over Lonrho and therefore 
control it. The Commission concluded that AAC would acquire sole control of Lonrho, taking 
into account the following considerations that: i) a 27.47% shareholding would have amounted 
to a majority of the votes cast at past meeting; ii) the next largest shareholder owned 3% of the 
shares, while it also had shares in AAC itself; iii) AAC was the only industrial or mining 
company having a significant shareholding in Lonrho, which added to the leverage AAC could 
exercise in it since it increased its influence over the board; and iv) Lonrho’s directors who 
                                                          
1815 See Recital 20 EUMR. 
1816 Article 3(1)(a). 
1817 Article 3(1)(b). 
1818 Jurisdictional Notice, para 9. 
1819 Ibid., para 11. 
1820 See, for example, Arjomari-Prioux-SA/Wiggins Teape Appleton plc (Case IV M.025) C(1990) 321, para 4. 
1821 Ibid.  
1822 Jurisdictional Notice, para 54. 
1823 Jurisdictional Notice, para 18. 
1824 Ibid., para 24. 
1825 Case COMP/M.754, [1998] OJ L 149/21, paras 31–39. 
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held a total of 0.12% of the shares in the company would not be expected to vote against AAC 
in its capacity of main shareholder.  
Under the UK national merger legislation the definition of control is less strict, thus 
entailing a broader jurisdictional scope. Under the UK law (Enterprise Act 2002), minority 
shareholdings will be subject to merger control where ‘material influence’ can be exercised 
over the acquired business. The ‘Merger Assessment Guidelines’1826, provide guidance on the 
authorities’ assessment of ‘material influence’ focusing mainly on the importance of voting 
rights and board representation. Factors that may be relevant to an assessment of a particular 
shareholding include the distribution and holders of the remaining shares, in particular whether 
the acquiring entity’s shareholding makes it the largest shareholder, patterns of attendance and 
voting at recent shareholders’ meetings based on recent shareholder returns, the existence of 
any special voting or veto rights attached to the shareholding under consideration, the status 
and expertise of the acquirer and its corresponding influence with other shareholders.1827 
BSkyB/ITV is one of the leading cases on the issue of material influence. The OFT (the 
predecessor of the Competition and Markets Authority- CMA) considered the issue of material 
influence in relation to the acquisition by BskyB, by far the UK leading Pay-TV operator, of a 
17.9% stake in ITV, the leading commercial Free-To-Air TV operator. The OFT concluded 
that the acquisition of this minority stake would give BSkyB material influence. The OFT 
found that, on the basis of evidence of attendance and voting at recent ITV shareholders' 
meetings, BSkyB's shareholding would be likely in practice to allow it to block special 
resolutions at ITV shareholders’ meetings. The OFT found that turnout at ITV shareholders' 
meetings has ranged between 63-70%. Therefore, BSkyB's 17.9% stake would have enabled it 
to exercise more than 25% of the votes cast at these meetings. 
The OFT also made the following observations: a) BSkyB could obtain board 
representation as a result of its shareholding; b) BSkyB was the only significant trade 
shareholder and has substantial industry expertise; c) BSkyB was the largest individual 
shareholder and ITV's corporate governance policy was to hold frequent discussions with major 
shareholders; d) the remaining shareholdings in ITV were fragmented; and there was a number 
of other ITV shareholders that had cross-shareholdings in both merging firms. This approach 
was upheld by both the Competition Appeal Tribunal1828 and the Court of Appeal.1829  
In Ryanair/Aer Lingus1830 the UK Competition Commission (now replaced by the CMA) 
focused its analysis on the obstacles which an unwelcome shareholder can pose to the company 
freely pursuing its own commercial objectives. The CC concluded that by limiting Aer 
Lingus’s ability to pursue its independent commercial policy and strategy, Ryanair’s minority 
shareholding would have led to a reduction in Aer Lingus’s effectiveness as a competitor1831. 
In the US, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Anti-
merger Act of 1950 and then in 1980, adopted against a backdrop of increasing concern towards 
                                                          
1826 Merger Assessment Guidelines, September 2010, paras 3.2.8–3.2.10 
1827 Ibid., para 3.2.10. 
1828 BskyB v Competition Commission and the Secretary of State [2008] CAT 25. 
1829 BskyB v Competition Commission and the Secretary of State [2010] EWCA Civ 2. 
1830 Competition Commission Report, Ryanair Holdings plc/Aer Lingus Group plc [2013]. 
1831 Ibid., paras 7.16-7.24. 
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concentration of US businesses, prohibits not only acquisitions by one corporation of the stock 
of another, but also, more broadly acquisitions of assets where the ‘effect of such acquisition 
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.’1832  This provision 
captures acquisitions by natural persons, partnerships, as well as other unincorporated 
associations and business entities, and not just by corporations. There is no express shareholder 
percentage ownership trigger or a ‘material influence’ test but it is the value of the acquisition 
that may trigger a filing under the Hart-Scott Rodino (HSR) Act, which parties to a transaction 
must submit to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice if 
certain jurisdiction tests are met. The Clayton Act’s coverage for partial acquisitions is however 
limited if the acquisition was made “solely for investment”1833. The HSR Act includes an 
exemption from filing for a partial acquisition if the acquirer shows that the acquisition was 
made solely for the purpose of investment and that it will result in ownership of 10% or less of 
the voting securities of the issuer1834, this percentage being 15% for institutional investors, as 
their intention is presumed not to be for investment only. Furthermore, to benefit from the 
exemption, the stock must not be used “by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting 
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition”, the parties arguing for the exemption 
being required to prove that the purpose of the acquisition was not to gain control over the 
target company1835. 
One may also note another type of structural link targeted by US merger control, 
“interlocking directorates,” that is situations where an individual or entity serves on the Board 
or as an officer of two competing corporations, a situation that may emerge with the recent 
financialisation trend, with private equity and hedge funds often investing in various companies 
active in the same industry. Under Section 8(a)(1) of the Clayton Act, ‘[n]o person shall, at 
the same time, serve as a director or officer in any two corporations (other than banks, banking 
associations, and trust companies) that are. . . by virtue of their business and location of 
operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them 
would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws . . . .’.1836 The statute is interpreted as 
applying not only to natural “persons” or individuals, but also to a “firm”. There are a number 
of exemptions however to the prohibition and liability (for banks, banking associations, and 
trust companies or when the “competitive” sales of the interlocked firms fail to meet some 
thresholds (de minimis exceptions). 
It is therefore accepted in various competition law regimes regarding merger control, 
although not as such in the EU, that structural links occuring in transactions that do not meet 
the legal definition of acquisition of control or decisive influence, but in which, instead, the 
                                                          
1832 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
1833 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
1834 This presumption is narrowly construed and does not apply if the issuer whose stock is being acquired is a 
competitor of the acquirer. 
1835 See, United States v. Dairy Farmers of America, 426 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2005), noting that “even without 
control or influence, an acquisition may still lessen competition” and constitute a violation of Section 8 Clayton 
Act. 
1836 15 U.S.C. § 19(4). 
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acquirer of non-controlling minority shareholdings gains the possibility to exercise material 
influence over the target, may lead, potentially, to significant anti-competitive effects1837.  
The literature distinguishes between full merger scenarios and partial concentration 
scenarios involing the acquisition of minority shareholdings: 
‘’’(i)n a full merger scenario, the acquiring firm obtains 100% of the following types of 
rights over the target: 1) ‘control rights’; and ii) ‘cash flow rights’. Control rights allow 
the acquirer to influence the target’s strategic decisions; hence they provide the acquirer 
the ability to raise the target’s prices. On the other hand, cash flow rights entitle the 
acquirer to have a financial interest- by means of its investment-and share in the profits 
of the target hence they give the acquirer the incentive to raise the target’s prices. 
Importantly, in the case of partial share ownership these two type of rights do not 
necessarily coincide, and their relative proportions may be rather asymmetrical 
depending on the particularities of each commercial transaction, or may even change 
from time to time. It follows that partial share ownership leads to two variants of the 
above-mentioned usual merger situation: i) it either gives only one type of rights (e.g. 
financial interests) but not the other one (e.g. control/influence); or ii) it gives partially 
both types of rights. This is crucial because the existence and the degree of each type 
of rights in a partial share acquisition have distinct competition implications in that any 
combination of financial interests and control rights leads to different anticompetitive 
effects’1838. 
Minority shareholdings can nevertheless be addressed, under the current European 
competition regime, with one of the following ways1839: 
• They may give ‘decisive influence’ in terms of the Merger Regulation, constituting a 
concentration. 
• They can be part of the substantive analysis of a concentration, eg minority 
shareholdings relevant to the assessment of a Significant Impediment to Effective 
Competition.  
• There have been cases where the merging parties have been willing to dispose of, or 
reduce, their stakes either before or during the phase I administrative proceedings, so 
as to obtain unconditional merger clearance1840; or to give formal commitments to 
                                                          
1837 It has been noted that “(a)cquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings account for approximately 
10-12% of all mergers notified in Germany and 5% in the United Kingdom”, the only jurisdictions (in addition to 
Austria) which currently have national merger control rules providing them the competence to review structural 
links, such as minority shareholdings. See, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, 
SWD(2014) 217 final, para. 38. The Commission’s “rough” estimates indicate that the number of cases of minority 
shareholdings that would meet the turnover thresholds of the Merger Regulation should be around 20-30 (or 7-
10% of the merger cases currently examined by the Commission each year), which means that in case the 
jurisdiction of the EUMR was extended to these cases the Commission could intervene in another 1-2 cases per 
year (Ibid., para 46). 
1838 A Tzanaki,’The legal treatment of minority shareholdings under EU competition law: Present and future’ 
University of Piraeus - Essays in Honour of Professor Panayiotis I Kanellopoulos, (Sakkoulas Publications,  2015), 
861-886. 
1839 See, A Burnside, ‘Minority Shareholdings: An overview of EU and national case law’, e-Competitions, No 
56676. 
1840 Courtaulds/SNIA Cases M.113 [1991] (disposal of a 12% stake in a competitor); Banco Santander/Abbey 
National M.3547 [2004] (modification of co-operation agreement between Santander and RBS, including 
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divest, as a condition of clearance.1841 However, had the same stake(s) been acquired 
post-acquisition, the Commission would lack powers to intervene.1842 
• Under the Commission’s remedial powers, the Commission cannot order the unwinding 
of a non-controlling shareholding that was part of a failed takeover: (i) the remaining 
stake does not confer control over the target, and (ii) the proposed takeover has been 
prohibited and thus not fully implemented. The Ryanair/ Aer Lingus cases have 
identified this problem. Ryanair acquired shares in Aer Lingus on the stock exchange 
and in parallel launched a public bid. Although initially only notifying the bid, the 
European Commission asserted jurisdiction over the combined stake-plus-offer, 
treating these as a single concentration, and prohibiting that concentration. While the 
offer therefore fell away, the question remaining was as to the stake. Although this had 
been part of a prohibited concentration, the Commission took the view that, once 
standing in isolation, it could not be the subject of a sell-down order under Article 8(4) 
EUMR (unwinding of completed/prohibited concentrations), because by itself it did not 
confer control. This position was upheld by the General Court1843. 
• Article 101 can apply to agreements by which a minority interest is acquired and Article 
102 TFEU can apply to acquisitions by a dominant company. In the Philip Morris and 
the Gillette cases, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have been specifically applied to 
minority shareholdings giving rise to ‘some (informal) influence’ over the target, which 
could be lower than the ‘decisive influence’ (control) threshold under the EUMR. 
However Article 101 cannot be invoked unless there is a finding of an ‘agreement’ 
and/or ‘concerted practice’ between two or more ‘undertakings’ linked to the minority 
share acquisition. Similarly, Article 102 is only applicable if there is a ‘dominant’ 
undertaking which is found to be ‘abusive’. 
In the Philip Morris judgment in 19841844, the European Court of Justice held that although 
the mere acquisition of a minority stake could not of itself be said to amount to conduct 
restricting competition ( for the purposes of art.101), it could nevertheless serve as an 
instrument for influencing the commercial conduct of a competitor, thereby restricting or 
distorting competition, in particular where the agreement provided for commercial co-
operation, or where it gave the acquiring shareholder the possibility of taking effective control 
of the target at a later stage. The Court emphasised the need to consider not just the immediate 
effects of the transaction, but also the longer term potential impact.  
                                                          
termination of reciprocal board representation and reduction of Santander's shareholding in RBS). [references 
taken by Burnside] 
1841 VEBA/VIAG Case M.1673 [2000] (disposal of various minority stakes to address concerns about joint 
dominance); IPIC/MAN Ferrostaal Case M.5406 [2009] (divestment of MAN Ferrostaal's 30% stake in 
Eurotecnica, a company involved in melamine production technology licensing and plant engineering, to address 
vertical concerns).[references taken by Burnside] 
1842 M Friend, ‘Regulating minority shareholdings and unintended consequences’ (2012) 33 (6) ECLR 303, 304-
305. 
1843 Case T-411/07 Aer Lingus Group Plc v European Commission [2011] ECR II-03691, paras 77-78, 84-85, 
87.and corresponding Commission Decision Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case COMP/M.4439) 
1844 Cases 142 and 156/84 British American Tobacco Co Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1987] 
ECR 4487. 
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Article 101 TFEU applies to a number of agreements by which a minority interest is 
acquired: 
• “Joint ventures, where formal ‘joint’ control in the EUMR sense is lacking. Typically 
these will involve parents with holdings in a common vehicle. 
• Production-only joint ventures – with joint control, but lacking full-functionality. 
• A shareholding anchoring a commercial relationship, e.g. supplier/customer, strategic 
alliances. 
• Complex ownership structures contrived to achieve a merger while avoiding a transfer 
of ‘control’ 
• Holding structures in which a company de facto neutralises a competitor. 
• Simple acquisition of a shareholding when sold by a single vendor”1845. 
As regards the possible application of Article 102 TFEU, the Court held that the acquisition 
of a minority shareholding in a competitor could only amount to an abuse where it resulted in 
effective control, or at least some influence, over the target's commercial policy, although the 
judgment offered no guidance on what level of influence would be problematic, or how the 
assessment was to be carried out.1846 
In the Warner-Lambert v Gillette1847 case, the Commission successfully challenged 
Gillette's acquisition of a 22% non-voting interest in the parent company of its major 
competitor, Wilkinson Sword, both as an infringement of art 101 and 102 TFEU. It is worth 
noting that there were various other commercial agreements in place, including an unsecured 
loan and the acquisition of certain trademarks outside the European Union and United States, 
but fell short of control.  
Despite this relative ignorance of minority shareholdings in the EU competition law 
enforcement, it is expected that minority shareholdings may lead to a number of possible 
anticompetitive effects, horizontal, vertical and eventually conglomerate. As the Commission 
clearly explained in some preparatory work on the need to xpand the EU merger control regime 
to non-controlling minority shareholdings, 
“22. (t)here are several types of anti-competitive concerns that can result from the 
acquisition of minority shareholdings. The economic effects of minority shareholdings 
on competition in the market significantly depend on the financial interests flowing 
from them and the corporate rights conferred by them. While financial interests refer to 
the acquiring firm's entitlement to a share of the profits of the target firm, corporate 
rights refer to the acquiring firm's ability to influence the target firm's strategic 
decisions. 
                                                          
1845 A Burnside, ‘Minority Shareholdings: An overview of EU and national case law’, e-Competitions, No 56676, 
2., who notes that although Article 101 TFEU seems not to apply when the minority shareholding is acquired 
through the stock exchange by buying a rival’s shares from a number of unidentified counterparties, this is still 
an unsettled issue. 
1846 A few other examined similar cases are: Enichem/ICI Case IV/31.846 [1988] OJ L 50/18, BT/MCI Case 
IV/34.857 [1994] OJ L223/36, Olivetti/Digital Case IV/34.410 [1994] OJ L 309/24 and Phoenix/Global One Case 
IV/35.617 [199] OJ L 239/57 [references cited in Tzanaki, ‘The legal treatment of minority shareholdings under 
EU competition law: Present and future’ University of Piraeus - Essays in Honour of Professor Panayiotis I 
Kanellopoulos, (Sakkoulas Publications,  2015), 861-886]. 
1847 Warner-Lambert/Gillette Case IV/33.440. 
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23. Structural links among competitors may lead to unilateral anti-competitive effects, 
since they may increase the ability and incentives of firms to unilaterally raise prices or 
restrict output. Intuitively, if firms have a financial interest in their competitors' profits, 
they 'internalise' the positive effects on their competitors' profits of a reduction in their 
own output or an increase in their own price. As a result, a firm with minority stakes in 
a competitor will have less of an incentive to compete vigorously and so will tend to 
reduce its competitive pressure, which will lead to price increases and output reductions 
in the market. This may occur irrespective of whether the minority shareholding is 
"passive", ie the minority shareholder has no influence on the target firm's decisions, or 
whether it is "active" and its holder may have some influence on the target firm's 
decisions. 
24. In case of "active" minority stakes the potential anti-competitive effects can also 
occur when the acquirer gains material influence over the outcome of special resolution 
decisions in the shareholders' meeting which are needed to approve certain strategies, 
for example in relation to significant investments, product lines, geographical scope, 
raising capital, engaging in mergers and acquisitions. As regards the ability to 
implement such as strategy, this depends on the specificities of the market and notably 
on the market position of the companies involved. The practice of the Commission and 
the Member States has shown that competition concerns are more likely to be serious 
when a minority shareholding grants some degree of influence over the target firm's 
decisions […] 
26. Competition concerns may also arise when the acquirer can use its minority 
shareholding position to limit the competitive strategies available to the target firm, 
thereby weakening it as a competitive force. […] 
29. Also, the most obvious way a minority shareholder can gain a competitive 
advantage in the market is through the ability to increase a rival’s costs. In an extreme 
situation, if the costs of the target firm are sufficiently raised, this firm may actually 
decide to stop competing with the acquirer in the relevant market. 
30. Horizontal minority participations may also lead to coordinated anti-competitive 
effects as they may impact on the ability and incentives of market participants to tacitly 
or expressly collude to achieve supra-competitive profits. The acquisition of a minority 
stake may enhance transparency as it typically offers the acquiring firm a privileged 
view on the commercial activities of the target. It may also make the threat of future 
retaliation more credible and severe in case a minority shareholder deviates from the 
collusive behaviour as firms may revert to a less collaborative behaviour in the jointly 
owned firm. Both effects will impact on the ability and incentives of market participants 
to coordinate.  
31. Finally, non-horizontal transactions may lead to competition concerns, in particular 
in relation to input or customer foreclosure. The ability to implement a strategy based 
on foreclosing competitors from the target company's supply or demand depends on the 
influence resulting from the minority stake over business decision of the target 
company and on the ability to exercise this influence against the resistance of other 
stakeholders. Extensive information rights can also matter in this regard: The fear that 
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commercially sensitive information ends up in the hands of a competitor, may deter 
companies from dealing with firms in which their competitors have minority stakes that 
entail such extensive information rights. In the case where the minority shareholding is 
purely "passive" and its holder has no influence on the target firm's decisions, the 
expected competition concerns will be more limited than in a full merger, given the 
smaller financial incentives to foreclose. On the other hand, when the minority 
shareholding is "active" and its holder has some influence on the target firm's decisions, 
the risk of foreclosure can actually be higher than what would occur with a fully-
integrated firm. This is because, in some circumstances, input or customer foreclosure 
may be more likely to occur since the company acquiring the minority shareholding 
only internalises a part, rather than all, of the target firm’s profits while it receives the 
full benefit of foreclosure”1848. 
In view of these potential anticompetitive effects, the acquisition of minority 
shareholdings has attracted attention1849, as the Commission has identified an ‘enforcement 
gap’ in respect of this type of acquisitions, especially with regards to non-controlling minority 
but influential (to business conduct) shareholdings in the context of merger control. The 
European Commission has explored the possibility of improving the effectiveness of the EU 
Merger Regulation by applying it to transactions that involve structural links1850. 
 
 
4.3.2. The competition law framework for common ownership: a work in 
progress 
 
The Merger regulation’s jurisdictional notice recognizes that “[s]ole control can be acquired 
on a de jure and/or de facto basis”1851. With regard to de facto basis, the Commission’s 
Jurisdictional Notice further stipulates that the Commission should assess whether “the 
[minority] shareholder is highly likely to achieve a majority at the shareholders’ meetings, 
given the level of its shareholding and the evidence resulting from the presence of shareholders 
in the shareholders’ meetings in previous years”. Indeed, “[w]here, on the basis of its 
shareholding, the historic voting pattern at the shareholders’ meeting and the position of other 
shareholders, a minority shareholder is likely to have a stable majority of the votes at the 
shareholders’ meeting, then that large minority shareholder is taken to have sole control”1852. 
 A further element to take into account is the importance of shareholder fragmentation 
on effective control, in particular on the aspect resulting from voting, the Commission finding 
in the past that an institutional investor was able to exercise decisive influence over the target 
                                                          
1848 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, SWD(2014) 217 final. 
1849 White Paper on Modernisation, Commission Programme No 99/027. 
1850 See, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, SWD(2014) 217 final, Part 3; Support Study 
for Impact Assessment concerning the review of merger regulation regarding minority shareholdings, Final Report 
92016), available at ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/KD0416839ENN.pdf  
1851 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, para. 55 
1852 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C95, 16.4.2008, para. 59. 
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with only controlling 39% shares, when the rest was spread among more than 100000 
shareholders1853. In a similar vein, the Commission found that a capital participation of 25.96% 
was such as to lead to a change of ownership of control, in particular due to the participation 
in general meetings1854. A dispersion of voting rights among a large number of small 
shareholders, also led the Commission to accept that effective voting rights of 34% by RTL 
(although it held 48.39% of the shares, the voting rights were limited by regulation) could 
signal control, in particular on the basis of past record of shareholders’ presence and the very 
unlikely possibility of their coalescence to reach a majority of the votes1855. A merger 
transaction may of course increase the level of participation of certain shareholders in the new 
entity, and eventually its possibility to establish control.  
But more than just a story of a simple minority shareholding leading to an effective 
control of the company’s strategy, the issue is if it is also possible to find an anticompetitive 
effect on the basis of the presence of common institutional investors in all significant players 
in a specific market, that is through a partial competitor ownership. It is accepted that cross 
ownership may give rise to anticompetitive effects, Paragraph 20(c) of the EU Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines state that  
“[t]he Commission is [...] unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a 
merger with a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 2000 and a delta below 250, or a 
merger with a post-merger HHI above 2000 and a delta below 150, except where special 
circumstances such as, for instance, one or more of the following factors are present: 
[...] (c) there are significant cross-shareholdings among the market participants […]”.  
Cross-shareholding is also mentioned as a possible facilitator of possible coordinated effects, 
in the sense that it provides an information channel amongst competitors1856, and that it 
provides “help in aligning incentives among the coordinating firms”1857. The causal mechanism 
is explained in the Commission’s decision in Dow/DuPont Annex 5: 
“For the sake of the argument, assume that a firm (the acquiring firm) acquires a 
minority share in a competitor (the partially acquired firm). When contemplating a price 
increase, the acquiring firm anticipates that part of its customers will react to this price 
increase by diverting their purchase to its competitors, which will see their sales 
increase, including the one in which it has a minority share. The extra profits generated 
by the diverted sales to the benefit of the partially acquired firm will, in turn, be partially 
redistributed to the acquiring firm. As a consequence, when holding a minority share in 
a competitor, the acquiring firm has higher incentives to increase its prices than in the 
absence of such a minority share”1858. 
Hence, “(t)he impact on the acquired firm’s incentives depends on how the transaction 
affects the governance of the acquired firm, that is on the acquiring firm’s degree of 
                                                          
1853 See, Case IV/M.025 – Arjomari/Wiggins Teape Appleton (OJ C 321, 21.12.1990), page 16; Case IV/M.764 
– Saint Gobain/Poliet (OJ C225), page 8. 
1854 Case IV/M.343 – Société Générale de Belgique/Générale de Banque, (OJ C225, 20.08.1993), page 2. 
1855 Case M.3330 – RTL/M6, (OJ C95, 20.4.2004), page 35. 
1856 Recital 47 of the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
1857 Ibid., recital 48. 
1858 Ibid., para. 43. 
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control, which can range from no control at all (silent financial interest), to partial 
control, to total control”1859. 
The Commission felt that it did not have adequate tools for dealing with anticompetitive 
acquisitions of minority shareholdings. In its White Paper - Towards more effective EU merger 
control released in 2014, it advocated for a targeted transparency system which will be well 
suited to capture such transactions and to prevent consumer harm arising from them. The White 
Paper put forward three procedural options for the control of minority shareholdings: 
- ‘A notification system, which would extend the current system of ex-ante 
merger control to acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings under 
certain conditions. 
- A transparency system, which would require parties to submit an information 
notice informing the Commission of acquisitions of non-controlling minority 
shareholdings. The information notice would enable the Commission to decide 
whether to further investigate the transaction, enable the Member States to 
consider a referral request, and enable potential complainants to come forward. 
- A self-assessment system, which would not require parties to notify acquisitions 
of non-controlling minority shareholdings in advance of completion. The 
Commission could, however, initiate an investigation of potentially problematic 
minority shareholding acquisitions on the basis of its own market intelligence 
or complaints.’1860 
In order to provide parties with legal certainty, only a transaction which meets the following 
cumulative criteria would fall within the definition of a ‘competitively significant link’: 
- ‘acquisitions of a minority shareholding in a competitor or vertically related 
company (i.e. there needs to be a competitive relationship between acquirer and 
target); and 
- the competitive link would be considered significant if the acquired 
shareholding is (1) around 20% or (2) between 5% and around 20%, but 
accompanied by additional factors such as rights which give the acquirer a ‘de-
facto’ blocking minority, a seat on the board of directors, or access to 
commercially sensitive information of the target.’1861 
The parties would be required to self-assess whether a transaction creates a ‘competitively 
significant link’ and, if so, submit an information notice. In the event that an information notice 
is submitted, the Commission would then decide whether to investigate the transaction and the 
Member States would decide whether to make a referral request.1862 The theme of minority 
shareholdings was however omitted in the most recent merger control consultation launched 
by Commissionner Vestager, therefore bringing the process of reform of EUMR on this issue 
to a standstill1863. 
                                                          
1859 Ibid., para. 45. 
1860 European Commission, White Paper - ‘Towards more effective EU merger control’ (2014), available at 
ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_merger_control/mergers_white_paper_en.pdf, para 43. 
1861 Ibid., para 47 
1862 Ibid., para 48. 
1863 See, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2016_merger_control/index_en.html . 
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The literature discussed above has also triggered a number of proposals for legislative 
interventions, of varying levels of stringency. Elhauge (2016)1864 takes a radical stand claiming 
that stock acquisitions that create anticompetitive horizontal shareholdings should be 
considered illegal under current antitrust law. He thus calls for the break-up of the existing 
shareholdings, citing a range of negative outcomes such as corporate executives being 
rewarded for industry performance rather than individual corporate performance alone, 
corporations not using recent high profits to expand output and employment, and economic 
inequality rising in recent decades. 
Posner, Scott Morton and Weyl (2017)1865 question whether direct application Section 
7 of the Clayton Act would be a right measure, or would cause disruption on the markets whilst 
failing to eliminate most of the harms from common ownership. They present evidence from 
simulations of the market outcomes deriving the sufficient anti-monopolistic conditions for the 
model used in AST(2017)1866. Their simulation-driven evidence suggests that limiting 
investors to holding up to 1% of a company’s equity per oligopoly or shares of a single 
company in any oligopoly is a sufficient condition. They, therefore, propose a public 
enforcement policy granting a safe harbour to the investors who voluntarily reduce their 
portfolio to either of the two conditions. Note, however, that picking a single company in a 
sector raises important market-definition questions. As conversely pointed out in recent media 
discussions: ‘Can you invest in both Facebook and Google, or are they in the same 
industry?’1867 Should we rely on relevant markets, rather than industries, instead? 
Rock and Rubinfeld (2017b)1868 propose a much wider safe harbour. They suggest 
protection from antitrust liability for the investors whose ownership share is below 15 percent, 
provides no board representation, and who only engage in “normal” corporate governance 
activities. Notably, this approach does not remove the financial incentive aspect of common 
ownership, concentrating purely on the corporate control. The proposed limitations on the 
voting right behind the shares also fails to address the concern that shareholders may simply 
fail to exercise their corporate governance rights in the way that prioritises a profit-maximising 
strategy for a single firm over the industry performance. Elhauge (2016)1869 discusses such an 
example of DuPont’s diversified shareholders rejected an activist effort to (arguably) compete 
harder against Monsanto. Besides, the institutional investors such as index funds would argue 
that they owe to their individual investors the protection of their interests, such demanding 
good governance from the firms that they invest into. Voting rights, thus, is the instrument they 
can use to exercise the interests of their investors.  
                                                          
1864 E Elhauge, ‘Horizontal Shareholding’, (2016). 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267. 
1865 E A Posner, F Scott Morton, & E Glen Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional 
Investors’, forth. Antitrust law Journal (November 29, 2016). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 787. Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=2872754 . 
1866 J Azar, M C Schmalz, & I Tecu, Isabel, ‘Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership’ (March 15, 2017). 
Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2427345 
1867 M Levine (2015). Index Funds May Work a Little Too Well. Bloomberg View, 22. 
1868 EB Rock & DL Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust for Institutional Investors’ (July 2017). NYU Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 17-23; UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998296 
1869 E Elhauge, ‘Horizontal Shareholding’, (2016). 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267 
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There are also significant concerns about market distortions that can be caused by either 
form of legislative intervention. Posner, Scott Morton and Weyl (2017)1870 raise an important 
concern about potential interventions leading to a single investor’s act of becoming a 
significant common owner without taking a direct action, but simply led by actions of other 
investors on the market. The authors warn that private litigation or unguided public litigation 
could cause problems because of the interactive nature of institutional holdings on competition. 
Given that the proposed MHHI indexes evaluate market concentrations through the relative 
weights of investor portfolios, the investment of one institutional investor in competing firms 
affects the amount by which another institutional investor “lessens competition” with its 
investments in the same industry. Consequently, institutions could become liable simply 
because other institutions changed their holdings and thereby made an industry less 
competitive. A stringent legislation that transfers responsibility onto institutional investors to 
determine other institutions’ ownership shares and expected volatility, would put them into a 
difficult position lacking clarity about where they can legally invest.  
Having reviewed the literature, we find the intuitions captured in Azar’s (2012)1871 
mechanisms a reasonable concern about the effect of common ownership on market 
competition. Given the recent emergence of measurement techniques and empirical estimation 
methodology in this area, we are not very concerned with the criticisms expressed by some 
authors on this issue, although we acknowledge the need for improvement. What we do feel 
strongly about is the debate about the incentives of firms in the market being distorted away 
from competition by the presence of institutional investors – and here we do not find any 
sufficiently convincing counterarguments. Policy makers are ultimately agnostic as to whether 
common ownership undermines competition by altering the firm manager’s incentives or via 
other routes. The policy maker concern remains about the eventual unilateral effects, or 
collusive outcomes. The main test therefore is – whether these collusive outcomes and 
anticompetitive effects are facilitated by the presence of financial investors. 
 
4.4. Common ownership in the global food value chain 
 
We first consider general evidence about common ownership in the food value chain, before 
exploring the way the European Commission dealt with this issue in its recent Dow/Dupont 
merger decision. 
 
4.4.1. General evidence about common ownership in the food sector 
 
Some of the competition authorities examining the recent seed mergers raised concerns over 
the common ownership that can be observed by the same financial investors in the various 
segments of the food value chain, and more specifically seeds and crop protection chemicals. 
                                                          
1870 E A Posner, F Scott Morton, & E Glen Weyl, ‘A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional 
Investors’, forth. Antitrust law Journal (November 29, 2016). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 787. Available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=2872754 . 
1871 J Azar, ‘A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification’ (November 8, 2011). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1993364 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993364 
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In particular, the European Commission noted in its recent Dow/Dupont merger decision a 
significant level of common shareholdings across the BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto 
and Syngenta, the shareholding of these firms also been characterised by a tail of atomistic 
shareholders, most of the listed shareholders having less than 0.01% equity share1872. Such a 
tail of atomistic equity holders may be less likely to be able to exert influence over general 
assemblies and the companies’ management, the Commission concluding that “the control 
exerted by large shareholders seems to be more important than their ownership equity share 
suggests”1873. Furthermore, according to Annex 5 included in the Dow/Dupont EU 
Commission decision, “Dow, DuPont and Monsanto seem to be the most ‘consanguine’ 
agrochemical firms, as they share a significant number of equity holders with, overall, large 
positions on all of these three firms”1874. Indeed, small number of common shareholders, 
collectively own around 21% of BASF, Bayer and Syngenta and around 29%-36% of Dow, 
DuPont and Monsanto1875. 
The Commission even went further and explored the shareholding structure outside the 
Big 6 and found that a significant number of shareholders listed in in the Big Six are also 
shareholders of FMC, a competitor that is no longer present in active R&D discovery, thus 
taking the view that the conclusions reached for the integrated R&D players and Monsanto on 
their concentrated shareholdings and on their common shareholdings also extend to some of 
the non-vertically integrated shareholdings1876. 
We confirmed these findings by conducting our own research on the shareholding of 
these companies by institutional investors. We selected 33 publicly traded companies on 
NYSE, NASDAQ and LSE across various parts of the food value chain. The food value chain 
is presented by companies operating in such sectors as biotechnology Illumina, ILMN; Genus, 
GNS.L), agriculture seeds, crop protection producers (i.e., Monsanto, MON; E.I. Du Pont 
Nemours and Company, DD; the Dow Chemical Company, DOW; Agrium, AGU; American 
Vanguard Corporation, AVG), fertiliser producers (Potash Corporation of Saskatchevan Inc., 
POT; the Mosaic Company, MOS; CF Industries Holdings, CF), farm and construction 
machinery manufacturers (Deer and  Company, DE; AGCO Corporation, AGCO; CNH 
Industrial, CNHI), food producers including major branded food diversified manufacturers 
(Archer Daniels Midland Company, ADM; Bunge Limited, BG; Tyson Foods, TSN; the Kraft 
Heinz Company, KHS; Conagra Brands, CAG, Pinnacle Foods, PF; Post Holdings, etc.), 
animal health medicines, vaccines and animal safety products (Zoetis, ZTS; Neogen 
Corporation, NEOG), pet products (Blue Buffalo Pet Products, BUFF) and some others.  Our 
analysis covered the full value chain from leading biotechnology companies producing genome 
sequencing equipment to seeds and animal breeding companies, from fertiliser and pesticides 
manufacturers to farm equipment, from farmers and raw food manufacturers to major food 
diversified holdings.  
                                                          
1872 See Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), paras 2339, 2340 & 2347. 
1873 Ibid., Annex 5, paras 32-33. 
1874 Ibid., Annex 5, para. 13. 
1875 Ibid., Annex 5, para. 80. 
1876 Ibid. para. 18. 
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The information about investors was taken from Bloomberg (date of analysis June 12-
13, 2017). Overall, we analysed investor profile of 33 public companies and 2,569 investors 
into these companies. Overall these investors account for 10,239 links (relationships) across 33 
publicly traded agriculture and food companies. The results of our research are shown in the 
following Figure. 
 
Figure 2: Helicopter view of the investors into leading food value chain publicly traded 
companies 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations1877 
 
The helicopter view shows a clear core group of top-20 investors. Using page-rank 
algorithm1878 we identified key investors (the importance/influence of the investor is indicated 
by the size of the node, the thickness of relationship between the investor and the investee is 
correlated with the percentage of shares owned). 
The most active investors include the leading global investment & wealth management 
corporations (Morgan Stanley,  Goldman Sachs, UBS, Deutsche Banks and others), banks 
(BNY Mellon, Bank of New York, Bank of America Corporation, etc.), asset-managers and 
financial services providers (BlackRock, Vanguard Group, State Street, TIAA, Wells Fargo, 
etc.), pension and sovereign wealth funds, central banks (Norges Bank, the central bank of 
                                                          
1877 We include 33 public companies (blue color), 2569 investors (orange color) with 10 239 links. The names of 
the major 15 investors representing an influential cluster are provided. 
1878 S Brin & L Page, ‘The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine’, Proceedings of the 
seventh International Conference on the World Wide Web (WWW1998):107-117 
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Norway), investment funds (Dimentional Fund Advisors, Geode Capital Management) and 
other players.  
 
Figure 3: The core investors in seed and traits 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The top-20 investors from the list ranking by their activity (the number of companies they 
invested, maximum possible ties – 33) are presented in the Table below.  
 
Table 1: top 20 investors 
 
Investor 
Number of 
investees  
% of total 
investees 
covered 
MORGAN STANLEY 30 91% 
BLACKROCK 29 88% 
BNY MELLON 29 88% 
DIMENSIONAL FUND 
ADVISORS LP 
29 
88% 
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP 
INC 
29 
88% 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 29 88% 
NORGES BANK 28 85% 
NORTHERN TRUST 
CORPORATION 
28 
85% 
STATE STREET CORP 27 82% 
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TIAA-CREF 27 82% 
BANK OF AMERICA 
CORPORATION 
25 
76% 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 25 76% 
GEODE CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT LLC 
25 
76% 
UBS 25 76% 
CHARLES SCHWAB 
CORPORATION 
24 
73% 
VANGUARD GROUP 24 73% 
AMERIPRISE FIN GRP 22 67% 
INVESCO LTD 22 67% 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 22 67% 
FMR LLC 21 64% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Note that each investment company or mutual fund holds several funds, each of which could 
be managed in a “passive” or in an “active” way. More details on share ownership of the most 
active investors into the global food value chain is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 3: Share ownership of the most infuential investors into the global food value chain (sorted by page rank) 
 
Investor 
Percentage shares owned 
Animal 
Safety 
Biotech / 
Animal 
genomics 
Seeds & Crop 
Protection 
Fertilisers 
Farm 
Machinery 
Food, diversified 
companies 
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T
y
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F
o
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d
s 
BlackRock Inc 7.35 
11.7
2 
7.33 4.56 5.97 6.31 6.58 4.75 
7.1
2 
5.23 8.21 5.69 6.91 6.34 6.61 
Vanguard Group 6.67 8.55 6.61 2.4 6.82 6.99 6.65 2.31 
7.1
2 
6.39 7.1 
10.0
1 
7.64 
10.8
8 
8.36 
State Street Corp 4.33 2.38 4.15 0.59 4.59 4.91 3.97 0.14 
5.5
7 
3.84 4.16 3.02 5.79 4.29 4.86 
FMR LLC 0.21 0.82 0.54 0 2.88 3.73 1.27 3.2 
1.4
6 
1.33 1.63 2.86 0.16 0.19 0.27 
Capital Group Companies 0 0 
10.5
7 
0 2.98 
10.2
5 
3.74 5.34 
5.1
6 
2.91 0 0 0 2.08 0 
Dimensional Fund 
Advisors LP 
0.27 1.7 0.18 1.08 0.23 0.18 0.34 0.27 
1.0
5 
0.29 3.51 1.48 0.95 0.32 1.39 
T Rowe Price 8.19 0.03 4.33 1.42 0.33 2.29 0.17 0 
0.8
1 
0.19 1.44 6.76 2.11 2.29 
10.5
7 
Morgan Stanley 2.99 0.38 3.02 0.34 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.45 
1.4
6 
0.43 1.44 0.58 0.42 1.56 0.39 
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BNY Mellon 1.11 1.39 0.85 0 0.9 1.04 1.35 0.39 
2.9
9 
0.8 1.13 0.36 1.35 1.92 1.8 
TIAA – CREF 1.99 0.44 0.93 0.12 0.73 0.47 1.07 0.15 
0.3
7 
0.55 2.03 1.43 0.47 2.42 1.21 
Goldman Sachs 1.03 0.3 0.96 0.15 0.7 0.83 0.47 0.22 
0.4
9 
0.32 0.91 1.59 0.66 1.4 1.66 
Share owned by top-11 
investors 
34.1
4 
27.7
1 
39.4
7 
10.6
6 
26.6
7 
37.5
1 
26.1
4 
17.2
2 
33.
6 
22.2
8 
31.5
6 
33.7
8 
26.4
6 
33.6
9 
37.1
2 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of Bloomberg data (access date – June 12, 2017) 
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4.4.2. The Dow Dupont case 
 
The Commission examined in great detail the possible anticompetitive effects of common 
shareholding in the Dow/DuPont merger case, both in its decision and also in an Annex attached to 
its decision1879. The Commission’s starting point was the industry shares tend to underestimate the 
expected non-coordinated effects of the merger given the significant cross shareholding between the 
main players. The Commission provided factual evidence on the significant level of common 
shareholding in the agrochemical industry and on the involvement of large minority shareholders 
which, despite some being labelled “passive investors” are as in fact “active owners”. The 
Commission noted that presence of a significant level of common shareholding tends to lower rivalry. 
This finding was first based on the economic literature on cross-shareholdings, “which extends to 
common shareholding”, and which “tends to show that common shareholding of competitors reduces 
incentives to compete as the benefits of competing aggressively to one firm come at the expense of 
firms that belong to the same investors' portfolio”1880. This literature has been discussed in great detail 
in the previous Sections of this Chapter.  
The Commission further took into account some recent empirical studies1881 providing 
indications that the presence of significant common shareholding in an industry is “likely to have 
material consequences on the behaviour of the firms in such industries”1882, leading to the possibility 
of higher prices, in view of the fact that common shareholders tend to shape the monetary incentives 
of firms' executives in order to align them with industry performance, and not only their firm's specific 
performance1883. 
Quite interestingly, the Commission transposed this literature, which has focused on price 
effects to the situation of innovation competition, which allegedly may also be reduced by such cross- 
and common ownership1884. The narrative goes as following: 
 “[…] by increasing its efforts in R&D, a firm incurs a cost that decreases its current profits 
in expectation of future benefits brought by the resulting products of its innovation. Such 
future benefits would necessarily materialise through price competition of future products 
which, given the specificities of the agrochemical industry, in particular the fact that the total 
size of the crop protection industry is typically not related to innovation, is likely to be mainly 
at the expense of its competitors. In other words, the decision taken by one firm, today, to 
increase innovation competition has a downward impact on its current profits and is also likely 
to have a downward impact on the (expected future) profits of its competitors. 
This, in turn, will negatively affect the value of the portfolio of shareholders who hold 
positions in this firm and in its competitors. Therefore, as for current price competition, the 
                                                          
1879 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017).  
1880 Ibid., para. 2348. 
1881 In particular, J. Azar, M. Schmalz & I. Tecu, Anti-competitive effects of common ownership, (2016) Ross School of 
Business working paper 1235 
1882 Commission Decision, Case M.7932 – Dow/DuPont (2017), para. 2349. 
1883 See, M. Anton, F. Ederer, M. Gine & M. Schmalz, Common ownership, competition, and top management incentives, 
(2016) Ross School of Business working paper 1328. 
1884 Ibid., para. 2350. 
508 
 
presence of significant common shareholding is likely to negatively affect the benefits of 
innovation competition for firms subject to this common shareholding”1885. 
Hence, for the Commission, the concentration measures, such as market shares or the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (“HHI”), are likely to underestimate the level of concentration of the market 
structure and, thus, the market power of the merging parties. In view of the fact that common 
shareholding is a reality in the agrochemical industry, both in terms of the number of common 
shareholders as well as with respect to the level of shares possessed by these common shareholders, 
the Commission took this into account as an element of context in the appreciation of any significant 
impediment to effective competition, noting that in the context of innovation competition, such 
findings provide indications that innovation competition in crop protection should be less intense as 
compared with an industry with no common shareholding1886. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
This Chapter of the Report examined the possibility that common ownership may constitute a 
competition concern, raising issues of unilateral effects, horizontal collusion and vertical exploitation. 
Many institutional investors are passive investors in various companies active at various segments of 
the food value chain. Although this Chapter merely focused on the seed/agrochem sector, it is possible 
to identify considerable common ownership in other parts of the food value chain as well, in particular 
its bits with the highest economic concentration. In view of the possible negative welfare effects of 
common ownership to competition, and its prevalence in the food sector, it looks advisable that 
BRICS competition authorities develop the adequate tools to deal with this issue, eventually resorting 
to the use of the MHHI tool. Other tools, probably based on advanced social network analysis, could 
also be developed in the future. 
  
                                                          
1885 Ibid., para. 2351 & Annex 5, para. 59. 
1886 Ibid., para. 2352.  
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PART IV: Innovation and Competition in Agriculture 
 
Since the early to mid-1990s competition law has initiated the process of adding to its genetic code 
innovation, with the adoption of guidelines and subsequently case law, with the increasingly 
important role of competition law enforcement in technology sectors. A question emerged: how could 
this practically drive the action of competition authorities? These were not only supposed to care 
about the welfare of existing consumers on clearly defined relevant markets, but also now take into 
account innovation concerns in their enforcement activity. This is of course true also for BRICS 
competition authorities. The development of biotechnology, branding and marketing in the food 
sector has led to interesting encounters with Intellectual Property (IP) regimes. The first Chapter will 
explore this interaction. The second Chapter will delve into the analysis of mergers, in particular in 
the food sector, if one adopts an innovation perspective. 
 
Chapter 1: The interaction between competition law and IP rights 
 
Ioannis Lianos with Igor Nikolic & Riccardo Savona Siemens1887 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This part of the report will explore the role of Intellectual Property (IP) rights and more generally 
different forms of protection of innovations in the enforcement of competition law in food value 
chains. We will examine the various approaches and methods chosen by the BRICS and other selected 
jurisdictions so as to promote innovation in this sector of activity, while also preserving other public 
policy interests, such as affordability, the protection of the environment and biodiversity, among 
others. The first Section will deal with the expansion of IP rights in the food value chain in recent 
decades, in particular following the development of the biotechnology industry. The second Section 
will delve into the way competition law enforcement has interacted with IP rights in the jurisdictions 
examined. 
 
1.2. The expansion of intellectual property rights and the food value chain 
 
The expansion of property rights has been a salient feature of the recent transformation of the 
economic structure of many BRICS jurisdictions and other developing countries. A particular 
manifestation of this phenomenon of the increasing role of private property has been the expansion 
of intellectual property rights or property rights in intangibles, at each level of the food value chain. 
With regard to food production, historically, plant and seed material were regarded as communal 
resources to be freely shared. Farmers were incentivized to save, replant, and resell seeds to other 
farmers, the dominant paradigm for trait development being farmer sharing1888. Starting with the 
                                                          
1887 CLES&UCL. The text accompanying the footnotes 1944-1972 was taken by a common project between Ioannis 
Lianos and Dimitry Katalevsky on the Bayer/Monsanto merger. 
1888 M. Llewelyn, The Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: An Alternative Approach, (1997) 19 European 
Intellectual Property Review 115, 117.  
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mechanization and the use of tractors in the late 19th century and most recently with the granting of 
the first plant biotechnology patent in 1992, IP rights have long been used in the agricultural sector 
in order to stimulate research and development and innovation. They also formed the basis for the 
emergence of a private seed industry following the Green revolution of the 1960s-1970s. Initially 
funded by the public sector, the Green revolution led to an important increase of productivity at a 
higher cost for the independence of farmers that have until then ensured the effort of innovation in 
the sector by developing crop diversity (decentralised and highly fragmented innovation 
environment). Farmers became dependent on external seeds, which led to the emergence of a private 
seed market. The new varieties introduced by the Green revolution required also sharp increases in 
the use of Fertilisers and pesticides, which added to the dependence of farmers on the private market 
and increased the need for credit. The development of biotech and genetic engineering in the 1990s 
had also profound implications on the development of the industry and the process of its privatization. 
Hybrid crops provide high yields but also lose this advantage the following generation, thus leading 
farmers to buy new seeds regularly. 
Genetically modified (GM) seeds are at the centre of the innovative effort in modern 
agriculture, the plant science industry being one of the world’s most R&D intensive industries1889. 
The plant biotechnology R&D industry now consists of six large firms, whose number following the 
ongoing merger wave might come down to four, a varying number of smaller firms, and public-sector 
research organizations such as land-grant universities (see Part II of this Report). The degree of 
consolidation of this industry is remarkable if one takes into account that in the early 1980s there 
were more than two hundred different seed companies and that many agricultural chemical companies 
had both seeds and agricultural chemicals. The process of consolidation has been described as 
following: 
“At first, pharmaceutical and chemical companies sold off their bulk chemicals businesses 
and bought up or merged with other pesticide and pharmaceutical companies. The major life-
sciences companies each purchased smaller biotechnology companies that had promising new 
genes and seed companies that owned efficient seed distribution networks and/or traditional 
varieties into which novel genes could be inserted”1890.  
This concentration is not only limited in seeds. It is also reported that the 10 biggest pesticide 
firms now control 90% of the global pesticide market, that 10 companies control 76% of the animal 
pharmaceutical sales, 10 animal feed firms control 52% of the global animal market1891, three animal 
genetics firms control more than 90% of turkeys and broilers genetics markets, while 4 companies 
control the swine genetics market1892. A lot of these companies control IPRs. There is some causal 
link between the rise of IP rights protection in this industry and the higher levels of economic 
concentration observed. 
                                                          
1889 See, ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf 
1890 Carl Pray, James Ohmhke & Anwar Naseem, Innovation and Dynamic Efficiency in Plant Biotechnology: An 
Introduction to the Researchable Issues, (2005) 8(2&3) AgBioForum 52, 59. 
1891 ETC, Who will Control the Greem Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf 
1892 See, Chapter 2, Part II.. See also, P.H. Howard, Concentration and Power in the Food System (Bloomsbury, 2016), 
116-120. 
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In the seed business IPRs consist of patents, plant variety rights, trade secrets and trademarks. 
We will first comment on each of these rights, before discussing the balance between different forms 
of IP rights in the industry. 
 
1.2.1. Patents 
 
In 1930, U.S. Congress established a plant patent regime providing protection over asexually 
reproducing plants (where each generation is genetically identical to the preceding), with the 
exclusion of food tubers (such as potato or Jerusalem artichoke, which are considered staple food)1893. 
Asexual reproduction is the propagation of a plant without the use of fertilized seeds to assure an 
exact genetic copy of the plant being reproduced, with the aim to establish the uniformity and stability 
of the. The grant, which lasts for 20 years from the date of filing the application, protects the patent 
owner’s right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant, and from using, offering for 
sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its parts, throughout the United States, or from 
importing the plant so reproduced, or any part thereof, into the United States. The criteria for the 
patent protection do not include a requirement that plants are useful, but that they are new (non-
obvious) and distinct, that is, that the plant is shown to differ from known, related plants by at least 
one distinguishing characteristic, which is more than a difference caused by growing conditions or 
fertility levels,. To be patentable, it is also required that the plant was invented or discovered in a 
cultivated state, and asexually reproduced. Plant patents are mainly used by the horticulture industry. 
 
Figure 1: Top US plant patent holders 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data on the basis of USPTO data 
                                                          
1893 Plant Patent Act 1930, 35 U.S.C. 161. 
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The development of new traits via biotechnology is a quite costly process, the costs being 
associated with the discovery, development and authorisation of a new biotechnology derived crop 
trait being for the 2008-2012 timeframe estimated to $136 million, out of which $31 million are the 
costs of discovery, $28 million the costs of introgression breeding and wide-area testing and more 
than $35 million being spent on regulatory science and registration and regulatory affairs1894. This is 
quite substantial, although less than the cost of bringing a new conventional chemical crop protection 
product to the market, which was in the 2005-2008 period $256 million. The mean value of the 
number of years required from the discovery of the trait to its first commercial sale for all crops is 
estimated to 13.1 years, this period being 11.7 years for canola, while for soybean this period is 16.3. 
years, and for corn 12 years1895. These considerable investments of resources and time may explain 
the reason biotechnology-based inventions in agriculture were considered a patentable subject matter. 
In view of the prevalence of hybridisation and conventional breeding techniques, patents on 
living organisms were not recognized at least until the early 1980s. The expansion of cellular and 
molecular biology throughout the 1960s and 1970s, specifically the transplantation of genes between 
organisms by Cohen and Boyer in 1973,  increased the ability of crop scientists to identify and isolate 
desired traits, modify the  relevant genes, and to incorporate these traits into new crop varieties via 
transplantation with greater precision1896. These advances had two key implications for agricultural 
seed manufacturers and plant and animal scientists First, the ability to identify and isolate the relevant 
genetic traits greatly facilitated the transference of desirable characteristics through selective 
breeding. Second, the ability to incorporate genetic material from one species into the DNA of another 
organism allowed for previously infeasible or inconceivable transfers of specific traits.  
In Diamond vs Chakrabarty, the US Supreme Court extended patent claims to life sciences, 
this leading to the emergence of the biotechnology industry1897. In 1985, the court expanded patent 
protection to genetically modified plants in Ex Parte Hibberd1898. With a utility patent, patent-holders 
can sue farmers and rivals for patent infringement and pursue litigation to enforce licensing 
agreements. These decisions have led the agricultural biotechnology industry to rely heavily on utility 
patents for intellectual property (IP) protection. Utility patents are thus available for the protection of 
plant tissue and seeds, as well as for the whole plants. The emergence of IP protection led to a shift 
of the paradigm from public sector innovation to private sector innovation, particularly in plant 
technologies and molecular level agricultural biotechnology1899. It was reported that “the average 
annual growth rate in utility patents for plant biotechnology was about 20 percent for major field 
crops, higher than the average rate of growth across all innovation areas”1900. 
Further in the US, patent laws protect distinct plant varieties that are asexually reproduced. 
Protection is received by the special Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA) which established specific type 
                                                          
1894 P. McDougall, The cost and time involved in the discovery, development and authorisation of a new plant 
biotechnology derived trait, (Phillips McDougall, 2011), 7, available at https://croplife.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf_files/Getting-a-Biotech-Crop-to-Market-Phillips-McDougall-Study.pdf . 
1895 Ibid., 10. 
1896 ISAAA, 2010 
1897 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
1898 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Board of Patent Applications and Interferences, 1985). 
1899 Paul W. Heisey, John L. King, and Kelly Day Rubenstein, Patterns of Public-Sector and Private-Sector Patenting in 
Agricultural Biotechnology, (2005) 8 AGBIOFORUM 73. 
1900 Diana L. Moss, Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a Hard Place?, AAI Submission, 
October 23, 2009, p.25. 
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of patent called ‘plant patent’. As opposed to utility patent mentioned above, plant patents do not 
require utility. Instead, it requires distinctiveness, that the plan be a distinct new variety. According 
to the Section 161 of the PPA: “whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct 
and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, 
other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”1901 
Sexually reproduced plants, in contrast, are protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act of 
1970, a specific type of IP right which is covered in more detail in section 4.2.1.2 below 
Regarding genes, the US Supreme Court held that naturally occurring DNA segment is not 
patent eligible merely because it has been isolated.1902 According to the US Patent Act and in the light 
of US Supreme Court’s judgment in Mayo,1903 laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
are not patentable.1904 On the other hand, genes that are not naturally occurring can be patented. In 
that regard, the court held that synthetically created DNA, that omits portions of the natural DNA, is 
patent eligible because it is not a product of nature.1905 Therefore, as long as the genes are modified 
they would be eligible for patent protection in the US. 
The scope of patentability is more delineated in Europe, where plant varieties and essential 
biological processes are excluded from patent protection1906, also in view of the need to avoid a 
double protection under patent law and the sui generis plant variety protection resulting from the 
UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants) Convention1907.  
However, the European Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions led to the possibility of patenting when the technical feasibility of the invention is not 
confined to a specific plant variety1908. In 1999, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent 
Office stated that “(a) patent cannot be granted for a single plant variety but can be granted if varieties 
may fall within the scope of its claims”1909. Indeed, according to Recital 31 of the Biotechnology 
Directive, “a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its whole genome) 
is not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not excluded from patentability even 
if it comprises new varieties of plants”. Plant varieties may also fall within the scope of patent claims 
when they are the direct product of a patented non-biological technical process.  
The most recent jurisprudence of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) of the EPO has 
reduced even further the patentability exception enshrined in Article 53(b) EPC, even for a patent 
claim for a product that is directly obtained and/or defined by an “essentially biological process”. The 
EBA held that “the fact that the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed 
subject-matter is an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent 
application does not render a patent claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety 
                                                          
1901 35 U.S.C.A. § 161. 
1902 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109, 186 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2013) 
1903 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 182 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2012) 
1904 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 
1905 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109, 186 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2013). 
1906 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention. 
1907 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 
89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991). 
1908 Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13. According to Article 2 of Directive 98/44/EC, “(a) process 
for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it consists entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing 
or selection”. 
1909 Transgenic Plant/NOVARTIS II, G 001/98 [2000] OJ 111. 
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unallowable”.1910 In essence, the EBA found that the patentability exception in Article 53(b) EPC for 
“essentially biological processes for the production of plants” had to be interpreted narrowly and did 
not extend beyond the excluded processes in order to cover products defined or obtained by such 
processes. Hence, a product resulting from an “essentially biological process for the production of 
plants or animals” may be patented as long as (i) the patentability requirements (novelty, inventive 
step, industrial application) are satisfied, (ii) the claim defines the product to be covered, either in a 
product format or in a product-by-process format, and (iii) the patent does not claim a single plant 
variety, which is something that is explicitly excluded from the scope of patentability under Article 
53(b) EPC.  
This is a very favorable position for large agrochemical corporations1911 and contrasts with 
the more restrictive approach followed by some EU member States’ patent legislation, which exclude 
product claims from patentability where the claimed products have been generated by an essentially 
biological process for the protection of plants1912. 
On the other hand, the position of the EPO that patents can be granted for plants obtained 
from essentially biological processes is in contrast with the position of the European Commission 
(EC). Namely, the EC issued a Notice where it held that the EU legislator’s intention when adopting 
the Biotechnology Directive was to exclude from patentability products (plants/animals and 
plant/animal parts) that are obtained by means of essentially biological processes. 1913 Formally, 
however, the EPO is not bound by the EU legislation and the European Commission’s interpretation. 
The patentability of plants obtained from essentially biological processes will depend on the future 
interpretations by the EPO. 
Opportunities for access to proprietary knowledge through IP law are generally limited. The 
EU biotechnology directive includes the possibility of compulsory cross-licensing for non-exclusive 
use where a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior patent, 
inasmuch as the licence is necessary for the exploitation of the plant variety to be protected. This is 
subject to payment of an appropriate royalty on reasonable terms1914. Nevertheless, the conditions to 
apply for compulsory cross-licensing are quite restrictive, as applicants must show that “(a) they have 
                                                          
1910 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 1242/06, Case G 0002/12, Tomato II (March 25, 2015); Enlarged 
Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 0083/05 - 3.3.04, Case G 0002/13, Broccoli II (March 25, 2015). It is 
noteworthy that the Enlarged Board of Appeal emphasized that “there is no general notion of an obligatorily restrictive 
construction of exceptions to patentability, for example, such as that adopted by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) when insisting on a narrow interpretation of exceptions to or derogations from fundamental EC Treaty 
principles embodied in the four freedoms” (case G002/13, p. 41). Hence, the exclusion of patentability incorporated in 
Article 53(b) EPC of “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” does not cover any product of such a 
process, but only excludes biological breeding processes sensu stricto. 
1911 See, the discussion in Timo Minssen & Ana Nordberg, The Impact of Brocolli II & Tomato II on European patents 
in conventional vreeding, GMO’s and Synthetic Biology: The grand finale of a juicy patents tale?, (2015) 34 (3) 
Biotechnology Law Report 81-98. 
1912 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 0083/05 - 3.3.04, Case G 0002/13, Broccoli II (March 25, 2015), 
pp. 64-65 [Part VIII(2)6d] referring to recent amendments to this effect in the German Patent Act of 1936 (as amended 
in 2013) and in the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (as amended in 2014). However, as the EBA noted, “no such amendments 
have been made in […] the United Kingdom, […] France […] Austria […] and Switzerland”. It remains to be seen if the 
Court of Justice of the EU will adopt such a narrow interpretation of the exclusion of patentability of products deriving 
from essentially biological processes, when interpreting the exclusion rule under Article 4(1) of the Biotechnology 
Directive, the CJEU not being bound by the EBA jurisprudence. 
1913 Commission Notice on certain articles of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 2016 C 411/03.  
1914 Article 12, Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13. 
522 
 
applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent or of the plant variety right to obtain a contractual 
licence; (b) the plant variety or the invention constitutes significant technical progress of considerable 
economic interest compared with the invention claimed in the patent or the protected plant 
variety”1915. 
 With respect to patent protection in BRICS countries, the overall situation is the following: 
 
• Brazil: patent protection is available only to transgenic microorganisms and the processes 
which lead to production of transgenic seeds, plants and its parts (organs, tissues or cells), not 
to the final product itself.1916  However, the definition of transgenic microorganism (bacteria, 
mildews, yeasts, funguses, viruses) does not extend to transgenic plants, cells or seeds. As 
such, plant parts, including plant cells and seeds, appear not to be entitled to receive patent 
protection;1917 
• Russia: patent protection is available for cells of plants if they represent a technical solution 
that is novel, has inventive step and industrial application;1918 
• India: patent protection is available for the biological material such as recombinant DNA, 
Plasmids and processes of manufacturing thereof provided they are produced by substantive 
human intervention. Gene sequences, DNA sequences without having disclosed their 
functions are not patentable for lack of inventive step and industrial application; 
• China: patent protection is available for processes used in the manufacturing of animal and 
plant varieties.1919 Transgenic animals or transgenic plants obtained through DNA and generic 
engineering are not patentable.1920 Genes, however, under certain circumstances may be 
patentable.1921  
• South Africa: patent protection is available only for animal, plant or any essentially biological 
process used in the production of animals or plants or the product of the process provided the 
process and products are not microbiological.1922 A patent examination is not required as is 
the case in other countries although the recommendation for its implementation has been 
included the 2013 South African Intellectual Property (SA IP) Draft Policy. 
 
Below is the overview of patents granted in BRICS countries in during the period of 2010 to 2015 by 
the area of technology as collected by the WIPO Intellectual Property Statistics Data Centre: 
 
Table 1: Overview of patents granted in BRICS countries (2010-2015) 
 
 Organic Fine Chemistry 
                                                          
1915 Article 12, Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13. 
1916 See Brazil Food Country Fiche p. 10 
1917 https://www.lifesciencesipreview.com/contributed-article/brazil-focus-protecting-plant-varieties-in-brazil-without-
ip-law 
1918 https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-502-
0003?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 
1919 See: China Food Country Fiche, p. 31. 
1920 Wei Li, ‘Patenting Genes in China, U.S., and the EU: How Does it Differ? Can It Get Out of Control?’ (2016) 35 
Biotechology Law Report 165.   
1921 Ibid. 
1922 Section 25(4)(b) of the Patents Act, No. 57 of 1978 
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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
2015 
 
Brazil 230 185 143 277 262 354 
Russia 826 864 978 775 740 867 
India 141 143 157 141 166 1,858 
China 3,252 4,500 6,529 7,551 8,247 10,436 
South 
Africa 
37 240 564 368 467 158 
 
 
 Biotechnology 
 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Brazil 51 52 24 66 84 103 
Russia 493 537 506 483 566 676 
India 58 40 25 33 42 982 
China 2,197 3,292 5,409 6,986 6,595 6,465 
South 
Africa 
373 129 422 311 342 124 
 
 
 Food Chemistry 
 
 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Brazil 43 49 27 98 125 143 
Russia 4,064 4,165 2,844 3,352 4,961 2,461 
India 17 12 13 5 10 413 
China 1,930 2,943 7,371 8,950 6,843 7,952 
South 
Africa 
187 65 175 136 203 67 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
Table 2: Granted patents (biotechnology) BRICS 2010-2015 
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Source: Authors’s calculation 
 
Figure 2: Granted patents (food chemistry) BRICS 2010-2015 
 
Source: Authors’s calculation 
 
The following figure also aggregates different technologies that could be relevant and all BRICS data 
(on the basis of the WIPO database) 
 
Figure 3: Granted patents per year per technology group (BRICS) 
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Source: Authors’ data compilation 
 
With regard to the respective strength of the Big 6 in terms of patents they have been granted, the 
following tables compile data from the EPO. It has not been possible to identify the patents related 
to the agrochem industry, so the statistics present the overall strength of these companies in terms of 
the number of patents granted.  
 
 
Table 3: EPO - patents granted patents per year 2005-2016 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Most of the companies granted biotechnology patents are pharmaceutical companie, although 
DuPont, Bayer, BASF, DSM are also among the tiop applicants (although the figures refer to all life 
sciences related patents, including agricultural biotech). 
 
Figure 4: EPO top patent applicants in biotechnology in 2016 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
This information of course provides little information as to the quality of these patents. Of course, 
measure of R&D concentration are issuance of patents. 
 With regard to the US, the following data compiled by the USPTO database may provide 
some insights over the innovative potential of some of the R&D focused global corporations in 
agricultural biotech (although the patent figures do not only include agricultural biotech related 
patents). The figure also includes information on plant patents. 
 
Figure 5: The innovative potential of the large R&D agrichem corporations: US 
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Source: Authors’s data compilation 
 
 
1.2.2. Plant/Animal breeder’s rights 
 
According to the TRIPS agreement, every country must have at least sui generis protection 
for plants. Article 27.3(b) allows WTO members to exclude “plants and animals other than micro-
organisms and essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms and essentially biological processes for the production of plants and animals other 
than biological and microbiological processes”, provided that they offer patents or establish “an 
effective sui generis system” of protection for plant varieties. Yet, the WTO stays short in defining 
precisely what constitutes an “effective sui generis system”. Many jurisdictions protect plant varieties 
through the UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants) Convention, which was 
adopted in 1961, in order to safeguards the interests of farmers and breeders with exemptions 
permitting farmers to save seed from one growing season to another and allowing breeders to use 
protected seeds for research purposes1923. UPOV is an intergovernmental organization, most of its 
members being developed industrialised countries, which administers common rules for the 
recognition and protection of plant variety protection globally.  
Like patents, plant variety protection providing patent-like rights to plant breeders. These sui 
generis IPRs protect the genetic makeup of a specific plant variety, the criteria for protection being 
novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability. PVP confers to the developer of a novel combination 
of genes manifested as a distinct, uniform and stable variety (the phenotype of the variety) a bundle 
of rights, without any need to prove an inventive step nor a specific utility, as title is provided solely 
on the evaluation of the variety’s value in terms of genetic quality. Although plant variety protection 
laws can provide exemptions for breeders, allowing them to use protected varieties for further 
breeding and for farmers and allowing them to save seeds from their harvest, these exceptions are 
provided under highly restricted conditions and these regimes have become more and more similar 
to the protection provided by patents, in particular since the 1991 UPOV Convention.  
                                                          
1923 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 
89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991). 
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Countries such as the US have pursued a system of concurrent protection of a plant variety 
through the grant of utility patents, plant patents and plant variety protections (the latter protected in 
adherence to the UPOV Convention 1991 Act).1924 US Supreme Court decisions in J.E.M. Ag Supply, 
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred1925 and more recently in Bowman v. Monsanto1926 have emphasized the 
importance of conceiving these different systems of IP rights (utility patents, plant patent, plant 
variety protection) as parallel to one another rather than mutually exclusionary. This complementarity 
is also supported by the lack of wording to the contrary in the relevant legislation (U.S. plant patent 
legislation, U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act) and the divergence of scope and requirements for each 
type of IP protection in this area.1927 The plant variety protection is seen as an encouragement for new 
varieties of sexually reproduced plants, protecting their breeders and developers. Its scope covers 
plants that are sexually reproduced, tuber propagated, and F1 hybrids.1928 In addition to compliance 
with the criteria of ‘novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability’, the US provisions on plant variety 
protection require the deposit of propagation material for the purpose of preservation; the material 
deposited need not be accessible to the public.1929 The issuance of a certificate requires initial fees 
but no maintenance fees.1930 
In the EU too there is an overlap of different systems of IP protection in relation to plant 
varieties.1931 The Community-wide plant variety protection exists under the Community Plant Variety 
Rights regime pursuant to Regulation 2100/94 (which rests on the UPOV Convention 1991 Act). The 
criteria to grant plant variety protection are the same as those identified above in other jurisdictions, 
including the addition of the fact that the variety under scrutiny must be designated by a denomination 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 63 of Regulation 2100/94. The Community-wide 
provisions coexists with national plant variety protection present in twenty-three EU member 
states.1932 Thus, breeders may choose to rely on a plant variety protection that extends its coverage to 
the whole EU, or alternatively to a specific number of member states.1933 In order to benefit from the 
Community-wide plant variety protection, fees have to be paid for registration and on annual basis 
for each year of protection. 
The boundaries of these IP rights have also been broadly interpreted.  In Erawu-Jacquery v 
La Hesbignonne, the Court of Justice of the EU held that a prohibition on the sale or export of basic 
seeds by the IP right holder was not subject to Article 101 TFEU since considerable investment had 
been made in developing the basic seed. According to the Court, “a person who has made 
considerable efforts to develop varieties of basic seed which may be the subject-matter of plant 
                                                          
1924 On this generally, see also Mark D. Janis, Non-obvious plants, in Duncan Matthews and Herbert Zech (eds), Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and the Life Sciences (Edward Elgar, 2017). 
1925 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi–Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
1926 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 1761, 1767 (2013) 
1927 Mark D. Janis, Non-obvious plants, in Duncan Matthews and Herbert Zech (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and the Life Sciences (Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 163-164. 
1928 http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/upov_trainer_en_16/upov_trainer_en_16_05.pdf 
1929 Mark D. Janis, Non-obvious plants, in Duncan Matthews and Herbert Zech (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and the Life Sciences (Edward Elgar, 2017). 
1930 http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/upov_trainer_en_16/upov_trainer_en_16_05.pdf. 
1931 On this, see for example Axel Metzger, Patents on native traits: what scope of protection?’ in Duncan Matthews and 
Herbert Zech (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and the Life Sciences (Edward Elgar, 2017). 
1932 Bart Kiewiet, The Community Plant Variety Protection System, (1 July 2009) CVPO available at: 
http://cpvo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/articles/2009-07-10_Article_Italy.pdf. 
1933 Bart Kiewiet, The Community Plant Variety Protection System, (1 July 2009) CVPO available at: 
http://cpvo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/articles/2009-07-10_Article_Italy.pdf. 
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breeders' rights must be allowed to protect himself against any improper handling of those varieties 
of seed” and “to that end, the breeder must be entitled to restrict propagation to the growers which he 
has selected as licensees”1934. In Bowman v. Monsanto, the US Supreme Court held that the sale of 
one generation of seed does not exhaust rights on later generations: a farmer who purchased seed to 
grow could not sow a new crop using the seeds produced by the fist crop—as that, the Court held, 
would constitute making the patented product and not reusing or selling the seed that had been 
purchased. 
BRICS countries have implemented differently the plant variety protection rights, under direct 
or indirect pressure from developed countries, in the context of bilateral trade and investment 
agreements containing an obligation for developing countries to embrace UPOV rules.  
India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 (PVPFR Act), which 
became fully operational in 2007, require that the breeder or any other person entitled to produce, 
market and sell the seeds of a registered variety must make such seeds or propagating materials 
available to farmers “in a timely manner” to “satisfy their requirements” and “at a reasonable market 
price”1935. A number of provisions in the PVPFR Act directly or indirectly recognize specific rights 
of, or grant entitlements to, farmers and farming community1936. Farmers have the right to ‘save, use, 
sow, resow, exchange, share or sell’ farm produce including seed of a protected variety in the same 
manner as they were entitled to prior to the Act, without however that involving the right to sell 
branded seed of a protected variety. Farmer are also entitled to recognition and reward in cases where 
the genetic material they preserved and improved is used in developing new varieties. Farmers have 
the right to claim compensation from the breeder, if the variety they purchased fails to perform as per 
the disclosure made by the breeder. Finally, they are immune from infringement legal action, if such 
infringement was innocent. Most importantly, the Authority in charge of the implementation of the 
Act is empowered to issue compulsory license after three years of registration, if the breeder fails to 
satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public for the seed or other propagating material or that the 
seed or propagating material has not been made available to the public at a reasonable price. The 
effects of UPOV protection on the quality or diversity of plant varieties is a matter for investigation, 
much commercial breeding being directed at cosmetic changes in order to serve market strategies. 
China’s protection of new plant varieties is provided for by the Regulations of the PRC on 
protection of New Varieties of Plants 1997 (amended on March 1, 2013) (the Regulations) and Seed 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in 2015) (SLPRC). The first instrument is an 
administrative regulation and therefore at a hierarchical lower level; the second instrument, through 
its dedicated chapter on the Protection of New Varieties (chapter IV), therefore strengthens the plant 
variety protection by upgrading its standing on the basis of a law.1937 China is only a signatory to the 
UPOV Convention Act 1978 and not the UPOV Convention Act 1991.1938 The Regulations sets down 
a protection of plant varieties for botanical genus and species that are included in the National List of 
the Protected Plant, provided the usual criteria of novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability and 
                                                          
1934 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919. See also, Case 258/78, Nungesser 
v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015, para. 10 
1935 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules, 2003 (as amended in 2012), Rule 36A. 
1936 For a description see, Sujith Koonan,  India’s sui generis system of plant variety protection (January 2014), available 
at http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/QUNO%20India%20-%20plant%20variety%20protection%20-
%202014.pdf 
1937 Cuicui Liu and Wenhui Zhang, Recent Advances in Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Lexology (19 July 2016). 
1938 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
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adequate denomination are respected.1939 Farmers are given a right of access to seeds and to propagate 
the protected variety material on their holdings when this was obtained by harvesting the material of 
protected variety on their own holdings in the first place.1940 Compulsory licensing may be granted 
by the Ministry of Agriculture for the implementation of varieties where national or public interest 
reasons may arise.1941 
Brazil’s Plant Variety Protection Act (Law 9,456 of 25 April, 1997) (PVPA) offers plant 
variety protection for conventional breeding techniques that would not qualify for patents under 
Brazilian law.1942 The PVPA incorporates into Brazilian law the provisions of the UPOV Convention 
Act 1978.1943 In order to avail of the protection the variety of plant genus or species would have 
satisfy UPOV criteria of eligibility as contained in the PVPA. Exceptions to the plant variety 
protection arise for farmers in certain cases, for example where they reserve and plant seeds for 
personal use in their own holding, or they use or sell products or the material obtained in their holding 
(except for reproduction), or where they multiply seeds for donation or exchange (only for small rural 
producers).1944 The revised Seeds Act 2003 also contains some provisions that recognise varieties 
that are connected to family farmers and indigenous people, whereby these categories benefit from 
an exemption of registration in the National System of Seeds and Plant Seedlings in instances of 
multiplication of seeds for “distribution, exchange or commercialization among themselves.”1945 
The Russian law that provides for the protection of new plant varieties is the law "On Seed 
Breeding" of 17 December 1997 N 149-FZ (Russian Law "On Seed Breeding). The law is based on 
the UPOV Convention acceded by Russia on 24 April 1998. The new variety of plant has to satisfy 
the UPOV criteria of eligibility and be included in the State Register of the Plant Variety Admitted 
to Use.1946 The breeder of the new variety would have to be registered as well by State Commission 
of the Russian Federation for Testing and Preservation of Plant Varieties.1947 The Russian Federation 
Civil Code (Civil Code) prescribes that the exclusive right of plant varieties is protected through 
registration in the State Register of Protected Varieties of Plants and confirmed by subsequent 
patent.1948 The exceptions to the rights of the breeder are the usual ones set forth by the UPOV 
Convention, with some additional provisions for the protection of farmers granted by the Civil Code. 
Thus, for instance, farmers are allowed to the use of the products of the harvest in their own holding 
for a period of two years for propagating within their own holding, if the variety is found in the list 
                                                          
1939 Li Jinguang, A view on Plant variety under china's Plant IP Protection system, (2011) 44 China Intellectual Property 
Magazine; Cuicui Liu and Wenhui Zhang, Recent Advances in Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Lexology (19 July 
2016). 
1940 Regulations Art. 10; SLPRC 2015 Article 29; Li Jinguang, A view on Plant variety under china's Plant IP Protection 
system, (2011) 44 China Intellectual Property Magazine. 
1941 Regulations Art. 11; SLPRC 2015 Article 30. 
1942 On this see also Marcelo Dias Varella, Intellectual Property and Agriculture: The Case on Soybeans and Monsanto, 
18 (2013) J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 59-82. 
1943 Renata Campello Afonso, Brazil focus: Protecting plant varieties—without IP law, Life Sciences Intellectual Property 
Review (16 June 2015).  
1944 Renata Campello Afonso, Brazil focus: Protecting plant varieties—without IP law, Life Sciences Intellectual Property 
Review (16 June 2015); Karine Peschard (2017) Seed wars and farmers’ rights: comparative perspectives from Brazil and 
India, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 44:1, 144-168. 
1945 Karine Peschard (2017) Seed wars and farmers’ rights: comparative perspectives from Brazil and India, The Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 44:1, 144-168 
1946 Russian Law "On Seed Breeding" art. 6. 
1947 ‘Provisions on the Registration of the Originator of the Variety of the Plant’ adopted by the Decree of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Production of the Russian Federation as of 10 February 1999 N 50, paras 1, 6. 
1948 Russian Federation Civil Code Article 1414. 
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of varieties adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation. Compulsory licensing of protected 
varieties is also available after three years from the patent, where a person is prepared to use that 
variety but is refused by the patent holder. The action for compulsory licence is brought in the court, 
which then defines the conditions of the license and the amount of payment.1949 
South Africa’s law on plant variety protection is found in Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 
(as amended), which reflects the additional steps undertaken by the country in its membership to the 
UPOV Convention.1950 The legislation provides for the conventional UPOV protection provided the 
criteria of eligibility to register a plant variety are satisfied. Rights are granted to farmers who use 
harvested material obtained on their holding from that propagating material with the objective of 
propagation. However, the harvested material cannot be used for propagation by anyone outside that 
farmer and thus farmers are only allowed to replant farm-saved seeds belonging to protected variety 
in their own holdings.1951 
 
The tables below summarises the state of art of plant and animal breeders’ rights in BRICS 
jurisdictions. 
 
Table 4: Plant breeders’ rights in BRICS 
 
 PVP laws PVP conventions Institutions 
Brazil a. Law No. 9.456 of April 
28, 1997 (Plant Variety 
Protection Law); 
b. Law No. 11.105 of 
March 24, 2005 (Biosafety 
Law); 
a. UPOV Convention for 
the protection of new 
varieties of plants1952; 
b. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 
a. The National Plant 
Varieties Protection 
Service (SNPC) – Ministry 
of Agriculture;1953 
b. National Biosecurity 
Council – CNBS.1954 
Russia a. General applicable IP 
rights: Civil Code of the 
a. UPOV Convention for 
the protection of new 
varieties of plants1956; 
b. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
Federal Antimonopoly 
Service 
                                                          
1949 Russian Federation Civil Code Article 1423. 
1950 Sileshi Bedasie, The Possible Overlap Between Plant Variety Protection And Patent: Approaches In Africa With 
Particular Reference To South Africa And Ethiopia, 1(1) (2012) Haramaya Law Review 125-136. 
1951 Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 (as amended) section 23; Netnou-Nkoana NC, Jaftha JB, Dibiloane MA, Eloff 
J. “Understanding of the farmers’ privilege concept by smallholder farmers in South Africa”, S Afr J Sci. 2015. 
1952 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
1953 Established with Article 44 Law No. 9.456 of April 28, 1997. 
1954 Established by Article 8 Law No. 11.105 of March 24, 2005. 
1956 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
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Russian Federation (as 
amended up to 2014);1955 
b. IP-related laws: 
- Federal Law No. 135-FZ 
of July 26, 2006 on the 
Protection of Competition 
(as last amended on 
December 6, 2011); 
- Federal Law No. 149-FZ 
of December 17, 1997 on 
Seed Culturing (as last 
amended by Federal Law 
No. 248-FZ of July 19, 
2011). 
India a. Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers' 
Rights Act, 2001; 
b. The Patents Act, 1970 
(as amended up to Patents 
(Amendment) Act, 2005). 
IP-related laws: 
a. The Seeds 
(Amendment) Act, 1972 
b. The Seeds Act 1966. 
a. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement); 
b. International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and 
Agriculture. 
a. Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers 
Rights Authority1957; 
b. The Appellate Board.1958 
China Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of 
China, the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants of 
1 October 19971959 
a. UPOV Convention for 
the protection of new 
varieties of plants;1960 
b. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA): 
- promulgated “The 
Implementing Rules for the 
Regulations of the People’s 
Republic 
                                                          
1955 Part IV of the Civil Code “codifies fundamental rules and principles of intellectual property law and has for the first 
time introduced provisions relating to databases protected by copyright”. For specific provisions on intellectual property, 
see Chapter 70 'Copyright', Chapter 71 'Related Rights', Chapter 72 'Patent Law', Chapter 73 'Selection Achievements', 
Chapter 74 'Topologies of Integrated Circuits', Chapter 75 'The Right to Trade Secret (Know-How), Chapter 76 'Rights 
to the Means of Individualization of Legal Entities, Goods, Works, Services and Enterprises, and Chapter 77 'Right of 
Using the Results of Intellectual Activity within a Unified Technology'; source wipolex database. 
For other general provisions relating to intellectual property provided for in the Civil Code, see: 
-Part I, Chapter 2, Articles 2, 8 & 3; Chapter 3, Articles 18 & 26; Chapter 4, Articles 64; Chapter 6, Articles 128 & 129; 
Chapter 16, Article 256 
-Part II, Chapter 38, Articles 769, 773 & 772; Chapter 45, Article 855; Chapter 54, Article 1028. 
1957 Established by Chapter II Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act, 2001. 
1958 As established by Art. 116 of the Patents Act, 1970. 
1959 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=360025. 
1960 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
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of China on the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants 
(Agriculture Part)”.1961 
- is responsible for the 
protection of new varieties 
of field crops, vegetables, 
ornamental species and 
fruit crops.1962  
 
State Forestry 
Administration (SFA): 
-promulgated “The Rules 
for the Implementation of 
the Regulations of the 
People's 
Republic of China On the 
Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (Forest Part)”1963; 
- responsible for the 
protection of new varieties 
of forest trees, bamboo and 
woody rattan, woody 
ornamental plant (including 
woody flower e.g. roses), 
fruit tree (dry fruit), woody 
oil-bearing plants, plants 
used for beverage, plants 
used for condiment and 
woody herbs as well as 
other plants which are in 
conformity with Article 2 
of the Regulations.1964  
 
South 
Africa 
a. Plant Breeders' Rights 
Amendment Act 1996 
(Act No. 673 of 1996) 
a. UPOV Convention for 
the protection of new 
varieties of plants1965; 
The Registrar of Plant 
Breeders' Rights.1966 
                                                          
1961 http://www.cnpvp.cn/en/index.html. 
1962 In October 2011, the protection of plant varieties under the authority of MOA covered 80 genera and species, see 
http://www.cnpvp.com/english/Introduction%20of%20the%20Network.htm. 
1963 http://www.cnpvp.net/index/index_en.aspx. 
1964 In October 2011, the protection of plant varieties under the authority of SFA covered 78 genera and species, see 
http://www.cnpvp.com/english/Introduction%20of%20the%20Network.htm. 
1965 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
1966 As established by the Plant Breeders' Rights Amendment Act 1996 (Act No. 673 of 1996). 
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b. Patents Act 1978 (Act 
No. 57 of 1978, as 
amended up to Patents 
Amendment Act 2002) 
c. Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Act 1976 (Act No. 15 of 
1976, as last amended by 
Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Amendment Act 1996). 
IP-related laws: 
a. Genetically Modified 
Organisms Amendment 
Act 2006 
b. Genetically Modified 
Organisms 1997 Act (Act 
No. 15 of 1997) 
c. Plant Improvement Act 
1976 (Act No. 53 of 1976). 
b. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
Table 5: Animal breeders’ rights in BRICS 
 
 ABR laws ABR conventions Institutions 
Brazil - The Brazilian 
Forest Code, 1965; 
 
- Brazilian federal 
law on the scientific 
use of animals, 2008 
(Law 
11794/2008);1967 
 
- Brazil Regulation 
of Industrial and 
Health Inspection of 
Products of Origin, 
2005; 
 
- Normative 
Guideline 07, 1999; 
- Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 
1992;1970 
 
- The International 
Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
on Food and 
Agriculture, 2001 
(art. 9);1971 
 
- The Agreement on 
Trade-Related 
Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), 
1994.1972 
- Ministry of agriculture, 
livestock and food supply 
                                                          
1967 http://www.fiocruz.br/omsambiental/media/ArtigoILARv5201eFilipecki.pdf 
1970 https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
1971 http://www.planttreaty.org/content/texts-treaty-official-versions 
1972 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm 
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- Decree 6.323, 
2007;1968 
 
- Normative 
Guideline 03 – 
Humane Slaughter, 
2000; 
 
- Decree 30.691- 
Sanitary and 
Industrial Inspection 
Regulation of 
Animal Origin 
Products, 1952.1969  
Russia - Federal statute No 
123 “On pure-strain 
stock-breeding”, 
1995;1973 
 
- Government 
regulation No 244 
“On measures of  
federal statute “on 
pure-strain stock-
breeding 
realization”, 
1996.1974 
- Decision of the 
Council of Eurasian 
Economic 
Commission No 94 
“On regulation on 
unified procedure of 
joint verification of 
objects and sampling 
among goods 
(products) come 
under veterinary 
control (inspection), 
2014;1975 
 
- Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 
1992; 
 
- The International 
Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
- State stock-breeding  
service. 
                                                          
1968http://www.agricultura.gov.br/arq_editor/file/Desenvolvimento_Sustentavel/Organicos/Legislacao/Nacional/Ingles/
DECREE_N_06_323_guidelines_for_organic_agriculture_December_de_2007.pdf 
1969 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1950-1969/D30691.htm 
1973 Федеральный закон от 3 августа 1995 г. «О племенном животноводстве» // СПС «КонсультантПлюс» 
1974 Постановление Правительства РФ от 6 марта 1996 г. «О мерах по реализации Федерального закона «О 
племенном животноводстве» // СПС «КонсультантПлюс» 
1975 Решение № 49 Совета Евразийской экономической комиссии «О Положении о едином порядке проведения 
проверок объектов и отбора проб товаров (продукции), подлежащих ветеринарному контролю (надзору) // СПС 
«КонсультантПлюс» 
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on Food and 
Agriculture, 2001; 
 
- The Agreement on 
Trade-Related 
Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), 
1994. 
India India’s Plant Variety 
Protection and 
Farmers’ Rights Act, 
20011976 
 
The Patents 
(Amendment) 
Ordinance, 2004 of 
the Indian Govt. on 
December 27, 
20041977 
 
The Biological 
Diversity Act, 
20021978 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 
1992 
 
The International 
Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources 
on Food and 
Agriculture, 2001 
(art. 9) 
 
The Agreement on 
Trade-Related 
Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), 
1994 
 
China The Patent Law, 
19931979 
 
 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 
1992 
 
The Agreement on 
Trade-Related 
Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), 
1994 
State Science and 
Technology Commission 
("SSTC") 
 
the China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) 
 
                                                          
1976 http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/ptplant2001/ptplant.html 
1977 http://lawmin.nic.in/Patents%20Amendment%20Ordinance%202004.pdf 
1978 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6058 
1979 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6503 
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South Africa Animal 
Improvement Act, 
19981980 
 
The South African 
Patents Act (Act No 
57 of 1978)1981 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 
1992 
 
 
Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
 
The Agricultural Research 
Council 
 
National Advisory 
Committee for Farm 
Animal Genetic Resources 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
Table 6: Plant Variety Rights Statistics 
 
The following table presents the statistics on granted plant variety rights protection rights in BRICS 
countries for the period of 2012 to 2016 as provided by the official statistics of the UPOV:1982 
 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Brazil 232 273 202 266 301 
Russia 466 458 426 544 592 
India1983 119 254 330 842 419 
China 336 296 996 1589 2132 
South Africa 259 255 273 233 247 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
Figure 6: Granted PVRs BRICS (2010-15) 
 
                                                          
1980http://www.daff.gov.za/doaDev/sideMenu/animalAndAquacultureProduction/docs/Animal%20improvement%20act
(2).pdf 
1981 http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/pa1978109/ 
1982 http://www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/c_51/c_51_7.pdf  
1983 Note that India is not a party to the UPOV Convention. The information on plant variety protection rights granted in 
India was obtained from annual reports of India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Authority, available 
at: http://plantauthority.gov.in/annualrpt.htm.   
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Authors’ compilation 
 
With regard to the importance of the Big 6 in plant variety protection the following figure may be 
helpful and indicated their relative importance with regard to the plant variety protection certificates 
granted by the EU Plant Variety Office and the relevant US data. 
 
Figure 7: Top companies for EU Plan Variety Protection certificates issued by the Community 
Plant Variety Office  
 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
Figure 8: Number of plant vvariety protection certificates issued by the US Marketing Service 
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Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
1.2.3. Trademarks 
 
Trademarks play and important role in the protection of one’s visual identity and recognition. 
Trademarks on the one hand serve as an indication of origin of a product, and a guarantee of quality 
in the the eyes of consumers. Trademarks are also good advertising tool and, if successful, may 
represent a valuable commercial asset.  
Various trademarks are tpresent in the processing segment of the food value chain, with a 
number of iconic global brands, enabling a higher degree of product heterogeneity. Brands also 
extend to more than product differentiation, as they may be used by brand-owners in order to reinforce 
the “emotional and cognitive appeal” of a certain brand to consumers, the identity that a brand confers 
on products giving a context to an individual act of consumption “which may increase its emotional 
impact and turn it into the basis of a continuing relationship”1984. For instance, Monsanto controls 
leading brands, such as Dekalb and Channel for corn, Asgrow for soybeans, Deltapine for cotton, 
Seminis and De Ruiter for vegetable seeds. It also develops biotechnology traits enabling crops to 
protect themselves from borers and rootworm and therefore assisting farmers in controlling insects 
and weeds. These products are distributed in various brands, such as SmartStax, YieldGard, 
YieldGard VT triple, VT triple PRO for corn, Intacta RR2 PRO for soybeans, Bollgard and Bollgard 
II for cotton. Its brand portfolio includes glyphosate-based herbicides or dicamba herbicides and 
include brands, such as Roundup Ready, RoundupReady 2 Yield, Roundup Ready 2 Xtend and 
Intacta RR2 PRO  (for soybeans), and Genuity. Bayer controls popular seed brands, such as Arize for 
rice, Credenz for soybeans, Fibermax for cotton, InVigor for canola seeds, Nunhems for vegetable 
seeds, Stoneville for cotton seeds, seed treatment solutions, such as Gaucho, glyfosinate-ammomium 
based herbicides like Liberty and Basta, and fungicides, like Nativo. 
                                                          
1984 Lianos, Ioannis, Brands, Product Differentiation and EU Competition Law (September 1, 2014). D. Desai, I. Lianos 
& S. Weber Waller (eds.), Brands, Competition Law and IP (Cambridge University Press, 2015); CLES Research Paper 
No. 7/2014. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2542970 
Bayer
128
BASF
0
Monsanto
1117
Du Pont
0
Syngenta
524
Vilmorin
2
Number of plant variety protection certificates (PVP) 
issued by the US Agricultural Marketing Service 
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Brand may also play a role further downstream in the food value chain. For instance, BRICS 
countries are experiencing the growth of private brand products in supermarkets. In South Africa, 
supermarkets are estimated to capture 90 percent of the South African food market.1985 A trend in 
South Africe is the incrase of supermaket's own private brands and every major supermarket chain 
has its own private brand.1986 This trend may allow new producers to enter the market via 
supermarket's own private brand. However, on the other hand, new entrants still have to supply at 
volume required by the large supermarkets which may make it hard for small producers to enter the 
market.1987 
On the international level, trademark protection is guaranteed by TRIPS Agreement to which 
all BRICS countries are members. Subsequently, BRICS countries have implemented trade mark 
protection in their national statutes. 
 
1.2.4. Geographical indications of origin 
 
Last but not least, many jurisdictions have developed a system of geographical indications of 
origin (GIs), as a vehicle for product differentiation. These can either take the form of sui generis 
systems (i.e. special regimes of protection), or the use of collective or certification marks, or finally, 
administrative product approval schemes.  
According to Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement, geographical indications of origin are 
“indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality 
in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin.” TRIPS Agreement also provides that all governments must 
provide legal opportunities in their own laws for the owner of a GI registered in that country to prevent 
the use of marks that mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the good. 
Each country generally has its own laws providing for protection of GIs. In the EU, there is a 
distinction between: i) Protected Designations of Origins (PDO); ii) Protected Geographical 
Indications (PGI), and iii) Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG).1988  
A PDO is defined as a name which identifies a product: “(i) originating in a specific place, 
region or, in exceptional cases, a country; (ii) whose quality or characteristics are essentially or 
exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors; 
and (iii) the production steps of which all take place in the defined geographical area.”1989 Therefore, 
it is necessary for a geographical name to qualify as a PDO that there is a clear link between the 
physical characteristics of the product with which the geographical name has been used and the 
geographical name. 
PGI is defined as a name which identifies a product: “(i) as originating in a specific place, 
region or country; (ii) whose given quality, reputation or other characteristic is essentially attributable 
to its geographical origin; and (iii) at least one of the production steps of which take place in the 
                                                          
1985 South Africa Country Fitche p. 16. 
1986 Reena Das Nair, 'Competition in Supermarkets: A South African Perspective' (2016) p. 17, available at: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/56f130034d088e7b7cb6fef4/1458647047632/Reen
a+das+Nair_Competition+in+Supermarkets+-+A+South+African+Perspective.pdf 
1987 South Africa Country Fitche p. 10. 
1988 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs OJ 202 L 343. 
1989 Ibid, Article 5(1). 
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defined geographical area.”1990 PGIs can be explained as a form of protection where there is not a 
clear link between the territory and the qualities of products, but reputational concerns of a given 
territory warrant protection.  
TSG, in the end, is defined as a name which describes a specific product or foodstuff that: “(i) 
results from a mode of production, processing or composition corresponding to traditional practice 
for that product or foodstuff; or (ii) is produced from raw materials or ingredients that are those 
traditionally used.”1991 In this case, the qualities of products are not required to be related to a certain 
geographical area. What is required is tradition in terms of production methods and materials used. 
A name may not be registered as a PDO or PGI “where it conflicts with a name of a plant 
variety or an animal breed and is likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the 
product.”1992  This provision is inserted to ensure that a certain plant variety cannot be protected both 
by plant variety protection and by GI protection. 
As BRICS countries are members of the TRIPS Agreement they are required to provide GI 
protection. 
South Africa provides for GI protection in the Agricultural Product Standards Act of 1990 
(APS Act).1993 GI protection is adminstred by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
According to the APS Act, geographical name can be protected if its is: i) used in connection with an 
indication of the true origin of the product in question; ii) used in translation; or iii) used together 
with words such as "kind", "type", "style", "imitation" or similar words or expressions. Ammedments 
to the GI protection legislation are currently under developments which should further regulate the 
use of registered GI to agricultural products. 
 
1.2.5. Technological means of protection of innovation 
 
 The seed industry has put in place biological tools to protect its IP rights by developing 
hybridization in the 1930s, in particular of corn that strengthened the ability of private actors to 
appropriate the value of new corn varieties through secrecy1994. Indeed, corn hybrids rely on cross-
polinating two inbred lines in order to generate a hybrid, which displays superior productivity to the 
inbred lines. However, this vigor is lost in subsequent generations, making thus necessary for farmers 
to purchase seeds for every planting season1995. More recently this “technological protection” has 
been achieved through cytoplasmic male sterility, one of the most efficient ways to produce F1 hybrid 
seeds.  
IP right holders may also take measures in order to avoid problems with regard to the 
implementation of their IP rights, in particular in developing jurisdictions with weak IP enforcement 
systems. Material Transfer Agreements between the IP right holders and farmers may specify the 
conditions under which a seed sample will be exchanged. Those holding utility patent rights in seed 
may sell subject to a contractual provision that bars the farmer from saving seed and using it to grow 
another generation of crops, thus controlling farmers through purchase agreements. An example is 
                                                          
1990 Ibid, Article 5(2). 
1991 Ibid, Article 18(1). 
1992 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs OJ 202 L 343, Article 6(2). 
1993 Act No. 119 of 1990. 
1994 D.N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: the development of hybrid maize, (2001) (2) Nature Reviews Genetics 69.  
1995 R. Dixon, Hybrid Corn Revisited, (1980) 48(6) Econometrica 1451. 
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Monsanto’s Roundup Ready ® Technology Agreement that usually provides that the farmer cannot 
save seed or any other part of the crop grown from the Monsanto seed for replanting and that the 
farmer is prohibited from supplying seed to any other person. Violation of these licenses may be 
regarded as a breach of contract subject to draconic sanctions, the farmer being obliged to pay 120 
times the technology fee plus the legal fee if he/she is caught violating the agreement. Enforcement 
of these contractual clauses involves the continuous inspection of the farmers’ fields by Monsanto 
staff. Binding arbitration constitutes the default dispute resolution mechanism for these agreements. 
One may consider these contractual limitations of traditional farmer seed saving and sharing practices 
as introducing a restriction to research and seed development by farmers and thus a restriction on 
innovation. Monsanto may advance that such restrictions are necessary in order to protect its own 
incentives to innovate, in view of its investment on R&D in order to develop the technology and the 
need to recoup the costs by the appropriation of the profits arising out of the productivity 
improvements introduced due to its innovative effort. 
 The seed industry has also put in place biological tools to protect its IP rights through 
cytoplasmic male sterility, one of the most efficient ways to produce F1 hybrid seeds. Another 
biological protection is Genetic Use Restriction Technology (GURT), with the development of 
terminator technologies preventing farmers from saving seeds since the genetically engineered plants 
will not germinate in subsequent generations or will not express the specific trait (e.g. herbicide 
resistance) that is protected by IP rights unless the plant is sprayed with specific chemicals in order 
to activate the right gene. These biological protection instruments are particularly useful for the 
private seed industry in jurisdictions with weak enforcement of IPRs. These technologies are 
protected by patents, a great number of them being held by few global seed companies. This IP-based 
business environment makes it quite difficult for public institutions to assert themselves in the process 
of innovation in the seed industry and promote the open access and sharing ethos that was prevalent 
prior to the expansion of IPRs in this sector of activity. 
   
1.2.6. Trade secrets 
 
Trade secrets are confidential business information that provides companies with a certain 
competitive edge.1996 Unlike patents, trade secrets are not required to be registered to produce effects 
and they last indefinitely as long as they remain secret. However, once trade secret is made public 
anyone can use it and the holder of trade secret does not have the right to exclude other form using 
trade secret that has become public.  
Trade secrets are internationally regulated by the TRIPS Agreements. Article 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement defines trade secrets as information that: i) must be secret (i.e. it is not generally known 
among, or readily accessible to, circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question); 
ii) have commercial value because it is a secret; and iii) must have been subject to reasonable steps 
by the rightful holder of the information to keep it secret (e.g., through confidentiality agreements). 
Similar definition of trade secret has been adopted in the U.S. and the EU. The U.S. Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act grants legal protection to trades secrets and protects their misappropriation.1997 On 
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the EU level a Trade Secrets Directive was adopted in 2016 which intends to harmonise the national 
laws in EU countries against the unlawful acquisition, disclosure and use of trade secrets.1998  
The EU Trade Secrets Directive defines trade secrets as the information that: i) is secret in the 
sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally 
known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; ii) has commercial value because it is secret; and iii) it has been subject to 
reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to 
keep it secret. The EU established remedies from unlawful misappropriation of trade secrets, 
including: i) stopping the unlawful use and further disclosure of misappropriated trade secrets; ii) the 
removal from the market of goods that have been manufactured on the basis of a trade secret that has 
been illegally acquired; and iii) the right to damages. 
BIRCS countries, as members of TRIPS Agreement, recognise the protection of trade secrets 
in their national statutes.  
As demonstrated above, IP protection of plants may be achieved by: i) plant variety protection 
or ii) patent protection in certain circumstances. Gene modifications may also be patented in certain 
circumstances. This may appear to leave little role for trade secrets in plant protection. Nevertheless, 
the use of hybrids, at least since the 1920s, and the fact that hybrids do not truly self-replicate enable 
a private firm to retain control of the pure lines so that these remain the exclusive source for the 
superior hybrid offspring. One may also add here contractual arrangements between breeders and 
farmers that prohibit seed replanting and/or the seed being used by others’ breeding programmes. 
Commonly referred to as bag tag licenses, these are routinely used to market seeds1999. These may be 
protected by trade secrets, although secrecy may be impossible for most crops other than corn 
varieties. A company may also gain valuable know-how that could be protected by trade secret rights. 
Farm data (mainly agronomic and equipment data collected by sensors and other precision ag 
technology) are particularly important for the development of the “Internet of farming”, and can be 
collected in an anonymised form including information on  yield and products used as well as GPS 
location information, without prior explicit authorisation by the farmer2000. These could be protected 
as a trade secret, in particular as there are no clear-cut guidelines regarding the privacy of the data, 
its ownership and control. This broad pool of real time data could be extremely valuable for traders 
in commodity markets as they could influence farmland values.  
 
1.2.7. A more inclusive innovation system: Balancing the rights of IP holders and 
farmers’ rights 
 
As highlighted above, the different regimes regulating farmers’ access to seeds derive from a 
combination between domestic and international intellectual property legal frameworks, including 
the overarching International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (the “UPOV 
Convention”). The following analysis shows the interconnection and influence between domestic and 
                                                          
1998 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed 
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2000 High-tech U.S. farm machines harvest Big Data, reap privacy worries (Reuters, April 10, 2014). 
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international frameworks by comparing BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) among other international players.  
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), directs its members to 
arrange “for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or 
by any combination thereof’” (Article 27(3)(b)). The UPOV Convention is relevant in this regard, as 
this instrument created a sui generis protection for plant breeding, and in doing so shaped the 
domestic intellectual property legislation of most countries.  
According to the UPOV Convention, a new plant variety (defined in Article 1(vi) of the UPOV 
Convention 1991) would be granted protection when the variety satisfies Article 12 UPOV 
Convention 1991 requirements of distinctiveness, uniformity and stability – the so-called DUS 
conditions:  
- Distinctiveness refers to the fact that a variety must be clearly distinguishable from any other 
variety whose existence is a matter of common knowledge (Article 7 UPOV Convention 
1991). 
- Uniformity denotes a sufficient uniformity in the variety’s relevant characteristics “subject to 
the variation that may be expected from the particular features of its propagation” (Article 8 
UPOV Convention 1991). 
- Stability is linked to the fact that a variety “must remain true to its description after repeated 
reproduction or propagation or, where the breeder has defined a particular cycle of 
reproduction or multiplication, at the end of each cycle” (Article 9 UPOV Convention 
1991).2001  
Finally, Article 6 UPOV Convention 1991 sets the element of novelty as applying where, within 
specific timeframes and localities, there has been no sale or disposal of propagating or harvested 
variety material from the date of filing for the protection. 2002 
The UPOV Convention’s protections afforded to the plant breeder are found in Article 14 UPOV 
Convention 1991; in the absence of authorisation, the breeder is granted exclusive control over:  
- Production  
- Reproduction (multiplication) 
- Conditioning for the purpose of reproduction 
- Offering for sale 
- Selling or other marketing 
- Exporting, importing, stocking for any of the above purposes.2003 
In certain cases protection is also granted over harvested material (Article 14(2) UPOV Convention 
1991) or certain products from the harvested material (Article 14(3) UPOV Convention 1991). 
The protection rights granted by the UPOV Convention 1991 are also subject to particular limitations 
found, for example, in Articles 15 and 16. Among these limitations, it is possible to see those that are 
aimed at regulating the access of farmers to seeds:  
- Article 15(1)(i) UPOV Convention 1991 deals with activities in the private sector for non-
commercial purposes, that may include for instance subsistence farming. 
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- Article 15(1)(ii) UPOV 1991 discusses activities that are conceived in the context of tests for 
ulterior cultivation. 
- The use of plants, or parts thereof such as seeds, for the purpose of creating a new variety can 
also be a limitation to the protection rights (Article 15 (1)(iii) UPOV Convention 1991) (i.e. 
“breeder’s exception”) 
- One of the most relevant provisions however is found in Article 15(2) UPOV Convention 
1991, also known as farmer’s privilege. As explained by Gert Würtenberger, this provision 
shields farmers who gained harvested material through the “the cultivation of legally 
produced propagating material of protected varieties [within their] own company and which 
[they] further use within [their] own company as propagating material…The farmer[s] may 
be allowed, without the consent of the plant variety right proprietor, to keep part of [their] 
harvest and to use the same in the following year on [their] fields as seed for the propagation 
of new plants.”2004  
Other limitations on the UPOV protection may derive from the legal principle of exhaustion of rights 
(Article 16 UPOV Convention 1991) and on the basis of public interest arguments, including public 
morals, order and security, the health and life of humans, animals or plants, the environment, 
industrial and commercial property rights, restricting competition, trade or agricultural production 
(Articles 17(1) and 18 UPOV Convention 1991). 
While the present analysis has focused on the general UPOV Convention thus far, the 
relevance of this framework is clear when one views the domestic legislative models dealing with 
plant varieties and farmers’ access rights.  
In the EU there is currently ongoing debate whether certain plant varieties, besides plant 
variety protection based on the UPOV Convention, may also be patented. Namely, the European 
Patent Convention excludes from patentability “plant varieties” and ““essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants”. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1.1, the EPO in two cases in 
2015 held that process for the production of plants is not patentable in principle if it involves 
conventional breeding, irrespective of additional technical steps such as marker assisted selection, 
which support conventional breeding.2005 However, it also ruled that products of such processes (cross 
breeding and selection) are patentable (e.g. plants with novel traits) provided they also fulfil the 
criteria for patentability.2006 In other words, new plant varieties obtained through biological processes 
may be patentable.   
This has been viewed negatively by the EU institutions and some Member States. The 
European Parliament adopted in 2015 a Resolution communicating the view that the patentability of 
products obtained from essentially biological processes should be prohibited.2007 The European 
Commission followed with aNotice where it held that the EU legislator’s intention when adopting 
the EU Biotechnology Directive was to exclude from patentability products (plants/animals and 
plant/animal parts) that are obtained by means of essentially biological processes. 2008 However, such 
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interpretation of the European Commission is not formally binding on the EPO as EPO works 
pursuant to the European Patent Convention, and not the EU Biotechnology Directive. Therefore, the 
future of the patentability of plant varieties obtained from essentially biological processes will depend 
on the future interpretation by the EPO. 
Next, some Member States have included in their patent statues specific plant breeder’s 
exception. As seen above, UPOV allows others to use plants, or parts of plants such as seeds, for the 
purpose of creating a new variety. Some EU countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands have gone further and introduced a breeding exception in their patent statutes - limiting 
the right of patent holders by allowing plant breeders to use freely patented biological material for 
creating new plant variety types.2009 The Unitary Patent Convention similarly provides an exemption 
from the unitary patent protection for “the use of biological material for the purpose of breeding, or 
discovering and developing other plant varieties”2010 
BRICS countries constitute a revealing example of how the UPOV Convention provisions 
have been replicated to varying extents. Russia’s law "On Seed Breeding" dated 17 December 1997 
N 149-FZ and the IP part of the Russian Civil Code mirror the provisions on plant variety rights along 
the lines of the UPOV Convention. Interestingly however, the exclusive right to plants varieties is 
also provided confirmation by patent.2011 The situation is slightly different for countries such as 
Brazil, China and South Africa, which unlike Russia are signatories to the UPOV Convention 1978, 
and where there is a clearer separation between plant variety protection and patents. In Brazil, the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (Law 9,456 of 25 April, 1997) deals with conventional plant breeding 
techniques that would not fall within the remit of patent protection under the Industrial Property Law 
(Law 9,279 of 14 May, 1996).2012 The patent option would only be available to transgenic 
microorganisms and the processes which lead to production of transgenic seeds, plants and its parts 
(organs, tissues or cells), not to the final product itself.2013 Similarly in China, patent law may cover 
the production methods used in connection to plant varieties but not the protection of the plant 
variety;2014 the protection of plant varieties is based on administrative regulations (which stand at a 
lower level than laws) such as Regulations of the PRC on protection of New Varieties of Plants 
1997(amended on March 1, 2013) 2015 and the Seed Law of the People’s Republic of China (SLPRC) 
(Amended in 2015). 2016 In South Africa, the provisions pertaining to plant variety protections are 
contained in the Plant Improvement Act 53 of 1976 (as amended) and the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 
15 of 1976 (as amended). In the present discussion, India offers a model that is different to the 
countries analysed so far; the country is not a member of the UPOV Convention and yet maintains 
certain characteristics from the UPOV protection through its Protection of Plant Varieties and 
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Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 (PVPFR Act). There are however also some similarities with the other 
jurisdictions analysed previously; for instance a method or process for modifying a plant can 
potentially be patented, and patents are “allowed on microorganisms, as well as on microbiological, 
biochemical and biotechnological processes.”2017 At the same time there is an exclusion from 
patentability for plants and parts “other than microorganisms, but including seeds, varieties, species 
and essentially biological processes for production or propagation of plants and animals.”2018 
In terms of farmers’ access rights, the standard can vary across different jurisdictions. 
Countries like Russia and China, for example, provide for similar legislative provisions that follow 
UPOV frameworks, while India and Brazil have in place more balanced provisions for farmers, and 
South Africa seemingly offers lower prospects for farmers’ access rights.  
The Russian Civil Code at Article 1422 sets forth the exceptions to the UPOV rights contained 
in Article 15 UPOV Convention 1991 and discussed above. The Civil Code also adds specific 
conditions to the farmer’s privilege provision to protect farmers’ rights, including a two-year time-
limit and the presence of the variety in the specified list of varieties adopted by the Government of 
the Russian Federation. Finally, Article 1423 of the Civil Code also allows for the compulsory 
licensing of the rights for varieties of plants upon application to court; so-far however such option 
has not been greatly availed of perhaps due to the conditions and the consideration due for the license 
agreement.  
The Chinese framework for farmers’ access rights follows similar lines, with Article 10 
Regulations of the PRC on protection of New Varieties of Plants 1997(amended on March 1, 2013) 
granting farmers the possibility to harvest protected variety material and use it for propagating within 
their own concern; such farmers’ rights however have to be viewed within the limitations imposed 
by the law, particularly in the Seed Law of the People’s Republic of China (SLPRC) (Amended in 
2015). One interesting difference between Russia and China in this area is the latter’s provisions 
enabling the Ministry for Agriculture to grant compulsory licensing as opposed to requesting the 
intervention of the courts.  
In comparison to the above, the Brazilian legislation would seem to be more accommodating 
towards farmers’ access rights. While the Plant Variety Protection Act does not grant explicit 
recognition to farmers as breeders, the revised Seeds Act 2003 recognises varieties associated to 
certain categories such as family farmers and indigenous people.2019 These categories are exempted 
from registration in the National System of Seeds and Plant Seedlings when they “multiply seeds or 
seedlings for distribution, exchange or commercialization among themselves.”2020 Other provisions 
that regulate the access rights of farmers, include the Plant Variety Protection Act section dealing 
with farmer’s privilege. While certain parts of this section set strict conditions on seeds for “own use” 
on quantity and time limits, provisions are also made for small rural producers, who can multiply 
seeds for exchange but only in dealings with other similar producers.2021 The Brazilian provisions 
might explain the country’s opposition to the UPOV Convention 1991, primarily because of the 
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restrictions on rights to seeds. The potential for saving seeds would in fact develop into an ‘optional 
exemption’, and be restricted to farmers’ own use.2022 The obligation to ‘safeguard the legitimate 
interests of the breeder’, could result in larger farmers paying royalties to breeders to save seeds for 
their own use.2023  
The position in India is similarly framed by one its objectives: offering safeguards to farmers’ 
access. It is important to note the PVPFR Act has a broad definition of breeder, encompassing also 
farmers; this in turn means that farmers can register their varieties and are in theory placed at the 
same level as breeders.2024 The definition of farmer’s varieties includes, for example, those that are 
traditionally cultivated or their wild relatives, and their registration is exempted from fees. The 
criteria for protection nevertheless remain the same DUS conditions identified at the outset of this 
discussion, except for novelty.2025 The PVPFR Act however also has other innovative provisions in 
terms of farmers’ access rights, such as: 
- the right “to save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share or sell seeds, including from protected 
varieties, as well as harvested materials, ‘in the same manner as he was entitled before the 
coming into force of this Act” 
- the limitation on farmer’s liability for innocent infringement of breeder’s rights. 
- disclosure by seed companies to farmers of the expected yield for the protected variety, and 
compensation rights where non-performance arises.  
Thus, the Indian law provisions in respect of farmers’ rights of access seem to be more comprehensive 
and effective than their counterparts in the other countries analysed so far, including Brazil. Unlike 
the provisions in the Brazilian legislation, the PVPFR Act offers safeguards that go beyond basic 
rights to seeds, and its coverage applies to all farmers rather than solely small rural farmers.2026 
Furthermore, the PVPFR Act would also seem to tilt in favour of farmers, in the event that they are 
shown not be aware of the protections granted to plant varieties.2027 At least in theory therefore, the 
PVPFR Act would suggest farmers being on the same level as private and public breeders in terms 
of entitlement to intellectual property protection, rather than just being entitled to rights of cultivation 
as offered in other jurisdictions such as Brazil. This, in turn, would benefit broadly the rights of access 
by farmers.  
The legal framework in South Africa is more restrictive for farmers’ access rights. The Plant 
Breeders’ Rights Act is among one of the pieces of legislation that gives effect to South Africa’s 
obligations under the UPOV Convention. Under this legislation, farmers are allowed access rights as 
per the usual UPOV provisions, including the farmer’s privilege. The exchange of protected varieties 
among farmers is excluded, allowing farmers to only replant farm-saved seed from protected varieties 
on their own holdings. The South African provisions offer a stark contrast to the more flexible 
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provisions on exchange found in the Brazilian and Indian legislation. It should be noted that two bills 
(the Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill (PBR Bill) and the Plant Improvement Bill 2015) are being held at 
public hearing in the South Africa’s Portfolio Committee on Agriculture. These bills will not 
necessarily improve access rights of farmers, as they allow for provisions including for “only certified 
seed to be sold on the commercial market” that thereby restrict rights concerning the re-use, exchange 
and sale of farm-saved seed.2028 
The example of South Africa provides a reminder of the different levels of access rights 
granted to farmers across various jurisdictions. While the UPOV Convention sets down criteria at the 
international level for plant variety recognition and its limits, it is also important to examine national 
legislations replicating such provisions. Ultimately, the interaction between each country’s provisions 
on the rights of access of farmers and the intellectual property rights legislation reveals not only how 
these property rights are conceived in the area of agricultural biodiversity but also how they are 
shaped by wider socio-economic factors.  
 
1.2.8. The rise of patents versus other forms of IP protection for private investment in 
agricultural research 
 
There has been a relatively higher increase in the use of utilities patent protection in agricultural filed 
in the US, in comparison to plant variety protection, although the trend for both has been in the 
ascendant the last three decades2029. This may be due to the higher effectiveness of utility patents in 
ensuring the appropriability of the innovation returns provided by the invention. 
Appropriability under Plant Variety Protection is limited by the farmer’s privilege and the 
breeders’ exemption, which erode the ability of new variety developers to appropriate rent by selling 
seeds2030. It was reported that plant variety rights are only associated with low increase in value in 
comparison to seeds not protected by Plant Variety Rights, and that they are often not litigated, which 
indicates that they may not be expected to confer substantial market power2031. There is, however, 
evidence that Plant Variety Rights stimulate innovation and R&D spending, as their establishment 
had led in general to an increase in R&D spending for crops eligible for protection2032. Evidence that 
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their availability as mechanisms to protect plant varieties stimulated the rate of innovation in the 
industry is more ambiguous2033.  
Plant patents do not have limits to appropriability, such as the farmer’s privilege or a breeder’s 
exemption, and from this perspective may be considered more valuable than Plant Variety Protection 
rights2034. Some studies put the price premium provided to on average a level of 23.5%2035, which 
declines with the age of the patent and disappears when the plants get of patent, thus showing that 
the price premium is not merely due to the higher quality of the protected plants2036. Some other 
studies indicate that the effect of plant patents on innovation is, similarly to that of plant variety rights, 
quite limited as there is no evidence that it led to increased commercial breeding. although one might 
not exclude that the lower impact of plant patents could be explained by other factors, such as 
widespread breeding by users2037. 
Appropriability is quite high for utility patents, and there is evidence that biotechnology 
patents have one of the largest patent premiums of any industry2038. This may explain why half of 
utilities patents on varieties ever issues were granted during the period of 2011-2015 and that during 
this period there has been a considerable growth of the share of patented private varieties for corn, 
wheat, cotton and soybeans2039.  
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2039 . Clancy & G. Moschini, Intellectual Property Rights and the Ascent of Proprietary Innovation in Agriculture, 
Working Paper 17, WP 572 (January 2017),, 19 , reporting that private corn varieties account for 100% of planted US 
acres (already since 1980 (this being facilitated by hybrid technology), while for wheat it rose from 5% to 24% between 
1980 and the late 1990s, for cotton it rose from 72% to 93% over the same period and for soybeans it rose from 8% to 
70-90% over the period. 
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The type of IP protection preferred by the firms is not necessarily will not necessarily promote 
societal welfare if the specific type of innovation could be protected by less restrictive to competition 
instruments. As it has been shown by some recent research, patents may be best at promoting long-
range research programs (such as the introduction of exotic germplasm), while Plant Variety 
Protection rights promote faster diffusion of genetic improvements across firms, hence, they can be 
a superior option to patents when the diffusion element of innovation dominates the incentives 
element2040. 
 
1.2.9. The governance of the innovation process: inter-business arrangements 
 
The important number of M&A transactions in the seed and crop protection industries the last 
thirty years constitutes the tip of a much bigger consolidation iceberg that has taken various forms2041. 
The extent of this cross-licensing activity is unknown as major competition law jurisdictions, such as 
the EU and the US, do not require a notification of cross-licensing agreements. In Brazil, while 
CADE’s precedents suggests that cross-licensing agreements used to be of mandatory notification 
under the old CADE’s ruling for associative agreements, after the enactment of CADE’s Resolution 
nº 17 in October 2016, there was no precedent that would signalize whether these arrangements 
should be of mandatory notification. It is important to point out that CADE’s Resolution nº 17 
significantly changed criteria for mandatory notification of associative agreements. According to the 
new ruling, associative agreements are of mandatory notification provided that: (i) the involved 
parties are competitors and met the double turnover threshold criteria; (ii) with a term of 2 year or 
longer; (iii) the agreement aims to create a joint undertaking to pursue an economic activity; and (iv) 
the sharing of the risks and results of the economic activity2042. 
 
• Joint ventures: In 2013, KWS and Limagrain acquired joint control of Genective SA, a 
company active in the research and marketing of transgenic traits to be used in the production 
of genetically modified (“GM”) seeds, in particular “GM maize traits”, with the aim to 
improve the plants’ qualities in terms of herbicide tolerance, insect resistance and water use 
efficiency. These transgenic traits were protected by patents, the parties aiming to license their 
use between them (cross-licensing) as well as to interested customers. The European 
Commission cleared the joint venture2043. It found no competition concerns in the upstream 
market for the development and licensing of GM maize traits, as it noted that the joint venture 
would compete with Monsanto, the only strong competitor already active in the EEA market, 
and that other firms may enter this market, concluding that there would be four providers of 
GM maize traits in the European market in the future2044. The Commission also found no 
competition concerns in the downstream market for breeding and commercialization of 
conventional and GM maize seeds to customers in Europe. First, the parties conducted their 
breeding activities almost exclusively for internal use. Second, although the Commission 
found that the market shares of the parties were high at some national markets in the EEA, it 
                                                          
2040 S.H. Lence, D.J. Hayes, J.M. Alston & J.S. Smith, Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels 
and forms of protection, (2016) 43(1) Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. 1. 
2041 ETC Group Communiqué 115, Breaking Bad (December 2015), 11. 
2042 Submission Questionnaire Brazil. 
2043 Case No COMP/M.6454 - LIMAGRAIN / KWS / GENECTIVE JV (2013). 
2044 Id., para. 40. 
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did not find that a level of 30-40% market share raised concerns and noted that the proposed 
transaction did not give rise to vertical links between the activities of the JV and the activities 
of the parties in the commercialization of conventional seeds. The European Commission 
made clear that the issue in this case was not the combination of the parties’ activities in the 
breeding and commercialization of seeds, as their cooperation remained confined to the 
development and licensing of transgenic traits on the upstream market, leading to the creation 
of a new competitor in the development and licensing of GM maize traits. The European 
Commission also held that companies regularly offered seeds incorporating transgenic traits 
of their competitors to meet customer demand, and that therefore “trait developers normally 
do not have incentives to market GM seeds incorporating exclusively their own transgenic 
traits”2045. Monsanto, Du Pont and Syngenta have also invested and established four joint-
venture companies in China with Chinese seed enterprises. 
 
• Cross-licensing and trait licensing agreements: Some recent research has documented a 
spider web of cross-licensing agreements of proprietary traits and technologies between the 
“Big Six”2046. This form of collaboration is particularly linked to the development of crops 
stacking multiple transgenic traits, some of them combining transgenic traits owned by 
different companies, within a single seed. By licensing traits to one another, companies can 
sell their own technologies as well as the technologies of their competitors. Monsanto’s traits 
are the central node in this network of agreements, as it is the only firm to have agreements 
with each of the other 5 firms, with the result that, according to some estimations, “more than 
80% of the land planted with major field crops in the US contained transgenic traits owned or 
licensed by Monsanto”2047. It is also quite difficult to understand the full implications of the 
existence of this web of cross-licensing agreements between the Big Six, but also more 
broadly, the network of all trait licensing agreements with third parties, in view of the fact 
that licensing information is rarely made public, patent owners being not legally required to 
disclose licensing data to the patent office, or the competition authority, the public only seeing 
“the information that a patent owner chooses to provide”2048. This may stifle innovation as 
“(a) young entrepreneur interested in that collection of patents could spend huge sums of 
lawyer’s fees for investigating the true ownership of each patent or developing a freedom-to-
operate analysis before even beginning to make a product for market”2049.  
 
• Distribution agreements: In order to distribute their own products on the national and local 
markets, a large seed company can make a deal with smaller seed companies without owning 
them. This may dampen competition between them to the detriment of consumers. 
 
• Collaborations, research agreements and R&D strategic alliances: A number of inter-firm 
alliances have also developed in recent years. BASF and Monsanto have collaborated since 
2007 on R&D partnerships worth $2.5 billion in breeding, biotech, pesticides, ag microbials, 
                                                          
2045 Id., para. 53. 
2046 Ph. Howard, Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry, (2015) 55(6) Crop Science 1-7. 
2047 Ph. Howard, Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry:1996-2008, (2009) 1 Sustainability 1266, 1279. 
2048 O.A. Jefferson, D. Kȏllhofer, T. H. Ehrich & R.A. Jefforson, The ownership question of plant gene and genome 
intellectual properties, “(015) 33(1) Nature Biotechnology 1138, 1142. 
2049 Id. 
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ag biologicals, and precision agriculture2050. Microbial products are a new opportunity and 
potentially a game changer and a disrupting technology at the global scale. Although currently 
the industry is still in its infancy (less than USD 2bn of global sales in 2014), going forward 
it represents a huge potential, especially given the growing demand for organic farming 
globally. Realizing this, in 2014 Monsanto announced an alliance known as BIOAG Alliance 
with Novozymes, one of leaders in biotech industry. Novozymes is responsible for the 
production of the microbial products while Monsanto serves as the lead for field testing, 
registration, and commercialization for the Alliance’s products2051.  
 
• Patent litigation truces: Following a period of patent war about who controls the technology 
for making soybeans resistant to the weed-killer Roundup, known generically as glyphosate, 
DuPont and Monsanto agreed in 2013 to drop antitrust and patent claims against each other. 
DuPont agreed to pay Monsanto $1.75 billion over 10 years for the rights to the technology 
of its herbicide-resistant soybean, sweeping away a US federal jury’s decision that DuPont 
should pay Monsanto $1 billion for infringing on the company’s proprietary glyphosate-
resistance technology, and also an antitrust lawsuit that DuPont had brought against 
Monsanto. Commenting on the agreement, Brett D. Begemann, Monsanto’s president and 
chief commercial officer, noted in a joint news release: “(t)his signals a new approach to our 
companies doing business together, allowing two of the leaders in the industry to focus on 
bringing farmers the best products possible”2052. This culture of “doing business together” 
may increase risks of collusion or parallel exclusion of actual and/or potential competitors. 
 
‘Post-Patent’ Generic trait agreements: One may also mention as an illustration of the extensive 
collaboration between the Big Six the generic trait agreement aiming to put in place a “post-patent” 
regulatory regime, laying down the rules for access to generic biotech traits at patent expiration2053. 
The expiration of some of the first biotech patents granted in the mid to late 1980s constitutes an 
important challenge for the industry, in particular as it is theoretically possible that generics may enter 
these markets and that the Big Six may attempt to delay such entry, using exclusionary strategies, 
such as failing to renew the regulatory approval of a biotech trait before expiration of the patent or of 
existing regulatory approvals2054. These patents’ expiration may enable farmers to save commodity 
seed from the current year for planting the next year (brown bagging), a practice that seed companies 
have long sought to limit. 
An example is Monsanto’s Roundup Ready ® Technology Agreement that usually provides 
that the farmer cannot save seed or any other part of the crop grown from the Monsanto seed for 
replanting and that the farmer is prohibited from supplying seed to any other person. Violation of 
these licenses may be regarded as a breach of contract subject to draconic sanctions, the farmer being 
obliged to pay 120 times the technology fee plus the legal fee if he/she is caught violating the 
                                                          
2050 ETC Group Communiqué 115, Breaking Bad (December 2015). 
2051 BIOAG Alliance Fact Sheet, available at http://www.novozymes.com/en/about-us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-
Alliance-factsheet.pdf. 
2052 A, Pollack, Monsanto and DuPont Settle Fight Over Patent Licensing, New York Times (March 26, 2013). 
2053 ETC, Issue # 110, Gene Giants Seek “Philanthrogopoly (March 2013). 
2054 The issue was raised by Martin A. Lema & Vanesa Lowenstein, Tit for Tat:  Agbiotech Intellectual Property and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 BRIDGES TRADE BIORES REV. 11, 11–12 (2008). See also, Norman W. Hawker, 
Competition Issues Arising from Generic Biotech Crops, (2013) 18(1) Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 137, 138. 
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agreement. Enforcement of these contractual clauses involves the continuous inspection of the 
farmers’ fields by Monsanto’s staff. Binding arbitration constitutes a default dispute resolution 
mechanism.  
The seed industry has also put in place biological tools to protect its IP rights by developing 
hybridization, or more recently through cytoplasmic male sterility, one of the most efficient ways to 
produce F1 (the first filial generation of offspring of distinctly different parental types) hybrid seeds. 
Another biological protection is Genetic Use Restriction Technology (GURT), with the development 
of terminator technologies preventing farmers from saving seeds since the genetically engineered 
plants will not germinate in subsequent generations or will not express the specific trait (e.g. herbicide 
resistance) that is protected by IP rights, unless the plant is sprayed with specific chemicals in order 
to activate the right gene. These biological protection instruments are particularly useful in 
jurisdictions with weak enforcement of IPRs. 
As Monsanto’s Roundup and Roundup Ready patent expired in 2015, competitors can now 
introduce a generic version of the trait. Monsanto has patented the Genuity™ Roundup Ready 2 Yield 
trait technology, these seeds being protected by a different utility patent which will not expire until 
the end of the next decade. It is estimated that around two dozen patents on first generation biotech 
crop traits and technologies will come off patent in the next 5-10 years. However, as with the pharma 
industry, which is also heavily regulated for human health and safety reasons, generic genetically 
engineered seeds and traits or chemicals must go through re-approval. One may add to these 
regulatory requirements those resulting from the UN Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which would require from the breeders wanting to use these generic 
traits, to have biosafety approval from the government authorities, in particular where they plan to 
export the genetically engineered germplasm or cultivate the genetically engineered seeds2055. To 
satisfy these government approval processes and the subsequent registration requirements, the 
generics’ producers will need legal access to the proprietary safety testing data initially submitted by 
the Big Six. Without access to this proprietary information the cost of bringing generic biotech crops 
to market may be quite prohibitive. 
In order to pre-empt any regulatory or competition law initiative in this area, the industry 
leaders put in place a “unique private sector solution to address the transition of regulatory and 
stewardship responsibilities for biotech”2056, with the aim to ultimately control the terms of access to 
expired traits. Monsanto, in the context of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) and the 
American Seed Trade Association (ASTA), drafted the Generic Event Marketability and Access 
Agreement (GEMAA) which provides that companies that have developed proprietary regulatory 
information (the “Proprietary Regulatory Property (PRP) Holders”) should provide access to the 
generics at patent expiration. PRP Holders are required to provide notice of patent expiration three 
years before the last patent on the biotechnology event expires. At the point of the notice of patent 
expiration, the PRP Holder may choose one of the following strategies: (i) independently maintain 
regulatory responsibility at no cost to users of the generic, thus providing access to the proprietary 
regulatory package for purposes of new product development, such as seed products containing 
proprietary stacks; (ii) share regulatory responsibility, in which case in which case the PRP Holder 
and interested Signatories to the GEMAA would begin negotiation of a “joint responsibility 
                                                          
2055 See our analysis in Part III, Chapter 1. 
2056 See, http://www.agaccord.org/ . 
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agreement”; (iii) or discontinue regulatory responsibility leading to the negotiation of a “transition 
agreement” with the same timeline and process as the joint responsibility agreement, including 
binding arbitration for unresolved issues in the negotiation2057. The GEMAA entered into force in 
November 2012 and has 10 signatories, including the Big Six (with the exception of Syngenta)2058. 
The Data Use and Compensation Agreement (DUCA) requires its signatories to provide three 
years in advance of patent expiration notification that a patent will expire. It also puts in place 
mechanisms for a ‘good-faith’ negotiation for pre-patent access, prior to patent expiration, if 
necessary, as well as an alternate mechanism for data compensation in return for access to proprietary 
regulatory property (PRP) at patent expiration2059. The DUCA opened for signature in December 
2013 and will become operational once it is signed by six parties. It has so far been signed by four. 
The speed of the entry of generics in this market will depend on the access generic seed 
companies may have to Monsanto’s and other Big Six’s data packages allowing them an advanced 
development and testing. This may raise equivalent competition issues than those routinely involved 
in the competition law enforcement in the pharma sector that led to jurisprudence such as FTC v. 
Actavis in the U.S.,2060 and Astra Zeneca in the E.U with regard to strategies by incumbent IP holders 
to block the entry of generics, following the expiration of their IP rights2061. 
•  
 
1.2.10. The governance of the innovation process: knowledge commons 
 
At the other side of the governance spectrum, one may think of organising the innovation activity in 
the form of “common pool resources” or “knowledge commons”2062. Crop genetic resources could 
be conceptualised as a form of commons, the relative open flows of germplasm making possible 
collective systems of conservation and innovation, as those self-managed by farmers from the dawn 
of agriculture2063. One may cite the example of the collective pooling and management of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture put in place by the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA), adopted by the FAO in 2001 and which entered into 
force on 29 June 2004.  Emergent and developing countries have vigorously campaigned to ensure 
that genetic material taken from their territories without permission would not be used to generate 
commercial applications that would benefit from IP rights internationally protected through the 
TRIPS agreement. By asserting territorial sovereignty over all genetic resources, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) provided the possibility for an international regulation of access to these 
resources by scientists for research purposes and eventually farmers. The CBD provided regulations 
for access to genetic resources and transfer of relevant technologies on Mutually Agreed Terms 
(MAT) and based on Prior Informed Consent (PIC). The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefits 
                                                          
2057 See, http://www.agaccord.org/include/GEMAA-SecondAmendedEdition-Nov52015.pdf . 
2058 These include the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Seed Trade Association, the American Soybean 
Association, BASF Plant Science LP, Bayer CropScience, Dow AgroSciences LLC, Dupont Pioneer, Gro Alliance, LLC, 
Monsanto Company and the National Corn Growers Association. 
2059 See, http://www.agaccord.org/?p=DUCA. 
2060 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). 
2061 Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770. 
2062 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); C. Hess & E. Ostrom, Understanding Knowledge as Commons (MIT press, 2006) 
2063 M. Halewood, I. López Noriega & S. Louafi (eds.), Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons: Challenges in 
International Law and Governance (Routledge, 2013). 
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Sharing, a 2010 supplement to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, put forward a 
framework for ensuring that countries where seeds and microbes held in public collections originate, 
along with the relevant traditional knowledge, share in the profits and other benefits provided from 
their use. The Nagoya Protocol mainly focused on the creation of a mechanism for bilateral 
arrangements, but an additional option would have been a multilateral treaty establishing a 
transnational exchange and remuneration system.  
The last option was taken with the PGRFA, with the establishment of public seed banks. The 
Treaty constitutes the follow up of an International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources in 
19832064 The Treaty’s  aims are the conservation and sustainable use of all plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their use, in 
harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food security 
2065 Article 9 of the PGRFA provides for farmer’s rights, and in particular for “the right to equitably 
participate in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture”2066. The Treaty also puts in place a global system for access and benefit sharing in order 
to provide farmers, plant breeders and scientists with access to plant genetic materials and covering 
64 of the most important crops. This easily accessible global pool of genetic resources in various 
public collections and seed banks is freely available to potential users in the Treaty’s ratifying nations 
for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture. Those who access the materials must be 
from the Treaty’s ratifying nations and they must agree to use the materials totally for research, 
breeding and training for food and agriculture.  
The Treaty prevents the recipients of genetic resources from claiming intellectual property 
rights over those resources in the form in which they received them, and ensures that access to genetic 
resources already protected by international property rights is consistent with international and 
national laws. For those that want to make a commercial use of these resources, the Treaty puts in 
place a “take and pay” rule. If a plant cultivar put in a public collection is used for commercial 
purposes, they agree to share any benefits from their use through four benefit-sharing mechanisms 
established by the Treaty, the exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology and 
capacity building. They are also required to pay a small percentage of the resulting proceeds, a tithe, 
back to the Benefit Sharing Fund of the ITPGRFA. Facilitated access to this vast gene pool under the 
Treaty is provided under the terms and conditions of the Standard Material Transfer Agreement 
(SMTA). If the recipient commercializes a product (product that is a PGRFA and that incorporates 
material accessed under SMTA) and where such product is not available without restriction to others, 
the recipient is required to pay a fixed percentage of the sales of the commercialized product into the 
mechanism. This is specifically 1.1 % of net sales less 30 % or 0.77 % of gross sales. However, if the 
recipient commercialises a product where product is available without restriction to others, the 
recipient is encouraged to make voluntary payments into the mechanism. After the expiry or 
abandonment of the protection period of an IPR on a product, the recipient is encouraged to place a 
sample of this product into a collection of the multilateral system. In case a recipient obtains IPR on 
any products developed from the material or its components and assigns such IPR to a third party, 
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the benefit sharing obligations of the agreement is transferred to that third party. The Benefit Sharing 
Fund invests directly in high-impact projects such as supporting farmers in developing countries who 
conserve crop diversity in their fields and providing assistance to farmers and breeders who adapt 
crops to our changing needs and demands.  
Other examples of international efforts to constitute commons are the recent proposals for 
establishing a commons regime for microbial genetic resources2067. One may also consider the quite 
sophisticated Transnational Open Knowledge Environments enabling the sharing of data 
 
1.3. Public investment in agricultural research 
 
Research and development in agriculture has been described as one of the main drivers of agricultural 
productivity and, in turn, of global food production to match increasing demand.2068  
Public investment has featured in agricultural research to varying extents and under specified 
frameworks according to different countries. Different reasons arise for public investment in 
agriculture. For instance, some countries have different standards and costs associated to IP 
enforcement, making it hard to defend IP and thereby diminishing the returns of private research and 
development in this area. The development of technologies through public R&D in agriculture has 
also been beneficial in aiding the relief of poverty and equity, and therefore tackling social issues.2069 
In this regard, for example, public investment aimed at the productivity of smallholder farmers could 
target new varieties of crops and therefore increase self-sufficiency by reducing the price of crops.2070 
Empirical studies conducted in some countries reveal how public investment in research can 
lead to long-term increase in crop productions consistently through different crops;2071 moreover 
productivity-based research can produce higher results than investment for example into 
irrigation.2072  
In terms of the relationship between public and private investment, the former could in certain 
circumstances also increase the profitability of the latter. This may occur, for example, where R&D 
in crop varieties that produce higher yield increases the financial standing of agricultural enterprises, 
expands the opportunities for private actors and pushes in turn for more private investment.2073 At the 
same time it should be noted, macroeconomic consequences of public investment (for eg increases in 
                                                          
2067 P.F. Uhlirch, Designing the Microbial Research Commons (National Academies Press, 2011); J. H. Reichman, P. F. 
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2068 K.O Fuglie and A.A Toole, The evolving institutional structure of public and private agricultural research, (2014) 
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2069 Tewodaj Mogues, Bingxin Yu, Shenggen Fan and Linden McBride, the impacts of public investment in and for 
agriculture: synthesis of the existing evidence, ESA Working paper No. 12-07 October 2012. 
2070 Tewodaj Mogues, Bingxin Yu, Shenggen Fan and Linden McBride, the impacts of public investment in and for 
agriculture: synthesis of the existing evidence, ESA Working paper No. 12-07 October 2012. 
2071 See for example Rosegrant, M., F. Kasryno, and N. D. Perez., Output Response to Prices and Public Investment in 
Agriculture: Indonesian Food Crops., 55 (2) 1998 Perez Journal of Development Economics 333–352.  
2072 Rosegrant, M., F. Kasryno, and N. D. Perez., Output Response to Prices and Public Investment in Agriculture: 
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Mogues, Bingxin Yu, Shenggen Fan and Linden McBride, the impacts of public investment in and for agriculture: 
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2073 Tewodaj Mogues, Bingxin Yu, Shenggen Fan and Linden McBride, the impacts of public investment in and for 
agriculture: synthesis of the existing evidence, ESA Working paper No. 12-07 October 2012 p. 40.  
558 
 
interest rates) may increment the cost of borrowing and diminish the margins of profitability for 
private actors.2074 
 
 
In recent years, the relationship between public and private investment has come to the forefront 
of discussions on agricultural investment. In countries like the US, as a matter of fact, agricultural 
research has witnessed an emergence of trends that see a correlation between diminished public 
investment on one side and increased private investment on the other, with productivity in the area 
being increasingly propped up by the latter.2075 This trend is also reflected globally: in 2008 private 
investment amounted to 36% of the 54 billion USD spent on agricultural research.2076  
Moving forward, the new private/public dichotomy has led to reconsider the interplay between 
governmental bodies (and spending) and private actors. Private actors have been pursuing projects 
that in the past would have been in the primary scope of public bodies, due to higher returns on social 
issues (environment, food nutrition etc) rather financial returns.2077 On the other hand, public bodies 
and institution can engage in a different allocation of public resources in their portfolio of public 
projects, creating new opportunities of collaboration between private and public and the possibility 
of technology transfer; as an example, public investment could focus on upstream research, with the 
market development and application being given to private actors.2078 Specifically, the collaboration 
could range from the simple research grant or patent licensing to joint venture or more complex 
research consortia involving a number of private and public actors.2079 
This new paradigm requires appropriate legislative frameworks that create and foster 
technology transfer between public and private. Illustrations of such frameworks can be seen in many 
jurisdictions, for example in the US with the Technology Transfer Act 1986 or the Bayh–Dole Act 
1980, or in South Africa with the Intellectual Property Rights from the Publicly Financed Research 
and Development Act (act no. 51 of 2008). The importance of legislative frameworks is crucial as 
they establish clear boundaries between public and private in the research and commercialisation 
efforts. In the absence of clarity, private actors could be disincentivised where they lack the financial 
returns to their investment, and equally public investment would lack the commercialisation needed 
to fully realise social benefits.2080 
Institutional design is also crucial in determining public investment and collaboration with 
private actors. Brazil, for example, has been very successful in developing public research 
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development in agriculture through EMBRAPA (Brazilian Entreprise for Agriculture Research), as 
can be seen by the country’s enhanced productivity and economic efficiencies in agriculture, “strong 
export performance and geographic decentralization of growth.”2081 EMBRAPA has the task of 
pursuing research and development activities and technology transfer in agriculture and livestock.2082 
It is a public company that employs 10.000 people and has an annual budget of ca. 900 million 
USD.2083 EMBRAPA works in the development and marketing in seeds through collaborations with 
research centres and governments, and is the owner of relevant patents and software registers (in 
either sole or co-ownership). It is also in charge of coordinating federal state entities’ participation in 
a wider national system of research.  
The success of EMBRAPA can be illustrated through its work in the transformation of 
Cerrado’s soil, in a central part of the country that is 22% of the country’s total area.2084 The soil was 
originally highly acid and contained poor nutrients, leading to an unproductive use of the area. 
EMBRAPA tackled the issues by employing techniques, such as agricultural liming, developing 
varieties of bacterium rhizobium (adapted to the Cerrado soil), and cross-breeding African grass 
brachiaria with a native Cerrado grass to improve the yield of the grass feed.2085 As a result parts of 
Cerrado turned into a successful high-yield pasture. 
The results of EMBRAPA are in part due to its collaborative efforts internationally. The 
breeding program dealing with short-photoperiod soybeans was in collaboration between EMBRAPA 
and USDA-ARS. The germplasm of grass feed bracharia (that was then adapted to for the Cerrado 
soil) was provided by the International Center for Tropical Agriculture. EMBRABA further maintains 
so-called Virtual Labs Abroad (Labex) for collaboration in the US and in Europe.2086 
In South Africa, public research and development in agriculture is carried out by the 
Agricultural Research Council and nine provincial Departments of Agriculture.2087 This segregation 
of R&D expenditures between different public entities has been criticised as not reflecting suitable 
agro-ecological boundaries to conceive and target agricultural R&D.2088 From 2000 to 2009 South 
Africa’s R&D expenditure was on average 0.87 percent of GDP.2089 However, despite relatively high 
public R&D expenditure in agricultural sector, it has declined significantly since 2005. The decline 
in public agricultural R&D expenditure was mainly attributed to the shifts in government funding 
model and budget cuts.2090 
                                                          
2081 P. Correa and C. Schmidt, Public Research Organizations and Agricultural Development in Brazil: How Did Embrapa 
Get It Right?, World Bank Economic Premise (June 2014), p.8 available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP145.pdf 
2082 Brazil Country Fiche, p.9 
2083 Available at: https://www.embrapa.br/en/quem-somos. 
2084 P. Correa and C. Schmidt, Public Research Organizations and Agricultural Development in Brazil: How Did Embrapa 
Get It Right?, World Bank Economic Premise (June 2014) available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP145.pdf 
2085 P. Correa and C. Schmidt, Public Research Organizations and Agricultural Development in Brazil: How Did Embrapa 
Get It Right?, World Bank Economic Premise (June 2014) available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP145.pdf 
2086 P. Correa and C. Schmidt, Public Research Organizations and Agricultural Development in Brazil: How Did Embrapa 
Get It Right?, World Bank Economic Premise (June 2014) available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP145.pdf 
2087 Trade Research Niche Area, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, North West University, ‘South Africa’s 
Agricultural Trade Competitiveness Diagnostics (June 2013), p. 137. 
2088 Ibid. 
2089 Ibid, p. 138. 
2090 Ibid, p. 139. 
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The figure below represents the agricultural R&D expenditure in South Africa and selected peer 
countries  
 
Table 7: Agricultural R&D expenditure in South Africa 
 
 
Source: Trade Research Niche Area, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, North West 
University, ‘South Africa’s Agricultural Trade Competitiveness Diagnostics (June 2013) p. 140. 
 
To improve the productivity and efficiency in agricultural sector, it has been suggested that Brazil’s 
EMBRAPA model shoud be introduced in South Africa as well.2091 
 
1.4. The interaction between competition law and IP: how much room do competition law 
enforcers have in the innovation space? 
 
1.4.1. General Discussion 
 
As innovation is considered a major engine of growth, public authorities play a direct role in fostering 
innovation2092, but also in supporting the emergence of an innovation-friendly market environment. 
Historical work has duly noted the role of institutions (formal and informal) in the promotion of 
                                                          
2091 Trade Research Niche Area, Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, North West University, ‘South Africa’s 
Agricultural Trade Competitiveness Diagnostics (June 2013), p. v. 
2092 This is either done through public investment in science and basic research, which can play an important role in 
developing general-purpose technologies and, hence, in enabling further innovation, as well as public support to 
innovative activity in the private sector, which is usually taking the form of a mix of direct and indirect instruments such 
as tax credits, soft loans, direct support etc. On the important role of the State in supporting innovation, see M Mazucatto, 
The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths (Anthem 2013). 
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innovation and creativity.2093 The growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP)2094 is often used as a 
measure of innovation2095. The intensity of R&D expenses has also been used as an indirect measure 
of innovation, as it quantifies the resources used to promote innovation. Firm-level survey data may 
also provide information on innovation, the way firms introduce new products or processes in the 
market. But these do not constitute the only metrics, in particular as innovations may take different 
forms along the value chain if one is to approach the measurement topic from a value chain 
perspective. This involves agricultural inputs such as Fertilisers and seeds, at times coming from the 
chemical or the biotechnology sector; product innovations; and process or organizational innovations 
in the fields of payments, logistics, and distribution services. Specific innovation metrics may develop 
for each of these various forms of innovation. For instance, in the context of agricultural 
biotechnology, Moser, Ohmstedt, and Rhode compiled data on advances in yields, and other 
biological characteristics of patented corn hybrids, to measure the speed of biological innovation2096. 
These different measures may indicate that performance measures are impossible to construct in a 
manner that makes them comparable across industries2097. One also needs to bear in mind that in 
developing countries, agricultural activities and related innovations often take place at the farm or 
household level (especially in case of subsistence farming), not in private-sector firms as captured by 
most data collections, and that  capturing activity in the informal sector may be statistically 
challenging. 
Innovation has been traditionally defined as an ‘economic change’ or development that is not 
generated by the spontaneous evolution of consumers’ needs but is instead engendered by the 
inventors. Schumpeter emphasized the role of the entrepreneur and opposed the active role she or he 
plays in the innovative process to the passive role of the consumer.2098 His point was that most 
innovation is entrepreneur-generated. This view accommodates the perception that the main actor in 
the innovation process is the inventor (or more broadly the entrepreneur) and that law should provide 
the right set of tools in order to enhance his or her inventive activity this involving the protection of 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights. One could compare this entrepreneur/inventor centred view of 
innovation to the increasing role of consumer-generated innovation.  
Users, such as farmers, participate to the development of innovation in the market. Major 
advances in agricultural technology, let alone the process of single selection, found their sources in 
innovation performed by the farmers or agricultural, working individually or collectively in 
cooperatives. Their share in the innovation process has been declining since the development of the 
chemicals-based model of agriculture in the 1960s-1970s and then the biotech revolution, which 
increased the costs of innovation. This may change with the advent of cheaper technologies of 
genome-editing and the possibility to develop varieties with regional characteristics, which seem to 
                                                          
2093 J Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (OUP, 1992). 
2094 TFP corresponds to the growth of output that is not explained by the relative contributions of capital and labor and 
can be considered as “technical progress in its broadest sense”. Its level is its level is determined by how efficiently and 
intensely the factors of production (labour, capital) are utilized in production: R.M. Solow, ‘Technical change and the 
aggregate production function’ (1957) 39 The Review of Economics and Statistics, 312-320. 
2095 R. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth (Princeton University Press, 2016). 
2096 P. Moser, J. Ohmstedt, & PW. RhodePatent Citations - An Analysis of Quality Differences and Citing Practices in 
Hybrid Corn (March 5, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1888191 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1888191  
2097 P. Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History, (2016) 8 Annual Review of Economics 241. 
2098 J Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942, published by Harper & Bros. in 1950). 
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require less specialisation and cheaper and more easily accessible instruments2099. The question of 
the ownership of farm data could also be quite relevant for a more active role of farmers in the process 
of innovation brought by “smart agriculture”. A more active role of farmers in the process of 
innovation should presumably get them a better share of the total surplus value produced by 
innovation.  
Traditionally the process of innovation has been conceived of as linear. According to this 
traditional model, innovation is thought to start ‘upstream’, with fundamental scientific insights, and 
moved ‘downstream’ through the discovery of technical applications of these insights, the 
development of commercial embodiments and manufacturing techniques, followed by arrangements 
for distribution, servicing, and sales. In Bush’s view, upstream research—basic science—was too far 
removed from application to be an attractive target for commercial investment. At the same time, 
however, this work is the wellspring from which multiple technological prospects flow. The 
expectation was that robust competition would function as an ‘engine’, driving industry to adapt the 
advances, find applications, create new businesses and jobs, enhance productivity, and improve social 
welfare.2100 
 
Figure 9: The Innovation process 
 
 
Source: J.A. Ordover (1984) 2101 
 
It has become clear that the traditional model and the laws that flowed from it do not capture many 
important aspects of the innovation process.  
                                                          
2099 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genome Editing: An Ethical Review (September 2016), 9. 
2100 J Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (London, Transaction Pub 2005, first published by Harvard 
University Press in 1934) and Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942, published by Harper & Bros. in 1950). 
2101 JA Ordover, ‘Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual Property’ (1984) 53 
Antitrust Law Journal 503, 515. 
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Modern economists have questioned the linearity of innovation. Fundamental insights are not 
the exclusive domain of scientists. In fact, downstream players can have a significant role in 
identifying new prospects and finding commercial opportunities for their use. Conversely, upstream 
inventors are sometimes in the best position to guide the further development of fundamental 
insights.2102 Similarly, the emerging shift from vertical integration to value chain licensing recognizes 
that every participant in the innovation process brings its own expertise to bear in taking ideas and 
turning them into marketplace products.2103 Since intellectual property licenses serve to allocate 
rewards along the development path, rights holders require a high degree of flexibility in the manner 
in which they arrange their business dealings.2104 
Dating back at least to William Nordhaus’s work2105, an optimal intellectual property (eg 
patent) policy design has traditionally been conceived in terms of a trade-off between the benefit of 
providing incentives for the development of new technologies and the cost of deadweight loss from 
higher prices during the life of the patent or of the IP protection.2106 This influential approach has 
traditionally modeled innovations as isolated discoveries and predicted an unambiguously positive 
relationship between patent strength and the rate of innovation. This model is not however 
unanimously shared and has been criticized in recent years. In her work, Suzanne Scotchmer2107 has 
stressed that many or most innovations are cumulative - in the sense that any given discovery is also 
an input into later follow-on discoveries where successive innovations build upon earlier 
innovations.2108 In markets where innovation is cumulative in this sense, optimal patent policy design 
also depends on how patents on existing technologies affect follow-on innovation. There is a growing 
body of empirical evidence supporting that patents may hinder follow-on innovation.2109 
Follow-on or cumulative innovation is particularly important for plant-related innovation to 
the extent that the value of a seed to a farmer is encapsulated in its genetics, which codes the 
accumulation of desirable traits from innumerable generations of breeding and selection activities, 
some of which date back to the dawn of agriculture, and that “production of an improved variety is 
not possible without physical access to the relevant germplasm”, information per se, such as that 
disclosed by utility patents, being “just not enough to provide the blueprint for an improved variety 
without access to the relevant biological material”2110.   
                                                          
2102 See, eg, F Murray and S O’Mahony, ‘Exploring the Foundations of Cumulative Innovation: Implications for 
Organization Science’ [2007] 18 Organization Science 1006. 
2103 SM O’Connor, ‘IP Transactions as Facilitators of the Globalized Innovation Economy’ in RC Dreyfuss, DL 
Zimmerman and H First (eds), Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property-Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society (Oxford University Press 2010) 203. 
2104 DJ Teece, G Pisano and A Shuen, ‘Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management’ (1997) 18 Strategic Management 
Journal 509, 516; DJ Teece, ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, 
Licensing and Public Policy’ [1986] 15 Research Policy 285. 
2105 W Nordhaus, ‘An Economic Theory of Technological Change’ [1969] 59 The American Economic Review 18. 
2106 K Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention in The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity: Economic and Social Factors (NBER, 1962) 609. 
2107 S Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives (MIT press, 2004). 
2108 This was well understood since the times of Isaac Newton who famously wrote in a letter to Robert Hooke that ‘[i]f 
I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants”. See R Andrews et al (eds), The Columbia World of 
Quotations No. 41418 (Columbia University Press 1996). 
2109 MA Heller & RS Eisenberg, ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’  [1998] 280 
Science 698; J Bessen & E Maskin, ‘Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation’ [2009] 40 RAND Journal of Economics 
611. 
2110 M.S. Clancy & G. Moschini, Intellectual Property Rights and the Ascent of Proprietary Innovation in Agriculture, 
Working Paper 17, WP 572 (January 2017), 13. 
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Closely related to the prevalence of cumulative innovation is the increasing importance of 
knowledge sharing as a fundamental source of innovation.2111 There is evidence of knowledge sharing 
taking place even between ‘apparent competitors’ in various industries, which facilitate innovation 
that builds cumulatively on previous advances.2112 There is considerable evidence that innovation in 
agriculture was particularly strong, even before the institution of property rights, such as plant variety 
protection rights or patents, and that it was shared between the various market participants, farmers 
freely sharing improved varieties or within the context of agricultural societies that disseminated 
knowledge via meetings and fairs, and facilitated the collection and dispersal of seeds2113. .The rise 
of ‘collective innovation2114’ constitutes a defining moment in the new economics of innovation and 
indicates that it is inevitable that, at least at the initial stages of the development of a new technology, 
firms would cooperate, while competing in other aspects of their activity, in what has be described 
as ‘soft rivalry’ (or co-opetition). 2115 It is important to rethink the interaction of competition law with 
IP rights, but also more specifically the framework of competition law enforcement in the era of 
‘collective innovation’. 
It is clear that the pattern of technological advance is not the same in all fields. As Richard 
Nelson and Robert Merges have noted, ‘at least four different generic models are needed. The first 
describes discrete invention. A second concerns ‘cumulative’ technologies. Chemical technologies 
have special characteristics of their own. Finally, there are ‘science-based’ technologies where 
technical advance is driven by developments in science outside the industry’.2116 A ‘one size fits all’ 
intellectual property system is therefore not appropriate. Specifically, because intellectual property 
law was first developed during the Industrial Revolution, it is largely based on stand-alone (discrete) 
mechanical inventions. Thus, it has few doctrines that permit one generation of innovators to ‘stand 
on the shoulders’ of those who went before.2117 Change is necessary to make the law resonate better 
with a science-based sector such as biotechnology. There exists many opportunities (or as professors 
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley would put it, ‘levers’) that can be used to tailor patent law to deal with 
these realities.2118 
 Classic intellectual property and innovation laws were developed with a single jurisdiction in 
mind. As borders have become more permeable, capital, firms, and expertise migrate to jurisdictions 
                                                          
2111 J Bessen & A Nuvolari, ‘Knowledge Sharing Among Inventors: Some Historical Perspectives’ in D Harhoff & KL 
Lakhani (eds.), Revolutionizing Innovation (MIT press, 2016) 135. 
2112 E von Hippel, ‘Cooperation between rivals: informal know-how trading’ [1987] 16 Research Policy 291. 
2113 M.S. Clancy & G. Moschini, Intellectual Property Rights and the Ascent of Proprietary Innovation in Agriculture, 
Working Paper 17, WP 572 (January 2017), 10; W.E. Huffman & R.R. Evenson Science for Agriculture: A Long-Term 
Perspective. (Ames, IA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
2114 RC Allen, ‘Collective invention’ [1983] 4 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 24. 
2115 E von Hippel, ‘Cooperation between rivals: informal know-how trading’ (1987) 16 Research Policy 291, 299 explains 
this process of sharing by focusing on the ‘competitive value’ of the unit of knowledge that was revealed to a competitor. 
If the competitive advantage provided by this unit of knowledge is limited, information disclosure, in particular if 
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(2011) available at SSRN: ssrn.com/abstract=1698802 (observing that as technology matures firms’ willingness to share 
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technology or where local innovation has little effect on worldwide prices). 
2116 RP Merges and R Nelson, ‘On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope’ (1990) 90 Columbia Law Review 839, 880. 
2117 See, eg, S Scotchmer, ‘Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Protecting Cumulative Research and the Patent Law’ 
[1991] 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 29. The phrase, ‘standing of the shoulders of giants’, derives from a Isaac 
Newton's famous letter to Robert Hooke, supra n 2108. 
2118 DL Burk and MA Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve it (University of Chicago Press 2009). 
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with the most favourable conditions.2119 Indeed, the promulgation of the TRIPS Agreement within 
the World Trade Organization is testament to this change. The global nature of the innovation 
enterprise and the emergence of a global marketplace for innovative products is a reality illustrated 
by the emergence of innovation value chains in various industries, where multiple firms acting in 
various segments of the chain innovate, thus contributing to the total surplus value of the chain.2120 
The increasing number of jurisdictions worldwide having adopted and enforcing competition law 
statutes may nevertheless complicate the operation of these global IP rules, in view of the divergent 
positions various jurisdictions take on the intersection of competition law with IP rights and the 
absence of a global competition law framework, equivalent to the TRIPS agreement. 
 It has become evident that intellectual property laws are not the sole determinants of 
innovation. Firms appropriate the benefits of inventiveness in a variety of ways; for many firms, 
patent law is low on the list of strategies, alternative methods including lead time, secrecy and the 
development of complementary capabilities in sales and service or manufacturing2121. Economic 
research has shown that the role of property rights on information may be relevant only in a limited 
amount of circumstances, as small inventions are not imitated, medium inventions involve a form of 
“implicit licensing,” and large inventions are protected primarily through secrecy when property 
rights are weak2122. Indeed, Edwin Mansfield’s work suggests that the pharmaceutical sector is alone 
in relying principally on patent law to capture returns from innovation.2123 A similar evolution seems 
also happening in agricultural biotech to the extent that the largest companies active in the seeds & 
traits value chain come from the chemical sector2124. But is this the only model for the future of 
agriclture? Once again, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ system makes little sense as it is clear that patent law can 
be manipulated to deal with differences that arise from the technical field in which innovation is 
taking place, changes that occur as an industry matures, and other variables. 
The role of the competitive process in the promotion of innovation is well recognized and widely 
accepted. Certainly, research and development requires up front investments for uncertain rewards. 
Intellectual property rights were initially conceived as an exception to the rule of competitive markets. 
By providing some economic rents (, intellectual property rights ensure that the inventor has adequate 
incentives to innovate at the first place.2125 Although IP may provide some certainty over the ability 
of an undertaking to retain the benefits from the innovation it put in place (and internalise the positive 
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1632, Figure 3. 
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externalities thus produced), the social return to innovation largely exceeds its private return.2126 In 
reality, imperfect IP protection may lead the competitors to gain some of the rewards from the rival’s 
innovation (the problem of limited appropriability).2127 Technological spillovers and imitation across 
the industry or cross-industries may boost growth to a considerable extent, without being possible 
that these indirect benefits are appropriated by the IP holder, thus illustrating the inadequacy of a 
policy relying on intellectual property rights only to spur innovation and the importance of public 
funding of research. It has been argued that disruptive innovation may also challenge monopoly 
positions that become temporary (the process of ‘creative destruction’).2128  
With regard to the appropriate market structure for innovation two views oppose each other.2129 
The Schumpeterian view alleges that large firms and monopolists may be more innovative than firms 
in competitive markets, in view of the head start they dispose, having a dominant position on a market, 
and the resources to fund large research and development. In contrast, economist Kenneth Arrow has 
challenged the incentives of a monopolist to invest on R&D in view of the fact that the new products 
may displace, partly or totally, the monopolist’s products from the market (thus leading the 
monopolist to compete with himself).2130 Recent empirical economic studies have examined these 
claims attempting to link market concentration in an industry (on the basis of the Lerner index, 
thought of as a proxy for product market competition) to R&D expenditures in the same industry. 
They found the existence of an ‘inverted-U’ relationship whereas the level of innovation rises in 
industries with oligopolistic market structures, being relatively more modest in industries having a 
more competitive market structure and industries dominated by monopolists (see the analysis in 
Chapter 2, Part IV) However, some other economists find these studies unconvincing.2131 
Competition law may be aimed at fostering innovation in product markets as well as innovation and 
technology markets, by taking an industry-specific approach and prioritizing restrictions to 
competition that may impact the most on innovation. Jonathan Baker explains, 
‘[a competition law] enforcement program crafted to promote innovation would attack direct 
reductions in innovation competition; protect product market competition in winner-take most 
or winner-take-all markets; protect product market competition in markets in which probable 
technological or regulatory developments or rapid growth in demand largely determine the 
extent of future product market competition; challenge naked horizontal agreements to fix prices 
or allocate customers; prevent agreements among rivals to engage in conduct facilitating 
coordination with no plausible business justification; and challenge horizontal mergers likely to 
                                                          
2126 This was highlighted by K Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention in The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (NBER, 1962) 609. 
2127 Ibid., 619. 
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2129 For a critical analysis, see J Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation’ [2007] 74 
Antitrust Law Journal 575; RJ Gilbert, ‘Competition and Innovation’ in WD Collins (ed) [2008] 1 ABA Section of 
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2131 See, the discussion in J Baker, ‘Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation’ (2007) 74 Antitrust 
Law Journal 575, 584–587 (suggesting some alternative measures of innovative activity). 
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reduce product market competition. […] There are other areas of [competition law] enforcement, 
including cases challenging vertical restraints, vertical mergers, and restrictions imposed by 
legitimate horizontal joint ventures in industries not characterized by winner-take-most 
competition, likely technological or regulatory change, or rapid growth. In these remaining 
areas, [competition law] intervention could, in theory, simultaneously enhance pre-innovation 
product market competition and reduce post-innovation competition, with the net effect on 
innovation incentives unclear. In practice, however, [competition law] enforcement in these 
other areas is, on the whole, measured. The great majority of such conduct will not be found to 
harm competition under current antitrust standards, so these kind of cases in the aggregate would 
present little threat to innovation in the economy even if the incentives at issue in the third and 
fourth economic principles turned out to be particularly important in the settings for those 
enforcement actions. Accordingly, it is unlikely that [competition law] enforcement to protect 
product market competition in areas outside those that would be emphasized by a policy focused 
on innovation would systematically affect the level of post-innovation competition reasonably 
anticipated by firms conducting R&D throughout the economy’. 
This discussion highlights not only the importance of intellectual property and competition law, 
but also the complexity of the various trade-offs to undertake between pre-innovation product 
competition, competition for the development of innovation and post-innovation product and 
technology innovation, as well as of the various interests to take into account (inventors, cumulative 
innovators, competitors, external or internal participants in value chains, actual consumers and future 
generations of consumers), which highlight the need for a governance system that stays abreast of 
technological, economic, and social developments, and which is steeped in the economic literature. 
 
1.4.2. General principles on the interaction between competition law and IP law 
 
Critics of competition law’s intervention with IP rights often note its static focus on competitive 
outcomes in terms of competitive market structure, or, for more effects-based competition law 
regimes, on better economic performance (measured in terms of lower prices, better quality, and 
wider choice). Some authors have suggested a re-orientation of competition law towards a more 
dynamic approach that would incorporate innovation as an objective of competition law.2132 The 
concept of ‘dynamic competition’ regroups a number of theories that might be distinguished from the 
‘static competition model’.2133 A common characteristic of these different theories of ‘dynamic 
                                                          
2132 For a discussion of this literature, see, MA Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law (Oxford University Press 2011). 
2133 See, for this opposition, A Tepperman and M Sanderson ‘Innovation and Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Review’ 
(Canada, Competition Bureau 2007), available at www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cra-final-
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behaviour among those market participants using strategic instruments such as pricing or advertising that can be applied 
and varied in the “short term”. Dynamic competition involves the creation of new products and potentially also new 
markets, along with the replacement or obsolescence of older products. It also implicitly or explicitly involves entry and 
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competition’ is that they all focus on innovation as a key component of the competitive process.2134 
In both Europe and the US, IP rights traditionally fall under the scope of competition law. This is also 
increasingly the case for more mature but also younger competition law regimes, with the emergence 
of soft law managing the interaction between competition law and IP rights in a way that satisfies the 
aims of both these areas of law2135. There are different standards governing the interaction between 
competition law and IP rights. 
 
1.4.2.1. Standards for the interaction between competition law and IP rights 
 
Competition authorities have progressively moved from formalistic standards for the IP/Competition 
law interface to economic balancing standards. It is also possible to identify a new trend, observed in 
recent merger cases, to move beyond a simple economic balancing test, and take into account 
potential entrants in technology markets and innovation paths in the medium term. 
 
1.4.2.1.1. Formalistic standards 
 
 With regard to formalistic standards, one may distinguish between standards focusing on the 
scope of the IP and standards focusing on the intent of the IP holder.  
 Standards focusing on the scope of the IP rights have taken different forms. First, the 
inherency doctrine, or scope of the patent doctrine, protects the practices inherent to the exercise of 
the IP right from the application of competition law.2136  Such standards were adopted at the initial 
steps of the interaction between competition law and IP rights. For instance, the Court of Justice of 
the EU  
proceeded in its first cases regarding IP rights in competition law to the definition of the scope 
of the IP rights as linked to the ‘subject matter’ and the ‘essential function’ of the specific IP rights. 
The concept of the ‘specific subject-matter’ made it possible to determine what might be covered by 
the legal status of any industrial or intellectual property right without damaging the EU principles of 
competition or that of free movement (exhaustion). For instance, in the field of patents, the ‘specific 
subject-matter’ consists, in the Court of Justice's view, in ‘the exclusive right to use an invention with 
a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time […] 
                                                          
exit by firms—there is no guarantee that today’s successful firms will be able to offer the product attributes demanded 
by tomorrow’s consumers’. 
2134 J Ellig and D Lin, ‘A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories’ in J Ellig (ed), Dynamic Competition and Public 
Policy – Technology, Innovation and Antitrust Issues (Cambridge University Press 2011) 16–44 outline the principal 
strands of dynamic competition law scholarship. 
2135 See, for instance, in Japan, the recently amended Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property under the  
Antimonopoly Act, January 2016 stipulates that “[…] when applying the Antimonopoly Act with respect to the 
restrictions pertaining to the use of technology, it is important for competition policy to insulate competition in 
technologies and products from any negative effect caused by any restrictions that deviate from the intent of the 
intellectual property systems, while making every effort to facilitate competition through the intellectual property 
systems”; for China (see footnote 4). Even in the South Korea and Taiwan competition law regimes that provide some 
form of immunity regime to the exercise of IP rights (article 59 of the Monopoly Regulation and the Fair Trade Act in 
South Korea and article 45 of the Fair Trade Act in Taiwan), competition authorities have enacted guidelines to distinguish 
a justifiable exercise of IP rights , entitled to competition law immunity, from unjustifiable acts going “beyond the 
purpose”, or being “inappropriate use” of IP rights, which fall under the scope of competition law.  
2136 VB Venegas, ‘Shifting Towards a Dynamic Efficiency Test?: Evaluating Licensing Agreements under Antitrust Law’ 
in S Anderman and A Ezrachi (eds) Intellectual property and Competition Law – New Frontiers (Oxford University Press 
2011) 461–485. 
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as well as the right to oppose infringements’.2137 The Court referred to the purposive concept of 
‘essential function’ in order to expand the specific subject matter beyond the core rights previously 
identified. The concepts of ‘subject matter’ and ‘essential function’ of IP rights have been used in 
various cases as a shield to competition law enforcement.  
 In other occasions the EU Courts went beyond a purely formalistic distinction between the 
‘existence’, the core of the IP right, and its ‘exercise’ and considered the value of the IP right in 
envisioning the interaction between competition law and IP rights. In Erawu-Jacquery v La 
Hesbignonne, the Court held that a prohibition on the sale or export of basic seeds was not within 
Article 101 TFEU since considerable investment had been made in developing the basic seed.2138 
According to the Court, ‘a person who has made considerable efforts to develop varieties of basic 
seed which may be the subject-matter of plant breeders' rights must be allowed to protect himself 
against any improper handling of those varieties of seed’ and ‘to that end, the breeder must be entitled 
to restrict propagation to the growers which he has selected as licensees’.2139 
A possible alternative formalistic standard is to focus on the intent of the monopolist.2140 Some 
US courts have adopted standards based on anticompetitive intent, advancing the view that a 
monopolist should not ‘rely upon a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive 
conduct’.2141 This might involve some analysis of the subjective intent of the undertaking, by looking 
to documents, emails or statements. However, it is unclear at what level of company management the 
decision-maker should look to find evidence of intent and it is quite common for executives to use 
language that suggests intent to exclude a competitor.  
An alternative would be to examine objective intent as this is indicated by the behaviour of 
the undertaking. In its Preliminary Report of the Sector Inquiry on the Pharmaceutical Sector, the 
European Commission noted that ‘intention can […] be taken into account in competition law 
assessments’,2142 although it is clear that the intent of the applicants does not form part of the 
assessment of patent claims.2143 The Astra Zeneca decision of the European Commission, confirmed 
by the General Court, acknowledged the importance of evidence of anticompetitive intent in 
demonstrating that a conduct is liable to have anticompetitive effects.2144 The General Court of the 
EU in its judgment in the same case found that while abuse is an objective concept, ‘[…] intention 
can still be taken into account to support the conclusion that the undertaking concerned abused a 
dominant position, even if the abusive conduct actually took place’.2145  
 
1.4.2.1.2. Balancing tests 
 
                                                          
2137 Case C-15/74 Centrafarm BV and Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 1147. 
2138 Case C-27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919. See also, Case C-258/78 L.C. 
Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 2015. 
2139 Ibid., para 10. 
2140 MA Carrier, ‘Unravelling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox’ (2002) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 761, 793. 
2141Image Technical Services, Inc. v Eastman Kodak Co. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), 1219. 
2142 European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final Report, fn 375 and 376. 
2143 For example, in the context of the DG Comp’s Pharmaceutical sector inquiry, the European Patent Office argued 
against a scrutiny of the intent of applicants in applying for patent rights for purposes of competition law. See, 
Communication from the Commission, Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, available at 
ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf, p 7  
2144 Commission Decision, AstraZeneca, Annex A, para 13. 
2145 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805, para 334, although on appeal the Court of Justice 
did not explicitly confirmed this position: Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca AB v Commission (6 December, 2012). 
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A significant episode in the interaction between competition law and IP rights, at least in 
Europe and the US, is the development of balancing tests.  
Balancing tests weigh the restriction of allocative efficiency or other anticompetitive effects 
of the conduct involving IP rights from one side and the possible benefits of these IP rights in inducing 
innovation and dynamic efficiency on the other side. Innovation is considered positively as it 
enhances competition in the market and provides a variety of choice to consumers. Contrary to the 
formalistic analysis conducted under the scope or intent tests, balancing tests involve some 
consideration of the economic effects of the IP rights in the specific market configuration. Various 
balancing tests have been suggested in the law and economics literature, some intervening in the IP 
side of the equation, while others in the competition law side.2146 
 The EU Guidelines on Transfer of Technology Agreements (interpreting the Transfer of 
Technology Block Exception Regulation) seem to be inspired by the principle of an economic 
balancing test.2147 Their starting standpoint is that there is no inherent conflict between intellectual 
property rights and EU competition rules. According to the European Commission, 
‘[…] both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and 
an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic 
component of an open and competitive market economy. Intellectual property rights promote 
dynamic competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved 
products and processes. So does competition by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate. 
Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to promote 
innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof’.2148 
The Guidelines refer to the concept of ‘dynamic competition’,2149 but it is important here to 
note that although there is no presumption that intellectual property rights and licence agreements as 
such give rise to competition concerns, any eventual anticompetitive concerns will be assessed with 
an eye on the possible pro-competitive efficiencies, which ‘must be considered under Article 101(3) 
TFEU and balanced against the negative effects on competition’.2150 In the current version of the EU 
TTBER, the market share threshold to be applied for the purpose of the safe harbour depends on 
whether the agreement is concluded between competitors or non-competitors . Outside the safe 
harbour individual assessment is required, although this does not give rise to any presumption that 
the agreement is caught by Article 101 TFEU.  
In the context of Article 102 TFEU, the European Commission seems to have been inspired 
by the balancing approach in its Microsoft decision.2151 The specific characteristics of intellectual 
property rights were not prima facie taken into account. The Commission observed that ‘there is no 
persuasiveness to an approach that would advocate the existence of an exhaustive checklist of 
                                                          
2146 For an example of the first see, the Kaplow’s ‘ratio test’ [L Kaplow, ‘The Patent-Antitrust Intersection:  A 
Reappraisal’ (1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 1813] focusing on the IP side of the equation and suggesting an adjustment 
of the scope and strength of IP rights as a possible solution to the problem. For an example of the second, see Ordover’s 
critical trade-off is ‘between incentives for investment in knowledge creation and the overall efficiency with which this 
investment is achieved’ [JA Ordover, ‘Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting Industrial and Intellectual 
Property’ (1984) 53 Antitrust Law Journal 503]. 
2147 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to technology transfer agreements, [2014] OJ C 89/3. 
2148 Ibid., para 7. 
2149 Ibid., paras 7- 8. 
2150 Ibid., para 9. 
2151 Microsoft/W2000 (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision [2004], available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf. 
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exceptional circumstances and would have the Commission disregard a limine other circumstances 
of exceptional character that may deserve to be taken into account when assessing a refusal to 
supply’.2152 Microsoft has put forward the same justification as in the US litigation: the need to protect 
its own incentives to innovate by preserving its intellectual property rights.2153 The Commission 
rejected that claim by affirming that intellectual property rights ‘cannot as such constitute a self-
evident objective justification for Microsoft’s refusal to supply’.2154 The Commission considered that 
innovation is an objective for both intellectual property and competition law2155 and adopted a 
balancing test focused on innovation incentives of Microsoft and its competitors.2156 Because of the 
nature of the market, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were maintained, while those of its 
competitors were also preserved2157 
In its Microsoft judgment, the General Court considered that prejudice to consumers may arise 
where there is limitation of technical development.2158 The Court did not however balance 
Microsoft’s incentives to innovate with those of its competitors, thus focusing on a version of the 
balancing test that would compare static allocative inefficiencies to dynamic efficiency benefits. This 
version of the test may lead to an extension of the scope of Article 102 TFEU, as it takes into account 
only the incentives of the rivals of the dominant firm to innovate without considering those of the 
dominant firm. 
The risk of the economic balancing approach is that in practice courts and competition 
authorities may emphasize more restrictions to allocative efficiency than dynamic efficiency benefits. 
The possibility that these economic balancing tests might lead in practice to weigh more static 
efficiency as opposed to dynamic effects has led to the view that competition law should turn to 
dynamic analysis and embrace the goal of innovation. 
 
1.4.2.1.3. New standards for restrictions to innovation competition? 
 
Competition authorities have been increasingly focusing on the possible effects of 
anticompetitive conduct activity on innovation. This is particularly the case in merger control which 
is quite forward-looking. The US DOJ & FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 were the first 
to include a specific Section on competition harm to innovation and product variety and explicitly 
considering that “(a) merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to 
raise price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished 
competitive constraints or incentives”2159. In analyzing effects on innovation, the US competition 
authorities have often taken an “innovation market” perspective2160, or as this has been reframed in 
the 2017 update of the US DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 
“research and development markets”2161. According to the 2017 US Licensing of IP Guidelines, 
                                                          
2152 Ibid., para 555. 
2153 Ibid., para 709. 
2154 Ibid., para 710. 
2155 Supra n 2151, Microsoft Commission Decision, para 712. 
2156 Ibid., para 783. 
2157 Ibid., para 725. 
2158 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission (2007) ECR II-3601, para 647. 
2159 USDOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), p. 2. Emphasis added. 
2160 RJ Gilbert and SC Sunshine, ‘Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation 
Markets’ [1995] 63 Antitrust Law Journal 569.  
2161 US DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Section 3.2.3. (2017) 
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“(a) research and development market consists of the assets comprising research and development 
related to the identification of a commercializable product, or directed to particular new or 
improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and development. When 
research and development is directed to particular new or improved goods or processes, the close 
substitutes may include research and development efforts, technologies, and goods that 
significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant research and 
development, for example by limiting the ability and incentive of a hypothetical monopolist to 
reduce the pace of research and development. The Agencies will delineate a research and 
development market only when the capabilities to engage in the relevant research and 
development can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms. In 
assessing the competitive significance of current and potential participants in a research and 
development market, the Agencies will take into account all relevant evidence. […] The Agencies 
may base the market shares of participants in a research and development market on their shares 
of identifiable assets or characteristics upon which innovation depends, for example, on shares of 
research and development expenditures, or on shares of a related product. When entities have 
comparable capabilities and incentives to pursue research and development that is a close 
substitute for the research and development activities of the parties to a licensing arrangement, 
the Agencies may assign equal market shares to such entities”2162. 
The US authorities have employed “innovation markets” or “research and development markets” 
concepts in order to assess competition effects in a number of cases2163. According to this approach, 
the US Agencies will delineate research and development markets, only when the capabilities to 
engage in relevant research and development can be associated with specialized assets or 
characteristics of specific firms”, the authorities seeking to identify three key effects: (i) the ability 
of the merged firm to reduce total market investments in R&D, (ii) the incentive of the merged entity 
to reduce the innovative effort and (iii) the impact of the merger on the efficiency of the R&D 
expenditure2164. This looks like a relatively demanding framework from an evidential perspective. In 
most recent cases, the US authorities seem to adopt a broader framework and have also challenged 
mergers for diminishing innovation even if the merger would eliminate potential competition from a 
relative small competitor, in particular when the smaller player has promising pipeline products. The 
theory of harm in these cases was the ‘actual potential entrant’ theory, a potential entrant merging 
with an existing competitor and thus leading to lessen future competition.  
The European Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines includes as one of the effects to 
be analysed under merger control, the ‘effect on innovation’2165. According to the Commission’s 
Guidelines, 
                                                          
2162 Ibid. 
2163 The FTC has identified and referred to research and development markets in the following matters: Complaint, Amgen 
Inc., 134 F.T.C. 333, 337-39 (2002) (identifying a research and development market for inhibitors of cytokines that 
promote the inflammation of human tissue); Wright Med. Tech., Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid 
Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 460, 463 (Jan. 4, 1995) (identifying a research and development market for orthopedic 
implants for use in human hands); Am. Home Prods. Corp., Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public 
Comment, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,807, 60,815 (Nov. 28, 1994) (identifying a research and development market for, among other 
things, rotavirus vaccines).   
2164 E. Cefis et al, The Role of Innovation in Merger Policy: Europe's Efficiency Defence versus America's Innovation 
Markets Approach, Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute, Discussion paper series 07-21. 
2165 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2004] OJ C31/5, para 8 (hereinafter EU HMG). 
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“(i)n markets where innovation is an important competitive force, a merger may increase the 
firms' ability and incentive to bring new innovations to the market and, thereby, the 
competitive pressure on rivals to innovate in that market. Alternatively, effective competition 
may be significantly impeded by a merger between two important innovators, for instance 
between two companies with "pipeline" products related to a specific product market. 
Similarly, a firm with a relatively small market share may nevertheless be an important 
competitive force if it has promising pipeline products”2166. 
The innovation potential of the merging firms, in particular if “one or more merging parties are 
important innovators in ways not reflected in market shares”, is taken into account, irrespective of 
the levels of concentration that are usually considered by the Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines as 
raising competition concerns2167. The Commission’s Guidelines also recognize that efficiencies may 
bring forward positive innovation effects, and acknowledge that “consumers may also benefit from 
new or improved products or services, for instance resulting from efficiency gains in the sphere of R 
& D and innovation”2168. However, as for other types of efficiency gains put forward, the parties need 
to demonstrate that (i) efficiencies are a direct consequence of the notified merger and cannot be 
achieved to a similar extent by less anticompetitive alternatives, and (ii) that efficiencies have to be 
verifiable such that the Commission can be reasonably certain that the efficiencies are likely to 
materialise, and be substantial enough to counteract a merger's potential harm to consumers2169. 
Similarly, the EU non-horizontal merger guidelines list the diminishing of innovation as a 
competition concern for vertical and conglomerate mergers2170 and also state that mergers involving 
innovative companies that are likely to expand significantly in the near future will be extensively 
investigated even when the post-merger market share is below 30%2171.  
A Competition Policy Brief published by  the European Commission in 2016 explains that harm 
to innovation may justify the Commission to consider that a merger between a firm present in the 
relevant market with a firm that is not actually present in the relevant market could lead to a 
significant impediment of effective competition. According to this document, 
“(f)or a merger with a potential competitor to raise serious competition concerns, it is in principle 
necessary to show, firstly, that the potential competitor currently acts as a significant competitive 
constraint, or there is a significant likelihood that, absent the merger, it would grow into an 
effective competitive force in the foreseeable future. This is more likely in particular when the 
market is already concentrated, as in a market with many actual competitors a potential entrant 
is, in principle, less likely to be a significant competitive constraint. Secondly, it needs to be 
established that there are not enough actual or potential competitors to maintain the necessary 
competitive pressure after the merger. In particular, barriers to entry must be high enough to 
exclude the existence of several other potential competitors, but the merging firm potentially 
entering the market must be well positioned to overcome these barriers, for instance as it is present 
in an adjacent or vertically related market or already has specific entry plans”2172. 
                                                          
2166 Ibid., para. 38. 
2167 Ibid., para. 20. 
2168 Ibid., para. 81. 
2169 Ibid., paras 85-86. 
2170 EU Non Horizontal Merger Guidelines [2008] OJ C 265/7, para. 10. 
2171 Ibid., para. 26. 
2172 European Commission, Competition Policy Brief, 2016-01, p. 3. 
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Members of the chief economist team of the European Commission have also recently published 
studies analysing the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to innovate and showing that in certain 
markets at least, mergers tend to reduce overall innovation, making consumers “always worse off 
after a merger and that the inverted-U relationship between innovation and some measure of 
competition is not applicable to a merger setting2173. In their paper they study three key channels for 
the effects of a merger on innovation: price coordination relates to “the elimination of product market 
competition between the merging firms”, as, “(t)he merger internalizes the negative pricing 
externality that the merging firms exert on each other in the absence of the merger” and , according 
to the authors this affects the incremental profit of innovating and consequently the incentive to 
innovate.. While it is clear that a merger between competitors induces price coordination and thus 
harms consumers via higher prices, its effects on innovation incentives is ambiguous, but in general 
the reduction in the intensity of price competition following a merger tends to favour innovation. 
However, a merger will also produce an innovation externality reflecting the reduction of expected 
profits that innovation by one of the merging may produce to its merging partner (and vice-versa): 
either innovation by one of the merging firms cannibalizes the pre-innovation sales of the merging 
partner, or innovation by one of the merging firms diverts profitable post-innovation sales of the other 
merging firm. According to the authors, each of the merging firms internalizes this expected negative 
externality by reducing innovation, thus showing that the merger exerts a downward pressure on 
innovation incentive of the merging firms, at least via the innovation externality channel. This effect 
is more likely to be significant when (i) the merger brings together two out of a limited number of 
significant innovators and (ii) the merging firms, absent the merger, would have been likely to divert 
to a significant extent future sales from each other when introducing innovative products , which is 
particularly the case if the merging firms’ existing and/on innovative products compete closely. 
Finally, the third channel consists in innovation-related efficiencies caused by the merger that 
increases the ability and/or incentive of the merging parties to innovate, in particular as it affects the 
ability by an innovator to prevent knowledge spillovers to other firms (appropriability). The authors 
argue that a merger leads to a reduction in the innovation effort of the merging parties in the absence 
of efficiencies, that the negative effect on innovation incentives tends to be stronger if the parties are 
close competitors, and finally that although non-merging parties increase their innovation effort post-
merger, this increase does not compensate for the reduction of innovation effort by the merging firms. 
Their conclusion is  that a merger between two out of a limited number of innovators is likely to 
depress innovation incentives, in the absence of innovation-related efficiencies. 
The Commission has actively considered innovation effects in a series of recent merger cases, 
either exploring the possibility that a horizontal merger will lead to a loss of innovation by eliminating 
pipeline products that would likely have entered existing markets or that would have created entirely 
new value chains, thus preventing consumers from increased choice and variety2174, as well as non-
                                                          
2173 G. Federico, G. Langus, T. Valletti, A simple model of mergers and innov ation, (2017) 157 Economic Letters 136; . 
Federico, G. Langus, T. Valletti, Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation: An Economic Framework, Federico, Giulio 
and Langus, Gregor and Valletti, Tommaso M., Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation: An Economic Framework 
(July 10, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2999178 . 
2174 COMP/M. 5675 – Syngenta/Monsanto’s Sunflower Seed Business, Commission decision of 17 November 2010, para. 
248 and paras 200 and 207 (finding that farmers would have suffered from reduced choice); COMP/ M.6166 – Deutsche 
Börse/NYSE Euronext, Commission decision of 1 February 2012, section 11.2.1.3.4, confirmed by Case T-175/12, 
Deutsche Börse AG v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:148; Case No COMP/ M.7326, Medtronic/Covidien, Commission 
decision of 28 November 2014; Case No COMP/M.7275, Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline's oncology business, Commission 
decision of 28 January 2015 ; Case No COMP/ M.7559, Pfizer/Hospira, Commission decision of 4 August 2015 Case 
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horizontal vertical or conglomerate mergers that would have harmed the ability of the merged entity's 
rivals to innovate2175. It has been alleged that in several of these cases the Commission has proceeded 
to establish a novel theory of harm, that of a significant impediment to industry innovation (SIII), as 
it has not explored the existence of specific innovation markets that could have been affected by the 
merger, the Commission relying, in order to find the SIII, on several negative views about the merger 
gathered from third parties, without assessing if the merger would lead to a reduction in the R&D 
spend/innovation incentives of the merged entity, its rivals and/or the whole industry2176. According 
to this view, the Commission’s SIII theory is based on a presumption that regulatory intervention is 
warranted when a merger removes a “parallel path R&D”, this being not in line with the standard of 
proof in EU merger control2177.  
These criticisms are far-fetched as, first, it is quite difficult to explain why the competition 
authority should not assess, when examining the merger, what would be the merger’s effects on 
innovation incentives in the industry. This can be done, without necessarily defining a specific 
“innovation market”. Indeed, in the context of the Transfer of Technology Guidelines, the 
Commission has put in place a filter that confines detailed analysis to cases “that are likely to present 
real competition concerns”, not based on market shares but on the existence of “at least four 
independent technologies that may constitute a commercially viable alternative, in addition to the 
licensed technology controlled by the parties to the agreement”2178. According to the Commission, 
‘(i)n assessing whether the technologies are sufficiently substitutable the relative commercial strength 
of the technologies in question must be taken into account. The competitive constraint imposed by a 
technology is limited if it does not constitute a commercially viable alternative to the licensed 
technology’2179. Although if an agreement falls outside the safe harbour this does not create a 
presumption of incompatibility with Article 101 TFEU but simply leads to an individual assessment 
under the guidelines and Article 101(3) TFEU, the Commission’s approach indicates that the main 
concern is the existence of sufficient choice in terms of independent technologies available in the 
market, thus showing that showing the emphasis put on the existence of various “independent” R&D 
paths or, more generally, technologies. Limiting the focus on innovation to just the adoption of the 
“innovation markets” approach seems reductionist and certainly does not represent the most recent 
competition law thinking, also of US competition agencies2180. It is also important to take into account 
the patent portfolio strength of the merging parties, as well as the existence of licensing and cross-
licensing agreements and internal strategy documents in order to assess the possible effects of a 
specific merger on innovation. 
One should not limit this finding on situations of high market shares but it may be also be relevant 
to emphasise the need to keep an eye on technological developments and the possibility of potential 
                                                          
No COMP/ M.7278, General Electric/Alstom (Thermal Power- Renewable Power & Grid Business), Commission 
decision of 8 September 2015   
2175 Case COMP/ M.5984 – Intel/McAfee, Commission decision of 26 January 2011 ; Case COMP/ M.6564 – 
ARM/GIESECKE & DEVRIENT/GEMALTO JV, Commission decision of 6 November 2012; Case No COMP/M.7688 – 
Intel/Altera, Commission decision of 14 October 2015. 
2176 N. Petit, Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation: A Novel Theory of Harm in EU Merger Control?, ICLE 
White paper 2017-1, 22. 
2177 Ibid., p. 21. 
2178 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology 
transfer agreements [2014] OJ C 89/3, para. 157. 
2179 Ibid. 
2180 See our analysis of the US merger cases above where innovation concerns were raised. 
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competitors that rely on different technologies than the dominant undertaking, even if they are of a 
smaller size than the dominant undertaking, to challenge the competitive position of existing value 
chains and replace them with new ones. Competition law should take into account this form of 
disruptive competition, not only in relativizing the high market shares proxy, but also in assessing 
restrictions to the potential competition from these disruptors.  
This may be particularly important in view of recent work raising questions over the effects of 
mergers and economic concentration on innovation in various industries. The market for agricultural 
biotechnology research and development is particularly concentrated, with the former “Big Six” 
accounting for a significant number of agricultural bio-technology patents issued in the US, as well 
as more than 80% of crop field trials for regulatory release in the US2181. There is empirical evidence 
of the inverse relationship between firm concentration in corn, cotton and soybean seed markets, and 
R&D intensity in these markets, research finding that as the number of firms declined following the 
M&A waves, the intensity of R&D fell2182. Similar evidence exists for the effect of M&As on 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry2183. Although synergies and efficiencies were often put 
forward as the main rationale for mergers, the empirical evidence that these are effectively realized 
remains rather poor2184. The companies may argue that they will increase spending on R&D. 
However, there may be doubts on these increases in R&D research materializing, in view of the fact 
that their R&D expenses have been going down recently2185. Having three instead of six important 
market players may restrict the possibilities of joint collaboration on R&D, in view of the prevalence 
of cross-licensing in this sector, thus increasing the risk of tacit collusion, in particular as most stacks 
are inter-firm stacks. Overlaps in biotech innovation could also lead to size down research capabilities 
and thus restrict the number of R&D poles. Finally, a recent drop in research intensity in this sector 
may be related to the increasing consolidation of the industry, thus showing an inverse relation 
between market concentration and innovation and/or product quality2186. Ø. Solberg & L. Breian 
(2015) studied five Nordic countries finding that consolidation (from 1950 to the present) has resulted 
in a decrease in the number of available cultivars, a shift in focus to crops and hybrids more profitable 
to companies, and termination of breeding programs for regionally relevant crops2187.  
                                                          
2181 J.L. King & D. Schimmelpfenig, Mergers, acquisitions, and stocks of agricultural biotechnology intellectual property, 
(2005) 8(2&3) AgBioForum, 83-88. Available: http://www.agbioforum.org (accessed May 29, 2017). 
2182 D. E. Schimmelpfennig et al, The impact of seed industry concentration on innovation: a study of US biotech market 
leaders, (2004) 30 Agricultural Economics 157–167. 
2183 W.S. Comanor & F.M. Scherer, Mergers and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, (2013) 3291) Journal of 
Health Economics, 106-113; J. Haucap & J. Stiebale, How Mergers Affect Innovation:                              Theory and 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, DICE DISCUSSION PAPER 218 (2016), available at 
http://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/Discussion_Pap
er/218_Haucap_Stiebale.pdf . 
2184 For recent empirical evidence: see B.A. Blonigen & J.R. Pierce, ‘Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market 
Power and Efficiency’ [2016] Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-082. Washington: Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, available at doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.082. 
2185 For instance, Monsanto’ expenses for R&D have been going down in recent years: from $1,725 million in 2014 to 
$1,580 million in 2015 and $1,512 million in 2016: Monsanto 2016 Annual Report, Form 10-K, p. 8. It therefore looks 
that, as a percentage of sales, R&D spending has actually slumped back down to mid-1990s levels. The level of R&D in 
this sector (between 8.5-11.4% of sales) [Bayer, Acquisition of Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture, 
Investor Presentation, June 2016, 17] is also much lower than the level of R&D in the pharmaceutical sector (between 
16-20% of sales), even if the level of costs of launching an innovative product (including the costs associated to the 
regulatory approval pipeline) are comparable. 
2186  
2187 Ø. Solberg & L. Breian, Commercial cultivars and farmer’s access to crop diversity: a case study from the Nordic 
Region, (2015) 24 Agricultural and Food Science 150. 
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Recent research has found that R&D intensity, measured as the share of industry-level R&D 
expenditure to sales, increased from 11.0% in 1994 to 15.0% in 2000 before falling back to 10.5% in 
20092188. There is a significant heterogeneity across firms as they vary by size and innovation strategy 
with the eight largest seed companies having an average R&D intensity of 15.8% while accounting 
for 75.6% of the global R&D share. The number of new active ingredients in the R&D pipeline also 
decreased by 60% between 2000 and 2012. J. Fernandez-Cornejo & D. Schimmelpfennig also note : 
“[c]alculations for corn, soybeans, and cotton indicate that as the seed industry became more 
concentrated during the late 1990s, private research intensity dropped or slowed. Was there a 
connection between the concentrating industry and the slowing intensity? Further ERS analysis, 
using econometric methods, found a simultaneous self-reinforcing relationship. Those companies 
that survived seed industry consolidation appear to be sponsoring less research relative to the size 
of their individual markets than when more companies were involved. This finding runs counter 
to the hypothesis that dominant firms in consolidated industries conduct more new product 
research than they otherwise would in order to expand the size of their markets (because of less 
risk of being outcompeted during the long time periods required to bring new products to 
market)”2189. 
A recent study by Jefferson et al2190 (2015) of ownership issue of agriculture seed-related patents 
concluded that “the restructuring of the crop agriculture industry in the 1980s and 1990s and the 
strategic use of patent rights enabled some large-scale patent holders to exclude or deter others from 
using critical research tools and materials. This legal and expected use ….allowed a few corporations 
to influence or control much of global agricultural innovation”. R&D spending of leading agriculture 
seeds may also constitute a way to assess innovation. The five companies (Monsanto, Syngenta, 
DuPont Pioneer, BASF and Bayer2191) had a combined R&D budget accounted for more than USD 6 
billion2192 in 2015. Such concentration of industrial R&D suggests potential barriers to entry for 
competitors. The industry leaders claim that the process of development of a new biotechnology trait 
is complex and time consuming. According to Syngenta, it takes about 13 years on average to develop 
a new GM trait and roughly USD 136m of R&D costs (excluding failures)2193. Another study brings 
this cost to $286 million. The regulatory framework of GM plants is very stringent and typically 
requires about nine years of regulatory work assuming it is running in parallel to early development 
stages.  Some researchers believe that R&D expenditures as well as expenditures on regulatory 
improvements should be considered sunk costs2194.  Sunk costs are typically considered to be a 
characteristic of non-contestable markets (in other words, markets that do not behave in a competitive 
manner; although contestable markets have few companies competing, however due to a threat of 
new entrants such markets considered to behave in a competitive manner).  
                                                          
2188 B. Anderson & I. M. Sheldon, R&D concentration under Endogenous Fixed Costs: Evidence from Genetically 
Modified Corn Seed (2017) 99(5) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1265. 
2189 J. Fernandez-Cornejo & D. Schimmelpfennig, Have Seed Industry Changes Affected Research Effort?, Amber Waves 
(2004), available at https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2004/february/have-seed-industry-changes-affected-
research-effort/  
2190  Jefferson, Osmat A., Köllhofer, Deniz, Ehrich, Thomas H., & Jefferson, Richard A. The ownership question of plant 
gene and genome intellectual properties. Nature Biotechnology, 33(10), 2015. pp. 1138-1143.  
2191 Source: companies annual reports. For BASF and Bayer the numbers reflecting agriculture science departments R&D 
spending were used. 
2192 After currency exchange adjustments. 
2193 Syngenta. Our Industry 2016. http://www4.syngenta.com/~/media/Files/S/Syngenta/our-industry-syngenta.pdf  
2194 Fulton, M., and K.  Giannakas. Agricultural biotechnology and industry structure. AgBioForum, 4(2), 137-151. 2001. 
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An important literature has also covered the possible negative economic effects of the 
consolidation of this sector on consumer welfare and innovation, but also biodiversity. Stiegert et al. 
(2010) show that industry concentration can increase seed prices2195. A recent report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015) indicates that concentration in animal health market has had a 
negative impact on R&D and that low R&D productivity led to mature portfolios with some of the 
key drugs on the market present for more than 20 years2196. Some studies have also found that 
excessive market power and high concentration in animal genetics industry led to less biodiversity 
by (i.e., poultry)2197. Moser and Wong2198 (2015) analyzed completion dynamics in the US 
agricultural biotechnology industry before entrance of Monsanto into this market segment (1996) and 
after, showing that Monsanto’s acquisitions triggered a patent war between Monsanto and Pioneer 
Hi-Bred, although it also led to important investments in R&D. Roucan-Kane and Gray (2009)2199 
explained that corn and soybean seed costs have been growing rapidly, as a percentage of farm costs, 
while farmers are almost completely reliant on commercial seed industry. It is reported that growth 
of commercial seed industry triggered growth of private R&D spending which increased by 1300 
percent (in real terms) between 1960 and 1996 (Fernandez-Cornejo 20042200). Since 1984 private 
research spending exceeded public spending in seed industry and has been almost completely 
privatized today. Rising costs of private R&D spending on seeds were put on farmers: the rise in seed 
prices outperforming the general index of prices paid by US farmers by nearly 30% over the period 
of 1994-2008 (since the introduction of the GE seeds in 1996)2201. Studies on the adoption of 
innovations in agriculture (in particular, adoption by farmers of GE seeds) show that a superior 
control of a wide range of weeds (Scursoni et al, 2006), convenience, flexibility and relative 
simplicity of pest control that led to the reduction in managerial intensity compared to traditional 
methods (Marra and Pigott2202, 2006; Gardner and Nelson2203, 2007) were suggested as key causes 
that led to the acceptance of farmers of herbicide-resistance technology and GE seeds. Interestingly, 
the higher reliance of farmers on seeds through time leads to more inelastic demand: farmers become 
less sensitive to price increases in seed (Pigott and Marra2204, 2008). Schiemmelpfennig et al. (2004) 
                                                          
2195 K. Stiegert, S. Guanming, J.-P. Chavas, Innovation, Integration, and Biotech Revolution: The Case of U.S. Seed 
Markets, Choices 25(2) (2010). 
2196 PWC, Animal health: Strategy Playbook for an Evolving Industry, (August, 2015). 
2197 W.M. Muir et al, Genome-wide assessment of worldwide chicken SNP genetic diversity indicates significant absence 
of rare alleles in commercial breeds, (2008) 105(45) PNAS, 17312-17317. 
2198 P. Moser & P.Wong, Competition and Innovation: Did Monsanto’s Entry Encourage Innovation in GMO Crops? 
April 3, 2015. 
2199 M. Roucan-Kane & A.Gray. The US Seed Industry: An Exploration of Statistics Highlighting the Economic Activity 
pf the US Row Crop Seed Industry, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Working Paper #09-08, 
2009 
2200 J. Fernandez-Cornejo. The seed industry in U.S. agriculture: An exploration of data and information on crop seed 
markets, regulation, industry structure, and research and development. Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 786. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture–Economic Research Service. Washington, DC. 2004. Available online at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib786/aib786.pdf   
2201 National Research Council. The Impact of Genetically. Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 2010, p. 146, 148 
2202 M.C. Marra, & N.E. Piggott. The value of non-pecuniary characteristics of crop biotechnologies: A new look at the 
evidence. In Regulating agricultural biotechnology:Economics and policy. eds. R.E. Just, J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman, 
2006. pp. 145–178. New York: Springer. 
2203 J.G. Gardner & C.H. Nelson. Genetically modified crops and labor savings in US crop production. Paper presented 
at the 2007 Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting (Mobile, AL, February 4–7, 2007). 2007 
2204 N.E.Piggott, N.E & M.C. Marra. Biotechnology adoption over time in the presence of non-pecuniary characteristics 
that directly affect utility: A derived demand approach. AgBioForum 11(1), 2008. pp: 58–70. 
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found that an increase in industry concentration produces negative effect on research intensity of 
agriculture biotechnology2205. Roucan-Kane and Gray (2009)2206 showed that corn and soybean seed 
costs have been growing rapidly, as a percentage of farm costs, while farmers are almost completely 
reliant on commercial seed industry; 
Rising costs of private R&D spending on seeds by industry leaders were put on farmers: the rise 
in seed prices outperformed the general index of prices paid by US farmers by nearly 30% over the 
period of 1994-2008 (since the introduction of the GE seeds in 1996)2207. For some crops, after 
adjustments for inflation the price of cotton seeds almost tripled between 1996 and 2007 while growth 
in price of soybean seed increased by over 60%. Stiegert et al. (2010) claimed that industry 
concentration can increase seed prices2208. Schiemmelpfennig et al. (2004) concluded that increase in 
industry concentration produces negative effect on research intensity of agriculture 
biotechnology2209; Industry concentration and market power of leaders in seed industry raise concerns 
of potential market manipulations from leading companies (i.e. by artificially lowering supply and 
variability of seeds being produced by the market combined with increased prices). This is important 
given the fact that farmers need to adapt seeding materials to the specific conditions of local 
environments2210; 
A number of studies in other factors of production industries (animal health, animal genomics) 
provided similar conclusions in relation to negative effects of industry concentration. For instance, 
high concentration in animal genetics industry results in excessive market power of industry leaders 
and, more importantly, provides less biodiversity thus enables long-term negative consequences for 
the industry as a whole. A study conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2015 focusing on animal 
health market provided that concentration in animal health market has negative impact on R&D as 
low R&D productivity lead to mature portfolios with key drugs on the market for more than 20 
years2211. Moreover, a patent power can frustrate competition in the market to the advantage of the 
market leader.  
Another interesting academic study of negative effect of industry concentration in seeds sector 
was conducted by Moser and Wong2212 (2015). The researchers analyzed completion dynamics in the 
US agricultural biotechnology industry before entrance of Monsanto into this market segment (1996) 
and after. They found that between 1924 and mid-1990-ies Pioneer Hi-Bred used to dominate the US 
plant-breeding industry. However, the acquisition DeKalb Genetics by Monsanto  in 1996-1998 
                                                          
2205 D. E. Schimmelpfennig et al, The impact of seed industry concentration on innovation: a study of US biotech market 
leaders, (2004) 30 Agricultural Economics 157–167. 
2206 Maude Roucan-Kane and Allan Gray. The US Seed Industry: An Exploration of Statistics Highlighting the Economic 
Activity pf the US Row Crop Seed Industry, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics, Working Paper 
#09-08, 2009 
2207 National Research Council. The Impact of Genetically. Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 2010, p. 146, 148 
2208 Stiegert, Kyle. W, Guangming Shi, and Jean-Paul Chavas. Innovation, Integration and the Biotechnology Revolution 
in the US Seed Markets. The Magazine of Food, Farm and Resource Issues. Quarter 2, 25 (2), 2010. 
2209 Schiemmelpfennig, D.E, Carl E. Pray, Margaret F. Brennan. The impact of seed industry concentration on innovation: 
a study of US biotech market leaders. Agricultural Economics. Volume 30, Issue 2. March 2004. Pp.157-167. 
2210 Shi, G. and J.-P.Chavas. On pricing and vertical organization of differentiated products. Staff Paper No. 535. 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Madison, WI. 2009.Available online at 
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/pubs/sps/pdf/stpap543.pdf  
2211 Animal Health: Strategy Playbook for an Evolving Industry. PWC Report, August 2015. Available at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/our-perspective/animal-health-playbook.html  
2212 Petra Moser and Paul Wong, Competition and Innovation: Did Monsanto’s Entry Encourage Innovation in GMO 
Crops? April 3, 2015. 
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changed the volume of innovation by Pioneer (based on the analysis of field trials permits issued by 
the US Department of Agriculture for GMO crops). As a result of acquisition, Monsanto got access 
to elite combinations of corn and soy. As a field study conducted by Moser and Wong showed, field 
trials for soy conducted by Pioneer fell from 20.5 per year (1992-1995) to 2.9 per year in 1999-2005. 
Overall, all soy breeders performed fewer trials after Monsanto’s acquisitions.  In addition, 
Monsanto’s acquisitions triggered a patent war between Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-Bred. Although 
field trials for soy declined, Pioneer and other soy breeders applied for almost 50 times more patents 
after 1998 in soy compared to other crops. This is also consistent with the view of Schumpeter on 
competition and economics who claimed that monopolies tend to spend more on R&D. 
However, there is no clear link established in the academic literature between market 
concentration and innovation2213. Although it is widely believed that R&D is the main driver of 
innovation in agricultural biotechnology, some researchers note that R&D is not the only contributor 
to the innovative products. Some  believe that the role of expenditures in improved machinery and 
capital equipment should not be underestimated (Piergiovanni and Santarelli, 20132214) while others 
claim that broader advancements in informatics sciences (bioinformatics), genomics, engineering and 
other fields of science should be taken into account while as a source of innovation as well2215. 
Moreover, agriculture is increasingly prone to potential disruptive shocks. For instance, Mitra et all 
conclude that both pharmaceutical and agricultural industries are susceptible to technology shocks as 
new technology discoveries significantly broaden new options for R&D2216. For instance, a recently 
discovered new effective way of genome editing named CRISPR/Cas9 has produced a revolution in 
genome editing and is a considered to be a good example of such technology disruption cases.  
Innovation level is typically measured by such metrics as R&D expenses, R&D intensity (ratio 
of R&D expenses to sales)2217, patent counts and patent citations. However, none of these indicators 
treated alone is a useful measure of the true innovation efforts as claimed by Petit (2017)2218. Instead, 
an industry wide context should be taken into account – i.e., like technology disruption, agriculture 
commodity price trends, specific policy regulations, etc.  
Therefore, in our view a merger assessment should not only be limited to the assessment of the 
potential harm or usefulness to industry’s overall innovation efforts, but should be viewed in a wider 
perspective and primarily from the potential of market power arising from industry concentration. 
                                                          
2213 Petit, Nicolas. Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation: A Novel Theory of Harm in EU Merger Control? ICLE 
Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program. White Paper, 2017-1. 
2214 Piergiovanni, Roberta and Enrico Santarelli, The More You Spend, the More You Get? The Effects of R&D and 
Capital Expenditures on the Patenting Activities of Biotechnology Firms, SCIENTOMETRICS, Volume 94, Issue 2 
(2013), pages 497-521. 
2215 Philip G. Pardey, Connie Chan-Kang, Jason M. Beddow, and Steven P. Dehmer, Long-Run and Global R&D Funding 
Trajectories: The U.S. Farm bill in a Changing Context, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 
Volume 97, Issue 5 (2015), pages 1312-1323 
2216 Mitra, James, Joyce Tait, and David Wield, From Maturity to Value-added Innovation: Lessons from the 
Pharmaceutical and Agro-biotechnology Industries, TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, Volume 29, Issue 3. 2011. pp. 
105-109. 
2217 R&D expenses and intensity has  been relatively stable over the last several years for the market leaders (Appendix 
1). 
2218 Petit, Nicolas. Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation: A Novel Theory of Harm in EU Merger Control? ICLE 
Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program. White Paper, 2017-1.p.18 
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Industry concentration increases a risk of oligopolistic pricing since coordination of few market 
players are possible thus exercising significant market power upon dispersed farmers2219.  
Considering this, common concerns still to be addressed include: 
• Potentially limited access to seeds (with or without GE traits) to farmers (especially access to 
seeds non GE-seeds of the same yield characteristics); 
• Lack of farmer input and knowledge regarding which seed traits might be developed; 
• Emerging alliances between large biotechnology, agriculture input providers as well as 
agribusiness firms that might reduce in the long-term diversity and availability of choice2220; 
• Power relationship between biotechnology firms and farmers2221; 
In addition, special attention should be paid to potential lobbying power by the seeds and other 
agriculture input industry leaders, which may affect innovation if it leads to barriers to entry for 
innovative firms in the market. Thus, there is evidence that sizeable amount of funding is used by 
market leaders for financing of political campaigns to influence public policy processes2222.  It is 
worth mentioning that a study conducted by the US National Academy of Sciences on impact of 
genetically engineered crops on farm sustainability in the US produced a following conclusion on 
seed industry concentration: 
“[…] Research has also identified the continuing consolidation of the seed industry and its 
integration with the chemical industry. The market power of firms that supply seed has not 
adversely affected farmers’ economic welfare so far, but research is needed on how market 
structure may affect ongoing access to non-GE or single-trait seeds and future seed prices. 
Furthermore, there has been comparatively little research on how changes in farmer social 
networks and seed-industry concentration might be affecting farmers’ planting decisions and 
options, overall yield benefits, crop genetic diversity, and economic returns”2223. 
In other words, there is a clear lack of studies of the seed industry consolidation consequences and 
we still do not fully understand all potential implications.  
 Innovation has also been an important consideration in the competition law and policy at the retail 
sector. A recent study commissioned by the European Commission on The Economic Impact of 
Modern Retail raises the possibility that retail concentration at local level may produce negative 
aggregate dynamic effects, through the reduction of the incentives of suppliers to innovate.2224 
                                                          
2219 Carstensen, Peter. Comments for the United States Departments of Agriculture and Justice Workshops on 
Competition Issues in Agriculture. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.1103. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537191.  
2220 Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States. The NAS report.  
2221 Phillipson, M. Agricultural Law: Containing the GM revolution. Biotechnology and Development Monitor (48): 2-5, 
2001 
2222 Renwick, Alan, Md. Mofakkarul Islam and Steven Thompson, Power in Global Agriculture: Economics, Politics, and 
Natural Resources. International Journal of Agricultural Management, Volume 2, Issue 1. 2012 
2223 Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States. The US National Academy of 
Sciences Report. pp. 206-207 
2224 European Commission, DG COMP, The Economic Impact of Modern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EU 
Food Sector, (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/KD0214955ENN.pdf, 36. However, the 
study also found that “a large imbalance away from suppliers and towards modern retailers was generally found to be 
associated with more innovation, reflecting in particular the finding that greater supplier concentration was associated 
with less innovation,” although it was also noted that the Member States in the sample did not include those with the 
highest level of national retailer concentration. The methodology of measuring the level of innovation followed in this 
study was also quite narrow as innovation essentially referred to the introduction of “new EAN products” (EAN being 
European Article Number). 
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In its recent decision on the Dow/Dupont merger2225, the European Commission found that the 
merger may have reduced innovation competition for pesticides by looking to the ability and the 
incentive of the parties to innovate. The Commission found that the fact that two parties were 
competing head-to-head in a number of important herbicide, insecticide and fungicide innovation 
areas may have affected, after the merger, the incentive of the new entity to innovate and may have 
led it to discontinue some of these costly development efforts. The Commission emphasised that this 
analysis was not general but was based on “specific evidence that the merged entity would have lower 
incentives and a lower ability to innovate than Dow and DuPont separately” and “that the merged 
entity would have cut back on the amount they spent on developing innovative products”2226. That 
said, the Commission also mentioned the following, which we think may be of relevance to the 
competition assessment of the other pending mergers: 
“(o)nly five companies (BASF, Bayer, Syngenta and the merging parties) are globally active 
throughout the entire R&D process, from discovery of new active ingredients (molecules 
producing the desired biological effect), their development, testing and regulatory registration, to 
the manufacture and sale of final formulated products through national distribution channels. 
Other competitors have no or more limited R&D capabilities (e.g. as regards geographic focus or 
product range). After the merger, only three global integrated players would remain to compete 
with the merged company, in an industry with very high barriers to entry. The number of players 
active in specific innovation areas would be even lower than at the overall industry level”2227. 
This type of assessment looks close to the filter of the existence of at least four independent 
technologies that constitute a commercially viable alternative, in addition to the licensed technology 
controlled by the parties to the agreement, that the Commission usually employs in its Transfer of 
Technology Guidelines in order to exclude the possibility that a licensing agreement may restrict 
competition and thus infringe Article 101 TFEU2228. There is no reason why the Commission will 
apply a different approach in the context of merger control. The above indicate that the Commission 
may view more negatively mergers that lead to less than three or four independent technologies 
commercially available on the market. The Commission will also certainly look to effects on 
innovation in the context of its analysis of the Bayer/Monsanto merger. 
 
1.4.3. The interaction between competition law and IP rights in BRICS 
 
The interaction between competition law and IP rights in BRICS countries is mixed. On the 
one hand, there are countries like China and India that fully apply competition law to the exercise of 
IP rights. On the other hand, countries like Brazil, Russia and South Africa do not yet have a clear 
view on the role between competition law and IP law. Brazil appears to examine the exercise of IR 
right mainly through merger control provisions, Russia examines the exercise of IP right thought 
unfair competition law statute, while South Africa appear to have least developed practice in this 
respect. 
                                                          
2225 European Commission, Case M.7932 Dow/Dupont (2017). 
2226 Commission’s Press Release on Dow/Dupont, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm. 
2227 Id. 
2228 European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to technology transfer agreements, [2014] OJ C 89/3, para. 157. See Section 13.3.3.2.2. 
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The following sections will provide a brief overview of the state of the interplay between 
competition law and IP rights in BRICS countries. 
 
1.4.3.1. Brazil 
 
Brazilian Competition Law is contained in the Law 12,529 of 30 November, which came into 
force on May 29, 2012. The Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE is in charge with 
the competition law enforcement. Decisions are subject to a broad scope of judicial review not only 
at the first instance but also with several instances of appeal. IP right are not subject to any tailored 
exemption and the Brazilian Competition Law is applicable to business practices involving such 
rights  
CADE examined IP related issues in several merger decisions. For instance, in the 2017 
DuPont/Dow merger, CADE cleared the transaction subject to certain remedies related to divestment 
of R&D assets, transfer of corn R& centres and brands (see Case Study xxx).  
In 2014, CADE assessed the licensing agreement granted by Monsanto to Bayer, through 
which the latter would develop and sell soya seeds with the Intacta technology.92 The report of the 
authority indicated that there was the risk that Monsanto would exert undue control and influence on 
Bayer in the soya market. It considered that some clauses of the agreement would be detrimental to 
the competition and had to be changed. CADE imposed restrictions on the agreement such as the 
exclusion of a preference option and of provisions related to the exchange of commercial information. 
The transaction was approved with those restrictions.  
In 2006, CADE analysed the agreement between Monsanto, FMT and Unisoja for the 
licensing and sale of soybean seeds with the gene Roundup Ready. The authority approved the 
transaction with the conditions of changing three clauses of the contract in order to allow the parties 
to carry out research and development independently and to produce seeds with technologies other 
than Monsanto’s.  
 
1.4.3.2. China 
 
The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML) 2008 provides for 
competition law protection in China. Chinese competition authorities have held that exercise of IP 
rights is not immune from competition law. For instance, the recent Order of the State Administration 
for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) No. 74, promulgated on April 7th, 2015, for the purposes of 
protecting fair market competition, stimulating innovation and prohibiting undertakings from abusing 
intellectual property rights to eliminate or restrict competition. These provisions became effective in 
August 2015. In a document released by SAIC on the interpretation of this Order it is recognized that 
protecting IPRs is important to encourage innovation and competition, but it also stipulated that SAIC 
will not hesitate to intervene where it considers that IPRs are being exercised in a manner that harms 
innovation and competition and thereby the consumer interest and social welfare in China. According 
to Article 2 of that Order, “the Antimonopoly Law shall apply if an undertaking abuses its intellectual 
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition” in particular for IP related practices involving 
“monopoly agreements or abuse of a dominant market position”. According to Article 3, the impact 
of such practices on “intellectual property rights, innovation and other factors” has to be taken into 
consideration, not only in product markets, but also in technology markets. Article 7 of this Order 
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stipulates that “(w)ithout justifiable reasons, an undertaking with a dominant position shall not refuse 
to license its intellectual property rights on reasonable terms to other undertakings for the purpose of 
eliminating or restricting competition, provided that such intellectual property rights constitute an 
essential facility for production or business operation”. Hence, Chinese anti-monopoly law may apply 
to a refusal to license such intellectual property rights when this will result “in adverse effects on 
competition or innovation in the relevant market, and will impair consumer or public interests”, under 
the condition of course that (compulsory) “(l)icensing its intellectual property rights will not cause 
unreasonable harm to the dominant undertaking”. This amounts to a balancing exercise. According 
to Article 16 of this Order, a number of factors will be considered in performing this balancing: 
“(1) Market position of the undertaking and of the trading parties, 
(2) Market concentration degree in the relevant market, 
(3) Entry barriers in the relevant market, 
(4) Industry practice and stage of industry development, 
(5) Duration and scope of the effects of the restrictions in relation to output, territories, 
consumers, etc. 
(6) Effects on the promotion of innovation and technology, 
(7) Innovation capacity of the undertakings concerned and speed of technological change, and 
(8) Other factors relevant to determining the effects of exercising intellectual property rights 
on competition”. 
The Chinese example shows that a gradual approach may be developed in the application of 
competition law to IP rights. Article 55 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly law (2007) provided that  
“(t)his Law does not apply when an undertaking exercises its intellectual property rights in 
accordance with laws and administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; However, 
this Law shall apply if an undertaking abuses its intellectual property rights to eliminate or 
restrict competition”.  
This established the possibility that Anti-Monopoly Law may apply to IP rights related conduct. 
However, in the absence of published detailed guidance, competition law enforcement to IP rights 
remained largely theoretical. It was only after a long process of gestation, with a working group 
established by SAIC in 2009 with the task to develop detailed guidelines as to the implementation of 
Anti-Monopoly law to IP rights and after several years of consultations with stakeholders both within 
and outside China, that the move was finally made with the promulgation of SAIC’s Order in 2015. 
It is also noted that in view of the separation of powers between the SAIC and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Order does not consider pricing issues, 
including the question of excessive royalties. Further guidance is to be expected by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”). The Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) will 
also adopt guidance on mergers involving IP rights. In addition, SAIC is in the process of adopting 
detailed guidance for monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance not relating to price. It is 
expected that the final guidelines will be formulated by the three Chinese Competition Agencies and 
will be released by their overarching authority, the Antimonopoly Commission of the State Council 
during 2016. 
It is worthy of note that “cross-licensing agreements” between seed companies may violate 
relevant laws. Although Article 5 of China's anti-monopoly law rules that the law should not be 
applied to the behavior of business operator that follow intellectual property law and administrative 
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rules and regulations, the law should could be applied to those who abuse of  intellectual property to 
limit competition. 
 
1.4.3.3. India 
 
In terms of Section 3(5) of the Indian Competition Act 2002 (as amended in 2007), sections 3(1) to 
3(4) may not be deemed to restrict the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose 
reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights which have been or may 
be conferred upon him under—  
(a)  the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957);  
(b)   the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970);   
(c)   the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade Marks  Act, 1999 
(47 of 1999);   
(d)   the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999  (48 of 
1999);   
(e)   the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000);   
(f)   the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of 2000).  
It is clear that this article does not provide a blanket immunity for anticompetitive conduct 
involving IP rights (as it exempts only “reasonable conditions” that are “necessary” for the protection 
of the right). In addition, Section 4 of the Act (dealing with abuse of dominance) does not include a 
similar provision, which indicates that even “reasonable” conditions imposed by IP holders, in the 
sense of Article 3(5), may be subject to the Competition Act, if they result in an abuse of a dominant 
position when there is an “appreciable adverse effect on competition”. In Amir Khan Productions 
Private Limited v. Union of India2229, the Bombay High Court held that the Competition Commission 
of India (CCI) has jurisdiction to deal with competition cases involving IPRs. It seems that the CCI 
staff would favour an approach that would call for “a balance between abuse of monopoly and 
protection of the property holders' rights”2230. 
The CCI referred to Section 3(5) in Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars India Limited 
& Others.2231 In examining whether the three types of agreements entered into between Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and Original Equipment Suppliers (OESs) fell within the ambit 
of section 3(4), CCI held that:  
(a)  agreements between OEMs and their overseas suppliers did not fall within section 3(4) as 
these were internal agreements of a single economic entity;  
(b)  agreements between OEMs and local OESs were instances of refusal to deal and exclusive 
distribution agreements, and fell within the mischief of section 3. CCI analysed the AAEC of these 
agreements in light of factors listed in section 19(3). It also considered whether the defendant was 
entitled to an exemption under section 3(5)(i);2232  
                                                          
2229 Amir Khan Productions Private Limited v. Union of India, 2010 (112) Bom LR 3778. 
2230 CCI, Intellectual Property Rights under the Competition Act, 2002, available at http://www.competition-commission-
india.nic.in/advocacy/Intellectual_property_rights.PDF . 
2231 Case 3/2011 decided 25.08.2014. 
2232 ibid (para 20.6.7). CCI also referred to this reasoning in: (1) Case 3/2011 Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars 
Limited India & others, decided 27.07.2015  and  (2) In considering section 3(5) exemption in Case 107/2013 Association 
of Third Party Administrators v. General Insurers (Public Sector) Association of India & others decided 04.01.2016 CCI 
clarified that joint ventures that enhanced efficiency even though horizontal, were not presumed to have an AAEC and 
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(c) agreements between OEMs and their authorized dealers were also anti-competitive on the basis 
of an analysis similar to that in case of OEMs and local OESs (see (b) above).  
 
1.4.3.4. Russia 
 
Competition Law in Russia is based on the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” dated 
26 July 2006 N 135-FZ (Federal law “On Protection of Competition”). The enforcement of 
competition law is entrusted to the The Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation ( 
FAS)  
The FAS’s investigations are mainly based on the following provisions of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition”: 
(i) Article 10 – prohibition of abuse of dominant position; 
(ii) Article 11 – prohibition of written or oral agreements between competitors (cartels) / 
“vertical” agreements, which lead or might lead to anticompetitive effects described in 
the said Article; 
(iii) Article 11.1 – prohibition of concerted actions, which leads to restriction of competition; 
(iv) Article 15 – prohibition of adoption of acts or performance of actions by state bodies, 
which lead or may lead to restriction or elimination of competition; 
(v) Article 16 – prohibition of anticompetitive agreements or concerted actions by state 
authorities; between the state authorities and economic entities if they lead or may lead to 
restriction or elimination of competition. 
However, with respect to IP rights, competition law in the Russian Federation lacks any efficient 
instruments, which can help to resist any negative consequences for competition resulting from the 
abuse of IP rights. For instance, under Article 10 of the Federal law “On protection of competition” 
abuse of IP rights by dominant households does not affect actions in respect of enforcement of 
exclusive rights on intellectual property and means of identification, individualizing food products or 
associated services. Moreover, in accordance with Article 11 of the Federal law “On protection of 
competition”, anticompetitive agreements are prohibited. However, these legal provisions are not 
applied to agreements on assignment, alienation of rights of exploitation of IP assets or means on 
identification.  
Instead, the developments concerning the interaction between IP and competition in Russia are 
mainly in the area of unfair competition law.  
 
1.4.3.5. South Africa 
 
The Competition Commission is in charge of enforcing competition law in South Africa. 
However, the interplay between competition and IP law is not specifically addressed in any statute 
or regulation., and the Competition Commission has not yet issued official guidelines addressing the 
overlap of IP and competition law 
Nevertheless, the Competition Commission may apply provision of South Africa’s 
Competition Act to firms holding intellectual property rights. For instance, Section 8(b) of the 
                                                          
their anti-competitive effects needed to be established. ‘The question of them being per se anti-competitive does not 
arise...’ (para 67). 
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Competition Act prohibits a dominant firm from refusing to give a competitor access to an essential 
facility when it is economically feasible to do so.2233 Section 8(b) of the Competition Act can 
therefore be used, in certain instances, as a means to grant compulsory licensing in situations where 
the firm has refused to license its IP right. The Competition Commission may also use Section 8(a) 
of the Competition Act prohibiting dominant firms from charging excessive prices and challenge 
patent holders that charge excessively high royalties for the use of their patented technology.2234 
 The Competition Commission may further apply other provisions of the Competiton Act, such 
as Section 5(1) that prohibits an agreement between parties in a vertical relationship if it has the effect 
of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market and Section 8(c) that prohibits a 
dominant firm from engaging in conduct that impedes or prevents other firms from entering into, or 
expanding within a market. 2235 
In that regard, the Competition Commission investigated company HZPC Holland BV,2236 
that enjoyed plant breeder’s right over the Mondial seed potato variety in South Africa for 20 years. 
After the expiry of plant breeder’s right, HZPC Holland BV entered into exclusive agreement with 
company Wesgrove Potatoes for the use of Mondial seed veriety and refusing access to seeds to 
others. The Competition Commission considered this exclusive agreement to be the means to exclude 
other South African potato seed growers from growing and selling the Mondial seed potato variety 
once the plant breeder’s right has expired.2237  
 
Table 8: Comparison Competition/IP in BRICS 
 
 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Competition 
law applies to 
IP rights 
Partly  No Fully Fully Partly 
Competition 
Law and IP 
Guidelines 
No  No Yes Yes No 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data 
 
1.5. Exhaustion of IP Rights 
 
                                                          
2233 Itumeleng Lesofe, 'Finding the Right Balance Between the Enforcement of Competition Law and The Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2017) p. 14, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Paper_Competition-and-IP-Law_Itumeleng-Lesofe_Final_24082017.pdf  
2234 Itumeleng Lesofe, 'Finding the Right Balance Between the Enforcement of Competition Law and The Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2017) p. 15, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Paper_Competition-and-IP-Law_Itumeleng-Lesofe_Final_24082017.pdf 
2235 Itumeleng Lesofe, 'Finding the Right Balance Between the Enforcement of Competition Law and The Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2017) p. 16, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Paper_Competition-and-IP-Law_Itumeleng-Lesofe_Final_24082017.pdf 
2236 Itumeleng Lesofe, 'Finding the Right Balance Between the Enforcement of Competition Law and The Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2017) p. 15, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Paper_Competition-and-IP-Law_Itumeleng-Lesofe_Final_24082017.pdf 
2237 Itumeleng Lesofe, 'Finding the Right Balance Between the Enforcement of Competition Law and The Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights' (2017) p. 15-16, available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Paper_Competition-and-IP-Law_Itumeleng-Lesofe_Final_24082017.pdf 
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While patents produce dynamic benefits by encouraging innovation, they also produce allocative 
inefficiencies.2238 An exclusive right holder seeking to maximize returns will tend to raise prices over 
the competitive price and decrease output. This produces a deadweight loss, in that there are potential 
consumers who forego purchase at the ‘monopoly’ price even though they could put the invention to 
good use (and thus raise social welfare). The patentee does not make the sale, and thus earns less than 
the full potential return. The exhaustion doctrine mitigates the first problem. Once a patentee sells an 
embodiment of the invention (or authorizes such a sale), his interest in that embodiment is deemed to 
be exhausted. From this perspective, IP rights exhaustion offers a way to limit the monopolistic rents 
of the IP rights holder. The buyer can resell, creating a secondary market where goods are available 
at lower cost. Those who would not pay the original price can purchase in the secondary market and 
enjoy the benefit of the invention.  The exhaustion doctrine is also said to satisfy purchasers’ 
expectations in that it limits restraints on alienation. 
There are, however, numerous issues raised by the exhaustion doctrine. First, exhaustion can 
increase the patentee’s loss in that the secondary market can compete with the primary market for the 
patentee’s products. This exerts a downward pressure on price and reduces incentives to innovate. 
Patentees thus prefer to deal with deadweight loss by segmenting markets and charging differential 
prices, depending on what that market can pay. The exhaustion doctrine interferes with this strategy 
because buyers can purchase in the low-cost segment of the market and resell to the high-cost 
segment. In particular, patentees use international boundaries for this purpose. As a result, prices in 
some countries will be significantly lower than prices in other countries. Patentees do not believe that 
their interest in selling where the price is high is ‘exhausted’ by sale where the price is low. IP holders 
(in particular patent holders) also have other interests in the fate of the embodiments they sell. Some 
products are dangerous if not refurbished correctly. In these cases, the patent holder needs to control 
resale in order to assure quality (and protect itself from tort liability). 
The principle of exhaustion or first sale in the US has been considered as a possible way to 
regulate the use of patents in self-replicating technologies, such as genetically engineered crops. In 
Bowman v. Monsanto, the US Supreme Court clarified that patent exhaustion doctrine applies to 
reusing or selling, but not to making the patented product, effectively indicating that the patent 
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to self-replicating technologies in the specific circumstances of 
the case, the intentional character of the self-replication and the fact that the purchaser exercised  
control over that replication having probably played a role in this case. The scope of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine was narrowed down, as the Supreme Court held that the sale of one generation 
of seed does not exhaust rights on later generations. A farmer who purchased seed to grow could not 
sow a new crop using the seeds produced by the fist crop - as that, the Court held, would constitute 
making the patented product and not reusing or selling the seed that had been purchased2239. Bowman 
was found to infringe two of Monsanto’s patents because he “made” replicas of Monsanto’s 
genetically modified, herbicide-resistant soybean seeds, by simply planting, cultivating, harvesting, 
saving, and then re-planting the patented seeds. IP rights on self-replicated seeds are thus not 
exhausted by the first authorized sale to a farmer. Seed companies that own the patent rights for 
genetically edited/modified plants may, in conjunction with license agreements, restrict a farmer’s 
use of patented genetically-edited plants, this being also possible when a farmer plants seed that 
                                                          
2238 On the complex economics of parallel trade, see KE Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems – The Global 
Economics of Intellectual property in the 21st Century (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012) 172–188. 
2239 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). 
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contains the patented product. The Court was however careful to limit its holding to Bowman’s 
particular situation, refusing to apply the holding to all cases involving self-replicating technologies 
In a quite interesting recent judgment in Impression Products v Lexmark, the US Supreme Court 
reiterated that the exhaustion doctrine in the US patent law means that when a “patentee sells an item, 
that product is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly and instead becomes the private, 
individual property of the purchaser.”2240 In other words, once a patentee sells patented product, it 
exhausts all of its patent rights in that product and cannot, from a patent law perspective, prohibit the 
future sale or re-use of the patented product. The parties cannot bargain around this rule by specifying 
conditions at the time of sale, even if these are clear. Hence, the rule of first sale (exhaustion) “is not 
merely presumptive, but absolute once a sale of the patented article has occurred”2241. In the case at 
hand, Lexmark wanted to prevent competitors, such as Impression Products, from buying used ink 
cartridges, refurbishing them, and selling them to its printer customer. Its aim was to keep this market 
for itself. The company imposed contractual terms to limit resale of ink cartridges obtained through 
its cartridge Return Program in the US also tried to prevent ink cartridges obtained abroad from being 
resold in the US through claimed patent rights. The practice that Lexmark was attempting to enforce 
amounts to a tying arrangement. The US Supreme Court held that Lexmark could not make a patent 
claim to ban Impression Products from importing in the US and re-selling Lexmark’s toner cartridges 
which it obtained from Lexmark’s customers from abroad and in the US, as having sold outside the 
US exhausts patent rights just as a sale inside the US. According to the Court, once a patented thing 
is sold, conditions imposed on that particular thing, such as an obligation to cannot be enforced via 
patent infringement suits. With this case the Supreme court reinforced the freedoms of device owners 
against the practice of IP holders to expand their power to the after-sales markets for repair and/or 
replacement parts and diagnostic tools. This may relate to “the importance of leaving buyers of goods 
free to compete with each other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods”, which was 
recognised by Justice Breyer in Kirtsaeng2242.  
This more expansive application of the exhaustion doctrine, and the underlying principle of 
protecting the freedom of buyers, may be particularly relevant for agriculture in view of the tendency 
of agricultural machinery companies to argue that the specialised software running tractors and other 
machines bought by farmers is protected by copyright and patent law and that allowing farmer’s 
access to it would harm the companies’ intellectual property rights2243. If agricultural machine 
manufacturers were recognised such a right, farmers would not be able to personalise, modify or 
improve the equipment they purchase. Farmers have reacted to this expansive interpretation of 
copyright and patent law, claiming of their “right to repair”. It was reported that some US States have 
been considering legislation to legalise the right to repair electronics more generally, or tractors and 
other farm equipment, specifically2244. In view of the significance of big data and data analytics in 
“smart agriculture” and the development of the Internet of Things, it is expected that this issue will 
be particularly important and will raise questions as to the scope of the property rights of farmers 
when buying hardware and equipment, including their ability to repair and modify “their” equipment, 
                                                          
2240 Impression Products v. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) 
2241 H. Hovenkamp, Reasonable Patent Exhaustion, (August 22, 2017). Yale J Regulation (2017); U of Penn, Inst for Law 
& Econ Research Paper No. 17-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995751  
2242 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538, 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) 
2243 See, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/kbgzgz/farmers-right-to-repair . 
2244 See, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7nbv/five-states-are-considering-bills-to-legalize-the-right-to-
repair-electronics . 
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and the extent to which the IP rights the companies have on software, through copyright or patent, 
(digital property) may limit the property rights of the farmers on the tangiles (machines, 
equipment)2245. To a certain extent farmers may be thought to compete with the agricultural 
machinery companies in the market for the repair of the products they purchased from them, which 
may raise the possibility that the patent exhaustion could apply in this case, should this expansive 
interpretation of the doctrine prevail.  
There is a great diversity in the exhaustion regimes chosen by various jurisdictions. A major 
distinction concerns between importing and exporting countries,2246 the latter usually adopting the 
international exhaustion regime, as this is more favorable to parallel trade.2247 It is also frequent that 
the exhaustion regime may change over time, or that the choice of policy remains undetermined by 
national legislation, thus leaving it up to national courts to determine what exhaustion rules to apply 
in specific cases.  For instance, in the absence of any provision in the Chinese legislation, Chinese 
courts have generally avoided addressing the question directly.2248 In contrast, Indian law adopts 
international exhaustion for trade-marks, although it provides the trade-mark owner with the 
possibility of opposing parallel imports of trademarked products under limited circumstances, such 
that the conditions of the goods have been changed or impaired after they were put on the market.2249 
The South African Trademarks Act adopts a similar position, stating in § 34 (2) (d) of the Trade 
Marks Act that a trade mark registration is not infringed by ‘the importation into, or distribution, sale 
or offering for sale in the Republic, of goods to which the trade mark has been applied by or with the 
consent of the proprietor’.2250  
 
Table 9: Comparison Exhaustion in BRICS 
 
Exhaustion 
regime 
Brazil Russia India China South 
Africa 
                                                          
2245 For an interesting discussion on this issue, see J.A.T. Fairfield, Owned (Cambridge Univ. press, 2017). 
2246 “Exporting country” is the country out of the market of which a good is exported in parallel and “Importing country” 
is that where a good is imported in parallel. 
2247  .G. Grigoriadis, Trademarks and Free Trade: A Global Analysis (Springer, 2014),, 60. 
2248 See, for instance, the discussion of Chinese law in D. Chow (2011), Exhaustion of Trademarks and Parallel Imports 
in China, (2011) 51(4) Santa Clara Law Review, 1283. 
2249 High Court of Delhi, Kapil Wadhwa & Ors. vs Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd [decided on October 3, 2012], FAO(OS) 
93/2012, where the High Court interpreted Section 30 (3) of the Indian Trade Marks Act 1999 to cover international 
exhaustion. Section 30(4) of the Indian Trademarks Act empowers a brand owner to have parallel imported goods 
declared infringing on the basis of any ‘legitimate reason”. The High Court recognized the wide scope of this exception 
enabling the trade-mark proprietor to oppose parallel imports by noting the following: (para. 68) “[…] it would be relevant 
to note that further dealing in the goods placed in the market under a trademark can be opposed where legitimate reasons 
exist to oppose further dealing and, in particular, where the condition of the goods has been changed or impaired. With 
respect to physical condition being changed or impaired, even in the absence of a statutory provision, the registered 
proprietor of a trademark would have the right to oppose further dealing in those goods inasmuch as they would be the 
same goods improperly so called, or to put it differently, if a physical condition of goods is changed, it would no longer 
be the same goods. But, sub-Section 4 of Section 30 is not restricted to only when the conditions of the goods has been 
changed or impaired after they have been put on the market. The section embraces all legitimate reasons to oppose further 
dealings in the goods. Thus, changing condition or impairment is only a specie of the genus of legitimate reasons, which 
genus embraces other species as well.” 
2250 However, under the Consumer Protection Act, the parallel importer ‘a person who markets any goods that bear a trade 
mark, but have been imported without the approval or licence of the registered owner of that trade mark, must apply a 
conspicuous notice to those goods in the prescribed manner and form.’ See South African Consumer Protection Act, No 
68 of 2008 (s. 25 (2)).    
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International 
Exhaustion 
(General) 
No No Yes Yes No 
Regional 
Exhaustion 
N/A Yes N/A N/A N/A 
National 
exhaustion 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Authors’s compilation of data 
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Chapter 2: Mergers and Product Innovation: Seeds and GM Crops 
 
Pierre Régibeau2251 and Katharine E. Rockett2252 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
One approach attempts generality using formal modelling to draw broad lessons about the link 
between merger and innovation in an effort to define a benchmark position.  This literature has 
generated some useful initial recommendations; however, the models often are incomplete 
descriptions of the relevant features of markets and the merging firms within them, so drawing policy 
advice could be premature.  A clear step forward would be to develop the theory further, but this will 
take time and so does not address current policy challenges.   
A second approach is to argue for the burden of proof to fall on the merging parties as a way 
to summarise the scepticism in the literature without making bold policy moves, while at the same 
time recommending a thorough review of the facts in each case. This is also a useful step, but could 
be made more useful by putting more form on this factual review.  As a first step toward doing this, 
some others have made conceptual recommendations on factors to consider or areas in which 
argumentation would be welcome.  While these contributions are useful, they have remained at a high 
level, moving them a step away from implementation by practioners. This highlights a potential area 
of contribution in this literature that could have a nearer term solution.  
Finally, some have recommended analysis of markets that are alternative to product markets, 
including technology and innovation markets.  Again, this is useful conceptually but the definition of 
these markets can be difficult to pin down.  As before, there is a clear area where development is 
needed in the literature.  
In light of this current state of knowledge on the analysis of mergers and innovation, our paper 
has two main purposes. Firstly, we develop what we hope to be a more “policy-maker friendly” 
typology of the effects of mergers on innovation investments by outlining simple components that 
can be combined into a decision rule. Such an exercise has several benefits: it provides a step by step 
understanding of the many effects at play, makes it possible to distinguish between first and second 
order effects, and finally helps to compare the innovation dimension of mergers to the more 
traditional pricing/output dimension. Having identified the effects at play we are then in a position to 
ask whether there are indeed circumstances where an a priori – rebuttable – presumption about the 
link between mergers and innovation would be justified.   
Our second objective is to use this typology of effects in order to better understand the 
innovation dimension of mergers in the GM/seed industry as a specific case of interest. This industry 
has a concentrated core, which makes it a potentially fertile ground to investigate mergers that could 
be of concern to competition authorities.  It is without question an important contributor to the BRIC 
economies, which are a focus of the work in this volume.  The industry and the recent mergers within 
it share special features that make it a nice counter-point to the theoretical models that have been 
proposed as generalizable to mergers: to the extent that this industry provides special features, we 
would want to allow for any policy recommendations to take those into account in any merger 
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analysis to be undertaken.  These features include a heavy regulatory framework that leads to 
economies of scale and scope in GM applications but also a natural synergy between chemical and 
GM innovations that could bias the choice of applications to fall in specific areas.  This means that 
the diversity in applications that could result from the economies of scope at the regulatory level may 
not emerge.  To the extent that the BRIC countries could benefit from some of the more far-flung 
applications, these two features may not overall be beneficial to BRIC economies.  To the extent that 
merger would be justified, then, by the economies at the regulatory (or marketing level), the 
complementarity may work in the opposite direction.  Second, there is also a natural complementarity 
in seeds production as germplasm is an important “stock” from which innovations flow.  This 
generates a natural vertical linkage that can also affect innovation production in terms of volume and 
application.   
The Chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 reviews the economic literature very briefly.  
In fact, the literature is huge, so this is a highly selective treatment.  The overall message, however, 
should be to communicate the early nature of the theoretical results, some of the measurement issues 
that dog this area of work and increase the ambiguity of its recommendations, and the typologies that 
have been put forward before to address policy making in the face of this ambiguity.  Section 3 
proposes our typology and then we develop an algorithm in Section 4 to create a clear decision 
framework to approach merger and innovation.  Section 5 examines patent data in the GM food sector 
and discusses the special features of this industry.  Section 6 concludes and outlines next steps in this 
evolving area of work.   
 
2.2.Review of the economic literature  
 
2.2.1. Competition Policy and Innovation 
 
This Chapter takes as a starting point that the uses of intellectual property is a valid area to 
which to apply competition policy analysis.  We have developed this point elsewhere: while 
intellectual property may generate stronger externalities than some other types of property, the tool 
of intellectual property rights provides a forum for addressing these externalities and does so by its 
unique rights design.  This design anticipates, clearly, that intellectual property rights have the 
potential to be profitable and so allow their creators to recoup their investment.  At the same time, 
the specifics of the design can, and have, adjusted in response to changes in this anticipated return 
for a variety of reasons, including regulatory reasons.  In this light, there is no need for any strong 
exception to be made in competition policy for intellectual property2253. 
This does not give much guidance, however, in light of the fact that competition policy 
certainly affects innovation incentives and innovation can be of benefit to final consumers.  Hence, 
the interaction of competition policy and innovation is an important area to understand and 
incorporate into policy design.  Ideally, to be most efficient, any tool that affects innovation incentives 
should act only in the case where innovation occurs.  It is not clear, however, that competition policy 
is well adapted to do this, as it often affects both the pre- and post- innovation settings of a firm: if 
firms are allowed to merge, the merged entity will be present in the pre-innovation state and the post-
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development of this argument, see Regibeau and Rockett (2007).   
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innovation state and will be subject to any requirements of competition policy in both states equally.  
This could be good for innovation incentives if the policy means that the firm will appropriate more 
of the gains to any innovation that follows, but bad if it means that the firm has a more protected and 
profitable position in the absence of innovation.       
Competition clearly needs to work hand in hand with other innovation oriented policies, such 
as intellectual property protection so that it does not negate but instead reinforces the potential 
appropriability or other benefits that these sister policies afford.  Hence, the set of policies must work 
together to guarantee an outcome that will incentivise innovation.  The most recent revision of the 
US horizontal guidelines (2010) and the equivalent EC Merger Regulations (2004) also require 
innovation effects to be included in the potential set of harms 2254 but does not provide further tools 
to diagnose when this will be the case.  Hence, the precise nature of the innovation-merger interface 
is a live competition policy issue.  We need to keep in mind that while this paper and much of the 
discussion of the innovation-merger link focuses on mergers and competition policy, this occurs in 
the context of an overall regulatory, legal, and institutional structure that also affects innovation – 
sometimes more directly - and interacts with the merged firm as well.   
We then move on to an issue that has received a great deal of attention: the relation between 
market structure and innovation, but which is not necessarily directly relevant to the analysis of 
mergers since merger involve the analysis of combinations of entities rather than simple changes in 
concentration, ie changes in the number of potentially identical entities.  We then consider mergers 
more specifically, observing that a series of approaches have been attempted to capture what policy 
makers need to know about the role of mergers in innovation incentives and innovation ability.  This 
includes work that recommends that the facts of each merger need to be reviewed on a case by case 
basis but with some distribution of the burden of proof; work that develops simple theoretical 
benchmarks  as a starting point to create a benchmark position for policy-makers; and work that 
advocates some concepts to guide the analysis of innovation incentives and effects but does not 
necessarily go far enough to provide an accessible guide.  Whatever system is advocated based on 
the current state of debate needs to be readily understandable by a wide variety of professionals 
involved in mergers.  For this it needs to be simple, in keeping with the historical philosophy and 
approach of competition analysis, and applicable as a decision-making methodology.  We attempt a 
move in this direction after setting the scene in this literature review.  
    
2.2.2. Innovation and Market Structure 
 
One way to approach the question of whether merger increases or decreases innovation incentives is 
to look at the relation between market structure and innovation, where attempts have been made to 
find the “optimal” degree of concentration to generate high levels of innovation.  Changes in 
concentration are not, of course, the same as a merger since changes in concentration in these models 
amount to a change in the number of competitors while a merger transforms the merging firms.  At 
the same time, much of the debate on merger and innovation has taken concentration and innovation 
as a starting point in the same way as one might take the tools of market structure analysis in terms 
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of price and quantity effects to raise questions about whether a merger concentrates an industry 
excessively according to basic concentration measures.  We begin, then, with a review of the main 
findings of this literature, including a nod to its long history going back to the mid-twentieth century.    
The controversy about which market structure generates the most innovation traces its roots 
back to the work of Joseph Schumpeter (1942), who postulated that, the large firm operating in a 
concentrated market is “the most powerful engine of progress and…long run expansion of output…”.  
He suggested that the superiority of the large firm over the “atomistic” firm was due to a combination 
of several factors: the need for at least a transient profit gain to create a return to the investment in 
innovation; the reduction in uncertainty that can accrue to a firm that dominates its market and so 
need not take into account rivals’ strategic behaviour; and the relative lack of financial constraints of 
large firms.  While this view set the static efficiency losses of concentration against dynamic 
efficiency gains of concentration, early estimates in the mid-twentieth century suggested that these 
static efficiency losses were relatively small compared to the longer term gains from innovation in 
economic growth2255. This work also paved the way for innovation effects to be an argument for 
concentration, which ran against anti-trust orthodoxy of the time.  More precisely, the market 
structure that may generate the greatest consumer gains in terms of prices and output may not be the 
one that generate greatest gains in product quality or “new things”.     
The results of the literature on innovation and market structure are not so clear cut, however.  
First, it is not always clear whether concentrated markets themselves affect innovation or whether the 
larger firms that often are associated with such markets are the root cause of any benefits. Indeed, 
empirical work attempting to verify that innovation increases more than proportionately with firm 
size has been inconclusive2256 so that the size-innovation linkage is unclear. Early work on whether 
innovation increased with market concentration was no more definitive as the relation appeared to be 
non-linear with moderate concentration levels being optimal (Scherer, 1967).  
One issue bedevilling any progress was how innovation should be measured.  Output based 
measures such as patent counts risk over-counting relatively insignificant innovations unless weights 
are applied to attempt to correct for this while input based measures such as R&D personnel and 
R&D expenditures risk measuring effort rather than what society presumably cares about, which is 
results.  Work by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) suggests that many of the indexes to measure 
innovation are related, but there are many qualifications to this and the performance varies across 
field2257.  A second measurement issue was how to address endogeneity: does size generate 
innovativeness or do more innovative firms tend to grow?  Does concentration generate 
innovativeness, or does innovation result in growth by innovators and exit by those who cannot keep 
up?  More recent techniques in econometric analysis have helped to address this, but have not been 
able to generate a definitive answer2258.   
                                                          
2255 See Harberger 1954, and Cowling and Mueller, 1978, although more recently critiqued by Aidt and Hillman 2008. 
2256 See for example, Cohen (2010) and Katz and Shelanski (2007) for references on this and discussion.  
2257 Citations-weighted patents perform relatively well in their work.  See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) for careful 
and insightful analysis.   
2258 See Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013) for a recent contribution that maps out some of the challenges of endogeneity 
in the relation between research and development activities and productivity of firms, which is one outcome of innovation 
advances.  References contained in this paper include many other important works that have generated advances on 
isolating causation.  For an alternative treatment of endogeneity see Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) and references 
therein.   
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Finally, the simple rate of innovation may not tell the entire story: Cohen (2010) finds that the 
type of innovation tends to differ across larger and smaller firms with larger firms conducting more 
process and incremental innovation whereas smaller firms conduct more product innovation.  To the 
extent that both types of innovation are necessary to progress consumer surplus in the longer run, it 
is not the size of a single firm but its size as part of the overall mix in the industry that matters to 
consumer welfare.  To the extent that industries with moderate concentration levels tend to include a 
mix of firm sizes, it is not clear what precise control variable – size or concentration – is generating 
the favourable innovation results.   
The ambiguity in the link between market structure and innovation can be traced back to the 
theoretical ambiguity of two effects that influence innovativeness in opposite directions, and which 
are rooted in the discussions that Schumpeter’s work engendered.  On the one hand, a larger firm 
tends to “replace its own profits” when it innovates.  A firm that cannibalises an existing highly 
profitable position by replacing its products by better versions of the same has little to gain, net, from 
its innovative activity compared to a firm that enters “de novo” in the industry.  This “replacement 
effect” can suggest that more concentrated markets would have lower levels of innovation.  Arrow 
(1962) formalised the argument, using the example of a process innovation that lowered marginal 
cost to argue that a competitive market would generate little profit to a non-innovative firm but that 
an innovator can effectively use the price of non-innovative rivals as a “price umbrella” that it can 
undercut slightly while retaining high sales and a healthy margin.  This could be called an “efficiency 
effect” that drives innovation as opposed to a “replacement effect” that could stall it.  Together, 
replacement and efficiency effects suggest that more competitive product market structures should 
generate more innovation.   
On the other hand, a second effect argues in the opposite direction.  A firm that is already 
dominant has a strong incentive to maintain that dominance and the profits it generates, rather than 
allow entry that could potentially make the industry more competitive.  Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 
point out that when a firm is facing a potential challenge to its dominance by an outsider, the “insider” 
firm maintaining its dominance has more to lose than a challenger has to gain by coming into the 
industry.  This is because the challenger would be entering an already contested market while the 
insider would be defending a market that is not currently contested.  This “strategic effect” means 
that an existing dominant firm would have a greater incentive than a challenger to innovate2259: 
dominance, not competition, engenders innovation.   
The incentive to “escape competition” and the effect of “establishing or defending 
dominance” by innovating were combined in a classic paper by Aghion et al (2005).  This paper 
assumes a very particular balance of these effects to obtain the result that the relation between 
concentration and innovation follows the shape of an “inverted U”, that was found in earlier empirical 
results.  It is worthwhile detailing this paper, as it should be clear what a fine balance it strikes in 
order to generate the theory that allows us to interpret the contention that moderate concentration 
levels and innovation go hand in hand.   
Aghion and co-authors assume that innovation takes a specific form: it must be “step by step”, 
for example slowly chipping away at the marginal cost of producing output.  This means that 
                                                          
2259 See Tirole (1997) for an outline of these effects.  Vickers (1985) presents a theoretical model of “leapfrogging” 
behaviour and “increasing lead” behaviour in various industry settings that investigates the strategic incentive for a leader 
to maintain a lead, finding that the type of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) matters to the answer.  Schmutzer (2013) 
revisits this issue in recent two-stage work.   
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innovators cannot “leap ahead” with a drastic innovation but instead must draw even with competitors 
before drawing ahead with a series of incremental innovations.  Imitation, at the same time, is 
assumed to be ready enough that followers are at most one step behind at any time: the lead can never 
become overwhelming.  As such, it assumes a particular intellectual property rights regime and a 
particular type of innovative “technology”.  Finally, it is assumed that the profitability of a firm 
depends solely on its lead: a firm that draws even with a competitor may earn more than a firm that 
is behind, but a leader earns more than a firm that has drawn even.  All of these assumptions are 
important to generating the final result of an inverted U relationship between innovation and market 
structure. Indeed, Gilbert (2006), discussing the theoretical literature on the link between competition 
and innovation, points out that the relationship is complex and depends on many factors.  As one 
varies these factors, the conclusions change.  He sums this up by saying that it is not so much that we 
don’t know what the linkage is between competition and innovation but rather that we have a plethora 
of models that emphasise different environments and that environment is, in fact, important to the 
way the linkage works overall.   
Despite this fine balance in Aghion’s work, then, he and coauthors manage to capture many 
of the threads of the competition and innovation literature in a single setting that is internally 
consistent and yields empirical results that tend to be robust to some degree.  The incentives for the 
two innovative effects: escaping competition and catching up to a leader (or maintaining a lead) 
depend on the level of “competition” in the industry, which translates roughly to the intensity of 
rivalry in the “head to head” state where firms draw even.  As competition rises, innovation comes 
mainly from the incentive to escape this intense head to head competition; as competitive rivalry falls, 
innovation is increasingly generated by followers attempting to earn greater profits by moving toward 
a head-to-head state (which is profitable if rivalry is not too intense).  Because both low and high 
competition industries generate innovation, albeit for different reasons, it is unclear which degree of 
rivalry dominates overall in generating innovative output.  Indeed, the most innovative industry in 
this model is an intermediate structure.  A nice feature of the theoretical analysis is that it separates 
out the effects of the intensity of rivalry from the product market structure2260.  The model also allows 
rivalry to act as both a spur for innovation and a brake, as it can discourage laggards as well as force 
head to head firms to surge forward.   
The paper verifies these results empirically on UK data from 1968-1997 drawing an analogy 
between product market competition and rivalry, albeit at the 2-digit SIC code level, with citation-
weighted patents as the index of innovative output, noting that different industries have different 
“sweet spots” in concentration levels.  On some level, their empirical result has been verified in a 
wide number of settings since the publication of this work and using a wide number of techniques2261 
At the same time, the exact “peak” of the inverted U varies across industries and across time, which 
makes it difficult to implement except in extreme situations of monopoly or very close to monopoly.  
If this is the case, then while it does an excellent job at isolating underlying behavioural drivers, it 
stops short of giving a well-defined policy direction: a relationship between competition and 
innovation that changes direction from positive to negative at some point, but where that point is not 
well defined, is a significant step away from policy.  
                                                          
2260 As has been noted by others, the intensity of competition is not synonymous with product market structure and so 
should not be treated so (Gilbert, 2006).   
2261 See Aghion et al (2015) for a review of the recent literature.   
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Even on its own terms, it also leaves other questions unanswered, some of which have been 
address elsewhere at least in part.  The first and most vexing is whether, as a general issue, 
maximising innovation rates is what is best socially.  Indeed, there is no theoretical clarity on whether 
private incentives to innovate are too low or too high socially without intervention.  A firm that 
innovates “steals business” from a rival.  This means that the private sector will have excessive 
incentives to innovate from a social perspective since society should not care which particular firm 
innovates – what matters is that consumers have access to an improved product or service regardless 
of source.  From the firm’s perspective, however, it matters very much whether it – or a rival – 
receives that business and so the business stealing effect is a wedge between private firm incentives 
and social incentives for innovation.  On the other hand, it is also the case that any innovation 
produces some surplus that is not fully captured by the firm in the form of spillovers to other firms 
or simply generating value for consumers that is not fully incorporated into price (“consumer 
surplus”).  Hence, private incentives to innovate may be too low (because firms do not capture the 
full value of their innovations) or too high (because firms innovate to steal business from each other) 
compared to the social optimum.  Without firm guidance on where innovation rates are compared to 
the social optimum, we cannot use the “inverted U” result as a complete guide on where we would 
“prefer” industry rivalry to be.  As an empirical issue, Bloom et al (2013) address this in a recent 
paper.  In their careful analysis, positive spillovers from innovation dominate, so that their view is 
that the private incentives to innovate are socially insufficient overall.  They qualify this by noting 
that smaller and larger firms do not fall at the same point on the trade-off, since smaller firms tend to 
produce niche products, which tend to produce smaller spillovers.     
The second question is that while Aghion et al’s argument is compelling, it is not the only 
explanation for why innovation rates might be highest at moderate concentration levels.  As was 
mentioned above, Gilbert (2006) points to a number of other confounding factors that can be present 
in any particular case and it is not clear that the controls in the “inverted U” literature have adequately 
taken these concerns into account.  For example, Darwinian effects have been pointed to by Lee 
(2005, 2009) and are not an emphasis here. Recent work has gone farther to examine the role of 
management practices in differences in productivity across firms2262 and resulting industry 
productivity levels of survivors from “Darwinian selection”, but again are not really addressed here. 
If the observed changed in rivalry in an industry has come about due to a reduction in regulation, is 
a high innovation rate due to a loosening of past constraints or due to the level of rivalry?  Is it because 
moderate levels of rivalry tend to be associated with a mix of firm sizes?  To the extent that differently 
sized firms might create different types of innovation, is it this mixture that is really behind the 
results? In short, the model does what models do well: they simplify the problem to isolate the role 
of certain effects and then observe the role of those effects in a general setting.  When we move to 
decisions on specific cases, however, we need to aggregate all the effects into a decision that is suited 
to the specifics of the case at hand. While the controls are very careful in this empirical tradition, the 
interpretation the results for the purposes of deciding specific cases are unclear since they attempt 
something different: they attempt general behavioural truths.  A step needs to be made to clarify how 
the general translates to the specific.  As we noted above, the results do not lead to a well defined 
policy position for the bulk of cases. 
                                                          
2262 See Kortum and Lerner 1997, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Aghion et al (2013), Bloom (2010) and Bloom et al 
(2015) for example.  The measurement of management practices is very difficult, as this literature emphasises, so the 
results are still evolving rapidly in this area.   
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2.2.3. Innovation and Mergers 
 
2.2.3.1.Moving from Market Structure to Merger: 
 
As we have noted, while the preceding literature can be relevant to the discussion, it is not definitive.  
First, an “inverted U” empirical relation between market structure as a proxy for rivalry and 
innovation, relies for its theoretical justification on a specific balance of forces.  Second, the empirical 
work points to industry-specific effects that significantly affect the balance of effects.  Third, the 
nature of innovation that will be generated is clear as is its market effect in this theoretical framework: 
a merger of interest may instead involve only roughly defined ideas of exactly what the nature of 
future innovations will be and how they will affect existing or future product markets2263.     
Fourth, and most importantly merger is not the same as a change in market structure (although 
it may accompany one) and merger policy is not the same as changes in concentration.  This point 
was made by Whinston in his 2012 discussion of the Shapiro (2012) contribution that we will focus 
on here.  Whinston illustrates his argument by quoting his own work with Segal (2007), where he 
notes that while primitives (such as the elasticity of demand) make a large difference to the “Aghion 
style” of analysis, one would be mistaken to modify competition policy to reinforce these primitives.  
Instead, modelling merger itself and how it works provides targeted answers to the question of how 
merger should be handled that can be more definitive.   
The specific framework in which merger occurs can narrow down the analysis, which can in 
turn yield more definitive answers.  Merger involves a specific approval framework that allows tools, 
including remedies, that are not included in the theory we have presented; it involves options to 
promote innovation that need to be considered in comparison to or possibly in conjunction with 
merger (such as cross licensing or research joint ventures), it involves a change in management that 
can have important positive or negative effects on the merged parties’ innovation rates; it involves a 
change in size of the resulting firm; it involves entry effects and possibly other effects not mentioned 
here.  While the relation between market structure and innovation might be a good starting point, 
then, it is only a starting point.  To make a judgement about how merger and innovation interact, we 
need to go farther, to delve into the precise issues involved in mergers rather than industry 
concentration.  This does not mean that precise way these mergers are evaluated do not depend on 
market structure or other situational “triggers”.  Katz and Shelanski (2007) suggest, for example, that 
the burden of proof might shift to show that merger would or would not have positive innovation 
effects depending on market structure considerations.  One must recognise, however, that the 
“inverted U” literature does not provide a strong guide to this since the position of the “peak” of the 
inverted U is unclear across industries and circumstances.  Finally, the possibility of remedies means 
that the choice set of policy makers may be considerably wider than to simply “allow or not allow” a 
merger: remedies allow for merger to be allowed under certain conditions.  This enriches the set of 
                                                          
2263 The literal effect of merger in the Aghion et al model is to shut down innovation completely.  This follows from 
design features of the model that allow for a “clean” presentation but illustrate that the application to merger of the 
framework is not straightforward.  In other matters related to this discussion, Segal and Whinston (2007) study a model 
of “exchanges of leadership” through innovation, finding that the presence of an entrant serves as a spur for innovation.  
This paper suggests that exclusionary practices can harm innovation, a point reinforced by Raskovich and Miller (2010).   
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possibilities to be considered.  All of these point to the need of analysis that is more tailored to the 
issue of merger per se.  
 
2.2.3.2.Formal modelling of Merger and Innovation: First Steps 
 
We have said that the literature linking innovation and market structure does not give much guidance 
both because of the nature of its results and the fact that they are not well linked to the nature of 
merger as a combination of firms, even though one could consider pursuing the possibility of market 
structure triggers.  A more targeted approach needs to be considered.  One way forward would be to 
use a case by case analysis of the facts with each case simply treated as unique.  It would be helpful, 
however, to have more definitive red lines that could allow authorities to decide on a limited set of 
issues for which to request fact-based analysis or have some overarching rules.  This could also allow 
for more certainty for the merging parties and could reduce the cost of the cases for authorities and 
parties alike.  
Two recent papers have attempted formal modelling to address the merger and innovation per 
se, both of which emphasise that internalising externalities is the essence of the merger’s effect on 
innovation2264. This allows the papers to address squarely the combination effect of mergers rather 
than rely on market structure to address merger indirectly.  Federico, Langus and Valetti, (2017a, 
2017b), points out that when firms combine, they coordinate prices (ie, internalise a negative pricing 
externality), which raises innovation incentives (all else equal) by improving overall profitability2265. 
The merger also allows the firms to internalise negative innovation externalities by internalising what 
would otherwise be a business stealing effect (in both innovative and non-innovative states). This can 
lower innovation rates for the entire industry if the concentration levels are already relatively high 
since business stealing has a powerful effect in their specification (for example, if the firms are in 
highly substitutable product areas).  In a similar vein, Motta and Tarantino (2016) examine an 
industry where prices and investments are two choice variables, finding that mergers that are 
profitable generally are not good for consumer surplus.  The paper has a similar “feel” in that it 
emphasises the role of mergers in internalising a (negative) pricing and a business stealing innovation 
externality, although the modelling of R&D differs from stochastic to deterministic.  Their model 
also includes regularity assumptions on the reactions of non-merging competitors that guarantee that 
the direction of travel for the merging firm is the same as the industry as a whole, which means that 
merger decreases both the merging entity’s innovation and that of the industry as a whole.  While this 
result becomes ambiguous under modest changes to the model (such as sequential rather than 
simultaneous setting of prices and investment or quality improvement rather than cost reductions) 
they can show that the result does survive for set of specific function forms.  
As a stylised models, both approaches contribute an outline of underlying effects that could 
inform a set of considerations that could give form to an approach that goes beyond case-by-case 
analysis.  Indeed the three concepts behind these works two of which, innovation competition and 
product market competition, are outlined above and a third, appropriability conditions, which is 
included but analysed only secondarily in these papers, are used to organise the economics literature 
                                                          
2264 Earlier related models include Yi (1999), Kleer (2012), and Ishida et al (2011).  These are not as general as the 
frameworks discussed here.    
2265 They qualify this by noting that since the price coordination occurs both before and after the innovation, the effect is 
not obvious a priori where the markets of the merging firms are linked.  
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in Annex 4 of the European Commission’s recent Dow-Dupont decision2266. The actual analysis of 
the merger’s effect on innovation carries on after this enumeration of general considerations to focus 
more on specific issues that were raised in the course of the arguments.   
The paper by Federico et al (2017) can be viewed as an illustration of how these three general 
considerations can work together in a specific framework to draw a conclusion, but equally shows 
that the way these are drawn together is crucial to the result.  This is also clear from earlier synthesis 
work, such as that of Gilbert (2006).  Our synthesis treatment includes these considerations, but nests 
them within a methodology as a guide to decision making. We also disaggregate the general concepts 
to allow for more straightforward and targeted measurement.  We detail our arguments below.    
Haucap and Stiebale (2016) add empirical work to a theoretical model of merger.  They begin 
by noting that the effect of merger on the innovation of non-merging firms is not, in fact, mentioned 
as a consideration in the US horizontal merger guidelines.  This is an important issue, and is certainly 
not the spirit of the two theoretical contributions we have just mentioned.  It is worthwhile to 
underline, as Haucap and Steibale do, that the effect on the entire industry is potentially the salient 
point for overall consumer welfare.  In their empirical work, they study a sample of recent European 
pharmaceutical cases, finding that merger tends to be accompanied with a secular decline in 
innovation.  This can lend some empirical support to these  relatively stark theoretical models that 
generate an unambiguously negative result for merger’s overall innovative effect.   
If we use Haucap and Steibale’s empirical work to justify these approaches, the difficulty is 
that the empirics are based on an industry with very long lead times so that diagnosing innovation 
effects of merger is fraught: getting the lag structure right is crucial, as the observed reduction in 
innovation could have been the reason for the mergers in the first place.  Furthermore, the term 
necessary to observe long term effects does not necessarily elapse in their observation set.  Overall, 
while the Haucap and Steibale work is careful, using state of the art difference-in-differences 
technology, it is not clear that this technique solves the problem of establishing the correct lag 
structure.  For example, the merging firms may be precisely those susceptible to weakness in an 
environment with changing research technology, as was present in the 1990s and 2000s in this 
industry.    
From a purely theoretical viewpoint, the models are very restrictive.  As in the Aghion et al 
paper, innovation is incremental not transformative.  Entry and exit do not occur so Darwinian effects 
will not tend to be present.  Neither is fully dynamic.  These models are, then, first steps at organising 
ideas in this sense: they may be good models for some innovative situations but are not general 
enough to be a full guide to policy.  Furthermore, if one were to use them as a guide in certain cases, 
there are some pressing concerns.  First, innovation is taken as given in these models within the 
timeframe with no exit and no postponement.  If innovation considerations are likely to make merger 
approval harder as matter of policy, then postponement or exit as a prelude to merger could become 
likely.  Second the competitive environment in these models is quite specific and, as the Motta and 
Tarantino extensions suggest, they do not necessarily generalise.  One has to be conscious of “doing 
no harm” when applying such stylised frameworks.   It is for this reason that we take a modified 
approach to generating guidance, below.   
Katz and Shelanski (2007) review the literature and find as we do that there is ambiguity in 
the recommendations or that the results are too early for implementation.  In the face of this, they 
                                                          
2266 See European Commission (2017). 
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suggest that merger policy adopt a generally neutral stance toward innovation (except in the extreme 
case of merger to monopoly) and instead conduct a case-by-case review.  Such a case-by-case 
approach would allow cases that have not yet been treated, such as drastic changes in the structure of 
the industry due to merger-induced changes in innovation, to be taken into account.  As they point 
out, pre-merger market shares may be completely irrelevant post-merger if such innovation occurs 
and may, indeed, be the reason the merger has been proposed in the first place.  At the same time, the 
case-by-case review would normally need some guidance so that each case can be decided.  In this 
sense, one would like to go farther to establish from the literature how to approach a case, even if 
each is viewed as unique.  There is a thin line between this approach and the formal but restrictive 
models we reviewed above, and we attempt in our framework, below, to tread this line.      
 
2.2.3.3.The Impact of the Conditions of Merger 
 
The literature has pointed out some specific pitfalls in the analysis of mergers, and these could 
perhaps serve as a guide to decision-making.  One is that the effects that Schumpeter originally quoted 
in favour of innovation by large firms need not operate for large firms that are created by mergers.  
Some mergers severely restrict liquidity and so could mean that even though the firm is larger, it is 
not necessarily more liquid or generally financially stronger.  Hence, Schumpeter takes firm size as 
initially given, and not the method by which is it achieved.  Indeed, Aghion et al (2005) stand this 
argument on its head by arguing that the threat of bankruptcy that could be present in a merger that 
takes on a great deal of debt.  They argue that this could be a significant stimulus for innovation.  This 
is supported also by Hall’s (1990) earlier work that suggests that the method of financing an 
acquisition has more to do with the innovative outcomes than the fact of acquisition itself.   
Katz and Shelanski (2007) point out that the institutional setting matters2267.  This is clear from the 
Aghion et al (2005) paper, where imitation possibilities affect the balance of innovation 
incentives: a firm can only be “so far” ahead in their framework and this matters to the results.  As a 
result, the intellectual property regime, the legal framework for licensing agreements, and other 
technology policy can matter to how we approach mergers.  As shown by Aghion et al (2015), and 
again following in the inverted U tradition, strong patent rights can be complementary to a 
competitive product market structure in driving innovation in a step-by-step innovation as described 
above: the strong protection increases the duration of the rents a firm earns by escaping competition 
and so improves innovation in this case2268.  Indeed, the “escape competition” possibility is what 
allows their model to have a complementarity link whereas earlier work of Romer (1990) and Aghion 
and Howitt(1992) showed what appeared to be the opposite.   
Institutions and regulation can also allow firms ample opportunities to combine innovative 
efforts without merger.  If this is the case it may be less crucial that mergers accommodate innovation: 
other techniques such as research joint ventures or cross licensing can be accessed to generate the 
                                                          
2267 While we focus on patents as the relevant setting here, the argument can be made much more broadly.  See for 
example, the work of Griffith and co-authors (2010) evaluating a swathe of product market reforms their effect on the 
profitability of innovation and productivity growth.  Overall, she finds that reforms that put pressure on profitability tend 
to be associated with a positive innovation effect.   
2268 The paper presents their work as a way to reconcile the relatively ambiguous results on the link between the strength 
of patent protection and innovative activity overall with the theoretical justification of the incentive effect of temporary 
profits to spur innovation.  See comments by Lerner (2009).  The linkage between innovation and growth is discussed 
with references in Aghion et al (2015).  
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innovation gains that a full merger might also generate without necessarily changing firm structure 
or the attendant pricing incentives.  Indeed, Motta and Tarantino (2016) explicitly compare merger 
to other combinations that fall short of merger in their formal treatment.  Finally, verification matters: 
even if there are potential innovation gains from a merger, if these gains are not readily verifiable it 
is unclear to what extent this can reasonably be taken into account in any decision regarding the 
merger.   
 
2.2.3.4.The Ambiguous Results of the Empirical Work on Merger and Innovation 
 
In empirical work studying mergers and innovation specifically, generally merger and innovation are 
not highly related empirically at a general level: individual variation in circumstance seems more 
salient than the overall effect and the empirical results tend to vary by study2269.  The style of the 
studies that address this question differ a lot and the differences in technique may be related to the 
different answers.   
To select just a few to outline the range of relationships that have been found between 
innovation and merger, Gautam and Katila (2001) in a study of acquisitions in the chemical industry, 
find that increasing size of the acquiring firm’s knowledge base is positive for innovation while 
increasing size of the acquired firm’s knowledge base is overall a negative, making not so much size 
but size plus the role in the acquisition play a key role.  Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) find ambiguous 
results that vary by industry, by whether the merger is cross-border or not, and overall show little 
effect of merger on R&D2270.  Orgnaghi (2009), Szucs (2014), and Haucap and Steibale (2016) are 
generally negative on the effect of merger on innovation, with the last of these papers focussing on 
the effect on the entire industry and not just the merging firms.  Cassiman et al (2005) find that the 
effects on innovation depend on whether the merging firms possess complementary or substitute 
technologies with greater gains for complements and when the firms are not product market rivals.2271 
More recent work by Entezarkheir and Moshiri (2017) on a panel of publicly-traded US firms from 
1980-2003 find a positive relation between merger and innovation but find significant cross-industry 
variation.   
As a general comment on this literature, the timeframe of analysis often is quite short, often 
only a few years.  It is not clear that one would see significant innovation effects, at least in innovation 
outputs, over such a short period and certainly not in certain industries such as pharmaceuticals where 
lead times are very long.   
The issue of appropriate timeframe is particularly concerning when the amount of disruption 
associated with the process of merger itself may affect innovation and may do so more in precisely 
the cases where the potential gains are greatest.  For example, in older work Hitt, Hoskissen et al 
(1991) find that mergers of firms that are not product market rivals may have worse “integration” 
                                                          
2269 See Veugelers (2006) for a literature review emphasising the role of differences and individual circumstance in driving 
the results of merger and innovation empirically.   
2270 Bertrand et al (2007) expands on this argument with a focus on affiliates.  Steibale and Reize (2011) expand on the 
issue of where innovation is affected (acquirer/acquiree) in the FDI context.  
2271 Other papers showing that “fit” matters include Gautam and Katila 2001 and Cassiman et al 2005. While the last 
result of Cassiman and co-authors seems helpful, this is not clear: socially speaking redundant R&D efforts are not a 
benefit.  If firms with substitute technologs and who are product market rivals and therefore reduce their redundant R&D, 
this can be a social positive.  As pointed out by Katz and Shelanski (2007), however, it may still be best for consumers 
to have even redundant R&D go forward unless the expense is such that the firm elects not to pursue R&D effort at all.   
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effects on innovation than mergers among product market rivals2272  In related empirical work, Hall 
(1990) also finds results indicating that there is a “learning” benefit to a vigourous merger strategy: 
some firms with a high propensity to merge appear to perform better on research measures than those 
who have a lower propensity to merge.  In other words, we should consider when we evaluate effects 
how good a firm is at executing mergers and choosing merger partners.     
 
2.2.3.5.Which market should competition policy be concerned about? 
 
The market structure literature relates product market structure to the incentives to innovate.  On the 
other hand, it has been proposed that one way to incorporate innovation into merger concerns is to 
evaluate “innovation markets” and evaluate the effect of a change in concentration in those markets.    
There are several problems with using innovation market structure as a way of judging the innovation 
incentives of a merger.  First, defining an innovation market can be challenging: potential competitors 
in an innovation market may not be those who currently are active in that market, as defined by 
production of existing patent or other innovative output measures.  In other words, the most dangerous 
potential rival may be one who has an excellent idea, but who has not even put it into practice.  In 
this sense, the definition of competitors in an innovation market may be much harder than the 
definition of the relevant competitors in a product market.  Innovation market considerations can 
then, if nothing else, introduce uncertainty into the merger review process that could create 
difficulties of its own for users.  
Second, even if one could define the innovation markets unambiguously, the literature on the 
link between innovation market structure and innovation rates does not deliver robust predictions.  
The structure of theoretical models is that of “R&D races”.  Such races are quite technical to analyse, 
and generating predictions often involves quite specific assumptions about competitors, the 
“technology” by which innovations are obtained by the racing parties, the information available to 
them on the progress of competitors towards innovative output, distance to technological frontier and 
other elements2273. The results are sensitive to these assumptions, but the precise conditions of real 
R&D “races” are likely to diverge from those chosen in models that have been published.  This 
suggests that bespoke modelling would need to be undertaken to know how particular innovation 
markets are affected by merger.  It may also be the case that particular innovations would not be 
affected in the same way: at the very least, the information available on competitor progress is likely 
to differ across technologies and across time2274.   
 
2.2.4. Approaching Merger and Innovation with Some Key Principles 
 
                                                          
2272 Ernst and Vitt, 2000, show in case studies that key innovators often leave firms upon merger, R&D Management – 
but Healy, Papelu and Ruback 1992 do not find this.   
2273 See Harris and Vickers (1987) for a theoretical treatment of the differential behaviour of leaders and followers in a 
patent “race”.  More recent work, referenced in part in Aghion et al (2015), discussed differences in behaviour. across 
leaders and followers in the context of distance from a technological frontier.   
2274 Katz and Shelanski (2007) discuss the difficulties of defining a market where innovation is present in some depth, 
critiquing using predicted price movements as a method because of the difficulty of comparing price movements in future 
– let alone products - in an innovative environment to price movements and product substitution possibilities today.  This 
is clearly particularly serious where innovation is “disruptive” rather than incremental as in the Aghion et al framework.  
They also discuss the merits of evaluating “technology markets” separate from “product markets”.   
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Two pieces have attempted to tread the same line as we do between the formalism but specificity of 
the theoretical treatments the mild but perhaps not sufficiently directive neutral recommendation of 
Katz and Shelanski.   
Baker (2007) has gleaned four key principles from the state of the literature to consider in 
evaluating the effect of any proposed merger on innovation, which are summarised in Shapiro’s 
(2012) review: (1) competition among firms seeking to develop the same new product or process 
encourages innovation; (2) competition among firms producing an existing product encourages them 
to find ways to lower their costs or improve their products; (3) firms that expect to face more product 
market competition after innovating have less incentive to invest in R&D; and; (4) a firm will have 
an extra incentive to innovate if doing so discourages its rivals from investing in R&D.   
These are reasonable, but not the only rules one could propose.  Shapiro (2013) goes on, for example, 
to propose some rules of his own: to wit that analysis should be organised around three concepts: (1) 
contestability, ie the prospect of gaining or protecting profitable sales by providing greater value to 
customers, spurs innovation; (2) appropriability, the ability to capture the social benefits to innovative 
effort, spurs innovation; and (3) synergies, a combination of complementary assets that enhances 
innovation capabilities, can spur innovation.  Shapiro links these general concepts to the work we 
have reviewed above in some detail, making the point that competition is often a misleading concept 
to use in evaluating innovation incentives, as what matters is the “before versus after” comparison of 
the firm’s situation. This may be quite unrelated to competition as the latter is often measured in 
concentration ratios or HHI and instead may be determined more by imitation possibilities (which 
may or may not be related to product market structure) or rivalry (which also may or may not be 
related to standard measures of product market structure).   
Shapiro, in line with Katz and Shelanski, sees certain “typical” cases arising for merger and 
innovation analysis.  These usually involve a small number of firms that are either product market 
rivals or are incumbent and entrant in a market.  In some cases, they are two potential competitors 
who are developing products for a market but have not yet entered.  In all these cases, the issue is to 
analyse the incentive to innovate, which Shapiro’s classification suggests is addressed by considering 
contestability and appropriability, and the ability to innovate, which he suggests boils down to an 
analysis of synergies.  He goes on to outline the 2010 revisions of the US horizontal guidelines, which 
incorporate innovation concerns, and some cases to illustrate how his three concepts do a good job 
of organising the arguments in these cases.   
Whether this is the best classification to communicate with the plurality of those who need to 
understand and apply merger analysis, however, is less clear.  These are difficult and high level 
concepts and may not be understood similarly across the wide constituencies that must use them: 
lawyers, judges, businesspeople and politicians.  As such, even though the concepts of “incentive and 
ability” to innovate are clear, the jump to contestability, appropriability, and synergy and exactly 
what these concepts mean is less clear.    
Overall, then, we see from this review that the literature on market structure and innovation 
delivers some empirically verified and insightful results on desirable levels of concentration for 
innovative production, but that these results do not carry over perfectly to merger and may, indeed, 
be quite different from what a model explicitly characterising merger might generate.  The differences 
across industry of the basic empirical results, and the differences between merger and changes in 
concentration are manifold, including the financing of the merger, the size and organisation effects, 
and the context of the merger.  At present there are both arguments for a benchmark approach coming 
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from those with simple theoretical presentations, and more case-by-case analysis by those who view 
the complexities of specific mergers as key.     
In the next two sections, we will try to develop the last of the various approaches here, where 
a set of guiding principles that map how the decision should be undertaken is proposed.  The closest 
to our approach is Shapiro (2012), with Katz and Shelanski’s (2007) approach also somewhat related, 
and Baker (2007) linked as well.  We then move on to discussing some special features of the industry 
and setting of interest, GM crops in the BRIC countries, in the last section of the paper.   
 
2.3. Main economic effects and a proposed typology 
 
We now turn to a review of the basic effects in merger and propose a typology that captures them as 
way of organising thoughts on the interaction between merger and innovation in a directive but not 
restrictive manner.  This is in the spirit of the typology of Shapiro (2013), with some differences in 
selection and breadth that we argue makes the classification useful. Our approach will be to map out 
a decision framework, which distinguishes our approach from his. In order to conduct the analysis 
we will build up the analysis in a step by step way, so that layers of effects are added.  These layers 
need to be combined, which we do at the end of the analysis.  Many of the effects underlined in the 
models and approaches discussed above will be found here.  The aim here, however, is to provide an 
analysis that is neither too high level nor too specific in order to fashion a tool that is more useful in 
policy 
The main economic principles underlying the relationship between mergers and innovation 
are relatively straightforward. When competition authorities consider the traditional static effects of 
mergers, they focus on three dimensions: the substitutability or complementarity of the products 
involved, productive efficiencies (and the likely pass-through of these to consumers) and the reaction 
of non-merging firms. We see no reason to deviate from this approach when looking at the potential 
effects of mergers on innovation. We will therefore ask whether the innovative activities of the 
merging parties are complementary or substitutes, whether the merger gives rise to material 
efficiencies in the innovation process and what the impact of the merger on rivals’ innovation might 
be. 
Of course, from a policy point of view, it is useful to link these broad principles to observable. In 
particular, competition authorities like to be able to get a broad preliminary view of the likely effects 
of a merger by looking at the current pattern of prices and sales. This approach is well established for 
the assessment of static effects and is embodied in the use of “summary measures” such as Herfindahl 
indices or measures of upward pressure on prices. It is these measures – and the economic theory on 
which they rely – that support the universally accepted presumption that mergers between significant 
“players” and mergers that occur in already highly concentrated markets are especially likely to lead 
to higher prices. The question then seems to be whether we can establish a similar link between the 
current state of the market and the likely dynamic effects of concentrations. 
 
2.3.1. Static Effects 
 
In order to draw a useful analogy between static and dynamic effects, it is important to go back to the 
economic foundation of the notions of “substitutability” and “complementarity”. The notion of 
substitutability goes back to consumer preferences: if acquiring more of a given product can 
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compensate the consumer for having less of another, then the products are substitute. It is because of 
this primitive – and very intuitive meaning of “substitution” that economic textbooks and competition 
authorities can go on to define substitutability between two products A and B in terms of a price 
experiment: if an increase in the price of good A leads to an increase in the demand for good B, then 
A and B are said to be (gross) substitutes. In the same vein, A and B are said to be complements if an 
increase in the price of A leads to a decrease in the demand for B.  
The implication of the concept of substitution for merger regulation is straightforward. If firm 
A produces a product which is a substitute for the product of firm B then an increase in the price of 
good A leads to higher sales for good B. in the pre-merger situation, firm A does not take this effect 
into account: what happens to the profits of its rivals is of no concern as long as its own profits are 
not affected. After the merger, however, firm A and B act to maximise their joint profits. The fact 
that an increase in the price of good A increases the demand for good B then means that the price 
increase is more likely to be profitable than before the merger. This is why mergers between 
producers of substitutes are expected to raise the prices of the merging parties. By contrast, a merger 
between producers of complements would be expected to lead to lower prices for the merging parties. 
For a long time, such price effects were the main source of concerns about mergers. 
A further complication comes from the fact that a merger also changes the decisions of non-
merging parties. Does the fact that the merged parties raise their prices (or decrease their levels of 
production) lead other rivals to raise their prices (decrease their own output) or does it lead them to 
decrease their prices (increase their own output)? Unfortunately, economic theory does not have a 
general answer to this question. If the products of the merged entity and those of its rivals are strategic 
complements then less aggressive behaviour on the part of the merged entity also leads to less 
aggressive behaviour on the part of its rivals. The rivals’ reaction then compounds the negative effect 
of the merger. If the products are strategic substitutes, then the merger leads rival to behave more 
aggressively. i.e. to cut prices or expand output. This reaction is good for consumers. While economic 
theory does not allow us to determine on an ex ante basis whether we are in a world of strategic 
substitutes or strategic complements, it does nevertheless throw us a lifeline: under rather general 
circumstances, the reactions of rivals are a second order effect. In particular the more aggressive 
behaviour of rivals when goods are strategic complements usually does not suffice to overcome the 
negative effect coming from the merged parties’ own behaviour: these reactions are only a mitigating 
factor2275. 
Perhaps because of how difficult it is to pin down the sign and magnitude of such second order 
effects, competition authorities have increasingly relied on so called measures of upward price 
pressures which focus on the behaviour of the merged entity and ignore the reaction of rivals2276.  
 
2.3.2. Dynamic Effects arising from the product markets 
 
The role of substitution in the analysis of the effect of mergers on incentives to innovate is 
complicated by the fact that, in the vertical chain of activities, innovation occurs “upstream” of price 
and output decisions. This means that incentives to innovate are affected not only by the degree of 
substitution between the innovative activities of the merging parties, it also depends on the effect of 
                                                          
2275 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) for a discussion of these effects.  Bulow Genakopoulos and Klemperer (1985) 
coined strategic substitutes and strategic complements as phrases to describe the effects outlined in the 1984 paper.   
2276 See Farrell and Shapiro (2010) for details.  
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the merger on the level of prices (outputs) for the final products. For expositional purposes, then, we 
will first ignore the price/output effects of the merger and turn to the interaction between innovation 
and price/output decisions later on. 
The fact that innovation activities take place “upstream” from price/output decisions also 
means that we need to distinguish between two types of substitution. At the level of innovation 
markets the concept of substitution/complementarity is technical.  A and B’s innovative activities are 
substitutes if an increase in A’s innovation decreases the net technical contribution of B’s innovation 
and complements if an increase in A’s innovation enhances the value technical merit of B’s 
innovation. So, for example, we would expect A and B’s innovation to be substitutes if they both 
work on a given approach to the development of a malaria vaccine but we would expect them to be 
complements if A works on a technology to improve a mobile telecommunication standards and B 
develops more advanced mobile applications which are enabled by the new standard. 
At the level of the technology and product markets, the notion of substitution or 
complementarity is the same as for price/output decisions. A’s innovation is a substitute for B’s 
innovation is it helps A steal sales from B and B’s own innovation helps steal sales from A.  
 
2.3.2.1.Mergers without Price Effects 
 
Assume for now that prices are fixed. If it helps, we can imagine that prices (for example) are 
regulated. This means that investing in innovation is beneficial because it increases the demand for 
the innovator’s product(s) at these fixed prices. Let us now distinguish between different post-merger 
scenarios. 
 
Scenario 1: Independent R&D Programs and No Sharing of Results 
 
In this scenario, the merging parties remain separate. Each formerly independent entity follows its 
own innovation policy without any coordination. Moreover, the results from the separate innovation 
programs are not shared. The only impact of the merger is that the levels of investment in innovation 
at each of the formerly separate entities are determined with the goal of maximising joint profits2277. 
Under such circumstances, the relevant notion of substitution is substitution between the products 
sold in the downstream market and the analogy with price or output decisions is complete. If the 
innovations conducted by firms A and B are substitutes, then an increase in A’s investment in 
innovation takes business away from B. Before the merger, A does not consider this externality. After 
the merger, A takes this negative effect on B’s profits into account. Hence the merger reduces the 
levels of investment in innovation just as it led to higher prices or lower output levels. If the 
innovation pursued by A and B are complements, then an increase in A’s innovation also increases 
the value of B’s innovation and, hence, increases B’s sales and profits. In that case, the merger leads 
to higher levels of innovation. As we will argue further below, the fact that this effect of mergers on 
innovation corresponds so exactly to the main static effect of mergers is useful because it implies that 
there is no need to worry about this type of dynamic effects unless the merger raises significant static 
concerns in the first place. Moreover, this close relationship between static and dynamic effect also 
                                                          
2277 One could imagine, for example, that levels of funding are set so that a common goal is met, but there is no “on the 
ground” coordination of activities.  Contrast to scenario 2, which could include a more complete coordination of the 
research activity beyond mere funding levels. 
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implies that traditional remedies (e.g. divestments of some products) designed to alleviate static 
concerns would also deal with this type of dynamic issue. 
There is not anything very different in terms of the reaction of rivals either. If the merged 
firm’s investment in innovation is a strategic substitute for the investment of rivals then a decrease in 
the merged entity’s investment in innovation leads to higher investments by rivals. The effect is 
reversed if we have strategic complements. The only slight difference between innovation investment 
decisions and price/output decisions is that economic theory provides us with even less of a guide as 
to whether we are in a world with strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Indeed, one can 
easily have situations where the investments of one firm are strategic substitutes and those of the 
other are strategic complements. Moreover, whether we face strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements depends in a complex manner on the appropriability regime and the pay-off of R&D 
“races”.2278 In our view, this additional complexity is one more reason for ignoring the second order 
effects coming from the reaction of rivals. There is simply no point in considering effects of which 
we cannot possibly determine the magnitude or even the sign in a reliable manner. 
 
Scenario 2: Independent R&D Programs and Sharing of Results 
 
We modify our previous scenario to allow for the sharing of results between the two parts of the 
merged entity. This introduces the useful distinction between R&D investment and R&D outcome. 
The difference between the two comes from three sources: uncertainty, duplication and diffusion. We 
begin with diffusion. 
Diffusion is an issue because the knowledge created by innovation is a public good. While a 
new production line can only be used by one firm at a time, the knowledge required to offer new 
products can be disseminated at no or very low cost. Let us first assume that the knowledge obtained 
from investing in R&D is fully appropriable, i.e. that the entity which obtained the knowledge can 
fully exclude others from using it. Let us say that firm A is the investor. Before the merger, A 
considers the benefits of having the additional knowledge – and the new products or product 
improvements that it entails – while its rivals do not. This is equal to the fixed price-cost margin times 
the additional sales realised due to the innovation. After the merger, the innovation can be applied to 
firm A and to firm B. In one extreme case, where the innovation leads to a new product, the diffusion 
of knowledge between A and B does not matter: the benefits to the firm as a whole is still equal to 
the net additional sales generated by the products tie the price-cost margin. However, as soon as the 
innovation can help improve some of the products of each of the two parties, then sharing the 
knowledge creates additional profits for the merged entity as a whole. Hence intra-firm diffusion 
extends the scale of application of innovation. This scale effect has two consequences. Firstly it 
implies that, for a given level of investment in R&D, the resulting innovation diffuses more broadly 
and is therefore more useful to consumers. Secondly, the ability to exploit innovation on a greater 
scale makes it more valuable and increases the merged entity’s incentives to invest in R&D. These 
two effects are beneficial to consumers and do not exist for price/quantity decisions. In this restricted 
sense then, mergers are less likely to have adverse effects on innovation that on price/quantity 
decisions. 
                                                          
2278 In particular, in R&D races, the slope of R&D “reaction functions” depends crucially on whether the benefits of 
“forging ahead” exceed the benefits of “catching up”. On this topic, see Vickers (1985) and Harris and Vickers (1987). 
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The magnitude of this knowledge-diffusion effect depends both on the size of the merging 
parties and on the degree of substitution between their innovative activities in the innovation market. 
The larger the merging parties, the greater the benefits from using a given stock of knowledge on a 
larger scale. The closer the substitution between the innovation efforts of the two entities, the less 
additional knowledge is gained by sharing results and hence the smaller the magnitude of the effect. 
 
Scenario 3: Integrated R&D Programs 
 
We now turn to duplication. A merged entity might also have the opportunity to better coordinate its 
research programs in order to avoid duplication. The potential importance of this coordination benefit 
depends crucially on the nature of the R&D process. If we are in an environment where research can 
be directed effectively, then most overlap between the outcomes of two research programs can be 
avoided. If the environment is such that the nature of R&D outcomes is highly uncertain, then the 
scope for effective R&D coordination would be small. 
As we show formally in the appendix, coordination between the R&D programs of the two 
merging parties has an ambiguous effect on the total investment in innovation but unambiguously 
improves the innovation outcome (i.e. the quality of the products). The intuition is the following. 
Imagine that one of the research programs (say A) proceeds just as before the merger, while the other 
is directed to avoid any duplication2279. Given knowledge sharing within the firm, B gets the benefit 
of the duplicated innovation it would have obtained on its own before the merger “for free”. This 
means the, de facto, investment in A creates a positive spillover for B. This leads to greater innovation 
investment in A. For B, any level of its own investment now corresponds to a higher level of total 
quality than without coordination, since it now gets the “spillover” from A. As there are decreasing 
marginal returns to quality, this implies that B invests less in R&D then without coordination. In fact 
one can show that B invests exactly the amount needed to reach the same overall quality level as in 
the absence of coordination. The overall effect then is an increase in the quality of product A and no 
change in the quality of product B. We conclude that the ability to coordinate research programs is 
another source of merger-specific improvement in the innovation outcomes of the merging parties. 
Contrary to the knowledge sharing effect discussed in the previous section, the strength of this 
coordination effect increases with the degree of substitution of the two entities’ efforts in the 
innovation market: the closer the research, the greater the potential for inefficient duplication. 
 
2.3.2.2. Price Effects 
 
A distinctive feature of investments in innovation is that they take place “upstream” of pricing/output 
decisions. As such innovation decisions depend not only on the expected equilibrium prices – and 
hence on the expected profit margins – but on how innovation itself would affect these prices. It is 
this difficulty that makes finding general results on merger and innovation particularly hard – much 
harder than for static effects. A formal analysis of how allowing for endogenous prices affects 
incentives to innovate can be found in the appendix. However, the results are rather intuitive and can 
therefore be presented informally here.  
                                                          
2279 This is of course unlikely to be the optimal manner of coordinating. This example is used only to show simply that 
coordination has benefits for innovation outcomes. 
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In the absence of merger-specific efficiencies, mergers lead to higher prices for the products 
of the merging parties. This means that the corresponding profit-margins also increase, making any 
gain in sales due to innovation more profitable than before the merger. This effect leads 
unambiguously to more investment in innovation by the merging parties. 
When investing in innovation, the firm should anticipate how successful innovation would 
change the equilibrium prices of all industry participants. Two types of price changes matter. Firstly, 
investing in A will lead to a higher price for the merged entity’s products. This makes gaining sales 
through innovation more profitable and hence leads to an additional merger-specific increase in 
incentives to innovate compared to the situation with fixed prices that we studied above. Secondly, 
the merging party should anticipate that investing in innovation will lead rivals to actually decrease 
their prices (to compensate for their higher quality handicap), which hurts the merged entity’s profits. 
In the pre-merger situation, firm A only considered the negative effect of this price reaction by rivals 
on its own profits. After the merger, the effect on the profits of product B are also taken into account. 
So, with endogenous prices, there is also an additional negative effect of the merger on the parties’ 
incentives to innovate. It is not generally possible to determine the net effect of these two types of 
price changes. As discussed in the appendix, we can only suppose that the net effect is more likely to 
be negative if non-merging rivals are more important.2280 
 
2.3.3. Efficiencies 
 
2.3.3.1.Economies of scale and Complementarities in the Innovation Markets 
 
Since we focus on product innovation, the efficiencies that are relevant to our analysis are those that 
makes it possible to obtain a given level of expected product improvements at a lower cost. Since we 
have already discussed the benefits of information sharing and the avoidance of overlap the only 
traditional efficiency-enhancing factors that we are left with are economies of scale and 
complementarities at the level of the research activities. Economies of scale need no elaboration. 
These are economies of scale arising in the innovation market only. Economies of scale stemming 
from the ability to apply a given knowledge base to a broader product line have already been 
accounted for under our “knowledge sharing” effect. By complementarities we mean the ability to 
combine different research skills, knowledge base and research equipment. This type of efficiencies 
are similar to the productive efficiencies those that are usually assessed as part and parcel of the 
evaluation of the static effects of a merger.  
 
2.3.3.2.Legal Uncertainty and Patent Thickets 
 
Patent rights are probabilistic and imprecise2281. They are also very numerous. This means 
that there can be considerable uncertainty as to whether a given product infringes on some legitimate 
IPR held by another party. In such an environment, a firm which invests in innovation is potentially 
                                                          
2280  This is just a conjecture. As non-merging rivals become more important, the effect of their price reaction on the 
merging parties increase. However, at the same time, rivals might find it less necessary to adjust their prices in reaction 
to the merging parties’ investments if these parties account for a small share of the market. So, this conjecture might 
actually be fragile. 
2281 See Ayres and Klemperer (1999) and Lemley and Shapiro (2005) for independent and alternative presentations of 
this concept.   
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exposed to hold up as IPR holders attempt to enforce undetected or imprecise IPRs after the firm has 
sunk its own investment. This has a chilling effect on innovation. If broad cross-licensing agreements 
aimed at restoring legal certainty are not forthcoming then a merger between two IPR-holding parties 
has an additional pro-innovation effect. 
A related but distinct issue is that of patent thickets. Patent thickets arise when IPRs held by 
a significant number of different entities read on a potential new product. The best-known example 
is probably that of mobile phones where thousands of patents held by a significant number of different 
firms must be clear in order to produce an attractive non-infringing product. In a sense, this is a third 
type of complementarity between the innovations pursued by different entities. We have discussed 
the role of product market substitution, and the role of complementarities in the innovation markets. 
Patent thickets relate to complementarity in the production of the products. As always with 
complementarity, internalisation improves efficiency. A merger between two firms involved in the 
same “thickets” would then offer an efficiency benefit. Moreover, the anticipation of this greater ex 
post efficiency should improve the innovation incentives of all firms involved in the thicket, including 
non-merging parties. The magnitude of this effect depends on the number and significance of the 
thickets where the merging parties overlap as well as on their joint importance within any given 
thicket: the more thickets with overlap, the greater the economic significance of these thickets and 
the larger the merging parties’ joint share of the thicket patents, the greater the expected benefit from 
the merger. 
 
2.3.4. Horizontal effects on innovation markets 
 
Concerns can also arise if the merging parties enjoy strong positions in the innovation market, i.e. if 
they seem likely to jointly account for a large share of future innovations in a given technological 
area. The source of this consistent success in the innovation markets matter. In particular – absent 
overlap in the corresponding downstream markets, which we have already discussed, A merger 
between two firms with a major presence in innovation markets should not raise concerns unless they 
control inputs that are crucial to innovation and – as one would normally expect – the merger would 
increase their incentives to withdraw these inputs from others. In that sense, “horizontal” concerns in 
the innovation market are truly “vertical” concerns at heart. They are therefore further discussed in 
the next section. 
 
2.3.5. Vertical effects 
 
Two main types of vertical effects are relevant for the innovation dimension of mergers: a traditional 
foreclosure effect affecting the innovation market and the fact that future innovation typically relies 
on past innovation and the knowledge/information that it generates. 
 
2.3.5.1. Foreclosure in the Innovation Market 
 
Innovation activities require inputs. These include specialised personnel, specialised equipment and, 
some times, materials or organisms on which research can be performed and into which it might be 
embedded. Specialised labour does not necessarily move easily between employers, especially if 
there is significant teamwork involved. Some specialised research equipment might be expensive and 
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time-consuming to replicate and form quasi-essential facilities (e.g. particle accelerators) or it might 
be covered by patents. Some research requires access to genetically engineered laboratory animals or 
appropriate plants/seeds. In all of these situations, the merger might increase the parties’ joint 
incentives and/or ability to foreclose rival research activities. Potentially, this type of vertical issue 
could be addressed by imposing divestments of some of the parties’ research capacities, where 
“capacity” refers to the hard to imitate or access research inputs discussed above. Note that such 
divestments only make sense to address these potential negative vertical effects of the merger on 
innovation. It is of little use to handle the product-market related effects analysed in section 3.2. It 
would therefore be wrong to think of such divestment as a necessary part of merger remedies 
whenever innovation effects might matter.  
 
2.3.5.2. Sequential innovation 
 
In most industries, today’s innovations rely on previous discoveries. When the pace of technological 
progress is at least reasonably fast, some of these past innovations are still proprietarily held. As 
discussed in the ample literature on sequential innovation2282 this can result in hold-up issues that 
leads to lower levels of cumulative innovation. Integration between firms involved at different stages 
of this dynamic innovation process reduces the severity of the hold-up problem, leading to higher 
levels of innovation. The importance of this effect increases with the speed of technological progress, 
imperfections in the technology markets (i.e. obstacles to licensing) and the extent to which current 
innovation relies on past innovation. All three of these factors can be assessed in the context of a 
specific industry or transaction. In particular, the extent of interdependence between current and past 
innovation can be evaluated based on patent citation studies with particular attention to the citation 
pattern between the merging parties. 
 
2.4. Linking the effects to market structure2283 
 
In the previous section we went through the main effects that help explain how a merger between to 
innovative firms would likely influence their level of investment in R&D and the corresponding level 
of innovation. While this analysis helps us clarify matters and make it possible to draw a point per 
point comparison with the more traditional static concerns of merger review, it does not by itself links 
the likely effect of mergers to observable features of the industry (except 
substitution/complementarity). In particular, we have not yet discussed how the strength of the 
various effects identified above relate to the pre-merger market structure.   
For the static effects of mergers, the link is relatively straightforward. For simplicity, consider 
an industry made up of identical single-product firms. Other things equal, increasing the number of 
firms in the market decreases the “diversion ratio” between the merging parties A and B so that the 
first order effect of the merger becomes smaller. The link between the reaction of rivals and market 
structure is much less certain. However, as rivals’ reaction is of second order, it makes sense to have 
                                                          
2282 See Scotchmer (1991, 2004), and Rockett (2010) for a survey.    
2283  In this section, we will adopt the “old” approach linking pre-merger market structure to likely merger effects. 
We are fully aware of the drawbacks of this approach pointed in Farrell and Shapiro (XXX) and the literature that this 
paper spurred. However, as our main purpose is to present a simple typology of effects, the endogeneity considerations 
considered in this literature would overly complicate matters.  
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a rebuttable presumption that a merger leads to lower levels of static consumer welfare and to be 
especially suspicious of mergers taking place in an already highly concentrated market. 
Does a similar presumption make sense for innovation? Just as in the case of static effects, 
the direct innovation-decreasing effect identified in our scenario 1 above depends on the diversion 
ratio between the merging parties. Again, all else equal, a more diluted industry means a lower 
diversion ratio and hence a lower negative effect of the merger. As rivals’ reactions are still of second 
order – and their sign is even harder to assess than for price/quantity decisions – these two traditional 
effects would indeed argue for an equivalent dynamic presumption that mergers lead to lower 
investment in innovation and to worse innovation outcomes from the point of view of consumers. 
However, we also saw that link between merger and innovation involves a number of 
additional effects which are not present for the simpler static price/output decisions. Two of these 
effects, the diffusion of knowledge between merging partners and the avoidance of duplication lead 
to better innovation outcomes after the merger. The third broad class of effects relates to the fact that 
changes in the quality/features of the merged entity’s products also lead to different equilibrium 
prices. As we have just seen, the net impact of this “equilibrium price effect” cannot be determined 
with any generality. However, if anything, it seems more likely to have a net positive effect on 
innovation post-merger than a net negative one. 
One might of course hope that one could find conditions under which these specific dynamic 
effects are small enough so that the static presumption that mergers decrease consumer welfare could 
be extended to a dynamic context. In particular, might we still think that the effect of mergers on 
innovation is more likely to be negative if the pre-merger environment is highly concentrated and the 
merging parties are large? Unfortunately such a convenient extension is not warranted. This is not 
only because, as we have seen, the link between innovation and endogenous prices seems likely to 
account for increased innovation post-merger even in highly concentrated environments but because 
the benefits from information sharing are larger the larger the merging parties are. We therefore 
conclude that there should not be a (rebuttable) presumption that mergers lead to less innovation 
even if the initial situation is highly concentrated and the merging parties are large. 
We can however identify a number of factors that make it more likely that a given merger 
would increase or decrease innovation. The first factor – as for static effects – is the computation of 
the relevant “diversion ratios” and profit-margins which can be combined into a dynamic equivalent 
of our traditional measures of upward pressure on prices. The profit margins are the same price-cost 
margins used for static UPPs. The diversion ratios would refer to the proportion of the sales gained 
by A following an innovation which come at the expense of B. As we do for price/output decisions, 
one could start from a neutral symmetric benchmark where all of A’s rivals account for the same 
share of the diversion and modify this analysis if we have reasons to believe that the products of the 
merging parties are especially close substitutes. Once the size of this negative effect on innovation is 
estimated, we have a better idea of how big pro-innovation effects need to be to overcome it. 
A practical approach might then be to make the strongest possible case for positive innovation 
effects and check what the total magnitude of these countervailing forces might be. One would start 
from the projected price effect from the merger. This gives us a projected increase in price cost 
margins. From this, one can compute the likely increase in investment based on some assumed 
elasticity of quality improvement to investment. Such an assumption is not very different from 
assumptions on demand elasticities that we routinely make. The next step would be to assess the 
extent of overlap between the innovative activities of the two parties. This could be based on a review 
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of their patent portfolios and research projects. The greater the overlap, the larger the gains from 
reducing it and hence the better the innovation outcome. Again some quality to investment elasticity 
is needed to help translate these gains into innovation outcomes. Finally, an examination of patent 
portfolios could also give us an estimate of the potential for innovation sharing between the two 
parties. One subtlety in this respect is that, since we only care about merger-specific information 
sharing, technologies that are already licensed by one of the parties to the other should be eft out of 
this exercise. From this cumbersome but feasible exercise we could get an upper bound of the merger-
specific increase in innovation incentives and outcomes. If it falls significantly short of the direct 
harmful effects discussed above, then innovation issues compound the concerns about the merger and 
call for specific remedies. If the orders of magnitude are broadly similar, then the authority is better 
off focussing on the traditional static effect. If the positive effects on innovation dwarf the negative 
effects then the conventional “thresholds” used in assessing the static losses from the proposed 
transaction should be adjusted upward’ 
 
The following table summarises our discussion so far. 
 
Table 1: Main Innovation Effects of Mergers 
Effect Static Innovation 
Effect on 
Consumers 
Link to 
Market 
Concentr
ation and 
Size of 
Merging 
Parties 
Effect on 
Investm
ent 
Effect 
on 
Innova
tion 
Outco
mes 
Link to 
Market 
Concent
ration 
and Size 
of 
Merging 
Parties 
Substitutio
n/ 
Compleme
ntarity 
Cannibalisation 
of Sales between 
merging parties 
 
Higher 
Prices / 
Lower 
Quantities 
Harm 
increases 
with 
concentrat
ion and 
size/625lo
seness of 
the parties 
 
Lower 
levels  
 
Less 
Innovat
ion 
Harm 
increases 
with 
concentr
ation and 
size/clos
eness of 
the 
parties 
Harm 
stronger if 
greater 
substitution 
in 
downstream 
markets 
Reaction of 
Rivals 
Ambiguous 
Second-
order 
Ambiguo
us 
Ambiguo
us 
Second-
order 
Ambig
uous 
Second
-order 
Ambiguo
us 
NA 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
NA NA Increases 
investme
nt 
More 
Innovat
ion 
Positive 
effect 
increases 
with the 
size of 
Benefits 
stronger if 
less 
substitution 
in 
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the 
merging 
parties 
innovation 
markets 
Coordination of 
Investments 
NA NA Ambiguo
us 
More 
Innovat
ion 
No 
obvious 
link 
Benefit 
stronger if 
less 
substitution 
in 
innovation 
markets 
Indirect Price 
Effect  
NA NA Ambiguo
us but 
more 
likely to 
be 
positive 
if 
merger-
specific 
price 
increases 
are large 
Ambig
uous 
but 
more 
likely 
to be 
positive 
if 
merger-
specific 
price 
increas
es are 
large 
Conjectu
re: 
positive 
effect 
more 
likely if 
merging 
parties 
large 
compare
d to the 
market 
Stronger 
likelihood 
of positive 
effect if 
products of 
the merging 
entities are 
closer 
substitutes 
Economies of 
scale and 
complementarity 
in Innovation 
markets 
 
Similar 
efficiencies 
at the 
production/d
istribution 
levels 
 
Stronger if 
merging 
partners 
are larger 
 
Ambiguo
us 
 
Higher 
 
Stronger 
if 
merging 
parties 
are large 
 
Obvious 
Complementarit
y from 
Sequential 
Innovation 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
Ambiguo
us 
 
Higher 
 
NA 
 
NA 
Patent thickets NA NA Higher Higher NA Stronger if 
the merging 
parties 
overlap in 
several 
significant 
thicket and 
their joint 
share of 
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patents in 
the thicket is 
large. 
Legal Certainty NA NA Higher Higher NA Stronger if 
substitution 
in 
innovation 
and product 
markets 
 
2.5. A competition policy algorithm 
 
Our arguments in sections 3 and 4 have strong implications for dealing with the innovation aspect of 
mergers. As we have seen, the main negative effect of mergers on innovation works through the same 
channels as the standard static effects. This immediately implies that, if there are no significant static 
concerns (or if these concerns can be remedied) and there are no significant vertical issues affecting 
the innovation market, then, as the additional innovation effects should be favourable to the merger, 
one can dispense with that part of the review. 
What if there are significant static effects from the mergers? Two main principles apply. 
Firstly, remedying the static effects should also remedy the main negative, innovation-related effects 
of the merger since those work through the main channels. Secondly, the presence of innovation 
effects operating through overlap in the product lines of the merging parties make finding appropriate 
remedies more pressing: while remedies that would ensure that prices do not increase by more than 
2% might be considered sufficient in that absence of an innovation dimension to the merger, they 
would not be if they also leave a 2% decrease in innovation. The criteria for what constitutes 
satisfactory downstream remedies should therefore be tighter if innovation issues also appear to be 
material. 
If static effects (magnified by their dynamic equivalent) cannot be fully remedied or if there 
are significant concerns about foreclosure in innovation markets then analysing the additional 
positive effects of the merger on innovation becomes indispensable to reach a fair decision about 
clearance. In that case as well, the burden of proof should be on the merging parties since the size of 
“additional” effects such as knowledge sharing and the avoidance of duplication depends on the 
nature of R&D activities and their internal organisation, which are both factors on which the parties 
should have much better information than the regulator. 
Based on these principle, we can propose a policy algorithm illustrated in the flow chart 
below. 
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In a sense, this algorithm can be seen as proceeding from a (refutable) presumption that mergers are 
bad for innovation. After all we argue that significant static issues imply significant dynamic issues, 
that mergers might create some vertical concerns in innovation market and that the burden of 
providing evidence of the positive effects of the merger on innovation should mostly be on the 
merging parties. However, the policy algorithm presented above has several features that go beyond 
such a presumption. In particular, there is the crucial observation that, once the static aspects of a 
merger have been addressed, the main negative dynamic issues should also have been resolve unless 
one can document some legitimate “vertical” concern in the innovation markets.  
 
2.6. The GM crops and seed industries: main features and past mergers 
 
2.6.1. Product and industry characteristics 
 
Crops are grown from seeds. To be successful, farmers must ensure that they obtain seeds of good 
quality which are well-adapted to the environment in which they will be used. As pathogens, fungi, 
insects and other pests are an endemic problem, farmers are also interested in obtaining plants that 
are as robust as possible to these hazards and/or plants on which effective chemical or biological 
defensive substances can be used without adversely affecting the yield and quality of the crop harvest. 
Pathogens and pests are not the only major obstacles. By drawing water and nutrients away from the 
crop, weeds also hurt the farmer’s output. Hence, again, farmers seek seeds for crops that do not 
suffer too much from such competition and/or crops which are resistant to the use of herbicides to 
control the weeds. The ability to draw nutrients from the ground is also crucial. This makes the 
development of plants with efficient root systems economically important. Here too, there is a 
potential complementarity with bio-chemical products as plants can be designed to be especially 
receptive to specific types of fertilisers. In the same vein, plants can also differ in their ability to deal 
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with the presence of undesirable compounds – such as salt or heavy metals – in the soil. A fourth 
factor is the general climate. Crops are crucially affected by the availability of water, the average 
temperature and the variability of these two variables. Hence, using seeds that yield drought-resistant 
crops, for example, can make the difference between success and failure. The commercial success of 
crops also depends on their nutritional content (if meant for consumers), biological content (if meant 
for material extraction), their texture, their presentation and their ability to survive the modern 
distribution system with little deterioration. Again, seeds for a similar crop can differ markedly in 
these respects. 
New varieties of seeds are obtained in two main manners. The first, traditional approach, is 
through cross-breeding existing varieties or mutant varieties thereof. This traditional approach can 
itself be assisted by some expertise at the genetic level in order to help identify the types of plants 
worth breeding together and/or select the plants to keep breeding through the program, for example. 
However, genetic engineering is not used to directly insert foreign genes into the seed. By contrast, 
“GM” crops involve the insertion of foreign genes into a host plant with the goal of modifying one 
or more of the plant’s “traits”. There are of course various possible combinations of these two 
approaches, but the distinction still remains important, as the expertise involved in the two processes 
is rather different. 
Economically, GM crops and, for lack of a better term, “non-GM” crops are substitutes. For 
example, herbicide resistant plant can be obtained by inserting genes into a plant genome but it can 
also be bred from parents demonstrating a promising natural resistance. The substitution between 
different crops (wheat, corn, soybean and so on) depends on the intended use, with greater 
substitution for animal feed that for products meant for final consumers. There is nothing specific to 
GM or non-GM crops in this respect. Finally, the different traits possessed – or imparted to – a given 
plant/seed are a priori neither substitute nor complements: herbicide resistance is generally unrelated 
to the control of ripening. However, these characteristics are “bundled” within a single seed so that, 
when it comes to designing a seed that respond to the specific need of a specific type of farmer 
operating in a specific region, the traits embedded in the seed are effectively complements.  
 
2.6.2. Mergers and the direction of innovation 
 
Mergers can affect not only the level of innovation but also the direction of innovation. The 
complementarity between seeds, GM modification and products like pesticides and herbicides has 
implications for innovation. As shown in Harhoff et al. (2001), firms that sell herbicides and 
pesticides have an incentive to devote more resources to the development of plant traits that pairs 
them more closely with their proprietary products. This indeed seems to be one of the main reasons 
why traits such as herbicide or pesticide resistance were developed earlier and more intensively than 
other traits such as drought resistance. This bias towards plant traits that complement the companies’ 
other products is not socially desirable. It leads to the relative neglect of other aspect of innovation.  
Some crop traits have wider applications than others. In particular, traits aimed at tailoring a 
seed to particular local conditions have lower scale than others such as some types of herbicide 
resistance. Because of the public good nature of innovation, private companies privilege the 
development of traits (and plants) with broad applications. There is no obvious efficiency here: 
investing more on innovation which can be used on a large scale than on innovation with more limited 
applications makes sense both privately and socially. However, from the point of view of specific 
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country – and BRICs in particular, this scale concern can be acute as it often leaves such countries 
short of the type of technology (environmental stress, sugar cane varieties,…) that fits their need. It 
is legitimate for the Competition Authorities of a given country to take its specific need into account 
when reviewing a merger. In this respect, a merger between two companies can increase the relevant 
scale of commercialisation of innovation directed towards less popular traits or plants if both parties 
are active in the corresponding downstream markets. 
 
2.6.3. Past mergers 
 
The pattern of substitution and complementarity in the (GM) crop/seed industry is reflected in the 
evolution of the market structure and the type of mergers that we have observed. Initially, three main 
types of companies joined the industry in the late 1980s to early 2000s: seed companies – who were 
already long-standing players – chemical companies, driven by the desire to promote their herbicide, 
pesticides, fertilisers and other products and pharmaceutical/biological companies looking to 
leverage their budding expertise in genetic engineering. 
The tables below, based on Lianos with Katalevsky (2017), summarises some of the main 
acquisitions in the industry. In the first table, we colour-code the expertise of each of the acquiring 
firm: green from main expertise, yellow for a lesser but still significant involvement. We then count 
the number of acquisitions that fall within each of the expertise categories. 
 
Table 2: name 
Acquirer  GM  
Crops 
Seeds/ 
Breeding 
Chemicals Pharma Bio Crop 
Protection 
Misc 
Bayer      Check  
 Acquisitions 1 9 8 0 4 4 
Monsanto        
 Acquisitions 6 13   2 5 
Dupont        
 Pioneer   0 0 0 0 
  1 9 0 0 0 1 
Syngenta        
  0 20 1 0 3 7 
Villmorin        
  0 27 0 0 0 1 
 
source? 
A striking feature of the table is that, with the exception of Bayer, which acquired a number of other 
chemical manufacturers, the acquisitions relate to firms which are active in complementary activities. 
Indeed, by far the dominant pattern is the acquisition of seeds companies by firms coming either from 
the chemical or the pharmaceutical side of the industry. As such, the presumption should be that these 
acquisitions are more likely to lead to increased innovation than to reduce it. The review of such 
transactions should then concentrate on the typical static effect, with a possibility for the parties to 
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argue for some innovation-related benefits. However, as discussed in section 5.4. below, this does 
not mean that this type of acquisition, if they persist would necessarily remain benign. 
Moreover, as shown in table XXX, a breakdown of Bayer and Monsanto’s acquisitions 
according to the focus of the targets on certain crops shows a bias toward Soybean, Cotton and Corn-
related acquisitions. One would therefore also need to look at the overall presence (seeds, GM, 
complementary products) of the newly formed entities in the markets for these specific crops. While 
one should also investigate the “trait” dimension of the acquisitions, we do not have the information 
necessary to do so. 
 
Table 3: the trait dimension of the acquisitions 
Acquirer  Soybean Wheat Rice Cotton Corn Rape Other 
Specific 
Plants/Crops 
Bayer         
 Acquisitions 7 1 1 4 1 1 2 
Monsanto         
 Acquisitions 4 1  3 4 2 4 
 
source? 
2.6.4. Vertical dimensions 
 
So far, our analysis has neglected two indirect but potentially important effects of mergers on 
innovation in the (GM) crop industry: the complementarity between seeds and GM R&D and the 
potential bundling of seeds and chemical products. 
Research into genetic modification of crops only produces revenues once it is incorporated 
into seeds that can be sold commercially. While a GM innovator could in principle license its 
discovery to companies controlling seeds, such licensing is typically less profitable than direct 
application to the relevant seed. Moreover, the very development of the technology allowing the 
modification of a given trait benefits from the availability of a broad variety of seeds on which to 
experiment.2284 In practice, then, this means that GM research is facilitated by having a large variety 
of seeds on which experiments can be conducted and to which the GM technology can eventually be 
applied. As we have seen above, this seems indeed to be a major factor being the acquisition of so 
many seed companies by chemical firms. As long as each potential GM innovator still has access to 
a critical mass of seeds, we would expect such mergers to be welfare improving as they allow the 
internalisation of complements. However, as the share of the (proprietary) seed markets controlled 
by some companies grows, one might be concerned that additional mergers between these companies 
and seed companies would eventually limit the availability of seeds to rival GM innovators to the 
point where it negatively affects their continued ability to innovate at the same pace. To assess the 
likelihood of such an “innovation foreclosure” theory of harm, it is useful to look at the share of the 
proprietary seed market controlled by the main companies. 
 
                                                          
2284  The importance of this factor would depend on the state of the “experimental exemption” doctrine in the relevant 
jurisdictions. See MIstali and Adachi (2010) and references therein.  
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Table 4: the share of the proprietary seed market controlled by the main companies 
 2007 2012 
Monsanto 23% 27% 
Dupont-Pioneer 15% 17% 
Syngenta 9% 9% 
Limagrain 6% 5% 
Lands O’ Lakes 4% 4% 
KW SAG 3% 4% 
Bayer 2% 3% 
Source: xxx 
 
The shares controlled by the larger owners like Monsanto, are inching towards the levels at which 
Competition Authorities would consider that there might be an ability and possible incentive to 
engage in some form of foreclosure. Of course, the numbers above cut across all types of seed so that 
concentration levels are bound to be higher for some given crops and/or traits. In our opinion, then, 
we have likely reached the point where further acquisitions of seed companies by Monsanto should 
not be waived through without a proper investigation of potential foreclosure effects on the GM 
innovation of rivals. 
The second “vertical” concern comes from the practice of tying certain types of seeds to certain 
types of products, e.g. refusing to supply seeds unless they are used together with a specific 
herbicide…owned by the same company. This is a more traditional merger-related foreclosure 
concern. It should either be addressed ex post as a matter of antitrust or – maybe preferably – be the 
object of “cease and desist” commitments as part of the merger review process. Again, the market 
shares shown in the table above are probably not yet at the level for which such concerns would be 
found to be founded, but we are getting into an areas where such effects would need to be considered. 
 
2.7. BRICS: special concerns 
 
Our analysis of merger and innovations and the specific characteristics of the (GM) crop industry 
applies fully to mergers affecting BRICS countries either as consumers or a host to some of the 
relevant activities. However, merger enforcement in the crop industry also raises issues that are either 
specific to the BRICS or are at least more acute. 
In our opinion, the most significant differences stem from the different needs of BRIC 
countries in terms of crop-related innovation. Growing conditions in China, India and Brazil are 
notably distinct from conditions in the large markets of North America and Europe. There is therefore 
a natural tendency for traits suiting those specific conditions and the type of crops that the climate 
favour to be relatively neglected in the innovation efforts of private firms. In a similar vein, 
production technologies vary across countries. For some crops at least the capital intensive methods 
found in Northern America are not appropriate in some BRICS locations. This again creates a need 
for a somewhat different type of research. The effect of a particular merger on the direction of 
innovation of the merged entity is therefore of greater importance for BRICS countries than for North 
America or Europe. 
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We saw above that, because of expanding scale, a merger between two firms that are active 
in the type of downstream products needed by BRICS should increase the parties’ incentive to invest 
in BRICs-compatible product. In this sense, Brics might benefit from the innovation-related effects 
of mergers more than the US, Canada or Europe. There might be countervailing effects however. In 
particular, the consequences of the acquisition of a local firm by a large foreign company might be 
uncertain. Local companies not only have local market expertise, their own innovation, IPRs and 
products tend to be geared towards local need. It is therefore crucial to determine why the acquisition 
is taking place. If the main driver is to access the name, local reputation and distribution channels of 
the local firm, then one might fear that the local firm’s focus on local needs might be quickly eroded 
once it becomes part of a large group. If, on the other hand, the rationale for the acquisition is to 
obtain access to the company’s IPRs, its research expertise or even its stock of locally adapted seeds, 
then one would expect that the acquisition would lead to an increase in innovation targeted at some 
local needs. 
While resistance to chemical compounds and compatibility with chemical fertilisers is of 
course useful in BRICS countries, they might still be relatively less important than for markets like 
the US and Canada, where the type of crops, the climate and the farming techniques are quite 
different. In this respect, the acquisition of a target by a large Agro-chemical group might lead to a 
greater emphasis on these types of traits than was the case when the target was independent. In this 
sense then, continued acquisitions of seeds or GM companies by large agro-chemical firms is likely 
to also have a downside in terms of the type of innovation that it encourages. 
We have already discussed the possible “vertical” issues that could arise because of the 
acquisition of seed companies. The shares of the privately owned seed market that we referred to did 
not account for the specific needs of the BRICS’ agricultural sectors. Clearly then, data for a more 
“BRICS-relevant” basket of seeds should be obtained in order to assess the vertical theories of harm 
that we discussed. 
It is interesting that, as noted in Chapter I of Part III and Chapter 1 of Part IV until the recent 
mega-merger wave in agrochem there has not yet been a merger case in the BRICS where innovation 
was a significant issue. This is somewhat surprising since, if anything we would expect BRICS 
countries to be particularly concerned about innovation as it has been shown to be a major engine of 
growth for countries at this stage of economic development.2285  This is especially so for countries, 
like Brazil, where trade in agricultural products is an important aspect of the overall growth strategy.    
A final issue for innovation and merger that is specific to the BRICs is that patent coverage 
and enforcement might differ significantly from what is found in North America or Europe. As we 
have seen in the literature survey, this can matter in some frame works: if competition and strong 
patent rights are complementary in inducing innovation in the Schumpeterian world set out by Aghion 
et al in a series of papers (but not in other worlds, as he points out), then we can expect the surrounding 
intellectual property environment to affect the optimal approach to innovation from society’s 
perspective. Contrary to what one might think, this does not really question our reliance on US patent 
data in our short empirical analysis. In that analysis, patents are used only to give us an idea of the 
overall intensity and direction of research. It therefore makes sense to use a jurisdiction where large 
industry participants patent extensively. Of course, differences in the treatment of IPR might also be 
a reason why the current innovation strategies of large crop companies appears to neglect the specific 
                                                          
2285 See Aghion et al (2015) and related discussion in our literature review.   
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needs of BRICS markets, with consequences for what we observe in the data. In that sense then 
competition policy and merger reviews are complements when it comes to trying to address this 
imbalance.  Chapter 1 of Part IV details some differences in patentability between the BRICs and 
Europe that could imply different optimal competition policy responses, when placed in the context 
of the literature we have reviewed, above.2286  
 
2.8. An empirical examination 
 
2.8.1. Using patent data to assess innovation: methodology and limitations 
 
Innovation is notably hard to measure. Essentially one has a choice between input measures such as 
firm’s investment in innovation and outcome measures. Input measures are unreliable as the “R&D” 
expenditures reported often include expenses that are only remotely related to what economists would 
consider to be “investments in innovation”. Moreover, even such imperfect measures are not easily 
available, especially if some companies are privately held. Outcome data is not much better. Ideally, 
we would want measures of the improvement in product quality and/or the lowering of production 
costs. These simply do not exist. A common fall-back option is then to rely on the number and 
type/quality of patents obtained by a given company2287. While this is often the best measure 
available, it has its own drawbacks. 
The main drawback of patent data as a measure of innovation is that there is a difference 
between the propensity to innovate and the propensity to patent. Simply put, not all useful innovation 
are patented and many useless findings are. This discrepancy between patenting and innovation 
would not be a special concern for our purpose if the distance between patent measurements and 
innovation was not itself affected by the merger: the same bias would apply before and after the 
merger so that a comparison of patenting pre and post-merger would still be informative as to the 
merger-related change in innovation. Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that mergers can 
themselves affect the wedge between propensity to innovate and propensity to patent. Two examples 
will help illustrate the issue. 
The first example comes from the limited nature of our data. We only record patents, not plant 
protection rights. If a company – say a seed company – relied primarily on non-patent rights before 
the merger, it might well be that, post-merger, the acquiring firm’s extensive patent experience 
translates into more patenting for the same level of innovation. In this case, relying on patent data to 
assess the effects of the merger on innovation would paint too rosy a picture: the data might show an 
increase in patenting which does not correspond to any increase in innovation or even masks a 
decrease in innovation performance. 
The second example shows how our re and post-merger comparison might be biased by 
strategic patenting behaviour. Patents exist not only to protect the technology embedded in the firm’s 
products. It is also there to exclude others from using technologies that the firm is not using or to 
serve as bargaining chips in licensing negotiations. The more strong competitors the firm faces, the 
stronger the incentives to use patents defensively or as bargaining chips. If the firm acquires another 
                                                          
2286 Chapter 1 of Part IV of this Report. 
2287 For example, see Valentini (2012). 
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significant rival, the number of strong competitors decreases, possibly leading to less patenting 
overall, even though the total level of innovation might not have changed. 
While we should be aware of such potential biases, the stark reality is that patent information 
is essentially the only publicly available, sufficiently reliable source of information on innovation 
that can be collected and used within the tight deadline faced in merger reviews and without investing 
huge resources. 
 
2.8.2. The data 
 
We rely on two data sets. The first one is the USPTO data on patents granted. Our second source is 
ESPACENET.  We focus on separate issues in the two sections, and so our selection of patents is 
somewhat different even within these different sources.  The two sections should be complementary, 
however, building a picture of innovation performance generally in the first treatment and more 
specifically in a limited number of patents that we suggest may have special relevance to the BRIC 
countries in the second.  Our analysis in both sections is preliminary, with the data serving to raise as 
much as answer questions.   
 
2.8.2.1.US Patents 
 
The advantage of using US patents is that we look at patents over time under a single, fairly stable 
review regime. Biases include a greater propensity of firms to patent into their own jurisdiction. This 
bias should not matter when we look at mergers/acquisitions between two US-based firms but it might 
matter when the acquiring firm or main merging party is based in the US, since it might have a greater 
propensity to file protect the innovation of the acquired/joined firm under the US patent system. 
The following table give us the total number of US patents for the main firms in the industry. 
These are patents relating to the GM Crop/seed business broadly understood but excluding patents 
on non-biological herbicides and pesticides. We also report the total number of such patents. The 
numbers are presented for four time periods; 1995 -1999, 2000 – 2004, 2005 – 2009 and 2010 – 2015. 
Table ? 
 1995 – 1999 2000 – 2004 2005 – 2009 2010 – 2014 
 Non-
GM 
GM Non-
GM 
GM Non-
GM 
GM Non-
GM 
GM 
Monsanto 50 64 53 106 176 153 833 177 
Bayer 0 7 0 19 14 33 18 55 
Dupont 3 2 0 4 0 16 0 18 
Syngenta 0 0 19 37 109 60 231 48 
Novartis 18 37 17 24 0 0 0 0 
Zeneca 10 45 0 26 0 0 0 0 
De Kalb 46 5 87 27 5 7 0 0 
Pioneer 196 
 
 
51 269 130 535 180 1379 222 
Seminis 1 2 6 12 2 3 109 2 
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Aventis 0 0 0 40 0 3 0 0 
Rhone 0 12 0 12 0 0 0 0 
 
The table reveals two main trends: the concentration of GM patents has increased over time and the 
number/proportion of “non-GM” patents has literally exploded from 2005 to 2014. The first trend 
tells us that we have reached a point where Competition Authorities should worry about concentration 
in both innovation and technology markets if any merger between firms significantly involved in 
GM-crop innovation is proposed. The second trend is at least consistent with the prediction that 
merging entities with complementary research programs (GM firms and seed companies) should lead 
to an increase in innovation. This increase is especially noticeable for Dupont – Pioneer and 
Monsanto – Seminis. The lack of effect for Bayer might be a reflection of its greater focus on 
chemical acquisitions. In this respect, collecting information on crop-related chemical patents would 
be useful. 
The next table shows the patents on non-biological pesticides, fungicides and herbicides 
divided between patents that mention prominently the modification of a specific trait and those which 
do not. This classification helps us get an idea of the split between more basic and more applied 
research. Interestingly, there is no trend. One might have expected to find a natural “lifecycle”, where 
there is more general innovation in early years, followed by more applied research but, apparently, 
broad innovation is still thriving in the industry. 
 
Table 6 
 1995 – 1999 2000 – 2001 2005 – 2009 2010 – 2014 
 Traits Methods Traits Methods Traits Methods Traits Methods 
Monsanto 28 36 51 55 49 154 52 105 
Bayer 5 2 15 4 25 8 39 16 
Dupont 0 2 2 2 9 7 11 7 
Pioneer 29 22 38 92 71 109 114 108 
Novartis 22 15 16 10 0 0 0 0 
Syngenta 0 0 31 11 35 25 26 22 
Zeneca 25 20 12 14 0 0 0 0 
DeKalb 1 4 2 25 1 6 0 0 
Seminis 2 0 10 2 1 2 1 1 
Aventis 0 0 13 27 2 1 0 0 
Rhone 2 10 3 9 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Tables XXX show the specific traits covered by patents, while Table XXX organises patents 
according to the type of traits which are modified. The following tables organises patents according 
to the plants or crops to which they apply. These tables gives us an idea of the type of innovation and 
products for which concentration is higher than what overall patent numbers would led us to believe. 
In terms of traits, the data confirm that chemical companies have a disproportionate tendency 
to produce patents specifically related to the control of weeds, insects and other pests. We also find 
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some high concentrations in some categories such as insect/nematode resistance where three firms 
account for the bulk of patents. 
 
1995 – 1999 
 Herbicide Pest/disease Insect Fungi  Virus Starch/ 
Sugar 
Drought/ 
Salt 
Others 
Monsanto 5 0 10 1 6 5 0 2 
Bayer 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Dupont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 0 2 2 1 3 1 0 19 
Syngenta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Novartis 1 9 3 4 1 0 0 4 
Zeneca 1 4 1 9 0 4 0 5 
DeKalb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhone 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2000 – 2004 
 Herbicide Pesticide Insect/ 
nematodes 
Fungi  Virus Starch/ 
Sugar 
Drought/ 
Salt 
Others 
Monsanto 3 1 32 4 2 5 0 5 
Bayer 2 1 3 0 0 4 0 5 
Dupont 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Pioneer 0 16 3 0 0 4 0 14 
Syngenta 4 3 10 7 0 1 1 4 
Novartis 4 4 6 0 0 1 0 1 
Zeneca 1 1 2 3 0 3 0 2 
DeKalb 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 7 2 0 1 
Aventis 3 3 4 0 0 2 0 1 
Rhone  1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2005 – 2009 
 Herbicide Pesticide Insect/ 
nematodes 
Fungi  Virus Starch/ 
Sugar 
Drought/ 
Salt 
Others 
Monsanto 5 5 26 2 0 2 1 8 
Bayer 5 0 8 2 0 9 0 1 
Dupont 3 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Pioneer 4 11 17 8 0 12 3 16 
Syngenta 3 18 28 5 2 2 2 1 
Novartis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zeneca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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DeKalb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Aventis 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
2010 – 2014 
 Herbicide Pesticide Insect/ 
nematodes 
Fungi  Virus Starch/ 
Sugar 
Drought/ 
Salt 
Others 
Monsanto 5 3 19 0 2 0 9 16 
Bayer 20 1 7 0 0 5 3 1 
Dupont 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Pioneer 12 7 30 9 1 5 9 41 
Syngenta 5 14 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Novartis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zeneca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DeKalb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The tables on patent by plant type also reveal high concentrations for specific plants such as corn and 
cotton. We also note that the bulk of plant-specific efforts is devoted to very few crops. This supports 
our claim that research in the industry might be biased away from some of the specific needs of 
BRICS countries so that special attention to the research composition effects of mergers might be 
called for. 
 
1995 – 1999 
 Soybea
n 
Cor
n 
Whea
t 
Ric
e 
Cotto
n 
Suga
r-
Cane 
Tomat
o 
Fruit
s 
Vegetabl
es 
Other
s 
Monsan
to 
3 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 
Bayer 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Dupont 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 
Syngent
a 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Novartis 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zeneca 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 
DeKalb 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2000 – 2004 
 Soybean Corn Wheat Rice Cotton Sugar-
Cane 
Fruits Vegetables Others 
Monsanto 3 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 
Bayer 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 
Dupont 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 1 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Syngenta 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Novartis 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Zeneca 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
DeKalb 0 12 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Rhone 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
2005 – 2009 
 Soybean Corn Wheat Rice Cotton Sugar-
Cane 
Fruits Vegetables Others 
Monsanto 2 11 4 4 4 0 0 0 3 
Bayer 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Dupont 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 2 35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syngenta 0 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 2 
Novartis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zeneca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DeKalb 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
2010 – 2014 
 Soybean Corn Wheat Rice Cotton Sugar-
Cane 
Fruits Vegetables Others 
Monsanto 8 25 0 4 5 0 0 1 8 
Bayer 0 2 0 3 16 0 0 0 4 
Dupont 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 7 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Syngenta 0 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 6 
Novartis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Zeneca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DeKalb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Seminis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Aventis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
2.8.2.2.Espacenet 
 
The Data 
 
We now turn to the alternative data.  As above, while the data are not sufficient for a formal analysis, 
but they do serve to generate some issues and questions that should be investigated further as 
modelling of innovation and merger develops. 
We focus on the area of GM crops as it is both relevant to the BRICs in terms of economic 
activity and is a relatively well defined and narrow area of innovation.  This reduces the scope of our 
analysis to a manageable number of data points so that we can hope to understand our data set well 
and the issues it raises before passing to larger data set analysis in future work.  We eliminate patents 
related to purely chemical compounds in insecticides and herbicides, even if these could also be used 
with GM crops, and also do not look at ancillary patents on implements used with crops.  We are 
interested in patents affecting the plants themselves.  We also restrict information to those patents 
that were published in any area related to the BRICs or the BRICs themselves, as an indicator of 
which patents viewed as directed at their specific needs and possible implementation within those 
markets.  This gives us a more limited dataset but perhaps one that reflects more the “local” benefit 
of the BRIC countries.   
As in the USPTO data case, we focus our initial review on raw patent counts without citation 
weighting, despite its limitations.  As we have explained, this is because the point of the exercise is 
merely to generate questions that may merit further investigation.  The focus of this section is to point 
out if there are any striking differences in this alternative dataset compared to the broader USPTO 
approach. Finally, we include patent applications (which may or may not have ended up as patent 
grants) as a measure of research activity in this dataset.  While this opens the data to a variety of 
strategic and administrative effects that could, for example, result in multiple applications and 
withdrawals, our view is that as a complement to the USPTO patent grant data this can be useful as 
part of our first look, however “raw” the figures are at this point.   
 
Some Preliminary Observations 
 
Restricting attention to firms that are listed as merging in Lianos’ compilation of BRIC mergers for 
this industry and reproduced in Appendix B of this chapter, we first note that many of the merging 
firms (particularly the seed firms) do not hold patents that fall within this dataset.  For a company 
such as Seedworks, this is clear as their focus is on hybridisation (which falls outside our data 
selection).  Indeed, many of the seed firms are listed with a specialty in hybridisation.  In fact, the 
reasons for some of these mergers were not necessarily for production of more patents, but for 
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application of existing techniques to a wider germplasm portfolio2288.  For others, such as Misung, 
while there are patents listed but none that applies to plants directly.  
 
Table 7:  Total Patents Recorded for Merging Firms* 
Name Total Datapoints 
Monsanto 155 
Bayer 82 
Syngenta 104 
Devgen 22 
Agventure 1 
Bilag 1 
Mitsui 3 
Pioneer 234 
Others (27 firms) 0 
*Start date of data collection for each firm differs somewhat, as each becomes merger-active at a 
different point in Lianos’ table, reproduced in Appendix B of this chapter.  We collected data from 
ten years before the first of the relevant merger dates in his table, and continue throughout (as the last 
date of merger was within ten years of the present).  The data reported here terminate in 2016, as the 
final year is currently incomplete 
 
For those with a patent portfolio, we see representation over the entire period we record data for each 
firm.  This period differs somewhat, as is noted after the table, above.  Furthermore, a zero entry does 
not mean that the firm did not patent: it may very well have patented, but those patents may not have 
fit our search criteria.  We keep those criteria fixed so that our data is comparable across firms and 
across time, but do not attempt to be fully inclusive.  This section is based on a highly selective, but 
still we feel useful, exercise.   
 
Table 8:  Total Datapoints per year for merging firms with patents in dataset 
 
Year Name 
Monsanto      Bayer          Syngenta     Devgen         Agventure      Bilag             Mitsui          
Pioneer 
1987       1  
1988       0 1 
1989       0 0 
1990       0 2 
1991   3    0 1 
                                                          
2288 For example, see Monsanto’s press release on the benefits of the Agroeste Sementes acquisition, 
http://news.monsanto.com/press-release/monsanto-company-acquires-agroeste-sementes-brazilian-corn-seed-company .   
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1992   2    0 2 
1993   1   0 0 6 
1994  1 1   0 0 3 
1995 7 1 3   0 0 5 
1996 3 2 5   0 0 5 
1997 5 2 6   0 0 10 
1998 1 3 5   0 0 7 
1999 2 3 10 1  0 1 12 
2000 4 2 15 6 0 0 0 11 
2001 9 8 10 0 0 0 0 7 
2002 4 5 9 0 0 0 0 6 
2003 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 
2004 15 1 5 0 0 0 0 9 
2005 9 3 1 0 0 0 0 5 
2006 8 1 3 1 0 0 0 8 
2007 11 5 2 4 0 1 0 13 
2008 6 3 5 1 0 0 0 9 
2009 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 15 
2010 4 2 5 1 1 0 0 20 
2011 5 9 2 0 0 0 1 9 
2012 2 9 3 1 0 0 0 13 
2013 2 5 4 1 0 0 0 11 
2014 12 3 1 4 0 0 0 21 
2015 17 3 0 0 0 0 0 14 
2016 19 5 0 2 0 0 0 6 
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The number of patents per firm, year in and year out, seems relatively stable per firm.  There does 
not appear to be any large jump – up or down - upon a merger event, although with the small numbers 
of patents involved per year and per firm, this type of jump would be quite difficult to eyeball.  This 
might bear investigation with a somewhat less “raw” dataset: there are some years with standout 
numbers that may be the result of particular merger events or may be the result of other strategic or 
operational decisions or even random variation in research productivity.  What seems most surprising, 
however, is the lack of “churn” in the larger players in this industry.  This is at odds with the bulk of 
the theoretical models reviewed in the literature review, with the exception of Vickers (1985), where 
certain industry structures could lead to increasing dominance rather than churn.   
Given that churn may be an important feature of innovative systems, especially when one 
considers Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, this bears investigation before carrying over the 
results of the general literature on innovation and merger to this industry or to the BRICs.  If the 
industry is exhibiting a feature not predicted generally by these models or compatible with them, then 
it suggests that current analysis is missing something important.  Again, this points to further 
investigation.   
In terms of overall productivity of the firms that merge compared to those that have not but 
that trigger the same set of keywords and satisfy the other search criteria we used on Espacenet – our 
“control” group – we see that this alternative group is responsible for a generally growing number of 
total patents over the time period.  Compared to the merging firms in terms of innovation totals, we 
see that the merging firms’ productivity is relatively stable over the period post-2000 whereas the 
non-merging firm group increases production considerably in the table below.  The non-merging firm 
totals are influenced by entry as well as productivity, of course, whereas the bulk of the merging 
firms’ production is from firms that reached a relatively mature status pre-2000.   
Taking this one step farther, however, if one considers any firm that has a patent included in 
our non-merging firm dataset as a “potential innovator”, we see the set of potential innovators rising 
sharply over time and the average number of patents per potential innovator is falling.  Clearly, there 
is considerable variance across firms, however, with some patenting only once while others remain 
active so that a comparison of averages is somewhat unfair: a full comparison of merging and non-
merging groups would require us to compare like with like, and this would require some case study 
development (since the numbers are small).  The point of this observation should be that there are 
many entities capable of research in this area, as represented by patent applications, even if few appear 
to commercialise ultimately and few are relatively high research producers.  In this sense, the set of 
potential innovators is large (assuming smaller producers can ramp up) even if the set of potential 
commercialisers is small.  This may be due to the regulatory demands of this industry upon 
commercialisation.   
 
Table 9:  Total Patents Recorded for Merging and “Non-Merging” Firms* 
Year Merging firms (total) Non-merging firms 
2000 38 179 
2001 41 283 
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2002 24 223 
2003 13 282 
2004 30 261 
2005 18 353 
2006 21 330 
2007 36 286 
2008 24 422 
2009 24 495 
2010 33 695 
2011 26 649 
2012 28 863 
2013 24 958 
2014 41 792 
2015 34 876 
2016 32 871 
*These are taken from 2000 to ensure a constant selection of firms for the merging group.   
 
We also note that the mergers identified by Lianos generally do not conform to the mould set out in 
the literature review’s articles of mergers of equals, both of whom have strong incentives to take the 
industry leadership in any given product areas, and where there are few impediments to 
commercialisation separate from those of innovation.  In this industry, many of the mergers have 
been to obtain resource access (germplasm) for the innovators and have not been among equals in 
terms of innovative or commercial capabilities.   
Moving on to look more precisely at the composition of the patent portfolios across traits and 
crops, we also see general stability although with significant differences in areas of focus possible 
across firms.  As in the case of US patents, most patents are centred in the area related to herbicide 
or resistance to certain pests and pesticides or insects and insecticides.  Drought, or salt resistance 
features were less represented, but protein content features were, via Monsanto and Pioneer.  In terms 
of crops, while much activity was in sorghum, maize, soy, rice and wheat, the areas of coffee and 
cocoa were much less represented.  Again, the focus differed across firms with some both holding far 
more relevant patents and having a much broader portfolio of traits and plants in their research 
portfolio.   
The participation in some of the ancillary areas (like drought resistance) looks more like the 
work of a firm doing monitoring activity to keep a participation in an area that by and large is being 
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pushed forward by others.  This draws attention to a potential difference between this data set’s 
lessons and those of the theoretical literature.  In the data, it looks like there are areas where firms 
might well prefer to be second movers or otherwise “bit players”.  In the models of innovation we 
saw in the literature review, there is generally a first mover advantage: firms do not aspire to be 
second.  As was pointed out in an early paper by Katz (1987) this need not be the case: a race can 
turn into a waiting game under certain conditions, including favourable licensing terms and 
favourable imitation possibilities.  These are conspicuously lacking in the models we reviewed, 
above, but there is some evidence that the second mover position can be quite profitable in some 
areas2289.  We present, below, figures for two of the highly productive patenters in this dataset as 
illustration. 
 
Table 10: Trait Production: Entire Dataset, by firm* 
Name Trait 
 Herbici
de 
Resistan
ce 
Drought 
Resistan
ce 
Protei
n 
Conte
nt 
Pest/Pestic
ide 
Resistance 
Insect/Insecti
cide 
Resistance 
Salt 
Toleran
ce 
Miner
al 
Conte
nt 
Nemato
de 
Resistan
ce 
Monsan
to 
57 10 113 34 44 14 0 16 
Bayer 33 1 55 9 22 7 1 2 
Syngent
a 
22 6 63 22 31 9 1 12 
Devgen 1 1 14 16 15 0 0 11 
Agvent
ure 
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Mitsui 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 30 52 130 59 77 17 77 8 
 
*Note that many traits may be present in a single patent’s claims, so this table should not sum up to 
the total number of patents.  Bilag excluded from this table, as claims are missing from the relevant 
Espacenet files. 
 
Table 11: Plant Production: Entire Dataset, by firm* 
Name Plant 
 Sorghu
m 
Maiz
e 
So
y 
Ric
e 
Whe
at 
Cotto
n 
Sug
ar 
Rap
e 
Potat
o 
Coff
ee 
Coc
oa 
Toma
to 
Monsan
to 
29 44 86 78 77 81 52 21 37 5 1 42 
Bayer 7 17 20 18 12 25 11 16 9 0 0 8 
                                                          
2289 See Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and later follow up work for an early study of first versus second mover 
advantages.  There is also anecdotal evidence for this.  One well-studied case is that of GE’s second mover position in 
CT Scanners, unseating EMI.  See Bartlett (1983). 
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Syngent
a 
25 39 29 37 32 22 23 1 19 0 0 22 
Devgen 5 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 5 2 0 5 
Agventu
re 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Mitsui 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pioneer 122 185 12
0 
115 121 81 48 41 40 1 5 43 
*Note that many traits may be present in a single patent’s claims, so this table should not sum up to 
the total number of patents.  Bilag excluded from this table, as claims are missing from the relevant 
Espacenet files. 
 
Table 12: Monsanto Trait Production By Year 
 
Year Trait 
Herbicide   Drought     Protein     Pest(icide)  Insect(icide)     Salt         Mineral    
Nematode 
Resistance Resistance Content     Resistance Resistance Tolerance    Content   
Resistance 
1995 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 
(throughout) 
0 
1996 0 0 2 0 0 0  0 
1997 2 1 2 0 1 2  1 
1998 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 
1999 0 0 2 0 0 0  0 
2000 2 1 4 0 1 0  0 
2001 2 1 6 4 6 0  1 
2002 2 2 3 0 1 1  1 
2003 1 1 7 2 3 0  0 
2004 3 2 7 1 4 2  0 
2005 4 0 9 3 1 0  1 
2006 4 0 4 1 2 2  1 
2007 4 0 6 3 4 0  2 
2008 2 0 5 0 1 0  1 
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2009 2 1 3 0 2 0  1 
2010 2 0 1 0 1 1  0 
2011 1 0 5 1 1 0  1 
2012 0 0 2 1 1 0  0 
2013 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 
2014 7 0 10 4 2 3  2 
2015 10 1 13 3 2 1  1 
2016 8 0 16 9 8 2  2 
Monsanto: Crop Production Per Year* 
Year Crop 
Sorghum  Maize      Soy         Rice        Wheat   Cotton      Sugar       Rape      Potato    
Coffee     Cocoa    Tomato 
1995 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 2 
1996 0 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 0 0 2 
1997 0 2 1 1 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 
1998 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1999 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 4 2 3 3 0 2 4 0 0 4 
2001 5 1 7 6 7 7 5 4 4 0 0 6 
2002 0 2 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 
2003 4 1 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 
2004 0 9 6 8 7 7 3 0 3 0 0 2 
2005 3 4 7 5 5 5 3 0 3 0 0 3 
2006 1 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 0 0 1 
2007 3 3 5 4 4 5 3 2 2 0 0 4 
2008 1 2 3 3 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2009 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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2010 0 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 0 3 4 2 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 
2012 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2014 3 2 7 7 7 8 4 1 2 1 0 2 
2015 2 1 12 12 12 11 11 0 1 0 0 2 
2016 3 2 12 8 8 9 7 3 3 3 0 3 
 
*Note: If a plant (or a trait) is not mentioned in a patent, it does not trigger the keyword search that 
would make it included in this table.  This does not mean that the patent does not apply to the plant 
or trait: it just means that the trait or plant is not singled out separately as an application.   
 
Table 13: Pioneer Trait Production By Year* 
 
Year Trait 
Herbicide   Drought     Protein     Pest(icide)  Insect(icide)     Salt         Mineral    
Nematode 
Resistance Resistance Content     Resistance Resistance Tolerance    Content   
Resistance 
1988 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
throughout 
 
1989 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
1990 0 0 0 1 2 0  0 
1991 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 
1992 0 0 2 0 0 0  0 
1993 0 0 2 1 1 0  0 
1994 1 0 1 1 1 0  0 
1995 0 0 3 0 1 0  0 
1996 1 0 2 1 2 0  0 
1997 0 0 5 0 0 1  0 
1998 2 1 3 0 2 2  1 
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1999 0 0 10 0 0 0  1 
2000 1 0 9 0 1 0  1 
2001 1 0 6 0 0 0  0 
2002 1 0 6 0 1 0  0 
2003 0 0 1 0 0 0  0 
2004 2 3 3 0 3 2  0 
2005 1 2 1 0 3 2  0 
2006 5 6 4 3  5  2 
2007 2 0 4 5 6 0  0 
2008 0 2 8 5 0 0  0 
2009 1 1 11 9 7 0  1 
2010 0 5 10 12 10 0  0 
2011 0 3 6 3 4 0  0 
2012 1 7 6 2 4 1  0 
2013 2 3 7 1 4 0  2 
2014 4 10 8 6 8 2  0 
2015 2 4 6 7 7 0  0 
2016 3 4 1 4 4 2  0 
 
*Please see note accompanying Monsanto trait and plant tables as it also applies here: these tables 
signal when a trait or plant is specifically singled out as part of the patent, and does not mean that 
other patents that are quite general in their application do not apply to the trait or plant in question.   
 
Table 14: Pioneer: Crop Production Per Year* 
Year Crop 
Sorghum  Maize      Soy         Rice        Wheat   Cotton      Sugar       Rape      Potato    
Coffee     Cocoa    Tomato 
1990 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1991 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1992 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
1993 1 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1994 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1995 2 4 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1996 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1997 2 5 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 4 5 3 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 5 8 5 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 5 7 6 6 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 4 6 3 4 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2002 3 4 2 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2004 2 7 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 2 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 6 5 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 6 10 7 6 6 6 3 2 3 0 0 3 
2008 7 7 8 7 7 7 6 6 6 0 0 6 
2009 11 11 11 11 11 9 9 7 9 0 0 7 
2010 9 13 10 8 14 7 5 4 4 0 1 4 
2011 8 9 6 8 8 5 1 4 1 0 0 1 
2012 11 12 9 9 9 8 6 2 4 0 1 2 
2013 5 8 6 4 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2014 11 18 12 8 9 6 6 3 3 1 0 3 
2015 9 13 6 8 9 8 8 6 7 0 1 6 
2016 4 6 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 1 
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In sum, we see that the data points to several features that should be analysed to see how they affect 
the general “pro-competitive” slant of the merger and innovation literature. We see surprisingly little 
churn in both volume and application of research, surprisingly little keenness in some traits that may 
suggest a second mover advantage, and considerable narrowing of the competitive field when moving 
from those who appear research active and those who are active to a level of commercialisation.   
Separate from GM crop considerations, if we step back and think that the patents in this dataset 
are intended to be filtered for those with special applicability to BRIC countries, we need to question 
whether any second mover advantage could be due to differences in strength of intellectual property 
protection.  The current research shows that there is a link between this and optimal level of 
competitive pressure to generate innovation (Aghion et al (2015)) and older papers indicate that weak 
intellectual property protection can result in second mover advantages rather than first mover 
advantages (Katz 1985), so investigating merger policy in the presence of weaker intellectual 
property rights could also bring the analysis more in line with the data.   
 
2.8.2.3.A first look at some major mergers 
 
Ideally an empirical study of the link between merger and innovation would compare the chosen 
measure of innovation before and after the merger, controlling for all other factors that might also 
have affected the measure of innovation. 
Unfortunately, this approach is hard to apply to mergers in the GM Crop/Seed business, for 
two main reasons. The first reason is the relative dearth of “mega mergers”, i.e. mergers that are 
substantial enough to be likely to leave a trace in the data. Bayer-Monsanto would qualify, but we do 
not have a “post-merger” period to use for comparison purpose. For Monsanto, the acquisition of 
DeKalb and Seminis would be likely candidates. The DeKalb transaction suffers from the opposite 
problem: it occurred early enough that the pre-merger period might not be sufficiently informative. 
Seminis, on the other hand, seems “just right” a it occurred in 2005. The acquisition of Pioneer by 
Dupont in 1999 is another merger worth looking at. 
Another limitation comes from the time and resources limit that we faced in developing this 
study. In principle, we would have liked to gather information not only on GM Crops and plant 
patents but also on patents obtained on complementary products such as pesticides, herbicides and 
fertilisers. At this stage, we do not have information on these complementary products. This is an 
issue for the Monsanto-Seminis and Dupont-Pioneer acquisitions since we observe only one type of 
innovation.  We simply point here to some interesting initial observations that warrant, in our view, 
further work.   
The graph below illustrates a first attempt at detecting a possible effect of major mergers on 
innovation. The numbers underlying the graph are computed as follows. For Monsanto, Bayer and 
Dupont, we add the patents registered under their name as well as the patents registered under the 
names of the major acquisition (DeKalb, Seminis, Aventis/Rhone Poulenc, Pioneer). For Syngenta, 
which was not involved in any major acquisition, we simply add the Syngenta and Novartis numbers. 
The vertical lines show the dates of the major acquisitions.  
If we take Syngenta as a reference for the evolution of innovation in a firm which was not 
affected by major mergers, it seems pretty clear that Monsanto and Dupont experienced significantly 
faster innovation growth soon after their major merger. This is what we would expect from the 
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acquisition of a major seed company. By contrast Bayer, whose main acquisition was of Aventis, a 
firm with a similar profile, shows no such bounce, which is again in line with expectations.  This is 
not definitive, but it is suggestive that more work in the area of analysing certain mergers could yield 
insights and perhaps insights that differ across industries and countries.  We believe that this 
indicative graphic warrants further investigation.   
 
Figure 1 
 
2.9. Conclusion 
 
   We began with a review of the economics literature that is relevant to mergers and innovation.  We 
find that the literature illustrates several points.  First, the material on the inverted U relation between 
rivalry (read market structure for empirical work) and innovation is not directly relevant to merger 
and, to the extent it establishes a starting point to “trigger” investigations, that starting point is not 
well defined since it varies considerably across industry and across the institutional conditions of 
merger and the way merger is accomplished (such as its financing). Second, the theoretical work 
specifically on merger and innovation is based on restrictive and recent models that have yet to be 
shown to be robust.  At the same time, it should be clear from this work that there should be no “get 
out of jail free” card based on innovation.  Third, the work on creating conceptual maps for policy 
purposes from the literature has been helpful in the sense of organising what is a large number of 
sometimes contradictory factors, but could be made more user-friendly.    
In light of this current state of knowledge, our paper has two main purposes. Firstly, we have 
presented  what we hope to be a more “policy-maker friendly” typology of the economic effects of 
mergers on innovation investments by outlining simple components and combining these into a 
decision rule. Such an exercise has several benefits: it provides a step by step organisation of the 
many effects at play, makes it possible to distinguish between first and second order effects, and 
finally helps to compare the innovation dimension of mergers to the more traditional pricing/output 
dimension. Having identified the effects at play we are then in a position to ask whether there are 
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indeed circumstances where an a priori – rebuttable – presumption about the link between mergers 
and innovation would be justified. Our main conclusion in this respect is that, indeed, mergers 
between parties with material overlap in the products and technology markets can be assumed to have 
a negative effect on innovation. However, such effects can be addressed through the kind of remedies 
which are traditionally used to handle the likely effects of mergers on prices and levels of output. In 
that sense, dynamic issues can remain mostly in the background as long as traditional static issues 
are addressed successfully. There are however additional channels through which a merger can affect 
innovation. We have argued that most of those effects are favourable to innovation. Nonetheless, a 
merger can also lead to “vertical” issues in the innovation market where the combination of crucial 
inputs held by the parties could harm the innovation efforts of their rivals. When such a concern can 
be documented, there is a trade-off between this negative effects and a whole set of positive effect 
linked to scale effects, improved coordination of investment and the complementary nature of 
successive innovations. When assessing this trade-off, the merging parties should be responsible for 
bringing evidence in support of these positive effects. 
We have made some progress on our second objective of using this typology of effects in 
order to better understand the innovation dimension of mergers in the GM/seed industry as a specific 
case of interest. The industry and the recent mergers within it share special features that make it a 
nice counter-point to the theoretical models that have been proposed as generalizable to mergers: to 
the extent that this industry provides special features, we would want to allow for any policy 
recommendations to take those into account in any merger analysis to be undertaken.  These features 
include a heavy regulatory framework that leads to economies of scale and scope in GM applications 
but also a natural synergy between chemical and GM innovations that could bias the choice of 
applications to fall in specific areas.  This means that the diversity in applications that could result 
from the economies of scope at the regulatory level may not emerge.  To the extent that the BRIC 
countries could benefit from some of the more far-flung applications, these two features may not 
overall be beneficial to BRIC economies.  To the extent that merger would be justified, then, by the 
economies at the regulatory (or marketing level), the complementarity may work in the opposite 
direction.  Second, there is also a natural complementarity in seeds production as germplasm is an 
important “stock” from which innovations flow.  This generates a natural vertical linkage that can 
also affect innovation production in terms of volume and application.   
We see in our initial data work that there are indicators that the orientation of innovation is 
indeed related to complementarities and this narrowing of focus in the larger firms combined with 
the regulatory barriers to overcome for commercialisation may mean that the diversity of applications 
of this technology that reach the market may be biased, possibly in directions that are not helpful to 
the BRIC countries.  Furthermore the heavy merger activity with seed companies conceivably relates 
to the innovation complementarities here of germplasm and GM applications, but creates vertical 
integration issues that need to be considered.  The local effects that we found in our data related to 
the BRIC countries per se were not the same as the general effects on innovation at a global level, 
suggesting that innovation effects may be very widespread geographically, and suggesting that any 
mitigating factors for innovation effects might rely on data drawn from a wide set of activities 
undertaken by the firm.  We have emphasised that our results are very preliminary and have left 
detailed application of our framework to specific mergers for future work.  At the same time, our data 
review indicates that this exercise could be enlightening and worthy of the time and effort it would 
require.   
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Appendix A: formal analysis of the innovation effects of a merger 
 
Two firms A and BBB merge. Competition is in prices. For simplicity we assume that each firm sells 
a single product, hence innovation takes the form of product improvements, 𝑃𝑖 is the price charged 
by firm I, with 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵. We define as P as the vector of the other firms’ prices. There are no 
production costs. By investing 𝐼𝑖, firm i improves its quality from a benchmark of zero to 𝑄𝑖 =
𝑄(𝐼𝑖), 𝑄
′ > 0, 𝑄′′ < 0 with a probability equal to 𝛼. If two firms A and B succeed in their innovation 
effort, part of their innovations might overlap in the sense that a firm with its own acquired knowledge 
no longer needs the knowledge obtained by the other firm. We define the overlap as a fraction 𝜔 of 
the smaller of the two quality improvements. Hence, if we have 𝑄𝐴 > 𝑄𝐵, B has a quality 
improvement (1 − 𝑤)𝑄𝐵 which A does not have and A has an improvement 𝑄𝐴 − 𝑤𝑄𝐵 that B does 
not have.  
 
Fixed price 
 
No Coordination, No Sharing of Information 
 
Before the merger, the profit maximisation problem of firm I is 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗 , 𝑃; 𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗, 𝑄) − 𝐼𝑖 
The corresponding first order condition is 
𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
− 1 = 0 
After A and B merge, the maximisation problem is 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝐴,𝐼𝐵𝑃𝐴𝐷𝐴(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵, 𝑃; 𝑄𝐴, 𝑄𝐵, 𝑄) − 𝐼𝐴 + 𝑃𝐵𝐷𝐵(𝑃𝐵, 𝑃𝐴, 𝑃; 𝑄𝐵, 𝑄𝐴, 𝑄) − 𝐼𝐵 
The corresponding first order conditions are 
𝑃𝐴
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
+ 𝑃𝐵
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
− 1 = 0 
𝑃𝐵
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
+ 𝑃𝐴
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
− 1 = 0 
Comparing the FOCs before and after merger shows that they differ only because of an additional 
term equal to 
𝑃𝐵
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐴
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
 
In the post-merger conditions. If the products produced by A and B are substitutes, then this term is 
negative: improving the quality of good A steals sales from good B. Indeed this term could easily be 
couched in terms of diversion ratios and profit margins. Therefore investments in innovation are 
unambiguously lower after the merger. 
 
No Coordination, Sharing of Information 
 
We need to define the amount of transferable information between the R&D programs of the two 
firms. We simply assume that a proportion 𝛾 of the improvement in one product is transferable to the 
other product. Essentially 𝛾 is a measure of post-merger internal spillovers. The size of the parameter 
depends on the technological closeness of the products involved as well as on the type of innovation 
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pursued. The closer the products are technology and the more “upstream oriented” the research is, 
the larger we would expect the parameter 𝛾 to be.  
The pre-merger first order conditions are the same as before. Post-merger we have 
𝑄𝐴 = 𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) + 𝛾𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) 
𝑄𝐵 = 𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝛾𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) 
Hence the profit-maximisation problem is 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝐴,𝐼𝐵𝑃𝐴𝐷𝐴(𝑃𝐴, 𝑃𝐵 , 𝑃;  𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) + 𝛾𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵), 𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝛾𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴), 𝑄) − 𝐼𝐴
+ 𝑃𝐵𝐷𝐵(𝑃𝐵, 𝑃𝐴, 𝑃;  𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝛾𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴), 𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) + 𝛾𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵), 𝑄) − 𝐼𝐵 
The corresponding first order conditions are 
𝑃𝐴 [
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝛾
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
] + 𝑃𝐵[
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝛾
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
− 1 = 0 
𝑃𝐵 [
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝛾
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
] + 𝑃𝐴[
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝛾
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
− 1 = 0 
The first expression can be re-arranged as follows 
𝑃𝐴 [
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
] + 𝑃𝐵 [
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
] − 1 + 𝛾
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
[
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐵
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐵
] = 0 
The first three terms correspond to the effects that we have already identified in the previous sub-
section. The additional effect of information sharing is captured in the last part of the expression. The 
two terms in bracket have opposite signs: an improvement in the quality of product B increases the 
demand for B and decreases the demand for A. It seems reasonable – in line with traditional practice 
in models of oligopoly, to assume that the “own effect” of a change in the quality of B is larger in 
absolute value than the “cross-effect”. This mean that the sum of the two terms in bracket is positive 
and the diffusion of innovation enabled by the merger leads the merged entity to invest more heavily 
into innovation. Moreover, because information exchange leads to a broader application of the 
innovation for any given levels of investment we can also conclude that the diffusion of innovation 
enabled by the merger leads to larger superior innovation outcomes. 
 
Coordinated Investment in Innovation 
We now abstract from innovation-sharing and focus on duplication. The effect of duplication depends 
on the appropriability regime. For simplicity we limit ourselves to the situation where innovation is 
not excludable, i.e. two firms making the same discovery can each exploit that discover 
In the absence of exclusivity, the pre-merger situation is the same as in our base case so that the FOC 
for firm i can be written as: 
𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
− 1 = 0 
So, in the pre-merger word, investment levels of 𝐼𝐴 and 𝐼𝐵 would lead to quality levels of 𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) and 
𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) respectively with an overlap equal to 𝜔𝑀𝑖𝑛[𝑄𝐴, 𝑄𝐵]. After the merger, the same levels of 
investments could be reallocated. The merged entity could keep 𝐼𝐴 at the pre-merger level, giving 
𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴). To reach the same level of quality for B, it would then need to invest 𝐼𝐵
𝑜 such that 𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵
𝑜) =
(1 − 𝜔)𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵), leaving additional resources equal to 𝐼𝐵 − 𝐼𝐵
𝑜 available to obtain further quality 
improvements either for A or for B. This effect can only lead to better innovation outcomes, even 
though it might no lead to greater total investment in innovation. Keeping other things equal (in 
particular, ignoring the other effects of the merger), if investing a given sum to get given levels of 
product improvements is worth it, then investing a smaller sum to obtain the same improvements is 
662 
 
also worth it. So the level of realised innovation cannot fall because of coordination. Indeed, because 
avoiding overlap also increases the marginal productivity of innovation investment, coordinating 
R&D programs must lead to higher levels of realised innovation. However, this does not imply that 
total investment goes up since, as the marginal productivity of investment decreases the level of 
realised innovation. To see this, neutralise all other merge effects and assume that the revenues linked 
to qualities are equal to 𝑅𝐴(𝑄𝐴), 𝑅𝐵(𝑄𝐵) respectively with 𝑅𝑖
′ > 0, 𝑅𝑖
′′ < 0. Before the “merger”, the 
firms faced the following maximisation problem: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑖𝑅(𝑄𝑖(𝐼𝑖)) − 𝐼𝑖 
With the following corresponding first order conditions: 
𝑅′(𝑄𝑖(𝐼𝑖))
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐼𝑖
− 1 = 0 
After the “merger”, we have 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝐴,𝐼𝐵𝑅(𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴)) + 𝑅(𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝜔𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴)) 
This specification assumes that A pursues research as usual while B is steered away from areas of 
overlap. While this might not be the most efficient organisation of research it at least gives us a lower 
bound on what the merged entity should be able to achieve. The First order conditions are: 
𝑅′(𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴))
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
− 1 + 𝑅′(𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝜔𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴))𝜔
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
= 0 
𝑅′(𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝜔𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴))
𝜕𝑄𝐵
𝜕𝐼𝐵
− 1 = 0 
Comparing these FOCs to the FOCs without coordination, we see that coordination leads to greater 
investment in product A since it de facto produces a “spillover” in favour of good B. The FOC for 
investment in B has the same functional form as without coordination. However, because of the 
spillover from A, the level of quality reached for any given investment in B is higher under 
coordination. Given that there are decreasing returns to quality, this implies that there is less 
investment in B when R&D programs are coordinated to avoid overlap. However, for both FOC to 
be satisfied we need 𝑄𝐵(𝐼𝐵) + 𝜔𝑄𝐴(𝐼𝐴) to be equal to the level of quality reached without 
coordination. Overall then the form of cooperation that we have considered leaves to more investment 
in A, less investment in B, the same level of quality for B but a higher level of quality for A. This is 
therefore an additional positive effect of the merger on the innovation outcome for the merging 
parties. 
 
endogenous prices 
 
So far, we have taken the prices as exogenous. Let us now define the equilibrium prices as a function 
of the qualities obtained by all parties as 
𝑃𝑖
∗(𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗, 𝑄) 
Pre-merger, the innovation investment problem of firm i is 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑖𝑃𝑖
∗(𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗, 𝑄)𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖
∗, 𝑃𝑗
∗, 𝑃∗; 𝑄𝑖, 𝑄𝑗, 𝑄) − 𝐼𝑖 
The corresponding first order condition is 
[𝑃𝑖
∗ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
− 1] + 𝐷𝑖
∗ 𝑑𝑃𝑖
∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
+ 𝑃𝑖
∗[
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑖
∗
𝑑𝑃𝑖
∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
+
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑗
∗
𝑑𝑃𝑗
∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
+
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑃∗
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
] = 0 
Using the envelope theorem, we have 
663 
 
[𝑃𝑖
∗ 𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
− 1] + 𝑃𝑖
∗[
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑗
∗
𝑑𝑃𝑗
∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
+
𝜕𝐷𝑖
𝜕𝑃∗
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝑖
] = 0 
The first term in bracket is the first order condition that we obtained when prices were exogenous. 
The second term captures the (effect of an increase in quality on the equilibrium prices of the rival 
firms and hence on the demand for the product of firm i. If, as one would generally expect, an increase 
in the quality of product I leads to a decrease in the equilibrium prices of other products, then this 
second term is negative, i.e. a single product firm will invest less in innovation if prices are 
endogenous than if they are fixed. 
We can now consider the post-merger situation. The maximisation problem is 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐼𝐴,𝐼𝐵  𝑃𝐴
∗(𝑄𝐴, 𝑄𝐵, 𝑄)𝐷𝐴(𝑃𝐴
∗, 𝑃𝐵
∗ , 𝑃∗; 𝑄𝐴, 𝑄𝐵, 𝑄) +  𝑃𝐵
∗(𝑄𝐵, 𝑄𝐴, 𝑄)𝐷𝐵(𝑃𝐵
∗ , 𝑃𝐴
∗, 𝑃∗; 𝑄𝐵, 𝑄𝐴, 𝑄) − 𝐼𝐴
− 𝐼𝐵 
The first order condition for 𝐼𝐴 is: 
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
𝑑𝑃𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
[𝐷𝐴 + 𝑃𝐴
∗
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑃𝐴
 ] + 𝑃𝐴
∗
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
[
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑃𝐵
 
𝑑𝑃𝐵
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑃 
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
] +
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
𝑑𝑃𝐵
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
[𝐷𝐵 + 𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑃𝐵
]
+ 𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
[
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑃𝐴
𝑑𝑃𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑃
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
] − 1 = 0 
It is important to be clear as to the comparison we now engage into. We start by assuming that we 
are at the pre-merger level of prices and at the pre-merger level of investment, so that the pre-merger 
FOCs for both the investment decision and the pricing decisions are satisfied and evaluate the post-
merger investment FOC at that point. Because the price setting FOC is satisfied, our post-merger 
FOC can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑃𝐴
∗
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
[
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑃𝐵
 
𝑑𝑃𝐵
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑃 
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑄𝐴
] + 𝑃𝐵
∗
𝜕𝑄𝐴
𝜕𝐼𝐴
[
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑃𝐴
𝑑𝑃𝐴
∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑃
𝑑𝑃∗
𝑑𝑄𝐴
+
𝜕𝐷𝐵
𝜕𝑄𝐴
] − 1 = 0 
 
Comparing the FOCs before and after merger we see that the post-merger FOC has an added set of 
terms. So the first term minus 1 would be equal to zero but not the second term. The sign of this 
second term will then determine whether investment incentives are higher after the merger. The sign 
of this term is the sign of the bracketed part of it. The first term in brackets is positive: an increase in 
the quality of good A leads to a higher price for A, and this increases the demand for product B. By 
contrast, the second term is negative: a higher quality for A leads to lower prices at non-merging 
entities and this decreases the demand for product B. The third term is an old acquaintance: it is the 
direct cannibalisation of B’s sales due to the improvement of the quality of product A. This effect 
already existed in our model with fixed prices. As before, it leads to less investment in innovation. 
Hence the additional effect of allowing for endogenous price is the sum of the other two terms in the 
bracket. As those two terms have opposite signs, can we say anything about the likely net effect? It 
seems reasonable to assume that the indirect effect through the price of non-merging parties would 
become relatively more important as the number and significance of these parties increases compared 
to the significance of merging party B. If that conjecture is correct then introducing price endogeneity 
would be more likely to lead to lower innovation by the merging parties when the merging parties 
account for a relatively low share of the industry. 
So far, we have compared the FOCs at the pre-merger price and investment equilibrium. 
However, we also know that, for any level of investment, the equilibrium prices of the merging parties 
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will be higher after the merger. The main effect of this price effect is to increase the profit margins 
of the merging parties. As the result, the value of gaining extra sales by improving the product is 
higher post-merger. This implies higher investment in innovation. 
Overall then, introducing endogenous pricing adds to main effects to the merger: an own price 
effect that leads to higher innovation and an indirect effect on the price of other parties which can 
either increase or decrease innovation, with a decrease more likely if the merging parties are relatively 
small. 
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Appendix B: Mergers 
 
Bayer’s recent M&A activity 
 
Year Company 
purchased/target 
Main 
Geographical 
markets involved 
 
Product/Main activity of 
target company 
 
2015 SeedWorks India Pvt. Ltd India  Breeding, production and 
marketing of hybrid seeds of 
tomato, hot pepper, okra and 
gourds 
2015 proPlant Gesellschaft für 
Agrar- und 
Umweltinformatik mbH 
Germany Agricultural digitalization: 
provider of plant health 
diagnosis and infection level 
warning service 
2014 Biagro Group Argentina, Brazil Production and distribution of 
biological seed treatment 
solutions 
2014 Granar S.A. Paraguay 
 
Breeding, production and 
marketing of improved seed 
(especially soybean seed) 
adapted to the growing 
conditions in subtropical 
regions 
2014 E. I. DuPont de Nemours 
and Company  
(acquisition of land 
management assets) 
United States. 
Canada, Mexico, 
Australia, New 
Zealand 
Forestry and range & pasture 
business segments 
2013 PROPHYTA Biologischer 
Pflanzenschutz GmbH 
Germany Supply of biological crop 
protection products 
2013 Wehrtec Tecnologia 
Agricola Ltda 
 
Brazil Production of soybean seed  
2013 Agricola Wehrmann Ltda  Brazil  Soybean business 
2013 Melhoramento Agropastoril 
Ltda 
Brazil Soy Germplasm Bank 
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2013 FN Semillas S.A.  Argentina  Breeding, production and 
marketing of improved 
soybean seeds  
2012 Abbott & Cobb Inc. United States, 
Mexico, Australia 
and Asia 
Watermelon and melon seed 
business 
2012 AgraQuest, Inc. United States, 
Global  
Supply of innovative 
biological pest management 
solutions based on natural 
microorganisms  
2011 Hornbeck Seed Company, 
Inc. 
United States  Supply of  soybean, rice, and 
wheat varieties; in-house 
soybean 
breeding program and a 
proprietary 
soybean germplasm. 
2011 Raps GbR 
 
Germany Oilseed rape seed business 
and breeding material 
2009 Athenix Corporation United States Herbicide tolerance and insect 
control trait development 
platform, particularly for corn 
and soybeans 
2007 Stoneville Pedigreed Seed 
Company 
United States Cotton seed production 
2006 California Planting Cotton 
Seed Distributors, Inc. 
United States Development, production, 
and distribution of cotton 
planting seeds 
2006 Reliance Genetics LLC United States Cotton production 
2005 Associated Farmers 
Delinting, Inc. (acquisition 
of intangible assets and the 
property, plant and 
equipment required for the 
production of cotton seeds) 
United States Cotton seed production  
 
2004 Gustafson United States, 
Canada and Mexico 
Manufacture and marketing 
of seed treatment products 
and related technical 
equipment. 
2004 Bilag Industries Private Ltd, 
India (shares buy-back in a 
joint venture) 
India Manufacture of 
agrochemicals  
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2002 Aventis CropScience 
Holding S.A. 
Global Crop protection, 
biotechnology and 
agrochemical specialties 
2001 Syngenta AG  
(acquisition of corn 
herbicide  MIKADO®) 
Europe  Crop protection and herbicide 
2000 Novartis  
(acquisition of FLINT® line 
of crop fungicides) 
Global Crop protection 
2000 Misung Ltd.  
(acquisition of remaining 
interest of Joint Venture) 
South Korea Development and marketing 
of a wide range of crop 
protection products 
1999 pbi Home & Garden Limited United Kingdom Supply of plant protection 
products and Fertilisers for 
amateur gardeners 
1998 Zeneca  
(acquisition of seed 
treatment business) 
United Kingdom Crop protection  
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Monsanto’s recent M&A Activity 
 
 Year  Company 
purchased/tar
get 
Main 
Geographical 
markets 
involved 
 
Product/Main activity of target company 
 
2016  Vitalfields 
 
Europe Digital agriculture innovation and farm 
management software 
2016 TargetGene 
(acquisition of 
undisclosed 
equity stake) 
Israel  Genome-editing technologies 
2014  BioAgAllicanc
e 
United States Alliance with Novozyme to work on 
microbial solutions 
2013 Agradis, Inc. United States  Development of sustainable agricultural 
solutions. Includes a collection of microbes 
that can improve crop productivity 
2013 Rosetta Green 
Ltd  
 
Israel Identification and use of unique genes to 
guide key processes in major crops 
including corn, soybeans and cotton 
2013 Grass Roots 
Biotechnology  
 
United States Gene expression and other agriculture 
technologies 
2013 Dieckmann 
GmbH & CO. 
KG  
Germany Breeding of oilseed rape and rye seeds 
2013 The Climate 
Corporation  
United States Weather data analysis 
2012 Precision 
Planting, Inc.  
United States Planting technology development 
2012 Beeologics  
 
Israel Development of biological tools to provide 
targeted control of pests and diseases 
2011 Divergence, 
Inc. 
United States Research and development services for 
genomics and informatics on agriculture 
and infectious diseases, as well as products 
for the control of parasites 
2011 Pannon Seeds  Hungary Seed processing plant 
2010 Anasac  
 
Chile Corn and soybean processing plant  
2009 Westbred United States  Focus on wheat germplasm 
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2009 MDM 
(acquisition of 
equity stake) 
Brazil Cotton seed business 
2008 Aly 
Participacoes 
Ltda 
Brazil  Sugarcane breeding and research and 
development in plant applied genomics 
2008 Marmot, S.A. Guatemala, 
Central America, 
and South 
America 
Hybrid corn seed production and provider 
of corn, sorghum, forage sorghum, 
soybeans, and pastures (grass-type seeds) 
2008 De Ruiter 
Seeds Group 
B.V. 
Europe, Global  Breeding and production of hybrid 
vegetable seeds (including crops such as 
tomatoes, cucumbers, melons, peppers and 
rootstock). Provider of products to growers 
within the protected-culture vegetable seed 
market. 
2008 Evogene Ltd 
(acquisition of 
equity stake) 
Israel Focus on crop productivity 
2007 Agroeste 
Sementes 
Brazil Hybrid corn seed production 
2007 Delta and Pine 
Land Company 
United States  Commercial breeding, production and 
marketing of cotton planting seed. Also 
breeding, production and marketing of 
soybean planting seed. 
2005 Emergent 
Genetics, Inc. 
United States, 
India  
Cotton seed business 
2005 Icoria 
(agricultural 
division) 
United States  Biotechnologies  
2005 Seminis, Inc. United States, 
Global  
Development, growth and marketing of 
fruit and vegetable seeds 
2004 Channel Bio 
Corporation 
United States  Production and marketing of seeds 
(specialising in corn) 
1998 Plant Breeding 
International 
Cambridge 
Ltd. and PBI 
Saatzucht 
GmbH 
Europe Production and marketing of new and 
improved crop varieties. Includes 
significant breeding programs for winter 
wheat, barley, oil seed rape, beans, peas and 
potato 
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Dupont Pioneer’s recent M&A activity 
 
Table . Mergers and acquisitions of DuPont Pioneer (1995-2015) 
  1995-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 Subtotal 
Number of Deals  1 10 1 12 
of which         
seeds, agriculture products (crops, 
cereals, etc.) 1 7 1 9 
traditional Fertilisers / pesticides / 
chemicals  - - - - 
biotech (pesticides, other) - 1 - 1 
others (IT software) - 2 - 2 
Total transaction volume*, USDm n/a n/a n/a   
*based on publicly disclosed 
information         
 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International was acquired by El DuPont de Nemours & Co in 1999. Since 
then this division manages the agriculture business of Dupont. By the end of 2014 the annual net 
sales figure of the division reached almost USD 11.3bn. Unlike its rivals, mostly Monsanto and 
Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred was less acquisitive. We identified 11 deals where Pioneer was buyer of 
the seeds assets (Table 3). Most acquisitions were announced in 2008-2011 and completed in 2010-
2014. Two of the acquisitions are software deals (Farms Technology,LLC which provides Internet-
based procurement applications and Map Shots, Inc., which is active in precision agriculture software 
sales). 
The majority of DuPont Pioneer’s transactions (9 out of 11 deals) are acquisitions of seeds 
producers: two of them based in India, one in South Africa, and the rest were US incorporated seed 
companies.  In 2008 DuPont launched the PROaccess platform which enables the company to sell its 
seeds to more growers through a network of distributors via special distribution agreements. Over the 
period 2008-2011, Pioneer acquired many of its partners of PROaccess platform including 
AgVenture, Hoegemeyer Hybrids, NuTech Seed, Seed Consultants, Terral Seed (all deal announced 
in 2010), and Doebler’s Pennsylvania Hybrids (2011). No transaction data was disclosed on any of 
DuPont’s deals.  
Interestingly, Pioneer Hi-Bred was more involved in divestments than in acquisitions over the 
period under review. In 2014 the company sold pesticides business assets to its rivals such as Bayer, 
Sumimoto Chemicals, Mitsui, S&W Seed, and Syngenta. Over the last 5 years Pioneer continued to 
sell pesticides and chemical assets while acquiring mostly seeds companies. 
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Syngenta’s recent M&A activity 
 
Table . Mergers and acquisitions of Syngenta (2000-2015) 
  2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 Subtotal 
Number of Deals  6 16 8 30 
of which         
seeds, agriculture products (crops, 
cereals, etc.) 5 11 4 20 
traditional Fertilisers / pesticides / 
chemicals  - - - - 
biotech (pesticides, other) - 1 2 3 
others (IT, peat, distribution, animal 
feed, etc.) 1 4 2 7 
Total transaction volume*, USDm 654,28 607,62 741,57 2 003,47 
 
Syngenta emerged as a spin-off, after the merger between the agrochemical business of 
pharmaceutical corporation AstraZeneca and the seeds and crop protection business of Novartis. 
Between 2000 and 2015 Syngenta continued steady M&A activity; however the company pursued 
smaller size targets compared to Monsanto. Its biggest deal was acquisition of a Belgian biotech 
company Devgen (closed in 2014) for USD 512,6m. 
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Vilmorin’s recent M&A activity 
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PART V: Country Reports 
 
Chapter 1: Brazil2290 
 
Murilo Lubambo 
 
1.1. The Food Value Chain 
 
Brazil plays a major role in the world food value chain, as one of the greatest producers of agricultural 
and livestock products. It is the world`s largest supplier of coffee beans, oranges and sugar cane. It 
has been among the top five leading producers and suppliers of corn, dry beans, soybeans, tropical 
fruits, meat, milk and beer.2291  
Brazil went through a liberalisation programme in the early 90s. Despite that, some claim that 
the Brazilian economy remains comparatively closed compared to other emerging economies: its 
integration in Global Value Chains is lower than the average.2292 This may be explained by the 
persistence of a strategy of industrial policy which promotes domestic production of inputs in key 
sectors and intermediate products, relying on subsidies and local content rules. 
The primary sector of the economy accounts for 5.2% of the Brazilian GDP.2293 Brazilian 
agriculture is highly developed in certain geographical areas, supplying the internal and export 
markets. Some recent reports have assessed the performance of Brazilian agriculture.2294 According 
to the OECD, “Brazil is projected to maintain its role as a leading supplier to international food and 
agriculture markets over the next decade while also meeting the needs of an expanding and 
increasingly wealthy population.”2295 There is strong institutional support to the development of 
agriculture research and technology through the public entity EMBRAPA.2296 In other areas, 
however, agriculture remains inefficient and without any expressive technical developments. The 
large-scale farming is generally carried out in very large estates. Reports say that around 45% of rural 
land is concentrated in estates over 1000 hectares (ha), which represents less that 1% of total number 
of rural estates.2297 
The export-oriented markets attract a great deal of intermediaries in the agriculture wholesale 
and trading sectors. The concerns about the appeal of the products abroad has naturally led to the 
development of certain voluntary, higher quality standards. In general, the best products (eg fruits 
from the Northeast of the country) end up in developed markets. The expansion of the agricultural 
frontier towards the Equatorial forest and the Northeast of the country raises concerns in terms of 
                                                          
2290 This fiche reflects the law as it was on 31st August 2017 and consider events which took place until this date. 
2291 http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#rankings/countries_by_commodity  
2292 Araújo, S. and D. Flaig (2016), “Quantifying the Effects of Trade Liberalisation in Brazil: A Computable General 
Equilibrium Model (CGE) Simulation”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1295, OECD Publishing, 
Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jm0qwmff2kf-en   
2293 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS&country=BRA  
2294 OECD (2015), Innovation, Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability in Brazil, OECD Food and Agricultural 
Reviews, OECD Publishing Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264237056-en; OECD (2015), “Brazil”, in 
Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris  
2295 OECD/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2015-en  Chapter 2 Brazilian agriculture: Prospects and 
challenges p. 61 
2296 https://www.embrapa.br/en/quem-somos  
2297 https://www.oxfam.org.br/sites/default/files/arquivos/relatorio-terrenos_desigualdade-brasil.pdf p. 8 
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environmental sustainability. The market for inputs is key to keep up with this expansion. Producers 
of agricultural machines, seed developers and multipliers, livestock genetics, feed and fertilising 
companies, all play a role in this process. 
There is a striving food processing industry, concentrated in South and Southeast of the 
country. In this intermediary sector, important domestic and the conglomerate multinational groups 
interact. In some sectors (orange juice and meat) there is a high degree of verticalisation. The whole 
agribusiness chain (considering inputs, agriculture and livestock, industry and related services) 
accounts for 21.35% of the GDP.2298 
Moreover, large national and international groups are active in the wholesale and retail 
markets. In 2015, the Brazilian food retail market has achieved R$ 315.8 billion (around US$ 80 
billion) in revenues, which represent 5.89% of the GDP.2299 The increase of the medium class meant 
a diversification of the diet of the average Brazilian. More products were in demand and the industry 
and retail have had to adapt to new choices and tastes. 
There has been a special concern with family, small sized agricultural production and how to integrate 
those in the value chains.2300 It represents around 70% of the food consumption of the internal 
market.2301 Land reform is a pressing and ongoing concern.2302 The support of the Worker`s Party 
(“PT” in the Portuguese acronym) by the Landless Workers Movement (“MST” in the Portuguese 
acronym) meant a relative decrease in the number of protests.2303 Despite the peak in 2003-2006, it 
fell in 2007-2010. 2304 The recent political instability is likely to raise again the level of tension and 
may lead to more invasions or occupations of land owned by companies, for instance, to protest 
against transgenic seeds and pesticides.2305 
As to the fight against poverty, the Zero Hunger programme was the first landmark social 
programme of the former Worker`s Party government. It consisted initially in a national wide set of 
policies to eradicate hunger in the territory. Some of its components were progressively, and more 
successfully, translated into the programme Bolsa Familia, which quickly gained prominence. It 
mainly consists in a monthly allowance given to the women, heads of poor families in need, provided 
that they fulfill some conditions (eg keep children at school, pre-natal care…). The Bolsa Familia 
programme was key to consolidate the Worker`s Party label as a socially oriented political group.  
Discounting some excesses in the marketing of the policies in order to garner prestige and political 
gains, its merits were widely recognized from a technical perspective, nationally and internationally. 
In fact, it achieved consistent results in line with the recommendations of the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation.2306 FAO is currently headed by a Brazilian, Dr. Jose Graziano, former 
Extraordinary Minister for Food Security. He was elected and re-elected with the support of several 
countries, which recognised in him the merits of the Brazilian policies. 
                                                          
2298 http://www.cepea.esalq.usp.br/upload/kceditor/files/Pib_Cepea_1994_2015_V2.xlsx 
2299 http://www.abrasnet.com.br/economia-e-pesquisa/ranking-abras/os-numeros-do-setor/  
2300 Formerly a Ministry, the Secretary for Family Farming and Rural Development is now located in the Ministry of the 
Civil Cabinet, which is closer to the Office of the President. 
2301 http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2015/07/agricultura-familiar-produz-70-dos-alimentos-consumidos-
por-brasileiro  
2302 The National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), also linked to the Civil Cabinet, is responsible 
to carry out land reform in Brazil. 
2303 http://oglobo.globo.com/politica/mst-governo-lula-teve-20-menos-de-invasoes-de-terra-que-de-fh-2832226  
2304 https://www.oxfam.org.br/sites/default/files/arquivos/relatorio-terrenos_desigualdade-brasil.pdf  
2305http://g1.globo.com/pernambuco/noticia/2013/10/agricultores-ocupam-unidade-de-empresa-que-produz-
transgenicos.html  
2306 See the FAO report on the Brazilian initiatives http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5335o.pdf  
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1.2. Regulatory Framework of the Food Sector in Brazil 
 
1.2.1. General Introduction  
 
The justifications for the existence of regulation in the food sector are varied and go much beyond 
the inability of the marketplace to deal with structural problems.2307 
Agriculture is a sensitive market given its specific characteristics, eg the risk of crop 
destruction and the exogenous determination of prices. The cyclical nature of production, the long-
term response that is needed to increase demand, subject to sudden and dramatic supply shocks 
requires some level of government intervention and coordination in order to avoid crises of over or 
under-production.  
Other segments of the food chain require regulation or intervention. Food processing requires 
the definition of health and hygiene standards. Retail requires regulation for reasons of information 
asymmetry of final consumers. Inputs, such as seeds and pesticides, require safety standards. This 
flows under the umbrella of the regulations of risk and protection of vulnerable parties. It involves 
decisions on how to evaluate information, how to balance costs and benefits and how to value, 
manage and assess risks.2308 
One could argue that in developing or emergent economies, such as Brazil, regulation and 
competition in the agriculture and food chain sectors should be carefully designed and analysed, given 
their impact in nutrition and health for the population that cannot afford the importation of food 
products. It could be argued that regulation should be adequate to the particular situation and 
development needs of the country. This forms part of the government duty to fulfil its social 
commitments to ensure the right to food. In this sense, access to food and water should be a key 
concern for regulators. Issues of unequal bargaining power, such as in the case of small farmers and 
cooperatives, may also require special legislation.  
 
1.2.2. The legal nature of the Regulation of the food sector 
 
In fact, the Brazilian Constitution recognises the right to food as a fundamental right,2309 and this is 
explicit since 2010. While this recognition was the result of the approval of the Constitutional 
Amendment n. 64, from a bill introduced in 2003, a fundamental right to food (and water) could 
always be derived from the principle of human dignity, the right to life and the right to health.2310 
The Constitution also provides the legal basis for the regulation of food supply and stocks and the 
inspection of food and beverages.2311 The Constitution and the Civil Code ensure freedom of contract 
and the Consumer Code establishes special rights to consumers in contracts. 
                                                          
2307 For a classic text, see Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Reprint edition, Harvard University Press 1984) 
Chapter I. 
2308 For an exposition see Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, University of Chicago Law Review. 
Vol. 63, No. 4. (Autumn, 1996), pp. 1423-1461. 
2309 See art. 5, art. 6. See also art. 7, IV, art. 208, VII, art. 227 (caput), 
2310 Lubambo de Melo, Murilo Otavio “Direito Fundamental à Água” in Anais do II Congresso Jurídico de Estudantes de Direito, 2003, 
Recife, 2003. 
2311 See art. 23, VIII and art. 200 VI. 
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The result of the liberalisation programme was the creation of a model of regulatory reform 
based on independent regulatory agencies, set up from 1998. They exert regulatory powers in each 
of the areas reserved for them. In the health and food safety area, the main body is the Brazilian 
Health Regulatory Agency – ANVISA, the powers of which are described later. 
The different aspects of the regulation of the food chain in Brazil are expressed in the form of 
infra-constitutional norms such as laws, decrees, ministerial regulations and agency resolutions. The 
federal norms must be published in Diário Oficial (Official Gazette) and most of them are available 
online. The system of federalism also leaves to States and municipalities the regulation of same 
aspects of the production and consumption with a local interest.  
Brazil is also part of Mercosur, together with Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela 
(currently suspended). It is an imperfect customs union, with a common external-tariff on non-
member countries, despite several exceptions. This institutional set-up enhances cooperation in terms 
of agricultural policy and provides for an exchange of regulatory initiatives. The respective ministers 
of agriculture have a forum to meet in the political level, whereas working sub-group n 8 provides a 
technical arena for discussions.2312 However, Mercosur`s normative reach and impact in relation to 
internal regulations for food is rather limited, except indirectly, by means of the treaties related to 
consumer protection and intellectual property. 
 
1.2.3. Stakeholders and Policy Framing 
 
Several players in the food chain interact in the process of setting up the regulation of the sector. It is 
indeed necessary to know which are the key interests influencing regulators and how interests should 
be balanced and taken into account.2313 
The economic players in the market (farmers, cooperatives, food processors/manufacturers, 
industrial groups, traders and retailers) are the primary addressees of the regulations. The 
government, with its bureaucratic institutions and agencies, has its own policy interests and agenda. 
One could add the role of the national confederations of agriculture, industry and services. More 
specific to food products, the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association, the Association of Exporters 
of Citric Juices and the Brazilian Association of Slaughterhouses are examples of active and 
politically influential entities in the primary sector. The Brazilian Association of Food Industry 
(ABIA) and the Brazilian Association of Supermarkets (ABRAS) are powerful associations that 
gather interests and lobby for the regulation of their sectors. Small farmer`s associations were 
important stakeholders in relation to land access and seeds, especially during the time when the 
Worker`s Party ruled. Civil entities, such as Proteste and the Brazilian Institute for Consumer Defence 
(IDEC), are active in consumer rights and constantly monitor and pressure for an adequate regulation 
of labelling. 
Lobbying is exerted towards the activities of the Parliament (for bills), of the executive power 
(for decrees and ministerial regulations) and of the independent administrative authorities. Regulatory 
agencies constantly carry out public consultations on new regulations, in which several stakeholders 
take part. 
 
                                                          
2312 http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/492/1/estructura.noviembre_es.pdf 
2313 Tony Prosser, “Theorising Utility Regulation” Modern Law Review. n 62, March 1999, 206-209 
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1.2.4. Courts and Regulations  
 
Federal courts in Brazil have the power to review administrative acts by federal authorities and to 
issue injunctions against those acts. State courts also review acts by state entities. There are Regional 
Courts of Appeals and further recourse to the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) or the Supreme Court 
(STF) in certain cases. Therefore, all the decisions taken by administrative agencies such as ANVISA, 
CADE and other federal and state authorities are subject to judicial review, as will be illustrated. This 
involves an assessment of the legality of the act and the proportionality of the decision. Courts have 
the power to annul administrative acts, such as general resolutions and individual orders. 
  
1.3. Production 
 
1.3.1. Acquisition of Land by Foreigners 
 
The importance of a regulatory framework for investments in the food sector has been emphasised in 
several arenas. The Federal Constitution establishes a general principle of non-discrimination for 
investments, except for specific sectors clearly defined. This means that the Brazilian legal system 
ensures equitable treatment for both national and foreign investors. There are also measures taken for 
national security reasons. An example of that are the restrictions on rural land ownership by 
foreigners, through the imposition of conditions and limits. 
Both the Law 5,709 of October 1971 and the Law 8,269 of February 19932314 apply to land 
purchases and land leases by foreigners and, more controversially, to Brazilian companies controlled 
by foreigners. The following limits are established: 
- Foreigners may acquire or lease up to three ‘special modules’ without seeking approval. Each 
‘special module’ ranges from 5 to 100 hectares depending on the region. 
- For foreign natural persons, there is a limit in acquisition or lease of fifty modules.  
- For foreign juridical persons, there is a limit in acquisition or lease of one hundred modules. 
- Acquisitions over twenty modules require approval by National Institute for Colonisation and 
Agrarian Reform.  
- Foreign companies can only acquire rural land for agricultural, cattle-raising, industrial or 
development projects.  
- No more than 25% of the rural areas of any municipality may be owned by foreigners, and no 
more than 10% may be owned by foreigners of the same nationality. 
Following concerns of “land grabbing” in the aftermath of the global food price hikes of 2007-
20082315, Brazil published on 23 August 2010 a Presidential Order, approving a Government Legal 
Opinion (Parecer CGU/AGU No. 01/2008) providing that on rural land-ownership and leases, 
Brazilian companies that are controlled by foreigners are also subject to the legal regime applicable 
to foreign companies. There have been claims that this reinterpretation of the laws hampered the 
development of investments in agriculture by foreign companies in Brazil.  
After that, the State of São Paulo's Internal Affairs Division of Justice issued a legal opinion to 
all land registries of Sao Paulo which seems contrary to the Federal Government Opinion. In 2016, 
                                                          
2314 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L5709.htm and 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8629.htm  
2315 OECD Chapter 2, p. 91-92 
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the Supreme Court of Brazil suspended the effects of the State’s legal opinion.2316 There is also a 
pending claim by the influential Rural Society of Brazil to reinstate that Brazilian companies, 
controlled or not by foreigners, should not be subject to the restrictions, based on the principle of 
equality. They argue that agribusiness needs scale and volume of resources in order to attract 
investments. 
 
1.3.2. Agricultural Policy and Food Supply 
 
Law 8,171 of 17 January 19912317 sets out the Brazilian agricultural policy, which is supply-oriented 
by promoting food supply as one of its main tenets. It establishes the principles for research and 
technical assistance, rural credit and insurance, agricultural inspection, and the production, deposit 
and sale of stocks. When it comes to agricultural products, basic foodstuffs (eg. rice, beans, wheat) 
should be given special attention with regard to the minimum price policy. 
The National Food Supply Company (CONAB) is a public enterprise responsible for the management 
of food supply stocks in Brazil. Created in 1990, it regulates the supply of the Brazilian internal 
market. CONAB manages the supply of food stocks and implements the policy of minimum price of 
the federal government and other mechanisms to sustain agricultural products prices. The 
programmes of acquisition of foodstuffs by the federal government consists in the purchase of 
foodstuffs in order to level off the rent of small producers, that is, family farmers and their 
cooperatives. However, the programme has been subject to successive budget cuts and was granted 
340 million reais in 2017 (around 100 million USD).2318 
CONAB also organises the national framework of warehouses and the wholesale of food 
products. In order to do that, it gathers detailed data and statistics on prices and crop production. As 
a public company, it establishes internal rules to organise its activities and procedures. CONAB is 
responsible for the delivery of food kits to communities affected by climate disasters. It carries out 
the sale of public stocks by legal means, including through electronic auctions and the programme 
for spot market sales focussed on micro producers (farming and livestock).  
Box I analyses and justifies the available mechanisms for agricultural price support in Brazil: 
 
Box I: Mechanisms for agricultural price support in Brazil 
 
“Market price support aims to reduce price volatility, protect farmers’ incomes, improve the 
availability of food supplies and offset the additional costs of producers in regions that are distant 
from the main markets and ports. There are also specific programmes that target small-scale 
agriculture, with some purchases being distributed via food programmes. 
Minimum guaranteed prices are reviewed annually, covering thirty-three crops. They are announced 
regionally through the PGPM (Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos) by the Secretary of 
Agricultural Policy (SPA) operated by the National Food Supply Agency (Companhia Nacional de 
Abastecimento, CONAB). This mechanism covers a great variety of crops from rice, wheat, maize, 
cotton, soybeans, to regional crops like cassava, beans, açaí, guaraná, sisal, and a few livestock 
products like cow and goat milk, and honey. Other price support mechanisms for commercial 
                                                          
2316 http://www.conjur.com.br/2016-set-13/stf-suspende-parecer-compra-terra-rural-estrangeiro  
2317 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8171.htm 
2318 http://www.canalrural.com.br/noticias/rural-noticias/orcamento-programa-aquisicao-alimentos-cai-65687 
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agriculture are the direct government purchases (Aquisição do Governo Federal, AGF) and the 
provision financing of storage by the FEPM (Financiamento para Estocagem de Produtos 
Agropecuários integrantes da Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos) former Empréstimo do 
Governo Federal-EGF. The [Secretariat of Family Farming and Agrarian Development] supports the 
development of family farming, and makes use of the minimum prices policy. Instruments that 
support prices and target small-scale agriculture are government purchases similar to AGF (Programa 
de Aquisição de Alimentos, PAA) and the minimum prices programme for family farms, (Programa 
de Garantia de Preços para a Agricultura Familiar, PGPAF). Under PAA, CONAB makes direct 
acquisitions from family farms at market prices, with the product either going into stock or distributed 
as part of a food programme. The PGPAF ensures that small-scale farmers receive a guaranteed price 
based on the average regional production cost of family farms.” 
 
Source: OECD/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015)2319 
 
States and municipalities also possess regulatory powers. To illustrate, States can establish periods 
of non-cultivation of soybeans, beans and others to avoid the proliferation of plagues, any violation 
being subject to sanctions. In addition, States are responsible for regulating the State`s central food 
services for the wholesale supply of horticultural products from small farmers and cooperatives. 
 
1.3.3. Production and Trade  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA) formulates and carries out the 
government`s policy in relation to agriculture and agribusiness. It regulates, classifies and inspects 
agricultural products in Brazil, including imported foodstuffs. MAPA coordinates the national system 
for agricultural and livestock protection, in which state entities also play a role. 
It has a stable structure of civil servants, led by a minister, politically appointed by the 
President. The main Secretariats dealing with food related regulation are the following: Secretariat 
of Agricultural Protection (SDA); Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock Development and 
Cooperativism (SDC); and Secretariat of International Agribusiness Relations (SRI).2320 Connected 
to MAPA, apart from the Coffee Policy Council, there is the Agribusiness Council, which gathers the 
Sectoral Consultative Chambers for more than 30 products or chains. Since March 2017, the Ministry 
of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services has been responsible for fisheries and aquaculture, previously 
under the MAPA structure. 
Rural debt remains a challenge in Brazil. As underlined by the WTO Trade Policy Review 
Report, Brazilian authorities generally justify the rural credit system, as a means to correct a market 
failure resulting in insufficient credit allocation to medium, small and micro producers, and the 
financing mechanism, due to the importance of family farming on the supply for internal 
consumption, thus, food security.2321 
Agricultural foreign trade policy, as part of the foreign trade policy, is defined by the Foreign 
Trade Chamber, the council of which is composed by seven Ministries and which may issue 
                                                          
2319 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris. P. 94 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2015-
en 
2320 Food and Agriculture US Report p. 3 
2321 WTO TPR 2013, parag. 4.31, p. 124  
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Resolutions. In addition, both the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services, the Ministry of 
Finance, through its Secretariat of Federal Revenue, and the Central Bank have a role in the 
administration of import and export of products for commercial use, including foodstuffs. 
 
1.4. Access to Seeds 
 
1.4.1. Seeds Market 
 
Brazil has a solid seed industry. The value of the domestic market was estimated in R$ 10 billion 
(around US$ 3 billion) in 2015. Soybeans and corn seeds constitute 74% of the market in Brazil, as 
shown in the chart below:2322 
 
 
 
Source: Chart adapted from the 2015 Report of the Brazilian Association of Seeds and Seedlings2323  
 
1.4.2. Food Security  
 
Law 11,346 of 15 September, 20062324 establishes the National System for Nutritional and Food 
Security in order to ensure the human right to adequate food. It emphasises the sovereign right of 
states to make decisions on food production and consumption. 
The system is managed by several institutions from the public sphere as well as private 
entities. The National Council for Nutritional and Food Security is the main body to set guidance and 
priorities for the food policy. It was regulated by the Decree 7,272 of 25 August, 2010,2325 which sets 
out the National Policy for Food Security. An executive chamber is responsible for specific measures 
of monitoring and assessing the policy and drafting four-year long plans. 
                                                          
2322 See Dow/Dupont merger analysis in the Report of the Commissioner Burnier, p. 23-24, AC 08700.005937/2016-61.  
2323 Available at: http://www.abrasem.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Anuario_ABRASEM_2015_2.pdf 
2324 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/lei/l11346.htm 
2325 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2010/decreto/d7272.htm 
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The chamber approved in May 2016 the Plan for 2016/2019, in which the United Nations 
participated through the Centre of Excellence against Hunger of the World Food Programme.2326 
There are 9 challenges, 121 goals and 99 measures, with specific indexes. Since this policy was highly 
linked with the Worker`s Party agenda, there are doubts on the extent to which the current government 
will stick to it.  
 
1.4.3. Protection of Seeds 
 
The Brazilian Entreprise for Agriculture Research, EMBRAPA, is a public company founded in 
1973. EMBRAPA has almost 10.000 employees and an annual budget of around 3 billion reais 
(roughly 900 million USD).2327 It undertakes high-profile research and development activities and 
technology transfer in agriculture and livestock. It develops and markets seeds in cooperation with 
research centres and governments and offers products in competition with other national and 
international companies. EMBRAPA is the owner of relevant patents and software registers, in sole 
or co-ownership, in Brazil and abroad and have made hundreds of requests, still under analysis.2328 It 
also coordinates the national system of research in which federal states entities participate. 
The Brazilian Plant Variety Protection Act (Law 9,456 of 25 April, 1997)2329 protects 
conventional plant breeding techniques, which are not subject to patent protection conferred by the 
Brazilian Industrial Property Law (Law 9,279 of 14 May, 1996).2330 Patent law in Brazil is only 
available to transgenic microorganisms and the processes which lead to production of transgenic 
seeds, plants and its parts (organs, tissues or cells), not to the final product itself.2331 
The plant variety protection extends up to 15 years. In case of vine, fruits, forestry and ornamental 
trees, it extends up to 18 years. Box II summarises the main features of the Brazilian system: 
 
Box II: Brazilian Plant Variety Rights Regime 
 
“Definition  
According to PVP Law, plant variety consists in a variety of any plant genus or species that is 
clearly distinguishable from other known plant varieties by a minimum margin of descriptors and 
by its own denomination, is homogenous and stable in its descriptors throughout successive 
generations and belongs to a species useful in farming and forestry, being described in a publicly 
available and accessible specialized publication, including the component lines of hybrids.  
Only a new plant variety or an essentially derived variety of any genus or species is eligible for 
protection. New plant variety, according to PVP Law, means a variety that has not been offered for 
sale in Brazil for more than 12 months prior to the date of the application for protection and, with 
due regard to the period for commercialization in Brazil, has not been offered for sale in other 
                                                          
2326 http://www.cfn.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/PLANSAN-2016.pdf   
2327 Available at: https://www.embrapa.br/en/quem-somos 
2328 https://www.embrapa.br/en/web/mobile/noticias/-/noticia/12612116/pesquisas-geram-19-patentes-em-doze-meses  
2329 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9456.htm 
2330 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9279.htm 
2331 Rodrigues, Roberta L, Lage, Celso L. S, & Vasconcellos, Alexandre G. (2011). Intellectual property rights related to 
the genetically modified glyphosate tolerant soybeans in Brazil. Anais da Academia Brasileira de Ciências, 83(2), 719-
730. https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0001-37652011000200029 
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countries, with the breeder’s authorization, for more than six years for tree and vine species and 
for more than four years for other species.  
How To Protect  
The application for protection of a new plan variety shall be formalized in a request signed by the 
natural or legal person who has bred the plant variety or his agent and endorsed by the competent 
agency. Such application shall include at least the requirements established in Article 14 of the 
PVP Law.  
Every plant variety shall have a denomination that identifies it, serves as its generic designation 
and conforms to the following criteria for the purposes of protection: (a) it must be unique, and not 
expressed in the form of numerals only; (ii) it must consist of a designation that is different from 
that of a pre-existing plant variety; and (iii) it must not mislead as to the essential characteristics or 
origin of the variety.”  
 
Source: Intellectual Property Guide Brazil 2014, IPO 2332 
 
The National System of Seeds and Plant Seedlings was set out by Law 10,711 of 5 August, 2003.2333 
It establishes a system of certification for seed varieties, which could be done by research institutes 
and agricultural commissions. Some claim that these entities are heavily influenced by seed breeding 
companies.2334 The registration requirements do not apply to agriculture farming, which receives 
special treatment. They can cultivate with local or creole seeds without the need to register. They can 
multiply, sell and distribute the seeds or seedlings among themselves but not to the general market. 
Seed networks with local seed banks explore the local varieties, which, some claim, are more 
adaptable to the specific environments.2335 
The National Program of Seeds and Plant Seedlings for Agriculture Farming was launched in 
the context of preserving food security through the distribution of seeds. The federal government can 
also acquire local seeds in the Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos – PAA, described above, which 
are distributed to farmers afterwards, at no cost. 
Law 10,831 of 23 December, 20032336 recognised organic farming. Decree 7,794 of 20 
August, 20122337 sets out the National Policy for Agroecology and Organic Production, which 
explicitly recognises the role and importance of local varieties. 
 
1.4.4. GMOs 
 
Brazil is the second largest producer of genetically modified (GM) crops in the world after the US: 
in the 2014/2015 planting season, around 90% of the soybean and corn crops was genetically 
modified.2338 
                                                          
2332 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/456358/IP_Guide_Brazil.pdf  
2333 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10.711.htm 
2334 https://www.ileia.org/2016/04/16/seed-banks-national-policy-brazil/  
2335 https://www.ileia.org/2016/04/16/seed-banks-national-policy-brazil/  
2336 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10.831.htm 
2337 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/decreto/d7794.htm 
2338 http://www.soybeansandcorn.com/news/Dec11_14-20145-Brazilian-Soybean-Crop-is-91-GMO-Corn-88-GMO  
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Law 11,105 of 24 March, 2005,2339 sets up an institutional framework to manage the biosafety 
policy. It defines the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), including seeds and 
grains, such as soybeans, corn and sugarcane. The law sets out authorization, inspection and 
monitoring procedures for research and commercial release, production and marketing rules, 
cultivation regimes and restrictions on GMOs in foodstuffs.  
The National Biosecurity Council (CNBS) is a ministerial body responsible for setting the 
guidelines of the biosafety policy. The National Technical Commission for Biosafety (CTNBio), 
under the umbrella of the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology, is a 
multidisciplinary collegiate authority, of a consultative and deliberative nature, for the provision of 
technical advice and support to the Federal Government in the formulation, updating and 
implementation of the policy for GMOs and their derivatives. Moreover, it establishes technical 
safety standards and technical opinions concerning the authorisation for activities which involve 
research and commercial use of GMOs and their derivatives, based on the evaluation of the sanitary 
risks to human health and the environment. 
In October 2016, the CTNBio has approved the biosafety certificates for the importation of 
three varieties of genetically modified corn, two from Monsanto and one from Syngenta. The corn 
would be destined to be used as animal feed and should not be cultivated. This comes in the context 
of problems related to corn stocks and low supply. This decision has not come out without protest. 
Representatives of the small-scale family agriculture sector and some experts expressed concerns as 
to the depth and accuracy of the analysis and the possible risks of deviation in the use of the corn.2340 
Moreover, the first genetically modified sugarcane has been developed by the Sugarcane 
Research Centre and, pending authorization, will be released in the crop 2017/2018.2341 In 2016, the 
CTNBIO has also authorised the production of new soybeans GMOs resistant to herbicide 
DICAMBA, developed by Monsanto.2342 This is part of the strategy to release the third generation of 
GM soya, with several products to be commercially released by 2020.2343 
The Law 11,105, in its article 6, VII, sole paragraph, prohibits the development and sale of 
seeds genetically modified to become sterile after the second generation. Nevertheless, many law 
bills have been proposed to eliminate or condition this prohibition. They originate from 
representatives of the agribusiness and are to the benefit of seed breeding companies, which support 
these initiatives.2344 In case they are adopted, this would increase small farmer`s dependence on those 
companies, since they generally save grown seeds to cultivate the next crop. 
 
1.5. Consumers’ interests  
 
1.5.1. Food and Health Surveillance  
 
                                                          
2339 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/l11105.htm 
2340 https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2016/10/28/milho-transgenico-aprovado-pela-ctnbio-jamais-foi-testado-em-
condicoes-brasileiras/  
2341 http://www.canalrural.com.br/noticias/agricultura/cana-transgenica-tera-uso-comercial-liberado-64892  
2342 http://sfagro.uol.com.br/ctnbio-aprova-soja-transgenica-resistente-ao-herbicida-dicamba/ 
2343 http://zh.clicrbs.com.br/rs/noticia/2016/12/monsanto-prepara-terceira-geracao-de-soja-transgenica-8814192.html 
2344 http://www.cartacapital.com.br/sustentabilidade/brasil-pode-ser-o-primeiro-pais-a-liberar-semente-terminator-
9110.html ; see also http://outraspalavras.net/brasil/ruralistas-tentam-aprovar-sementes-estereis/  
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The Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA) is a regulatory agency characterised by its 
administrative independence, which is ensured by its financial autonomy and the mandate terms for 
its board of directors, composed by five members. Its creation and regulatory powers were defined 
by the Law 9,782 of 26 January 1999.  
The agency is monitored by the Ministry of Health. It exercises health surveillance on the 
production and marketing of products and services, including technologies, processes and ingredients 
that pose health risks.2345 It is competent to regulate the importation of products and to perform 
sanitary inspections at the points of entry to the territory. 
ANVISA has the power to issue general regulations in the form of Resolutions and individual 
decisions to prohibit the sale of products and to determine the recollection from the market of unsafe 
foodstuffs.  
In 2016, ANVISA put in force a new regulation (Resolution 26/2015) for foodstuffs labelling. 
The industry is now under an obligation to include information in clear language on all ingredients 
which may produce allergies. This generated some judicial claims by stakeholders such as milk 
producers’ associations. Recently, the Federal Court of Appeals for the 1st Region confirmed that the 
Resolution applies to both domestically produced and imported products.2346 There has been a public 
consultation on labelling related to lactose and lactose diet2347 and also a related children’s food, who 
may be oversensitive to some minerals.2348 
Some sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations in Brazil are also exercised by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA). Its Secretariat of Agricultural Protection (SDA) 
is responsible for the protection of animal and plant health. It is responsible for the SPS aspects of 
production and international trade of livestock, fruits, vegetables, grains, veterinary drug, plants and 
pesticides.2349 The proposals for negotiation of SPS measures are put forward by the Secretariat of 
International Agribusiness Relations, which also follows the WTO notification procedures in the area. 
In March 2017, there was a blow to the confidence of the Brazilian agriculture protection 
system after the Federal Police uncovered a nation-wide scheme of corruption on the inspection of 
meat and meat products in “Operation Weak Flesh” (Operação Carne Fraca).2350 This involved 
MAPA`s state representatives and federal inspectors who apparently received advantages in exchange 
of turning a blind eye on inspection procedures of meat-packing establishments. Several countries 
announced a temporary ban of importation of meat from Brazil, but have progressively resumed 
imports, given the assurances by the Brazilian government that the problem was under control and 
that the authorities involved were being investigated.2351 
 
1.5.2. Pesticides and Additives 
 
                                                          
2345 http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/contact-us  
2346 http://www.justicaemfoco.com.br/desc-noticia.php?id=118360&nome=Rotulagem-em-produtos-alergenicos-se-
aplica-tanto-aos-produtos-nacionais-quanto-aos-importados  
2347 http://www.brasil.gov.br/saude/2016/09/anvisa-ira-consultar-populacao-sobre-rotulagem-de-alimentos-com-e-sem-
lactose  
2348 http://www.brasil.gov.br/saude/2016/06/anvisa-abre-consulta-sobre-limite-toxicologico-em-comida  
2349 WTO TPR Brazil 2013 p. 65 
2350 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-corruption-food-exports/operation-weak-flesh-takes-bite-out-of-brazils-
meat-exports-idUSKBN16V281 
2351 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-meat-idUSKBN17823W 
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Several institutions are involved in the approval of food additives and agricultural chemicals 
(pesticides and herbicides), under Law 7.802 of July 11 1989.2352 Apart from the ones already referred 
to above (i.e. MAPA and ANVISA), there is the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Natural 
Resources (IBAMA), which forms part of the structure of Ministry of Environment. Box III 
summarises the main features of this regulation: 
  
Box III: Brazilian regulation of pesticides 
 
“ANVISA defines food additives as any ingredient without nutritional benefits deliberately added to 
food to modify its physical, chemical, biological and sensorial characteristics during any stage - 
processing, storage, handling, transportation, etc. Before approved for consumption, any food 
additive is analyzed separately in order to prove its technological need and safety. This analysis 
includes: the relation of the additive to the product it will be incorporated to; its functionality; studies 
and toxicological data which allows an adequate risk assessment; studies on estimates of potential 
ingestion; regulatory framework from other countries; and, international benchmark.  
Depending on its nature, the approval or incorporation of the additive to the food regulatory 
framework may occur with restrictions of use. In this case ANVISA will establish maximum limits 
for the active substance for the specific food product in which the additive will be incorporated. If 
the additive is approved but a safety tolerance is not set, the additive may be used at the level required 
to obtain desired result. […]  
Brazil follows international standards on tolerances of pesticides, herbicides and fungicides on 
agricultural products, and uses Codex Alimentarius as a general reference. The Codex Alimentarius 
Committee of Brazil (CCAB) represents the country in international Codex Committees and 
advocates for the use of Codex standards in the country.  
Based on Codex norms, registration of agricultural chemical is held by a three party committee 
(MAPA, IBAMA, and ANVISA). ANVISA provides toxicological analysis and establishes 
maximum tolerance levels while IBAMA evaluates environmental impact. MAPA is the initial point 
of contact in the product registration process and also the party that deliberates final approval after 
receiving inputs from ANVISA and IBAMA. In order to improve the inspection of pesticides and 
contaminants on vegetables in Brazil, in 2009 the National Program for Pesticides and Contaminants 
Detection was created. The program collects samples of domestic and imported fruit and vegetables, 
such as papaya, apple, pineapple, lettuce, rice, peanut, banana, lemon, acid lime, mango, melon, corn, 
strawberry, pepper, tomato and grape. Imported products must comply with the same requirements 
established for local products.” 
 
Source: Food and Agriculture, US Report p. 10-11 2353  
 
In addition to the Pest Risk Assessment (PRA), MAPA and ANVISA sets out registration and 
inspection requirements for importing meat, dairy, seafood products and plant products, animal feed 
and alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.2354 
                                                          
2352 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L7802.htm 
2353 Brazil: Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards – Narrative. 11 January 2016 Available at: 
https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/brazil-fairs-country-report-0  
2354 For details, see Food and Agriculture US Report p. 10-15. 
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1.5.3. Standards and Local Interests 
 
The Institute of Metrology, Standardisation and Industrial Quality (INMETRO) is responsible for the 
definition of standards. INMETRO is the focal enquiry point in Brazil in relation to the technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) committee of the WTO. In the food area, it sets out regulations on packaging 
and containers, when it comes to the quality and safety of their conditioning. It conducts tests and is 
responsible for the accuracy of weights and measurements. It delegates some of its powers to entities 
in the federal states. 
Technical rules, comprising standards and specifications for packaging and containers are set 
out by the Brazilian Association of Technical Norms (ABNT). It is a member of the International 
Organization for Standardisation (ISO) and other regional entities. It carries out the certification for 
consumer packaging (paper and carton boxes, plastic bags, steel sheet, aluminium cans, tetrapak, PET 
bottles) and regulates the recycling of packaging and containers for food products.2355 
Municipalities can also regulate public food markets in the exercise of its police powers. They 
can impose sanitary inspection taxes. They can also regulate the opening and closing times of markets 
and supermarkets.2356 In 2015/2016, several municipalities adopted local laws prohibiting the 
production or sale of foie gras (goose fat spread). In Sao Paulo, this local law was annulled by the 
State Court, which found it contrary to the State constitution. 
  
1.5.4. Alcoholic Beverages and Consumption 
 
Consumption of alcohol is permitted and socially acceptable in Brazil. As to spirits, Cachaça do Brasil 
(sugar cane liqueur) has been recognised as a geographical indication since 2001, under the terms of 
the TRIPS agreement. The regulation of its use was finally completed in 2016.2357 
Brazil is a great worldwide producer of beer, though consumption per capita is low. The norms 
in relation to the classification, production and inspection of beverages are set by Law 8,918 of 14 
July, 1994, regulated by the Decree 6,871 of 4 June, 2009.2358 
Specific regulation aims at ethical considerations in advertisement in order to avoid 
overconsumption and consumer deception. The National Council for Advertisement Self-Regulation 
- CONAR - is an example of self-regulation in the area. It has the power to send warnings and require 
the removal of poster and TV shots. It has analysed several beer advertisements on ethical grounds, 
including excessive sensuality and undue suggestion to sexual prowess, social success and popularity 
derived from beer consumption. 
                                                          
2355 Food and Agriculture US Report. p. 9  
2356 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarJurisprudencia.asp?s1=645.NUME.%20NAO%20S.FLSV.&base=base
Sumulas  
2357 http://www.agricultura.gov.br/comunicacao/noticias/2016/10/cachaca-com-indicacao-geografica-ganha-
regulamento  
2358 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8918.htm and 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Decreto/D6871.htm 
689 
 
Laws 11,705 of 19 June, 2008 and 12,760 of 20 December, 20122359 have established stricter 
terms of alcohol in the blood while driving (“zero tolerance” approach). The measures have 
significantly reduced road accidents and deaths in Brazil. 
 
1.5.5. Consumer Protection System 
 
Law 8,078 of 11 September, 1990,2360 sets out the norms for consumer protection and defence. 
Articles 6(I) and (III) of the Law state that the protection of the consumer's life, health, and safety 
against risks arising from practices when buying harmful or dangerous products and services is a 
basic consumer right. They should be given adequate and clear information about different products 
and services, with correct specifications for quantity, characteristics, composition, quality and price, 
as well as any risks involved.2361 It provides a list of criminal offences, the penalties of which may 
be higher, if they are related to foodstuffs. 
The National Secretariat for Consumer Policy (SENACON) is part of the Ministry of Justice. 
Together with the State and local consumer agencies (many of them referred to as PROCONs), civil 
entities and public prosecutors and defenders, they form the National System for Consumer 
Protection. They are responsible for enforcing these regulations. SENACON is also responsible for 
coordinating and promoting the recall of products, including foodstuffs. This is the case when 
companies identify a risk for human health or incorrect labelling in foodstuffs already released for 
sale. For example, SENACON promoted the recall of tomato sauces of a brand produced by Heinz, 
which had surpassed the maximum tolerable of rodent hair.2362 Moreover, it monitored the recall of 
peanut sweets and pasta products which had not included the correct information on the presence of 
gluten.2363 Finally, in March 2017, SENACON determined the recall of products originating from 
some meatpacking companies involved in the meat inspection probe (Operation Weak Flesh), 
referred above.2364 
The Secretariat also possesses the power to impose sanctions against the enterprises. To 
illustrate, in 2015, SENACON confirmed the imposition in 2013 of a fine to Parmalat and others for 
incorrect labelling of its UHT milk in relation to fat, carbohydrates and protein levels in breach of 
ANVISA and MAPA regulations.2365 
GMO labelling in Brazil is mandatory since the Decree 4,680 of 24 April 2003.2366 The label 
consists of a transgenic symbol in the shape of a triangle with the letter T inside the triangle.2367 Under 
                                                          
2359 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/lei/l11705.htm and 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12760.htm 
2360 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L8078.htm 
2361 http://brasilcon.org.br/arquivos/arquivos/cdc-en.pdf Art. 31 provides that: “The offer and the presentation of products 
and services must contain information that is clear, direct, precise, comprehensive, and in the Portuguese language 
regarding the characteristics, qualities, quantity, composition, price, warranty, validity and origin, among other pieces of 
information, as well as any risks that the product or service may pose to the consumer's health and safety.” [emphasis 
added] 
2362 http://justica.gov.br/noticias/pelo-de-roedor-provoca-recall-de-molho-de-tomate-heinz 
2363 http://justica.gov.br/noticias/senacon-alerta-para-recall-de-macarroes-barilla 
2364 http://justica.gov.br/noticias/senacon-divulga-desdobramentos-da-operacao-carne-fraca 
2365 http://www.jurisway.org.br/en/article.asp?id_dh=11579  
2366 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2003/d4680.htm 
2367  
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the labelling regulations, consumers must be informed if more than one percent (1%) of a food 
product for human or animal consumption is produced from or contains GMOs.  
In January 2016, Nestle, Pepsico and Bimbo were fined for non-disclosing the presence of 
transgenic organisms in some of their products.2368 The products ranged from salty snacks, biscuits 
and cakes. The total fines reached around 1 million dollars. The authorities considered that these 
companies had violated the right to information and consumer choice.  
 
1.6. Competition Law 
 
1.6.1. Competition Law and Food Value Chains 
 
Competition law in Brazil has gone through some important changes in the past five years. The New 
Law 12,529 of 30 November, 20112369 came into force on May 29, 2012, replacing the old Law 8,884, 
of 1994. 
It was the culmination of a reform, the objective of which was to improve effectiveness of the 
enforcement of competition law. It set out a single authority system under the umbrella of the 
Administrative Council for Economic Defence – CADE, with a subsidiary role by the Ministry of 
Finance in the promotion of competition. It established a pre-merger notification system with changes 
in the notification criteria, the notification criteria being defined by articles art. 88 of the Law and 
CADE’s Resolution n. 2/2012. CADE was given new powers to investigate, prosecute and sanction 
anticompetitive conduct. There were also some changes in the leniency and settlement regime. 
CADE`s Superintendence (SG) assesses concentrations and investigates conducts, while CADE`s 
Tribunal renders the final decisions in the relevant cases. The drivers of the reform were the 
rationalisation of bureaucratic and business costs, already pointed out by the OECD in its peer review 
reports.2370 
A reform started to be envisaged in 2003, in the context of doubts on how a newly elected 
Worker’s Party government would deal with competition law. Thus, the reform was an opportunity 
for the agenda setting of the new government at the time. The process of diffusion/transplantation 
explored the social capital2371 of a generation of lawyers and government officials with access to more 
“modern” systems. The new competition law bill benefitted from seven years of interaction between 
the executive and the legislative branches. Intense lobbying from companies and associations also 
took place. Throughout this period, there was unstable support to the bill by politicians. There was 
specific pressure in the process of approval, which may be evidenced by some amendments to address 
particular situations. A compromise was reached with regulators to raise the notification thresholds 
as soon as the new law came into force. There was also a political compromise to reduce the amount 
of possible fines (percentage-wise and on a turnover basis). 
                                                          
2368 http://www.ibtimes.com/gmo-labeling-requirements-brazil-fines-nestle-pepsico-failing-disclose-genetically-
2259921  
2369 Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12529.htm 
2370 OECD Peer Review (2005) Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/45154362.pdf ; (OECD Peer Review 
(2010) Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/35445196.pdf  
2371 Yves Dezalay, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational 
Legal Order / Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth ; Foreword by Pierre Bourdieu (University of Chicago Press 1996); Yves 
Dezalay and Bryant G Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to 
Transform Latin American States (1 edition, University Of Chicago Press 2002). 
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Competition policy in Brazil is enforced by a centralised administrative system, relying also 
on the judiciary’s and public prosecutors’ cooperation to strengthen enforcement (dawn raids, 
extension of the geographical reach of the law). Decisions are subject to a broad scope of judicial 
review not only at the first instance but also with several instances of appeal. CADE is placed inside 
the bureaucracy of the federal government, but has the powers of an independent agency. It decides 
how it will spend its resources, but it may be subject to budget constraints and cuts from the Central 
Federal Administration. 
Among the challenges for the future, one may cite the backlog of cases. It is necessary that 
CADE speeds up the analysis and investigation of anticompetitive conducts. There is also a pressing 
need for guidelines on fines and remedies, the standard of proof, and vertical conducts2372. The 
following years will be an important test for institutional resilience. There are pending cases with the 
highest economic and political profile ever. They are derived from the Lava Jato (Car Wash) 
investigations, which uncovered an extensive corruption scheme involving top politicians and large 
companies, engaged in cartel and bid-rigging practices.2373 
Competition law in Brazil does not include any a priori sectorial exclusions or exemptions.2374 
Therefore, mergers in the food chain are scrutinised in the same way as all the other economic sectors, 
if they reach the turnover requirements of the law. Likewise, conducts in the food sector are analysed 
irrespective of the level of the chain or its vertical/horizontal nature. The next sections report on 
relevant cases under merger control and conducts decided with regard to each product. 
 
1.6.2. Merger Cases 
 
1.6.2.1. Agricultural Machines 
 
In February 2016, CADE was notified of the acquisition of the control of Precision Planting, a 
subsidiary of Monsanto, by John Deere.2375 In November 2016, CADE`s Superintendence decided 
that the merger was complex. The Superintendence`s report indicated that the transaction could lead 
to high horizontal concentration in the aftermarket of sales of seeders to rural producers. Also, there 
was vertical integration between the seeders and its components. It was considered that there were 
incentives and capacity to discriminate in the aftermarket. There were also concerns related to 
exchange of sensitive information between John Deere and its competitors. The efficiencies were not 
deemed to be sufficient to compensate for the competitive harms.  
SG`s opinion was that the ,merger should not be approved in that manner. Given its global 
scope, the transaction had to be analysed in several jurisdictions. Due to the lack of progress in the 
approval by the American authorities, the parties decided to abandon the request, which was 
discontinued by CADE. 
                                                          
2372 See, D. Geradin & C. M. da Silva Pereira Neto, For a Rigorous Effects’ Based Analysis of Vertical Restraints Adopted 
by Dominant Firms, (2012) http://www.cedes.org.br/pesquisas/vertical_restraints.pdf . 
2373 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/brazil-operation-car-wash-is-this-the-biggest-corruption-scandal-
in-history 
2374 There are, however, some particularities of regulated sectors such as telecommunication; oil and gas; electricity; 
surface, civil and air transportation; and health. See OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil - A Peer Review (OECD 
Pub 2010). In the case of banking, there is a pending discussion in the Supreme Court of whether the Central Bank would 
be the authority with exclusive competence to analyse mergers in the financial sector. There is also one exemption 
regarding submissions of consortiums formed to participate in public bids (art. 90, sole paragraph). 
2375 AC 08700.000723/2016-07, discontinued. 
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1.6.2.2. Fertilisers 
 
In 2014, CADE assessed the dissolution of a joint venture (Fosbrasil) between ICL and VALE.2376 
As a result, ICL would control the totality of Fosbrasil, which produced phosphoric acid used as an 
input to ICL the production of phosphate salts and fertilisers. The report of the authority indicated 
that vertical integration would result from the operation. Due to the high market shares, CADE 
decided that Fosbrasil had both the incentives and the capacity to discriminate against its competitors, 
such as refusing to sell its inputs to producers of phosphate salts. The final decision was approval 
with the restrictions described in the negotiated agreement with the parties to ensure supply on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
 
1.6.2.3. Seeds 
 
In 2006, CADE analysed the agreement between Monsanto, FMT and Unisoja for the licensing and 
sale of soybean seeds with the gene Roundup Ready.2377 The report of the authority indicated that 
Monsanto and FMT had almost 40% of the market of soybeans and that Monsanto had signed 
agreements with other companies. Therefore, CADE concluded that there was a risk of market 
foreclosure for other developers if the exclusivity clause remained. The authority approved the 
transaction with the conditions of changing three clauses of the contract in order to allow the parties 
to carry out research and development independently and to produce seeds with technologies other 
than Monsanto’s. 
In 2008, CADE reviewed the acquisition by Monsanto of Agroeste Sementes.2378 The report 
of the authority indicated some horizontal concentration in the market for hybrid corn, involving the 
technology, the incorporation into the seeds, the multiplication and the sale. Monsanto was a market 
leader in all types of corn seeds and the variation of the HHI was significant. Although barriers to 
entry were high, the authority considered that rivalry in the market (Syngenta, Pioneer and Dow) was 
enough to curb any anticompetitive effects. There was though a non-competition clause that required 
adjustment. The final decision was approval of the transaction with the condition of restricting the 
non-competition clause to five years. 
In 2014, CADE assessed the licensing agreement granted by Monsanto to Bayer, through 
which the latter would develop and sell soya seeds with the Intacta technology.2379 The report of the 
authority indicated that there was the risk that Monsanto would exert undue control and influence on 
Bayer in the soya market. It considered that some clauses of the agreement would be detrimental to 
the competition and had to be changed. CADE imposed restrictions on the agreement such as the 
exclusion of a preference option and of provisions related to the exchange of commercial information. 
The transaction was approved with those restrictions. 
 
1.6.2.4. Livestock Genetics Industry 
 
                                                          
2376 AC 08700.000344/2014-47, decided on 16 December 2014.  
2377 AC 08012.003997/2003-83, decided on 15 March 2006. 
2378 AC 08012.012229/2007-44, decided on 23 April 2008. 
2379 AC 08700.004957/2013-72, decided on 23 January 2014. 
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In 2011, CADE scrutinised the acquisition by Cobb of Hybro business owned by Hendrix 
Genetics.2380 The report of the authority indicated that there was horizontal concentration in the 
international market for poultry genetics and in the national market of poultry genetics replication. 
There was also vertical integration between those sectors. Entry barriers were moderate and rivalry 
was not sufficient to cub the exercise of market power. Efficiencies were mostly considered to be 
positive. However, the main concern was that investment in technology could be hindered. 
The transaction was approved with the imposition of behavioural commitments. They included 
obligation to keep active the acquired genetic lineages. If parties considered they were not 
commercially viable, they would be obliged to transfer them, sell them by auction or give access to 
third parties that would keep the same commitments. 
 
1.6.2.5. Fruits and Vegetables 
 
In 2011, CADE analysed the merger of the orange juice businesses of Fisher and Citrovita 
(Votorantim). 2381 The report of the authority indicated that there was horizontal concentration in the 
markets of unprocessed orange and frozen orange juice. In the latter, despite the high market shares, 
rivalry was deemed to be able to prevent the exercise of market power. In the former market, it 
considered that the merger would increase the purchase power of oranges by the parties. The vertical 
relation would be reinforced, so there was a risk of market foreclosure for independent orange 
farmers. Efficiencies were not considered sufficient to balance the competitive concerns to farmers 
and national consumers. 
The merger was approved with the condition of signing a performance agreement. The 
agreement required that the parties provide to their orange suppliers annual data on harvest, crops 
and orange juice processing, such as prices and amounts. This would be in force until the creation of 
the association of orange farmers and processors.   
In 2014, CADE evaluated the constitution of the Council of Producers and Exporters of 
Orange Juice.2382 Its aim was to improve conditions for the purchase of oranges, given the 
concentration of the market in the processing sector. The report of the authority indicated that the 
Council should be organised following some criteria, such as membership and information sharing. 
If the rules are not followed, the incorporation will be prohibited. The final decision was approval 
with conditions. 
With regard to vegetables, CADE assessed, in 2015, the acquisition of assets of Brasfrigo by 
Goias Verde.2383 The report of the authority indicated that there was horizontal concentration in the 
markets of canned corn, peas, and other vegetables and some vertical integration in tomato related 
products. The report emphasised that the combined market share was not high enough to raise 
competition concerns (slightly over 20% in the market of canned corn, and below 20% in other 
markets). However, the operation had only been notified after CADE`s investigation, which 
constituted gun jumping, in accordance to the new law. 
Because of that, the final decision was approval with the following restrictions, in agreement with 
the companies: 
                                                          
2380 AC 08012.007776/2008-99, decided on 23 February 2011. 
2381 AC 08012.005889/2010-74, decided on 12 December 2011. 
2382 AC 08012.003065/2012-21, decided on 12 February 2014. 
2383 AC 08700.010394/2014-32, decided on 22 April 2015. 
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- Recognition of the infringement of gun-jumping 
- Payment of R$ 3.000.000,00 
- Refrain from use of the brand “Jurema” for two years. 
 
1.6.2.6. Coffee 
 
In 2012, CADE evaluated the acquisition by 3 Coracoes of Veloso e Tavares.2384 The report of the 
authority indicated that some horizontal concentration would result from the transaction in the market 
of toasted coffee, cappuccino and coffee filters. However, the combined market shares were not 
sufficient to raise any competitive concerns (below 20% in toasted coffee, and between 40-50% in 
cappuccino, but with a very low HHI increase). There was a non-competition clause which needed 
adjustment as to the geographical scope and language. The final decision was approval with the 
restriction of changing the non-competition clause. 
 
1.6.2.7. Chocolate and Confectionary 
 
The multinational Nestlé acquired Garoto, a top Brazilian producer of chocolates. In 2004, the final 
report of the authority indicated that in confectionary and chocolate powder, the resulting horizontal 
concentration was not relevant.2385 On the other hand, there was high horizontal concentration in 
chocolate coatings and chocolates in general. It considered that there were high barriers to entry in 
the market due to brand loyalty and industrial secrets. Also, rivalry was not capable of preventing the 
exercise of market power. CADE concluded that that the efficiencies were not sufficient to address 
the competition concerns. The final decision, taken by majority, was the prohibition of the merger. 
One commissioner dissented and voted for the approval with conditions. However, the operation had 
already taken place under the post-merger approval procedure. 
The decision was challenged in courts for more than a decade. In October 2016, Nestlé finally 
presented a proposal for a judicial settlement. CADE considered that the package for sale offered by 
Nestle was adequate. The market for chocolate coatings was not a problem anymore. As to the market 
of chocolates in general, the package allowed a prospective buyer to operate independently and in a 
satisfactory way. In 18 October 2016, CADE accepted the agreement, which ended this long dispute. 
 
1.6.2.8. Meat and Poultry 
 
In 2009, the merger of Sadia and Perdigão, two Brazilian top players in the food industry – and 
historical rivals – into Brasil Foods took place. They represented together between 50% and more 
than 80% of sales in the Brazilian market of processed food in each market. In 2011, CADE undertook 
an extensive analysis of all the relevant markets.2386 The report indicated that the operation could lead 
to high horizontal concentration, especially in the markets of margarine, sausages, ham, hamburgers, 
lasagnes, frozen pizza, kebabs and meatballs. There was also vertical integration and concerns on the 
increase of the purchase bargaining power. Entry and rivalry were not capable of compensating the 
market power created. The claimed efficiencies were not sufficient. 
                                                          
2384 AC 08012.004527/2011-47, decided on 12 September 2012. 
2385 AC 08012.001697/2002-89 and AC 08700.003861/2016-30, decided on 04 February 2004. 
2386 AC 08012.004423/2009-18, decided on 13 July 2011. 
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The reporting Commissioner voted for the prohibition and disapproval of the merger. The 
other Commissioners (majority) voted for its approval with several restrictions. The restrictions 
involved, among others: 
• the suspension for 5 years of brands such as Perdigao and Batavo in some markets; 
• the sale of “fight brands” such as Doriana, Light, Texas, Patitas, Rezende and Wilson; 
• the sale of unprocessed meat businesses; 
• the sale of assets and distribution centres. 
In this context, BRF`s competitor, Marfrig, bought several distribution centres, production plants, 
slaughterhouses, farms, hatcheries and more than 10 brands. 
In 2013, CADE evaluated the acquisition by JBS of the assets of the major slaughterhouse 
Bertin and of assets from several other companies in 2012.2387 Some transactions had not been 
notified in due time and others not at all. Due to that, CADE imposed a fine of R$ 7,4 million for the 
delay. The report of the authority indicated that the merger should go forward, but identified the need 
for market monitoring. Moreover, JBS had to adjust its non-competition clauses. In addition, it had 
to inform the authority of any acquisition, rent or lease of slaughterhouses, either active or inactive, 
for the following 30 months. The final decision was approval with restrictions. 
In 2014, CADE scrutinised the acquisition by BRF Foods of a minority participation (16%) 
in the capital of Minerva.2388 In exchange, Minerva acquired BRF`s livestock activity in the State of 
Mato Grosso do Sul. The report of the authority indicated that the operation would be pro-competitive 
in the market of livestock bovine meat. On the other hand, it would raise concerns in the market for 
processed food (healthy hams, processed chicken products, meatballs, kebabs and bacon) due to 
horizontal concentration. Both parties brought efficiency gains from the minority participation. The 
final decision was approval with the condition of selling specific assets (not published). This was 
reached by means of a negotiated agreement with the parties. 
Also, in 2014, CADE analysed the rental by JBS of three units of cattle slaughtering from Rodopa in 
the States of Mato Grosso do Sul, Sao Paulo and Goias.2389 The report of the authority indicated that 
the operation could lead to high horizontal concentration and vertical integration in a relevant market 
composed by small slaughterhouses.  The final decision was approval with conditions. Among them, 
there was the obligation to keep the operations of the acquired units, to reactivate some closed units, 
and not acquire units in states in which it had high market shares. This was reached by means of a 
negotiated agreement with the parties. The parties did not comply with some of the obligations so, in 
October 2016, a fine was imposed and a new deadline was set. 
JBS, one of the world’s biggest meat-packing firms, is being investigated in the Lava-Jato 
(Car Wash) proceedings. The concerns are related to the fraudulent concession of subsidised loans 
for the expansion of the JBS group by the National Bank for Social and Economic Development 
(BNDES) and illegal measures taken by the administration for the benefit of the group.2390 Because 
of that, all the acquisitions involving JBS are being carefully scrutinised. 
From 2016, CADE has evaluated the acquisition by JBJ Agropecuaria of Fratelli Dorazio 
Alimentos and Mataboi.2391 Due to the delay in the notification, CADE considered that the parties 
                                                          
2387 AC 08012.008074/2009-11 and others, decided on 17 April 2013. 
2388 AC 08700.000658/2014-40, decided on 20 August 2014. 
2389 AC 08700.010688/2013-83, decided on 20 August 2014. 
2390 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-25/brazil-s-car-wash-scandal-reveals-a-country-soaked-in-
corruption 
2391 AC 08700.007553/2016-83, final decision pending. 
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engaged in gun-jumping, fined the company in R$ 664.000 and set a firewall within the merged 
company until a final decision is reached. In March 2017, CADE`s Superintendence considered that 
the transaction was complex and undertook an extensive analysis of all the relevant markets. Due to 
the family relations between the controlling shareholder of JBJ and the controlling shareholders of 
JBS, CADE’s SG evaluated the risk of coordinated action. In June 2017, it considered that high 
horizontal concentration would arise in the markets of cattle slaughtering in the State of Goias and in 
the national market of unprocessed meat. The failing firm defence was not accepted. It recommended 
the imposition of remedies and sent the case to CADE`s tribunal, which will soon reach a final 
decision. 
 
1.6.2.9. Beer and Soft Drinks 
 
In 2000, CADE analysed the merger between Antartica and Brahma, two major players in the beer 
and soft drinks markets, into AMBEV.2392 CADE decided that there was high horizontal 
concentration in the beer market in five regional markets. Rivalry and entry were not capable of 
curbing market power. There were no compensating efficiencies to balance the increase in the 
dominant position. CADE decided that AMBEV should sell the brand Bavaria together with five 
processing units and assets to produce beer in each of the affected markets. It should provide for 
temporary sharing of the distribution network for the brand sold. The final decision was approval 
with the restrictions contained in the agreement. A dissenting commissioner voted for the prohibition 
of the operation. 
In 2004, CADE analysed licensing by Pepsico to AMBEV (via CBB) for the production and 
sale of Gatorade, with the respective transfer of assets.2393 The report of the authority indicated that 
horizontal concentration would arise in the market for artificial isotonic beverages. The combined 
market would be very high (95%) given that CBB already produced the isotonic Marathon. Barriers 
to entry were high due to the loyalty to the brand. Besides, there would be no effective rivalry in the 
market. Efficiencies related to production and sale strategies and marketing were not sufficient to 
curb the exercise of market power.  
CADE decided for the sale of the brand Marathon by means of a public auction. The acquiring 
company would be able to use the distribution channels of the seller. A dissenting commissioner 
voted for the full prohibition of the operation. The final decision was approval by majority with the 
conditions set out in the performance agreement between CADE and CBB. Marathon was 
successfully sold to Energia Online Ltda. 
In 2008, CADE evaluated the acquisition by Coca Cola and FEMSA of Del Valle Mexico.2394 
The report of the authority indicated some horizontal concentration in the markets of ready-to-drink 
juices. The added market shares were expressive, but entry and rivalry would be enough to curb 
anticompetitive effects for the supermarket sales. The report then analysed the specificities of the 
distribution chains in the retail for cold juices. There was also a non-competition clause that required 
adjustment. The final decision was approval with the condition of restricting the scope of the non-
competition clause to the relevant market. Also, by a close majority, it decided that the parties should 
abstain from tying practices in relation to prepared juices in the cold market. 
                                                          
2392 AC 08012.005846/1999-12, decided on 30 March 2000. 
2393 AC 08012.000212/2002-30, decided on 14 July 2004. 
2394 AC 08012.003001/2008-44, decided on 18 June 2008. 
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In 2012, CADE assessed the distribution contract through which Probiotica would distribute 
AMBEV`s Gatorade products for 3 years.2395 The report of the authority indicated that there was no 
horizontal concentration in the markets of food supplements for physical activities and artificial sports 
drink. This led to the conclusion that the acts would not raise competitive problems. However, there 
was a non-competition clause that required adjustments. The final decision was approval with the 
condition of changing the non-competition clause, restricting it to the sale channels through which 
Probiotica distributed Gatorade. 
 
1.6.2.10. Dairy 
 
In 2011, CADE evaluated the acquisition by Laticinios Bom Gosto of shares and quotas in the 
companies Lider, Santa Rita, Menpar, Cedrolat, CBL and of assets from Parmalat.2396 They were 
notified after investigation for non-submission. Therefore, a fine for the delay was imposed. The 
report of the authority indicated horizontal concentration in the markets of milk cream; ultra-high-
temperature milk; cheese; creamy cheese; butter; powdered milk; milk drinks; milk caramel; 
condensed milk and prepared juices. However, the concentration in those markets was below 20%, 
so there were no competitive concerns to address. The final decision was approval with a restriction 
in one of the transactions, consisting in the adjustment of the temporal aspect of the non-competition 
clause. 
CADE analysed in 2012 the acquisition by Avex (BrFoods) of Argentinian enterprises of the Danica 
Group, in the margarine market.2397 The report of the authority indicated no horizontal concentration 
resulting from the operation, since Danica only operated in Argentina. It highlighted that BRFoods 
could not use the Danica brand in Brazil, due to previous commitments with CADE. The final 
decision was approval with the restriction of non-use or introduction of new margarine brands in the 
Brazilian market, in line with the decision on the creation of BRFoods. 
 
1.6.2.11. Retail  
 
Several decisions resulted in an intervention in the retail sector in Brazil. In 2004, CADE analysed 
the acquisition by Bompreco of six supermarket units in Bahia.2398 The report of the authority 
indicated some horizontal concentration in the retail supermarket business in Salvador and Lauro de 
Freitas. In the latter case, the resulting market shares were high (over 50%). Entry would be possible 
only in relation to small supermarkets. Rivalry was not considered sufficient to prevent the exercise 
of market power. Efficiencies in relation to cost reductions and technical progress were not deemed 
to counter-balance the anticompetitive effects. The final decision, taken by majority, was approval 
with the condition that Bompreco sold the unit in the city Lauro de Freitas-BA in three months. If not 
sold, the unit would have to be publicly auctioned. 
                                                          
2395 AC 08012.005575/2012-33, decided on 21 November 2012 and 03 April 2013. 
2396 AC 08012.003820/2010-14; AC 08012.003821/2010-51; AC 08012.003822/2010-03; AC 08012.003824/2010-94, 
decided on 19 January 2011. 
2397 AC 08012.011550/2011-98, decided on 09 May 2012. 
2398 AC 08012.005104/1999-51, decided on 02 June 2004, available at 
http://anexos.radaroficial.com.br/0481696497dc9650bd77f8f366916888.pdf 
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In 2007, CADE evaluate the constitution of Sendas Distribuidora, owned by Sendas and CDB 
(Pão de Açucar Group), involving several supermarkets and brands.2399 The report of the authority 
indicated that the operation resulted in horizontal concentration in several markets, among them retail 
in a local and neighbourhood levels. In several markets, the rivalry and entry were capable of 
compensating the market power created. In the market of Cabo Frio/RJ, the high variation of the HHI 
led to the conclusion that the analysis should be deepened. The majority considered that entry and 
rivalry would not be enough to balance the market power. The final decision was taken by majority 
and resulted in the approval with the condition of selling the assets related to the supermarket in Cabo 
Frio/RJ in 60 days. 
Also in 2007, CADE analysed the acquisition by Bompreco of five supermarkets of Carrefour, 
including all the respective assets, workers and food products.2400 The report of the authority indicated 
that horizontal concentration in some markets would result from the operation. Specially in the market 
of Petrolina-PE, the high market share and the absence of probable entry or rivalry led to the 
conclusion that a restriction was necessary. Efficiencies were considered vague and not fully proven. 
The final decision was approval with the restriction that Bompreco should sell one of its supermarkets 
in the city of Petrolina. 
In 2008, CADE decided on the rental by CBD (Pão de Açucar Group) of the assets related to 
five supermarkets of Rossi.2401 The report of the authority indicated that the merger resulted in 
horizontal concentration in the supermarket retail business in several localities. In the cases where 
concentration was over 30%, rivalry and entry were capable of compensating the market power 
created. The final decision was approval with the condition of restricting the scope of the non-
competition clause to specific neighbourhoods, when it came to the city of Guarulhos. 
In 2016, CADE assessed the joint venture agreement between Dia World Trade and IRTS 
(Casino Group) to constitute ICDC, which would provide international services on top and 
coordination for private label.2402 Both groups operated in the retail market for food products. The 
Brazilian Association for Food Industry had been accepted as a third party. CADE defined that the 
market for services on top and analysed it on the international and national basis. It defined the market 
shares to conclude that the resulting HHI was high enough to justify a more detailed analysis. It 
carried out an analysis of rivalry to conclude that both Wal Mart and Carrefour were capable of 
exercising a balance to the market power of the JV companies. Also, the compensatory power of 
manufacturers was strong enough. CADE considered there were enough guarantees that sensitive 
market information would not be discussed in the JV. Efficiencies on global operations would result 
in better quality of the services provided, since both groups covered different countries. The final 
decision was approval without restrictions. 
 
1.6.3. Conduct Cases 
 
1.6.3.1. Soybeans 
 
                                                          
2399 AC 08012.009959/2003-34, decided on 24 October 2007. 
2400 AC 08012.003972/2001-18, decided on 12 December 2007. 
2401 AC 08012.010903/2007-56, decided on 17 September 2008. 
2402 AC 08700.003252/2016-81, decided on 05 August 2016. 
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The Minister of Agriculture made a request for the opening of preliminary proceedings against the 
non-governmental organization Focus on Sabbatical. The allegations were that the NGO was offering 
to soybean producers in Brazil US$ 165 to every non-farmed hectare. The aim was to reduce supply 
and force an increase in prices in the world market for soybeans. 
In 2005, CADE decided that in theory the conduct could be a violation of the antitrust law 
related to the destruction or abandonment of crops.2403 However, there was no sufficient evidence of 
the infringement, given the low representativeness of the NGO and the fact that it was not duly 
established in Brazil. CADE discontinued the proceedings. 
 
1.6.3.2. Meat and Poultry 
 
CADE investigated a buyer cartel to purchase meat composed by the largest meat-packing firms of 
the country. In 2007, CADE decided that there was enough material evidence of the conduct.2404 It 
fined all the companies. One of the companies and its managers signed a cease-and-desist agreement 
and voluntarily paid its fines with a reduction. 
In the poultry sector, an ex officio investigation began after the authority found out that the 
president of the Brazilian Association of Poultry Farming recommended that the sector reduced its 
production in 20% in order to avoid a decrease in prices. The declaration was published in public 
reports. In 2010, CADE considered that the conduct was illegal.2405 The Association and its president 
entered into a cease-and-desist agreement and paid a fine of almost 1 million reals (around half a 
million dollars). 
 
1.6.3.3. Fish and Seafood 
 
CADE investigated a claim of abuse of petition (sham litigation) in the market of sardines in brine. 
Ampex, an importer of sardines, argued that Gomes da Costa and Coqueiro (Pepsico), by means of 
their trade unions, were trying to avoid that Ampex consolidated its market position. They had made 
several requests to administrative authorities to increase taxes of imported sardines and to prevent the 
inclusion of the species imported by Ampex in the list of authorised products in Brazil. 
In 2011, CADE considered that there was no sham litigation.2406 All the claims were a legitimate 
exercise of petition rights. It closed the investigation of the preliminary proceedings. 
 
1.6.3.4. Orange  
 
Since 1999, Brazilian authorities had been investigating a cartel for the purchase of oranges.2407 The 
companies and the association involved signed in November 2016, seven cease-and-desist 
agreements by which they recognised the cartel.2408 The resulting fine was 301 million BRL (around 
90 million dollars). The processing companies fixed prices and established quotas to purchase orange 
                                                          
2403 AP 08001.003383/2002-40, decided on 28 September 2005, available at: 
http://anexos.radaroficial.com.br/314000986b81bfa079a872fe1ba19e01.pdf 
2404 PA 08012.002493/2005-16, decided on 28 November 2007. 
2405 PA 08012.003623/2009-53; RQ 08700.002933/2009-01, decided on 10 June 2010. 
2406 AP 08012.006484/2010-53, decided on 31 August 2011. 
2407 PA 08012.008372/1999-14, 08012.001255/2006-66 e 08012.010505/2007-30, decided on 23 November 2016. 
2408 http://www.cade.gov.br/cade-celebra-acordos-em-investigacao-de-cartel-de-compra-de-laranjas  
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from farmers. Evidence was obtained from dawn raids, which were target of several judicial 
measures. This was an important decision considering that, in 2006, CADE had rejected an agreement 
in the case. The decision constitutes an affirmation of the autonomy and independence of CADE 
given that the companies were powerful and had good relations with political groups in Brazil. 
Among those involved, there was the family of a wealthy business with considerable influence over 
several politicians.2409 
 
1.6.3.5. Chocolate 
 
Proceedings were initiated against the Brazilian Association for the Chocolate and Confectionary 
Industry for sharing information about price increases during Easter in 2009.2410 
In 2013, the Association and its directors concluded with CADE a cease-and-desist agreement 
through which it ensured that it would not share information on prices, costs or levels of production 
in the market nor dates or percentage of price increases. They also paid an amount of R$ 96.000,00 
(around 40 thousand dollars) related to the infringement. 
 
1.6.3.6. Cereals  
 
In 2013, CADE decided on the determination of the infringement and imposition of fines to several 
bakeries and its owners for the fixing of the price of bread in the town of Sobradinho, in the 
surroundings of the city of Brasilia.2411 The case started in 2001 from a complaint made by the State 
Police who had arrested bakery owners during a meeting organised by the trade association at a local 
restaurant. 
CADE decided that there was sufficient evidence of the infringement, which included the 
agenda for the meeting, with an item named “price of bread”, identical posters with the new prices to 
be announced to consumers, and several oral testimonies. CADE concluded that the meeting was part 
of a strategy to align market practices. 
Fines were imposed to 18 bakeries and 19 individuals, totalling 650 thousand reals. 
(approximately US$ 200,000.00). 
 
1.6.3.7. Salt 
 
CADE has been investigating a cartel in the national market for salt, involving companies, its 
managers and trade associations.2412 The investigation began after a complaint of predatory pricing 
on imports on preliminary proceedings. In turn, this led to information about a possible cartel. CADE 
collected further evidence from dawn raids. In 2014, Salina Branco and its managers opted for a 
settlement and paid R$ 5,5 million. The decision was to approve the cartel settlement due to its 
convenience and legality. The proceedings continue in relation to the other parties. CADE`s 
                                                          
2409 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-27/brazil-orange-baron-becomes-billionaire-as-florida-output-
sours  
2410 PA 08012.001772/2009-88 and RQ 08700.011043/2012-87, decided on 03 July 2013. 
2411 PA 08012.004039/2001-68, decided on 22 May 2013. 
2412 PA 08012.001022/2008-25; PA 08012.005882/2008-38 and RQ 08700.002238/2014-06, decided on 26 November 
2014. 
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Superintendence recommended to the Tribunal their condemnation and imposition of fines. The final 
decision is pending in the Tribunal. 
 
1.6.3.8. Dairy 
 
In 2017, CADE condemned and fined several milk producers, including cooperatives, and a trade 
union of milk producers in Brazil in the state of Rio Grande do Sul for the organisation of a cartel. 
2413 According to the decision, the producers gathered to define the price of milk and put pressure on 
small producers to align their behaviour with the market leaders. 
 
1.6.3.9. Beer 
 
AmBev, formed in 1999 and currently part of the AB Inbev group, abused its dominant position by 
engaging in exclusionary practices, relating to the beer sold to small points of sale. AmBev 
established a loyalty programme called “Tô Contigo” (“I’m WITH you”), which awarded “points” 
redeemed into prices to dissuade retailers from selling competing brands. In 2009, the report of the 
authority concluded that AmBev was dominant in the upstream market of beer in each of the five 
regions of Brazil. The downstream product market was defined as ready-to-drink cool bottled beer 
(0.6L), sold in bars and small stores. Geographically, the downstream market was defined as local, 
since consumers tend to move around locally to consume cool beer. CADE found that the discounts, 
conditioned on exclusivity or 90% market share, were a very powerful inducement for points of sale 
to prefer AmBev’s porfolio against its rivals. It enabled AmBev to leverage its dominant position.  
In July 2009, CADE decided that the conduct was an abuse of dominance and ordered AmBev 
to change its programme.2414 The fine for abuse of dominance was 1.5% of the turnover.2415 
Following the decision, AmBev brought judicial proceedings. In 2015, CADE and AmBev concluded 
a judicial agreement, which resulted in the reduction of the fine. Additionally, CADE ordered SDE 
to open administrative proceedings against AmBev managers for their purposeful role in the conduct. 
These proceedings were settled administratively in July 2014. 
In another case, CADE analysed whether AmBev had created difficulties for its competitors 
by adopting a new 630ml bottle to distribute its beers. The investigation started with a complaint from 
the Association of Soft Drinks claiming that the introduction of the new bottle increased the costs of 
rivals. They could not recycle the bottles for reuse, considering that the sharing of 600ml bottles was 
the standard practice in the industry. In 2010, AmBev and CADE concluded a cease-and-desist 
agreement by which AmBev would progressively abandon the use of the bottles in some states. It 
also agreed to exchange 630ml bottles for the standard 600ml ones at the request of its rivals. 
In 2015, AmBev and CADE concluded a cease-and-desist agreement related to proceedings 
investigating its exclusive supply and freezer policy with points-of-sale (retail). The case had initiated 
by a complaint of the rival Kaiser. AmBev agreed to limit the amount and the volume of sales of beer 
to points of sale with which it could have formal or de facto exclusivity in a given region. It also 
                                                          
2413 PA 08012.010744/2008-71, decided on 18 January 2017. 
2414 PA 08012.003805/2004-10 and PA 08012.010028/2009-74, decided on 22 July 2009. 
2415 For more details, see Murilo Lubambo & Fernando Furlan, “The Companhia de Bebidas das Américas – AmBev 
Loyalty Rebates Case” International Antitrust Bulletin, American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, vol 4, p. 13 
(2010). 
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agreed to change its freezer policy. It could not require exclusivity in exchange for the loan of the 
freezer. The report of the authority concluded that the agreement was adequate and convenient.  
 
1.7. Superior Bargaining Power 
 
1.7.1. Contract Law 
 
In Brazilian law, there is no concept of abuse of economic dependence. Contracts between businesses 
are regulated2416 by the Civil Code, since the enactment of the New Civil code in 2002 (hereinafter 
“BCC”). The BCC unified the regulation of commercial contracts, previously regulated by the 
Commercial Code, with the general law of obligations. Brazilian contract law is centred upon the 
principle of bargaining power, though several limitations are possible, especially through the 
application of general concepts, such as good faith and public interest.2417 In fact, the founding 
principle of objective good faith is now expressed in art. 422 of BCC and serves as an interpretative 
tool and as an element of creation of legal duties.2418 Also, the social function of contracts is now 
explicit in art. 421 and has been discussed and applied by courts.2419 
In particular, Brazilian scholars envisage the judicial intervention in cases of contractual 
imbalances as connected to the constitutional principle of social justice.2420 However, the recourse to 
constitutional principles may be justified only in particularly serious cases. 
Nonetheless, some argue that contract law can be used against opportunistic and exploitative 
behaviour of the dominant party of the contract.2421 The concept of vulnerability has been raised as a 
basis for intervention in order to avoid excessive advantages to one of the parties.2422 In this regard, 
Iwasa reports that: 
 Castello Miguel classified those interventions in two types: the first one aims to 
protect interests that are external to the contracting parties and are related to 
collectivity (e.g., social function of the contract and the environment). The second type 
aims to protect the interests of the parties of the contract and its application is justified 
only when there is an inequality of bargaining power between parties. If there is a 
balance between them, they are presumably able to protect their own interests and 
avoid the violation of social values such as the principle of equality. Consequently it 
                                                          
2416 Article 966 defines ‘business proprietor’ as “anyone who engages, on a professional basis, in organised economic 
activity for the production or trade of goods or services”, see Leslie Rose, O Código Civil Brasileiro em Inglês/ The 
Brazilian Civil Code in English (Renovar 2008) 188. 
2417 Luciana Iwasa, ‘A Comparative Evaluation of the Legislative Controls on Unfair Terms and Exemption Clauses in 
Consumer and Business Contracts in England and Brazil’ (phd, Aston University 2013) 72 <Available at: 
http://eprints.aston.ac.uk/19144/> accessed 25 August 2015. 
2418 Caio Mário da Silva Pereira, Instituições de Direito Civil (16a-25a edição, Forense 2012) 17–19. 
2419 Nelson Nery Júnior and Rosa Maria Andrade Nery, Código Civil Comentado (8 ed rev, ampl e atualizada até 
12072011, Editora Revista dos Tribunais 2011) 538–543. 
2420  Ibid referring to Paula Castello Miguel, Contratos entre Empresas (Revista dos Tribunais 2006) 86-93 and André 
Osório Gondinho, 'Codificação e Cláusulas Gerais' (2000) Rio de Janeiro: Padma, n. 2 Revista Trimestral de Direito Civil 
3 
2421 Ibid, referring to Humberto Theodoro Júnior, O Contrato e seus Princípios (3rd edn, Aides 2001) 17. 
2422 Lobo, Paulo. “Contratante Vulneravel e Autonomia Privada” in https://jus.com.br/artigos/25358/contratante-
vulneravel-e-autonomia-privada accessed 8 May 2017. 
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is possible to contend that interventions in B2B contracts are generally of the first 
type; whereas the second type may be more relevant to small businesses contracts.2423 
 
It seems possible for Brazilian judges to treat specific cases involving abuse of superior bargaining 
power, using different provisions of Brazilian contract law, in particular: Art. 122 regarding 
potestative clauses; Art. 157 on the concept of damage; Art. 187 on the abuse of right; Art. 317 on 
the adjustment of a disproportional obligation; Art. 413 on the equitable reduction of the penal clause; 
Art. 478 and art. 480, respectively on the termination and on the reduction of obligations for excessive 
onerousness; and Art. 884 on enrichment without a cause (different from the common law institute 
of unjust enrichment). 
As in the Roman law tradition, Brazilian contract law generally provides for nullity of the 
contract as a consequence of several vitiating factors: mistake and ignorance (art. 138); wrongful 
conduct (“dolo”) (art. 145); coercion (art. 151); state of peril (art. 156) and fraud (art. 158). Art. 157 
of the new civil code also sets out the vitiating factor of lesion, which “occurs when a person, in 
pressing need or through lack of experience, assumes an obligation that is manifestly disproportionate 
to the value of its counterpart.”2424 
However, in case of B2B contracts, it is generally assumed that both parties enter the contract 
with the minimum knowledge available to avoid substantial mistakes, at least as intended in the 
Roman law doctrine. Moreover, only in fringe cases will it be possible to envisage coercion, as 
general contract law principles tend to strictly interpret the physical harm element. By contrast, the 
objective good faith has the function of a general clause, which is however limited by the 
substantiation of the fraudulent intent of the party covering a dominant position. 
Finally, the Brazilian law on unfair contracts addresses solely consumer protection, leaving therefore 
out of its reach B2B contracts.  
 
1.7.2. Competition Law 
 
Brazilian law does not explicitly contemplate any rule on abuse of economic dependence, abuse of 
superior bargaining power or the concept of obligatory trading partner.2425 However, thanks to the 
loose wording of the competition law provisions, CADE maintains that it would be possible to 
sanction an undertaking for abuse of superior bargaining power, as the “claim could be based on any 
of these effects / purposes, even though there is not a clear definition of the infraction”2426.  
Article 36 of the Brazilian Competition Act provides for all the types of anticompetitive conduct 
sanctioned by the law:  
“The acts which under any circumstance have as an objective or may have the following 
effects shall be considered violations to the economic order, regardless of fault, even if not 
achieved: 
I - to limit, restrain or in any way injure free competition or free initiative;  
II - to control the relevant market of goods or services; 
III – to arbitrarily increase profits; and 
                                                          
2423 Iwasa, referring to Paula Castello Miguel, Contratos entre Empresas (Revista dos Tribunais 2006) 124-125. 
2424 Leslie Rose, O Código Civil Brasileiro em Inglês/ The Brazilian Civil Code in English (Renovar 2008) 41. 
2425 ICN, ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position’ (2008) 10. 
2426 ibid 12. 
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IV - to exercise a dominant position abusively”. 
The following indents of Article 36 better define these four broad violations, presenting examples of 
classical conducts that may be considered violations whenever they produce the effects above. 
However, none of these definitions refers to an abuse of superior bargaining power or to other similar 
non-structural power type of infringement. One could argue that indent III (arbitrary increase of 
profits) could base such a claim, dispensing with the analysis of restraint of competition, control of 
markets or abuse of dominance. However, CADE has been quite reluctant to refer to this indent to 
base infringements. 
Article 36, § 2 adopts indeed a structural approach to the definition of dominance stating that:  
“A dominant position is assumed when a company or group of companies is able to 
unilaterally or jointly change market conditions or when it controls 20% (twenty percent) 
or more of the relevant market, provided that such percentage may be modified by Cade 
for specific sectors of the economy”.  
In fact, the broad scope of the law could encompass those kinds of abuses. On the other hand, CADE 
has been careful to not intervene in the freedom of contract, in relation to conduct within the sphere 
of private relations. In 2009, for instance, CADE analysed whether AMBEV had imposed quotas, 
engaged in resale price maintenance with its distributors and sold directly to supermarkets, among 
other practices.2427 CADE decided that there was no infringement related to the distribution network, 
since those were private matters and discontinued the proceedings.  
Nonetheless, CADE has already examined cases dealing with abuse of economic dependence and has 
reasoned about the connection between dependency and market power. 
As Berardo and Becker state, “CADE highlighted that dependency, i.e. one seller depending 
exclusively or almost exclusively on purchases made by one purchaser, does not in itself necessarily 
correspond to buying power, which obviously depends on aggregate market output and 
purchases.”2428. 
In this regard, for example, the competition authorities investigated a complaint by a 
cooperative of milk producers in Minas Gerais. The cooperative was an intermediary in the sale of 
milk to Itambe, a large company which sold milk in Brazil. It complained that Itambe engaged in 
market division and discriminatory practices towards its suppliers, which depended on the sale to 
Itambe. In the end, the proceedings were discontinued by CADE for lack of evidence.2429  
All in all, no infringement has ever been found based exclusively on economic dependence, devoid 
of general market conditions. 
Finally, another way that competition enforcement could possibly deal with the situation is in 
the scope of the analysis of mergers. CADE’s Resolution No. 10, adopted November 2014., 
mentioned nterdependence as a criterion for the mandatory notification of certain contracts.2430 If an 
                                                          
2427 PA 08012.004363/2000-89, decided on 28 October 2009. 
2428 Jose Carlos da Matta Berardo, and Bruno Bastos Becker,  in Pierre Kobel, Pranvera Këllezi and Bruce Kilpatrick 
(eds), Antitrust in the Groceries Sector & Liability Issues in Relation to Corporate Social Responsibility (2015) 101. 
2429 AP 08012.010986/2006-01, decided on 12 March 2011. 
2430 “[The Resolution] sets out the situations in which notification to CADE is required for associative agreements. 
According to the resolution, associative agreements are those in force for a period longer than two years, in which there 
is horizontal or vertical cooperation or risk sharing that represent a relationship of interdependence among the contracting 
parties. The resolution also defines that a relationship of interdependence fits into two different hypothesis. : When 
companies are horizontally related in the object of the contract, interdependence occurs if the joint participation of the 
companies in the market affected by the contract equals or exceeds 20% of the market share. When companies are 
vertically related in the object of the contract, on the other hand, interdependence occurs if at least one of them holds a 
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associative contract between companies is of mandatory notification, CADE could impose 
restrictions upon its presentation to avoid the abuse of economic dependence. However, Resolution 
10 was revoked and substituted by Resolution 2017, which narrowed the scope of associative 
contracts with mandatory notification  
 
1.8. Agricultural Subsidies 
 
Brazil recognises that agriculture is a sensitive market given its specific characteristics, eg the risk of 
crop destruction and the exogenous determination of prices.  
Brazilian authorities have justified justify the rural credit system, as a means to correct a 
market failure resulting in insufficient credit allocation to medium, small and micro producers, and 
the financing mechanism, due to the importance of family farming on the supply for internal 
consumption, thus, food security.2431 
 
1.8.1. Mechanisms and Institutions for Support 
Box I analyses and justifies the available mechanisms for agricultural price support in Brazil: 
 
Box I 
“Market price support aims to reduce price volatility, protect farmers’ incomes, improve the 
availability of food supplies and offset the additional costs of producers in regions that are distant 
from the main markets and ports. There are also specific programmes that target small-scale 
agriculture, with some purchases being distributed via food programmes. 
Minimum guaranteed prices are reviewed annually, covering thirty-three crops. They are 
announced regionally through the PGPM (Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos) by the Secretary 
of Agricultural Policy (SPA) operated by the National Food Supply Agency (Companhia Nacional 
de Abastecimento, CONAB). This mechanism covers a great variety of crops from rice, wheat, maize, 
cotton, soybeans, to regional crops like cassava, beans, açaí, guaraná, sisal, and a few livestock 
products like cow and goat milk, and honey. Other price support mechanisms for commercial 
agriculture are the direct government purchases (Aquisição do Governo Federal, AGF) and the 
provision financing of storage by the FEPM (Financiamento para Estocagem de Produtos 
Agropecuários integrantes da Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos) former Empréstimo do 
Governo Federal-EGF. The [Secretariat of Family Farming and Agrarian Development] supports the 
development of family farming, and makes use of the minimum prices policy. Instruments that 
support prices and target small-scale agriculture are government purchases similar to AGF (Programa 
de Aquisição de Alimentos, PAA) and the minimum prices programme for family farms, (Programa 
                                                          
participation of 30% or more in the affected markets. In this case, the resolution requires, additionally, that at least one 
of the following conditions is met: (i) the contract establishes revenue or loss sharing; (ii) the contract results in a 
relationship of exclusivity. The resolution brought both clarification and legal certainty to a much-debated issue within 
the legal community”, see OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Brazil (OECD 2014) 4 
<Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/AR(2015)19&docLanguage=En
>. 
2431 WTO , Brazilian Trade Policy Review, 2013, WT/TPR/S/283 parag. 4.31, p. 124 17 May 2013 
706 
 
de Garantia de Preços para a Agricultura Familiar, PGPAF). Under PAA, CONAB makes direct 
acquisitions from family farms at market prices, with the product either going into stock or distributed 
as part of a food programme. The PGPAF ensures that small-scale farmers receive a guaranteed price 
based on the average regional production cost of family farms.” 
Source: OECD/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2015)2432 
 
The National Food Supply Company (CONAB) is a public enterprise responsible for the management 
of food supply stocks in Brazil. Created in 1990, it regulates the supply of the Brazilian internal 
market. CONAB manages the supply of food stocks and implements the policy of minimum price of 
the federal government and other mechanisms to sustain agricultural products prices. The 
programmes of acquisition of foodstuffs by the federal government consists in the purchase of 
foodstuffs in order to level off the rent of small producers, that is, family farmers and their 
cooperatives. However, the programme has been subject to successive budget cuts and was granted 
340 million reais in 2017 (around 100 million USD).2433 
 
1.8.2. Level of Support and Crops 
 
The most up-to-date document describing the level of subsidies in Agriculture is the 2017 WTO 
Secretariat Report of the Brazilian Trade Policy Review.2434 Box II highlights some of the findings: 
 
Box II 
“4.20. During the review period, Brazil continued to provide a broad range of assistance to its 
agricultural sector, inter alia, in the form of administered interest rate or concessional credit lines, 
price support mechanisms, and insurance premium subsidies. …  
4.21. Domestic support to agricultural producers remains at a low level compared with OECD 
countries.19 According to the OECD, Brazil's total support estimate (TSE) to agriculture averaged 
0.35% of GDP in 2012-15 (0.55% in 2008-10), well below the OECD average of 0.7% (Table 4.2). 
Support to farmers as measured by the producer support equivalent (PSE) was 3.2% of gross farm 
receipts in the period, below the OECD average of 17.6%.20 Support peaked in 2014 and fell in 2015 
as both market price support (MPS) and payments based on input use (credit and insurance subsidies) 
declined. The MPS reduction was due to the minimum guaranteed prices increasing at a slower pace 
than inflation, and the depreciation of the R$ relative to the US$.  
[…] 
4.22. According to Brazil's WTO notifications on domestic support measures during the review 
period, the current total aggregate measure of support (AMS) stood at US$213.7 million in 2010/11 
(wheat, sisal) and US$7.7 million 2011/12 (sisal) (above its de minimis level but much below its final 
                                                          
2432 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris. P. 94 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_outlook-2015-
en 
2433 http://www.canalrural.com.br/noticias/rural-noticias/orcamento-programa-aquisicao-alimentos-cai-65687 
2434 WTO, Brazilian Trade Policy Review, 2017 WT/TPR/S/358/Rev.1, 18 October 2017 available at: < 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp458_e.htm> 
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bound level of U$912.1 million), and then fell to zero (i.e. below its de minimis level) in 2011/12 and 
remained at this level in 2013/14 and 2014/15.” 
Source: WTO TRP 2017 (2017) 
No export subsidies for agriculture have been granted in the recent past.2435 
 
1.8.3. Forms of Support 
1.8.3.1. Minimum Prices Guarantees 
 
The table below details the operations of the mechanism of minimum price guarantees in 
2013-16 by programme and crops: 
Table I 
(R$ million) 
       2013   2014   2015   2016  
Disbursement 
(purchase)               
    Total   79   84   0   0  
 
AGF2436 
  Edible beans   0   72   0   0  
   
Maize 
  
79 
  
4 
  
0 
  
0 
 
             
    Wheat   0   8   0   0  
    Total 1,395  0  0  0  
COV2437  Coffee 1,029  0  0  0  
    Maize 366  0  0  0  
 PEP   Total   0   0   0   9  
 Wheat 0 0 0 9 
 Total 484 631 15 69 
 Cotton 0 244 0 0 
                                                          
2435 WTO notifications G/AG/N/BRA/36, 27 January 2015, and G/AG/N/BRA/39, 12 January 2016. 
2436 See above. 
2437 Public Option Contracts (COV) “The Government offers option contracts to producers and cooperatives through 
public auctions. Winning bidders acquire the right to sell their products to the Government at a future date, for a pre-
determined "execution price" (a minimum price plus storage and financial costs). If the execution price is lower than the 
market price on the due date, the option contract is not used. When it deems convenient, the Government may transfer its 
obligation to buy to another party. The scheme may be used for any product covered by the PGPM.” TPR Brazil p. 105  
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 Maize 455 256 0 0 
PEPRO2438 Grapes 11 0 0 0 
 Natural rubber 0 3 15 0 
 Orange 18 47 0 0 
 Wheat 0 81 0 69 
Total  1,958 715 15 78 
 
Source: CONAB, prepared by MAPA. 
 
1.8.3.2. Agriculture Insurance and Environmental Requirements 
 
Box III 
“4.40. Agricultural insurance support continued to be provided to producers through four main 
programmes, either in the form of insurance premium subsidies covering the difference between a 
fixed premium and market rates through a discount in the fee to farmers (fixed percentage), or by 
compensating farmers for production losses due to natural disasters. … The operation of these risk 
management programmes is currently shared among federal institutions, including some Ministries 
and the Central Bank. During the review period, a number of initiatives to improve the effectiveness 
of the rural insurance premium programme (PSR) included: the development of a model contract to 
facilitate collective negotiation for producers; greater dissemination of the programme availability; 
disclosure of statistical information on the programme; risk analysis; greater involvement of the 
private sector through advisory committees; and, the creation of a productivity register for a better 
estimation of risk (March 2016). Resources allocated to all agricultural insurance programmes 
amounted to R$700 million (US$210 million) in the 2015/16 agricultural plan; subsidy rates ranged 
from 35% to 100% of the premium, depending on the sector and the risk coverage.41 … 
4.42. Agricultural zoning requirements continue to link agricultural support to environmental 
sustainability. They condition producers' eligibility for concessional credit and subsidized insurance 
programmes. Compliance with zoning applies to all concessional credit and all insurance premium 
subsidies for any product covered by the zoning (Section 4.2.4.1).” 
Source: WTO TPR 2017 (2017) fn ommited 
 
1.9. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
2438 Agricultural Products' Sale Option Private Premium (PEPRO) “This scheme offers producers and cooperatives the 
possibility to sell their product at a premium, equal to the difference between reference and market prices, fixed through 
an auction. In contrast to the PEP, premiums are paid directly to producers.” TPR Brazil p. 105 
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To sum up, Brazil has a wide network of regulations in the food sector. It is spread in several levels 
of hierarchy, organs and autonomous agencies, as described. The rationale of the regulation generally 
follows the classic framework of regulation of production and trade for economic reasons, regulation 
for social purposes, including food safety, and risk regulation. Consumer protection and competition 
enforcement in the food market are essential to maintain the functioning of market, to the benefit of 
the citizens. Compared to other BRICs countries, CADE has been quite active in its enforcement 
activities in this area. Contract law can be also a tool to tackle some issues affecting food chains. 
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Chapter 2: Russian Federation 
 
By Ekaterina Perevoshchikova2439, Maxim Bashkatov, Katya Semenova & Georgy Tyulyaev2440 
 
2.1.General Overview and Legal Framework 
 
2.1.1. Domestic aspects and institutional framework 
 
The Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation (hereinafter – “FAS”) as the national 
competition authority plays a prominent role in monitoring and ensuring the protection of competition 
in the Russian food market. This is evidenced by the increasing number of inquiries and investigations 
carried out by FAS, as well as by the variety of areas which have become the object of its scrutiny. 
The task of FAS is protection of competition and creation of favorable conditions for 
competition in the products markets (including the agricultural products and food markets).2441 This 
task is performed through different instruments including monitoring of the prices for socially 
important alimentary products,2442 especially in periods of significant price increase (as was the case 
in autumn 2014 − winter 2015), investigation of abuse of dominance and concerted practices; control 
on economic concentration at all levels of the food supply chain; control on the fairness and 
transparency of the procedures of granting subsidies to agricultural producers; giving clarification 
and recommendations to state and municipal bodies on the application of legislation having effect on 
competition, etc. 
It is noteworthy that FAS’s mandate has been significantly expanded during last years2443 and 
now encompasses not only protection of competition, but also various spheres of economic 
regulations. Thus, FAS regulates and oversees the activities of natural monopolies; performs control 
over the public procurement procedures and foreign investments in the Russian Federation; oversees 
compliance with the regulations on advertising activities.2444 The Order of the President of the 
Russian Federation dated 21 July 2015 No.373 conferred to FAS significant powers in the sphere of 
tariff (price) regulations. On the one hand, this gives FAS more flexibility in its choice of remedies 
and broader approach to tackling particular market problems; on the other hand, this might lead to 
the tendency to administrative regulation of the markets instead of creating the system of economic 
incentives to promote competition.2445 
                                                          
2439 Centre for Law, Economics & Society, UCL Faculty of Laws. 
2440 HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development. 
2441 Mission of the FAS at <fas.gov.ru/about/mission.html> accessed 26 December 2016; ‘Regulations on the Federal 
Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation’adopted by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation 
dated 30 June 2004 No. 331. 
2442 Paragraphs 5,6 of Article 8 of the Federal law "On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in 
the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 2009 N 381-FZ and ‘The List of Certain Types of Socially Important 
Essential Alimentary Products…’ adopted by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 15 July 2010 
No. 530. 
2443 Thus, during last 20 years the number of laws, for overseeing of which FAS is responsible, increased from 3 to 16 
according to Sergey Titov, ‘FAS Reform: Struggle for the Agency’ (November 27, 2014) 3725 Vedomosti < 
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/11/27/borba-za-sluzhbu> accessed 20 April 2017. 
2444 ‘Regulations on the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation’ adopted by the Decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation dated 30 June 2004 No. 331. 
2445 Sergey Titov, ‘FAS Reform: Struggle for the Agency’ (November 27, 2014) 3725 Vedomosti < 
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2014/11/27/borba-za-sluzhbu> accessed 20 April 2017. 
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In its activities FAS is subject to Russian competition law, which comprises two principal 
legal acts. 
The first one is the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” dated 26 July 2006 N 135-
FZ (hereinafter – the “Federal law “On Protection of Competition”), whose goals are to secure the 
single economic area; free movement of goods; freedom of economic activity; protection of 
competition, and creating conditions for effective functioning of product markets.2446 
The FAS investigations are mainly based on the following provisions of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition”: 
(vi) Article 10 – prohibition of abuse of dominant position; 
(vii) Article 11 – prohibition of written or oral agreements between competitors (cartels) / 
“vertical” agreements, which lead or might lead to a restriction of competition ; 
(viii) Article 11.1 – prohibition of concerted actions, which lead to restriction of competition; 
(ix) Article 15 – prohibition of adoption of acts or performance of actions by state bodies, 
which lead or may lead to prevention, restriction or elimination of competition; 
(x) Article 16 – prohibition of anticompetitive agreements or concerted actions by state 
authorities; between the state authorities and economic entities if they lead or may lead to 
the prevention, restriction or elimination of competition. 
The second important legislative act is the Federal law "On the Basic Principles of State 
Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 2009 N 381-FZ 
(hereinafter – the "Federal law "On the Trading Activities"), which was adopted with the view to 
rebalancing relationships between food retail chains and food suppliers. Article 9 of the said Federal 
Law sets forth the rights and obligations of parties to a food supply contract including, inter alia, 
mandatory disclosure of information about selection criteria of potential counterparties and the 
essential terms of a food supply contract; the 5% cap on the volume-based remuneration for the 
purchase of goods under a food supply contract; prohibition of bundling of purchasing of food 
products from the supplier with rendering to the latter by the buyer services aimed at promoting and 
advertising food products; etc. 
Article 13 of the Federal law “On the Trading Activities” sets antimonopoly requirements for 
economic entities involved in trading activities for sale of food products through organising a retail 
chain and economic entities supplying food products to retail chains including prohibition to: 
1) create discriminatory conditions as defined in the Federal law “On Protection of 
Competition”; 
2) prevent entry to / exit from the product market for other economic entities; 
3) violate price setting procedures established by normative legal acts; 
4) impose “unfair” conditions on the counterparty (e.g. exclusivity of supplies, return to the 
supplier of food products, which were not sold upon certain term, etc.).2447 
                                                          
2446 Article 1 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”. 
2447“Article 13. Antimonopoly Rules for Economic Entities Involved in Trading Activities and Economic Entities 
Supplying Food Products 
1. Economic entities, involved in trading activities for sale of food products through organization of a retail chain, and 
economic entities, supplying food products to retail chains, are prohibited from: 
1) Creating discriminatory conditions defined in accordance with the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”; 
2) Preventing entry/exit of another economic entity to/from the market; 
3) Violating price setting procedures established by normative legal acts; 
4) Imposing upon a counterparty the following conditions: 
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Article 15 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" sets antimonopoly requirements for 
state and local authorities in the area of regulations of trading activities, including prohibition of 
restrictions on free movements of goods between different regions or between districts within one 
region; restrictions on free selection of counterparties; imposing price regulation on the economic 
entities, etc. 
Provisions of both acts are subject to FAS enforcement. According to last publicly available 
official statistics on investigation of the cases on violation of the Federal law “On Protection of 
Competition”, the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" in agricultural markets,2448 the majority 
of investigated cases referred to an unjustified increase of prices for food products. Among them, out 
of 321 antitrust cases brought by regional departments of FAS from August 2010 to January 10, 2012, 
setting of monopolistic prices constituted 104 cases; refusals to deal and concerted actions aimed at 
price increase constituted 159 cases; anticompetitive actions of state and local authorities constituted 
52 cases. 
The interplay between the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” and the Federal law "On 
the Trading Activities" was not initially clear. The amendments introduced to the Federal law "On 
the Trading Activities" in July 2016 aimed, inter alia, to eliminate the discrepancies between two 
legal acts and bring the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" in compliance with the main concepts 
and principles of antimonopoly regulations in the Russian Federation.2449 Importantly, FAS clarified 
that Article 13 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" was applicable to all cases of violation 
of its requirements by retail chains and food suppliers regardless of their market shares.2450 Therefore, 
there is no need to establish dominance in order to apply Article 13 the Federal law "On the Trading 
Activities". However, its application should be in line with the Federal law “On Protection of 
Competition” and the clarifications of FAS related to the Article 10 of the said law [abuse of 
                                                          
a) Prohibiting the economic entity from entering into food supply contracts with other economic entities involved in 
similar activities, as well as food supply contracts with other economic entities on similar or other conditions; 
b) On liability for failure to comply with the obligations of the economic entity for supplies of food products on conditions 
that are more favourable than conditions for other economic entities involved in similar activities; 
c) On providing information by the economic entity to the counterparty about contracts concluded by the economic entity 
with other economic entities involved in similar activities; 
f) On reducing the prices by the economic entity, supplying food products, to the level, when with mark-up (surcharge) 
added, the price shall not exceed the minimum price for such goods supplied to the economic entities involved in similar 
activities (“most favoured nation clause”); 
i) On returning the food products, not sold during the designated period, to the economic entity that had supplied such 
goods, except when returning such goods is allowed or is provided for by laws of the Russian Federation; 
j) Other conditions not relevant to the subject matter of the contract or substantially similar to the conditions provided 
for by sub-clauses "а" - "i" of this Article; 
5)Performing wholesale trade under a commission agent agreement or a mixed agreement with elements of a commission 
agent agreement. 
2. An economic entity can present evidence that its actions (omissions) specified in Part 1 of this Article (except actions 
specified in Paragraph 4 Part 1 of this Article) can be allowed under Part 1 of Article 13 of the Federal Law “On 
Protection of Competition” as of 26 July 2006 No.135-FZ”. 
2448 Report on investigation of the cases on potential violations of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”, the 
Federal law "On the Trading Activities", the Code of Administrative Offences by territorial departments of FAS as of 
10.01.2012 <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1524> accessed 05 January 2017. 
2449 Paragraph 4 of the “Clarification of the FAS of Russia on some issues of application of the Federal Law dated 
28.12.2009 No. 381-FZ "On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" as 
amended by the Federal Law dated 03.07.2016 No. 273-FZ” <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=14896> 
accessed 05 January 2017. 
2450 Provided that the threshold equal to 400 million RUB of the annual turnover of the economic entity (its group) / retail 
chain is met: ibid. 
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dominance].2451 Meanwhile, breaches of Article 9 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" fall 
outside the scope of competition law and enforcement of the said provisions does not require 
compliance with the procedures of investigation of antitrust violations.2452 
The courts play an important role in the application of competition law to food supply chains 
in Russia through individual cases review and the general interpretation of competition rules. Russian 
commercial courts undertake a close scrutiny of FAS decisions, including the correct definition of 
product and geographical markets in abuse cases when assessing if there is sufficient evidence of 
anticompetitive agreements and that the distinction between agreements and concerted practices was 
duly observed. Commercial courts may strike down decisions of FAS due to incorrect definition of 
the product market (generally too narrow);2453 because the FAS’ decision blurred the distinction 
between an agreement (cartel) and concerted actions set forth by Articles 11 and11.1 of the federal 
Law “On Protection of Competition” respectively, because of the failure to prove existence of an 
agreement between alleged participants of the cartel;2454 or the failure to prove the fact of setting a 
monopoly price in compliance with paragraph 1 Article 6 of the Federal law “On Protection of 
Competition”.2455 
FAS has defined priorities in the promotion of competition in the Russian federation by 
publishing the ‘National Plan on Development of Competition in 2017-2018’. This focuses on a 
number of industries including agriculture (agro-technologies, digital agricultural platforms, modern 
genetics, and plant protection agents)2456. Upon adoption of the National Plan by the Order of the 
President of the Russian Federation, the specialised ministries and agencies should devise and 
implement on its basis the “road maps” of development of competition in the corresponding sectors 
of the economy. Thus, the draft ‘Road Map on Development of Competition in Agricultural Industry 
in 2017-2018’ puts particular emphasis on increasing the availability of the transport infrastructure 
for the agricultural producers; development of exchange trading and off-exchange online trading of 
agricultural products; promotion of competition in the seed market by stimulating the domestic supply 
of seeds and establishment/upgrading the agricultural genetics centers.2457 
 
                                                          
2451 Letter of the Federal Antimonopoly Service dated 05.09.2016 No.AK / 60976/16 "Clarification of the FAS of Russia 
on some issues of application of the Federal Law dated 28.12.2009 No. 381-FZ "On the Basic Principles of State 
Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" as amended by the Federal Law dated 03.07.2016 No. 273-
FZ <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=14793> accessed 05 January 2017. 
2452 Letter of the Federal Antimonopoly Service dated 05.09.2016 No.AK / 60976/16 "Clarification of the FAS of Russia 
on some issues of application of the Federal Law dated 28.12.2009 No. 381-FZ "On the Basic Principles of State 
Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" as amended by the Federal Law dated 03.07.2016 No. 273-
FZ <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=14793> accessed 05 January 2017. 
2453 See, for example, decision of the First Commercial Court of Appeal dated 28 March2016 on the case №А79-
8318/2015 on complaint of CJSC “Tander”; decision of the Commercial Court of Volgo-Vyatsky Region dated 24 
October 2016 on the case №А79-11990/2015 on complaint of the State unitary agricultural enterprise “Ulyanovskoye”. 
2454 Decision of the Commercial Court of Povolzhskiy region dated 04  October 2016 on the case № А65-20903/2015 on 
complaint of  LLC “Agrotorg”, CJSC “Tander”, CJSC “TD “Perekrestok”, LLC “Ashan”, and others. 
2455Decision of the Commercial Court of the Northern-Caucasus region dated 26 November   2015 on the case № А63-
803/2015 on complaint of CJSC “Stavropolsky broiler” and LLC “Ptizecombinat”. 
2456 FAS Press release ‘National Plan on Development of Competition in 2017-2018 must enhance the national economic 
framework’ (10 November 2016)  // FAS. URL: https://fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=47744.  
2457The draft ‘Plan (“Road Map) of on Development of Competition in Agricultural Industry in 2017-2018’, < 
http://fas.gov.ru/upload/other/%D0%94%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D
0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%B0%20%D0%BF%D0%BE%20%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BA
%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8%20%D0%B2%20%D0%90%D0%9F%D0%9A
%2015.02.2017.docx>accessed 20 April 2017. 
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2.1.2. International Cooperation 
 
The Russian competition authority is integrated into the international competition law system 
through Russia’s participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter – the “EEU”). The 
foundation document of the EEU is the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (Astana, 29 May 
2014), which sets forth the general principles and rules of competition in the EEU, powers of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission in the field of competition law and rules of the interaction between 
national competition authorities of the EEU member states, as well as between the Eurasian Economic 
Commission and national competition authorities of the EEU member states. 
The main goal of the EEU in the field of competition is the establishment of the common 
competition policies and rules in the territory of the EEU. This is achieved through:  
(i) harmonisation of the competition law and policies of the EEU member states; 
(ii) control over protection of competition in the cross-border markets.2458 
In 2013 the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council adopted the Model Law on Competition,2459 
which has become an important tool of harmonisation of competition law within the EEU and was 
transposed into the national competition policies of a number of the EEU member states.2460 
In addition, the Eurasian Economic Commission has powers to (i) conduct antitrust 
investigations with regard to violations of the general rules of competition in the EEU established in 
Article 76 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, (ii) adopt legally binding decisions and 
(iii) impose fines on undertakings in case such violations have or might have negative impact on the 
competition in the cross-border markets.2461 The cross-border markets mean the product markets, 
which geographic boundaries include the territories of two or more EEU member states.2462 The 
Eurasian Economic Commission is authorised to investigate the violation of the competition rules in 
cross-border markets  when additional criteria established by the Eurasian Economic Commission 
are met (for example, participants of an anticompetitive agreement reside in at least two different 
member states, the certain market share threshold is exceeded, etc).2463 Decisions and actions of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission in the field of competition can be appealed to the Court of the Union, 
which is a permanent judicial body of the EEU.  
FAS has collaborated with the Eurasian Economic Commission on a number of cross-border 
competition cases with a view to level the playing field for competitors in cross-border EEU markets. 
Thus, the Eurasian Economic Commission and the FAS assessed the cross-border (Russian-
Belorussian) market of apatite concentrate in order to ensure equal wholesale prices of apatite 
                                                          
2458Article 74 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (Astana, May 29, 2014, amended May 08, 2015); 
‘Competition Policy within the Eurasian Economic Union’, <fas.gov.ru/international-partnership/eaes.html> accessed 20 
April 2017. 
2459Decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council dated October 24, 2013 No.50 “On the Model Law “On 
Competition”, accessed at https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0047311/scd_25102013_50. 
2460 Denis Gavrilov and Alina Chernyaga, ‘Antitrust Regulation in the Eurasian Economic Union’ (December 13, 2016), 
the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, <www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/антимонопольное-
регулирование-в-евразийском-экономическом-союзе> accessed 20 April 2017. 
2461Annex 19 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (Astana, 29 May 2014, amended 08 May 2015) ‘Protocol on 
the General Principles and Rules of the Competition’, para 9.  
2462 Decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council dated 19 December 2012 No.29 “On the Criteria of Defining a 
Market as Cross-Border ”, para 2, <docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0044093/scd_20122012_29> accessed 20 April 2017. 
2463 Decision of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council dated 19 December 2012 No.29 “On the Criteria of Defining a 
Market as Cross-Border ”, para 2, <docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/0044093/scd_20122012_29> accessed 20 April 2017., 
paras 4-5.  
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concentrate for both Russian and Belorussian manufacturers.2464 The EEU and Russian competition 
authorities also carried out the investigation into vertical agreements between the major manufacturer 
of mining equipment Caterpillar and its dealers, which resulted in amendments of the relevant 
agreements.2465 During the period of  2016 – first half of 2017 the Eurasian Economic Commission 
resolved 16 complaints on violation of the competition rules in cross-border markets which resulted 
in 9 investigations.2466 On 27 September 2017 the Eurasian Economic Commission adopted its first 
prohibition decision with regard to the abuse of dominance in the cross-border market of grain-
oriented electrical steel by PJSC “Novolipetskiy Metallurgical Complex” and LLC “VIS-Steel” 
which resulted in a total fine of over 217 million RUB.2467 In general, the Eurasian Economic 
Commission favours a ‘soft’ approach in the form of voluntary commitments to remedy violations of 
competition rules and make use of instruments of prevention and consultations to deter antitrust 
violations.2468 In line with this the Commission continuously works on formalising several codes of 
good practice (including the Code for Retail Chains).2469 This means a closer cooperation between 
the Eurasian Economic Commission and FAS in the future and greater role for the EEU competition 
rules and practices in protection and promotion of competition in the Russian Federation. 
 
2.2.Competition Issues on Different Levels of the Food Supply Chain 
 
2.2.1. Factors of Production 
 
Within the factors of production, the main competition law concerns expressed by FAS refer to 
the high dependency on import supplies of genetic materials and seeds, underdevelopment of 
domestic seed farming industry and necessity of import substitution in this important segment.2470 
Seed farming is considered to be the most profitable segment of the global fresh fruit and 
vegetables production chain: the volume of the global fruit and vegetable seeds market exceeds 6 
billion USD and is expected to reach 13 billion USD by 2018.2471 Despite this, Russia almost has had 
no participation in the selection, seed farming, and development of new products, mostly due to a 
lack of necessary support to Russian R&D in this area (see the section IP Rights of this report).2472 
Among the measures suggested by FAS to improve the situation in this area are the state support 
for the establishment of agricultural genetics centers; the market launching of selection inventions, 
the IP rights involved belonging to the state; and the application of competition law to the practices 
of abuse of intellectual property rights as an instrument of monopolisation of the agricultural 
markets.2473 
                                                          
2464 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/30-09-2016.aspx accessed 20 April 2017. 
2465 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/29-07-2016-4.aspx accessed 20 April 2017. 
2466 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/25-08-2017-2.aspx accessed 25 October 2017. 
2467 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/27-09-2017-1.aspx accessed 25 October 2017. 
2468 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/25-08-2017-2.aspx accessed 25 October 2017. 
2469 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/nae/news/Pages/30-09-2016.aspx accessed 20 April 2017.. 
2470 FAS press releases dated 07 December 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=48110> accessed 24 
December 2016 and 07 July 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=46335> accessed 24 December 2016. 
2471 Meshkova T.A., Moiseichev E. Russia’s Experience of Foresight Implementation in Global Value Chain Research // 
Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 2016. Vol. 5. N 9. p. 8. 
2472 Meshkova T.A., Moiseichev E. Russia’s Experience of Foresight Implementation in Global Value Chain Research // 
Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 2016. Vol. 5. N 9. p. 8. 
2473 FAS press release dated  07 July 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=46335> accessed 24 December 
2016. 
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The concentration in the market of seeds raises additional competition concerns, as “there are 
significant risks to competition inherent to the formed structure of the seed market”.2474 In 2016 FAS 
of Russia approved two mergers in the seeds market: the merger between Dow Chemical and DuPont 
and the acquisition of LLC Syngenta by ChemChina.2475 Both transactions have been cleared 
unconditionally based on traditional approaches to merger control (such as definition of product 
markets, in which parties to merger are active, and their market shares).2476 However, the head of the 
Department of control on chemical industry and agro-production remarked that  
“there is an issue of updating approaches to the analysis of transactions in the market for 
genetic materials. We should take into account the specifics of their functioning and their 
influence on the global food markets, as well as assess the risk of restricted access to 
innovative products and technologies for potential competitors”.2477 
In accordance with the commitment decision adopted by the EU Commission in March 2017, 
which addressed concerns that the merger between Dow Chemical and DuPont would significantly 
reduce competition in markets for existing pesticides, as well as stifle innovation in the pesticides 
sector,2478 DuPont committed to divest a significant part of its existing pesticide business, including 
its R&D arm.  On 26 May 2017 FAS cleared unconditionally acquisition by the US company FMC 
Corporation of the JSC “DuPont Chimprom”2479 which formed a part of the transfer of pesticide 
production and R&D division of DuPont to FMC following DuPont’s divestiture commitments.  
The similar commitment have been offered to the EU Commission by ChemChina in the view of its 
acquisition of the Swiss company Syngenta, one of the global players in the market of pesticides 
and  plant growth regulators.2480 Despite both companies’ presence in the Russian market for 
pesticides, according to experts, the merger is unlikely to change the dynamics of the market in 
Russia, unless in the short-term perspective, while in long-term it might contribute to expansion of 
ChemChina in Russia.2481 
There are signs of the further consolidation also in the market of animal genetics and breeding. 
On April, 25th 2017 FAS cleared unconditionally the merger between Cypriote GP CY Holding Ltd 
(which allegedly acts in the interests of Cobb-Vantress, Inc., the global producer of poultry breed)2482 
and LLC “Broiler Buduschego”,2483 the leading Russian supplier of the poultry breed material 
currently controlling up to 40% of the Russian market of the breed material for broiler producers. 
                                                          
2474 FAS press release dated 07 December 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=48110> accessed 24 
December 2016. 
2475 Decision of FAS of Russia dated 13 July 2016 № СП/47456/16 (on Syngenta) and Decision dated 10 July 2016  № 
ЦА/49718/16 (on Dow Chemical and DuPont).  
2476 FAS press release dated  07 July 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=46335> accessed 24 December 
2016. 
2477 Decision of FAS of Russia dated 13 July 2016 № СП/47456/16 (on Syngenta) and Decision dated 10 July 2016  № 
ЦА/49718/16 (on Dow Chemical and DuPont).  
2478 European Commission - Press release as of 27 March 2017 ‘Mergers: Commission clears merger between 
Dow and DuPont, subject to conditions’, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm> accessed 02 
September 2017. 
2479 Decision of FAS dated 26 May 2017 N СП/35465/17, <solutions.fas.gov.ru/ca/upravlenie-kontrolya-himicheskoy-
promyshlennosti-i-agropromyshlennogo-kompleksa/sp-35465-17> accessed 02 September 2017. 
2480 European Commission - Press release as of 05 April 2017 ‘Mergers: Commission clears ChemChina acquisition of 
Syngenta, subject to conditions’, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-882_en.htm> accessed 04 September 2017. 
2481‘ChemChina has got permission for acquiring Syngenta’, <sugar.ru/node/18283> accessed 02 September 2017. 
2482 Anatoliy Kostyrev, ‘Samuel Lipman is tired of poultry farming’ (Kommersant No. 74 dated 27 April 2017), 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3282845 accessed 19 April 2017. 
2483 Decision of FAS of Russia dated 25 April  2017 № ЦА/27771/17 http://solutions.fas.gov.ru/ca/upravlenie-kontrolya-
himicheskoy-promyshlennosti-i-agropromyshlennogo-kompleksa/tsa-27771-17 accessed 19 April 2017. 
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The merger puts the foundation for further expansion of Cobb-Vantress into the Russian market of 
the animal breed materials.2484 
 
2.2.2.1. Right of Access of Farmers to the Plant Varieties and Animal Breeds in Russia 
 
The legal basis for the production, harvesting, processing, storage, sale, transportation and use of 
seeds of agricultural and forest plants is set forth by the Russian law "On Seed Breeding" dated 17 
December 1997 N 149-FZ (hereinafter – the “Russian Law "On Seed Breeding").  
The Russian law is based on the provisions of the International Convention for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (hereinafter – “UPOV Convention”), which aim is to encourage the 
development of new varieties of plants by codifying and protecting intellectual property for plant 
breeders. Russia acceded to the said Convention on 24 April 1998 and since that its domestic laws 
should abide by the basic concepts of plant variety protection established by UPOV Convention.  
According to the Russian Law "On Seed Breeding" the use of the new variety of plants is allowed 
after this variety had been included in the State Register of the Plant Variety Admitted to Use.2485 
The breeder of a new variety of plant should be registered by the designated State Commission of the 
Russian Federation for Testing and Preservation of Plant Varieties.2486 Upon registration the breeder 
incurs obligations of maintaining (preserving) the variety in accordance with the characteristics 
indicated in the variety description as of the date of registration in the State Register of the Plant 
Variety Admitted to Use.2487 According to the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter – 
the “Civil Code”), the exclusive right to the variety of plants is recognized and protected subject to 
its state registration in the State Register of Protected Varieties of Plants and Animal Breeds and is 
confirmed by the patent.2488 The intellectual property rights for new variety of plants belong to the 
owner of such patent including its production and reproduction; conditioning for the purpose of 
propagation; offering for sale; selling or other marketing; import to or export from the territory of the 
Russian Federation.2489 However, in line with the provisions of Article 15 of UPOV Convention, 
there are certain exceptions to the breeder’s right, including compulsory exceptions set forth by 
UPOV Convention:2490 
(i) acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes (e.g. for subsistence farming),  
(ii) acts done for experimental purposes, 
(iii) use of protected varieties for the purpose of breeding other varieties, as long as the new 
varieties are not "essentially derivative" of the protected variety. 
Additional exceptions set forth by the Civil Code to protect the right of farmers (so-called 
“farmer’s privilege”) include: 
(iv) use of the products of the harvest obtained by farmers in their own holding, for two years 
for propagating purposes within their own holdings, if the variety of plants is included the 
                                                          
2484 Anatoliy Kostyrev, ‘Samuel Lipman is tired of poultry farming’ (Kommersant No. 74 dated 27 April 2017), 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3282845 accessed 19 April 2017. 
2485Article 6 of the Russian Law "On Seed Breeding". 
2486‘Provisions on the Registration of the Originator of the Variety of the Plant’ adopted by the Decree of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Production of the Russian Federation as of 10 February 1999 N 50, paras 1, 6. 
2487Provisions on the Registration of the Originator of the Variety of the Plant’ adopted by the Decree of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Production of the Russian Federation as of 10 February 1999 N 50, para 7. 
2488Article 1414 of the Civil Code. 
2489 Article 1421 of the Civil Code. 
2490 Article 1422 of the Civil Code. 
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specified list of varieties adopted by the Government of the Russian Federation2491 (this 
provision corresponds to the optional exception established by paragraph 2 Article 15 of 
the UPOV Convention); 
(v) reproduction of commercial animals for their use in the own holding (the farmer’s 
privilege applied mutatis mutandis to animal breeds). 
 
In addition, subparagraph 6 Article 1422 of the Civil Code sets forth the principle of exhaustion 
of the breeder’s right in line with Article 16 of the UPOV Convention. This provision allows any acts 
with seeds, plant material, breed material and commercial animals, which have been sold or otherwise 
marketed by the breeder or with his consent, apart from: 
- further propagation of plant seeds or animal breeds; 
- an export of material of the variety, which enables the propagation of the variety, into a 
country which does not protect varieties of the plant genus or species to which the variety 
belongs, except where the exported material is for final consumption purposes. 
As evidenced by the case law, the exhaustion of the breeder’s right is quite often used as a defence 
against claims of unauthorised use of protected seeds in farming activities.2492 
Article 1423 of the Civil Code sets forth compulsory licensing of the rights for varieties of plants 
or animal breeds. According to it, after three years from the date of grant of the patent for the variety 
of plants, any person who wishes and is prepared to use the variety of plants,2493 in case the patent 
holder refuses to license it for the production or sale of seeds or breed material on conditions 
consistent with established practice, has the right to bring an action to court to force the patent holder 
to grant to the plaintiff a non-exclusive license to use this variety of plants or animal breed in the 
territory of the Russian Federation. The conditions of the compulsory license, including the 
consideration to be paid, should be defined by the court. The aggregate consideration should be no 
less than consideration paid under the license agreement in similar circumstances. The burden of 
proof that there are justifiable reasons why the license should not be granted to the plaintiff lies with 
the patent holder.  
Despite the provisions of Article 1423 of the Civil Code entered into force more than 10 years 
ago, the Russian case law on granting compulsory licenses for varieties of plants or animal breeds is 
scarce.2494 In fact, the compulsory license for varieties of plants remains rather theoretical opportunity 
than the practical solution for agro-producers.2495  
                                                          
2491 The order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 04 October 2007 N 643 sets forth the list of some staple 
varieties like wheat, rye, potato, buckwheat, peas, etc. 
2492 See, for instance, the decision of the Federal Commercial Court of the Far-Eastern Region dated 14 May 2009 on the 
case N А04-1065/2008; the decision of the Sixth Court of Appeal dated 16 July 2010 on the case N А04-1211/2010; the 
decision of the Fifteenth Court of Appeal dated 02 December 2009 on the case N А32-15389/2009. 
2493 The preparedness means the technical ability to use the license (for instance, possession of the agricultural land plot, 
relevant equipment, etc.) – see the commentary to Article 1423 of the Civil Code at http://stgkrf.ru/1423 accessed 13 
September 2017. 
2494Thus, there is only one case available in the public data base on refusal to grant compulsory license for varieties of 
plants, which is decision of the Nineteenth Commercial Court of Appeal dated 30 June 2015 on the case N А08-3816/2014 
in which both the court of the first instance and the court of appeal dismissed the claim on the ground that (i) the offer to 
conclude the license agreement was sent before expiry of three year period from the date of grant of the patent, and (ii) 
the offer of the plaintiff did not contain all substantial conditions of the license agreement required by law.  
2495 Karina Safaryan, Innovation Business, Practical Aspects of Assets Evaluation (FBGOU VPO “The Russian Academy 
of National Economy and Public Service under the President of the Russian Federation” 2012) 
https://profilib.com/chtenie/20893/karina-safaryan-innovatsionnyy-biznes-prakticheskie-aspekty-otsenki-aktivov-
25.php accessed 11 September 2017. 
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2.2.2.2. Markets of Fertilisers in Russia 
 
Regarding Fertilisers, in 2014 FAS released the Analytical report on the conditions of 
competition in the market of Fertilisers where it established that in 2011-2012 the market was 
characterised by the low degree of concentration and vigorous competition in the market of nitrogen-
based chemical Fertilisers (the most massively used by agricultural producers) and much higher 
degree of concentration and suppressed competition in the markets of potassium and phosphate 
chemical Fertilisers.2496 The main reasons are high barriers to entry to the market and presence of 
only two producers of raw materials for potassium and phosphate chemical Fertilisers in the Russian 
Federation – OJSC “Uralkaliy” (for potassium Fertilisers) and OJSC “Apatit” (for phosphate 
Fertilisers). FAS also noted that the exportation of the Fertilisers exceeds several times supplies to 
the domestic market, which is explained, inter alia, by low demand for Fertilisers in the Russian 
market due to insufficient financial resources of Russian agricultural producers.2497 As a result, FAS 
urged the necessity of regular monitoring of the pricing and competition conditions in the market of 
Fertilisers.2498 
The transparency of pricing in the market of Fertilisers remained a concern for FAS in 2015-
2016 and in October 2016 FAS announced its plans to introduce the exchange trading of Fertilisers 
in Russia.2499 The main rationale was to prevent the establishment of monopoly prices for Fertilisers 
and improve the logistics and planning components in the market of Fertilisers. The announced 
launching of exchange trading is scheduled for autumn 2017.2500 
 
2.2.2.3. Agricultural Production (Farming) 
 
Prior to 1993, the Russian agricultural industry was based on a system governed by the Ministry 
of Trade and supervised by a number of state agencies. The producer supplied commodities to 
wholesale intermediaries which, in turn, distributed the goods to industrial processors or to territorial 
departments of the Ministry of Trade. 
The opening up to the global market and the dissolution of the Soviet regime brought the 
restructuring of the industry, which was intensified following the 1998 financial crisis. The 
agricultural sector has been consolidated progressively under the aegis of few national incumbents. 
In particular, Gazprom became the largest agricultural holding, controlling 91 agricultural firms 
through 25 of its subsidiaries.2501  
                                                          
2496Analytical report on the conditions of competition in the market of Fertilisers, Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia 
(2014), <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1851,13> accessed 20 December 2016. 
2497 Analytical report on the conditions of competition in the market of Fertilisers, Federal Antimonopoly Service of 
Russia (2014), <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1851,13> accessed 20 December 2016., 14. 
2498 Analytical report on the conditions of competition in the market of Fertilisers, Federal Antimonopoly Service of 
Russia (2014), <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1851,13> accessed 20 December 2016., 15. 
2499 FAS press release dated 29 October 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=47589>.  
2500 Interview with the Deputy Head of FAS Andrey Tsyganov at “RIA News”, < 
ria.ru/interview/20161228/1484793637.html>; the latest announcements mention the launch of exchange trading by the 
end of 2017 - http://мниап.рф/en/news/FAS-Rossii-planiruet-do-konca-2017-goda-zapustit-birzevuu-torgovlu-
mineralnymi-udobreniami/. 
2501  Johan F. M. Swinnen, and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank, 2011), 91. 
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The rationale of the regional authorities for assisting the creation of agrofirms and large 
regional holdings was “to actively employ methods of state control to preserve and develop the agro-
industrial sector of the region, to rehabilitate bankrupt agricultural enterprises, to provide the 
enterprises with fixed and current assets, and to restore the broken integration links”.2502 The Orel 
region was intended to become a model for developing a regional agricultural sector under market 
conditions but with a strong supervisory role for the state. The creation of huge agro-holdings in 
Russia has significantly affected the performance of the farms. Interestingly, the results appear to be 
quite mixed.2503 Gataulina et al.’s (2004) study finds that vertical integration has contributed to: 
•  A better supply of inputs to farms. 
•  Growth in output and productivity. 
•  Poor financial results. 
•  “Important heterogeneity among the farms. Some of the integrated farms with good 
management seem to have performed very well”2504. 
However, on the other hand, Gataulina et al found out that the profitability of such agro-
holdings worsened by almost 20 percent during 1999-2002. The negative trend in profitability also 
affected other vertically integrated agricultural enterprises to the extent that, for instance, in 2002 
among 149 agro-holdings in the Belgorod region only 39 were profitable.2505 
In the field of agricultural production, one of the most important goals of the state policy 
declared since the adoption of the Food Security Doctrine in 2010, and re-enforced after the 
introduction of import limitations for agricultural products from the Western countries in the summer 
2014, is the “sustainable development of domestic production of food and raw materials, which is 
sufficient to guarantee the country’s food independence”.2506 In line with this goal, different 
measures of state support for domestic agricultural producers have been introduced, starting from 
direct subsidies to farmers to the creation of state-owned grain companies and the interventional 
reserve for grains as a mechanism of direct regulation of the market in order to stabilise the prices 
for the most important food products.  
FAS plays a quite an active role in this area. On the one hand, it monitors compliance of state 
and local bodies with the procedures of granting subsidies to agricultural producers and detects 
abusive practices related to it. Thus, control on the procedures of granting subsidies to farmers was 
one of the priority activities of FAS in 2015.2507 As a result, more than fifty investigations were 
opened on the alleged violation of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” by regional state 
bodies (see an example of the case in Box 1). The violations were mostly related to illegal 
discrimination among the recipients of subsidies (for instance, by setting an additional criteria, such 
as having registered office in the region granting a subsidy or obligation to sell all the grains harvest 
                                                          
2502Johan F. M. Swinnen and others. 
2503 Johan F. M. Swinnen,and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank, 2011), 91. 
2503 Johan F. M. Swinnen,and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank, 2011), 91. 
2504 Johan F. M. Swinnen,and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank, 2011), 91.; Gataulina and others. 
2505Johan F. M. Swinnen,and others, The Dynamics of Vertical Coordination in Agrifood Chains in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia: Implications for Policy and World Bank Operations (The World Bank, 2011), 91.  
2506 Paragraph 3 of the Food Security Doctrine adopted by the Order of the President of the Russian Federation dated 30 
January 2010 N 120. 
2507 FAS press release dated 12 February 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=44712> accessed 20 
December 2016. 
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of the current year to the entities registered and having processing capacities in the territory of the 
specified region)2508 and violation of the order of granting state preferences set forth by Chapter 5 
of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” (for instance, by retroactively amending the legal 
normative act stipulating the procedure of granting subsidies in order to make a pre-defined recipient 
eligible for them).2509 
 
Box 1: Decision by FAS of Russia dated 17 August 2016 on the case №1-00-187/00-06-15 
 
In this case, FAS proved the existence of an oral agreement between the Government of Belgorod 
region, the Department of agricultural and industrial complex of Belgorod region, the Fund of 
promotion of products manufactured in Belgorod region and the group of companies affiliated to 
the same natural person in violation of Article 16 of the Federal law “On Protection of 
Competition” (prohibition of anticompetitive agreements or concerted actions by federal, regional 
or local state authorities; between these authorities and economic entities if they lead or may lead 
to restriction or elimination of competition). 
The Fund of promotion of products manufactured in Belgorod region was established in order to 
promote the products of Belgorod agricultural producers. Under control of the Government of 
Belgorod region, the Department of agricultural and industrial complex of Belgorod region, the 
Fund collected funds from the agricultural producers, who had previously received subsidies from 
the budget under the program of state support of agriculture in Belgorod region. In fact, almost 
100% of money received as subsidies was transferred by the agricultural producers to the said 
Fund. The Government of Belgorod region forced the agricultural producers to perform payments 
to the Fund through setting the lower rent rates for agricultural land plots owned by Belgorod 
region for those producers who transferred money to the Fund. In 2014 the Fund allocated all its 
budget (in the form of subsidies and loans on preferential terms) to the companies which 
constituted the same group and were affiliated to <...> (a natural person).  
FAS established that in 2014 the Government of Belgorod region, the Department of agricultural 
and industrial complex of Belgorod region, the Fund of promotion and economic entities affiliated 
to <...> entered into an oral agreement aimed at giving preferences to the economic entities 
affiliated to <...>  compared to other participants of the relevant market in violation of Article 16 
of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”. 
 
On many occasions, in addition to taking prohibition decisions and imposing fines, FAS issues 
obligatory requirements to insert amendments into the regional legal acts and plays an active role in 
the preparation of the said amendments. 
On the other hand, FAS performs the traditional monitoring of antitrust violations by market 
participants in the form of anticompetitive agreements and/or abuse of dominance. Antitrust 
instruments constitute one of the measures of the state’s agricultural policy, along with, for example, 
granting subsidies to agricultural producers or tariff and non-tariff regulation of the agricultural 
                                                          
2508Decision by FAS of  Russia dated 02 December 2014 on the case №1-15-11/00-06-14; Decision by FAS of Russia 
dated 27 November 2015 on the case № 1-00-122/00-06-15; Decision by FAS of Russia dated 27 November 2015 on the 
case № № 1-00-121/00-06-15; Decision by FAS of Russia dated  28 July 2015 on the case №1-15-42/00-06-15. 
2509Decision by Chuvashia FAS dated 16 December 2015 on the case № 43/05-АМЗ-2015; Decision by Chuvashia FAS 
dated 10 December 2015 on the case № 36/05-АМЗ-2015. 
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markets.2510 Russian competition law currently does not set forth any specific exemptions from 
antitrust scrutiny for the agricultural sector. Therefore, the general exemptions contained in Article 
13 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” and the Decree of the Government of the 
Russian Federation dated 16 July 2009 N 583 “On the Cases of Permissibility of Agreements between 
Economic Entities” apply to the agricultural sector with regard to the conditions of exemption of 
vertical agreements, R&D agreements and agreements on collaborative use of the R&D results.2511 
It is noteworthy that by 2013 “the Russian markets of the agricultural produce and food [were] 
evaluated as low-concentrated and highly competitive”,2512 which means that the majority of 
producers were small and medium enterprises and none of them can impose a monopolistic price for 
farming output.2513 The main reasons of low concentration includes low barriers for entry, 
insignificant economies of scale and high transportation costs limiting the optimal size of the 
production unit, etc.2514 Moreover, the share of small private farm holdings have been historically 
high in Russia (though with stable tendency to decrease since its peak in 2002)2515 and in 2009 
accounted for milk – over 50%; potato – over 80% and vegetables – over 75%.2516 
However, later reports notice the process of horizontal and vertical consolidation of agro-
production and establishment of large agro-holdings and more intense cooperation between  small 
agro-businesses,2517 for instance in the markets of sunflower oil, milk and milk products in some 
regions, and baker’s yeast.2518 The majority of agro-holdings have stemmed from the large food 
processing enterprises; they have complex horizontally and vertically integrated structure and are 
usually quite diversified, rather than specialised (see example in Box 2). As of 2014, the share of 
agro-holdings in the Russian food production market was estimated at 15-20%.2519 The increasing 
                                                          
2510Article 6 of the Federal Law dated 29 December 2006 N 264-FZ “On Development of the Agriculture”.  
2511 Considering also that (i) vertical agreements are exempted if the market share of each party to such agreement in the 
relevant market does not exceed 20% (paragraph 2 Article 12 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”), and 
(ii) some agreements between undertakings (such as related to price discrimination or imposing the “unfair” or irrelevant 
contract terms) are exempted if none of the undertakings  holds a dominant position in the relevant market and their 
aggregate turnover from the sale of goods does not exceed 400 mln. RUB for the last calendar year (paragraph 3 Article 
12 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”). 
2512 Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014) 16, 330. 
2513 Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014) 16, 330.; see also Tatyana Vorozheikina, ‘State Regulation of the 
Fragmented Industries’ (2011) Bulletin of the Russian University of Economics 4, 108.  
2514Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014) 16, 330. 
2515T.Kozhevnikova, V. Ryabikh, E.Mezhueva, ‘Prospects of Development of Enterprises of the Agricultural Industry in 
Russia in the Context of the World Economic Crisis’ (2014) Social and Economics Phenomena and Processes 3 42, 46, 
<cyberleninka.ru/article/n/perspektivy-razvitiya-apk-regiona-v-kontekste-mirovogo-agrarnogo-krizisa> accessed 26 
December 2016. 
2516 Tatyana Vorozheikina, ‘State Regulation of the Fragmented Industries’ (2011) Bulletin of the Russian University of 
Economics 4, 113. 
2517 KPMG Report, “The agricultural and food value chain: Entering a new era of cooperation” (2013), 22, 
<assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/06/agricultural-and-food-value-chain-v2.pdf> accessed 20 December 
2016; T.Kozhevnikova, V. Ryabikh, E.Mezhueva, ‘Prospects of Development of Enterprises of the Agricultural Industry 
in Russia in the Context of the World Economic Crisis’ (2014) 1 Social and Economics Phenomena and Processes 3 45, 
<cyberleninka.ru/article/n/perspektivy-razvitiya-apk-regiona-v-kontekste-mirovogo-agrarnogo-krizisa> accessed 26 
December 2016. 
2518 Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014) 16, 331). 
2519 T. Kozhevnikova, V. Ryabikh, E.Mezhueva, ‘Prospects of Development of Enterprises of the Agricultural Industry 
in Russia in the Context of the World Economic Crisis’ (2014) Social and Economics Phenomena and Processes 3 42, 
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concentration in the agricultural production sector is also evidenced by the decreasing number of 
agricultural enterprises (see Table 2a), which is a consequence of aggregation of enterprises and 
insolvency of small farms due to their unprofitability and inefficient business model.2520 
Unfortunately, more specific numbers related to market shares and levels of concentration in the 
Russian agricultural production sector are currently not available. 
 
Table 2a 
Types of Economic Activity* 
Number of economic entities, thousands, 
(in % to the total) 
Change, 
% 
(2014to 
2013) 
2007 2009 2011 2013 2014 
Total for the Russian 
Federation 
4506,6 4771,9 4823,3 4886,4 4886,0 100,0 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
261,5 
(5,8) 
222,1 
(4,7) 
193,4 
(4,0) 
169,4 
(3,4) 
149,6 
(3,1) 
88,3 
Source: FAS, ‘Report on the Conditions of Competition in the Russian Federation’ (2015), available 
at http://fas.gov.ru. 
 
Box 2: Agrocomplex 
 
On 24 November 2016 FAS cleared unconditionally merger between “Agrocomplex named after 
N.I.Tkachev” and “ParusAgroGroup” which resulted in “Agrocomplex” owning K600 ha of the 
farming land and becoming one of the four largest agro-holdings in Russia. This was a part of the 
long-lasting consolidation process. Thus, in 2015 “Agrocomplex” acquired fourteen farms with 
total area K170 ha from the agro-holding Valinor. In 2016 the company acquired Pavlovskiy sugar 
plant, Poultry factory “Akashevskaya” and rice assets of agro-holding “Rasguliay”.  Currently 
“Agrocomplex” is a very diversified vertically integrated agro-holding producing all range of 
agro-products starting from grains and animal feed to animal farming to meat processing and 
production of rice, bread, sugar, dairy and oil. However, upon merger assessment, FAS has come 
to conclusion that merger would not lead to restriction of competition, as the share market of 
“Agrocomplex” post-merger would constitute only 10% in Krasnodar region, 5,2% in Stavropol 
region and 3,7% in Rostov region. 
Source:  FAS press release dated 07.12.2016 accessed at http://fas.gov.ru/press-center/fas-in-
media/detail.html?id=48093 and the web site of “Agrocomplex” http://zao-agrokomplex.ru/. 
 
It should also be noted that the majority of agricultural markets in Russia are regional, as the 
major share of the products are consumed within the same region where they have been produced.2521 
                                                          
46, <cyberleninka.ru/article/n/perspektivy-razvitiya-apk-regiona-v-kontekste-mirovogo-agrarnogo-krizisa> accessed 26 
December 2016. 
 FAS, ‘Report on the Conditions of Competition in the Russian Federation’ (2015), 40, <fas.gov.ru/about/list-of-
reports/report.html?id=1685> accessed 19 December 2016. 
2521 Tatyana Vorozheikina, ‘State Regulation of the Fragmented Industries’ (2011) Bulletin of the Russian University of 
Economics 4, 108. 
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Therefore, the level of concentration varies from one region to another (as it will be illustrated in the 
next section with regard to processing of raw milk). 
In general, the agricultural producers represent a weaker level of the food supply chain and can 
hardly dictate the conditions of sales to the manufacturers and wholesalers, as evidenced by some 
FAS cases. Thus, in a number of similar cases FAS established that buyers of raw milk in different 
areas of Altay region violated subparagraph 1 of paragraph 1 Article 11 of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition” by entering into agreements on setting artificially low prices of purchase 
for raw milk from individual farms.2522 FAS pointed out that the relationships between sellers and 
buyers of raw milk are unequal, with buyers having superior bargaining power. The farmers do not 
have opportunity to influence the purchase prices of raw milk and accept the prices set by the buyers. 
As a remedy, FAS imposed on the buyers the obligation to conduct an independent pricing strategy. 
This case might be considered as an example of abuse of collective dominance in very fragmented 
oligopsony markets.  
 
2.2.2. Processing and Wholesale 
 
The conditions of competition on the level of processing and wholesale represent a much more 
important concern for FAS than the production level. This is evidenced by the regular monitoring 
performed by FAS of different product markets and the numerous investigations resulting from the 
sector inquiries and received complaints. The processing and wholesale segment is characterised by 
the higher degree of concentration and greater bargaining power of manufactures and wholesalers 
towards the farmers. Therefore, the abuse of dominance (including collective dominance) and 
anticompetitive agreements are the most frequent practices detected by FAS at this level. 
In the end of 2014-2015, during the outburst of prices for certain food products following the 
introduction of import limitations, FAS revealed numerous abuses related to unjustified increases of 
the wholesale prices for bread and cereals.2523 FAS established the presence of cartels on the local 
or regional level,2524 and violations of paragraph 1 Article 13 of the Federal law "On the Trading 
Activities" by creating discriminatory pricing conditions for buyers.2525 On some occasions, the 
manufacturer managed to put forward an economic justification of the price increase by providing 
evidence of an increase of the company’s costs (see Box 3).2526 
 
Box 3: Decision by FAS of Komi Republic dated 16 September 2015 on the case № А25-
11/14. 
 
FAS investigated the economically and technologically unjustified increase of the wholesale prices 
for the socially important alimentary products (rye bread, wheat bread) by LLC “Syktyvkarskiy 
chlebokombinat” (manufacturer and wholesaler). FAS established that the latter held a dominant 
                                                          
2522 Decisions of  UFAS of Altay Region on the cases №19-ФАС22-АМ/06-15, 14-ФАС22-(АМ)/06-15, 20-ФАС22-
АМ/07-15, 15-ФАС22-АМ/06-15, 18-ФАС22-АМ/06-15. 
2523 FAS press release dated 23 January 2015 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=34353> and 03 February 
2015 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=34384>. 
2524 Decisions by UFAS of Kurskiy region dated 21 July 2016 on the cases №03-05/21-2016А and №03-05/22-2016А. 
2525 Decision by Pensenskiy UFAS dated 16 January 2015 on the case № 2-15/02-2014; Decision by Tatarstan UFAS 
dated 16 March 2015 on the case №05-841/2014. 
2526 Decision by UFAS of Komi Republic dated 16 September 2015 on the case № А25-11/14. 
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position in the wholesale market of rye-wheat bread and the wholesale market of wheat bread in 
the territory of several Komi municipalities as its market share exceeded 50%, market shares of 
its competitors are insignificant, and there were significant barriers for entry. 
Under subparagraph 1 paragraph 1 Article 10 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” 
actions (lack of action) of an economic entity holding a dominant position, which result or can 
result in prevention, restriction or elimination of competition are prohibited, including, inter alia, 
establishment and maintaining of monopolistically high price for a commodity. Pursuant to 
paragraph 1 Article 6 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” monopolistically high 
price is the price set by a dominant undertaking, if that price exceeds both the sum of costs required 
for the production and sale of such product and mark-up, and the price, which was formed under 
conditions of competition on merit in the comparable product market.  
LLC “Syktyvkarskiy chlebokombinat” has provided evidence that increase of prices for bread by 
21,1 % from 01.10.2014 was caused by the increase of the company’s costs, including raw 
materials by 2,3 %,  fuel and energy by 20,1 %, salary by 14 %, overhead costs by 55,4 %. The 
increase of the overhead costs resulted from development and maintenance of its own retail chain. 
According to clarification of the tax authority, the costs of performing one type of economic 
activity (such as retail) could be included in the overall expenditures of the company (reflected in 
the wholesale prices). Therefore, the wholesale prices for rye bread and wheat bread set by LLC 
“Syktyvkarskiy chlebokombinat” are economically substantiated and do not constitute 
monopolistically high prices. 
 
The market of milk was also under constant monitoring of FAS. Thus, in 2004-2005 FAS 
performed an investigation of the market of the milk processing, in which it established that markets 
of processing of raw milk were regional and can be divided into four types: oligopsony, highly 
concentrated, medium concentrated and low concentrated (see Table 3a).2527 The narrow geographic 
definition of the markets is determined by high transportation costs and high costs of equipment (first 
of all, refrigerators) for farmers, which results in high dependency of the latter from local milk 
processing factories.2528  In some regions (Udmurt Republic, Komi Republic, Sakhalin Region, 
Archangelsk Region, Bashkiria, etc) the monopoly position of the milk processing factories is 
exacerbated by historically established production chains when back in Soviet times there was only 
one processing factory for each agricultural zone.2529 
 
Table 3a 
N Type of the Market Structure Share of 
Regions  
Examples of Regions 
1 Oligopsonic 8,3 Orel, Stavropol, Volgograd, Chita  
2 Highly concentrated 47,9 Amur, Astrakhan, Murmansk, Magadan, 
Sakhalin, Kurgan, Yaroslavl, Kirov, Tula, 
                                                          
2527 FAS, ‘Analysis of the Market of Services Provided by Dairy Producers and Other Economic Entities to Suppliers of  
Raw Milk’, <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1250> accessed 20 April 2017. 
2528 FAS, ‘Analysis of the Market of Services Provided by Dairy Producers and Other Economic Entities to Suppliers of  
Raw Milk’, <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1250> accessed 20 April 2017., 5. 
2529 FAS, ‘Analysis of the Market of Services Provided by Dairy Producers and Other Economic Entities to Suppliers of  
Raw Milk’, <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1250> accessed 20 April 2017., 7. 
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Lipetsk, Tver, Chelyabinsk, Kaliningrad, 
Smolensk, Komi, Tatarstan, Karelia, 
Karachayevo-Cherkassia, Adygheja, 
Bashkiria  
3 Medium concentrated 31,25 VoronezhRegion, Tambov, Kemerovo, 
Samara, Pensa, Kostroma, Omsk, 
Ulyanovsk, Sverdlovsk Region, 
Mordovija, Altay.  
4 Low concentrated 12,5 Belgorod Region, Saratov, Vladimir, 
Ryasan, Ivanovo, Nizhny Novgorod.   
Source: FAS, ‘Analysis of the Market of Services Provided by Dairy Producers and Other Economic 
Entities to Suppliers of Raw Milk’ (2004 – I half of 2005), available at http://fas.gov.ru/ 
 
FAS has also investigated abuse of dominance cases in the market of raw milk processing and  
imposed liability on some raw milk processors like JSC “DANON RUSSIA” and OJSC “Zolotiye 
Luga” for abuse of dominance in the form of unjustified price differentiation for suppliers of raw 
milk.2530 Thus, DANON RUSSIA bought raw milk from its suppliers on the basis of standard 
contracts, whose price consisted of basic price and various surcharges related to the quality of milk. 
The basic price consisted of the basic regional price (depending on supply-demand conditions in the 
region) and the price adjustment on the basis of a complex assessment of each supplier. Therefore, 
the basic price for each individual supplier was different and dependent on the volume of supplied 
raw milk, the schedule of milk delivery, category of the supplier, duration of relationships with the 
buyer, etc. The suppliers with similar characteristics where included in the same price groups – 
“clusters”. FAS established that such non-transparent price setting was detrimental to competition 
between suppliers, who could not understand clearly the factors, which they were assessed upon, and, 
therefore, could not devise the long-term commercial strategies. Thereby DANON RUSSIA created 
unequal conditions, under which some suppliers received a higher price for their supplies without 
objective justification. 
FAS conducted investigations of the sharp increase of wholesale prices in the markets of 
vegetables and fruits,2531 fish,2532 meat and poultry2533 establishing either the existence of a cartel or 
of an abuse of dominance. Multiple cases were initiated in the regional wholesale markets of 
sugar.2534 In one of the cases FAS established the coordination of economic activity of CJSC “TPK 
“Agro-Trade” and LLC “Buinskiy sugar” (two wholesalers) in the market of sugar by the third 
company, “Holding company “Ak-Bars”, which gave mandatory indications to wholesalers regarding 
prices and volumes of supplies, as well as the range of clients.2535 The coordination resulted or might 
result in setting economically unjustified (monopolistic) wholesale prices for sugar in Tatarstan 
                                                          
2530 Decision by Saint-Petersburg UFAS dated 30 June 2015 on the case №К06-23/15 (DANON) and decision by UFAS 
of Tumenskiy region dated 21 Decemeber 2015 on the case № К15/71-10 (“Zolotiye Luga”). 
2531 See, for example, Decision by Kemerovo UFAS dated 20 November 2015 on the case N16/А-10-2015. 
2532 Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 15 September 2015 on the case №05-828/2014. 
2533 Decision of UFAS of Stavropol region dated 10 December 2014 on the case №91. 
2534See, for example, Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 30 November 2015 on the case №05-157/2015 (А05-1396/2015); 
FAS press release dated 23 January  2015 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=34353>. 
2535 Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 30 November 2015 on the case №05-157/2015 (А05-1396/2015); FAS press 
release dated 23 January  2015 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=34353>. 
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region. The coordination of economic activity of undertakings by the third party, which does not form 
a group with any of the coordinated undertakings and is not active in any of the markets, where the 
coordinated activity is performed, is prohibited by paragraph 5 Article 11 of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition” within the horizontal agreements (cartel) framework. The FAS rejected 
the arguments of “Holding company “Ak-Bars” that for establishing of coordination the presence of 
an anticompetitive agreement between the coordinated undertakings (the “rim” in the “hub-and-
spoke” conspiracy) should be proved and pointed out that “coordination is the unilateral actions of 
the coordinator… which in itself are prohibited regardless the grounds of performing of such 
actions”.2536 Therefore, no proof of existence of the “rim” is necessary, as long as the coordination 
resulted in actual or potential anticompetitive effects specified in Article 11 of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition”. 
All the above food products are included in the list of “socially important” products, which 
are subject to regular monitoring according to the Plan of the actions of FAS of Russia to implement 
the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 06 August 2014 №560 “On the 
Application of Certain Special Economic Measures in order to Ensure the Security of the Russian 
Federation" aimed at the prevention of unjustified increase of the prices in the food markets.2537 
Apart from monitoring and investigations, FAS pointed out to the necessity of structural 
measures, such as tightening control over the economic concentration on the processing level (for 
example, in the market of processing of raw milk)2538 or the strengthening of the position of farmers 
in contract negotiations with processors through, for instance, stimulating the cooperation between 
suppliers.2539 
The development of agricultural cooperations has been consistently declared as one of the 
priorities of the state agricultural policies in general, as well as of the FAS priorities in agricultural 
sector.2540 The agricultural cooperation is exempted from the restrictions imposed by Article 14 of 
the Federal law "On the Trading Activities” on dominant retail chains, whose market share exceeds 
25% in the relevant geographic market often defined as narrow as local district (see the section 
“Retail”).2541 Agricultural cooperatives receive state support in the form of subsidies provided from 
the federal and regional budgets for development of technical infrastructure, acquisition of 
equipment, organising of distributing and logistics centers, etc. As a result, the number of agricultural 
cooperatives has increased from 2006 to 2013 by five times and as of 01 January 2014 amounted to 
6913.2542 
 
                                                          
2536 Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 30 November 2015 on the case №05-157/2015 (А05-1396/2015); FAS press 
release dated 23 January  2015 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=34353>. 
2537 Decree of the FAS dated 14 August 2014 N 525/14 "On Adoption of the Plan of the Actions of FAS of Russia on 
Implementation of the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 07 August 2014 N 778 "On Measures 
on Implementation of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 06 August 2014 №560 “On the 
Application of Certain Special Economic Measures in order to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation". 
2538 FAS press release dated 20 May 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=45796>. 
2539 FAS press release dated 20 May 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=45796>. 
2540 ‘Strategy of the Sustainable Development of the Agricultural Territories of the Russian Federation to 2030‘ adopted 
by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 02 February 2015 N151-r; FAS press release dated 27 
February 2017 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=49039>. 
2541 Paragraph 1 Article 14 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. 
2542 ‘Strategy of the Sustainable Development of the Agricultural Territories of the Russian Federation to 2030‘ adopted 
by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 02 February 2015 N151-r; FAS press release dated 27 
February 2017 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=49039>. 
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2.2.3. Retail 
 
Over the last few years the food retail sector in Russia has witnessed various changes 
including “the growth of the number of retail trade chains”2543 and an increase of the market share of 
top ten retail chains2544 at the expense of regional chains and local retailers.2545 This raises the justified 
concerns of FAS, as the strengthened position of the large retail chains often results in abusive 
practices against suppliers and end consumers.  
In its investigations in the food retail market, FAS predominantly enforces Articles 9 and 13 
of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" and Articles 10 and 11 of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition”.  
In February 2017 the territorial department of FAS conducted the market investigation with 
regard to compliance of supply contracts between food retail chains and their suppliers with the 
requirements of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" (as amended by the Federal law dated 
03 July 2016 N 273-FZ).2546 FAS conducted altogether 701 inspections of the food retailers and 
established that out of 11 266 supply contracts around 11% (1 261 contracts) are non-compliant with 
the requirements of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities".2547  Thus, the most frequent 
violations of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" included: 
• stipulating the terms of delayed payment exceeding the terms set forth by the law 
(paragraph 7 of Article 9);2548 
• payment of remuneration for the purchase by a retailer from its suppliers certain 
quantities of the food products (“quantity rebates”),2549 if such remuneration exceeds 
permitted 5% of the price of purchased products or if the remuneration is paid for 
purchase of socially important products (paragraph 4 and 5 of Article 9);2550 
                                                          
2543 Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014) 16, 330). 
2544 2015 was marked by the record increase of top ten retailers’ market share from 21,6% to 24,3% according to 
INFOLine, <www.marketch.ru/marketing_marginalia/obzor_rynka_fmcg_po_itogam_2015_goda>  accessed 20 April 
2017. This trend is expected to continue. 
2545 Due to decrease of demand, the revenue of the local retailers plummeted by 27% on average in 2015 (see Ischenko 
N, ‘The Largest Retailers Have Significantly Increased Their Market Share’, “Vedomosti” N3989 dated 25 December 
2015 at <www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/12/25/622565-seti-narastili-dolyu>). 
2546 Report of FAS dated 27 March 2017 "On the results of inspections of supply contracts between retail chains and food 
suppliers with regard to their compliance with the requirements of Federal Law "On the Basic Principles of State 
Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 2009 N 381-FZ”, 
<fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=15105> accessed 01 September 2017. 
2547 Report of FAS dated 27 March 2017 "On the results of inspections of supply contracts between retail chains and food 
suppliers with regard to their compliance with the requirements of Federal Law "On the Basic Principles of State 
Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 2009 N 381-FZ”, 
<fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=15105> accessed 01 September 2017. 
2548 34% of the total amount of violations – ibid. Report of FAS dated 27 March 2017 "On the results of inspections of 
supply contracts between retail chains and food suppliers with regard to their compliance with the requirements of Federal 
Law "On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 
2009 N 381-FZ”, <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=15105> accessed 01 September 2017. 
2549 In the latest clarification of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" as of 09 June 2017 № АК/39035/17 FAS has 
stated that paragraph 12 of Article 9 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" does not preclude the parties from 
including in a supply contract with a retailer condition on reduction of the price of supplied goods for a specified period 
provided that the retailer will fully pass on this price reduction to the consumers. Such condition does not fall under 5% 
restriction specified in paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities".  
2550 22% of the total amount of violations – Report of FAS dated 27 March 2017 "On the results of inspections of supply 
contracts between retail chains and food suppliers with regard to their compliance with the requirements of Federal Law 
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• violation of the procedure of disclosing information on selection of the counterparties 
by a retailer (paragraph 1, 2 of Article 9).2551 
Other violations of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" established by FAS include, 
inter alia: 
• including provisions on rendering by the retailer to its supplier of the advertising, 
marketing, promotional or similar services in the food supply contract or forcing a 
supplier to enter into a contract for rendering paid services aimed at promoting food 
products while concluding or implementing the food supply contract (paragraph 12 of 
Article 9);2552 
• stipulating the slotting allowance - payment for the right to supply goods to the retail 
chain or the payment for the modification of the assortment of goods (paragraph 13 of 
Article 9, previously Article 13);2553 
• including in a food supply contract restrictions regarding the assignment of rights under 
the contract (paragraph 10 of Article 9; previously subparagraph 1a paragraph 1 Article 
13);2554 
• stipulating different terms of payment for supply of similar goods in the contracts 
(subparagraph 1 paragraph 1 Article 13);2555 
• stipulating different terms of responsibility in contracts for the supply of similar goods 
(subparagraph 1 paragraph 1 Article 13);2556 
• stipulation of the cost of marketing services as a percentage of the goods supplied to the 
retailer and setting the different prices of marketing services in contracts with suppliers 
of similar goods (subparagraph 1 paragraph 1 Article 13);2557 
• violation of the order of price setting defined by legal acts (subparagraph 3 paragraph 1 
Article 13);2558 
• refusal of a retailer to enter into a contract with a supplier (provided that the supplier 
corresponds to the selection criteria) or unjustified deferral of considering a commercial 
offer of the latter (subparagraph 2 paragraph 1 Article 13);2559 
                                                          
"On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 December 2009 
N 381-FZ”, <fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=15105> accessed 01 September 2017. 
. See also Decision by Voronezh UFAS dated 25 December 2015 on the case №606-13Т; Decision by Kaluga UFAS 
dated 27 October 2015 on the case №05-01т/2015; etc. 
255112% of the total amount of violations - ibid. 
2552 For example, Decision by Kurgan UFAS, 31 December 2015, case №44. 
2553 Decisions by Saint-Petersburg UFAS dated 18 September 2015 on the case №К06-36/15 and dated 23 June 2015 on 
the case № К06-7/15. 
2554 For example, decisions by Bashkortostan UFAS dated 21 May 2015 on the case № Т-13/13-15 and dated 19 May 
2015 on the case № Т-14/13-15. 
2555 For example, Decision by Lipetzk UFAS dated 05 August 2015 on the case №91. 
2556 For example, Decision by Karachaevo-Cherkessia UFAS dated 22 May 2015 on the case №27. 
2557 For example, Decision by Saratov UFAS dated 25 September 2015 on the case №36/tr; Decision by Moscow UFAS 
dated 03 April 2015 on the case № 5-9-3/00-18-14. 
2558 For example, Decisions by Yakutsk UFAS dated 28 May 2015 on the case №02-46/15А and dated 29 June 2015 on 
the case №02-20/15А. 
2559For example, Decision by Karachaevo-Cherkessia UFAS dated 22 May 2015 on the case №27; Decision by Krasnodar 
UFAS dated 10 June 2015 on the case №384/2014; Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 16 March 2015 on the case №05-
841/2014. 
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• prohibiting a supplier under the food supply contract from concluding analogous 
contracts with other buyers (organisations) carrying out the same trading activities 
within the specified territory (subparagraph 4 paragraph 1 Article 13);2560 
• including in the food supply contract the condition on returning to the supplier 
alimentary products which were not sold after a certain period (subparagraph 4 
paragraph 1 Article 13);2561 
• selling of food products to the entity performing trading activities through the retail 
chain via a commission/agent agreement unless such agreement is concluded by entities 
within one group (the aim of this provision is to limit the number of intermediaries 
between food suppliers and end users which might lead to unjustified increase of prices) 
(subparagraph 5 paragraph 1 Article 13).2562 
The latest investigations of violations of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities" initiated by 
FAS involve the major Russian retailers (such as retail chains “Metro”, “Lenta”, Magnit (CJSC 
“Tander”), Diksi and Seventh Continent) who have included in their supply contracts discriminating 
conditions, namely different terms of payment of remuneration and charges, which put suppliers of 
analogous goods in unequal position. The investigations are pending.2563 
The threshold below which the practices of food retail chains are unlikely to raise competition 
concerns is two-folded. On the one hand, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Federal 
law “On Protection of Competition”, the economic undertaking cannot be considered dominant if its 
market share does not exceed 35%.2564 On the other hand, food retail chains are exempted from the 
restrictions imposed by Article 13 and 14 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities” if the annual 
turnover of the retail chain (its group) does not exceed 400 million rubles.2565 Therefore, even if the 
retail chain cannot be considered dominant due to its low market share in the relevant product market, 
it still can be caught by the competition law prohibitions set forth in Article 13 of the Federal law 
"On the Trading Activities”. 
In addition, Article 14 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities” sets forth the important 
restriction on the territorial expansion of retail chains. Thus, the food retail chain, whose market share 
exceeds 25% of the volume of all food products sold during the previous year in the territory of the 
region or local district, is not allowed to acquire or lease additional premises for trading within the 
relevant territory on any ground, including commissioning of new objects. The transaction performed 
in violation of this restriction is null and void, and FAS is entitled to bring an action for closing the 
store opened in violation of Article 14 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. Regional 
departments of FAS perform regular monitoring of market shares of the largest retail chains. Thus, 
in 2010 the market share of the large retailer X5 in Saint-Petersburg was found to be 35% and the 
                                                          
2560 For example, Decision by Vologda UFAS dated 25 October 2016 on the case №1-13ТД/16. 
2561 For example, Decision by Smolensk UFAS dated 16 December 2015 on the case №05-09/04-15/Т. 
2562 For example, Decision by Ulyanovsk UFAS dated 31 August 2015 on the case №12222/04-2015. 
2563 Press-releases ‘Moscow Region FAS has initiated procedures against retail chains for imposing discriminatory terms 
on their suppliers’ as of 12 August, 20 August and 27 August 2017, <fas.gov.ru/press-
center/news/detail.html?id=51317>; <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=51243>; <fas.gov.ru/press-
center/news/detail.html?id=51420> accessed 01 September 2017. 
2564 With some exceptions set forth in paragraphs 3 and 6 of the said Article. 
2565 Paragraph 4.1. of Article 1 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. 
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latter lost right to expand within the territory of the city until 2013, when its market share dropped to 
22,86%.2566 
The cases of violation of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” by retail chains include 
the establishment and maintaining of monopolistically high prices for a commodity (subparagraph 1 
paragraph 1 Article 10),2567 setting different prices (tariffs) for analogous good unless it is 
economically, technologically or otherwise justified (subparagraph 6 paragraph 1 Article 10)2568  and 
entering into anticompetitive agreements, which lead or could lead to setting and maintenance of the 
prices (paragraph 1 Article 11)2569 and/or reducing the sales volume / termination of sales of the 
products (paragraph 4 Article 11)2570. There is evidence that the competition in the retail market in 
Russia is to the great extent based on price (especially against the fall in real incomes of customers 
in 2014-2015);2571 thus, even a small unilateral increase of the price of a product could result in a 
critical loss of customers and switching to a cheaper product.2572 Therefore, retailers often resort to 
parallel increases of the prices for the staple products, which was particularly the case during the 
volatile economic situation in the end of 2014-beginning of 2015. However, proving the existence of 
agreement aimed at setting the prices often poses practical challenges for FAS. 
For instance, Tatarstan FAS investigated significant simultaneous increase of retail prices for 
buckwheat in the supermarkets of LLC “Agrotorg”, CJSC “Tander”, CJSC “TD “Perekrestok”, LLC 
“Ashan” and others in the territory of Tatarstan in the period from November 2014 to January 
2015.2573 It established that the increase in the retail prices did not correspond to an increase in 
wholesale prices for the product and resulted in significant increases of the mark-up of retailers (up 
to 10 times in certain cases), which provided evidence of an anticompetitive agreement under 
paragraph 1 Article 11 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”. As a proof of the existence 
of an agreement, FAS considered that a consistent significant increase of retail prices by independent 
retailers (provided that their costs remain stable) has no other economically viable explanations, 
rather than as an agreement. However, the commercial courts did not uphold the position of FAS, 
pointing that FAS provided no evidence of the awareness of the participants of the alleged cartel of 
each other’s pricing strategies or communications between them that could constitute the 
agreement.2574  
According to subparagraph 1 paragraph 13 of Article 9 of the Federal law "On the Trading 
Activities” food retail chains are prohibited to require from their suppliers payment for the right to 
supply food products to the existing or newly opened retail facilities. According to FAS, prohibition 
of slotting allowances covers not only explicit cases, but also payments for any services delivered by 
the retail chain, which are imposed on suppliers by the retails chain and do not have the economic 
justification other than payment for access to the shelf space. However, commercial courts, without 
                                                          
2566 Elena Donbrova and Amera Karlos, ‘The market share of retailers X5, “Lenta” and “O’key” exceeded the threshold 
set by law’, (13 February 2017) Delovoy Peterburg, <www.dp.ru/a/2017/02/12/Retejleri_s_polovinoj> accessed 20 April 
2017. 
2567 Decision by Chuvashiya UFAS dated 08 July 2015 on the case №19/04-АМЗ-2015. 
2568 Decision by Chuvashiya UFAS dated 08 July 2015 on the case №19/04-АМЗ-2015. 
2569 For example, Decision by Tatarstan UFAS, 18June 2015, case №05-827/2014. 
2570 Decision by Yamalo-Nenetsk UFAS dated 27 April 2015 on the case № 02-01/11/03-2015. 
2571 http://www.marketch.ru/marketing_marginalia/obzor_rynka_fmcg_po_itogam_2015_goda/ 
2572 http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/12/25/622565-seti-narastili-dolyu/ 
2573 Decision by Tatarstan UFAS dated 18.06.2015 on the case №05-827/2014. 
2574 Judgement of the Eleventh Commercial Court of Appeal dated 14 June 2016 on the case №А65-20903/2015; Ruling 
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 30 January 2017 № 306-КГ16-19447. 
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rejecting the FAS standpoint entirely, require more thorough proof that payment for the services 
rendered by the retail chain (such as services for promotion of goods) is in fact slotting allowance 
(see Box 4). Meanwhile, the additional services rendered by the food retail chain to its suppliers (like 
promotional, marketing, logistics, packaging services) are subject to the stringent rules: (i) they 
should be rendered on the basis of the separate agreement, and (ii) the aggregate amount of payment 
for such services together with payment for the purchase by a retailer from its suppliers certain 
quantities of the food products should not exceed 5 % (earlier 10%) of the price of the purchased 
goods.2575 
 
Box 4: Decision by FAS of Saint-Petersburg dated 23 June 2015 on the case № К06-7/15 
 
FAS made an inquiry into the supply contracts of the retail chain “Lenta” and established that all 
the suppliers have entered into additional service agreements, under which specific remuneration 
was to be paid by the suppliers in exchange for their promotion and advertising. Moreover, supply 
agreements include “retro-bonus” paid to LLC “Lenta” for purchasing of a certain volume of goods 
from the supplier (not exceeding 10%). FAS established that the overall amount of payments 
performed by the suppliers to LLC “Lenta” varied from 24% to 53% of the product turnover and 
was considered unprofitable for suppliers. FAS came to conclusion that remuneration paid to 
“Lenta” under agreements for promotion of goods was, in substance, the payment for the right to 
supply the goods to the supermarkets of LLC “Lenta” and, as such, was in breach of the Federal 
law "On the Trading Activities”. 
The commercial courts overturned the FAS decision due to the lack of evidence of the violation 
committed. During the new trial, the Commercial Court of Saint-Petersburg pointed out that FAS 
did not prove that in that case payment for the services for promotion of the goods in the retail 
chain “Lenta” was in fact payment for the right to supply goods to the retail chain; that the services 
were imposed on suppliers as a condition for entering into supply contracts with “Lenta”; that they 
were unprofitable for suppliers and economically unjustified.2576  
 
2.2.3.1.Private Labels  
 
The share of private labels in the line of products of retailers is growing steadily during last several 
years. Thus, by 2017 the share of private labels of the big retailers has reached 10-17% in their overall 
turnover,2577 which are still less than the share of private labels in many foreign countries (30-
35%).2578  The difference in price between private labels and analogous brands reaches 20-30% and 
                                                          
2575 Paragraphs 4 and 11 of Article 9 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”. 
2576 Judgement of the Commercial Court of the Northern-Western District dated 24 October 2016 on the case №А56-
60406/2015. 
2577 According to RBK and Kommersant the share of private labels of “Piatorochka” amounts to 17% of its turnover; 
“Diksi” – 15,5%; “Lenta” – 12%; “Magnit” – 11%; “Metro Cash and Carry” – 10,9% (Anastasiya Demidova, ‘Food retail 
chains are selling their names’ (23 March 2017) RBC 
<www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/23/58d267cb9a7947df5d18c78d> accessed  21 April 2017; Julia Bezrukova,‘The retail 
chains use private labels to increase their income’ (09 August 2016, Kommersant), 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3059373 accessed 20 April 2017. 
2578 ibid. 
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many consumers switch to private labels in the low price categories where the brand is not of the 
utmost importance (sugar, cereals, milk, soft drinks, etc).2579 
The effect of private labels on supply side is ambiguous. On the one hand, as the trading space 
in supermarkets is limited, the small, less known brands tend to be replaced with private labels, which 
results in higher barriers to enter the market and foreclosure of small and medium suppliers. On the 
other hand, the retail chains usually do not manufacture private labels and contract them to smaller 
producers, which might be advantageous for the latter, as small producers usually do not have enough 
resources for marketing and promotion of their own brands.2580 However, producers of private labels 
often have to accept unprofitable trading conditions and sell their goods with very low or even zero 
margin,2581 due to the bargaining power of the big retail chains.  
Russian competition law and law on trading activities do not contain direct prohibition against 
private labels. However, this practice has attracted some attention of the competition authority. Back 
in 2011 during the expert panel on retail industry FAS announced that it was planning to investigate 
the practice of the “brand squeezing”, by which FAS meant using private labels as leverage to force 
independent producers to drop prices of their brands.2582 The outcome of the investigation is unclear. 
 
2.2.3.2.Code of Good Practices in Food Retail 
 
Development of good business practices plays significant role in the retail sector. Thus, in December 
2012 seven leading industry associations (AKORT, Rusbrand, Soyuzmoloko (association of milk 
producers), Rusprodunion, National Meat Association, Fish Union, Association of Producers and 
Consumers of Oil and Grease), the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Association of Consumers 
of the Russian Federation signed the “Code of Good Practices of Relationships between Retail Chains 
and Suppliers of Consumer Goods” (hereinafter – the “Code of Practices”).2583 The main goals of the 
Code of Practices are: 
• improvement of interactions between retail chains and suppliers based on the principles of 
good faith in order to establish the balance of commercial interests of the parties; 
• increase of efficiency of interactions between retail chains and suppliers in order to optimise 
the costs along all supply chain; 
• promotion of competition and compliance of all market participants with the ethical rules of 
market behaviour; 
• satisfying the customers’ demand for high quality consumer goods. 
The good practices include transparency of selection process and equal rights of suppliers to enter 
into a supply contract with the  retail chain; predictability and economic justification of any price 
modification under the supply contract; the transparent procedure of introducing consumer goods to 
and removing it from the assortment matrix of the retail chain; procedures of exchange of 
documentation between the parties of the supply contract; implementation of promotion campaigns 
                                                          
2579 Julia Bezrukova,‘The retail chains use private labels to increase their income’ (09 August 2016, Kommersant). 
2580 The Center of Monitoring of the Market Environment, ‘Analysis of Position of the Large Retail Chains in the Food 
Retail Market of Saint-Petersburg and Practices of their Interaction with Food Producers’ (2005, S.-Petersburg) 6, 
accessed at fas.gov.ru/files/8797/SPb_Ritail2005.doc.  
2581 Anastasiya Demidova, ‘Food retail chains are selling their names’ (23 March 2017, RBC).  
2582 FAS press release ‘Brand Squeezing’ dated 28 October 2011, <fas.gov.ru/press-center/fas-in-
media/detail.html?id=9994> accessed 11 September 2017. 
2583Accessed at http://www.codeofconduct.ru/ and http://fas.gov.ru/documents/documentdetails.html?id=1643. 
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and category management, etc.  If the dispute on implementation or interpretation of the Code of 
Practices arises, the parties may decide to bring the dispute in front of the special Commission on 
Implementation of the Code of Practices, which should resolve the dispute within 15 working days 
upon receipt of all necessary documents. FAS is highly supportive to the wider implementation of 
the Code of Practices. For instance, in 2014 FAS issued the letter approving the draft addendum to 
the standard supply contract / contract on promotion of consumer goods stipulating that during 
performance of the said contract the parties would abide by the Code of Practices.2584 
 
2.2.3.3.Regulation of Retail Prices and Mark-Up for Food Products 
 
One of the issues arisen in 2015 and addressed by FAS was the setting of a maximum retail mark-
ups for certain types of food products by regional state authorities in order to restrain the outburst of 
prices and maintain stability in food markets. Generally speaking, the Russian legislation does not 
provide for state regulation of food prices (except for cases determined according to the Article 8 of 
the Federal Law "On the Trading Activities"). The cases when the regional state bodies are authorised 
to set the regulated prices and mark-ups include, inter alia, mark-ups for food products traded in the 
Far North of Russia and equivalent regions with the restricted terms of shipment of goods.2585 FAS 
pointed out that the introduction of the state regulation of prices for certain types of food products 
(including the maximum retail mark-ups) by regional state bodies in cases, which are not listed in the 
Decree of the Government of Russian Federation dated 07 March 1995 No. 239, (even in the form of 
recommended mark-ups if recommendations are adopted by market participants) could constitute a 
violation of Article 15 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition”.2586 Such regional legal 
acts should be abolished as inconsistent with federal legislation. 
 
2.3.State Regulation of Food Supply Value Chains in Russia 
 
Agriculture is an important economic sector in terms of number of the people employed in it  which 
constitutes 9.7% of the active population.2587 The share of agriculture value added in the GDP is 
relatively low and amounts to 4% with the actual slow growth by 1.3% on average between 2000 and 
2010.2588 The agrarian system is characterized by the co-existence of large commercial producers 
with small farmers that produce predominately for their own consumption and informal markets.2589 
State support to agriculture has increased steadily in Russia during last decade  intending  to 
partially fill the gap in agricultural public policy  created after the collapse of state-owned agro-
holdings prevailing in the Soviet Union and the failure of the state to support market reforms in the 
agricultural industry in 1990s.2590 The WTO accession generates a number of challenges, mostly 
                                                          
2584 Letter of FAS dated 20.06.2014 N.AK/24749/14, accessed at 
http://www.codeofconduct.ru/files/dopolnit_soglashen_kdp.pdf. 
2585 The Decree of the Government of Russian Federation dated 07.03.1995 No. 239 “On measures of harmonisation of 
the state regulation of prices (tariffs)”.  
2586 See the Letter of FAS of Russia dated 17 April 2015 No. ИА/18706/15. 
2587 FAO Agriculture and Trade Policy. Background Note // FAOSTAT. 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/meetings/wto_comm/Trade_Policy_Brief_Russia_final.pdf. accessed 2 
November 2017. 
2588 ibid. 
2589 ibid. 
2590 ibid. 
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related to market access for meat and meat products, but Russia is not facing an eminent obligation 
to lower domestic support as measured by AMS. The AMS commitments for the period 2012-15 are 
well above the current level of support. However, after 2015 adjustments will have to be made to 
maintain the level of domestic support and eventually reduce it to the average level in the 2006-08 
period (US$4.4 billion per year). The main challenge for the Russian Government with respect to 
WTO commitments on agriculture will be finding new ways to foster long- term growth and 
competitiveness of the sector through less trade-distorting types of measures consistent with the WTO 
obligations.2591 
 
2.3.1. Agricultural Policy and Food Supply 
 
The agricultural policy in Russian Federation is defined under the Federal Law “On 
development of agricultural industry” dated 29 December 2006 N 264-FZ (hereinafter – the “Law 
on Agricultural Industry”). This Federal Law governs the relations arising between the citizens and 
agricultural producers, other citizens, legal entities, public authorities in the sphere of development 
of agricultural industry. The Law on Agricultural Industry establishes the legal basis of the state social 
and economic policy in the sphere of development of agricultural industry, which is defined as 
economic activity on production of agricultural goods, rendering services for providing the 
population with Russian food products, and providing the industry with agricultural inputs and 
assistance to the sustainable development of the rural territories.2592 
 Under Article 3 of the Law on Agricultural Industry, agricultural producers are defined as an 
organisation or an individual entrepreneur performing production of agricultural goods, their primary 
and subsequent (industrial) processing according to the list approved by the Government of the 
Russian Federation and sale of these products provided that the share of the income from sale of the 
above agricultural goods constitutes at least seventy percent in the total income of agricultural 
producers from sales of goods (performance of works, services)  for each calendar year. 
 Agricultural producers are also represented by:2593 1) citizens engaged in  personal subsidiary 
farming according to the Federal Law "About Personal Subsidiary Farming" dated  07 July 2003 No. 
112-FZ; 2) the agricultural cooperatives of consumers (processing, trading, providing services 
(including credit services), supplying, procurement) created according to the Federal Law "About 
Agricultural Cooperation" of dated 08 December 1995 No. 193-FZ (hereinafter - the Federal Law 
"About Agricultural Cooperation"). 
The Ministry of Agriculture is the federal body authorised to set forth the key priorities in the 
agricultural policy. The Ministry is, in particular, responsible for:2594 
(i) Drafting and implementing government policy and legal regulation of the agriculture and related 
industries, including livestock farming (inter alia, breeding of domesticated fish species included 
in the State Register of Protected Varieties of Plants and Animal Breeds), veterinary services, 
including pharmaceuticals, crop production, phytosanitary control, soil improvement and fertility, 
regulation of the farm products, raw materials, and food markets, the food and food processing 
                                                          
2591ibid.  
2592 Article 1 of the Law on Agricultural Industry. 
2593 Article 3 of the Law on Agricultural Industry. 
2594 Paragraph 1 of the Regulations on the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation adopted by the Decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation dated 12 June 2008 No. 450. 
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industry, the production and distribution of tobacco products, and the sustainable development of 
rural areas. 
(ii) Drafting state policy and legal regulation in the fisheries industry, including fishing and fish 
farming (aquaculture), conservation of aquatic biological resources, the manufacture, processing 
and sale of fish and other products derived from aquatic  biological resources, the industrial 
activities on fishing vessels; the protection, research, preservation and replacement of marine 
wildlife and protection of their natural habitats, excluding aquatic  biological resources in federal 
protected nature areas and listed in the Red Book of the Russian Federation; ensuring the safe 
operation of fishing vessels, as well as emergency and rescue work in fishing areas during fishing 
expeditions; and the supervision and control over aquatic  biological resources and protection of 
their natural habitats in Russia’s inland waters. 
(iii) Drafting and implementing state policy and legal regulation in the field of land relations 
(regarding agricultural land plots), ensuring state monitoring of such land. 
(iv) Providing state services related to agriculture, including the sustainable development of rural 
areas. 
(v) Managing state property belonging to enterprises and organisations subordinate to the ministry. 
According to Article 10 of the Law on Agricultural Industry, the Ministry is obliged to prepare 
and publish the national report related to state agricultural policy (hereinafter - the “National 
Report”). The Government of the Russian Federation adopts the National Report and sends it to the 
Federal Assembly. 
 The National Report sets forth: 
(i) The outcomes of the realisation of the state programme on agricultural development for the 
previous year; 
(ii) Key figures of performance of agricultural industry in accordance with the goals and objectives 
set up under the national program (index of gross production in agricultural and food industries, 
investments in agriculture, incomes of citizens of rural areas; figures on the staple food 
consumption per capita per year; net inflow from exports of food products; share of the national 
food products in the consumers market; cost effectiveness of agricultural industry; technical 
equipment in agricultural industry; price parity index and index of  increase of the volume of 
social services provided to citizens i  rural areas).  
(iii) Agriculture development forecasts for the forthcoming year and proposals to amend the national 
programme if necessary.  
 
The “State Program on Agricultural Development and Regulation of Agricultural Products, 
Commodities and  Food Markets, 2013–2020” (hereinafter – the “State Programme”) has been 
drafted by the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation pursuant to Article 8 of the Law on 
Agricultural Industry. 
The strategic aims of the State Programme include:  
1) Ensuring food security of Russia within the parameters of the Food Security Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation. 
2) Increasing competitiveness of Russian agricultural products on domestic and foreign markets 
within the framework of Russia’s WTO membership. 
3) Improving the financial stability of agricultural producers. 
4) Promoting the sustainable development of rural areas. 
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5) Regenerating and using lands and other agricultural resources more efficiently, making 
production environment-friendly. 
 
To achieve these goals, the State Programme addresses the following tasks within the framework 
of federal targeted programmes, sub-programmes and key measures: 
1) Incentivising production of the main types of agricultural products and food products; 
2) Implementing anti-epizootic measures with regard to quarantinable and especially dangerous 
animal diseases; 
3) Supporting the development of infrastructure of the agricultural and food market; 
4) Making agricultural products, commodity and food market regulation more effective. 
5) Supporting small businesses; 
6) Ensuring the effectiveness of state authorities’ activities in the sphere of agricultural development 
and regulation of agricultural product, commodity and food markets.; 
7) Increasing cost-effectiveness in agriculture to ensure its sustainable development; 
8) Improving life standards in rural areas; 
9) Encouraging innovation in the agricultural industry; 
10) Promoting biotechnology; 
11) Creating conditions for the efficient use of agricultural lands; 
12) Promoting the amelioration of agricultural lands; 
13) Economic regulation of the use of land, water and other renewable natural resources in 
agricultural production, increasing soil fertility to the optimal level in each specific zone. 
 
The State Programme consists of six sub-programmes and four federal targeted programmes: 
1) The sub-programmes are “Developing Crop Farming and the Processing and Sale of Crop 
Farming Products”; “Developing Animal Breeding and the Processing and Sale of Animal 
Breeding Products”; “Developing Beef Cattle Breeding”; “Supporting Small Businesses”; 
“Technical and Technological Modernisation, Innovative Development”; “Ensuring the 
Implementation of the State Programme”. 
2) The federal targeted programmes: “Social Development of Rural Areas to 2013”; “Sustainable 
Development of Rural Areas in 2014-2017 and to 2020 (draft)”; Preservation and Restoration of 
Agricultural Soil Fertility and Agricultural Landscapes as the National Asset of Russia in 2006-
2010 and to 2013; “Developing Agricultural Land Amelioration in Russia in 2014-2020” (draft). 
3) Total federal funding for the state programme is 1.5097 trillion rubles (in current prices), 
including 158.9 billion rubles in 2013, 162 billion rubles in 2014, and 175.4 billion rubles in 2015. 
4) The sub-programmes to develop crop farming and animal breeding are based on a scheme that 
includes not only agricultural production but also processing of agricultural products, 
infrastructure development and market regulation. 
5) Implementation of the State Programme and its sub-programmes and federal targeted 
programmes will be evaluated by the criteria established in the State Programme, which include: 
a. Index of agricultural production by farms of all categories (in comparable prices).  
b. Index of crop farming production (in comparable prices). 
c. Index of animal breeding production (in comparable prices). 
d. Index of food production, including beverages (in comparable prices). 
e. Index of the actual amount of investment in the fixed agricultural assets. 
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f. Cost-effectiveness of agriculture. 
g. Average monthly wages in the agricultural industry (at agricultural enterprises other 
than small businesses). 
 
The State Program outlines two sets of priorities. However, the so called “second level” of 
priorities may not be given significant financial support. 
The first level of priorities includes:2595 
1) In the production sphere – development of the cattle industry (production of meat and milk) as 
the core (strategic) sub-industry that use the “competitive advantages of the country”,2596 such as 
availability of significant agricultural lands. 
2) In the economic sphere – increase of returns of agricultural producers. 
3) In the social sphere the priorities are very general: sustainable development of rural territories as 
the precondition for preservation of labour resources and the territorial integrity of the country 
and creation of conditions for economic and physical availability of food for the socially 
disadvantaged groups of population (based on the rational norms of consumption). 
4) In the sphere of development of production potential – reclamation and irrigation of agricultural 
land, recovery of non-used arable land and other agricultural lands. 
5) In the sphere of institutional development – development of integration links in the agro-
industrial complex and establishment of food sub-complexes, as well as territorial vertically 
integrated agribusiness, so called “clusters”. 
6) In the sphere of science and human resources, the Program’s priority is to “provide for a 
innovative agro-industrial complex”. 
The second level of priorities includes:2597 
1) Development of import-substitution industries, including vegetable and fruits production. 
2) Ecological safety of agricultural and food products. 
3) Increase of exports of agricultural products, raw agricultural materials and food products, if and 
when the domestic markets are saturated. 
4) Minimising the cost of logistics and supporting the competitiveness of production, considering 
at the same time the rational location and specialisation of agricultural and food industries by 
zones and regions of the country. 
The State Program supports the Russian agriculture compliance with  WTO requirements and 
considers relevant plans of actions of the Russian Government, business, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Implementation of the State Programme will make possible to achieve the main 
indicators outlined by the Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation by 2020.2598 The annual 
allocations for the State Programme in eight years will grow slowly, at 4.6 percent, from 159 billion 
rubles ($5.3 billion) in 2013 to 218 billion rubles ($7.27 billion). The Program envisages that in the 
first 2 years (2013 and 2014) the budget allocations will be almost flat, and they will accelerate in 
2015-2018. According to industry analysts, the cuts in budget funds compared to the Ministry of 
                                                          
2595 Agriculture Development Program 2013-2020 // USDA Foreign Agricultural Services. 2012. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agriculture%20Development%20Program%202013-
2020_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_11-6-2012.pdf accessed 2 November 2017. 
2596 ibid. 
2597 ibid. 
2598 Agricultural Development and Regulation of Agricultural Products, Commodities and Food Markets, 2013–2020 // 
Government Decisions. The Russian Government <http://government.ru/en/docs/3360/> accessed 2 November 2017.  
740 
 
Agriculture’s draft were caused primarily by federal budget constraints and uncertainties, and only 
partially by Russia’s WTO obligations, since the most drastic cuts were in spheres in the “green box” 
that can have unlimited domestic support.2599 
Regulations on disclosure and agricultural policy have been elaborated by the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. Namely, Regulations have been adopted by a decision of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission “On Requirements for the Sub-System of Agricultural Industry of the 
Participating States in the framework of integrated reference system of the Eurasian Economic Union 
and the rules on formation thereof”. The sub-system shall guarantee storage of the data on median 
retail prices, median consumer prices and median contract prices of the key categories of agricultural 
products, food production and manufacturing in the Eurasian Economic Union.2600 
The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade (Minpromtorg) is responsible for working out an 
agenda for agricultural industry and trade activities. For instance, the Order of Minpromtorg dated 
25 December 2014 N 2733 set forth the “Strategy of Development of Trade in the Russian Federation 
for 2015-2016 and up to the year 2020”. The Strategy devises the optimal tools for the development 
of retail food marketing. Namely, it instigates interaction between distributors and farmers with the 
help of wholesaling centers and large-scale trade networks. Trade networks ought to minimise costs 
of both farmers and retailers and shorten the median term of production cycle. Local wholesale 
markets and small businesses shall uphold large-scale retail networks. That will guarantee the access 
of consumers to food products distributed on different tiers. Small-scale wholesale distributors shall 
interlink different tiers of market and foster cooperation between small and medium entrepreneurs.2601 
 
2.3.2. Production and Trade  
 
Basic legal provisions on state policies in the field of production and trade of food products 
are established under the Federal law “On the Trading Activities”.2602  Article 17 sets up the 
measures to be undertaken in order to foster trade activities in the domain of agriculture. The regional 
state authorities work out an agenda to instigate investment projects concerning the establishment of 
new supply centers, which receive and store agricultural products, form consignments of goods for 
households, maintain wholesale and retail trading activities. The agenda shall include the provisions 
in order to support agricultural households and consumers’ co-operatives, which run trading 
activities, sale and purchase of agricultural products in rural areas.2603  
 According to Article 5 of the Federal law “On the Trading Activities” the Government of the 
Russian Federation is responsible for:  
(i) State policy in the domain of trade activities. 
(ii) Adoption of calculation and assessment methods for the regional state authorities authorised to  
establish standards on the minimal sale premises per population of certain regions. 
                                                          
2599Agriculture Development Program 2013-2020 // USDA Foreign Agriculture Service. 2012 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agriculture%20Development%20Program%202013-
2020_Moscow_Russian%20Federation_11-6-2012.pdf accessed 2 November 2017.  
2600 EEC Collegium Decision No. 18 "On Requirements for an Agricultural Subsystem within the Framework of 
Integrated Information System of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Rules for its Joint Creation”. 
2601 The Order of the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade dated 25 December 2014 N 2733 “On Strategy of 
Development of Trade in the Russian Federation in 2015-2016 and by 2020”. 
2602 Federal law "On the Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities in the Russian Federation" dated 28 
December 2009 N 381-FZ. 
2603ibid. 
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(iii) Adoption of calculation and assessment methods of net overall volume of sales within the regions 
of the Russian Federation (including federal Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, municipal areas and 
city districts).  
Article 9 of the Federal law “On the Trading Activities” regulates the rights and obligations 
of the parties to supply agreement, retailers and distributors. Namely, it establishes the rules on 
mandatory disclosure of information, obligations of the parties to supply agreement, remuneration of 
the retailers and distributors. Supply agreements may preclude the parties from assignment of rights 
and liability for violation thereof. Additional services (e.g. preparation, packing of goods) can be 
rendered on the basis of additional service agreements. Solicitation of additional services or 
conditions is prohibited as well as abuse of rights.  
The obligations of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs are also regulated under Article 
11 of the Federal law N 51-FZ “On sanitary and epidemiological welfare of population”. Business 
entities are obliged to guarantee safety for human health, control quality of services and food products 
during production, transportation, storage and sale2604. 
 
2.3.3. Food Security  
  
 The international legal regulation of food security is based on the norms of “General 
Declaration on Abolition of Hunger and Undernourishment”, approved by the resolution 3348 
(XXIX) of UN General Assembly on 17 December 1974, Rome Declaration of the World Summit 
on food security, which took place on 16-18 November 2009, as well as other documents, including 
those prepared by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)2605. 
Basic requirements in respect of food safety in Russia are set up by the Federal Law “On 
Quality and Safety of Food Products” dated 02 February 2000 No. 29 FZ. The Federal Service for 
Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor) controls the 
enforcement of legal rules regarding food quality. Namely, Rospotrebnadzor enacts orders, which set 
forth methodological requirements for the classification of households and quality of food 
products.2606  
 The Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision (Rosselkhoznadzor) is the 
governmental federal organ carrying out functions of control and supervision in the field of veterinary 
science. It establishes and lifts phytosanitary quarantine zones; controls the use of pesticides and 
agrochemicals; maintains soil fertility; it is responsible for selection achievements, protection, 
reproduction and use of objects of animal world (hunting resources) and aquatic biological resources, 
and it also carries out the functions on protecting the population from animal infectious diseases. 
Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision is under control of the Ministry of 
Agriculture of the Russian Federation.2607 
The important provisions on food security are set forth by the Order of the President of the 
Russian Federation on “Doctrine of Food Security of the Russian Federation” (hereinafter – the 
                                                          
2604Federal Law "On Sanitary and Epidemiological Welfare of Population" as of 30 March 1999 N 52-FZ. 
2605 Legal coverage for food security of Russia: national and international legal aspects // European Congress on Rural 
Law – 11–14 September 2013. Lucerne (Switzerland). 
2606 See e.g.: The Order of the Federal Service on Surveillance for Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-Being  
dated 30 September 2015 No. 1008 “On Methodological Requirements”. 
2607 Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision // Official site. 
http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/main.html?_anguage=en accessed 2 November 2017.  
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“Food Security Doctrine”).2608 The Food Security Doctrine was approved on 01 February 2010. The 
Doctrine does not have the status of mandatory legal act, but may be considered only as an outline of 
the goals and objectives for agricultural production and policy.2609 The Food Security Doctrine’s 
goals are to guarantee reliable food supplies for the population, develop agriculture and fisheries, 
respond swiftly to internal and external threats to the stability of food market, and participate 
effectively in international cooperation on food security. The Food Security Doctrine identifies risks 
and threats to Russia’s food security, key directions of the national economic and social policies in 
this area, and mechanisms and resources for ensuring food security. The Food Security Doctrine sets 
the criteria for food security assessment. Thus, it establishes that the share of the following 
domestically produced food products in the total volume of food resources in the internal market 
should constitute: grain – not less than 95 percent; sugar – not less than 80 percent; vegetable oil – 
not less than 80 percent; meat - not less than 85 percent; milk – not less than 90 percent; fish – not 
less than 80 percent; and potatoes – not less than 95 percent.2610 
The major tasks in providing for food security regardless of changes in internal or external 
conditions are: 
 
(i) Timely prognosis, identification and prevention of external and external threats to food security, 
minimisation of their adverse effects due to permanent readiness of the system of food supply, 
formation of strategic reserve of food products. 
(ii) Sustainable development of the national production of food and raw food necessary to support 
food independence of the country. 
(iii) Achieving and maintaining physical and economic access to safe food for every citizen in amount 
and variety of products, which meet reasonable standards of food consumption to provide active 
and healthy lifestyle. 
(iv) Ensuring food security.2611 
 
The Chief State Medical Officer, who prescribes sanitary rules for business entities involved 
in trading activities, specifies the requirements for sale of food products. The sanitary rules  cover 
activities of households, food markets and warehouses notwithstanding their legal form of 
incorporation. The rules include the requirements for acquisition / acceptance and storage of food 
products and regulations for sale.2612  The Chief State Medical Officer enacts the rules on food value 
and safety of food staples. The rules are targeted at legal entities, individual entrepreneurs and citizens 
involved in production, importing, and sales of food products. They regulate the services in the field 
of retail marketing and public catering. For example, under the Order of the Chief State Medical 
                                                          
2608The Order of the President of the Russian Federation dated 30 January 2010 No. 120 “On Adoption of the Food 
Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation”. 
2609 Food Security Doctrine Adopted // USDA Foreign Agricultural Services. URL: 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Food%20Security%20Doctrine%20Adopted%20_Moscow
_Russian%20Federation_2-11-2010.pdf.  
2610 The Food Security Doctrine // The President of Russia. <http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/glossary/37> accessed 2 
November 2017.  
2611 ‘Russia’s doctrine of food security signed; possible implications for biotechnology’, Wageningen University & 
Research (02.02.2010) <http://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/file/cogem/cogem_t4c6a3a1a_001.pdf> accessed 28 October 
2017.  
2612The Order of the Chief State Medical Officer of the Russian Federation of dated 07 September 2001 No. 23 “On 
Adoption of Sanitary Rules” (SP 2.3.6.1066-01). 
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Officer dated 14 November 2001 No. 36  the legal entities and individual entrepreneurs involved in 
producing and trading of food products are obliged to disclose information on food products that 
contain genetically modified organisms (GMO).2613 
However, in 2016 the Federal law dated 03 July 2016 No. 358-FZ "On Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Improvement of State Regulation in 
the Field of Genetic Engineering"  prohibited domestic sales and import of genetically modified 
organisms.2614 The cultivation and breeding of genetically modified plants and animals is prohibited, 
except for cases where they will be used in testing and scientific research.2615 The current legislation 
allowed the use of genetically modified seeds in agriculture and required special labelling of food 
that was produced with GMOs. Because the introduction of GMO registration procedures has been 
postponed until July 2017, however, there was a de facto moratorium on production of genetically 
modified food and punishment for violation of the rules regulating GMO production was not 
foreseen.2616. 
The further regulations can be specified with the enactments of the executive. Interaction 
between business entities, associations and state authorities can be settled under industry agreements 
governing agricultural policy and overall agenda in the sphere of food production.2617 
Russian legislation provides for the liability for administrative offences and crimes committed 
by the economic entities.  
The grounds for liability are set up under Article 26.1 of the Federal law “On quality and 
safety of Food Products”. Legal entities, individual entrepreneurs, who conduct trading activities or 
manufacturing / production of food products, can be held liable for misconduct in accordance with 
civil, administrative or criminal liability rules.2618 
The rules on administrative liability for administrative offences committed by entities, which 
are engaged in trade activities, are set up under Articles 14.41, 14.42 of the Code of Administrative 
Offences of the Russian Federation (hereinafter – the “Code of Administrative Offences”). Article 
14.40 of the Code of Administrative Offences implies liability for infringing the antimonopoly rules 
established by federal law while exercising trading activity.2619 
 In accordance with Article 14.41 failure of an economic agent, engaged in trade activities by 
way of setting up a trade network, to supply information about the terms and conditions for selecting 
                                                          
2613The Decree of the Chief State Medical Officer of the Russian Federation dated 14 November 2001 No. 36 “On 
Adoption of Sanitary Rules” (SP 2.3.2.1078-01). 
2614 Amalia Zatari, ‘Putin signed the law on GMO prohibition’, (04 July 2017, RBC) 
<www.rbc.ru/politics/04/07/2016/577aa7bb9a794761a21c8d57> accessed 28 October 2017.  
2615 ‘Moscow Bans GMO: Russia, the World’s Largest GMO-free Territory, Platform for the Development of Organic 
Agriculture’ (2016)Global Research  <http://www.globalresearch.ca/moscow-bans-gmo-russia-the-worlds-largest-gmo-
free-territory-platform-for-the-development-of-organic-agriculture/5548448> accessed 2 November 2017; ‘Russian State 
Duma Passes Total Ban on GMO Crops and Animals’ (2016) Sustainable Pulse 
<http://sustainablepulse.com/2016/06/25/russian-parliament-passes-total-ban-on-gmo-crops-and-
animals/#.WPoJRxFZdp1> accessed 2 November 2017; ‘Where are GMOs grown and banned?’, GMO FAQ. 
Agricultural biotechnology frequently asked questions. <https://gmo.geneticliteracyproject.org/FAQ/where-are-gmos-
grown-and-banned/> accessed 2 November 2017. 
2616 Russia: Full Ban on Food with GMOs // Library of Congress. 2016. URL: http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-
news/article/russia-full-ban-on-food-with-gmos/; Law Proposal № 714809-6. On amending of the certain enactments on 
genetic engineering // ASOZD (the Automated System for Legislative Procedures). URL: 
http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=714809-6&02.  
2617 "The Industry Agreement on the Agroindustrial Sector of the Russian Federation in 2015-2017”, December 16, 2014. 
2618Federal Law dated 2 January 2000 N 29-FZ “On Quality and Safety of Food Products”. 
2619 "Code Of Administrative Offences Of The Russian Federation " dated 30 December 2001 No. 195-FZ. 
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a contractor for concluding a contract for supply of food products and about the substantial terms of 
such contract, which is requested by a contractor - shall entail the imposition of an administrative 
fine. Failure of an economic agent, engaged in supplying food products, to provide information about 
the terms and conditions for selecting a contractor for concluding a contract for supply of food 
products and about the major terms of such contract, as well as information on the quality and safety 
of food products to be supplied which is requested by a contractor shall also entail imposition of a 
fine.  
 Article 14.42 of the Code of Administrative Offences sets forth liability for failure to satisfy 
the requirements established by federal law for the terms and conditions of concluding a contract for 
supply of food products while exercising trade activities. 
 Finally, Article 283 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation prescribes criminal 
liability for production, storage, carriage or sale of goods and products, fulfilment of works or 
rendering of services, which do not meet safety standards.  
 
2.4.IP Rights 
 
Russia a. General applicable IP 
rights: Part IV of the Civil 
Code of the Russian 
Federation (as amended on 
01 July 2017);2620 
b. IP-related laws: 
- Federal Law No. 135-FZ 
dated 26 July 2006 “On 
Protection of Competition” 
(as last amended on 29 July 
2017); 
- Federal Law No. 149-FZ 
dated 17 December  1997 
"On Seed Breeding"  (as 
last amended on 3 July 
2016 ). 
a. UPOV Convention for the protection of 
new varieties of plants;2621 
b. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 
2.5.Seed Markets 
 
2.5.1. Mergers in Agriculture 
 
                                                          
2620 Part IV of the Civil Code “codifies fundamental rules and principles of intellectual property law”. For specific 
provisions on IP Rights in agriculture , see Chapter 73 ‘Selection Achievements’. 
For other general provisions relating to intellectual property provided for in the Civil Code, see: 
-Part I, Chapter 2, Articles 2, 8 & 3; Chapter 3, Articles 18 & 26; Chapter 4, Articles 64; Chapter 6, Articles 128 & 129; 
Chapter 16, Article 256 
-Part II, Chapter 38, Articles 769, 773 & 772; Chapter 45, Article 855; Chapter 54, Article 1028. 
2621 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm. 
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The markets of agricultural production have recently seen the highest growth rate amongst 
economic markets.2622 The highest growth was supported by the low volatility in the demand for 
food.2623 However, the growth rate may significantly decrease due to a drop in purchasing power and 
the depletion of production capacity reserves, significantly affecting the investment attractiveness of 
the agricultural sector.2624 
Nevertheless, mergers and acquisitions still occur in the regions. Usually, these M&As happen 
due to the inefficiency of the absorbed farms: farms failed to switch to new technologies in time, they 
have low yields, high production costs, and cannot stand competition. Thus, market players are 
consolidating.2625 However, M&As do not often decrease the number of economic entities: absorbed 
companies remain independent legal entities and only ownership changes.2626 
The main reasons encouraging Russian entrepreneurs to launch M&A are sale of distressed 
assets and presence of private investors, which increases competition for capital. Companies with a 
high degree of diversification are considering the possibility of selling inefficient assets to focus their 
efforts on developing their core business. Another incentive for M&As is the need to preserve and 
increase the market share, as well as to improve the profitability of the business.2627  
Moreover, it is easier to buy a strategic asset than make expensive R&D, introducing 
innovative technologies on its own. Limited access to capital markets reinforces the trend towards 
creating strategic alliances. 
Alliances and joint ventures are becoming increasingly attractive forms of cooperation for 
Russian and global companies in current economy. Alliances may preserve business or expand 
business geography and facilitate access to innovative technologies. 
Alliances have several advantages in comparison with joint ventures, since they increase the 
market share of business and give access to more technological and efficient processes without 
affecting the autonomy of the company. 
Sale of mortgages constitutes another popular tool. The most famous example of mortgages 
sale is the purchase of shares and debts of Razgulay Group (one of the ten largest agricultural 
companies in Russia) by the agricultural holding Rusagro (one of the largest owners of farmland in 
the country, controlling almost 500 thousand hectares)2628. Deals like the sale of mortgages of 
Razgulay Group outline an important trend: liquidity of assets makes it no longer profitable for banks 
to hold pledges and try to sell them at a price higher than the market price. 
 
2.5.2. Antimonopoly regulation and sale models in Agriculture  
 
                                                          
2622 Development of agriculture in Russia: perspectives and obstacles // KP.ru. 2016. URL: 
https://www.kp.ru/guide/razvitie-sel-skogo-khozjaistva-v-rossii.html; FAS Report on Competition in 2016 (2017). 
2623 Plotnikova I.A., Orlova E.R. Agricultural markets in Russia: analysis of contemporary obstacles // Vestnik MIEP. 
2015. Vol. 19. N 2. pp. 64-72.  
2624 ibid. 
2625 Tumalanov N.V. Change of competitive environment in perspective of agricultural markets // Modern Competition. 
2012. Vol. 3. N 33. P. 80-83. 
2626 ibid.  
2627 ibid. 
2628 Burlakova E. “Rusagro would cover expenses for “Razgulay Group” buyout in a 2 year period” // Vedomosti. 2016. 
URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2016/08/29/654748-rusagro-okupit-zatrati-na-pokupku-aktivov-
razgulyaya; “Razgulay Group” was adjudged bankrupt // Interfax. 2017. URL: http://www.interfax.ru/business/559781.   
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Patent protection for seed companies switched the sales model from seed sales contract to 
seed licensing agreements. Nevertheless, the transition to the licensing model was not possible, 
because the licensing model was based on the plant variety protection law2629, which allows farmers 
to save and re-seed the seeds, even if the seed company holds intellectual property rights on the seeds. 
Moreover, plant variety law is usually more restrictive in terms of licensing practices and the evidence 
of the infringement of these rights (given that protection is provided for the phenotypic characteristics 
of the variety). Biotechnological patents do not impose these restrictions and hence acts as a key 
license model. Therefore, seed companies prefer biotechnological patents rather than plant variety 
patents.   
Nowadays the main sale model is licensing agreements with detailed contract clauses on the 
use of seeds, in particular, clauses that prohibit farmers to save and re-seed the seeds. Such contract 
clauses allow patent holders to control farmers via contractual obligations. An example of this control 
is the so-called "Technology Transfer Agreement", under which Monsanto sells branded Roundup 
Ready seeds. This agreement has very restrictive clauses on farmers’ rights to save and re-seed the 
seeds, because it prohibits subsequent re-use of the seeds. Violation of this clause can be considered 
as a breach of contract, entailing draconian sanctions: a farmer violating the clause must pay 120 
times the price paid for the technology as well as pay legal costs. To control farmers, Monsanto also 
stipulates the right of Monsanto employees to carry out a permanent check of farmer fields. An 
arbitration clause forms also the part of the agreement.  
Biological tools to protect intellectual property rights are another model to control seed 
industry. For example, male cytoplasmic sterilization is the most efficient biological tool, because it 
allows the production of hybrid seeds deprived of the opportunity for self-reproduction. These 
biological tools are patented and all patents are owned by a limited number of seed companies.  
This sophisticated legal and biological environment turns the part of the value chain into a 
closed system. It relies on the self-contained complex practices of contracting and applies 
sophisticated technological security arrangements.  
 Nevertheless, antitrust legislation in the Russian Federation lacks any efficient instruments, 
which can help to resist any negative consequences for competition in the seed market resulting from 
the abuse of IP rights. For instance, under Article 10 of the Federal law “On protection of 
competition” abuse of IP rights by a dominant undertaking does not affect actions in respect of 
enforcement of exclusive rights on intellectual property and means of identification, individualising 
food products or associated services. Moreover, in accordance with Article 11 of the Federal law “On 
Protection of Competition” anticompetitive agreements are prohibited..  
 
2.6.Consumers’ Interests  
 
2.6.1. Food and Health Regulation 
 
The food and health regulation  in the Russian Federation are implemented by the Federal 
Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor), 
which is accountable to the Government of the Russian Federation.  
                                                          
2629 Federal Law dated 17 December 1997 N 149-FZ “On Seed Breeding”. 
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The Rospotrebnadzor carries out its activities in accordance with the Decree of the 
Government of the Russian Federation dated 06 April 2004 No. 154 "Questions of the Federal Service 
for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare" and on the basis of the 
Regulations on the Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human 
Welfare, approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 30 June  2004, 
No. 322. 
As follows from Article 1 of the Regulations, the Rospotrebnadzor is a federal governmental 
body responsible for the development and implementation of the state policy and normative legal 
regulation in the sphere of consumer protection, and for the development and approval of state 
sanitary epidemiological rules and hygienic standards. Moreover Rospotrebnadzor is responsible for 
the organization and implementation of the state sanitary-epidemiological control and supervision in 
the field of consumer protection. 
Rospotrebnadzor is also authorised to impose sanctions against the enterprises. For example, 
recently Rospotrebnadzor confirmed the imposition of a fine on the global retail company “Ashan” 
for violation of sanitary epidemiological norms. The total fines reached around $500 thousand.2630 
The Federal service of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision implement additional 
oversight in this area. According to the “Regulations of the Federal Service of the Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Supervision” dated 14 September 2016 No.633, this service is a federal governmental 
body responsible for the control and supervision in the field of veterinary, sales of medicines for 
veterinary use, quarantine and protection of plants, and the safe use of pesticides and agrochemicals. 
The Service is accountable to the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation and carries out 
the state supervision of the quality and safety of seeds.2631 
 
2.6.1.1.Pesticides and Additives   
 
The pesticide market in Russia is one of the largest in the world. It has already reached a 
volume of 1.2 billion dollars, but its growth continues.2632 It is worth noting that the Russian market 
of plant protection products today is dominated by imported products, the majority of which are 
counterfeit.2633 This requires the state to establish strict regulatory policies in this area. 
According to the Federal Law dated 19 July 1997 No. 109-FZ "On the Safe Management of 
Pesticides and Agrochemicals", pesticides are chemical or biological preparations used to control 
pests and diseases of plants, weeds, pests of stored agricultural products, domestic pests and external 
parasites of animals, as well as to regulate plant growth, pre-harvesting leaves (defoliants), pre-
harvesting plants (desiccants). 
The use of pesticides and agrochemicals in Russian Federation is allowed only after they have 
past the registration tests and have been issued the registration certificate by the authorised state body. 
In the case of registration of a new kind of pesticide, the application for registration  should pass the 
following steps: 
                                                          
2630 The amount of fines for violations in "Ashan" exceeded 25 million rubles. http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1522316/ 
accessed 29 October 2017. 
2631The Order of the Rosselkhoznadzor dated 14 September 12016 No. 663. http://fsvps.ru/fsvps/laws/4593.html#3. 
2632 ‘Until the thunder breaks out’ (2014) Expert Online <expert.ru/2014/02/26/poka-grom-ne-gryanet> accessed 29 
October 2017. 
2633 ‘Market, crisis, counterfeit’ (2 June 2016) Agroxxi <www.agroxxi.ru/associacija-evropeiskogo-biznesa/rynok-krizis-
kontrafakt.html> accessed 29 October 2017. 
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(i) Registration tests of pesticides and agrochemicals, organised by the federal executive agency; 
(ii) Expertise of the results of registration tests of pesticides and agrochemicals; 
(iii) State registration of pesticides and agrochemicals for 10 years;2634 
(iv) Finally, a pesticide or agrochemical is included in the State Register of Pesticides and 
Agrochemicals, which are approved for use in the territory of the Russian Federation. 
 
2.6.1.2.Standards and Local Interests 
 
The list of product standards, which are used in Russia, contains the following:   
- Documents of the national standardisation system which establish the general characteristics 
of the object of standardisation, as well as rules and general principles with respect to the 
object of standardisation. 
- All-Russian classifiers are standardisation documents that distribute technical, economic and 
social information in accordance with its classification (classes, groups, types, etc.) and are 
mandatory for use in government information systems and in inter-agency exchange of 
information in accordance with the procedure established by federal laws and other normative 
legal acts of the Russian Federation; 
- standards of organisations - documents on standardisation, approved by a legal entity, as well 
as by an individual entrepreneur to improve production and ensure product quality, perform 
work, provide services, including technical conditions. 
 
2.6.1.3.Alcoholic Beverages and Consumption 
 
The history of production and consumption of alcohol products, covering the period from the 
pre-revolutionary time to the present, indicates that the increase in the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages and the change in the structure of its consumption toward stronger alcohol products were 
due to the lack of unified approaches to the regulation of alcohol production, shifting priorities in the 
sphere of economic interests to the detriment of public health.2635 
In Russia in 1914 - 1917 the lowest level of alcohol consumption was observed compared to 
Europe, and amounted to 0.83 l of absolute alcohol (anhydrous alcohol) per capita. However, the 
mid-1970s marked beginning of a significant increase in its consumption. By the beginning of the 
1990s, the consumption of registered alcoholic products per capita amounted to 5.4 l of absolute 
alcohol (anhydrous alcohol) per year, and by 2008 it had increased to 10 l.2636 
However, taking into account the alcohol-containing products and spirits of domestic 
production that are not allowed for consumption, the actual consumption of alcoholic products per 
capita currently stands at about 18 l per year.2637 
According to World Health Organisation experts, exceeding the permissible level of alcohol 
consumption (at the rate of 8 l of absolute alcohol (anhydrous alcohol) per year per capita) is 
extremely dangerous for the health of the nation: consumption of each litre in excess of this limit 
                                                          
2634Federal Law dated 19 July 1997 No. 109-FZ "On the Safe Management of Pesticides and Agrochemicals". 
http://base.garant.ru/11900732/ 
2635 http://www.fsrar.ru/policy_of_sobriety/koncepcia 
2636 http://www.fsrar.ru/policy_of_sobriety/koncepcia 
2637 http://www.fsrar.ru/policy_of_sobriety/koncepcia 
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reduces the life duration by 11 months for men and by 4 months for women.2638 According to the 
world statistics, the alcohol consumption leads for nearly 2 million deaths and 4% of diseases 
worldwide every year.2639 
First of all, it is noteworthy that the Government Decree No. 2128-r dated 30 December2009 
adopted the “Concept of Implementing the State Policy on Reducing Alcohol Abuse among the 
Population of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020”. 
The main source of legal regulation of production and sale of alcoholic products is the Federal 
Law "On State Regulation of Production and Turnover of Ethyl Alcohol, Alcoholic and Alcohol-
Containing Products and on Limiting Consumption (Drinking) of Alcohol Products" dated 22 
November 1995 No. 171-FZ (hereinafter – the “Law on Production and Turnover of Alcohol”). 
According to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Law on Production and Turnover of Alcohol, alcoholic 
products mean food products produced with or without the use of ethyl alcohol, produced from food 
raw materials, and (or) alcohol-containing food products, with the content of ethyl alcohol more than 
0.5 percent of the volume of the end products. Alcoholic products are divided into such types as 
spirits (including vodka), wine, fruit wine, liqueur wine, sparkling wine (wine), wine drinks, beer and 
beverages, made on the basis of beer, cider, pear cider, mead. 
According to paragraph 2 of article 18 of the Law on Production and Turnover of Alcohol, to 
be eligible for selling alcoholic products, organisations must have a license for this type of activity. 
Sale of alcoholic products is prohibited for minors. The sale and repeated sale of alcoholic 
products to a minor entails administrative and criminal liability, respectively (Part 2.1 of Article 14.16 
of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation, Article 151.1 of the Criminal Code 
of the Russian Federation)2640. 
In general, the state control (supervision) of the production and turnover of ethyl alcohol, 
alcohol and alcohol-containing products, as well as state supervision over the use of the main 
technological equipment for the production of ethyl alcohol, which is subject for state registration, 
includes: 
1) licensing control over the production and turnover of ethyl alcohol, alcohol and alcohol-containing 
products; 
2) state supervision over compliance with the mandatory requirements for ethyl alcohol, alcohol and 
alcohol-containing products, which are established by international treaties of the Russian Federation, 
federal laws, and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation, which are adopted in 
accordance with these laws; 
3) state supervision over the use of the main technological equipment for the production of ethyl 
alcohol, which is subject for the state registration. 
 
2.6.2. Consumer Protection System 
 
The contemporary history of the development of consumer protection in the Russian 
Federation started with the adoption of the Federal Law “On Protection of Consumer Rights” dated 
                                                          
2638 http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/alcohol-use 
2639 http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/alcohol-use  
2640"The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation" of 13.06.1996 N 63-FZ. URL: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/. Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative 
Offenses of 30.12.2001 N 195-FZ. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_34661/. 
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07 February 1992 No. 2300-1 (hereinafter – “Federal Law “On Protection of Consumer Rights”).In 
addition, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, the "Guidelines for the Protection of Consumer 
Interests" (adopted on 09 April  1985 by Resolution No. 39/248 at the 106th Plenary Meeting of the 
UN General Assembly), and more than 20 federal laws adopted directly in compliance with the 
requirements of the Law "On  Protection of Consumer Rights" further specify the provisions about 
consumer protection. Moreover, in order to provide consistency of the case law in the field of 
consumer rights protection, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued the 
Resolution No. 17 of 28 July 2012 "On consideration by courts of civil cases on consumer rights 
disputes" where it clarifies a number of issues regarding the implementation of the the Federal Law 
“On Protection of Consumer Rights”. This multitude of legal sources for consumer protection rights 
may lead to inconsistencies and legal uncertainty, which along with the direct violations of consumer 
rights by unscrupulous representatives of the business, may have led to the growth of distrust from 
the part of citizens.2641 
The state body in the area of protection of consumer rights is the Federal Service for 
Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare (Rospotrebnadzor), which was 
created in 2004.  
 
2.7.Superior Bargaining Power  
 
2.7.1. Superior Bargaining Power in Russian Contract Law 
 
Russian contract law deals with the superior bargaining power concept as a part of the general 
mechanism to protect weaker parties in contracts. For a long time the protection of the weaker party 
has been based only on special legislation on consumer rights and Article 428 of the Civil Code on 
adhesion contracts. Nevertheless, even then, Russian legislation has included traditional means to 
protect the weaker party that is affected by the monopolist. This refers to a general prohibition of 
abuse of rights under Article 10 of the Civil Code, which authorises the court not to protect the right 
in the case of its abuse and Article 169 of the Civil Code which specifies the invalidity of a legal 
transaction made with a purpose contrary to the basis of the legal order or morality. Article 428 gives 
the right to the party adhering to the contract to demand the rescission or change of it if the terms of 
such an adhesion contract, determined by another party in standard forms, are unfair and burdensome.  
However, the enforcement of these rules has been relatively rare. Only in cases when an 
adversely affected party is an end consumer, courts tend to apply special legislative provisions on 
consumer rights protection, in particular Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Federal Law “On Protection 
of Consumer Rights”. This Paragraph establishes the mandatory nature of the rules set by the said 
law and stresses the general principle the contracts with consumers, whose provisions adversely affect 
consumers rights compared to the federal law, are null and void. Courts have tended to apply this rule 
in the majority of cases when the contract does not contradict the law but contains provisions which 
could be interpreted as unfair and too burdensome for one of the parties. 
 So, from a paternalistic point of view, the extension of the described protection to B2B 
transaction cannot be presupposed. Entrepreneurs (Russian law deals with this legal definition while 
                                                          
2641 "On Actual Aspects of Consumer Rights Protection in the Russian Federation". URL: 
http://council.gov.ru/activity/activities/roundtables/59611/. 
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describing actors with a special legal capacity) should incur all legal and economic consequences of 
their strategic decisions because of the implied entrepreneurial risk. So, as a general proposition, the 
law shall not interfere in relative contractual relationships. But, from a different point of view, a 
blatant violation of bargaining capability cannot be ignored by courts as this might reflect the abuse 
of civil law rights of the party to a commercial contract. 
The Supreme Commercial Court (hereinafter – the “SCC”) summarised the case law of lower 
state commercial courts to make Article 428 the center of protection of the weaker party in contract 
law. On 14 March 2014 it rendered a Ruling № 16 "On the Freedom of the Contract and Its Limits" 
(hereinafter - the “Ruling”) which opened the door for a new non-standard approach to interpretation 
of the contract law provisions. 
Firstly, the SCC stated that not only physical persons can be protected through the application 
of Article 428 (contract of adhesion). A previous version of this Article (existing as amended now) 
excluded contracts between legal entities from the scope of application.  
Secondly, the SCC expanded the sphere of application of this Article. Previously it had dealt 
only with contracts of adhesion (that means a “contract whose terms are determined by one of the 
parties in printed forms or other standard forms and that may be accepted by the other party not 
otherwise than by adhering to the proposed contract as a whole”), but the Court interpreted it as to be 
applied to all other contracts, “if one contracting party which has developed and proposed a draft 
contract containing clearly burdensome terms substantially violating the balance of interests (unfair 
contract terms), and if at the same time the other contracting party was in a position effectively 
complicating for him renegotiation of such terms (weaker party)”.2642 To apply the contract of 
adhesion regime the court does not have to establish that the disputed contract was a standard one, 
but rather defines the factual balance of the bargaining capabilities of the parties and finds out whether 
the adherence to the offered terms was forced.2643  
Thirdly, the SCC established what the unfair contract term is. These terms are supposed to be 
legally valid and binding but clearly onerous (burdensome), causing a serious imbalance in the 
parties’ interests. The court shall evaluate provisions of this kind in aggregate with the other terms of 
the agreement and related transactions, since advantages under some contractual conditions may, 
therefore, compensate for disadvantages under others. So, the onerous character of the concrete term 
shall be established as related to concrete cases, but not as being based on some abstract criteria.2644  
Fourthly, the status of the so called weaker party was clarified - it is the contracting party, 
which was in no position to negotiate the terms because of inequality in bargaining power.2645 It is 
important that courts shall analyse the actual (real) state of bargaining power in the deal, taking into 
account whether submission to the contract was compulsory and other related circumstances: the 
standard of professionalism of the parties in the concrete sphere, competition on the given market 
and the possibility of concluding an alternative transaction.2646 That means that the SCC entitled the 
weaker party to claim its counter-party for disproportion in bargaining power on the ground of 
competition level.  
                                                          
2642 Paragraph 9 of the Ruling. 
2643 Paragraph 10 of the Ruling. 
2644 Paragraph 10 of the Ruling. 
2645 Paragraph 10 of the Ruling. 
2646 Paragraph 10 of the Ruling. 
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Finally, the mechanism of the weaker party protection was sufficiently developed. Article 428 
of the Civil Code states that the affected party can claim for amendment or rescission of the adhesion 
contract (in our situation – of such a contract with unfair terms) by bringing an action to court. 
Consequently, the weaker party is stimulated to file the suit even if losses caused by the mentioned 
unfair terms have not yet been sustained. The SCC pointed that alternatively, instead of claiming for 
contract amendment, the weaker party can object to the enforcement of terms resulting from the 
superior bargaining power of the other party. This sort of objection is based on Articles 10 and 169 
of the Civil Code described above. Since compulsion in negotiations through superior bargaining 
power of one of the parties is to be regarded as acting in bad faith, the legal mechanism of objection 
under the civil law looks quite flexible and procedurally viable. 
Over the past several years of its application, the approach reflected in the Ruling  has been 
developed in a fairly large number of cases. Commercial courts turn to a new understanding of 
adhesion contract cautiously. For example, they interfere into B2B transactions on the basis of Article 
428 of the Civil Code only in exceptional cases, which are when the imbalance in superior bargaining 
power was clearly disproportional.2647 
However, there were several gaps in the existing approach to unequal bargaining power of 
parties to commercial contracts. Firstly, there are different approaches in judicial practice to cases 
when the party to the contract was offered the draft of the agreement, but did not make any effort to 
negotiate the terms of it. The Russian legal scholars suggest that only if such an adhering party is a 
consumer his or her lack of initiative could be excused and therefore could be granted protection. On 
the other hand, with regard to B2B transactions, the party claiming for application of Article 428 shall 
demonstrate initiative in negotiations, otherwise he or she cannot claim for such sort of protection. 
Secondly, it is important to clarify whether it is possible to identify the weaker bargaining 
party when the mentioned imbalance in bargaining power could have been evaded through an 
alternative transaction with another market actor  - “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” 
(BATNA). In other words, whether developed competition on certain market prevents application of 
the defence against the unfair contract terms just described, or whether actors shall have access to it 
even in the situation when an alternative deal is also possible.  
The Ruling states  that the court shall consider all attending factors, such as the possibility to 
negotiate the terms in concrete situations and facts of compulsion to the deal, but also the level of 
competition on the particular market and the possibility of an alternative transaction. Though the 
correlation between these various strands of the case law has not been revealed by now, the issue can 
be raised whether it is possible to argue that the adherence to the contract was compulsory and the 
party joined it is a weaker party when the hypothetical chance to enter into a substitutable agreement 
still exists. It may be argued that the consumer could receive the protection in all cases and the 
entrepreneur (a market professional actor) would obtain it while bargaining on a highly monopolised 
market. 
The third aspect is closely connected with a Russian economic peculiarity. One of the largest 
economic spheres in Russia is the public procurement sector. Entering into the contract for public 
procurement inherently means that the party submits the terms which could be negotiated in minor 
detail. Does it mean that such a submitting person will be named the weaker party in all the cases? 
                                                          
2647 Resolution of Plenum of SAC of the Russian Federation dated 14 March 2014 N 16 "On Freedom of Contract and its 
Limits" 
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Shall there be some sort of presumption concerning the inability to conclude the alternative deal and 
to prevent losses caused by the superior bargaining power of the public counterparty? Russian 
commercial courts are likely adopt the approach by which the compulsory character of negotiation 
with a public body should be established regarding all the attending factors: for instance, the chance 
to argue the disputed unfair term, the possibility of alternative transactions, etc. This means that a 
legally binding procedure of bargaining specified in statutory law does not presuppose that there is 
no space for unfair contract terms and superior bargaining power enforced in bad faith. 
On 08 March 2015 the Federal Statute No. 42-FZ ‘On Amendments to the First Part of the 
Civil Code’ was enacted. Among other changes to the Civil Code, this statute has amended Article 
428 of the Civil Code in line with the Ruling № 16 of the Supreme Commercial Court. 
Subparagraph 3 of Article 428 of the Civil Code provides that the courts may address the 
“weak party” aspect in many commercial disputes. Now, Article 428 specifies that:  
“Rules provided under sub-paragraph 2 of this Article [428] shall be applied also to contracts 
that are not contracts of adhesion but where conditions of such agreements are determined by 
one of the parties while the other party due to obvious inequality in bargaining power is put 
in a position that substantially prevents it from negotiating other content of the certain contract 
terms”. 
The new wording rises a lot of questions since it does not provide guidance as to what should 
constitute an “obvious inequality in bargaining power” and does not set forth any criteria for 
“substantial” prevention from negotiation of alternative conditions of the agreement except for the 
provisions of the Ruling № 16 of the Supreme Commercial Court (which remains in force, even 
though the SCC was abolished as a judicial forum and it’s the legal status of the Ruling seems 
uncertain). These doctrines are new to Russian civil law and it may take courts years to adopt a 
uniform approach to the issue of unequal bargaining power. 
 As it was stressed above, Russian contract law enables the assessment of the level of 
competition on a certain market in order to determine whether it is possible to apply the superior 
bargaining power concept. Moreover, in certain cases courts used Article 428 of the Civil Code as an 
additional criterion to qualify the dominant position of the market actor and then to enforce the 
competition law mechanism. 
 Thus, the Ruling of State Commercial Court of Cassation of Severo-Kavkazsky Region dated 
10 June 2011 on the case №A53-16802/2010 refers to Article 428 of the Civil Code when assessing 
the imposition of disadvantageous contract conditions or conditions unrelated to the subject of the 
contract. In the Rulings of the State Commercial Court of Cassation of Ural Region dated 28 May 
2012 №Ф09-3773/12 on the case №A60-29999/2011 and dated 16 August 2011 №F09-4957/11 on 
the case №A60-816/2011 the court refers to Article 428 of the Civil Code to assess the contract 
concluded by the parties. The position of the counterparties to the contract in these cases is clearly 
dominant, since they are natural monopolies. 
The Ruling of the Fifth State Commercial Court of Appeal dated 15 June  2010 №05АП-
3380/2010 on the case №A51-5351/2010 refers to Article 428 of the Civil Code 8 to assess the 
contract concluded by the parties. The position of the supplier is recognised as dominant, because it 
is the only provider of access to the cable TV market in the municipality (village). 
The Ruling of Seventeenth State Commercial Court of Appeal dated 10 February 2015 № 
17АП-10443/2014-ГК on the case №A50-8350/2014 refers to Article 428 of the Civil Code  when 
assessing whether the imposition of disadvantageous contract conditions or contract conditions 
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unrelated to the subject took place. The position of the group of entities was recognised to be 
dominant by FAS. 
 
2.7.2. Superior Bargaining Power under Competition Law 
 
Article 5 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition defines dominance as follows:  
“The position of an economic entity (except financial organisations) is recognized as dominant, 
when:  
1) its share in the certain product market exceeds fifty percent unless in the course of 
investigation of the case of violation of the antimonopoly legislation or in the course of 
exercising state control over economic concentration it would be established that despite the 
excess of the aforementioned quantity position of the economic entity in the goods market is 
not dominant; 
2) its share in the certain product market is less than fifty percent in case the dominance of 
this economic entity was established by the antimonopoly body based on its stable or 
insignificantly changing share in the market as compared to the shares of its competitors in 
this product market; opportunities for access to this product market of new competitors, or 
based on other criteria characterising the product market”. 
The evaluation of bargaining power of market actors or the assessment of economic dependence that 
might be established between some of them seems not to be a factor triggering the application of 
Russian competition law rules.2648  
However, Article 10 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition, although it targets 
only undertakings having a dominant position as defined by Article 5 thereof, can be potentially 
applied to anticompetitive conduct tending to exploit a superior bargaining position, such as the 
following: 
“[…] 3) imposing contractual terms upon a counterparty which are unprofitable for the latter 
or not connected with the subject of agreement (economically or technologically unjustified 
and (or) requirements for transferring financial assets, other property, including property 
rights, which are not provided for directly by federal laws, statutory legal acts of the President 
of the Russian Federation, statutory legal acts of the Government of the Russian Federation, 
statutory legal acts of the authorised federal executive authorities or judicial acts, as well as 
consent to conclude a contract only on condition of including in it provisions concerning the 
goods in which the counterparty is not interested and other requirements); 
4) economically or technologically unjustified reduction or cutting off the production of goods 
if there is demand for the goods or orders for their delivery are placed and there is possibility 
of its profitable production, as well as if such reduction or cutting off the production of goods 
are not provided for directly by the Federal Laws, statutory legal acts of the President of the 
Russian Federation, statutory legal acts of the Government of the Russian Federation, 
statutory legal acts of the authorized federal executive authorities or judicial acts; 
5) economically or technologically unjustified refusal or evasion form concluding a contract 
with individual purchasers (customers) in the case when there are possibilities for production 
                                                          
2648 At first glance, Russian competition law seems to be solidly based on structural underpinnings of the analysis of 
dominance. 
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or delivery of the relevant goods as well as if such a refusal or evasion is not provided for 
directly by federal laws, statutory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the 
Government of the Russian Federation, authorised federal executive authorities or judicial 
acts”. 
In the same vein, the Russian antitrust authority has openly stated that they reject the 
application of a notion of abuse of superior bargaining power independently from the analysis of the 
market power of the dominant firm, as “only a company(s) with substantial degree of market power 
can effectively exploit vertically integrated upstream and downstream trade partners and, therefore, 
general behavioral legal provisions for market dominant firms suffice”.2649  
Nonetheless, Article 13 of the Federal law "On the Trading Activities”, which deals 
exclusively with the supply of food products, set forth the types of conduct that may fall foul of 
competition regulation (for detailed analysis see the section “General Overview and Legal 
Framework” and “Retail”). Some of these types of conduct, such as creating and imposing 
discriminatory conditions to contractual counterparties, seem to operate independently from the 
assessment imposed by Article 5 of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” and may be used 
in dealing with superior bargaining power of big food retail chains. Hence, it is possible to argue that, 
at least potentially, the FAS is enabled to deal with cases of abuse of superior bargaining power, 
although solely in the market of supply of food products. 
 
2.8.Agricultural Subsidies 
 
During last years the agricultural development has been marked by the significant increase of the 
state support of the agricultural producers.2650  
Legal framework for the state support of the agriculture includes the following legal acts: 
2.8.1. Federal Law dated 29 December 2006 N 264-FZ “On Development of the 
Agriculture”.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the said Federal Law sets forth that granting budget subsidies to 
agricultural producers constitutes one of the measures of the state’s agricultural policy. Article 7 
specifies the measures of the state support of the agriculture including indirect support, development 
of the agricultural infrastructure and informational support, inter alia: 
1) ensuring the availability of credit resources for agricultural producers including farmers and 
agricultural cooperatives (by partial reimbursement of the interest rates payable by 
agricultural producers); 
2) development of the risk insurance system in agriculture; 
3) development of breeding livestock; 
4) development of elite seed production; 
5) ensuring the production of animal farming (dairy, meat, etc.); 
                                                          
2649 ICN, ‘Report on Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position’ (2008) 17 
<www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc386.pdf> accessed 29 October 2017. 
2650 ‘Development of the Agriculture in Russia: Reality and Perspectives’ (Komsomolkaya Pravda, 29 July 2016) 
(https://www.kp.ru/guide/razvitie-sel-skogo-khozjaistva-v-rossii.html 
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6) ensuring the development and maintenance of perennial plantations; 
7) renewal and upgrade of fixed assets of agricultural producers; 
8) improving soil fertility; 
9) ensuring sustainable development of rural areas, including the construction and maintenance 
of roads connecting the rural areas; 
10) provision of consulting assistance to agricultural producers, training of specialists for 
agriculture, etc. 
 
2.8.2. State programmes aimed at subsidising agricultural producers: 
• The State Programme on Agricultural Development and Regulation of Agricultural Products, 
Commodities and  Food Markets, 2013–2020 (hereinafter – the “State Programme on 
Agricultural Development”) is the main legal act governing the implementation of the state 
support of agricultural producers; 
• The Federal Targeted Programme "Sustainable development of rural areas for 2014-2017 and 
for the period until 2020"; 
• Federal Scientific and Technical Program for the Development of Agriculture for 2017-2025; 
• Federal Targeted Program "Development of Amelioration of Agricultural Land in Russia for 
2014-2020"; etc. 
Each of the programmes establishes certain subsidies to the budgets of subjects of the Russian 
Federation for implementation the measures for achievement of specific goals of the programme.  
The regions of the Russian Federation are entitled to adopt and implement their own regional 
programmes of the state support of the agricultural entrepreneurship or specific sectors of 
agriculture. They are funded from the regional budget and are overseen by the regional agencies 
authorised in the field of regulation of agriculture.  
Institutions in charge implementing the subsidies regime for agriculture are: 
 
(i) Government of the Russian Federation: 
• adopts the State Programme on Agricultural Development, other targeted 
programmes and many regulatory legal acts establishing, for instance, the 
conditions of granting the subsidies for the regional budgets for covering the costs 
of implementing the state support measures within the specific region;  
• specifies the list of products whose producers and initial processors are entitled to 
the state subsidies;2651 
(ii) Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation is the main public body responsible 
for:2652 
• implementing the State Programme on Agricultural Development;  
                                                          
2651 The Order of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 28 November 2016 No.2524-p. 
2652 Regulations on the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation adopted by the Order of the Government of the 
Russian Federation dated 12 June 2008 No.450. 
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• drafting and presenting  the national report on the progress and outcome of 
implementation of the State Programme on Agricultural Development;  
• devising and implementing measures to support small and medium-sized 
agricultural businesses aimed at their development, including development and 
implementation of relevant departmental target programs; 
• drafting and implementing the plans of allocation subsidies to the regional budgets 
for implementation of the State Programme on Agricultural Development and state 
targeted programmes; 
• coordinating the actions of the regions of the Russian Federation aimed at 
implementation of the state programmes. 
(iii) Regional bodies authorised to implement the agricultural policies are responsible for 
implementation of the State Programme on Agricultural Development and state targeted 
programmes and for allocation of subsidies to the end beneficiaries within the relevant 
region. 
(iv) Federal Antimonopoly Service monitors compliance of state and local bodies with the 
procedures of granting subsidies to agricultural producers and detects abusive practices 
related to it. Thus, control on the procedures of granting subsidies to farmers was one of 
the priority activities of FAS in 2015.2653 As a result, more than fifty investigations were 
opened on the alleged violation of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” by 
regional state bodies authorised to implement the agricultural policies. The violations 
were mostly related to illegal discrimination among the recipients of subsidies (for 
instance, by setting an additional criteria, such as having registered office in the region 
granting a subsidy or obligation to sell all the grains harvest of the current year to the 
entities registered and having processing capacities in the territory of the specified 
region)2654 and violation of the order of granting state preferences set forth by Chapter 5 
of the Federal law “On Protection of Competition” (for instance, by retroactively 
amending the legal normative act stipulating the procedure of granting subsidies in order 
to make a pre-defined recipient eligible for them).2655 
 
The state support of agricultural producers takes the following forms: 
(i) Preferential lending (one of the main forms of subsidising agricultural producers). It 
includes partial reimbursement by the state of the interest rates on short-term investment 
loans granted to agricultural producers, organisations and individual entrepreneurs that 
produce, process and / or sell agricultural products, so that  the actual payable rate 
constitutes no more than 5%.2656 The list of purposes for which a subsidised loan can be 
                                                          
2653FAS press release dated 12 February 2016 at <fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=44712> accessed 20 
December 2016. 
2654Decision by FAS of  Russia dated 02 December 2014 on the case №1-15-11/00-06-14; Decision by FAS of Russia 
dated 27 November 2015 on the case № 1-00-122/00-06-15; Decision by FAS of Russia dated 27 November2015 on the 
case № 1-00-121/00-06-15; Decision by FAS of Russia dated  28 July 2015 on the case №1-15-42/00-06-15. 
2655Decision by Chuvashia FAS dated 16 December 2015 on the case № 43/05-АМЗ-2015; Decision by Chuvashia FAS 
dated 10 December 2015 on the case № 36/05-АМЗ-2015. 
2656 http://mcx.ru/activity/state-support/measures/preferential-credit/ 
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taken is quite broad: renewal of the technopark, purchase of fertilisers and pesticides, for 
processors - purchase of domestic agricultural raw materials.2657 
(ii) Unified regional subsidy is granted to regions for implementation of the regional 
programmes of the state support. 
(iii) Partial compensation of direct costs incurred for construction and modernisation of 
agro-industrial facilities, as well as for the purchase of machinery and equipment. The 
eligible beneficiaries are enterprises that began construction and (or) modernisation of 
storage tanks, potato storage and vegetable storage facilities, greenhouses, dairy farms, 
pig breeding farms, animal breed and seed selection centers, and wholesale distribution 
centers. 
(iv) Subsidies aimed at increasing productivity in dairy cattle breeding, which are provided 
by partial reimbursing of the costs of agricultural producers for 1 kilogram of cow and 
(or) goat's milk sold in the market and (or) shipped for their own processing needs. 
(v) Subsidies to producers of agricultural equipment. 
(vi) Partial reimbursement of the costs of agricultural producers for payment of insurance 
premiums. This form of support arose in response to the law on compulsory agricultural 
insurance and encompasses reimbursement of costs for payment of insurance premiums 
under the insurance of risks of plant harvesting and livestock.  
(vii) Grants to agricultural cooperatives for acquiring of equipment and development of 
facilities and resources. 
(viii) One-off subsidies for setting a farm and acquiring necessary equipment, land plots, seeds, 
livestock, feed, etc. 
(ix) Subsidies for untied support of plant production. The subsidy is intended to compensate 
agricultural producers (except for citizens who run a personal subsidiary farm) for the part 
of their costs of agro-technological works and depends on the crop acreage.  
In general, after Russia’s accession to WTO in 2012, the untied forms of the state support of 
producers’ income are replacing tied price support, because they do not contradict the WTO rules 
that strictly regulate state subsidies to producers.2658 In fact, the above-mentioned reimbursement of 
the interest rates on investment loans should be attributed to the untied support as well. Another type 
of the untied support is subsidies for the payment of the first installment (advance payment) under 
the leasing agreement for the purchase of agricultural equipment and transport. Finally, tax incentives 
and preferential tax regimes for agricultural producers constitute another wide-spread form of the 
untied state support.2659 
The wide range of crops/agricultural sectors can benefit from the subsidies including: 
In animal breeding:2660 
• dairy cattle breeding; 
• livestock breeding; 
• meat cattle breeding; 
• increasing the number of reindeer, marals and meat horses; 
                                                          
2657 https://rynok-apk.ru/articles/plants/subsidiya-v-pomoshch/ 
2658 Vasily Erokhin, Establishing Food Security and Alternatives to International Trade in Emerging Economies (2017 
IGI Global), 69. 
2659 https://rynok-apk.ru/articles/plants/subsidiya-v-pomoshch/ 
2660 https://rynok-apk.ru/articles/plants/subsidiya-v-pomoshch/ 
759 
 
• increasing the breeding stock of sheep and goats,  
• production and sale of fine wool and semi-fine wool. 
In plant production: 
• laying and maintenance of vineyards; 
• purchase of seeds; 
• plant production in the territories with conditions adverse to the agriculture;  
• acquisition of elite seeds;  
• laying and maintenance of perennial fruit and berry plantings. 
The overall philosophy of the state support of the agricultural sector is reflected mostly in the 
State Programme on Agricultural Development, which emphasises as its primary objectives the 
increase in production outputs of the main types of agricultural products; modernisation and renewal 
of the technological base of agricultural industry and even increase in export of Russian agricultural 
products. The sustainable development of rural territories and providing the full employment of the 
rural populations is specified among its objectives and is the focus of the separate state programme. 
However, the number of unsolved problems indicates that the state support in this direction is sub-
optimal. Thus, the average salary of employees in the farming industry remains very low;2661 there 
are still difficulties in acquiring land plots to set up individual farms; significant upfront investments 
are necessary to receive the state subsidies.2662 The full implementation of the Federal Targeted 
Programme "Sustainable development of rural areas for 2014-2017 and for the period until 2020" 
might help to solve some crucial problems of rural territories and stimulate inflow of human resources 
to the agricultural sector.  
  
                                                          
2661 ‘Development of the Agriculture in Russia: Reality and Perspectives’ (Komsomolkaya Pravda, 29 July 2016) 
(https://www.kp.ru/guide/razvitie-sel-skogo-khozjaistva-v-rossii.html. 
2662 https://rynok-apk.ru/articles/plants/subsidiya-v-pomoshch/ 
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Chapter 3: India 
 
 Amber Darr 
 
3.1.Introduction 
 
On 3rd November 2017, the Government of India (the Government) launched the ‘World Food India’ 
initiative in a bid to attract investment of USD 10 billion in the Indian Food Processing sector. The 
Government’s avowed aim in doing so is to transform the Indian food economy and to double 
farmers’ income.2663 The Government’s focus on the Food Processing sector is both timely and 
appropriate. The Indian food industry comprises 32 per cent of the country’s total food market. It is 
one of the largest industries in India and is ranked fifth in terms of production, consumption, export 
and expected growth. It contributes around 8.80 and 8.39 per cent of Gross Value Added in 
Manufacturing and Agriculture sectors respectively, constitutes 13 per cent of India’s exports and six 
per cent of total industrial investment.2664 
The Indian food industry is also significant from a global perspective. India’s food and grocery 
market is the world’s sixth largest, with retail contributing 70 per cent of the sales. Although the 
online food ordering business in India is in its nascent stage, it has witnessed exponential growth in 
recent years: the online food delivery industry has grown at 150 per cent year-on-year with an 
estimated Gross Merchandise Value of US$ 300 million in 2016.  With online food delivery players 
like FoodPanda, Zomato, TinyOwl and Swiggy building scale through partnerships, the Government 
believes that the organized food business not only has huge potential but also a promising future. The 
Government has also announced that the Global e-commerce giant, Amazon is planning to enter the 
Indian food retailing sector by investing US$ 515 million in the next five years and the US-based 
food company Cargill Inc, aims to double its branded consumer business in India by 2020.2665  
In launching the World Food India initiative the Government implies that bolstering the Food 
Processing and Retail sectors will automatically benefit the Agriculture sector which not only feeds 
these sectors but also constitutes approximately 17.32 percent of India’s GDP2666 & employs 54.6 
percent of the Indian population.2667 However, the Agriculture sector continues to be affected by 
many challenges that hinder it from realizing its true potential. Even in the new millennium, when 
technology has touched every aspect of Indian lives, a majority of Indian farmers continue to deploy 
antiquated agrarian practices. Although the Government has taken some initiatives in this regard, it 
is understood that more needs to be done in this regard.2668 Further, businesses and related 
infrastructure across the Agriculture Value Chain remain underdeveloped and the sector is unable to 
attract investment due to structural inefficiencies and lack of economically remunerative business 
models.2669  
                                                          
2663 http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/india-to-attract-10-billion-in-food-processing-sector-in-3-years-
govt/article19974041.ece (accessed 4 November 2017). 
2664 https://www.ibef.org/industry/indian-food-industry.aspx (accessed 4 November 2017). 
2665 Ibid.  
2666 http://statisticstimes.com/economy/sectorwise-gdp-contribution-of-india.php (accessed 4 November 2017). 
2667 http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/PDF/State_of_Indian_Agriculture,2015-16.pdf (accessed 4 November 2017). 
2668 The Government’s information and communications technology (ICT) initiatives are discussed more fully in 
appropriate sections later in the fiche.  
2669 Ashish Iyer and Abheek Singhi ‘Indian Agribusiness: Cultivating Future Opportunities’ Boston Consulting Group 
(2012).  
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In order to support investment in the Food Processing and Retail sectors and thereby, at least 
indirectly to help the Agriculture sector, the Government proposes to launch a ‘Food Regulatory 
Portal’. This is planned as a single interface for food business to cater to both domestic operations 
and food imports. The Government expects the portal to be a ‘game changer’ for effective and 
transparent implementation of Food Safety Laws in the country.2670 Establishing such a portal is likely 
to be challenging given the complexities of the food value chains in India as well as the number of 
regulatory laws and institutions that presently govern the food sector. This fiche begins by describing 
the food value chain(s) in the country and proceeds to outline the relevant laws and institutions and 
identify the legal challenges that are likely to arise at different points in these chains and the 
considerations that may be taken into account in dealing with the Indian food sector.  
 
3.2.The Indian Food Value Chain(s) 
3.2.1. The Basic Indian Food Value Chain2671   
 
The basic structure of a Food Value Chain may be represented as follows:  
 
Figure 1: Basic Structure of the Food Value Chain  
 
Authors’ compilation 
 
In India, this basic representation of the Food Value Chain is complicated due to the distinct value 
chains that exist in the Agriculture and the Food Processing sectors and the interconnections between 
the two as well as their independent connections with the Retail sector. In order to unpack these 
complexities, it is important to first describe each sector in the basic Food Value Chain:  
 
3.2.1.1 The Input Sector  
 
The Input sector comprises seeds, Fertilisers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, electricity and water 
and crop insurance and is populated by Government agencies as well as private companies.  This 
sector forms the base of all food value chains whether Agriculture, Food Processing or Retail.  
 
3.2.1.2 The Agriculture Sector 
 
According to a strict definition, the Agriculture sector comprises all farmers whether individual, 
organized as co-operatives or corporate entities, engaged in the production of fruits, vegetables and 
                                                          
2670  See n. 2663. 
2671 This section is based upon information derived from Saurabh Kumar, Aparna Sharma ‘Agricultural Value Chains in 
India: Prospects and Challenges’© CUTS International 2016.  
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other crops. However, individual farmers and smallholders comprise the greatest portion of this sector 
and over 54.6 per cent of the rural households depend on agriculture as their principal means of 
livelihood.2672 Agriculture also contributes approximately 17.32 percent to India’s GDP. The Indian 
agriculture industry can be classified into four major product groups — food grains, fruits and 
vegetables, dairy, and meat. These product groups together account for approximately 85 percent of 
private final consumption expenditure on food.2673 The Agriculture sector has the option of supplying 
to wholesalers, food-processing companies, retailers or consumers.  
 
3.2.1.3 The Wholesale Sector 
 
The Wholesale sector comprises traders, middlemen and government purchase centers. This sector is 
fed solely by the Agriculture sector but may have onward connections with food processing 
companies, retailers or consumers. The value added by this sector is limited in that it acts merely as 
a conduit for the produce of the agriculture sector.  
# 
3.2.1.4 Food Processing Sector  
 
The Food Processing sector may be categorized into (a) Primary processing, which includes cleaning, 
grading, sorting, packing etc. of agricultural products to make agriculture products fit for human 
consumption. Finished products in this case include packed milk, fruits & vegetables, milled rice, 
flour, pulses, spices and salt largely unbranded, and, (b) Value-added or secondary/tertiary 
processing, which includes dairy products (ghee, cheese and butter), bakery products, processed fruits 
& vegetables, juices, jams, pickles, confectionery, chocolates and alcoholic beverages. These 
products undergo higher level of processing through which agricultural products are converted into 
new or modified products.   
 
3.2.1.5 Food Retail and Services sector  
 
The Retail sector is populated by a variety of players ranging from hypermarkets, supermarkets, 
corner grocery shops and local vendors. The inclusion of Food services to this sector brings the 
restaurant, fast food industry as well as online food delivery industry within its fold.  
 
3.2.1.6 Consumers  
 
Consumers, though not strictly a sector in the food value chains, represent the end-point of the food 
value chains and may include both the sophisticated urban consumer as well as her more traditional 
counterpart, the rural consumer. Consumers not only avail of the food sector but also play an 
important role in shaping it, to the extent that consumer preferences shape policy decisions and 
market choices. Arguably, the rise of an urban middle class in India has played in a considerable part 
in developing the nature of products produced by the Food processing industry as well as expanding 
                                                          
2672 See n. 2667. 
2673 See n. 2669, 22.  
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the retail options for customers whether through establishing modern fast food outlets to promoting 
online delivery services.  
 
3.2.2. An Integrated Model of the Food Value Chain  
 
Figure 2: The Integrated Food Value Chain  
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Figure 2, outlines the interconnections and linkages between the different Food sectors in India. The 
Input sector may supply to the Agriculture sector or directly to the Food Processing Sector. Further, 
the Agriculture sector may supply its produce to wholesalers, food processing companies, and 
retailers or even directly to consumers. Whilst the food-processing sector may be fed directly by the 
Input, Agriculture or Wholesale sector, its onward link is only with the Retail sector. 
Different laws and institutions regulate different sections in these value chains. Legislation in 
respect of the Agriculture sector is the domain of the States rather than of the Centre (or the Union as 
it is referred to in the Constitution. These terms are used interchangeably throughout, as 
appropriate).2674 Therefore, whilst the Centre may draft model laws and urge the States to adopt laws 
in accordance with these model laws, it does not have the constitutional authority to legislate in this 
regard. In April 2017, the Central Government (Agriculture Ministry) had drafted a new model 
Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act proposing single-point levy of market fee 
across a State and a united single trading license for cost-effectiveness of transactions,2675 whilst in 
                                                          
2674 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, State List, Item 14: Agriculture, including agricultural education and 
research, protection against pests and prevention of plant diseases. In terms of Article 246 (3) of the Constitution, States 
have the exclusive power to legislate in respect of items listed in the State List.  
2675 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/ministry-comes-up-with-model-apmc-act-to-integrate-agri-
markets/article9660628.ece (accessed 4 November 2017). 
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its recent budget speech, the Government has announced a move to table a draft contract farming 
law.2676 However, the extent to which these laws are adopted, depends on individual States.  
Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs, including 
edible oilseeds and oils, is a Concurrent subject and therefore, either the States or the Centre may 
legislate in this regard.2677 Intra-state trade and commerce is the domain of the Centre and only the 
Centre Legislature may legislate on this topic.2678 Further, although the Indian Constitution does not 
explicitly provide for the protection of consumers, several items in the Union and the Concurrent 
Legislative Lists allow both the Union and the Provincial legislature to legislate in this regard.2679 
 
3.3 The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Food Value Chain(s)  
 
In 1991, India adopted a liberal economic policy and for the first time in its independent history, 
opened itself to the global trade and investment.2680 Investors were initially attracted to India due to 
the low cost of labour combined with a weak legal and regulatory infrastructure.2681  However, as the 
magnitude of investment in the country grew, so did the demand for more stringent legal and 
regulatory protection. The Government, therefore, took it upon itself to frame appropriate polices to 
facilitate India’s transition from a protected to a competitive market economy and embarked on a 
process of drafting and adopting a modern legal framework and acquiring a new generation of 
regulatory institutions for implementing this legal framework throughout the country.2682 As part of 
this process, India adopted a number of laws and regulations for the food sector, which are not always 
in complete harmony with each other.  This section outlines the most significant legislation and 
instruments in respect of the different sectors within the Indian food sector:  
 
3.3.1 The Input sector  
 
Legislation governing the input sector includes the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and the Seeds 
Act 1966.2683  
 
3.3.1.1  The Essential Commodities Act 1955 
 
The Essential Commodities Act (ECA) and the Orders issued under it (for example, the Seeds 
(Control) Order 1983, the Seed Control Order (Amendment) 1983 and the Fertiliser Control Order 
                                                          
2676 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/centre-to-come-out-with-draft-model-law-on-contract-
farming/articleshow/60455065.cms (accessed 4 November 2017). 
2677 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List, Item 33 read with Article 246 (2).  
2678 Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, Union List, Item 42 read with Article 246 (1). 
2679 See for example in the Union List, Item 50 (‘Establishment of standards of weight and measure’); Item 51 
(‘Establishment of standards of quality for goods to be exported out of India or transported from one State to another’); 
and in the Concurrent List, Item 18 (‘Adulteration of foodstuffs and other goods’).  
2680 Jagdish Bhagwati India In Transition: Freeing The Economy Oxford University Press, Delhi © 1992. 
2681 To understand this underlying phenomenon, see Ronald B. Davies and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati 'A Race to 
the Bottom in Labour Standards? An Empirical Investigation' Journal of Development Economics 2013 (103) 1-14. For 
another perspective see Dr. Valpy Fitzgerald’s ‘Regulatory Investment Incentives’ OECD, 2001 
(https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/2510459.pdf accessed 4 Nov 2017). 
2682 Vijay Vir Singh and SiddhartaMitra, Regulatory Management and Reforms in India, Background Paper for OECD, 
CUTS International, page 4. 
2683 Information in respect of these laws has been taken from http://nsai.co.in (accessed 6th January 2017). 
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1985) govern a number of agricultural inputs including seeds and Fertilisers. The aim of this Act is 
to regulate the supply and distribution of, trade and commerce in these essential commodities.  
In terms of this Act, the Central Government has the power to control production, supply, 
distribution, etc., of essential commodities on grounds specified in the Act (section 3) and orders 
issued by the Government in exercise of this power override anything contained in any other 
legislation (section 6). The Government also has the power to confiscate essential commodities 
(section 6A) after following the procedure provided in the Act.  
Further, under this Act, the Government has almost unlimited power to pass certain Control 
Orders and take other action in respect of essential commodities. An example of this was the issuance 
by the Government of the Cotton (Price) Control Order in September 2015. In terms of this Order, 
the Government fixed Bt cottonseed prices at Rs 800 for 450 grams, compared with the then current 
rates that ranged from Rs 830 to Rs 1,000.2684 Monsanto indirectly challenged this Control Order 
before the Delhi High Court in a breach of contract suit filed by it against Nuziveedu Seeds Limited. 
However, in its decision dated 28th March 2017 the Delhi High Court ruled in favour of the Defendant, 
Nuziveedu Seeds Limited and required Monsanto to renegotiate the trait fee in accordance with local 
laws ie the Control Order.2685 
 
3.3.1.2 The Seeds Act 1966  
 
The Seeds Act (SA) and the Rules framed under it ie the Seed Rules 1968 and the Seeds (Amendment) 
Rules 1973 and 1974 provide for constituting the Central Seed Committee to advise the Central and 
State Governments on matters arising from the administration of the Act (section 3). The Act also 
establishes Central and State seed laboratories (section 4) and a Seed Certification Agency (section 
8); confers powers on the Government to notify different kinds and varieties of seeds (section 5) and 
to specify minimum limits of germination and purity of these seeds (section 6).  
The Act confers powers on the Certification Agency to certify different kinds and varieties of seeds 
on an application from an interested party (section 9) and to revoke such certification upon grounds 
specified in the Act (section 10). Further, the Act empowers State governments to appoint seed 
analysts (section 12) and seed inspectors (section 13) and specifies the powers of and procedure to 
                                                          
2684 https://nsai.co.in/editor/fmanage/userfiles/Newsletter/December_Newsletter.pdf (accessed 7 November 2017).  
2685 The Plaintiffs in this case were Monsanto Technology, Monsanto Holdings Private Limited and Mahyco Monsanto 
Biotech, all part of a multi-national agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation and a leading producer of 
genetically engineered seeds. The Plaintiffs filed a case against Nuziveedu Seeds Limited, Prabhat Agri Biotech Limited 
and Pravardhan Seeds Private Ltd. (Defendants), which are Indian agribusiness companies that market seeds and supply 
hybrid seeds to Indian farmers. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants continued to market and sell Genetically 
Modified Hybrid Cotton Planting Seeds despite the termination of sub-license agreements between the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants. The Plaintiffs also alleged violation of intellectual property rights of their registered patent (IA 214436) and 
their trademark sub-licenses for ‘Bollgard’ and ‘Bollgard II’. The Plaintiffs alleged trademark infringement and ‘passing 
off’ by the Defendants when they sold their products with labels of ‘Bollgard’. The Plaintiffs wanted to initiate a 
permanent injunction against the Defendants, along with disclosures, recalls of infringing products and award of damages. 
The High Court was of the opinion that the termination of the contract by the Plaintiffs was incorrect. The Judge stated: 
“the Plaintiffs were duty bound to consider the request of the defendants as made by the communications beginning July 
2015, for modification of the terms as to the rate of trait fee payable under the 2015 sub-license agreements for which the 
mechanism had earlier been agreed upon in the form of Article 11.03. Since the plaintiffs did not adhere to their obligation 
under the contract, the demand of payment under the contract terms being not lawful, it apparently being higher than the 
trait fee permitted by the law in force, the defendants could not have been found to be in default or to have breached their 
obligations within the meaning of Article 9.02.” http://www.invntree.com/blogs/delhi-high-court-makes-a-decision-in-
hybrid-cotton-seeds-case accessed 4 November 2017. 
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be followed by these analysts and inspectors (sections 14 and 15). The Act also restricts the export 
and import of notified kinds and varieties of seeds (section 17) and provides for the recognition of 
seed certification agencies of foreign countries (section 18). The Act was amended in 1972 to provide 
for establishing of a Central Certification Agency.2686 
In 2004, the Government had proposed a new Seeds Act, which was tabled before the 
Parliament as the Seeds Bill 2004. However, the bill was seen as being detrimental to farmers’ 
interests and was criticised for creating an unnecessary parallel system of registration and was not 
passed into law.2687 In 2014, the Government revived the bill after a decade, but it was again put on 
hold in 2015 after the backlash against the provisions relating to genetically modified (GM) seeds. 
Whilst certain scholars are of the view, that this bill, if passed, is likely to ‘improve the innovation 
incentives facing seed companies’2688 the fate of the bill remains uncertain.   
 
3.3.2. The Agriculture sector 
 
The Agriculture sector in India has received considerable legislative attention since the country’s 
independence from British Rule in 1947. India undertook extensive land reform and in its first 
legislative move in this regard, abolished intermediaries so that farmers could be brought into direct 
control of their land. India also carried out tenancy reforms to protect the rights of farmers, placed 
limits on land holdings and consolidated land holdings and established the Food Corporation of India 
with the mandate to devise effective price support operations for safeguarding the interests of the 
farmers; ensure distribution of food grains throughout the country for public distribution system; and 
maintain satisfactory level of operational and buffer stocks of food grains to ensure national food 
security.2689 However, given the country’s constitutional infrastructure, the majority of these 
initiatives are required to be implemented by State governments rather than the Central Government 
and, therefore, their impact varies from State to State.2690 Some of the most significant pieces of 
Central legislation in respect of the Agriculture sector are detailed below:  
 
3.3.2.1 The Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmer Rights Act 2001  
 
The Protection of Plant Varieties & Farmer Rights Act 2001 (PPV&FRA) provides, among other 
things, for the establishment of an effective system for protection of plant varieties and the rights of 
farmers and plant breeders and to encourage development of new varieties of plants.  
This Act was passed in pursuance of India joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995 and its signing of WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement, which brought intellectual property to the forefront of the Indian seed industry. Article 
27.3(b) of this agreement requires signatory countries to provide protection for plants in the form of 
                                                          
2686  The Seeds (Amendment) Act 1972. 
2687 Laurence R. Helfer, Graeme W. Austin Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface 
Cambridge University Press 2011, 409-415. 
2688 David J. Spielman, Deepthi E. Kolady, Anthony Cavalieri, N. Chandrasekhara Rao ‘The Seed and Agricultural 
Biotechnology Industries in India: An Analysis of Industry Structure, Competition, and Policy Options’ Food Policy 45 
(2014) 88–100. 
2689 Section 13, Food Corporation of India Act 1964.  
2690 Maitreesh Ghatak, Sanchari Roy ‘Land Reform and Agricultural Productivity in India: a Review of the Evidence’ 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 23, Number 2, 2007, 251–269. 
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patents, or with a system created specifically for the purpose (‘‘sui generis’’), or some combination 
thereof. Following the enactment of the PPV&FRA, the Government established the PPV&FR 
Authority (section 3), to carry out the purposes of the Act and to maintain a Plant Varieties Register 
(section 12). The Authority became operational in 2005 and began processing applications for varietal 
registration in 2007.2691  
The PPV&FRA requires that the breeder or any other person entitled to produce, market and 
sell seeds of a registered variety must make such seeds or propagating materials available to farmers 
“in a timely manner” to “satisfy their requirements” and “at a reasonable market price”. 2692 The Act 
also provides protection to farmers who have developed different varieties of plants (section 39). In 
terms of the Act, farmers have the right to ‘save, use, sow, resow, exchange, share or sell’ farm 
produce including seeds of a protected variety in the same manner as they were entitled to prior to 
the Act, however, without the right to sell branded seed of a protected variety. Farmers are also 
entitled to recognition and reward in cases where the genetic material they preserved and improved 
is used in developing new varieties. Further, in terms of the Act, farmers have the right to claim 
compensation from the breeder, if the variety they had purchased from him fails to perform as per the 
disclosure made by the breeder. Finally, farmers are immune from infringement legal action, if such 
infringement was innocent.  
The Act also sets out provisions for the grant of compulsory license in respect of certain plant 
varieties (section 47). The Authority has the power at any time, after the expiry of three years from 
the date of issue of a certificate of registration of a variety, to grant to any person a compulsory license 
to undertake production, distribution and sale of the seed or other propagating material of a registered 
variety, provided that such person is able to demonstrate that the reasonable requirements of the 
public for seed or other propagating material of the variety have not been satisfied or that the seed or 
other propagating material of the variety is not available to the public at a reasonable price.  
 
3.3.2.2 The Patents Act 1970 (as amended in 1999, 2002 and 2005) 
 
The Patent’s Act (PA) defines ‘inventions’ for the purposes of the Act (section 3). For agricultural 
purposes it is relevant to note that the Act excludes from this definition methods of agriculture or 
horticulture (section 3h) and plants and animals in whole or any part including seeds, varieties and 
species and essentially biological processes for production or propagation of plants and animals 
(section 3j). The Act provides the procedure for processing domestic and foreign patent applications 
and stipulates the protection allowed to patent holders.  
Although the PA did not initially allow for patenting in the Agriculture sector, it was amended 
in 2002 and 2005 in order to bring India into compliance with the Trade- Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. The 2002 amendment made microorganisms and 
any method of treatment for plants patentable. However, plants, animals, parts thereof, and essentially 
biological processes were excluded from this definition and still cannot be patented in India.2693  
                                                          
2691 Deepthi Elizabeth Kolady, David J. Spielman and Anthony Cavalieri ‘The Impact of Seed Policy Reforms and 
Intellectual Property Rights on Crop Productivity in India’ Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2012, 361–
384. 
2692 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules, 2003 (as amended in 2012), Rule 36A. 
2693 See n. 2688, 94. 
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The 2002 amendment to the PA is wide in its scope because it does not to define the term 
‘micro-organism’ and also does not prohibit the patentability of any seeds or plants derived from 
patented microorganisms. However, section 3(d) of the amended PA limits the scope of patent 
protection by stipulating that the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance, which does 
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance, is not patentable. Similarly, it 
stipulates that the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the 
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new 
product or employs at least one new reactant, is not patentable. However, the amended PA does not 
clarify as to how the ‘enhancement of the known efficacy of a substance’ may be established.2694  
The 2005 amendment introduced the term ‘inventive step’ in section 2ja and defined it as ‘a feature 
of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having 
economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art.’ 
Given the broad definition of the term inventors may apply for a patent on a product or process, on 
the grounds that it is economically significant, even if it does not involve any technical advance.2695  
 
3.3.2.3  The Biological Diversity Act 2002  
 
India adopted the Biological Diversity Act 2002 (BDA) after it had become a signatory to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.2696The BDA was enacted on 5th February 2003 with 
the object of conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components and fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use of biological resources, knowledge and for 
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.2697  
In 2003 India established the National Biodiversity Authority in pursuance of the Act with the 
mandate to facilitate, regulate and advise on behalf of the Government on issues relating to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological resources and fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising out of the use of biological resources. The Government also established State Biodiversity 
Boards (SBBs), which focus on advising the State governments, subject to any guidelines issued by 
the Central Government, on matters relating to the conservation of biodiversity, sustainable use of its 
components and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of biological resources. 
The SBBs also regulate by granting of approvals or otherwise, requests for commercial utilization or 
bio-survey and bio-utilization of any biological resource by Indians.2698 
The local level Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs) are responsible for promoting 
conservation, sustainable use and documentation of biological diversity including preservation of 
habitats, conservation of land races, folk varieties and cultivars, domesticated stocks and breeds of 
animals and microorganisms and chronicling of knowledge relating to biological diversity.2699 
 
                                                          
2694 Jagjit Kaur Plahe ‘The Implications of India's Amended Patent Regime: stripping away food security and farmers' 
rights? Third World Quarterly, 30:6, 1197-1213, 1203-1204. 
2695 Ibid.  
2696 Pratibha Brahmi, R. P. Dua and B. S. Dhillon ‘The Biological Diversity Act of India and Agro-biodiversity 
Management’ Current Science, Vol. 86, No. 5, 10 March 2004. 
2697 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=185798 (accessed 15th May 2017) 
2698 http://nbaindia.org/content/22/2/1/aboutnba.html (accessed 5 November 2017). 
2699 ibid.  
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3.3.2.4  Other Laws  
 
Further legislation that is likely to have an impact on the Agriculture sector includes the Disaster 
Management Act 2005,2700 Multi-state Co-operative Societies Act 2002;2701 Information Technology 
Act 2000 (as amended by the 2008 Amendment Act);2702 The Dangerous Machines (Regulation) Act 
1983,2703 and Insecticides Act 1968.2704 
 
3.3.2.5  Proposed Laws  
 
Given the growth of contract farming in recent times in which the supplier agrees with the farmer not 
only on price, quantity and time of the performance, but also establishes the standards that farmers 
have to follow in production2705 the Central Government is considering regulating relationships 
between agricultural producers and suppliers or wholesalers. In its recent budget speech, the 
Government has announced a move to table a draft contract farming law. However, given that this is 
a matter for the States, the enactment and effect of these laws is likely to vary. Though Punjab had 
enacted a law on contract farming in 2013, it has so far not implemented it. States like Gujarat, 
Haryana, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh have done this for select crops through 
amendments to their existing laws on agricultural marketing.2706 
 
3.3.3. The Wholesale, Food Processing and Food Retail and Services sectors.  
 
3.3.3.1 The Bureau of Indian Standards Act 2016  
 
This Bureau of Indian Standards Act (BISA) provides for the establishment of a national standards 
body for the harmonious development of standardisation, conformity assessment and quality 
assurance of goods, articles, processes, systems and services and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto.  The Act applies to all articles including any substances, artificial or natural, or 
partly artificial or partly natural, whether raw or partly or wholly processed or manufactured or hand-
made in India or imported into India (section 2(1)).  
                                                          
2700 Section 2(d) of the Act defines disaster as a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence in any area, arising 
from natural or man-made causes or by accident or negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering 
or damage to and destruction of property or damage to or degradation of environment and is of such a nature or magnitude 
as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area.  
2701 This Act governs all co-operative societies with objects not confined to one state, which were incorporated before or 
after the coming into force of the Act.  
2702 This Act provides legal recognition to transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other 
means of electronic communications, which involve the use of alternatives to paper based methods of communication 
and storage of information and facilitates electronic filing of documents with government agencies.  
2703 This Act provides for the regulation of trade and commerce in and production supply distribution and use of the 
product of any industry producing dangerous machines with a view to securing the welfare of labour operating such 
machine and for payment of compensation for the death or bodily injury suffered by any labourer while operating any 
such machine etc.  
2704 This Act regulates the import, manufacture, sale, transport, distribution and use of insecticides with a view to prevent 
risk to human beings or animals.  
2705 Most notably, Pepsi is involved in contract farming for potatoes to procure a particular quality input for its chips. 
Through contract farming, Pepsi is providing the required seeds, Fertilisers and other inputs to farmers so that it sources 
the desired quality of produce. See n. 2669, 14. 
2706 See n. 2676. 
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3.3.3.2 The Food Safety and Standards Act 2006 
 
The Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA) overrides all other food related laws in India such as the 
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954, Fruit Products Order 1955, Meat Food Products Order 
1973, Vegetable Oil Products (Control) Order 1947, Edible Oils Packaging (Regulation) Order 1988, 
Solvent Extracted Oil, De- Oiled Meal and Edible Flour (Control) Order 1967, Milk and Milk 
Products Order 1992.2707 The aim of this Act is to lay down the basic framework for regulating the 
manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import of food products to ensure availability of safe and 
wholesome food for human consumption. The Act addresses the entire gamut of food related issues 
with the primary objective of providing safe, hygienic and quality food to the people.2708  
 
3.3.3.3. The Legal Metrology Act 2009  
 
The Legal Metrology Act (LMA) and the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules 2011 (as 
amended in 2016) establishes and enforces the standards of weights and measures, regulates trade 
and commerce in weights, measures and other goods which are sold and distributed by weight, 
measure or number.2709 It also stipulates requirements to be complied with by manufacturers, packers 
or importers in the sale and distribution of packaged commodities.2710 This Act has repealed and 
replaced the Standard of Weights and Measures Act 1976 and the Standards of Weights and Measures 
(Enforcement) Act 1985.  
 
3.3.4. Consumers Related Laws 
 
3.3.4.1  Consumer Protection Act 19862711  
 
The purpose of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) is to provide for better protection of the interests 
of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and 
other authorities for the settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith 
(Preamble). 
The Act provides for the establishment of Central and State Consumer Protection Councils (sections 
4 and 7 respectively). The objects of the Central and State Councils are to promote and protect the 
rights of the consumers such as, the right to be protected against the marketing of goods and services 
which are hazardous to life and property; the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, 
purity, standard and price of goods or services, as the case may be so as to protect the consumer 
against unfair trade practices; the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to a variety of goods 
and services at competitive prices; the right to be heard and to be assured that consumer's interests 
                                                          
2707 In terms of Section 89 of the FSSA, 2006 the provisions of the Act are to have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue 
of any law other than this Act.” 
2708 This Act is discussed in more detail in section 9 below in relation to Unfair Trading Practices.  
2709 Preamble to The Legal Metrology Act, 2009. 
2710http://www.metrologycentre.com/codes/acts.html. 
2711 http://ncdrc.nic.in/bare_acts/Consumer%20Protection%20Act-1986.html# (accessed 5 November 2017). 
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will receive due consideration at appropriate forums; the right to seek redressal against unfair trade 
practices or restrictive trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and the right to 
consumer education (sections 6 and 8 respectively).  
The Act applies to all goods and services unless specifically exempted by the Central 
Government. It covers all sectors, private, public and co-operative. The Act allows damages to 
consumers, establishes simple, speedy and less expensive adjudicatory procedures and requires states 
to establish a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum to be known as the "District Forum" and a 
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be known as the "State Commission”. It also provides 
for the establishment of a National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to be established by 
the Central Government (section 9).2712 
 
3.3.4.2   Competition Act 20022713  
 
The Competition Act (CA) replaces the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969. The 
Act establishes the Competition Commission of India (section 8) and allows aggrieved persons to 
bring anti-competitive agreements (section 3) and instances of abuse of dominant position to the 
notice of the Commission (section 4). The underlying ethos of the Act, enunciated in its Preamble, is 
to prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in 
markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other 
participants in markets, in India. The Commission approaches all complaints filed before it with these 
objectives in mind and particularly focuses on ensuring consumer welfare. The Commission also has 
the power to take suo motu notice if it believes that circumstances warrant doing so (section 19). The 
Commission has the power to impose penalties if it finds a party to be engaged in anti-competitive 
practices or otherwise infringing the Act (section 27). In addition to addressing anti-competitive 
agreements and abuses of dominant position, the Commission also regulates mergers to ensure that 
these do not have an adverse effect on competition in the Indian markets. Until May 2017, appeals 
from orders of the Commission used to lie to the Competition Appellate Tribunal. However, these 
appeals now lie to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Appeals from orders of 
NCLAT lie to the Supreme Court of India.  
 
3.4  Relevant Government Ministries, Departments and Regulatory Bodies 
 
The Indian food sector is governed by a number of government ministries, departments and regulatory 
that exercise their powers under the various laws referred to in the preceding section. The most 
significant ministries and the relevant departments and regulatory bodies, organised under these 
ministries, are as follows. 
 
3.4.1 Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare  
 
This Ministry comprises the departments of Agricultural Research and Education, Agriculture, 
Cooperation and Farmers Welfare and Animal Husbandry, Dairying and Fisheries. The Ministry is 
                                                          
2712 This Act is discussed more fully in section 9 in relation to Unfair Trade Practices. 
2713 The Competition Act 2002 (as amended in 2007) 
http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/cci_pdf/competitionact2012.pdf (accessed 5 November 2017). 
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engaged in the management and development of Indian agriculture. The Ministry’s mandate includes 
evolving new strategies in the field of agriculture particularly through technological research. To this 
end, the Ministry manages the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, the Indian Agricultural 
Statistics Research Institute and the Indian Agricultural Research Institute.2714  
The Ministry also administers a number of laws relating to the Input and Agriculture sectors 
through its various divisions and directorates which include the Crops Division (Directorate of Pulses 
Development, Directorate of Jute Development, Directorate of Rice Development, Directorate of 
Wheat Development, Directorate of Sugarcane Development, Directorate of Millets Development, 
Directorate of Tobacco Development and Directorate of Cotton Development); Integrated Nutrients 
Management Division, Technology Mission on Oilseeds & Pulses Division and the Directorates of 
Oilseeds Development, Plant Protection, Quarantine and Storage.2715 
 
3.4.2 Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers 
 
This Ministry functions through two departments, the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals 
and the Department of Fertilisers. The Department of Fertilisers is particularly relevant for the food 
sector and concentrates in developing and promoting fertiliser industries. It comprises four divisions, 
the Fertiliser Projects and Planning Division, Fertiliser Imports, Movement and Distribution Division, 
Administration Division and Finance and Accounts Division.2716  
 
3.4.3 Ministry of Commerce and Industry  
 
This Ministry comprises two departments, the Department of Commerce and the Department of 
Industrial and Policy Promotion, both of which are mandated to work for the betterment of economic 
growth in the country. The ministry is divided into eight divisions and works through several different 
offices, boards, commissions and councils. The most relevant division from the perspective of the 
Food sector is the Export Products (Agriculture) Division which has the mandate to contribute 
towards formulating the Export Policy of Agriculture Products and also facilitating and promoting 
exports of agricultural and allied products (other than plantation crops like tea, coffee and spices and 
marine products).2717 This division also takes care of issues arising from Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
and Technical Barriers to Trade issues and Biotechnology matters. The Division also exercises 
administrative control over the Agricultural & Processed Food Products Export Development 
Authority (APEDA);2718 the Coffee Board, Spices Board, Tobacco Board, the Cashew Export 
                                                          
2714 http://www.mapsofindia.com/government-of-india/central-government-ministries/ministry-of-agriculture.html 
(accessed 9th January 2017) 
2715 http://goidirectory.nic.in/ministries_index.php?ct=1 (accessed 9th January 2017). 
2716 http://www.mapsofindia.com/government-of-india/central-government-ministries/ministry-of-chemicals-
Fertilisers.html (accessed 9th January 2017). 
2717 http://commerce.nic.in/DOC/InnerContent.aspx?Id=83. (accessed 5 November 2017). 
2718 APEDA was established by the Central Government under the Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export 
Development Authority Act 1985. Government officers from many different Ministries are represented as Members in 
APEDA and it is responsible for export promotion and development of scheduled products including fruits, vegetables 
and their products, meat and meat products, poultry and poultry products, dairy products, confectionery, biscuits and 
bakery products, honey, jaggery and sugar products, cocoa and its products, chocolates of all kinds, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, cereal and cereal products, groundnuts, peanuts and walnuts, pickles, papads and chutneys, guar 
gum, floriculture and floriculture Products, herbal and medicinal plants. APEDA is also responsible for monitoring the 
import of sugar. http://apeda.gov.in/apedawebsite/about_apeda/About_apeda.htm. (accessed 5 November 2017).  
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Promotion Council of India (CEPCI) and the Indian Oilseeds & Produce Export Promotion Council 
(IOPEPC). The Ministry also has administrative control of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade 
(DGFT). The DGFT was established in 1991 to express the commitment of the Government towards 
economic liberalization.2719 It is tasked to regulate and promote foreign trade in the country. In 
carrying out its mandate, the DGFT is required to take into consideration developments in 
international trade and to ensure India’s compliance with its WTO obligations.  
The Marine Products Export Development Authority is an autonomous body established in 
1972 under the Ministry’s Department of Commerce. It is responsible for the development of the 
marine products industry with special reference to exports.2720 Further, it is engaged in granting 
extension packages to fishermen, farmers and workers engaged in various stages of processing of 
marine products. The Authority also works to establish the presence of Indian seafood in major 
international markets by co-branding Indian products with major buyers and by marketing products 
abroad. The Authority also issues registration Certificates and Registration cum Membership 
Certificates (RCMC Certificates) on-line through its Regional Offices. It processes Subsidy 
Applications and disburses subsidies and conducts Lab testing over the computer. It has also 
introduced an e-procurement system. 
The mandate of the Ministry of Commerce was recently expanded when on 24th May 2017 
the Union Cabinet approved the phasing out of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB), 
which had been established under the Ministry of Finance to clear applications for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in the retail sector in India. The relevant Government announcement stated that 
after abolishing of the FIPB, the work relating to processing of applications for FDI and approval of 
the Government thereon under the extant FDI Policy would be handled by the concerned 
Ministries/Departments in consultation with the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) 
of the Ministry of Commerce, which will also issue the Standard Operating Procedures for processing 
applications and decisions of the Government under the extant FDI policy. This move was undertaken 
to increase the flow of FDI to India.2721  
 
3.4.5 Ministry of Food Processing Industries  
 
The functions of the Ministry may be broadly classified under policy support and development 
activities. Policy support includes formulation and implementation of policies for Food Processing 
sector with overall national priorities and objectives and facilitating creation of an environment 
conducive for the healthy growth of the sector.  
The development activities espoused by the Ministry include continued emphasis on creation 
of World Class Infrastructure for growth of Food Processing sector through Mega Food Parks, 
Integrated Cold Chain; modernization of abattoirs and providing assistance under various Plan 
                                                          
2719 http://dgft.gov.in/ (accessed 5 November 2017).  
2720http://commerce.nic.in/DOC/InnerContent.aspx?Id=219. 
2721 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=162097 (accessed 5 November 2017). The government of India has 
taken various initiatives to improve the retail industry in India. For example, it has allowed has allowed 100 per cent FDI 
in online retail of goods and services through the automatic route, thereby providing clarity on the existing businesses of 
e-commerce companies operating in India. It is also considering changing the FDI rules in food processing, in a bid to 
permit e-commerce companies and foreign retailers to sell Made in India consumer products. 
(http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/628322/Inward+Foreign+Investment/India+announces+new+Foreign+Direct+Invest
ment+Policy+2017+2018) accessed 5 November 2017.  
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Schemes to the sector; widening the R & D base in food processing by involving various R & D 
institutes and supporting various R & D activities; Human Resource Development to meet the 
growing requirement of managers, entrepreneurs and skilled workers in the food processing industry; 
assistance for setting up analytical and testing laboratories and active participation in the laying down 
of food standards and their harmonization with international standards and continuation of intensive 
consultation with industry, academia, scientists and representatives of state governments for 
smoother and inclusive growth of the sector.2722 Most recently, the Ministry has launched the World 
Food India initiative. 
 
3.4.6 Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution  
 
This Ministry is responsible for the equitable spread of essential edible commodities at fair monetary 
values. It comprises the Department of Consumer Affairs and the Department of Food and Public 
Distribution. The Department of Consumer Affairs controls, among others, the Bureau of Indian 
Standards,2723 the National Consumer Co-operative Federation and the National Consumer Disputes 
Redressal Commission whereas the Department of Food and Public Distribution performs the task of 
managing the food distribution system in India with the prime objective of setting up and managing 
a fair commodity pricing system for farmers. The Department also administers the Public Distribution 
System, which distributes essential commodities such as rice, wheat, kerosene and sugar through a 
nation wide network of Fair Price Shops. The Food Corporation of India reports to this Department. 
The Department of Food and Public Distribution is also tasked to ensure food security for the 
country through timely and efficient procurement and distribution which includes the procurement 
of food grains, building up and maintenance of food stocks, their storage, movement and delivery to 
distributing agencies and monitoring their production, stock and price levels.2724 The Department 
aims to give incentives to farmers by offering them fair value of their produce under the Minimum 
Support Price Mechanism, distributing food grains to families living below the official poverty line 
and by insuring poor households against the risk of hunger under Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) 
programme, establishing grain banks in food scarce areas and involving Panchayati Raj Institutions 
in the Public Distribution System.  
The policy objectives of this Department are to implement the National Food Security Act, 
2013, to undertake price support operations through efficient procurement of wheat, rice and coarse 
grains, to strengthen the Targeted Public Distribution Systems, to develop and promote the sugar 
industry, to develop warehousing sector and improve public service system.2725 To this end, the 
Department formulates sugar policy and fixes the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) of sugarcane 
payable by Sugar factories. It develops and regulates the sugar industry with particular focus on 
technology. The Department also formulates policies for the import and export of food grains and 
edible oils.   
                                                          
2722 http://mofpi.nic.in/about-us/goals-and-roles (accessed 5 November 2017). 
2723 The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) is a standard setting organization formed under the Bureau of Indian Standards 
Act 1986. It is the national standards body in India and works towards the harmonious development of standardization, 
marking and quality certification. There are several food items, which are under the mandatory certification of BIS, like 
milk products, infant milk substitute, packaged drinking water, complementary foods, and hexane – food grade. 
http://www.bis.gov.in (accessed 5 November 2017).  
2724 http://dfpd.nic.in/about-us.htm. (accessed 5 November 2017). 
2725 http://dfpd.nic.in/vision-mission.htm. (accessed 5 November 2017) 
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In 2014, the Government set up a High Level Committee under Mr. Shanta Kumar (Union 
Minister of Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution from 1999 to 2002) to suggest restructuring or 
unbundling of the Food Corporation of India with a view to improve its operational efficiency and 
financial management. The Government also asked the Committee to suggest measures for overall 
improvement in management of foodgrains by the Food Corporation; to suggest reorienting its role 
and functions of in Minimum Support Price operations, storage and distribution of foodgrains and 
food security systems of the country; and to suggest cost effective models for storage and movement 
of grains and integration of supply chain of foodgrains in the country.2726 
 
3.4.7 The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare  
 
This Ministry is relevant from the point of view of the Food sector as it has been designated as the 
relevant ministry for administering the Food Safety and Standards Act 2006 through the Food Safety 
and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) established under the FSSA. The main purpose of FSSAI 
is to stipulate scientific standards for food items and to regulate their manufacture, storage, 
distribution, sale, and import to ensure availability of safe and wholesome food for human 
consumption.2727 The national level authority has its head office in Delhi and the State Food Safety 
Authorities enforce provisions of the Act at the state level.  
 
3.4.8 Ministry of Corporate Affairs  
 
This Ministry is relevant for being the nodal ministry for the Competition Commission of India and 
for administering the Competition Act 2002 under which the Commission has been established.   
 
3.5. Categories of Regulation and their Impact  
3.5.1. Categories of Regulation  
3.5.1.1 Private Regulation 
 
Private regulation emerged in India as a response to international developments and the inability or 
incapacity of public bodies to cater to these. Some of these private regulations had their genesis in 
consortia while others emerged from the efforts of the NGOs and civil society groups. Regardless, 
however, a great many of these private regulations, especially those developed by the corporate 
sector, are primarily market-oriented and designed to address the level of economic development in 
the country. For example, regulations governing the Indian wet retail market may not be adequate 
according to US consumption standards however, these are considered appropriate from the point of 
view of Indian consumers because anything more stringent would render the products too expensive 
for their consumption. There is also some disparity between regulations for products intended for 
domestic consumption and export products. Whilst regulations adopted in respect of products 
intended for domestic consumption tend to be designed keeping in mind the ultimate affordability of 
                                                          
2726 Report of the High Level Committee on Reorienting the Role and Restructuring of Food Corporation of India © 2015 
http://fci.gov.in/app2/webroot/upload/News/Report%20of%20the%20High%20Level%20Committee%20on%20Reorie
nting%20the%20Role%20and%20Restructuring%20of%20FCI_English_1.pdf (accessed 7 November 2017).  
2727 http://fssai.gov.in/home (accessed 5 November 2017).  
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the products, those adopted in respect of products intended for the export market are more likely to 
conform to international standards.2728 
 
3.5.1.2  Government Regulation  
 
The Government is the most significant source of regulations for the Indian food sector. The 
regulatory requirements prescribed by the Government pertain, among other things, to the 
procurement of various licenses and permits with regard to business operations of persons and entities 
engaged at different stages of the food sector, particularly in respect of exports and imports. In recent 
years, the Government has also prescribed safety and quality standards, however, as in the case of 
private regulation, the regulations prescribed by the Government are not at the level of regulations 
prevailing in industrialized economies. Further, the effectiveness of even these Government 
regulations remains doubtful due to inadequate and/or cumbersome implementation 
infrastructure.2729 The Maggi Noodles case is an interesting example of lack of enforcement of food 
safety standards. In 2015, the FSSAI banned Maggi Noodles from the Indian market after finding 
excessive lead in them, there was some evidence that a large number of people still continued 
consuming these noodles.2730  
In the food export sector, the Government has allowed the foreign partners of export oriented 
Indian companies to set the standards. Although this has resulted in high profits for certain Indian 
food exporters it has also meant that the standards are not uniform throughout the sector and India’s 
inability to comply with international food safety standards has impeded food exports from India. 2731  
 
3.5.2. Impact of Regulations 
 
The impact of regulations depends on large measure on the ability and capacity of the relevant 
regulatory institutions to enforce these regulations. However, there are certain factors that even 
though are extraneous to the regulatory institutions, have nevertheless the power to obstruct if not 
altogether block their actions.  
 
3.5.2.1   Courts and Regulation  
 
In exercise of their powers of judicial review and in the wake of “judicial activism” in India, Indian 
courts, have recommended amendments to legislation, at times suggesting specific regulatory 
measures that may be adopted while at other times issuing policy advice and requiring concrete 
                                                          
2728 Rajesh Mehta ‘International Food Safety Standards and India’s Food Exports- An Analysis Based on Gravity Model 
Using Three-Dimensional Data’ Discussion Paper # 169 © Research and Information System for Developing Countries 
2010.  
2729 FICCI Report on Food Safety and Standards Act- Challenges in the Implementation of the Act, 2006, Food Defense 
Awareness Workshop, February 2013, http://ficci.in/events/21353/ISP/7th-
8th%20workshop%20on%20challanges%20of%20FSSA-2006%20at%20Jaipur.pdf; FICCI Food Retail Chain Report, 
http://www.ficci.in/events/21274/ISP/finalfoodRetailChainReport.pdf. 
2730Nestle’s Maggie noodles still had 10.9% of market share after the ban and after the company called off its products 
from the market. “Maggi regains top spot in noodles market with 57% share in June”, live Mint, August 23, 2013, 
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/yjum6G5Wnr29NPb8p9TpgN/Maggi-regains-top-slot-in-noodles-market-with-
57-share-in-J.html. 
2731 International Food Safety Standards and India’s Food Exports- An Analysis Based on Gravity Model Using Three-
Dimensional Data, Rajesh Mehta, September 2010, Research and Information System for Developing Countries. 
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administrative actions in pursuance of such advice.2732 Further, in some cases, the Supreme Court of 
India has also issued directions to the concerned central authorities with regard to proper 
implementation of regulations and has suggested strategies for doing so.2733 The Supreme Court of 
India has also maintained that the food value chain related laws have to be interpreted in light of the 
relevant provisions of the Indian Constitution.2734 
The 2015 decision of the Indian Supreme Court in an appeal filed before it by the Food Safety 
and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) against the decision of the Bombay High Court is an 
important example of the role that Courts may play with regard to enforcement of regulations. In 
2013 FSSAI had issued an advisory issued by that asked manufacturers to get recipe-by-recipe 
clearance for their products even if the ingredients were already approved or deemed safe. Under the 
regime prior to this advisory, manufacturers were only required to obtain product approval if they 
were adding a new ingredient or introducing an additive. However, the 2013 advisory broadened the 
requirement of approval to cover all products even if they were using approved ingredients or 
additives within permissible limits. The Maharashtra-based Vital Nutraceuticals and the Indian Drug 
Manufacturers' Association challenged this advisory before the Bombay High Court. However, in its 
2014 decision the Bombay High Court struck down the advisory on the ground that FSSAI did not 
have the authority to issue such an advisory without following due process.2735 FSSAI appealed to 
the Supreme Court, however, the Supreme Court also dismissed FSSAI’s product approval 
mechanism and agreed with the Bombay High Court that FSSAI did not have the authority to issue 
advisories without following the procedure provided for framing regulations as prescribed under the 
FSSA. Subsequently, FSSAI announced that it would not longer continue with the product approval 
system prescribed in the advisory. Although certain industry observers hoped that new regulations 
that FSSAI may make in this regard would bring India closer to the global practice where companies 
do not require approval from regulators to launch a product, while also paving the way for adopting 
the international practice of registration of food processing enterprises and setting up a random 
inspection system others were concerned about the uncertainty that may result due to discontinuation 
of the advisory.2736 
At the time of writing this, the Supreme Court is also hearing an appeal in respect of the Maggi 
Noodles case.2737 Nestle India had challenged FSSAI’s order banning Maggi Noodles for containing 
excessive lead before the Bombay High Court.2738 In its 2015 decision, Bombay High Court ruled in 
favour of Nestle arguing that FSSAI had acted hastily in banning the noodles and had directed Nestle 
to have the noodles tested from several laboratories. In June 2017, Nestle started selling the noodles 
again after obtaining satisfactory results from these lab tests.  However, in July 2017 FSSAI moved 
                                                          
2732Swami Achyutan and Tirth & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors (Writ Petition (C) No. 159 OF 2012; decided on August 
5, 2016). 
2733Centre For Public Interest Litigation vs Union Of India & Ors (Writ Petition (C) No. 681 OF 2004 (decided on 23 
October 2013), para 24. 
2734 Ibid,para 22. 
2735 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/supreme-court-junks-fssai-plea-against-bombay-
high-court-order-on-2013-advisory/articleshow/48545611.cms (accessed 5 November 2017).  
2736 http://www.livemint.com/Politics/Zdb1HmUtuCIjP3tHAGa6mL/FSSAI-scraps-product-approvals-after-SC-
questions-procedure.html (accessed 5 November 2017). 
2737 See n. 2730.  
2738 WPL No. 1688 of 2015 Nestle India Limited v Food Safety and Standards Authority of India and others.  
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the Supreme Court against the order of the Bombay High Court. It will be interesting to see how the 
Supreme Court reacts in this regard.2739  
 
3.5.2.2  Other Factors Affecting the Impact of Regulation  
 
The regulatory framework of the contemporary Indian food sector suffers from various anomalies, 
with the result that incentives available to private players in the food sector are not always in 
alignment with public and social policy.2740 The situation is exacerbated by the legal and regulatory 
framework, which, until recently, imposed too many hurdles in the way of entry for new entrants.2741 
An important reason for this gap between the regulatory framework and the social realities and 
priorities of the country is that the regulatory framework although ostensibly ‘made in India’, is 
mostly ‘imported’ from other countries or international standard setting organisations without the 
required degree of attention to the indigenous realities and needs of the country.2742 India also adopted 
a considerable amount of regulation due to its membership of the WTO and the need to remain in 
compliance with the international obligations imposed by it rather than due to an indigenous demand 
for the regulation. This externally dictated regulation has remained under utilized in the country if 
not altogether ignored.  
Interestingly, alongside borrowing regulations from elsewhere, policy makers in India are also 
working on expanding the scope of food value chain related regulations at a considerable pace and to 
encompass issues such as the price of farm output and input, setting safety and risk assessment 
standards etc. This approach towards food regulation is not without its consequences: for instance, 
Monsanto threatened to leave India and also withdrew the application it had filed before the Genetic 
Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC)2743 in terms of which it was seeking approval for its next 
generation Roundup Ready cotton seeds technology, citing uncertainties in business and regulatory 
environment as its reasons for doing so particularly in the wake of intervention on the part of the 
Indian government in setting not only Maximum Sale Price of Bt Cotton seeds but also the price of 
its components namely Seed Value and Trait Value.2744   
Whilst the government withdrew the price setting notification under pressure from the biotech 
body Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises (ABLE-AG) whose members include Monsanto, 
Mahyco, Bayer, Syngenta, DuPont Pioneer etc.,2745 the Order issued by it in exercise of its powers 
under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 to ‘provide an effective system for fixation 
                                                          
2739 http://www.livemint.com/Companies/1JKHsutTXLWtTcVwdIDg0H/The-Maggi-ban-How-Indias-favourite-
twominute-noodles-lost.html and http://food.ndtv.com/food-drinks/fssai-moves-supreme-court-against-lifting-ban-on-
maggi-noodles-1244235 (accessed 8 November 2017). 
2740 Shahidur Rashid, Ashok Gulati, Ralph Cummings Jr. (ed) From Parastatals to Private Trade: Lessons from Asian 
Agriculture © 2008 International Food Policy Research Institute  
http://base.dnsgb.com.ua/files/book/Agriculture/Business-in-Agriculture/From-Parastatals-to-Private-Trade.pdf 
(accessed 5 November 2017).  
2741 Doing Business in India: 2015 Commercial Guide for US Companies, US and Foreign Commercial Service and US 
Department of State, 2015. http://photos.state.gov/libraries/india/13974/PDFS/2015CCG.pdf. (accessed 5 November 
2017).  
2742 See Agricultural Legislations, http://www.icar.org.in/files/Agril-Legislation.pdf, February 28, 1976 at page 31.  
2743 Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) is responsible for the approving the production, sale, import and 
use of substance and products that contain genetically engineered or modified organisms. 
2744 Cotton Seed Price (Control) Order, 2015. Also see n. 2685.  
2745 Notification S.O.1813(E) dated May 18, 2016, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare, Ministry 
of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare Government of India. 
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of maximum sale price of cotton seeds to ensure their availability to the cotton farmers at uniform as 
well as fair, reasonable and affordable prices’ still remains in force.2746 
Domestic politics also plays a role in the impact of regulation. India often resorts to politically 
inspired policy instruments to address socio-economic distortions arising from the implementation of 
weak and largely ineffective regulatory framework in the food sector. However, in doing so, 
efficiency of the food sector is compromised on the altar of political expediency. Further, the drafting 
of policy instruments is mostly entrusted to the Indian bureaucracy, which has limited technical 
knowledge of the subjects in question and is even otherwise considered to be hampered by a certain 
degree of inefficiency and even corruption.2747 
For the food sector regulatory framework to achieve its goals in India, it is necessary for the 
government to set aside sufficient resources for regulatory authorities entrusted with the task of 
implementing this framework and to allow for the judicious and efficient use of these resources.2748  
 
3.6. Stakeholders in Food Sector Regulation in India  
 
The dynamics of policy-making and legislation involve a variety of stakeholders who have a vested 
interest in advancing their particular concerns and demands through the power corridors in the 
Parliament.2749 The number of stakeholders along the food value chain is ever increasing.2750 From 
research laboratories where new food technologies take birth to the farm and then to the table a 
diverse group of people become engaged with the food value chain and bring their expertise, influence 
and preferences to bear on the manner in which the chain functions. The three most important 
stakeholders in the Indian food sector are farmers, food processors/manufacturers and consumers. 
This section examines the situation of each of these stakeholders and highlights their concerns.  
 
3.6.1.  Farmers  
 
A review of policy debates, both inside and outside of the Parliament as well as newspaper reports 
indicates that all public, social and economic discourse is farmer centric. In addition to the rhetoric, 
the Government has taken considerable measures to improve the economic and social condition of 
the farmers by launching ICT initiatives.  
At the Central Government level plans included alternate delivery channels spanning Rural 
Knowledge Centres (RKCs), ICT-based extension, farmer-to- farmer extension, and simultaneous 
promotion of NGOs and the private sector. The scheme--’Mass Media Support to Extension’ aims to 
utilize the television and radio infrastructure for producing and broadcasting agricultural programmes 
                                                          
2746 Gazette Notification No. G.S.R.936(E) dated 07-12-2015 under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 
2747 Doing Business in India: 2015 Commercial Guide for US Companies, US and Foreign Commercial Service  and US 
Department of State, 2015. http://photos.state.gov/libraries/india/13974/PDFS/2015CCG.pdf; UK Department of 
International Trade 2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exporting-to-india/exporting-to-india. (accessed 
5 November 2017).  
2748 FSSAI to invest Rs500 crore to upgrade labs, will partner with private firms, live Mint, April 15, 2016, 
http://www.livemint.com/Companies/1nveH8rGscyryXWSicxQzM/FSSAI-to-invest-Rs500-crore-to-upgrade-labs-will-
partner-wi.html. 
2749 Rahul Sharma, A Case For Lobbying, The Hindu, May 30, 2013 http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-case-for-
lobbying/article4763497.ece. 
2750 Competition and Regulation in India, 2009 – Leveraging Economic Growth Through Better Regulation, Pradeep S 
Mehta, CUTS International.  
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for supporting other extension efforts. Further, in order to promote e-governance in agriculture at the 
centre and provide support to states/UTs for the same, the Department of Agriculture and Co-
operation is implementing a central sector scheme, ‘Strengthening/Promoting Agricultural 
Information Systems’.2751  
At the State level perhaps the most significant initiative as been the ‘E-Choupal’Initiative’ 
which makes use of the physical transmission capabilities of current intermediaries - aggregation, 
logistics, counter-party risk and bridge financing with a blend of click & mortar capabilities, village 
internet kiosks managed by farmers themselves, to enable the agricultural community to access ready 
information in their local language on the weather & market prices, disseminate knowledge on 
scientific farm practices & risk management, facilitate the sale of farm inputs and purchase farm 
produce from the farmers’ doorsteps .'E-Choupal' services today reach out to more than 3.5 million 
farmers growing a range of crops - soyabean, coffee, wheat, rice, pulses, shrimp - in more than 38,000 
villages through nearly 6500 kiosks across nine states namely Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, 
Uttaranchal, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Kerela.2752  
Regardless, however, the economic and social condition of farmers in India fails to improve 
if it does not actually deteriorate. The Indian farmer gets the least share of the retail price of the food 
product paid by the end consumer even though it is the farmer who provides the basic food item, 
which is later processed for end consumption.2753 The reasons for the powerlessness of farmers 
despite their numbers and significance in the food value chain are manifold. India has approximately 
159,591,855 hectares of agricultural land divided into 138,348,461 land holdings.2754 This means that 
approximately 90% of farmers in India have less than two hectares of land to their name.2755 The 
fragmentation of land is compounded by lack of awareness and education and financial stress, which 
makes the farmer the most vulnerable stakeholder in the Indian food value chain.2756   The small size 
holdings also imply that individual farmers exercise very low bargaining power when it comes to 
lobbying and asserting their rights before the Government. Farmers also have low bargaining power 
with respect to private sector corporations due to almost zero holding capacity, low to non-existent 
financial reserves for sustenance, limited access to the market, knowledge and information vacuum 
and, in some cases, due to the perishable nature of their produce and absence of affordable storage 
facilities.  
The problems faced by farmers in India are exacerbated by the fact that more than half of 
India’s agricultural households are debt ridden, with 42% of them owing money to the banking 
                                                          
2751 Bibhu Santosh Behera, T.K.Das, ,K.J., Jishnu, R.A.Behera, A.C.Behera, S.Jena ‘E-Governance Mediated Agriculture 
for Sustainable Life in India’ Procedia Computer Science 48 (2015) 623 – 629. 
2752 Ibid.  
2753 See The Statement of Managing Director, Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd, which owns the 
Amul brand in ‘Amul says FDI in retail will hurt farmers’, The Hindu, December 4, 2011 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/agri-business/amul-says-fdi-in-retail-will-hurt-
farmers/article2687070.ece. 
2754 Statistics from Indian Government Census with 2010-2011 as reference year. 
http://agcensus.dacnet.nic.in/NL/nettabledisplay2a.aspx. 
2755National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) 70th Situation of Agricultural Households in India, 
http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_new/upload/KI_70_33_19dec14.pdf. 
2756 See International assessment of Agricultural Knowledge Science And Technology for Development, 2009, Global 
Report, Mcntyre Baverly etc. al. Washington D.C. USA. 
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institutions and 26% to conventional moneylenders.2757 In many situations, farmers are forced to sell 
their produce at a price, which is lower than the cost of the production simply to make ends meet.  
In addition to the ICT initiatives, the Government has sought to help farmers through setting 
of minimum support price (MSP) and by procurement by Government agencies. The rationale of the 
MSP is to ensure that farmers are not compelled to sell their produce below support price either due 
to exploitation by large market players or due to a bumper harvest. The MSP is effective mainly for 
four crops: wheat, paddy, cotton (modestly) and sugarcane (for which mills are legally obligated to 
buy cane from farmers at prices fixed by government). However, the impact of MSP and procurement 
varies from State to State and its actual benefit to farmers remains fluctuating at best.2758 India has 
also enacted the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act 2013. Although the avowed aim of the Act is to provide just and fair 
compensation to the affected families whose land has been acquired, or is proposed to be acquired, 
or families that are affected by such acquisition, it is argued that the Act favours landowners to the 
detriment of impoverished landless farmers.2759  
India also has an endemic farmer suicide problem. A large number of qualitative studies, argue 
that the liberalization of the agricultural sector in the early-1990s led to an agrarian crisis which 
rendered farmers with certain socioeconomic characteristics–cash crops cultivators, with marginal 
landholdings, and debts–particularly vulnerable to the risk of committing suicide. A 2014 study of 
farmer suicides in India suggested clear policy implications: it suggested that if the State were able 
to reduce the proportion of marginal farmers, cash crops, or indebted farmers by one per cent, the 
suicide rates–suicides per 100,000 per year– would be reduced by 0·437, 0·518 and 0·549 
respectively, when all other variables are held constant. The study also noted that despite more than 
six decades of trying, the majority of Indian States have been unable to enact meaningful land 
reforms, largely because of the strength of the rural elite at the local level. It, therefore, suggested 
that while redistribution of land is a desirable policy prescription, it is perhaps not a realistic one. It 
argued that State interventions to stabilize the price of cash crops and relieve indebted farmers may 
be more effective at reducing suicide rates in India.2760  
An important factor in the continued occurrence of farmer suicides is that agriculture is no 
longer considered a viable occupation. Farmers often need loans to run their farms and find 
themselves unable to repay these loans.2761 The Intelligence Bureau has suggested termed loan waiver 
and relief packages for farmers to ease their situation. However, it is unlikely that credit facilities 
alone would ease the farmers’ general situation. Furthermore, farmers in India often choose private 
moneylenders in order to procure easy loans. These moneylenders charge interest at the rate of 25% 
to 50%, which then becomes impossible for farmers to repay. The Intelligence Bureau has also 
                                                          
2757 The Hindu, More than 50% of farm households in debt, 27 June 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/more-
than-50-of-farm-households-in-debt/article6711414.ecehttp://www.thehindu.com/news/national/more-than-50-of-farm-
households-in-debt/article6711414.ece. 
2758 Shoumitro Chatterjee, Divesh Kapoor ‘Understanding Price Variation in Agricultural Commodities in India: MSP, 
Government Procurement, and Agriculture Markets’ © India Policy Forum July 12–13, 2016 
http://www.ncaer.org/events/ipf-2016/IPF-2016-Paper-Chatterjee-Kapur.pdf (accessed 5 November 2017).  
2759 Samanta, D., & Shireesh ‘Social Impact Assessment of Projects involving Land Acquisition in India: Implications of 
RFCTLARR Act, 2013’. Journal of Management and Public Policy, (2015). 7(1), 27-35. 
2760 Kennedy and King Globalization and Health 2014, 10:16 http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1468922/1/1744-8603-10-16.pdf 
(accessed 5 November 2017).  
2761 Intelligence Bureau Report December 19, 2014; See Aman Sharma, December 23, 2014 Economic Times at 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/intelligence-bureau-raises-red-flag-on-farmer-suicides-
in-its-report-to-pmo/articleshow/45610775.cms. 
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pointed out that the farmer suicide rates are higher for farmers who cultivate crops that need high 
financial investment (in seeds and fertilisers etc.) to produce high yields.2762 The situation of the 
farmers is detrimental to agriculture itself as outstanding loans and rising debt leads to low crop yield, 
poor procurement rate of crops and successive crop failure. 
Contract farming has often been offered as a solution to the dire straits Indian farmers find 
themselves in. However, the extent to which contract farming may improve the lot of the farmers is 
unclear. In 1989, PepsiCo started the trend of contract farming in India by engaging in 
tomato farming in Hoshiarpur, Punjab.  However, this experiment proved to be disastrous.2763 It was 
also widely believed that “contract farming actively promoted through change of law will mean that 
the farmer loses his independence and rights over the land.”2764 Further, given the very low bargaining 
power of farmers India, it is likely that companies will either force one-sided contracts on them or 
will fail to honor the commitments made in these contracts.2765 Needless to say it would be difficult, 
if not impossible for farmers to enforce contracts against companies due to their lack of power and 
the exorbitant legal cost such an action is likely to entail.2766 
 
3.6.2. Food Processors and Manufacturers  
 
Indian food processors assert their rights and issues through the All India Food Processors’ 
Association (AIFPA), which was established in 1943 by highly motivated and visionary food 
processors engaged mainly in processing fruits and vegetables. Subsequently, AIFPA expanded to 
include food processors from other sectors of the industry and now includes a cream of processors 
involved in processing of fruits & vegetables, meat and poultry, fish, milk & milk products, cereals 
and pulses manufacture of a wide range of food products such as juices and nectars, jams and jellies, 
breads, biscuits and confectionery, various milk products, ready-to- eat foods, sweets and 
confectionery, various ethnic delicacies etc. Member food processors account for a large percentage 
of the total production of the food processing industry in India as well as that of total exports of 
processed food products.  
AIFPA’s objectives include the promotion, encouragement and support of the Indian Food 
Processing Industries and raising the industry’s technical standards, product quality and safety to 
match global standards; active participation in evolving quality standards & safety measures under 
the Food Safety and Standards Act 2006, and seeking redressal of the problems of the food industry 
that impedes their growth and development. AIFPA is duly recognized by the Government as a nodal 
agency and interacts closely with various government bodies, such as the Union Ministry of Food 
Processing Industries; Union Ministry of Health & Family Welfare; Union Ministries of Finance, 
Agriculture, Commerce and Civil Supplies; National Horticulture Board (NHB), Ministry of 
Agriculture, Govt. of India; Agricultural and Processed Food Products Development Authority 
                                                          
2762 Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 107, 24.022015 
http://mha1.nic.in/par2013/par2015-pdfs/ls-240215/107.pdf. 
2763Lok Sabha Debate, Lok Sabha Debates Further Discussion Regarding Widespread Distress Among The Farmers ... on 
24 August, 2006 an> Title: Further discussion regarding widespread distress among the farmers in the country raised by 
Shri Mohan Singh on the 17th August, 2006. 
2764 Ibid. 
2765Aloy Dutta et al., A Case Study of Pepsico Contract Farming For Potatoes, IOSR Journal of Business and 
Management, PP 75-85, 2016 
2766 Ibid. 
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(APEDA), Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of India; Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) & its variations 
sectional committees on subjects affecting the industry; Empowered Committee of State Finance 
Ministers on Value Added Tax (VAT), GST etc. and Quality Council of India.2767  
Certain foreign and domestic groups also exert considerable influence in the food processing 
industry. Some of the most successful conglomerates in the Indian Food Processing Industry include:  
a) Indo Nissin Foods Ltd. Nissin Food entered India in 1988 through a joint venture with 
Brooke Bond India Ltd. (Brooke Bond later merged with Hindustan Unilever Limited 
‘HUL’) to form Indo Nissin Foods Ltd. However, the agreement was terminated in 1998 
and HUL pulled out its stake from the company and discontinued the distribution of Indo 
Nissin products. Nissin Food then decided to distribute the products through Marico 
Industries. Nissin Food manufactures noodles and a variety of home foods. ‘Top Ramen’ 
is its most significant brand in India with approximately 20 per cent market share in the 
instant noodle market. Indo Nissin uses the technology of its parent company for 
manufacturing its products. The company’s production facilities are located near Delhi 
and in Bangalore.  
b) Perfetti Van Melle India. This is a 100 per cent subsidiary of the global conglomerate and 
started operations in India in 1992 by setting up its factory. It launched its first brand in 
the Indian market in 1994. It leads the Indian sugar confectionery market with more than 
25 per cent of the value share of the market. In the last 12 years, the company’s portfolio 
has grown from a single brand to 15 brands. The company strives to leverage the 
international brand portfolio in India, while adapting flavors and blends to suit local 
tastes.  
Domestic players in this industry include Dabur India Limited (fruit juice, cooking pastes, coconut 
milk, tomato puree, lemon drink, chilli powder and honey); Gits Food Products Pvt. Ltd. (sweet mix, 
namkeens, snack mix meal mix, pure ghee, dairy whitener and milk powder); Godrej Industries Ltd. 
(edible oils, vanaspati, bakery fats, fruit drinks, fruit nectar, fruit juices and tomato puree); Haldiram 
Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (sweets, namkeens, syrups, crushes, chips and papads); MTR Foods Ltd. (ready-
to-Eat curries and rice, Ready-to-Cook gravies, frozen foods, ice creams, instant snack and dessert 
mixes, spices such as turmeric, coriander, black pepper, pickles and papads); Parle Agro Private Ltd. 
(fruit drinks and mineral water); Milkfood (milk powder, baby food, cheese and other milk products).  
Significant overseas players in the industry are Hindustan Unilever Limited (tea, instant 
coffee, biscuits, ice-creams, salt, wheat flour, instant drinks, soups, jam and squash); Britannia 
Industries Ltd. (biscuits, flavored milk, dairy whitener, ghee, bread, cake and rusk); Agro Tech Foods 
(wheat flour, edible oil, vanaspati, popcorn, french fries and green peas); ITC Ltd. (wheat flour, salt, 
ready-to-eat meals, biscuits, confectioneries, snacks and cooking paste); Nestle India Pvt. Ltd. 
(instant coffee, condensed milk, dairy whitener, infant food, chocolates and confectioneries); Pepsico 
India Holdings (soft drink, fruit juice and chips);  Cadbury India Ltd. (chocolates, hard boiled 
confectionery, malt foods, cocoa powder).2768  
Some of the major investments in this sector in the recent past are: 
                                                          
2767 http://www.aifpa.net (accessed 15th May 2017) 
2768 This information is derived from report on Food Processing Market and Opportunities prepared by KPMG for India 
Brand Equity Foundation and issued by IBEF. https://www.ibef.org/download/Food_Processing_270608.pdf (accessed 
15th May 2017).  
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a) US-based food company Cargill Inc, aims to double its branded consumer business in 
India by 2020, by doubling its retail reach to about 800,000 outlets and increasing its 
market share to become national leader in the sunflower oil category which is likely to 
make the company be among the top three leading brands in India 
b) Mad Over Donuts (MoD), outlined plans of expanding its operations in India by opening 
nine new MoD stores by March 2017. 
c) Danone SA plans to focus on nutrition business in India, by launching 10 new products 
in 2017, and aiming to double its revenue in India by 2020. 
d) Uber Technologies Inc. plans to launch UberEATS, its food delivery service in India, 
with investments made across multiple cities and regions.  
e) Di Bella, the Australia-based coffee chain, plans to invest Rs 67 crore (US$ 10 million) 
for setting up 20 new outlets in Mumbai, besides entering Delhi and Bangalore by 2017. 
f) KKR & Co LP, the US-based private equity firm, plans to invest about Rs 520 crore (US$ 
77.38 million) in the dairy company Kwality Ltd, which will be used to strengthen its 
milk procurement infrastructure and increase processing capacity.  
g) Henry Ford Health Systems (HFHS), a US-based health and wellness group, plans to 
enter India by signing a franchise partnership with Chandigarh-based hospitality and food 
services firm KWalls Hospitality, and setting up 'Culinary Wellness' branded stores 
across the country. 
h) Mondelez International, the US-based confectionery, food, and beverage major, 
inaugurated its new manufacturing plant in Andhra Pradesh which is valued at Rs 1,265 
crore (US$ 190 million), with an annual production capacity of 250,000 tonnes.  
i) Pure Circle, a Malaysia-based natural sweetener producer, plans to invest around Rs 
1,300 crore (US$ 200 million) in India to set up a manufacturing plant and make the 
country its regional production and export hub in the next five years.  
j) Swiggy, a food delivery start-up owned by Bundl Technologies Private Limited, has 
raised Rs 230.34 crore (US$ 33.80 million) in a Series C funding round, with its existing 
investors SAIF Partners, Accel Partners, Norwest Venture Partners and Apoletto Asia 
Ltd contributing 79 per cent of the new funds raised. 
k) Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF), popularly known as 'Amul', 
plans to invest Rs 5,000 crore (US$ 733.6 million) to establish ten new processing plants 
as well as expand the current capacity to touch 32 million litres per day (MLPD) capacity 
by 2020.  
l) Private Equity (PE) firm India Value Fund Advisors (IVFA) plans to invest around US$ 
100-150 million in the food business in India over the next two years. 
m) Zomato, a restaurant search and discovery platform, has raised US$ 60 million from the 
Singapore government-owned investment company Temasek, along with existing 
investor Vy Capital, in order to explore new business verticals. 
n) ITC Limited plans to invest Rs 800 crore (US$ 117.4 million) to set up a world-class food 
processing facility in Medak, a district located in Telangana. The company has also 
formulated plans to enter the dairy market.2769 
o)  
                                                          
2769 https://www.ibef.org/industry/indian-food-industry.aspx (accessed 15th May 2017).  
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3.6.3  Consumers  
 
Indian consumers may make their presence felt through consumer organisations that are essentially 
advocacy groups seeking to protect people from corporate abuse including unsafe products, predatory 
lending, false advertising, astro-turfing and pollution. Consumer organisations exert pressure via 
protests, campaigning or lobbying. They may engage in single-issue advocacy or set themselves up 
as consumer watchdogs. Consumer organizations have also operated in the area of food safety. 
However, campaigning in this area is complicated since scientific, dietary or medical evidence is 
normally more complex than in other arena. Whilst the aim of consumer organizations may be to 
establish and to attempt to enforce consumer rights, these have also been effective simply by using 
the threat of bad publicity to keep companies' focus on the consumers' point of view.Some of the 
most significant consumer organisations in India are:  
 
3.6.3.1 CERC (Consumer Education and Research Centre) 
 
This is the leading consumer rights organisation in India and is set up as a non- profit, non-
government body, dedicated to the protection and promotion of consumer interests through active use 
of research, media, law, advocacy and information dissemination. CERC does not belong to any 
political party, nor does it subscribe to any political ideology.  CERC is recognised as a research 
institute by the Government and as a consumer organisation by the State government of Gujarat. The 
United Nations has recognised CERC as one of the approved non-government organisations. 
 
3.6.3.2  FEDCOT (Federation of Consumer Organisations in Tamil Nadu) 
 
FEDCOT is a nation-wide non-governmental organisation that is voluntary, non-profitable, non-
political, civic-minded, secular and registered under the Societies Act 1860 to work for the promotion 
and development of consumers’ interest and their welfare. It is an umbrella body of more than 350 
registered consumer associations in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry. It is one of the largest consumer 
organisations in the country and in Asia, which works at grass-roots level. It embraces people from 
different walks of life. It is significant that 60 per cent of the member councils are in rural areas. 
FEDCOT claims to be a consumer movement of the people, by the people and for the people and to 
be concerned with human values. 
 
3.6.3.3  Citizen Consumer and Civic Action Group (CAG)  
 
This is a non-profit, non-political and professional organisation that works towards protecting 
citizens’ rights in consumer and environmental issues and promoting good governance processes 
including transparency, accountability and participatory decision-making. CAG takes up and 
prioritizes issues affecting common citizens such as extreme pollution, lack of access to information, 
poor quality health care and civic amenities. 
 
3.6.3.4  Consumer Guidance Society of India (CGSI)  
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This is a consumer rights organisation based in Mumbai, India. It was founded by nine women in 
1966 to fight against sub-standard products, high prices, hazardous drugs, never ending shortage of 
goods and many other unjust practices. It became the first consumer rights organisation to conduct 
formal product testing in 1977. CGSI publishes a magazine, ‘Keemat’. 
 
3.6.3.5 Consumer Unity of Trust Society International (CUTS)  
 
CUTS began its journey in 1983 in Rajasthan, from a rural development wall newspaper ‘Gram 
Gadar’. This monthly communication initiative is still published regularly and has been instrumental 
in providing a forum to the rural population for voicing its issues and concerns. In 1983, CUTS 
operated on a zero budget out of a garage at Jaipur. Today, its annual budget exceeds US$2.5mn or 
Rs13crores. The organisation consists of five programme centres and one resource centre in India. It 
has its headquarters at Jaipur and offices in Chittorgarh, Calcutta and New Delhi, two resource centres 
in Africa (at Lusaka, Zambia and Nairobi, Kenya) and one resource centre in London, UK. CUTS’ 
current staff strength is over 130 persons, of which one third are females working also at managerial 
levels. 
CUTS is registered since 1984, under the Rajasthan Societies Registration Act, 1958. It is 
governed by a 12-member Executive Committee, which is elected every three years from a general 
body of 350 life members and 150 institutional members. With the vision of “Consumer sovereignty 
in the framework of social justice and equality, within and across borders” the activities of CUTS, as 
a research, advocacy and networking organisation working on several areas of public interest, are 
divided into: Consumer protection; International trade and development; Competition, investment 
and economic regulation; Human development, and Consumer safety. 
 
3.6.6.6.  Mumbai Grahak Panchayat (MGP) 
 
MGP is a registered voluntary consumer organization established in 1975. It has more than 20,000 
members in and around Mumbai to whom it supplies about 75 essential commodities at their 
doorstep, every month. MGP's joint purchase and distribution system has been acclaimed by 
Consumers International, which supports, links and represents consumer organizations all over the 
world. To enable consumers to exercise their choice, especially before festivals, MGP also has 
Consumer Plazas at different locations in the city which it runs for 10 days every year and sells items 
like readymade clothes, bed sheets, bags, sarees, utensils, crockery at reasonable rates. 
MGP’s Consumer Protection Wing has filed a number of public interest petitions to protect 
consumers' interests. MGP’s Consumer Education Wing organizes consumer awareness camps, 
workshops and seminars for students and teachers. MGP’s Study and Research Wing undertakes 
consumer research and provides the base for launching various consumer interest campaigns. It also 
sends an in-house newsletter ‘Grahak’ to its members, free of cost. A number of priced publications 
are also available. MGP has a number of Complaint Guidance Centres all over Mumbai, which give 
free guidance to consumers. MGP also has a new Environment Wing, which looks after matters of 
environmental interest.2770 
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794 
 
 
3.7  Intellectual Property Rights and the Agriculture Sector in India  
3.7.1. Positive Impact of India’s IPR regime 
 
The three main laws governing intellectual property rights in the Agriculture sector in India are the 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (PPV&FRA), the Patents Act 1970 (PA) 
and the Biological Diversity Act 2002 (BDA).2771 
As a result of the successive policy changes in Intellectual Property, India’s seed industry has 
expanded substantially. From 1987 onwards, policy reforms have encouraged several large firms 
(both foreign and domestic) to enter the seed industry.2772 
As of 2005, India’s commercial seed market has accounted for 25% of the total potential seed 
market in the country, whereas the varietal seeds farmers retain from the previous crops accounted 
for the remaining 75%, indicating significant room for commercial growth. Although public research 
organizations and State Seed Corporations still play a role in the industry, the private sector has grown 
in importance in recent decades. As of 2005, the ratio of seed sales by volume between the private 
and public sectors stood at 76–24 denoting a strong private sector presence in the market. State Seed 
Corporations are now mostly confined to distributing certified seeds in the high-volume, low-value 
segment of the varietal wheat, rice, pulses and cottonseed markets. The private sector, on the other 
hand, has made sizable inroads in the higher value segment of the seed market, first with the 
development and dissemination of vegetable hybrids, then with hybrids of sorghum and pearl millet, 
followed by maize, cotton and, most recently, rice.2773  
The private sector has not only invested heavily in new crops and technologies, but has also pursued 
legal IPR protection under the PPV&FRA. In 2008– 2009, 64% of the 460 PVP applications received 
by the PPV&FR Authority were from the private sector, with the remaining 36% from the public 
research system and farmers themselves. The largest number of applications was for crops where 
hybrids, particularly private hybrids, are predominant such as cotton, maize and rice.2774  
The combination of supportive policy changes and enforceable (biological) IPRs has encouraged 
greater private investment in hybrid crop (maize and pearl millet) improvement, ultimately leading 
to increases in yield levels. The statistical evidence pointing to structural changes in yield trends – 
when viewed alongside the well-documented historical evidence on changes in the public and private 
sectors’ roles in crop-specific research, development and delivery – suggests that India has leveraged 
both public science and private investment to accelerate productivity growth with respect to these 
two crops.2775 
 
3.7.3 Challenges Remaining  
 
On the whole, public policies in India have provided mixed signals to private investors in the 
innovation and product markets. Whilst the promulgation of the PPV&FRA and the approval of 
genetically modified Bt cotton in 2002 have been supportive measures, and have signaled India’s 
                                                          
2771 See section 3(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) above.  
2772 See n.2691, 364. 
2773 Ibid.  
2774 Ibid, 365.  
2775 Ibid, 378.  
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openness to private investors by ensuring that innovators would be allowed to recoup their research 
investments in cultivar improvement, and encouraging R&D at the technological frontier, a third 
policy shift—the 2010 moratorium on the commercial release of Bt brinjal—has dampened these 
innovation incentives.  
The realization of India’s Agriculture sector potential—and expansion beyond the current 
level of concentration—will likely occur when firms can overcome barriers to entry that currently 
inhibit innovation at the cutting edge. The major barriers are largely related to the high costs, time 
delays, and uncertainty associated with regulatory approval for GM crops and IPR enforcement for 
private cultivars. Uncertainty in the current regulatory system is probably the greatest constraint for 
India’s seed and agbiotech industries. Although the National Biotech Development Strategy 2007 
and the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India (NBRAI) Bill of 2009 aim to 
streamline regulatory agencies and processes, the uncertainty is persistent and largely unaddressed. 
This uncertainty is likely exacerbated by the slow progress of the 2004 Seed Bill through Parliament, 
which, if passed, is expected to improve the innovation incentives available to seed companies.  
 
3.8  Competition Law and the Indian Food Value Chain 
 
It is expected that “(t)he food industry, which is currently valued at US$ 39.71 billion will grow at a 
Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 11 per cent to reach US$65.4 billion by 2018.”2776 
The size of food market calls for addressing competition concerns by legislation, compliance and 
enforcement. Not only is the size of the food market growing but also its contours have evolved from 
traditional villages to a more dynamic and urbanized setting and now cover a broad spectrum of 
commercial activities.  
With the advent of globalization and increasing investments, the Indian food sector has given 
rise to much competition-related skepticism. For instance, the UK Department for International Trade 
has observed that India is a price competitive market where consumers, mostly prefer lower prices to 
quality and durability.2777 The nature of India’s economic system and widespread poverty in the 
country is the main reason behind this preference. However, the situation is aggravated by lack of 
awareness regarding other factors that may influence consumer behavior and highlight the multi-
faceted nature of consumer welfare. India being one of the world’s largest consumer markets which 
is mostly characterized by static competition, is prone to falling prey to the anti-competitive activities 
of big companies.   
 
3.8.1. The Rationale for Competition Law  
 
As the Consumer Price Index keeps moving upward and the rate of inflation keeps soaring, the 
competition concerns gain consumer-oriented dimensions. While prices of food items in India have 
been rising2778 the Government has been making an effort to align itself with the liberalized policy 
                                                          
2776http://indiainbusiness.nic.in/newdesign/index.php?param=industryservices_landing/337/1 July 2016. 
2777 UK Government’s Department for International Trade, Doing business in India: India trade and Export Guide, 
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2778 See Rahul Anand et al, Understanding India’s Food Inflation: The Role of Demand and Supply Factors, International 
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regime around the world and to serve the more organized industrial lobby,2779 often at the expense of 
the middle and poor class which is directly affected by the rising prices. 
The introduction of the Competition Act in 2002 and its operationalization in 2009 has added 
an important dimension to regulating the food sector in India. The aim of the Act is to provide for the 
establishment of a Commission to prevent practices which have or are likely to have an adverse effect 
on competition; to promote and sustain competition in the markets; to protect the interests of 
consumers, and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in the markets and for 
addressing all matters incidental thereto. Given this mandate it is likely that at least some portion of 
all stages of the food value chain in India ranging from inputs, agriculture to manufacturing and 
consumption fall within the ambit of the Indian Competition Law.2780  
In a note submitted by it to the OECD, the Competition Commission of India has expressly 
acknowledged the applicability of the Indian Competition Law to all markets at different stages along 
the food value chain.2781 However, the Commission has also observed that due to the complex 
legislative structure of the Indian food value chain, matters arising from practices along this chain do 
not often make it to the Commission.2782 According to the Commission other factors due to which 
food sector complaints are not often filed before it include lack of or limited awareness of 
Competition Law amongst consumers and the disorganized nature of several segments of the food 
supply chain.2783   
3.8.2. Landmark Cases relating to the Food Value Chain(s)  
 
3.8.2.1   Suo Motu Case 1 of 2010 – In Re Sugar Mills decided on 30.11.20112784 
 
In this case, the Commission took note of a news article “Cartelization by Industry to push up Sugar 
Prices: Traders”2785 which suggested that the Indian Sugar Mills Associations and the National Co-
operative Sugar Mills Federation were involved in anticompetitive practices by colluding with each 
other to increase ex-factory price of sugar by 4-6 per cent.2786 The Commission referred the matter 
                                                          
2779 See Sarah Joseph, Neoliberal Reforms and Democracy in India, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 31 
(Aug. 4-10, 2007), pp. 3213-3218. 
2780 Competition Issues in Food Chain Industry 2013, OECD, 15 May 2014, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise 
Affairs, Competition Committee DAF/COMP (2014)16 – A note by Competition Commission of India at page 221. 
Agricultural co-operatives are included in the definition of ‘person’ in the Indian Competition Act. See 1. 2(l)(v) ‘an 
association of persons or a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, in India or outside India;  ’2(l)(viii) ‘a co-
operative society registered under any law relating to cooperative societies‘ and 2(x) ‘every artificial juridical person, not 
falling within any of the preceding sub-clauses. There is nothing to suggest that these are assessed differently. While 
section 54 allows the Central Government to exempt, this power has not been exercised in respect of agricultural 
cooperatives.  
2781 Ibid. 
2782 Ibid at Page 2171. 
2783 The Commission has also alluded to lack of capacity on its part to deal with matters related to the food sector and has 
stated that India “expects to obtain knowledge and information from counterpart jurisdiction on this sector.” Elsewhere 
in the note, however, the Commission has stated that “Government investment policies on the subject would be playing 
crucial role in increased competitiveness in this sector and the Commission is fully equipped to handle issues of 
competition scrutiny in this sector.” Furthermore, in the two cases cited by the Commission in this note, the Commission 
has commented that the policies framed by the Government are anti-competitive.   
2784 http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/SUGAR%20CASE%20NO.%201-2010%2030.Nov%202011_0.pdf. 
2785 The Economic Times, 26.07.2010. 
2786 There are about 50 million sugarcane farmers and 5 million sugar mill workers in India.  The Industries (Development 
and Regulation) Act, 1951, placed the sugar industry in the First Schedule (Item No. 25) to the Act, which meant that no 
sugar mill could be set up without a license of the Central Government. Sugar and sugarcane are Essential Commodities 
under the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 3 of the Essential 
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for investigation, to the Director General Investigations (DG) who concluded in his report that the 
sugar mills, acting through their associations or federations, had formed cartel to fix the price of sugar 
in violation of Section 3(3) (a) and (b) of the Competition Act 2002.2787  
In evaluating the DG’s report, the Commission expressed the view that “since sugar is under 
control either through a mechanism of control over prices or control over release/supply, the industry 
is not operating within the free market and market dynamics are not able to drive the industry. The 
behavior of such an industry is determined not fully by market forces but by the controls and 
regulations of the government.” the Commission also observed that “..in such a regulated sector as 
sugar industry, the possibility of successful cartelization of sugar prices is remote because the releases 
in the market are not in the hands of sugar mills and additionally there is pressure to make timely 
payment of sugarcane.”2788 The Commission further observed that “the sugar industry is not free from 
control and is at present highly controlled and regulated” and that “sugar prices are not a mere 
function of demand and supply and there are complex forces at play which distort and in a way 
proscribe the market from working in a competitive and free manner.”2789 
The Commission also took note of the observations of the High Level Committee on 
Competition Policy2790 which had found that “restrictions on sugarcane prices and procurement, 
production capacities, dual pricing of sugar (levy and non-levy), restraints of exports and imports and 
many other like restrictions have enabled the inefficient producers of sugar to continue and prevent 
the rise of a competitive sugar industry.”2791 The Commission therefore recommended that the 
government, after taking into account all aspects, needs to put such measures in place as may be 
necessary for the overall social and economic welfare, and may frame a policy which allows market 
and competitive forces to play a bigger role in the sector. The Commission further sated that 
competition in the sector may not only enable the efficient firms to perform better but also may 
ultimately bring benefits to the consumers since efficient firms in a competitive environment may not 
only compete for greater share of the market but also incentivize consumers through better product 
and lower prices.2792 
 
                                                          
Commodities Act, 1955, the Central Government has issued the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966 and the Sugar (Control) 
Order 1966. In addition to the above, the Executive or the Parliament, as the case may be, has also passed Levy Sugar 
Supply (Control) Order, 1979, Sugar (Packaging and Marking) Order, 1970, Levy Sugar Price Equalization Fund Act, 
1976, Sugar Cess Act, 1982, Sugar Development Fund Act, 1982 and Sugar Development Fund Rules 1983. The price 
of sugarcane is announced by the Central Government on the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs 
and Prices (CACP) after consulting the State Governments and associations of sugar industry. The amended provisions 
of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 provides for fixing fair and remunerative price of sugarcane on the basis of various 
considerations such as price at which sugar produced by sugarcane is sold etc. In the case of sugarcane, the statutory 
minimum price has been replaced by Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP), in terms of which farmers are not required to 
wait for the end of the season or for any announcement of the profits by the sugar mills or the Government. This practice 
absolutely negates market forces and places an obligation on the government to provide support to the sugarcane farmers. 
The new system also assures the margins on account of profit and risk to farmers in all the years, irrespective of whether 
the sugar mills generate profits or not and is not dependent on the performance of any individual sugar mill. In order to 
ensure that higher sugar recoveries are adequately rewarded and considering variations amongst sugar mills, the FRP is 
linked to a basic recovery rate of sugar, with a premium payable to farmers for higher recoveries of sugar from sugarcane. 
2787 Para 32 of the Judgment. 
2788 Para 5.40 of the Judgment. 
2789 Para 7 of the Judgment. 
2790Raghavan Committee Report. 
2791 Para 8 of the Judgment. 
2792 Para 9 of the Judgment. 
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3.8.2.2  Suo Motu Case 1 of 2011 – In Re Rise in Onion Prices decided on 10.04.2012 
 
In this case, the Commission took note of reports published in various newspapers and journals (eg 
Wall Street Journal dated 23 December 2010) highlighting the unusual rise in price of onions during 
December 2010. After examining these newspaper reports the Commission formed the view that this 
was a fit case for investigation and referred the matter to the Director General Investigations (DG).2793 
After investigation, the DG concluded that the cause of the unusual price hike in onions was the result 
of unseasonal and erratic rainfall which had adversely impacted the seasonal onion crop and resulted 
in reduced supply of onions in the market.2794 However, the DG also observed that “although implicit 
understanding among the traders to raise prices in the wake of scarcity to make profits for themselves 
cannot be ruled out, evidence of cartelization and organized collusion among the traders or among 
any other player in the whole supply chain could not be found.”  
The DG also appeared to overstep his mandate when he recommended that, “policy measures 
are required to increase farm productivity, improve supply bottlenecks and augment the storage 
facilities. It has also been brought that there could be possibility of manipulation of prices through 
acts like mixing poor quality onions with higher quality onions and a system of grading may be 
introduced in onion.”2795 The DG further suggested that “reforms in the existing structure of APMC 
stating that at present without a license business of trading or commission in ‘mandis’2796 is not 
possible, which in a way prohibits new players from emerging at the market place.”2797  
The Commission agreed with the DG’s investigation report and ruled out existence of any 
cartelization or collusion among onion traders/commission agents. However, one member, wanted 
the matter to be re-investigated and, therefore, the Commission ordered a study to be carried out in 
this regard.2798 
 
3.8.2.3  Suo Motu case No. 2 of 2011—Re Aluminum Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers order 
dated 23.04.2012 
 
In this case, the Commission took notice of an alleged anti-competitive agreement amongst the 
manufacturers of Aluminum Phosphide tablets on the basis of a letter from the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI), which used these tablets for the preservation of central pool food grains in the country. 
Based on the information provided to it, the Commission formed the view that this was a fit case for 
further investigation and forwarded it to the Director General Investigations (DG). After examining 
extensive relevant evidence, the DG concluded in his report that the manufacturers of the tablets had 
‘acted in a concerted manner to eliminate competition among themselves by indulging in collusive 
bidding in the tender for procurement of goods by FCI in 2009 and collectively boycotting the e-
tenders floated by FCI in 2011’ in violation of section 3 of the Competition Act.2799  
                                                          
2793 Para 3 of the Judgment. 
2794 Para 5.39 of the Judgment. 
2795 Para 5.40 of the judgment. 
2796 The hindi word for wholesale markets.  
2797 Para 5.40 of the judgment 
2798 CCI Market Study on Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in India – done by Agricultural Development and 
Rural Transformation Center, Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) Bangalore (2012), available at 
http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/AO.pdf. 
2799 Para 4.26 of the judgment.  
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After considering the DG’s report and hearing the parties concerned, the Commission came 
to the conclusion that the conduct of three manufacturers of the tablets was in violation of section 3 
of the Act due to the parties having engaged in collusive bidding.2800 The Commission imposed a 
penalty at the rate of 9% on the average of 3 years turnover of these three parties. The Commission 
also directed the parties to cease and desist from engaging in manipulating the process of bidding.2801  
The Respondents in this case ie the three aggrieved parties, filed an appeal before the now 
defunct Competition Appellate Tribunal.2802 By its order dated 29 October 2013, the Tribunal 
substantially reduced the penalty imposed by the Commission on the ground that the Commission 
had failed to provide justification for fixing it at 9% of the average turnover of the Respondents.   
 
3.9. Unfair Trading Practices  
3.9.1. Legislation governing Unfair Trading Practices  
 
In India, unfair trading practices are covered under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (CPA) and 
may include unfairly refusing a transaction, discriminating against a transacting party, unfairly 
excluding competitors, unfairly soliciting customers, unfairly coercing customers, trading with a 
transacting party by unfairly taking advantage of one's bargaining position, trading under terms and 
conditions which unfairly restrict business activities of a transacting party, disrupting business 
activities of another enterprise, and unfair provision of capital, assets, manpower, etc. Section 2(1)(r) 
of CPA defines unfair trading practices to mean a trade practice, which, for the purpose of promoting 
the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provision of any service, adopts any unfair method or 
unfair or deceptive practice. The Consumer Protection Act addresses these practices through its three-
tier quasi-judicial system comprising the District Forums, the State Commission or the National 
Commission and finally the Supreme Court of India.2803  
Until 2002, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA), which was enacted 
to prevent monopolies and restrictive trade practices, was the foremost legislation for dealing with 
unfair trade practices in the country. In 2002, the Competition Act, repealed the MRTPA, and cases 
pending before the MRTP Commission were transferred to the Competition Commission of India. 
Although section 4(2) of the Competition Act states that the imposition of unfair or discriminatory 
conditions or prices in the purchase or sale of goods or services may be deemed to be an abuse of a 
dominant position, section 66(4) transferred the authority to deal with the unfair trade practices to the 
National Commission established under CMA which was already dealing with such practices. 
Two exceptions in this regard were provided in (a) section 66(3) in terms of which all cases 
pertaining to monopolistic or restrictive trade practices pending before the MRTP Commission on or 
before the commencement of the Competition Act, including such cases, in which any unfair trade 
practice had also been alleged, were to stand transferred to the Competition Commission and were to 
be adjudicated by that Commission in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act as if that 
Act had not been repealed, and (b) section 66(5) in terms of which cases pertaining to unfair trade 
practices referred to in clause (x) of subsection(1) of section 36A of the MRTPA and pending before 
                                                          
2800 Para 7.40 and 7.41 of the judgment.  
2801 Para 8.2 and 8.3 of the judgment.  
2802 In May 2017, the Comeptiotn Appellate Tribunal was abolished and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal 
was given the additional mandate to hear appeals from the decisions of the Commission.  
2803 See section 3(d)(i).  
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the MRTP Commission were to stand transferred to the Competition Commission, and the 
Competition Commission was directed to dispose of such cases as if they were cases filed under that 
Act.  
The most important sector specific legislation in respect of unfair trading practices is the Food 
Safety and Standards Act 2006 (FSSA).2804 The Act consolidates and repeals various acts and orders 
that had until its enactment handled food related issues in various Ministries and Departments. It also 
seeks to consolidate the laws relating to food and to curb food adulteration by prescribing higher 
penalties for violation of food laws. FSSA aims to ensure availability of safe and wholesome food for 
human consumption and the enforcement of food safety standards and seeks to regulate the law 
relating to advertising and unfair trade practices in the food sector. As per new rules issued under the 
FSSA, a penalty may be levied on, and prosecution undertaken against restaurants found violating 
the provisions of FSSA. The provisions of the FSSA apply to all types of food businesses – from a 
roadside food stall to a five-star hotel.  
The two most important provisions of the FSSA in this regard are, (i) section 18(f) which 
states that the Food Safety and Standards Authority (formed under the FSSA) shall, while framing 
regulations or specifying standards under the Act, ensure prevention of fraudulent, deceptive or unfair 
trade practices which may mislead or harm the consumer, and (ii) section 24 which states that no 
misleading or deceiving advertisement may be made in respect of any food item and that any person 
who makes any such advertisement or engages in any unfair trade practice for the purpose of 
promoting the sale, supply, use and consumption of articles of food, or adopts any unfair or deceptive 
practice including the practice of making any statement, whether orally or in writing or by visible 
representation, which falsely represents that the foods are of a particular standard, quality, quantity 
or grade-composition, makes a false or misleading representation concerning the need for, or the 
usefulness of, or gives to the public any guarantee of the efficacy of a food product, that is not based 
on an adequate or scientific justification thereof shall be liable to be penalized in an amount 
commensurate with the nature of the violation. The FSSAI also lays down science based standards 
for articles of food and for the manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import of foods and to 
ensure availability of safe and wholesome food for human consumption. FSSAI hears complaints 
relating to the food sector from the consumers.  
Also in pursuance of the Act, food safety committees have been established in each State. 
Such food safety committees meet each month and discuss the development in each state to learn 
from the best practices as well as to decide on future course of action. 
 
3.9.2. Instances of Unfair Trading Practices in Food Processing Industry2805  
 
There has been a global concern about food safety and unfair trade practices in quality and quantity 
of the food products and of the deliberate addition of chemicals like additives, adulterants and food 
colours, for the purpose of disguising inferior commodities, or contaminating the food products 
during production, processing, packaging and storage. There has also been concern regarding the 
adulteration of food items by addition of harmful substances like poisonous chemicals and copper in 
milk, alcohol, rice, etc. which has caused health hazards at mass levels.  
                                                          
2804  See section 3.3(ii) above.  
2805 http://www.cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Unfair_Trade_Practices_and_Institutional_Challenges_in_India-An_Analysis.pdf 
(accessed 15th May 2017) 
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In India, in 2011, the water purifier ‘Pureit’ (a brand of Hindustan Unilever) made a false 
claim that it could “destroy one crore viruses in one litre of water” and announced that the National 
Institute of Virology (NIV) had confirmed these claims. This claim and announcement agitated the 
Pune-based NIV and it issued a legal notice to HUL for making unsubstantiated claims. In a letter to 
HUL dated 2 June 2011, the director of NIV explained the details of the tests conducted by NIV and 
explained to HUL that its advertisements were not based on facts. It requested HUL to refrain from 
twisting and misrepresenting the facts and threatened it with legal action if it failed to take immediate 
corrective measures in this regard. 
Another example of such unfair trade practices in food industry was seen when the Consumer 
Guidance Society from Vijaywada, Andhra Pradesh filed a case in the District Forum (established 
under CPA) against Amway India Enterprises.2806 It was argued that Amway was offering a variety 
of consumer goods and food products including dietary supplements or sale through network 
marketing and at exorbitant prices. It was further argued that some of the products marketed by 
Amway were misbranded and that some of them were also adulterated. The District Forum held that 
Amway had adopted unfair trade practices in advertising and selling their products. The District 
Forum directed Amway to remove the adulterated and misbranded products from the market and not 
to indulge in such unfair trade practices in future. The Forum also directed Amway to issue a 
corrective advertisement regarding the products, which had been misbranded and misrepresented and 
imposed exemplary damages of Rs. 100,000.00 to be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Fund and 
Rs. 2,000.00 cost to be paid to the Consumer Education Society. 
3.10.  Superior Bargaining Power  
 
In 1987, the Supreme Court acknowledged the emergence of the theory of unequal bargaining power 
in the sphere of contract law, in terms of which the test of the reasonableness or fairness of a contract 
clause was examined on the touchstone of the bargaining power of the parties to the contract.2807 
In other cases, the Supreme Court has held that Article 14 of the Indian Constitution 
guarantees equality before and equal protection under law to all persons and has further held that this 
principle calls upon all Courts to strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract term between 
parties that do not enjoy parity in bargaining power. In this regard, the Supreme Court specifically 
referred to a situation where the weaker party had entered into a contract because it was the only 
option available to it to acquire the goods and services. The Supreme Court also held that the principle 
of superior bargaining power was applicable to the State in its industrial and commercial role.2808 In 
certain cases, the High Courts of India have held that the question of unequal bargaining power is 
related to the notion of free will i.e. whether the parties to the contract entered into it per their own 
free will.2809 The High Courts have also hesitated to find unequal bargaining power unless it is 
supported by evidence of fraud, mistake or duress that may be deemed to vitiate consent.2810 
                                                          
2806 Consumer Guidance Society v. Amway India Enterprises, C.C. 140 of 2007, decided 16th October 2007. 
2807 Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Another. etc. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Another. 1986 AIR 1571, 
1986 SCR (2) 278 at para 2.3. Foreign jurisprudence and common law played key role in the establishment of the 
jurisprudence of unequal bargaining power in India. For example, Gillespie Brothers & Co.Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport 
Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 400; Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1974] 3 All. E.R. 757; A. Schroeder music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. 
Macaulay (Formerely Instone), [1974]1  W.L.R.  1308; and Levison&Anr. v.  Patent Steam  Carpet Co.  Ltd., [1978] 1.  
2808 Such contracts are not covered by the “undue influence” doctrine as provided for under the Section 16(1) of the Indian 
Contract Act.  
2809 Unikol Bottlers Ltd. vs Dhillon Kool Drinks And Ors, decided on 7 February, 1994 (Delhi High Court) at Para 31. 
2810Ibid at Para 36. 
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In respect of cases relating to the Indian food value chain, contracts entered into between the 
companies and farmers may qualify as cases relating to unequal bargaining power particularly 
because more often than not, farmers are unlikely to even be aware of the terms they are agreeing to. 
The farmers’ lack of awareness and lack of resources required for hiring a lawyer aggravates the 
situation and tilts the contract in favour of large corporate party that is likely to have drafted the 
contractual provisions and is even otherwise able to obtain legal advice. Such cases may also be 
considered from the point of view of abuse of dominant position under Competition Law.  
Indian private law belongs to the common law tradition and, as such, applies many of its principles. 
Thus, Indian contract law provides for all the general remedies to the defects of consent such 
as mistake, misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, undue influence. A situation of unequal bargaining 
power between parties does not affect the validity of the contract even if it results in an agreement, 
which contains blatantly unequal provisions.2811 In order to have the agreement voided, the claimant 
has to prove that the contract was concluded in defect of consent.2812   
However, evidence of the unconscionable conduct reverts the burden of proof on the party 
that has a “dominating position” and that has presumably exerted undue influence. For this reason, in 
the case seminal case Inland Water v. Brojo the Indian Supreme Court referred to the doctrine of 
public policy to annul unfair and unreasonable contract clauses made in a situation of unequal 
bargaining power.2813 Based on this precedent, specific clauses may be expunged from the contract 
if they are affected by procedural or substantial unfairness in the sense that they confer an unjust 
advantage or unjust disadvantage on any one party. 
 
3.11. Interface between Competition Law, IP Rights, Unfair Trading Practices and Superior 
Bargaining Position 
3.11.1 Competition Law and IPRs2814 
 
The inherent conflict between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights arises from the fact 
that whilst Competition Law checks the abuse of dominant power, IP Law effectively creates 
dominance, if not monopolies by granting exclusive license to the right holders and by allowing them 
to exploit the result of their inventions albeit for a limited period of time.  
This inherent conflict between anti-monopoly legislation and and IPRs predates the 
Competition Act. Cases involving IP Rights had even arisen before MRTP Commission, which was 
the predecessor to the present Competition Commission. Specifically, the MRTP Commission had 
held in Vallal Peruman and Others versus Godfrey Phillips India Limited (1994) and Manju 
Bharadwaj v. Zee Telefilms Limited  (1996) that a trademark owner may be deemed to have engaged 
in unfair trade practices by the misuse, manipulation, distortion, contrivance or embellishment of 
ideas and in doing so, may expose himself to an action.  
The Competition Act appears to codify the thinking of the MRTP Commission. In terms of 
section 3(1) and (2) of the Act, any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, 
acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an 
                                                          
2811 Nilima Bhadbhade, Contract Law in India (Kluwer Law International 2010) 130. 
2812 Kesavulu Naidu v. Arithulai Ammal (1912) 36 ILR Mad 533. 
2813 Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly AIR 1986 SC 1571. 
2814 https://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/interface-between-competition-law-and-intellectual-property-rights-a-
comparative-study-of-the-us-eu-and-india-ipr.1000115.php?aid=26445 (accessed 15th May 2017). 
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appreciable adverse effect on competition within India is prohibited and may be deemed to be void. 
However, in terms of section 3(5), nothing in section 3, restricts the right of any person to restrain 
any infringement of, or to impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of 
his rights which have been or may be conferred upon him under the Copyright Act 1957; the Patents 
Act 1970; the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958 or the Trade Marks Act 1999; the 
Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act 1999; the Designs Act 2000; 
and the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of 2000). Further, section 
4(2)(b) of the Competition Act states that an enterprise may be deemed to abuse its dominant position, 
if it limits or restricts technical or scientific development relating to goods or services to the prejudice 
of consumers.  
However, the Competition Commission has not been consistent in its interpretation and 
enforcement of provisions relating to IP Rights. Unlike the EC in the European Union, and the FTC 
and DOJ in the USA, which frequently issue guidelines with regard to treatment of IPRs, the only 
comparable document in India is the Advocacy Booklet on IPRs published by the Commission. 
However, rather than elaborating the Commission’s approach to different types of agreements and 
forms of conduct, the Booklet only illustrates different licensing terms that are restrictive or likely to 
be anticompetitive. This lack of guidance is reflected in the Commission’s tendency to intervene in 
IP related issues without any consistent basis or method and its uncertain application of legal 
provisions.2815 
In Department of Agriculture, Cooperation & Farmers Welfare v M/s Mahyco Monsanto 
Biotech (India) Limited, which is a case concerning Monsanto’s licensing of its Bt cotton technology, 
the Commission while ordering a detailed investigation into the matter, held that the ‘agreements 
entered into by Monsanto with the sub-licensees appeared to be causing appreciable adverse effect 
on competition in the Bt cotton technology market’ and the ‘termination conditions are found to be 
excessively harsh and do not appear to be reasonable as may be necessary for protecting any of the 
IPR rights, as envisaged under Section 3(5) of the Act’. Interestingly, the Commission did not 
examine Monsanto’s conduct under the standards applicable to unilateral abuse of dominance under 
section 4 of the Competition Act. 2816 
In other cases such as the Shri Shamsher Kataria v. Honda Siel Cars,2817 the Commission 
conflated sections 3 and 4. First, the Commission concluded that the automobile manufacturers 
(OEMs) had violated section 4(2)(c) of the Act by denying market access to independent workshops 
and by excluding competitors by means other than legitimate competition. The Commission reasoned 
that the OEMs had strengthened their dominant position by becoming the only source of supply of 
these spare parts in the aftermarket, and the independent service providers had been effectively 
restricted from competing with the authorized dealers of the OEMs. Next the Commission evaluated 
these agreements under section 3, concluding that the restrictions placed on the Original Equipment 
Suppliers (OESs) violated sections 3(4)(b), 3(4)(c), and 3(4)(d) read with section 3(1) of the Act 
because they adversely affected competition in the automobile sector. However, its only basis for this 
finding was that (i) the choice between authorized dealer or independent retailer should be left to the 
consumer, and (ii) there is a requirement for the creation of a collaborative space between the 
                                                          
2815 Yogesh Pai and Nitesh Daryanani ‘Patents and Competition Law in India: CCI’s Reductionist Approach in evaluating 
Competitive Harm’ Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2017, 5, 299–327, 304. 
2816 Order dated 10 February 2016 in Reference Case No 2 of 2015. 
2817 Samsher Kataria v Honda Siel Cars India Ltd. & Ors., Case No 03/2011. 
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independent repairers, OESs, and auto manufacturers so they can effectively counter the use of 
spurious spare parts and provide the consumer with competitive and efficient repair and maintenance 
options. 2818 
The Commission also considered whether agreements between OEMs and OESs and between 
OEMs and their authorised dealers were eligible for an exemption under section 3(5). However, the 
Commission rejected the OEMs argument that measures for protecting its IP are exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny under section 3(5), holding that the OEMs had failed to provide sufficient evidence 
of the existence of any IP rights in the spare parts. Further, while examining the OEMs conduct under 
section 4, the Commission held that they could not rely on the defence that they were protecting their 
IP rights, because there is no equivalent to section 3(5) under section 4. In its order in December 
2016, the now defunct Competition Appellate Tribunal has broadly confirmed the approach of the 
Commission.2819  
The reaction of the Courts to the interventions of the Commission appears to be largely 
deferential and in petitions filed before the Courts challenging the jurisdiction of the Commission 
with respect to IP matters, the Courts have decided in favour of the Commission.  For instance, in the 
case of Amir Khan Productions Private Limited v. Union of India, the High Court ruled that the 
Commission has the power to deal with intellectual property cases; what can be contested before 
Copyright Board can also be contested before the Competition Commission and the Competition Act 
has overriding effect over other legislations for the time being in force. 2820 
 
3.11.2. Superior Bargaining Power and Competition Law  
 
Although there is no specific rule on abuse of superior bargaining power in the Competition Act, such 
a rule may be inferred from the provisions relating to abuse on dominant position. In terms of section 
4.2 (a), dominant position means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant 
market, in India, which enables it to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the 
relevant market, or to affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour. In 
considering dominance, the Commission is required to take into consideration certain factors which 
may be deemed to be indicative of the bargaining power of an enterprise including the market share 
of the enterprise; the size and resources of the enterprise; the size and importance of the competitors; 
                                                          
2818 See n. 2815, 309-310.  
2819 Toyota Kirloskar (Pvt.) Ltd. v Competition Commission of India (Appeal No 60/2014). 
2820 In Amir Khan Private Limited versus Union of India, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry 
(FICCI) filed information against united producers/distributors forum (hereinafter called as UPDF) and others for market 
cartel in films against the Multiplexes. In order to raise their revenue, UPDF refused to deal with multiplex owners. 
Multiplex business is 100 percent dependent upon films. So this is refusal to deal and anti-competitive. The UPDF and 
others hold almost 100 percent share in Bollywood film industry. UPDF was indulged in limiting/controlling supply of 
films in the market by refusal to deal with Multiplexes. It is violation of Section 3(3) of Competition Act 2002. The 
Commission prima facie found there is anticompetitive agreement and there is abuse of dominant position also. So the 
Commission directed Director General (hereinafter called as DG) to inquire into the matter. The Director General inquired 
into the matter and submitted a report that there is cartel. The Commission issued a show cause notice. UPDF instead of 
answering to show-cause notice, approached the Bombay High Court. UPDF contended that films are subject to copyright 
protection. Therefore Copyright Board has the jurisdiction to deal with matter. The Bombay High Court discussed the 
matter in great detail. The court ruled that Section 3(5) provides that Section 3(1) shall not take away the right to sue for 
infringement of patent, copyright, trademark etc. All the defences which can be raised before Copyright Board can also 
be raised before the Commission. Competition law does not bar application of other laws. Matter is presently sub judice 
before the Commission 
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the economic power of the enterprise eg commercial advantages over competitors; and the 
countervailing buying power. 2821 
The Commission has referred to the concept of superior bargaining power in a 2012 market 
study in which it investigated the onion market and found that, due to large storage capacity, traders 
had become highly concentrated locally and were able to exert superior bargaining power at the 
national level. The Commission further found that this allowed them to vertically integrate several 
other market actors, especially agents and logistic companies. In view of these factors the 
Commission stated that “(s)uch multiple roles by select few big traders have brought inequality 
between traders. So big have become very big which has created monopolistic conditions.”2822 The 
Commission also noted that contract farming can represent a viable solution to the problems of the 
Indian agricultural market, as it would allow the parties to the contract to bypass highly concentrated 
traders and set a balanced and fair contractual framework between farmers and retailers.2823 
In a number of its orders, the Commission has identified the existence of unequal bargaining 
power between parties to contracts,2824 whereas in several other cases parties themselves have pressed 
this principle.2825 Regardless, however, the Commission has not decided any of its cases on the basis 
of superior bargaining power.    
In the case of Indian Sugar Mills Association & Another vs. Indian Jute Mills Association & 
Others.2826, the Commission considered allegations of violation of section 3 made by the Indian Sugar 
Mills Association against the Indian Jute Mills Association. The Sugar Mills Association contended 
that the Government had made it mandatory on the Sugar Mills to use Indian made jute bags for the 
packaging of sugar and, therefore, there was an anti-competitive agreement between the members of 
the Jute Mills Association and the Gunny Trade Association for fixing the sale price of jute packaging 
material. In pursuance of this agreement, the Gunny Trade Association issued a daily price bulletin 
for jute bags and members of the Jute Mills Association and Gunny Trade Association duly followed 
it. After a detailed investigation and hearings, the Commission found the Gunny Trade Association 
and the Jute Mills Association to be in violation of section 3 of the Act. 2827  
In this order, the Commission also observed that “…although no contravention of section 3 
or 4 has been found against the Ministry of Textiles…the policy of the Ministry and …[the] placing 
[of] statutory requirement on the Sugar Mills to undertake sugar packaging using jute bags produced 
in India only, is undoubtedly against the principle of competitive neutrality as the entities 
manufacturing matching products are denied access to that segment of packaging products... 
Furthermore, such a policy/provision not only restricts the choice of customers like the Sugar Mills 
but it may also lead to escalation in the cost ultimately borne by the end consumer, i.e., common 
people.” The Commission then called upon the Ministry of Textiles “to reassess the whole situation 
in view of the current market situation and strive to remove the distortions which militate against the 
                                                          
2821 Section 19(4) of the Competition Act.  
2822 Competition Commission of India, Competitive Assessment of Onion Markets in India (2012) 28 <Available at: 
http://www.cci.gov.in/images/media/completed/AO.pdf>. 
2823 ibid 31. 
2824Belaire Owners’ Association Vs. DLF Limited, HUDA &Ors. (Case No. 19/2010) – Abuse of Dominant Position in 
Real Estate Industry.  
2825 M/s Rajarhat Welfare Association &Anr.  v/s DLF Commercial Complexes Ltd. &Ors. (Case No. 10 of 2011 , Dated: 
25.05.2011) at Para 2.6; Case No. 13 & 21 of 2010 and Case No. 55 of 2012 at par 5.24. 
2826 CCI, Case No. 38/2011. 
2827 Para 200 of the judgment 
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principle of competitive neutrality.”2828  This observation by the Commission indicates a paradigm 
shift in the approach as more heed was paid to the competition concerns and the consequential 
economic implications rather than on the fate of the ailing jute industry of India.  
More recently, in the Monsanto case2829, the Commission received a reference from the 
Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers 
Welfare and from private seed companies against Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) Limited 
alleging, inter alia, Mahyco’s contravention of the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The 
Ministry had made the representation on basis of information received from various stakeholders’ 
groups including farmers’ associations and political movement bodies, National Seeds Association of 
India.  
This case also reflects a situation where a large corporate entity such as Monsanto has been 
utilizing its superior bargaining power to charge heavy royalties to Indian companies, which had 
obtained licenses for its genetically modified seed. However, the final burden of the high royalty was 
borne by the consumers, which in this case means the farmers. The Commission found that there was 
a prima facie case against Monsanto and observed that lack of competition is taking toll of the 
agriculture. The Commission has referred to the matter to its Director General Investigations and the 
matter is still pending a final decision. 
  
3.11.3. Dealing with Unfair Trade Practices under Competition Law 
 
Although the Indian Competition Act does not explicitly deal with unfair trading practices, the 
Commission has taken up unfair trade practices in pursuance of its provisions dealing with abuse of 
dominant position. Cases taken up against coal companies2830 and builders2831 are particularly notable 
in this regard.  
 
3.12. Agricultural Subsidies 
 
Agriculture subsidies in India are managed by the government, primarily through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which plays a diverse role in this regard, through its trade and domestic policies. These 
policies are mostly implemented by departments and institutions set up under the central government 
and at times by institutions under the state governments. The ethos behind this support is to generate 
self-sufficiency in the agricultural sector, create employment and improve the income of the farm 
households.2832 The overall aim of the Indian agricultural policy is to protect farmers from 
international price volatility.2833 
                                                          
2828 Para 201 of the judgment. 
2829 Reference Case No. 2 of 2015 & Case No. 107 of 2015. 
2830 http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/unfair-trade-practices-7-coal-india-related-cases-before-
cci-113111000209_1.html (accessed 15th May 2017). 
2831 
http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/568058/Antitrust+Competition/CCIs+Whip+On+DLF+Cease+And+Desist+Unfair+Tr
ade+Practices (accessed 15th May 2017). 
2832 Harshal A Salunkhe and Binod B Deshmush, ‘The Overview of Government Subsidies to Agriculture Sector in India’ 
(2012) 1 IOSR Journal of Agriculture and Veterinary Science 43. 
2833 Kathleen Mullen, David Orden and Ashok Gulati, ‘Agricultural Policies in India’ (International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) 2005). 
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3.12.1. India’s trade policies 
The Agricultural & Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) is an 
autonomous organization established under the Department of Commerce. It is responsible for the 
promotion of export of agricultural commodities and for providing subsidies to exporters of certain 
specified products.2834 
The main incentive schemes established by the government include:  
Vishesh Krishi and Gram Udyog Yojana (VKGUY): The incentive under this scheme is 
granted in the form of duty credit scrip @ 5% of FOB value of the exports. 
Incremental Export Incentivization Scheme (IEIS): The incentive under this scheme is in the 
form of Duty Credit Scrip for export of agricultural products excluding sugar and food grains.2835  
To further encourage exports of value-added agricultural products, the Indian government has 
also established agricultural export zones (AEZs). The purpose of the AEZs is to source raw 
agricultural products and complete the processing and packaging of their products within a 
geographical region. This “cluster approach” involves states identifying the regions in which products 
with export potential are being produced. Through December 2002, the Government had approved 
41 AEZs in 17 states.
 
According to the APEDA website, today there are approximately 60 AEZs in 
20 states in India.2836 The central government contributes approximately 30 percent of the total 
funding for AEZs, while the state governments and private bodies supply 15 percent and 55 percent, 
respectively.  
 
3.12.2. Domestic policies 
Domestic polices include price support programmes, direct payments, and input subsidies to 
influence the cost and availability of farm inputs like credit, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation water, etc.2837 
In India, domestic support for agriculture has been provided mainly through two channels: Minimum 
Support Price (MSP) guarantees for basic staple commodities and provision of inputs subsidies. In 
addition, a complex array of other policy instruments has been employed.2838 
 
(a)  Market Support Price  
 
Basic staples in India continue to be subject to MSP guarantees. These commodities include paddy 
rice, wheat, coarse cereals, maize, barley, pulses, sugarcane, cotton, groundnuts, jute, 
rapeseed/mustard, sunflower, soyabean, safflower, toria, tobacco, copra, sesamum, and niger seed. 
The stated objectives of the agricultural price policy are to ensure remunerative prices to the farmers, 
even out effects of seasonality, and promote agricultural diversification although the guaranteed 
prices can be below prices prevailing in markets.  
Recommendations concerning the MSP levels are made by the Commission for Agricultural 
Costs and Prices (CACP).2839 In formulating its recommendation, the CACP considers a number of 
                                                          
2834 “India : Subsidy on Agricultural Goods” Publication info: MENA Report ; London (Aug 27, 2013). 
2835 “India : Subsidy on Agricultural Goods” Publication info: MENA Report ; London (Aug 27, 2013).  
2836 http://apeda.gov.in/apedawebsite/trade_promotion/Agri_Export_Zone.htm (accessed 17 November 2017). 
2837 Salunkhe and Deshmush (n 1). 
2838 Mullen, Orden and Gulati (n 2). 20 
2839 http://cacp.dacnet.nic.in (accessed 17 November 2017). 
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factors, including input/output price parity, trends in market prices, demand and supply, inter-crop 
price parity, effects on industrial cost structure, effects on general prices, cost of living, international 
market prices, and the terms of trade. CACP recommendations have generally been followed but the 
MSP can vary from the CACP recommended prices.2840 
 
(b)  Market Intervention Scheme  
 
For horticultural and other agricultural commodities not covered by the MSP, there is a Market 
Intervention Scheme (MIS) of somewhat ad hoc support measures. Under the MIS, if the price of a 
commodity falls below a specific “economic” level the Government can intervene, at the request of 
the state governments, by purchasing the product at intervention prices that do not exceed the cost of 
production. Losses incurred in implementing the MIS are shared equally between the central and state 
governments. Since 1998, the MIS has been used to support a number of horticultural products, 
including oranges, coriander seed, apples, oil palm, potatoes, red chilies, areca nut, ginger, and 
onions.2841 
 
(c)  Input Subsidies  
 
Subsidies to farmers resulting from interventions in fertilizers, electrical power and irrigation began 
to increase in the mid 1980s, and have continued to climb in current and constant (real) value. The 
Government claims to be gradually moving towards a more deregulated regime while emphasizing 
the need for investment in power, irrigation and rural infrastructure.  
 
Seeds 
 
Many schemes such Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojna, Macro Management Agriculture, Integrated 
Scheme for oilseeds, pulses, oil palm and maize (ISOPOM); Technology missions for cotton, 
National food security Mission etc. provide for subsidized seeds. Some of them also provide 
incentives for investment in Seed manufacturing infrastructure and upgradations. 
New Policy on Seed Development (NPSD) includes permitting 100 per cent foreign direct 
investment (FDI) under the automatic route. The thrust is also on creating a seed bank. There are 
three stages in seed production cycle. At the first stage the ‘Indian Council of Agricultural Research’ 
(ICAR), National Seeds Corporation (NSC) or state farms corporations (SFCs) develop Breeder 
seeds. In the second stage, the NSC, SFCs or State seeds corporations develop Foundation Seeds and 
then finally seeds certified by the state agricultural universities or private organizations authorized 
by ICAR, Certified Seeds, are produced and distributed to all farmers. The National Seeds Company 
(NSC) formed in 1963 has a central role in development of seed industry in India. It implements a 
number of subsidy schemes (including ISOPOM discussed above) and is also involved in export of 
seeds, especially to SAARC nations and African countries. It also maintains a SAARC seed bank in 
which it maintains an inventory of large quantities of various seeds in order to tackle shortages that 
may arise due to natural calamities or for other reasons. 
                                                          
2840 Mullen, Orden and Gulati (n 2). 21 
2841 ibid.  
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From 2016-17, new initiatives like distribution of seed minikits, subsidy on production of quality 
seed, creation of seed hubs, strengthening breeder seed production programme and 
strengthening/establishing production units of bio-fertilizers and bio-control agents at ICAR institutes 
and State Agriculture Universities (SAUs), cluster frontline demonstrations through grass root level 
farm science centres, Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVKs) are being undertaken under the National Food 
Security Mission to increasing productivity and production of pulses in the country.2842  
 
Fertilizers  
 
To promote the use of fertilizers by farmers, the central government provides a fertilizer subsidy to 
the producers of fertilizers. In 2017-18, Rs 70,000 crore has been allocated for fertilizer subsidy, 
which is the second biggest expenditure on subsidy after food subsidy.2843 Allocations for fertilizer 
subsidy have been increasing at an annual rate of 11.4% between 2000 and 2016. Currently the 
amount of subsidy to be given is determined based on the cost of production of the fertilizer company. 
Companies with a higher cost of production receive greater subsidies. This reduces the companies’ 
incentive to reduce their cost of production. Although the consumption of urea has been increasing 
over the past decade, no new domestic production capacity has been added in the past 15 years.2844  
A Committee that examined the role of Food Corporation of India recommended that cash transfers 
should be made to farmers to replace the current fertilizer subsidy regime. This would allow farmers 
to choose fertilizers in the combination best suited to their needs, and help them to fix the fertilizer 
imbalance in soil. In the Union Budget 2016-17, it was announced that a direct benefit transfer 
program for fertilizers would be launched on a pilot basis in a few districts across the country. In July 
2016, the government announced that it would be conducting pilot studies of direct benefit transfers 
in 16 districts in 2016-17. 
A retention price system (RPS) for fertilizers was introduced in 1977 to insulate farmers from 
rising prices of fertilizers and to ensure the availability of this input. The difference between the 
“retention price” or normal cost of production (plus 12-percent post-tax return on investment) and 
the “notified sales price” (minus a distribution margin) is paid to manufacturers based on specific 
plants. A subsidy is also paid to cover the cost of transportation to the farming areas where fertilizer 
utilization is concentrated. Since there is a uniform issue (sales) price for domestic and imported 
fertilizers, the government also bears the net cost between the delivery cost of imported fertilizers 
and the price paid by farmers.2845 Originally nitrogenous, phosphatic and potassic fertilizers were 
included under the price control subsidy program. However, in 1992 phosphatic and potassic 
fertilizers were decontrolled. Their prices rose dramatically leading to a fall in usage. To make these 
fertilizers available to farmers at lower prices, and to encourage balanced use among fertilizers, the 
central government has continued to provide “a concession” (subsidy) for decontrolled phosphatic 
and potassic fertilizers.2846 While the budgetary expenditure on fertilizer subsidies is large, a portion 
of the subsidy supports an inefficient fertilizer industry, rather than providing farmers with low cost 
inputs.2847  
                                                          
2842 ‘Agriculture Report 2016-2017’ © Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, 24.  
2843 Tanvi Deshpande State of Agriculture in India © 2017 PRS Legislative Research. 10 
2844 Ibid.  
2845 Mullen, Orden and Gulati (n 2). 
2846 ibid. 
2847 ibid. 
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Wheat and Rice  
 
When world cereal prices were at very low levels in the late 1990s, India increased the domestic 
support prices for wheat and rice, which led to increased production and procurement. Consequently, 
India’s food grain stocks grew to unusually large levels compared to usual carry-over quantities. In 
November 2000, the Government initiated a policy of subsidies to export cereals, by offering wheat 
for export at a price “equal to the economic cost minus two years carrying cost but not lower than the 
central issue price for [those below the poverty line] BPL”. The subsidy was expanded to rice the 
following year.  
 
Electricity  
 
Underpricing or provision of free electricity to agricultural users is possibly the largest subsidy. 
Industrial and commercial power consumers pay a price higher than the unit price of electricity to 
compensate for the losses on agricultural power supply. These subsidies are charged to the state 
budgets. There is some evidence of agricultural electricity being siphoned off for other uses as it is 
not metered and is determined on a residual basis.  
 
Irrigation  
 
Irrigation subsidies charged against state budgets remain the mainstay of Indian agricultural system. 
In most states, the pricing of canal water does not cover more than 20 per cent of the operation and 
maintenance, let alone recover capital costs. Other irrigation subsidy programs include the 
Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP) to assist States complete ongoing irrigation 
projects. Beginning in 1999-2000 minor irrigation schemes in the north-east region, hill States and 
drought prone regions were included in the AIPB. From 2002, approved medium and major irrigation 
projects that can be completed within one year are funded under the AIPB’s fast track programme.  
 
Credit  
 
Credit subsidy to Indian agriculture can be perceived to consist of two components: (a) interest 
subsidy that accrues to agriculture due to concessional rate of interest that is charged from the sector 
vis a vis others of the economy; and (b) default subsidy which accrues to the agriculture in the form 
of bad debts which will never be paid back to lending institutions.2848 Credit subsidies are given 
through the banking system and is available for short term loans provided for production purpose for 
a period of one year.2849 Nationalised Banks are authorised only to offer interest subvention provided 
by the Government of India through the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Co-operative Banks may offer 
both interest subvention and interest subsidy and it is given through the National Bank for Agriculture 
and Rural Development (NABARD).2850  
                                                          
2848 Ashok Gulati ‘Input Subsidies in Indian Agriculture: A Statewise Analysis’ (1989) Economic and Political Weekly, 
Vol. 24, No. 25, A57-A65. 
2849 ‘Agriculture Subsidies in India’ Shodhganga 62-63. 
2850 Ibid. 
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Agriculture subsidies and the WTO 
 
In recent years India has been concerned that the reduction of its agriculture subsidies in the face of 
continued support of their agriculture sector in the developed countries would make the Indian 
agricultural produce less competitive internationally. This will also encourage dumping of artificially 
cheaper products in India, which in turn will have an adverse impact on the livelihood of Indian 
farmers.2851 Regardless, however, India has been under pressure from the WTO to rationalize its 
support to the agriculture sector. 
India initially reported its fertilizer, electricity, irrigation, seed and credit to the WTO under non-
product specific support commitments. India’s support to its agricultural sector is covered by the 
domestic support categories that are exempt from reduction commitments under the WTO's 
Agreement on Agriculture.2852  The BJP-led government has toughened its stance on food subsidies 
since it came to power in 2014. The government indicated in the notification to WTO that another 
$14.7 billion was spent on public stockholding for food security purposes, another 'green box' 
complaint element that was $13.8 billion in FY 2011. India provided statistics to show that it was 
spending consistently lesser on research between 2011-12 and 2013-14 but increasingly more on 
advisory services.2853   
 
3.13. Conclusion  
 
The Indian Central Government disposes of important powers to regulate the food sector.2854 
However, it is a different issue whether such powers are being exercised effectively or not. In the 
context of India, it is important to understand that most of the food related laws pertain to food safety 
and standardization, whilst different laws govern the various aspects of commercial operations of 
food processing companies. Whilst some effort has been made to introduce technology in the 
Agriculture sector, a great deal more needs to be done especially given the small individual land 
holdings, the poor economic condition of the farmers and the farmers’ lack of awareness about new 
technologies. There have been efforts by the government to educate these farmers but financial 
constraints faced by the farmers has prevented them from taking advantage of this offer. The enormity 
of the tragedy of the farming sector is evident from the high rate of suicides of farmers, however, its 
impact is felt throughout the food value chain which remains unable to realise its true potential.  
  
                                                          
2851 Yogesh Bandhu ‘Trade Competitiveness, Subsidies and Barriers to Trade: Implication for Indian Agriculture’ Online 
at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22802/ MPRA Paper No. 22802, posted 25. May 2010 01:04 UTC. 
2852//economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/59623742.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&ut
m_campaign=cppst (accessed 12 November 2017). 
2853 Ibid.  
2854 Essential Commodities Act 1955. 
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Chapter 4: China 
 
Qiang Yu2855, Bo Wang & Ye Huilin2856 
 
4.1.China’s agricultural policy and food value chain 
 
The term “food value chain” refers to segments of independent but inter-related processes of food 
supply, from food production, to consumer purchase. Although there are thousands of years of history 
of agriculture and food processing in China, analysis and regulation of the power and structure within 
a specific segment of the food value chain and the inter-relationship between different segments and 
the over-all chain only began quite recently. China’s food production and supply system has 
undergone reforms since 1978, when there was a shift from the communist system (planed production 
and supply, with no market mechanism) to a system based on demand-supply relationships, that is, a 
market mechanism. The main reason for these agro-food product supply system reforms was that the 
planned agro-food product supply system was inefficient and unable to provide enough food for the 
growing Chinese population.2857 This major policy shift proved to be effective. According to an 
official document, China has successfully tackled hunger problems and increased the level of 
peasants’ income, as well as providing food for 22% of the world population with its own capacity, 
namely, 6% of the world’s water resource and 9% of the world’s arable land.2858 
The Chinese government attaches great importance on agricultural issues. Being a traditional 
agrarian country, China has an over 5,000-year history of agriculture-prioritize policy. The emphasize 
on the food-supply security and rural social stability have long been Chinese central government’s 
priorities. Such importance and priorities are influenced by the economic realities, the historical and 
cultural traditions, as well as the ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Firstly, the 
majority of the Chinese population lives in the rural area (although the number is constantly 
decreasing as the consequence of economic development and urbanization, the rural population still 
amounts 50.32% as of 20112859, over 348 million peoples directly working on agricultural industry 
as of December 20062860). Secondly, the stability and the well-beings of the rural society and farmers 
has long been the decisive factor of the tradition Chinese society, the issues of land annexation and 
land-lost peasants are the recurring inducements of Civil wars and revolutions. The patriarchal society 
and its related small scale natural peasant economy are the fundamental social structure of the ancient 
China. Consequently, the ancient dynasties have all adopted the ideology and policy of Physiocracy 
and commerce restriction. Chinese governments therefore view agricultural issues as the matters of 
national stability and security, even matters of government’s legitimacy. Thirdly, the CPC’s main 
supporters during the Chinese civil war are the mass public in Chinese rural areas. The CPC got 
support of them by implementing land reform policy which enable peasants to have their own lands 
and free them from exploitations by landlords. Mao’s most important strategy to achieve national 
success is “encircling the cities from the rural areas and taking the political power by armed 
                                                          
2855 HSE Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development. 
2856 Centre for Law, Economics and Society, UCL Faculty of Laws. 
2857 Exceeding 1.37 billion. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160420_1346151.html. 
2858 http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zt/38thdiqiuri/2.htm. 
2859 第六次人口普查数据 
2860 第二次全国农业普查数据 
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forces”(农村包围城市，武装夺取政权). The CPC’s most important strike (also a proved failure) 
towards communist economy was the agricultural collectivization during 1950s to 1970s. The 
“Chinese economic miracle” was also kicked off by Deng Xiaoping’s agricultural reforming policy. 
Until today, agriculture is still not only a sector/industry of Chinese economy, but a comprehensive 
issue of national security and stability. The Three Rural Issue (the issues of agriculture, rural areas 
and farmers, 三农问题)   is still one of the top priority of Chinese central government’s agenda. 
Moreover, some serious food security cases happed in the recent 20 years have forced Chinese 
government to address the issue with utmost importance. In a nutshell, from seeds to final goods, the 
whole food value chain is regarded as vital to national security and prosperity, and therefore, highly 
regulated. This fact may be better illustrated while comparing China to the countries with less 
population or with more developed industrial structure.       
China’s success in the food production and supply system is primarily the result of a proactive 
policy on the food production process. This policy has been extended to the external sphere when 
negotiating China’s international treaties. China has sought reservations when it signed World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreements with other countries on agricultural issues.2861 China is a founding 
member of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  China joined the 
the International Plant Protection Convention on 20 October 2005, without reservations.   
In domestic legislation, when drafting the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), a separate provision 
was added to provide exemptions for anticompetitive behaviour, such as sharing production facilities 
and co-operative production among farmers. A major reason explaining China’s proactive policy on 
the production segment in food production is the Great Chinese Famine of 1959 to 1961 and other 
famines that have occurred historically in China. During the Great Chinese Famine, about 30 million 
Chinese people died and it is estimated that it also led to about 33 million lost or postponed births.2862 
The so named “Three-Year Disaster”,2863 remains one of the worst catastrophes in world history. As 
a result, China has sought self-sufficiency on food production. The Chinese government has pursued 
a self-sufficiency oriented agricultural policy, rather than focusing on imports or exports and all 
means to improve food outputs have been implemented. This has further influenced the 
diversification of peasants and food suppliers. There have been some military units with the specific 
mission to conduct farming work and provide foodstuffs on the market, have, a typical example being 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp. (a unit in Heilongjiang being reformed in 1976), but 
their role in the food supply in China is quite limited2864.  
Although China’s Reform or “open-up” policy “搞活、放开” marked by the transition from 
the communist collective farm model to the “household contract responsibility system” since 1978, 
and the deregulation of the agro-foods sector, after China joined the WTO, has led to great successes 
in the production of agro-food products, there have also been adverse consequences in other segments 
of the food value chain, namely regarding food distribution. As an increasing number of people 
moved to urban areas, and became consumers, the number of people in food production positions 
fell. By 2011, the urban population exceeded the sub-urban population,2865 and it has continued to 
                                                          
2861 Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China 2001. 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf. 
2862 Ashton Basil, Hill Kenneth, Piazza Alan, Zeitz Robin, Famine in China, 1958–61, Population and Development 
Review 10:613–645 1984. 
2863 三年自然灾害. 
2864 http://www.xjbt.gov.cn/. 
2865 http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-08/14/content_2204179.htm. 
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increase. With the deepening of the “open-up” policy, food production became more professionalized 
and is no more simply subsistence agriculture. This trend indicates that the consumption market is 
increasingly important and food distribution has become a major issue in China, second only to food 
production aiming to mitigate problems of food scarcity. 
Deregulation of the food consumption markets and the processing and distribution segments 
of food value chains have increasingly led to problems. The increased demand from Chinese 
consumers attracted international food suppliers. With the increasing amount of food imports, 
problems have arisen sequentially or simultaneously regarding food quality, different food standards, 
excessive pricing, etc. With the fragmentation of the production segment, some domestic food 
distribution entities began to hoard food or raw material and sell them at unreasonably high prices. 
There have also been cases regarding illegal pricing of soybeans and garlic (which will be introduced 
in the following Section).2866 
Along with the rapid development of this huge consumption market, economic dependence 
problems between suppliers and dealers, market structure problems, and anticompetitive over-
charging by suppliers and dealers has appeared in many segments of the food value chain; increasing 
concentration, both vertically and horizontally. In 2010, the wholesaler Hubei Salt Group Ltd was 
found to be abusing its dominance over retailers; in 2014, a rice vermicelli processing factory 
organised a cartel to raise the price of rice vermicelli above a competitive level and was, therefore 
fined 10,000 RMB.2867 As a trend, since 2008, market concentration has become increasingly 
prominent, with at least 60 merger or acquisition cases relating to all segments of the agro-food 
industry, involving both domestic and international firms. 
 
4.2.Bodies regulating the food value chains 
 
Food value chains cover a wide range of independent but related sectors, subject to regulation from 
numerous regulatory bodies. The regulation of food value chains in Mainland China is especially 
complex. The market is comprises approximately 1.5 billion food consumers and agro-food 
production constitutes 8.6% of China’s gross domestic product (about 10.84 trillion USD in 2016).2868 
Together with the nation’s legal and policy support and protection, the number of regulatory bodies 
regulating food value chains is beyond the scope of this report. Consequently, only the main 
regulatory bodies are introduced below. 
Summarily, the food value chains regulating system could be categorized into 3 parts.  
• As for the top tier, the agencies responsible for macro-economic control and regulation, i.e. 
the National Development and Reform Commission, has its significant influence on the 
overall policies regulating food value chains. Moreover, the Commission has some specific 
authorities influencing agriculture and food industry. Thorough its price regulating, foreign 
investment regulation and antitrust powers, as well as it’s subsidy State Administration of 
Grains, the Commission plays an important role in Chinese food value chains regulation. On 
a separate note, observers of this topic should also pay attention to the CPC’s office of rural 
policy (中央农村工作领导小组办公室). That office is, however, beyond the scope of this 
fiche.  
                                                          
2866 Soybeans(豆你玩); garlic(蒜你狠). 
2867 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201402/t20140228_588558.html. 
2868 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201701/t20170120_1455942.html 
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• Secondly, there is a dedicated ministry of agricultural issues in the Chinese bureaucracy. The 
Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for several important matters concerning food industry. 
Moreover, there is a state agency regulating food and drug quality and security, since its 
crucially importance to the nation.  
• Thirdly, ministries and agencies responsible for general market supervision, intellectual 
property protection, commerce and trade regulation, import and export administration also 
have their respective authorities over food value chains. 
• Additionally, since the food industry is tightly connected with the land policy and the deeply 
involvement of state owned enterprises in the value chains. The Ministry of Land and 
Resources (MLR, 国土资源部) and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC, 国有资产监督管理委员会) also have indirect influence on food 
value chains. Other governmental ministries and agencies, may also have their influence when 
concerns specific issues.  
 
1. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 国家发展和改革委员
会) 
The NDRC is the competent authority for the macro control and regulation of the Chinese economy, 
it is also the authority responsible for national and industrial reform policies formulation. Considering 
Chinese central government’s long-standing agenda of promoting market economic-oriented reform, 
the NDRC is indeed the most powerful department within the State Council and the whole 
administrative system. Among its multiple duties, “to formulate and coordinate the implementation 
of the overall national economic and social development strategy, mid and long-term agendas and 
annual plan”, “to promote the industrial restructuring, research and coordinate issues of fundamental 
importance in agriculture industry; to coordinate specialised agricultural projects and policies”, “to 
formulate national import and export plan of important agricultural and industrial products, to 
supervise and adjust the implementation of the plans”, “to manage the state reserves of food, cotton, 
sugar, petrol and medicine” are all of relevance to the agriculture and food industry, and to be more 
precisely, food value chain. Besides, it is also worth mentioning that NDRC is also the price 
regulating authority and one of the foreign investment policy formulating authority.  
There are some NDRC’s affiliations important to the food value chains regulation. 
(1) Principally, and most significantly, the State Administration of Grain (SAC, 国家粮食局) 
is the very authority responsible for national grain distribution, agricultural industry guidance 
and supervision, and the central food reserve administration. The responsibilities and 
authorities of the SAC include the supervision and administration of grain production, 
procurement, marketing, storage, logistics, processing and quality inspection, as well as the 
related scientific research, agricultural informationalisation, and international affairs. The 
principal functions of the SAG include:2869 
• Entrusted by the NDRC, to study and formulate mid-term and long-term strategies of 
national grain macro-control, overall balance of supply and demand, grain distribution, 
grain import and export and deployment of national grain reserves; and to develop and 
implement the programs for the reform of national grain distribution system. 
• To draft laws and statutes, relevant policies, rules and regulations for the nation’s grain 
                                                          
2869 http://www.chinagrain.gov.cn/english/General%20Situation2.html  
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distribution and national grain reserves management, and supervise the enforcement; to 
formulate plans of building facilities for grain distribution, storage and processing; and to 
raise proposals in regard of setting a framework for grain protective procurement price, 
protection price and limited market price. 
• To standardize and manage the quality of grain products in coordination with the State 
Bureau of Quality and Technology Supervision; and to establish technical criteria for grain 
storage and transportation, and supervise the implementation. 
• To steer the management of national grain distribution and personnel training of grain 
sector; to guide and promote technical reform and the spread of new technology; to take 
charge of relevant financial work; to promote foreign exchanges and cooperation; and to 
handle the statistic work of grain industry. 
• To formulate technical norms for the management of national grain reserves and supervise 
the implementation; to propose the scale and overall layout of national grain reserves as 
well as plans for procurement, marketing, import and export of national grain reserves, 
and supervise the implementation; to supervise and examine the stock, quality and security 
of national grain reserves. 
• To undertake other tasks assigned by the State Council and the NDRC. In accordance with 
relevant regulations of the State Council, the SAG is also responsible for guiding the 
business of China Grain Reserves Corporation. 
In addition to the SAC, some other sub-sectors of the NDRC also have authorities over some issues 
concerning the agriculture economy and the food industry.  
(2) The Department of Rural Economy (农村经济司) is responsible for formulating general 
plans of rural economic development and agricultural policy. The Department of Rural 
Economy is responsible for analyzing the development of agriculture and rural economy; 
making policy recommendations on rural economic development strategies and the reform of 
rural economic system, coordinating major issues concerning agriculture and rural economic 
and social development; coordinating and balancing the development plans and policies for 
agriculture, forestry, water conservancy and meteorology; making proposals on layout of 
major projects, and coordinating the implementation of these proposals. 2870 
(3) The Department of Price (价格司) is responsible for forecasting price changes, 
recommending objectives, policies and reform plans for price adjustment; formulating price 
and fee-charging policies and regulations; putting forward the scope, principles and measures 
of price management, making recommendations on revision of government pricing catalog; 
setting and adjusting prices and fees administered by the central government; and organizing 
cost investigation concerning major agricultural products, commodities and services. The 
Department of Price has important functions in Chinese agricultural industry regulation. For 
example, it publishes the minimal grain (wheat, rice etc.,) procurement prices on a yearly 
basis; it also frequently conducts cost investigations of agricultural products and publishes its 
guidance on such investigations.2871  
(4) The Bureau of Price Supervision and Antimonopoly (价格监督和反垄断局) is one of the 
three Chinese antitrust enforcement agencies. Its jurisdiction covers unilateral, collective 
                                                          
2870 http://njs.ndrc.gov.cn/jgsz/ 
2871 http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfod/200812/t20081218_252212.html 
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anticompetitive cases concerning price behaviours. The bureau is also the statutory authority 
of implementing the Chinese Price Law. The Bureau of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly 
is responsible for drafting administrative laws and regulations of price supervision and 
inspection; guiding and organizing price supervision and inspection, and handling activities 
and cases related to commodity price, service price and fee collection involving violation of 
price-related laws by central government agencies, handling price monopoly activities and 
reconsideration cases and appeals concerning the punishment of price violations. 2872 
(5) The Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment (利用外资和境外投资司) 
has its influence on agricultural and food industry by formulating policies to promote, permit 
or forbid foreign investments on this very sector. As a crystal example, transgenic breeding is 
explicitly forbidden from foreign investments; the breeding of new varieties and the 
manufacturing of seeds are restricted from foreign investments, foreign investment is only 
allowed to invest in the companies controlled by Chinese and obtain clearances of 
governmental authorities; on the other hand, some of the sectors in agriculture and food 
manufacturing are listed as sectors encouraged for foreign investment.2873This department is 
also responsible for regulating Chinese outbound investments.  
2. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA, 农业部) 
Among all the regulatory bodies, most segments of food value chains are governed by the Ministry 
of Agriculture of the PRC. There are also agricultural departments of local governments responsible 
for regulating regional food value chains. According to ALPRC Article 9,  
“People's governments at all levels shall assume unified responsibility for work in respect of 
agriculture and development of the rural economy and make arrangements for the relevant 
departments and all sectors of society to do a good job in all fields of endeavor for the 
development of agriculture and for provision of services to the development of agriculture. 
The competent administrative department for agriculture under the State Council shall be in 
charge of work in agriculture and economic development in the rural areas throughout the 
country. The competent administrative department for forestry under the State Council and 
relevant departments shall, within the scope of their respective duties, be in charge of work 
related to agriculture and development of the rural economy. The competent administrative 
department for agriculture under the local people's governments at or above the county level 
shall be in charge of work related to agriculture and development of the rural economy 
including crop-planting, animal breeding and fishery, within their own administrative regions, 
while the competent administrative departments for forestry shall be in charge of forest work 
within their own administrative regions. The relevant departments under the local people's 
governments at or above the county level shall, within the scope of their respective duties, be 
responsible for work related to services for agricultural production and operation within their 
own administrative regions.”2874 
The MOA’s statutory responsibilities include:2875 
• To research into and work out development strategies and long-term and mid-term 
development plans of agriculture and rural economy, to organize their implementation after 
                                                          
2872 http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfod/201207/t20120719_492595.html 
2873 外商投资产业指导目录，2017 http://wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201706/W020170628553908627683.pdf  
2874 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2875 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/mandates/  
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approvals; to draw up agricultural development plans and supervise their implementation. 
• To study on and draw up agricultural industry policies, direct the rational structural adjustment 
of agricultural industries, rational allocation of agricultural resources and improvement of 
produce quality; to put forward policy suggestions regarding prices of agricultural products 
and means of agricultural production, tariff adjustment, circulation of agricultural staples, 
rural credit, taxation and rural financial subsidies; to organize the drafting of laws and 
provisions regarding various agricultural industries such as crop production, animal 
husbandry, fishery, rural and township enterprises. 
• To make researches for and put forward suggestions regarding further system reforms of rural 
economy; to guide the building of socialized agricultural service system and the building of 
rural collective economic and cooperative organizations; to stabilize and improve basic rural 
business running system, policies, adjust rural economic relations, guide and supervise the 
alleviation of farmers’ burdens and transfer of land-use rights. 
• To research and formulate guidelines and policies regarding industrialized management of 
agriculture and the system building and development plans of agricultural staple produce 
market and promote the agricultural integration of pre-production, in-production and post- 
production; to organize the “shopping basket program” and the market system building of 
means of agricultural production; research into and put forth suggestions concerning the 
import and export of major agricultural products and means of agricultural production; to 
forecast and publicize rural economic information on supply and demand of various 
agricultural products and means of agricultural production. 
• To organize the zoning of agricultural resources, ecological agriculture and sustainable 
agricultural development; to guide the exploitation of agricultural land, fishery waters, 
grasslands, shoals and swamps suitable for agricultural purposes and the exploitation of rural 
regenerative energy as well as the protection and management of resources of biological 
species of agriculture; to be responsible for the protection of ecological environment of fishery 
waters and aquatic wild animals and plants; to safeguard the state’s fishery rights and execute 
the supervision and management rights of fishing vessel inspections, fishery administration 
and fishing ports on behalf of the state. 
• To formulate development plans and related policies regarding agricultural scientific research, 
education, technology extension and their building of rank and files, and implement the 
strategy of revitalizing agriculture through science and education; to organize the selection 
and application of major scientific research and technology extension projects; to guide the 
development work of agricultural education and agricultural professional skills. 
• To draw up technical standards for various agricultural industries and organize their 
implementation thereof; to organize the implementation of quality supervision and 
certification of various agricultural products and green food products and the protection of 
new varieties of agricultural plants; to organize and coordinate the monitoring and defining 
of quality of agricultural inputs such as seeds, chemicals and veterinary drugs, and of related 
law supervision and executions; to organize the registration of domestic manufactured as well 
as imported seeds, chemicals, vet drugs and related Fertilisers, etc. and the safety supervision 
of agricultural machines. 
• To draft laws and provisions on animal and plant diseases prevention and quarantine, sign 
inter-governmental agreements and accords and formulate related standards; to organize 
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veterinary administrations and veterinary medical products administration and inspection; to 
organize and supervise domestic animal and plant disease prevention and quarantine, 
publicize epidemic information and organize the work of eradication. 
• To undertake foreign-related agricultural affairs and organize related international economic 
and technical exchanges and cooperation. 
• To guide the work of directly affiliated public institutions and the reform of enterprises 
affiliated to the Ministry; to supervise the value retention and increment of state-owned assets 
of enterprises affiliated to the Ministry; in accordance with authorizations, to administer the 
personnel affairs, payrolls, institutional establishments and stuffing of the directly affiliated 
institutions; to guide related social groups for the benefit of development of agricultural 
economy. 
The MOA has many internal departments. A large number of these departments are of responsibilities 
of food supply chains regulation. 
(1) Department of Bureau of Market and Economic Information (市场与经济信息司)2876: 
(2) The Department of Crop Production (种植业管理司).2877 
(3) The Department of Livestock Production (畜牧业司)2878 
(4) The Bureau of Quality and Safety Supervision for Agro-products (农产品质量安全监管
局)2879 
(5) The Bureau of Seed Management (种子管理局).2880 
(6) The Bureau of Fisheries (渔业渔政管理局)2881 
In addition to the departments and bureaus listed above, the MOA also has a bureau responsible for 
the management of state farms and land reclamation (农垦局), a department responsible for farm 
mechanization (农业机械化司), a bureau responsible of promoting agro-product manufacturing and 
township enterprises (农产品加工局及乡镇企业局) and a department responsible for supervising 
agricultural technology development (科教司)。Moreover, there are agricultural academic research 
institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (中国农业科学院) and the Chinese 
Academy of Fishery Science (中国水产科学院) also affiliated to the MOA. Most agricultural 
industrial associations are also under the supervision and direction of the MOA, such as China Agri-
Produce Marking Association (中国农产品市场协会), China Seed Association (中国种子协会), 
China Vegetable Association (中国蔬菜协会), China National Association for Seed Trade (中国种
子贸易协会), China Association for Plant Nutrition and Fertilisers (中国植物营养与废料协会) and 
Dairy Association of China (中国奶业协会). 
3. China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA, 国家食品药品监督管理总局) 2882 
The China Food and Drug Administration is a ministerial governmental agency responsible for 
Chinese food and drug safety regulation. The establishment of this specific administration in 2012 is 
a significant landmark implicating the food safety and quality regulation in China has been 
emphasized.  
4. State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC, 国家工商行政管理总局) 
                                                          
2876 http://www.scs.moa.gov.cn/jieshao/jigou/scltcscs/. 
2877 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9512.htm 
2878 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9514.htm  
2879 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9519.htm  
2880 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9520.htm  
2881 http://english.agri.gov.cn/aboutmoa/departments/201301/t20130115_9518.htm  
2882 http://eng.sfda.gov.cn/WS03/CL0756/  
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The State Administration for Industry and Commerce is the competent authority in charge of market 
supervision, regulation and related administrative law enforcement. The SAIC and its local 
subsidiaries are responsible for law enforcements in enterprise registration, antitrust and anti-unfair 
competition, advertising industry, consumer protection and trademark protection. 
Among its broad statutory responsibilities. The following points about food value chains are worth 
mentioning. 
• The SAIC and local AIC system is in charge of enterprises registration. All kinds of 
undertakings, including foreign-invested enterprises, joint ventures and agricultural 
cooperatives fall inside of its jurisdiction. 
• The SAIC and local AIC system is responsible for enforcing Chinese Anti-unfair 
Competition Law (AUCL, 中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) to investigate and punish 
economic irregularities such as unfair competition and commercial Bribery; and Chinese 
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML, 中华人民共和国反垄断法) with regard to monopolistic 
agreements, abuse of market dominant position, and practices to eliminate or restrict 
competition through abuse of administrative power (excluding price monopoly, which falls 
into the jurisdiction of the NDRC).  
• The SAIC system is responsible for trade mark registration and protection.  
Among the SAIC’s internal departments and bureaus, the Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair competition 
Bureau (反垄断与反不正当竞争执法局), the Trade Mark Office (商标局), the Consumer Protection 
Bureau (消费者权益保护局) are important agencies while regulating enterprise’s market behaviours, 
undertakings in food value chains are by all means under their authorities. 2883 
5. Other market regulating ministries and administrations. 
 
The 4 ministries aforementioned are the main branches for food value chains regulation. However, 
there are other ministries may also have influences.  
(1) Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM or MOC, 商务部).  Being the ministry responsible for 
international and domestic trade regulation and the international economic cooperation, the 
MOFCOM has a broad and strong voice over import and export regulation and other matters. 
The Anti-Monopoly Bureau (反垄断局) under MOFCOM is the authority responsible for 
merger review and clearance under the troika enforcement structure of the AML. 
(2) State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO, 国家知识产权局).  SIPO is the competent agency 
for patent application and protection. Under its sub-organisations, there is a dedicated division 
responsible for drug and biology innovation. 
(3) The National Health and Family Planning Commission (国家卫生计生委), which 
monitors and assesses food safety risks and develops national food safety standards; 
(4) the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQISQ, 国家质检总局), which regulates imported and exported food. 
(5) Antimonopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau Department for Market 
Circulation of Food: It has responsibility to (i) draft detailed measures and practice directions 
for regulating safety of food in market circulation, (ii) Implement safety surveillance, quality 
monitoring and related market entry rules for food in market circulation, and (iii) respond to 
significant emergencies of food safety in marketplaces, and investigate into severe food safety 
                                                          
2883 http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Departments/index.html 
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cases and mete out appropriate punishments thereof.2884 
     
4.3.Regulatory framework for the food value chains 
 
The basic regulatory framework and the basic economic order within and between the segments of 
food value chains have been set by a number of laws and national policies. As the food value chain 
is a novel concept to both Chinese academics and regulators, there is no specific law or policy that 
regulates it as an integrated phenomenon. All established policies and laws regulate only one or a few 
segments of a food value chain. The regulation of different segments of a food value chain differs 
substantially. Due to historical (famines) and factual (large population but limited natural resources) 
reasons, the Chinese government focuses on the production segments of the food value chains via 
both law and national policy, whereas regulation of the other segments of food value chains has 
basically relied on a number of laws. The following Sections will introduce the policies implemented 
within the supply segments of the food value chain. 
 
4.3.1. National policy regarding the supply segments of the food value chains 
 
As introduced in the previous paragraphs, it is reasonable and necessary for the Chinese government 
to emphasise the food production segments of food value chains. Under this policy, a stable food 
production system became the general aim of the legislation (as provided for by Article 3 of 
Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China). This general aim comprises three basic specific 
aims. To achieve these aims, since 1982, the Chinese central government has issued its so-called “No. 
1 Central Document” as an annual policy declaration.2885  
The No.1 Documents put great importance on larger-scale household agriculture operations 
(for example, family-run farms and farmer co-operatives); and encourage and support the transfer of 
rural land to specialised farmers, family-run farms, and farmer co-operatives. 
To achieve this aim, innovation of financial products and services to farmers is encouraged. 
Agricultural subsidies continue to support the modernisation of agricultural technologies and grain 
production. A mixture of minimum purchase price, temporary reserve measures and target price 
subsidy aims to secure the supply of wheat, rice, corn, soybean, rapeseed, cotton and sugar, and 
prevent volatile price fluctuations. The No. 1 Documents stress the importance of developing high 
efficient water saving irrigation and the improvement of agricultural logistics (trade market centres, 
wholesale and retail distribution, cold chain logistics and online settlements) to facilitate the "North-
South" and "West-East" distribution of food. Commercial investment is encouraged in greenhouse 
production, food processing, and livestock farming, but not in large industrial scale crop farming. 
Instead of following the US and South American model of large agricultural farms, China maintains 
a large rural population that is encouraged to be active in large-scale household agriculture. However, 
as a result of the shortage of agricultural land in China (China has 9% of the total arable land in the 
world and 21% of the world's population), imports are an important source of food security. 
                                                          
2884 https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/world/asia/cn/ip/law/pdf/origin/2008080758891502.pdf  and 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-10/10/content_5116652.htm (国务院办公厅关于印发国家工商行政管理总
局主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定的通知) 
2885 http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/yhwj2014/. Interrupted from 1987 to 2003. 
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The Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of the Modern Crop Seed 
Industry of 10 April 2011 state that the crop seed industry is a key national industry. Its modernisation 
is accelerated for the long-term social stability and food security of China. To achieve this objective, 
China will insist on independent innovation through international co-operation in the crop seed 
industry, in particular with respect to advanced breeding technology, to improve the domestic crop 
seed industry's competitiveness. As a result, foreign investment in the seed business in China is only 
allowed by way of a joint-venture in which the Chinese partners have a controlling interest. 
The first and primary basic aim of the Chinese agricultural policy is to achieve security of 
food supply. As universally known, China is the largest developing country in the world, and has the 
largest population.2886 This has exerted considerable pressure on the country’s food production 
capacity, which is based on limited natural resources and less-advanced production technology. 
Despite these issues, the Chinese government still insists on implementing a challenging agricultural-
food policy: supplying about 95% domestic needs for agro-food products.2887 
To guarantee the achievement of the first aim, a series of measures have been implemented 
by the central government, both from the overarching agro-food level and from the more sectorial-
specific level (“十八亿亩红线”). At the overarching agro-food level, the central government has, to 
date, offered support and subsidies for agricultural insurance, with specific programs for corn, rice, 
wheat, cotton, potatoes, oil-bearing crops, sugar crops, breeding sows, fattening swine, cows, natural 
rubber, forest, highland barley and Tibetan sheep, totaling 15 types of products. The central 
government offers compensation to crop farming insurance; the central and western regions receive 
compensation of 40% of the fiscal expenditure on crop farming insurance, the eastern region receives 
35%, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation, the central reclamation area, Grain 
Storage Company North, China National Agricultural Development Corporation receive 65%, and 
provincial governments receive at least 25%. In addition to providing policy support for the 
development of peasant cooperatives, the central government also encourages cooperative economic 
development in rural areas; supports the development of large-scale production, specialised 
production, and modern management; and allows direct financial support to be offered to eligible 
cooperatives unions. In 2015, in addition to continuing the established affirmative policy, the central 
government adopted a series of measures to further advance the healthy development of the peasant 
cooperatives. 
Each year, nearly all specific agro-food sectors receive policy support. In the grain sector, to 
prevent peasants from being hurt by low prices, in 2015, the central government continued a policy 
that has been implemented for a long time: the minimum purchase price policy toward wheat and 
rice. In 2015, the minimum purchase prices were: 118 RMB/50 kilograms for wheat, 135 RMB /50 
kilograms for spring rice, 138 RMB /50 kilograms for autumn indica rice, and 155 RMB/50 kilograms 
for japonica rice. In the animal genetics breeding sector, the central government has operated a high-
grade breed subsidy policy since 2005.  In 2014, the central government invested 1.2 billion RMB 
mainly subsidising farm(er)s buying high grade breeding swine (cattle) semen or high-grade antelope, 
breeding rams and yaks. The standards are: (1). for standard animals, 40 RMB per swine, 30 RMB 
per cow or breeding cow, and 20RMB per other species of breeding cow. (2). for high grade breeds, 
800 RMB per sheep and 2000RMB per cow. In 2015, the above subsidies were continued. In addition, 
                                                          
2886 Exceeding 1.37 billion. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201604/t20160420_1346151.html 
2887 http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1116/2010-08/27/content_1592133.htm 
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seed embryos were introduced into the subsidy list: the standard is 5,000 RMB per embryo. The 
central government also provides animal epidemic prevention subsidies. In mainland China,  these 
subsidies are available for: (1). the widely used animal diseases compulsory immunisation vaccines, 
covering highly pathogenic avian influenza, highly pathogenic blue-ear swine disease, foot and 
mouth disease, swine fever, and small ruminant animal disease; (2). the culling of animals and poultry 
infected with diseases, including: highly pathogenic avian influenza, foot and mouth disease, highly 
pathogenic blue-ear swine disease, small ruminant animal disease, and brucellosis and tuberculosis 
in dairy cows; (3). animal epidemic prevention, to which the central government provided a 0.78 
billion RMB in 2015; (4). the harmless treatment of dead swine on farms, with a standard subsidy of 
80 RMB per dead swine; ( 5). the harmless treatment of dead swine in processing factories, with a 
standard subsidy of 80 RMB per dead swine; (6) a diesel subsidy in the fishery sector, which is the 
largest subsidy in that sector; and (7) conservation of fishery resources, with the central government 
offering 0.4 billion RMB in 2015. 
Increasing the income of peasant is the second basic-aim of the national agro-food policy as 
increased income stimulates peasant to remain in the agro-food sector, which is beneficial for a stable 
supply of agro-food products. As food consumers, the peasants (about half of China’s population) 
directly benefit from this policy and can, in turn, contribute to balanced and stable food value chains. 
To achieve this aim, the central government implements various policies, including compensation 
and price limits on certain agro-food facilities. The central government offers compensation for 
buying and renewing machines related to the production of agro-food products. First, it offers a 
machinery purchase subsidy, which was paid to all domestic farms and individuals in 2015. The 
subsidy includes 11 general categories, which can be divided to 43 sub-categories. The subsidy 
amounts are fixed: general agricultural machine, not exceeding 50,000 RMB; milking 
machine/drying machine, not exceeding 120,000 RMB; large tractor, non-tillage planter, harvester, 
large seed soaking pre-germination machine, and combined harvesters, not exceeding 150,000 RMB; 
super-large tractor, not exceeding 250,000 RMB; sugarcane harvester, not exceeding 400,000 RMB; 
cotton picking machine, not exceeding 500,000 RMB. Second, there is a subsidy against the discard 
and replacement of agricultural machine. A pilot subsidy program was conducted in 2015 in the 
following provinces and cities: Hebei, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Shandong, Henna, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Shanxi, Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningbo, Qingdao. A subsidy 
against discard and replacement is offered simultaneously. The standards are: tractors - 500-11,000 
RMB per machine; combined harvesters - 3,000-180,000 RMB per machine. Third, the central 
government offers a subsidy for not increasing the amount of fertilisers and pesticides used in food 
production. Since 2014, the central government has offered a subsidy for advanced planting and 
nourishing technology with 3000,000 RMB has offered in five provinces for adopting a technology 
that plants corn and adds fertilisers concurrently. In 2011, the central government started pilot work 
on using low-toxicity biological pesticides. In 2015, the central government offered 960,000 RMB to 
support the adoption of these pesticides in 42 farms located across the country. 
The third basic aim, namely the efficiency of agro-food production (in some circumstances 
called competitiveness of agro-food production), is a policy that originated from many economic 
changes within the agro-food sector. There have been great changes in the production, supply, and 
consumption segments of food value chains since China’s agricultural policy reform began in 1978. 
Both production and distribution became more market-oriented, and are typically governed by market 
mechanisms. Competition became a main market mechanism in the production and distribution of 
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products in Chinese food value chains. China has already witnessed both domestic and international 
competition within the supply segments of food value chains, and there will be more international 
competition after the expiration of China’s agro-food protection agreements with WTO members. 
There are also other important reasons for implementing an efficiency-oriented policy, including, for 
example, the lack of arable land and other resources. For all these reasons, a high-efficiency 
production system is required in China’s agro-food sectors.  
The central government, therefore implements all-encompassing affirmative policies to 
address the efficiency issue. First, a high breed seeds subsidy is available. In 2015, the central 
government reserved a financial subsidy of 20.35 billion RMB for various agricultural plants, 
comprising rice, wheat, corn, cotton, soybeans, canola, barley, potato, and peanut. The relevant 
standards are: wheat, corn, soybeans, canola and barley - 10RMB/mu2888; Tibetan wheat - 
15RMB/mu; Tibetan rice/cotton - 15RMB/mu; potato 100RMB/mu; and peanut - 500RMB/mu. 
Second, the government offers a subsidy for standardisation of animal genetics breeding, to which 
3.8 billion RMB were allocated in 2014. 2.5 billion RMB to the swine sector, 1 billion RMB to the 
cow sector, and the remainder to sheep and cattle sectors. In 2015, the subsidy was continued, except 
for small-sized swine feeding. Third, there is a subsidy for training agricultural workers, for which 
the central government devoted 1.1 billion RMB for training peasants. This subsidy covers four 
provinces, including 20 cities, it ensured that 10,000 young peasants obtain necessary technological 
skills and experience. Fourth, financial support is offered through financial departments of the 
country, which has adopted many supporting policies, such as granting peasant credit loans, 
supporting mergers between small-sized agricultural farms and factories, helping to establish closer 
economic connections among all segments of food supply chains (downstream firm, farm and 
upstream firm), promoting modern agriculture projects, and supporting the establishment of 
wholesale markets, retail markets, and storage facilities. Fifth, support measures for household farms 
were adopted by the central government in 2015. These measures cover many aspects, including, for 
example, financial direct subsidies, tax incentives, loans, insurance, and mortgage guarantees 
. 
4.3.2. National laws regarding the various segments of the food value chain 
 
4.3.2.1.Basic laws for the production and supply segments of the food value chain 
 
4.3.2.1.1. Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China 1993(中华人民共和国农业法) 
 
Agriculture Law of the People's Republic of China (ALPRC) is the basic law for both Chinese 
agriculture and the production and supply segments of the food value chains. For Chinese agriculture, 
the law applies to all general and specific sectors that relate to agricultural and food production. 
Article 2 ALPRC provides that “For the purpose of this Law, agriculture consists of the industries of 
crop-planting, forestry, animal breeding and fishery, including the services before, during and after 
the production process directly related with the above”.2889 Article 1 ALPRC provides that agriculture 
is the foundation of all sectors of the country’s economy. In specific, it provides that “This Law is 
                                                          
2888 “mu” is a Chinese land measurement unit. 
2889 Article 2 of ALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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enacted with a view to consolidating and strengthening the position of agriculture as the foundation 
of the national economy, deepening the reform in rural areas, developing the productive forces of 
agriculture, pushing forward the modernization of agriculture, safeguarding the legitimate rights and 
interests of peasants and agricultural production and operation organizations, increasing the income 
of peasants, enhancing their scientific and cultural qualification, promoting the sustained, steady and 
sound growth of agriculture and the rural economy, and attaining the objectives of building a well-
off society in an all-round way.”2890 Besides the above issues, ALPRC provides many basic principles 
and conventions that apply to the agro-food sectors. Article 3 states the following:  
“The State gives first priority to agriculture in the development of the national economy. The 
main objectives in developing agriculture and the rural economy are to establish a rural 
economic system that meets the demand for the development of the socialist market economy, 
to continuously emancipate and develop the productive forces in the countryside, to enhance 
the quality and efficiency of agriculture as a whole, to ensure the supply and quality of 
agricultural products, to satisfy the need of developing the national economy, of an increased 
population and of enhancing people's lives, to increase the income of peasants and raise their 
living standards, to promote the transfer of the surplus rural labor to non-agricultural 
industries and to cities and towns, to narrow the difference between town and country and 
between regions, to build a prosperous, democratic and culturally advanced new socialist 
countryside, and to gradually bring about the modernization of agriculture and the 
countryside”.2891  
ALPRC also provides the fundamental conventions on using arable lands for production. 
Under Chinese law, all arable lands belong to the country or collective peasants. All peasants rent (or 
through contractual management) land from these two types of owners, known as “Household 
Contracted Management”.2892 Against this operating system, Article 5 ALPRC provides that “The 
State, for a long time to come, stabilizes the two-tier management system that combines unified with 
separate management on the basis of household contractual management, develops systems for 
commercialized services, expands the actual strength of collective economy, and guides the peasants 
onto the road of common prosperity.” 2893 For the food supply issue, it further provides that “The 
State adopts measures to ensure that agriculture plays a better role in many fields such as in the supply 
of food, industrial raw materials and other farm products, in the maintenance and improvement of the 
ecological environment and in the promotion of the rural economic and social development.”2894 
ALPRC provides the basic operating conventions for agricultural production, as well as 
governmental encouragement of cooperative production among peasants and all the other segments 
of food value chains. Article 10 ALPRC stipulates that  
“The State applies the contractual management system in respect of land in rural areas, 
protects, in accordance with the law, the long-term stability of the relationship of land contract 
in rural areas, and protects the right of peasants to use their contracted land. The Land 
Administration Law of the People's Republic of China and the Law of the People's Republic 
of China on Land Contract in Rural Areas shall be applicable to matters such as the mode and 
                                                          
2890 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2891 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2892 家庭承包经营. 
2893 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2894 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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term of contractual management of rural land, the rights and obligations of the party giving 
out the contract and the contractor, and protection and transfer of the right to land contractual 
management. The rural collective economic organizations shall, on the basis of the household 
contractual management and in accordance with law, manage the collective assets, provide 
their members with services in respect of production, technology, information, etc., make 
arrangements for rational development and use of collective resources and build up economic 
strength”.2895  
According to Article 11, “The State encourages peasants to voluntarily organize themselves 
into various kinds of specialized cooperative economic organizations on the basis of household 
contractual management. Specialized cooperative economic organizations of peasants may take 
diversified forms and shall be established and registered in accordance with the law. No organizations 
or individuals may infringe upon the property of such organizations or their right of decision-making 
in management.”2896 Article 13 provides that  
“The State takes measures to develop industrial management of agriculture in various forms, 
and encourages and supports peasants and agricultural production and operation organizations 
in their efforts to develop integrated operation of production, processing and marketing. The 
State provides guidance and support to enterprises, scientific research institutions and other 
organizations which are in the service of production, processing and circulation of agricultural 
products through concluding contracts or establishing different kinds of enterprises with 
peasants or farmers specializing in cooperative economic organizations, in their efforts to 
form benefit communities that jointly share profits and undertake risks, in order to push 
forward the industrial management of agriculture and give impetus to the development of 
agriculture.”2897  
Article 14 states that “Peasants and agricultural production and operation organizations may, in 
accordance with the law and administrative regulations, establish trade associations of different kinds 
of agricultural products in order to provide their members with services related to production, 
marketing, information, technology, training, etc., to play the role of coordination and self-discipline, 
to submit applications for relief measures for trade in agricultural products and to safeguard the 
interests of their members and trade.”2898  
ALPRC provides the basic mechanisms for processing and circulating agro-food products, 
devoting more than three articles to provide that the purchases and sale of agro-food products shall 
follow market mechanisms, namely, the competition mechanism. Articles 26, 27, and 30 provide that 
it is the central government’s responsibility to establish and maintain the market mechanism and to 
provide the corresponding environment.  According to Article 26, 
“The purchase and sale of agricultural products shall be regulated by market forces. The State 
exercises the necessary macro-economic control over in the purchase and sale of key 
agricultural products which have a bearing on the national economy and the people's 
livelihood, establishes a system for storage regulation at the central and local levels and 
                                                          
2895 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2896 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2897 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2898 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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improves the storage and transportation system, in order to guarantee supply and stabilize the 
market.”2899  
It is provided in Article 27 that  
“The State gradually establishes a unified, open, competitive and orderly market system for 
agricultural products and formulates plans for the development of a wholesale market for 
agricultural products. The State gives support to the rural collective economic organizations 
and specialized cooperative economic organizations of peasants in their efforts to build up 
wholesale markets and rural fairs for agricultural products. Administrative departments for 
industry and commerce under the people's governments at or above the central government 
level and the relevant departments shall, in compliance with their respective duties and in 
accordance with the law, administer the wholesale markets for agricultural products, 
standardize the order of trade and prevent local protectionism and unfair competition”.2900  
Article 30 provides that the State encourages the development of import and export trade of 
agricultural products.2901 This provision guarantees that domestic agro-food product supply is 
exposed to international competition.2902 In addition to these provisions, ALPRC also provides 
specific ways to facilitate the adoption of the general operating mechanism. Article 28 stipulates that  
“The State encourages and supports the circulation of agricultural products in various forms. 
It supports the peasants and the specialized cooperative economic organizations of peasants 
to engage in purchase, wholesale, storage, transportation and retail of agricultural products 
and other intermediary activities in accordance with the relevant regulations of the State. It 
encourages the supply and marketing cooperatives and other agricultural production and 
operation organizations engaged in the purchase and sale of agricultural products to provide 
market information and open up circulation channels for agricultural products in the service 
of the purchase and sale of such products. People's governments at or above the county level 
shall take measures and urge the relevant departments to ensure unblocked transportation of 
agricultural products and to reduce the circulation costs for such products. The relevant 
administrative departments shall simplify formalities to facilitate the transportation of fresh 
and live farm products, they are not allowed to detain the means of transport for fresh and live 
farm products except where otherwise provided for in laws and administrative 
regulations”.2903  
Article 29 provides that 
“The State supports the development of the processing of agricultural products and the food 
industry in order to increase the added value of the products. People's governments at or above 
the county level shall formulate plans for the development of the processing of agricultural 
products and the food industry, provide guidance to the enterprises engaged in the processing 
of agricultural products, helping them form a rational regional layout and structure of scale, 
and support the specialized cooperative economic organizations of peasants and enterprises 
town and township enterprises in their efforts to engage in processing and comprehensive 
development and utilization of agricultural products. The State establishes well-defined 
                                                          
2899 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2900 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2901 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2902 The State may take the necessary measures when the import of certain agricultural products has already occasioned 
or is likely to occasion serious effect detrimental to the production of relevant agricultural products at home. 
2903 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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quality standards for processed agricultural products, improves the means of inspection and 
testing and tightens control and supervision over quality safety during the processing of 
agricultural products, in order to guarantee food safety”.2904 
In addition to the various institutions and mechanism that target the establishment of a rural 
economic system that meets the demand for the development of the socialist market economy,2905 
ALPRC also includes provisions relating to the continuousl emancipation and development of the 
productive forces in the countryside, in order to enhance the quality and efficiency of agriculture as 
a whole, and to ensure the supply and quality of agricultural products,2906 ALPRC provides many 
measures to guarantee stable food supply and safety. Article 31 provides that the State may adopt 
measures to protect and enhance the comprehensive capacity for grain production, steadily to raise 
grain production level and to ensure gain safety.2907 Article 33 states that  
When the market price of grain is too low, the State Council may decide to introduce the 
protective price system for some varieties of grain. Protective prices shall be determined on 
the principle that they are conducive to the protection of the peasants' interests and to the 
stable production of grain. When peasants sell their grains in accordance with the protective 
price system, no purchasing units entrusted by the State may refuse to purchase them. People's 
governments at or above the county level shall make arrangements for departments of finance, 
banking, etc. as well as purchasing units entrusted by the State to raise enough funds in time 
for the purchase of grain. No departments, units or individuals may withhold or 
misappropriate such funds.”2908  
Article 35 provides that “The State establishes a risk fund for grain, which shall be used to support 
grain storage, stabilize grain markets and protect the interests of peasants.”2909 
As the production and supply of agro-food products depend heavily on natural environments 
and resources, and the sole application of market mechanisms may harm the supply of food, thus 
affecting the public interest, and further all the other segments of the food value chains ALPRC 
provides many corresponding measures, both at the central government and local government levels 
to ensure a sufficient level of support. Hence, Article 37 provides that  
“The State establishes a sound network for support and protection of agriculture, and takes such 
measures as financial investment, preferential taxation and banking assistance to support, in terms of 
fund input, scientific research and popularization of technology, education and training, supply of the 
means of agricultural production, market information, quality standard, test and quarantine, 
commercialized services and disaster relief, peasants and agricultural production and operation 
organizations in their efforts to develop agricultural production, in order to help increase the income 
of peasants. On condition that the relevant international treaties which China has concluded or has 
acceded to are not contravened, the State pursues a policy in support of the income of peasants, and 
the specific measures thereof shall be worked out by the State Council.”2910  
Furthermore, Article 40 stipulates that  
                                                          
2904 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2905 Article 3 of ALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2906 Article 3 of ALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2907 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2908 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2909 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2910 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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“The State, through taxation, pricing, credit and other means, encourages and guides peasants 
and agricultural production and operation organizations to increase investment in agricultural 
production and operation and in capital construction such as small irrigation and water 
conservancy projects. The State encourages and supports peasants and agricultural production 
and operation organizations to raise agricultural funds in various forms on a voluntary basis 
and in accordance with law.”2911 
According to Article 44, 
 “The State encourages the supply and marketing cooperatives, rural collective economic 
organizations, specialized cooperative economic organizations of peasants, other 
organizations and individuals to develop diversified forms of undertakings that provide 
commercialized services before, during and after the process of agricultural production. 
People's governments at or above the county level and the relevant departments under them 
shall take measures to provide support to undertakings that render commercialized services to 
agriculture. The departments for agriculture, industry and commerce, transportation and 
public security and other relevant departments shall take measures to give support to units 
that provide transregional commercialized services to agriculture”.2912  
Article 45 provides that “The State establishes a sound rural financial network, improves the rural 
credit system and tightens supervision over rural finance. The financial institutions concerned shall 
take measures to increase input to credit, improve financial services in the countryside and extend 
credit in support of agricultural production and operation conducted by peasants and agricultural 
production and operation organizations. Rural credit cooperatives shall adhere to their aims of serving 
agriculture, the peasants and economic development in rural areas and, in providing credit services, 
give priority to production and operation conducted by local peasants. The State, by taking such 
measures as discount, encourages financial institutions to provide credit to the peasants and 
agricultural production and operation organizations engaged in agricultural production and 
operation.”2913  Article 46 provides that “The State establishes a sound insurance system for 
agriculture. The State gradually establishes a sound policy-related insurance system for agriculture. 
It encourages and supports peasants and agricultural production and operation organizations to form 
mutual-aid cooperative insurance organizations in the service of agricultural production and 
operation, and encourages commercial insurance companies to conduct insurance business in 
agriculture. The principle of voluntariness shall be practised in agricultural insurance. No 
organizations or individuals may compel peasants or agricultural production and operation 
organizations to buy agricultural insurance.”2914 Article 47 provides that “People's governments at all 
levels shall take measures to increase the capabilities of fighting against natural disasters in 
agriculture, do a good job of preventing and fighting against disasters and providing disaster relief, 
help victims to restore production, and encourage them to support themselves by engaging in 
production and give each other assistance; and they shall give relief and help to the victims who lack 
the basic living guarantee.”2915     
                                                          
2911 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2912 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2913 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2914 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2915 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
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ALPRC takes special care to incentivise peasants to produce and supply agro-food products. 
Specifically, Article 72 provides that: “In the course of the agricultural and rural economic 
restructuring, the industrialization of agricultural operation and the transfer of the right to land 
contractual management, no people's government at any level, rural collective economic organization 
or villagers committee may infringe upon the peasants' right to land contractual management, 
interfere with the items of production and operation arranged by the peasants themselves, or compel 
the peasants to buy the means of production designated by it or to sell their agricultural products 
through the channels designated by it.”2916 Article 75 provides that “When purchasing agricultural 
products, no purchasing units may force down the grade or price or withhold any fees from the money 
paid. Where taxes are to be withheld or collected by an agent, as provided for by laws and 
administrative regulations, the provisions of the said laws and regulations shall be abide by. Where a 
dispute arises over the grade of quality of agricultural products between the unit purchasing the 
agricultural products and the seller of the products, they may entrust a statutory qualified authority 
for quality inspection of agricultural products with the inspection of the products.”2917  
 
4.3.2.1.2. Fisheries Law of the People's Republic of China 1986 (FLPRC)( 中华人民共和国渔
业法) and Animal Breeding Law of the People's Republic of China 2006 (AHLPRC)( 
中华人民共和国畜牧法) 
 
FLPRC and AHLPRC are the basic laws that apply to the production and supply segments of fisheries 
and livestock farming. 
From a broader view, FLPRC is an extension of ALPRC, because it sets the basic market 
order and operating system for the production of fisheries in China. FLPRC provides the basic order 
for both the aquaculture and capture fishery production activities such as aquatic animal and aquatic 
plants within PRC jurisdiction. Article 2 provides that “All productive activities of fisheries, such as 
aquaculture and catching or harvesting of aquatic animals and plants, in the inland waters, tidal flats, 
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of the People's Republic of China and in all other sea 
areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China shall be conducted in accordance with 
this Law”.2918 To enhance, protect, increase, develop and to proceed to the rational utilization of 
fishery resources, the FLPRC sets a very strict licensing system: namely, both the breeding and the 
fishery must be licensed by the PRC government. According to Article 10  
“Any unit or and individual that wishes to use the water areas or tidal flats owned by the whole 
people of China and designated for aquaculture according to national plans shall apply to the 
administrative department for fisheries under the local people's government at or above the 
county level. An aquaculture permit shall be issued after examination by the people's 
government concerned, allowing the applicant to use certain water areas or tidal flats for 
aquaculture. Specific measures for examining and issuing aquaculture permits shall be 
formulated by the State Council. The water areas and tidal flats owned by the collective or by 
the whole people but used by agricultural collective economic organizations may be 
contracted out to individuals or collectives for aquaculture”.2919  
                                                          
2916 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2917 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383785.htm. 
2918 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383934.htm. 
2919 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383934.htm. 
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The right to use water areas is subject to revocation if it meets the conditions of Article 11 of 
FLPRC.2920 Similarly, Article 15 FLPRC provides that “The import and export of fry and fingerling 
of aquatic animals shall be subject to examination and approval by the administrative department 
under the State Council or such departments under the people's governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government”.2921 Misuse of 
governmental licences is punishable by administrative sanctions. Article 32 further stipulates that 
“For water areas that are used for fisheries and that also serve the purposes of water storage, regulation 
and irrigation, the competent department concerned shall fix the lowest water level required for 
fisheries”.2922 
AHLPRC is designed to standardize “the production and operation in animal breeding 
(protection and utilization of the genetic resources, breeding, raising, operation and transportation of 
livestock and poultry)2923, to guarantee the quality and safety of livestock and poultry products, to 
protect and make rational use of the genetic resources of livestock and poultry, to safeguard the lawful 
rights and interests of the producers and operators in animal breeding and to promote sustained and 
healthy development of animal breeding”.2924 This law specifically clarifies the government’s 
responsibility to design and maintain markets for livestock farming and product circulation, in which 
market mechanisms should be followed. To fulfill theirtasks, in livestock and poultry breeding, The 
administrative department for animal breeding and veterinary medicine under the people’s 
government at or above the county level shall, in accordance with the development plan for animal 
breeding and in compliance with market demands, give guidance to and support the restructuring of 
animal breeding, promote the production of livestock and poultry and enhance the market competition 
of livestock and poultry products”. It is also mentioned in the same provision that “The State assists 
capital construction projects in pastoral areas of grasslands, such as erecting fences, building water 
conservancy projects, improving the grassland and building bases of forage grass and feeds, in order 
to optimize the composition of livestock herds, improve the strains, transform the mode of production, 
promote the rearing of livestock in pens or sties, and rotated grazing in demarcated areas, gradually 
bring about a balance between pastures and livestock and improve the ecological environment of 
grasslands”.2925 In livestock trading and transport, “People’s governments at or above the county level 
shall promote the building of a trading market of livestock and poultry characterized by openness, 
uniformity and orderly competition”;2926.2927 
 
4.3.2.1.3. Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China (LALPRC) 1986(中华人
民共和国土地管理法 ), Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Contract in 
Rural Areas 2002 (LPRCLCRA) (中华人民共和国农村土地承包法), Grassland Law 
of the People's Republic of China 2002 (GLPRC) (中华人民共和国草原法), Seed 
Law of the People's Republic of China 2015 (SLPRC)(中华人民共和国种子法) 
 
                                                          
2920 http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/06/content_5004465.htm. 
2921 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383934.htm. 
2922 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383934.htm. 
2923 Article 2 of AHLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384134.htm. 
2924 Article 1 of AHLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384134.htm. 
2925 Article 35 of AHLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384134.htm. 
2926 Article 50 AHLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384134.htm. 
2927 Article 51 AHLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384134.htm. 
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There are few basic laws that govern the primary production segments of the food value chains. These 
elements cover either the original production materials or the basic economic relationship between 
the owners’ of these inputs and their tenants or purchasers. 
LALPRC is enacted “for the purpose of strengthening land administration, maintaining the 
socialist public ownership of land, protecting and developing land resources, making rational use of 
land, effectively protecting cultivated land and promoting sustainable development of the society and 
the economy”.2928 This legislation emphasises that “The People’s Republic of China practises 
socialist public ownership of land, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership 
by the working people”, something that is also provided for by Chinese constitutional law.2929 
LALPRC provides that the State applies a system of control over the purposes of the use of land 
rigidly restricting the conversion of land for agriculture to land for construction also binding all units 
and individuals to use land in strict compliance with the purposes of use defined in the overall plans 
for land utilization.2930 LALPRC also provides for the renting (or the contractual management 
system) of arable lands, Article 15 specifically stipulating the following:  
“State-owned land may be operated under a contract by units or individuals for crop 
cultivation, forestry, animal breeding or fishery. Land owned by peasant collectives may be 
operated under a contract for crop cultivation, forestry, animal breeding or fishery by units or 
individuals that do not belong to the economic organizations of the said collectives. The party 
that gives out the contract and the party that undertakes it shall sign a contract in which they 
stipulate the rights and obligations of both parties. The duration of such contract shall be 
provided for by the contract. The units or individuals that contract to operate the land shall 
have the obligation to protect such land and make a rational use of it in conformity with the 
purposes of use provided for in the contract. Land owned by peasant collectives shall be 
operated under a contract by units or individuals that do not belong to the economic 
organizations of the said collectives, with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the members 
of the villagers’ assembly or of the representatives of villagers, and the matter shall be 
submitted to the township (town) people’s government for approval.”2931 
With regard to the contractual management institution provided by LALPRC, LPRCLCRA was 
enacted in order to specify its application in rural areas.2932 LPRCLCRA provides in its Article 1 that, 
first of all, the peasants own long-term and guaranteed land-use rights.2933 Article 20 then provides 
that the duration of a contract for arable land shall be 30 years, the term of contract for grassland 
ranges from 30 to 50 years and the term of contract for forestland ranges from 30 to 70 years; but 
may be longer for specific types of forest, upon approval by the competent administrative department 
under the State Council”;2934 The State applies the contractual management system in respect of land 
in rural areas. Land contract in rural areas takes the form of household contractual management within 
the collective economic organizations in the countryside, while such land in rural areas as barren 
                                                          
2928 Article 1 of LALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm 
2929 Article 2 of LALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm 
2930 Article 4 of LALPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm 
2931 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm 
2932Article 2 LPRCLCRA. For purposes of this Law, land in rural areas includes the arable land, forestlands and grasslands 
owned collectively by the peasants and by the State and used collectively by the peasants according to law, as well as 
other lands used for agriculture according to law. 
2933 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm 
2934 Article 20 of LPRCLCRA. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm 
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mountains, gullies, hills and beaches, which are not suited to the form of household contract, is 
contracted in such forms as bid invitation, auction and public consultation.2935. Furthermore, 
LPRCLCRA stipulates that  
“The State protects, in accordance with the law, the long-term stability of the relationship of 
land contract in rural areas. After the land in rural areas is contracted, the nature of ownership 
of the land shall remain unchanged. The contracted land may not be purchased or sold.”2936 
Article 5 LPRCLCRA provides that “Members of the collective economic organizations in rural areas 
shall, according to law, have the right to undertake rural land contracts with their own collective 
economic organizations that give out the contracts. No organizations or individuals may deprive the 
members of the rural collective economic organizations of their right to undertake contracts or 
illegally restrict such right.”2937 The situation that contracted land may not be purchased or sold 
prevents the free movements of the basic production material and is therefore contrary to the market 
mechanism within the production and supply segments of the food value chain. As a result, 
LPRCLCRA uses four articles to provide for the circulation of the right to contact management of 
the contracted land. Article 10 provides the principle for this circulation noting that “The State 
protects the circulation of the right to land contractual management, which is effected according to 
the law, on a voluntary basis and with compensation”.2938 Article 32 provides the forms of the 
circulation of the contact management of the contracted land, which may be achieved through 
subcontracting, leasing, exchanging, transferring or other means.2939 Article 42 provides that “For the 
purpose of developing the agricultural economy, the contractors may, of their own free will, jointly 
pool their rights to land contractual management as shares to engage in cooperative agricultural 
production”.2940 
Quite similarly to LALPRC and LPRCLCRA, GLPRC provides for the ownership of grassland and 
the corresponding utility institutions. GLPRC was drafted to protect, develop and rationalize the “use 
of grasslands, improving the ecological environment, maintaining the diversity of living things, 
modernizing animal breeding and promoting the sustainable development of the economy and 
society”.2941 GLPRC clarifies that  
“The grasslands are owned by the State, with the exception of the grasslands owned by 
collectives as provided for by law. With respect to the State-owned grasslands, the State 
Council shall exercise the right of such ownership on behalf of the State. No unit or individual 
may take illegal possession of, trade in or illegally transfer in other forms the grasslands”.2942  
In addition to this, GLPRC indicates the specific bodies entitled to utilize or to rent (or through 
contractual management) grassland. Article 10 states that “The State-owned grasslands may, in 
accordance with the law, be assigned for use to the units under the ownership by the whole people 
and to collective economic organizations. All units that use the grasslands shall fulfil the duty of 
protecting, developing and rationally using the grasslands”.2943 According to Article 11 “With respect 
                                                          
2935 Article 3 of LPRCLCRA. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm 
2936 Article 4 of LPRCLCRA. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm 
2937 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm 
2938 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm. 
2939 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm. 
2940 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/06/content_1382125.htm. 
2941 Article 1 of GLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
2942 Article 9 of GLPRC. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
2943 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
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to the State-owned grasslands, for which the right of use is not assigned, the people's governments at 
or above the county level shall register such grasslands and shall be responsible for their protection 
and control. With respect to the grasslands owned by collectives, the people's governments at or 
above the county level shall register such grasslands, issue to the collectives the certificates of 
ownership after verification to and establish their right of ownership of such grasslands. Where the 
ownership of grasslands is changed in accordance with the law, the formalities for registration of 
shall be completed”.2944 GLPRC also provides the specific form of renting grassland and the 
circulation of the right to contract management of grassland. Article 13 provides that  
“The grasslands owned by collectives or the State-owned grasslands which have been 
assigned for use to collective economic organizations may be contracted for management by 
households individually or jointly within the said collective economic organizations. No 
adjustment may be made to the grasslands used by the contractors within the term of 
contractual management of the grasslands; where appropriate adjustments need be made to a 
few pieces of grasslands, the matter shall be subject to agreement by two-thirds or more 
members of the villagers’ (herdsmen) assembly, or two-thirds or more villagers' (herdsmen's) 
representatives, of the collective economic organization concerned and shall be reported for 
approval to the township (town) people's government and the competent administrative 
department for grasslands under the people's government at the county level. Where 
grasslands owned by a collective or the State-owned grasslands which are assigned for use to 
a collective economic organization in accordance with the law are contracted to units or 
individuals other than the ones of the said organization, the matter shall be subject to 
agreement by two-thirds or more members of the villagers’ (herdsmen) assembly, or two-
thirds or more villagers' (herdmen's) representatives, of the collective economic organization 
concerned and shall be reported for approval to the township (town) people's government”.2945  
The circulation of the right to contract management of grassland is provided for by Article 15: “The 
right to contractual management of grasslands is protected by the law, and it may be transferred in 
accordance with the law according to the principles of voluntariness and compensation. The 
transferee of the right to contractual management of grasslands shall have the capability to pursue 
animal breeding and shall fulfil the obligations of protecting, developing, and rationally using the 
grasslands in adherence to the purpose of use as agreed upon in the contract. The transfer of the right 
to contractual management of grasslands shall be subject to agreement by the party contracting out 
the grasslands. The term of transfer agreed upon in the transfer contract by the contractor and the 
transferee may not exceed the remaining period of the original contract.”2946 
SLPRC covers many key issues on the protection and utilization of seeds, such as “protecting and 
making rational use of germ plasm resources, standardizing variety selection and cultivation, as well 
as seed production and business operation and the administration thereof, protecting the right to new 
varieties of plants, safeguarding the lawful rights and interests of seed producers, traders and users, 
improving the quality of seeds, pushing forward the industrial management of seeds, developing 
modern seed industry, guaranteeing grain safety of the state, and promoting the development of 
agriculture and forestry.”2947 It is worth noting that in the 2015 revision, the portions of the “regulation 
                                                          
2944 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
2945 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
2946 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1383951.htm. 
2947 Article 1 of SLPRC. http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=259498&lib=law 
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of New Plant Varieties” are incorporated into the revised law and penalties for violations are also 
strengthened.  
For the protection of germ plasm resources, Article 25 provides that “The State shall establish 
a new plant varieties protection system, whereby the rights of new plant varieties shall be granted by 
the administrative department for agriculture or for forestry under the State Council to those varieties 
listed in the national protected plant varieties catalog, cultured or discovered in the wilderness and 
then selected and bred, characterized by novelty, uniqueness, uniformity and stability and 
appropriately named. The legal rights of the new plant variety owner shall be protected. Other terms 
shall be implemented in accordance with this Law, related laws and regulations such as the new plant 
variety content and belonging, granting conditions, application and acceptance, review and approval, 
duration, cessation and invalidation, etc. The State encourages and supports seed scientific and 
technical innovation, new plant variety breeding and result transformation. Where the variety is 
granted new plant variety right and popularized, the breeder shall be entitled to obtain corresponding 
appropriate economic profits according to the laws.” Article 28 provides protection for owners of 
new plant varieties “The entity which or the person who is granted with variety right has an exclusive 
right in their protected variety. No other entity or individual shall, without permission from the owner 
of the variety rights, produce, reproduce or sell the propagation material of the protected variety, or 
repeatedly use the propagation material of the protected variety for commercial purposes in the 
production of the propagation material of another variety. Except as otherwise provided in this Law, 
related laws and regulations.” Article 73 stipulates the liabilities for breach of the new plant varieties: 
“If the parties fail to perform the agreement or no agreement is reached through the mediation, 
the owner or stakeholder of the new plant variety right may file a lawsuit to the people’s court 
according to law. The indemnity of infringing new plant variety right shall be determined in 
accordance with the right holder’s actual losses resulted from infringement; in case actual 
losses are difficult to determine, the indemnity can be determined in accordance with the 
infringer’s benefits gained from infringement; in case both right holder’s losses and 
infringer’s benefits are difficult to determine, the indemnity can be appropriately determined 
with reference to the times of the new plant variety right license fee. The indemnity shall 
include right holder’s reasonable expenses to cease infringement. In case new plant variety 
right is seriously infringed, the indemnity can be between one times and three times of the 
value determined by above-mentioned method. Where the right holder’s losses, infringer’s 
benefits, and new plant variety right license fee are all difficult to determine, the people’s 
court can determine an indemnity under RMB 3 million in accordance with such factors as 
the type of new plant variety right, infringement nature and circumstances. When settling a 
case regarding infringement of the new plant variety right, the administrative departments of 
agriculture and forestry under the people’s government at or above county level may order 
the infringer to cease the infringing act and confiscate the illegal gains and the seeds to 
safeguard public benefits. In case the amount is less than RMB 50,000, a fine between RMB 
10,000 and RMB 250,000 will be imposed; if such amount is more than RMB 50,000, a fine 
of 5 times to 10 times as that of the amount will be imposed”. 
 For the production of seeds, the former seed production license and seed operation license are 
merged into one Seed Production and Operation License. Article 31 stipulates that “The seed 
production and business license for seed import and export shall be subject to examination by 
administrative departments of agriculture and forestry of the people's governments of the provinces, 
839 
 
autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the State Council, and be issued by the 
administrative departments of agriculture and forestry under the State Council. The production and 
operation licenses for enterprises engaged in businesses including major crop hybrid seeds and parent 
seeds, tree seeds of improved variety, as well as the enterprises with integrated business in breeding, 
production and marketing, eligible for requirements of the administrative departments for agriculture 
and forestry under the State Council shall be subject to examination by the people's government 
administrative departments of agriculture and forestry at county level, and be issued by the 
administrative departments of agriculture and forestry of the people's governments of the provinces, 
autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the State Council. The license of production and 
business of any seeds other than those listed in the two preceding paragraphs shall be issued after 
examination by administrative department for agriculture or for forestry under the people's 
government at or above the county level where the seed producer or trader is located. The seed 
production and business license is not required for the persons that only produce non-major crop 
seeds or non-major forest tree seeds.”   
Seed is a special commodity; special principle in the accounting legal responsibility process 
of a trade is deserved. Article 46 provides that “Where seed users suffer losses due to seed quality 
problems, or inauthentic information on seed label and instructions, the seed user could claim 
compensation from the traders selling the seeds, or claim compensation from seed producers or other 
traders. The amount of such compensation shall include purchase price of the seeds, losses of 
anticipated profits, and other relevant losses. Where the liability rests on seed producers or other 
traders, the trader selling the seeds that have paid the compensation shall have the right to recover the 
paid compensation from other producers or traders. Where the liability rests on the trader selling the 
seeds, the seed producers or other traders trader who have paid the compensation shall have the right 
to recover the paid compensation from the trader selling the seeds.” 
SLPRC also provides that seeds import and export shall be based on administrative licensing. 
Article 58 provides that “Those engaged in seed imports or exports shall in addition to the seed 
production and business license, obtain the seed import and export permit in accordance with related 
laws and regulations of the state. The State Council shall set the limits of authority for examining and 
approving the introduction of the seeds of crops and forest trees from abroad, and formulate measures 
for validation of the import and export of such seeds and administrative measures for the introduction 
of transgenic plant varieties.” Article 60 provides exception to article 58, “Where seeds are imported 
for producing seeds for other countries, such imports may be exempt from the restriction provided in 
Paragraph 1, Article 58 of this Law, provided that a contract is signed for producing seeds for foreign 
countries. The imported seeds are only to be used for the production of hybrid seeds, and the products 
are not allowed to be sold at domestic markets. The crop seeds or forest tree seeds introduced from 
abroad for experiment shall be planted in isolation, and no harvests therefrom may be sold as 
commodity seeds.” 
 
4.3.2.1.4. Grain Law of the People's Republic of China (draft for public comments) 2015 
(GLPRCdpc)( 中华人民共和国粮食法 (征求公众意见稿)) 
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GLPRCdpc will be the law that will govern grain production, distribution and consumption across 
the country (provided by Article 2) for many categories of foodstuff. According to Article 2 of the 
draft law, grain refers to“cereals and their processed products, beans and root crops.”2948 
GLPRCdpc went to public comments phase in 2012. The legislators attached an important instruction 
on the legislative purpose, regarding its application scope and principles:  
“grain is a special commodity and material of strategic importance crucial to the national 
economy and people’s livelihood. The Draft for Opinions makes it very clear that 
safeguarding national grain security is the fundamental purpose of the legislation of the grain 
law. To achieve national grain security, we should not only maintain stable grain production 
and ensure domestic grain supply from various sources, but we should also strengthen our 
regulation and supervision on grain distribution, maintain market stability and safeguard the 
market order. Rational utilization and conservation of grain should also be advocated at the 
consumption end. Hence the Draft for Opinions provides that this act applies to grain 
production, distribution, and consumption in China. In line with the definition of grain 
stipulated in the Regulations on Grain Distribution and Medium to Long-term Planning for 
National Grain Security, the Draft for Opinions stipulates that grain refers to cereals and their 
finished grain, beans and tubers. Given that edible vegetable oil is an important life necessity 
for rural and urban residents and that the state has rendered similar support to the production 
and distribution of rapeseed oil, sunflower seed oil etc. to cereals, the Draft for Opinions 
provides that this act also applies to the production, distribution, and consumption of edible 
vegetable oil and oil seeds. Besides, in view of both of the similarities and differences between 
tubers and cereals and in light of such realities, the Draft for Opinions stipulates this act also 
applies to all activities in the production, distribution, and consumption of tubers except for 
the provisions of purchase certificates and storage filing.”2949 
GLPRCdpc covers many segments of food value chain, the key relevant contents being: (1). 
institutions on building capacity for comprehensive grain production as wellas  institutions about 
protecting incentives for grain production; (2). institutions on regulatory control and stock reserve 
management for grains; (3) institutions on market-oriented allocation of grain resource or; 
safeguarding grain distribution. 
The institutions on building capacity for comprehensive grain production and the institutions 
on protecting incentives for grain production were provided for in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
respectively, generally they are consistent with ALPRC and Chinese agricultural policy. The 
reference to institutions with the aim to build capacity for comprehensive grain production stresses 
government’s role in overall planning, direction and support. Asit is indicated in Article 11 
GLPRCdpc,  
“The State shall strengthen the integrated planning for grain production capacity building, 
focus the support efforts on main grain producing regions, improve grain production 
conditions, build reliable commodity grain production bases, and, in preservation of 
ecological system, duly and appropriately develop backup producing regions with resource 
                                                          
2948 Non-official translation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf 
2949 Non-official translation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft%20for%20public%20comments)
_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_3-6-2012.pdf. 
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advantages and production potential. The people’s governments above the county level shall 
formulate a grain production plan based on eco-system, water resources, land, and agricultural 
and climatic resources and conditions. The medium to long-term plan for national food 
security and grain production layout and construction projects shall go through a validation 
process with regard to water resources”.2950  
Institutions about protecting incentives for grain production provide government’s role in 
institutional construction, establishing production-facilitating systems and financial input. Besides, 
article 16 GLPRCdpc stipulates that it is the government’s role to establish agro-food related systems 
in order to prevent agricultural meteorological disasters:2951 
Many institutions for regulatory control and stock reserve management for grains were 
designed in order to maintain the stability of the supply and price of grain. From the grain regulation 
perspective, many institutions were designed to control grain import and export, as well as the 
aquiiation of domestic grain firms. Article 52 GLPRCdpc refers to the macro-control of grain import 
and export, specifically, noting that “Based on domestic grain supply and demand situation and the 
need of macro-control, the State shall adjust domestic grain surplus and deficiency through grain 
import and export and adopt a quota system to manage import and export of major grain varieties”.2952 
Article 59 provides the review procedure of grain related acquisitions: “The enterprises that are newly 
established or that are merged or acquired with domestic grain production and operation shall be 
reviewed in accordance with relevant state regulations if national food security is involved.”2953 The 
GLPRCdpc also stipulates that the government shall provide support to grain supply from many 
aspects, including tax, finance and insurance. For instance, Article 53 provides that “The State shall 
implement a grain risk fund system that rationally determine the use and scope of the grain risk fund 
based on the nation’s financial situation and the need of macro-control. The fund shall be earmarked 
to specified uses in a bid to support grain production and distribution and stabilize the grain 
market.”2954 Article 55 stresses the government’s role in offering financial support, noting that   
“The State shall take such measures as finance, banking, and tax to support grain operators 
undertaking policy-related grain operation. Policy banks shall ensure the supply of credit fund 
required in the course of grain production and storage in accordance with relevant state 
regulations. Financial institutions of commercial nature are encouraged to provide loans to 
                                                          
2950 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2951 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2952 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2953 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2954 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
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operation such as grain purchase and storage. The operators undertaking policy-oriented grain 
operation shall strictly follow relevant state policies and regulations.”2955 
Finally, the GLPRCdpc puts in place a grain reserve system. Article 56 provides that  
“The State shall implement a grain reserve system at the central and local government levels. 
The central grain reserve shall be used mainly to adjust the overall grain supply and demand 
at the national level in a bid to stabilize the grain market and deal with severe natural disasters 
or other emergencies. Unless approved by the State Council, no institutions or individuals 
shall be allowed to use the central grain reserves. The State Council shall issue the regulations 
on the management of central grain reserve. The grain reserve of local governments shall be 
used mainly to adjust the grain supply and demand within the region in a bid to stabilize the 
local grain market and deal with serious natural disasters or other emergencies in the region. 
The State Council shall determine the scale of local grain reserve and the People’s 
Governments at the provincial level shall determine the specific varieties, layout, and 
management methods. The regulations of local grain reserves are formulated by local 
governments. The central and local grain reserve shall be kept at a reasonable level and the 
function positioning, variety structure, and layout shall be coordinated and supplemented”.2956  
Furthermore, according to Article 58, “The State shall establish a minimum and maximum stock level 
system for grain operators. The grain operators engaging in grain procurement, processing, and 
marketing as well as feed and industrial grain enterprises shall be obliged to maintain a no-less-than 
minimum stock level in the event of surplus in the grain market and dramatic price declines or to 
maintain a no-more-than maximum stock level in the event of deficit in the grain market and dramatic 
price increases.”2957 
Institutions on market-oriented allocation of grain resources and institutions on safeguarding 
grain distribution are two of the key issues regulated by the GLPRCdpc, with the aim to meeting   the 
need of establishing and improving socialist market economy, consolidating the results of market-
oriented reform of grain distribution system and ensuring the fundamental role of market mechanism 
in the allocation of grain resources. The Draft for Opinions stipulates that the state adopts a market-
oriented management system under macro regulation for the production, distribution, and 
consumption of grain. Grain purchase, storage, processing, transport, wholesale, retail and etc. is 
open to the public. It is stated that all market players shall perform the same obligations, make their 
own decisions, and take full responsibilities for their profits and losses as well as self-development. 
Furthermore, relevant associations in the grain industry should strengthen self-discipline and improve 
service in a bid to maintain order in the grain market.2958  
                                                          
2955 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2956 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2957 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2958 Unofficial translation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft%20for%20public%20comments)
_Beijing_China%20-%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_3-6-2012.pdf. 
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Chapter 4 of the draft law provides more information on these two institutions. Article 25 
specifies that the State shall  
“nurture and develop a unified, open, and competitive grain market system and prohibit any 
regional blockade in grain distribution. The government shall establish a unified, 
standardized, and bidding-based grain transaction system in order to intensify the construction 
of the market for grain procurement, wholesaling, and retailing, and regulate the development 
of a grain futures market”.2959 
The various institutions on grain distribution are made explicit in Articles 26, 28 and 32. Article 26 
provides for the adoption of the licensing system for grain procurement. Specifially, it requires that 
“The operators engaging in grain procurement activities shall meet the following requirements: (1) 
Have necessary capital for operation; (2) Own necessary grain storage facilities and equipment; (3) 
Be equipped with relevant ability on grain quality inspection and storage; (4) Keep a good record of 
operations, management, and credit without any illegal operation. When processing a grain 
procurement license, the grain administration department shall inquire about the credit record of the 
license applicant or require him/her to provide credit reports issued by qualified institutions”.2960 
Article 28 of the draft law provides that “Operators engaging in grain storage shall report to the grain 
administration departments and meet the following requirements: (1) Have fixed location for 
operation; (2) Possess necessary facilities and equipment suitable for storage activities; (3) Equipped 
with technicians holding a national vocational certificate on grain inspection and storage. The 
previous provision shall not apply to grain operators that engage in storage activities for self-use or 
temporary storage for re-sale purposes”.2961 Besides, Article 32 provides all the forbidden issues that 
relate to operators engaging in grain procurement, wholesaling, and retailing activities: “(1) Default 
on payment to grain peasants; (2) Fabricate and spread false information to disturb market order; (3) 
Collude with each other and manipulate market prices; (4) Maliciously hoard grain and whoop up the 
prices; (5) Raise or depress prices in disguise through means such as intentional upgrading or 
downgrading; (6) Short weigh, adulterate or sell shoddy products; (7) Monopolize the market or 
conduct unfair competition; (8) Other activities in violation of state regulations”.2962 
 
4.3.2.2.Basic laws for the distribution and consumption segments of the food value chains 
 
The distribution and purchase of production materials, services and foods must also conform to a 
number of laws and international trade agreements, which are integrated parts of the economic order 
within the agro-food sectors and food value chains. 
 
                                                          
2959 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2960 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2961 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
2962 Non-officialtranslation offered by United States Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service. 
https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Grain%20Law%20(draft)_Beijing_China%20-
%20Peoples%20Republic%20of_12-18-2014.pdf. 
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4.3.2.2.1.1.Price Law of the People's Republic of China (PLPRC) 1998 (中华人民共和国价格
法) 
 
Price Law of the People's Republic of China (PLPRC) 1998 provides that the State practices and 
gradually perfects the price mechanism shaped mainly by the market under macroeconomic 
regulation and control. Specifically, Article 3 provides that  
“Determination of prices shall be in line with the law of value, prices of most commodities 
and services shall be the market-regulated prices and prices of an extremely small number of 
commodities and services shall be the government-guided prices or the government-set prices. 
Market-regulated prices mean those prices determined autonomously by the operators and 
formed through market competition. The operators referred to in this Law mean the legal 
persons, other organizations or individuals engaging in the production and management of 
commodities or provision of paid services. Government-guided prices mean those prices 
determined to guide the operators by the competent departments of price of the government 
or other departments concerned, the baseline prices and their range of fluctuations in 
accordance with the pricing authority and scope in pursuance of the provisions of this Law. 
Government-set prices mean those prices determined by the competent departments of price 
of the government or other departments concerned in accordance with the pricing authority 
and scope in pursuance of the provisions of this Law”.2963  
Article 6 further provides that “Market regulated prices shall be practised and determined 
autonomously by the operators in pursuance of this Law for commodity prices and services prices 
except those to which government-guided prices and government-set prices shall apply pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 18 of this Law”.2964 
Both Article 3 and Article 6 provides that the government may enforce government-guided prices or 
government-set prices when necessary for the prices of the following commodities and services. 
According to the National Development and Reform Commission, many agro-food products are 
subject to government-set prices. Some of them appear in the below form: 
State Development Planning Commission (Now NDRC) and the State Council list on 
commodities that apply government-set prices 2965. 
 
  
Types of 
commodities 
Substances of pricing Departments  
1 
Important 
commodities that are 
reserved by the 
central government 
Reserved grain, edible vegetable oil, cotton 
purchasing and selling prices, the reserve 
price of the reserved sugar in auction, prices 
of purchasing and selling reserved fertiliser, 
purchasing and selling prices of natural silk 
(from silkworm) 
State Development Planning 
Commission and other related 
departments  
2 Partial Fertilisers 
bench mark price and its floating range for 
factory sales, port settlement prices 
State Development Planning 
Commission 
                                                          
2963 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300046121.shtml 
2964 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300046121.shtml 
2965 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zwfwzx/zfdj/djfw/200507/t20050707_130525.html. 
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4.3.2.2.1.2.Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and 
Interests 1994 (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法) 
 
The law provides the basic law for protecting consumers and the principle for trade. In particular 
Article 2 provides that “The rights and interests of consumers in purchasing and using commodities 
or receiving services for daily consumption shall be under the protection of the present Law, or under 
the protection of other relevant laws and regulations in absence of stipulations in this Law”.2966 
Article 3 stipulates that “Business operators shall, in their supply of commodities produced and sold 
by them or services to consumers, abide by the present Law, or abide by other relevant laws and 
regulations in absence of stipulations in the present law”.2967 Article 4 provides that “In transactions 
between business operators and consumers a principle of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty 
and credibility shall be followed”.2968 With respect to peasants, their rights as a group of consumers 
were confirmed by the law. Article 54 provides that “The present Law shall be applicable mutatis 
mutandis to peasants' purchase or application of means of production used directly in agricultural 
production”.2969 This article indicates that the purchase of production materials by agricultural 
workers receive special protection. 
 
4.3.2.1.3. Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China (1994) (中华人民共和国对外
贸易法) 
 
Importation and exportation of food are regulated by a number of Chinese laws, in particular the 
Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China (FTLPRC) which governs this economic 
activity, although it provides exceptions or reservations for issues relating the food value chains. 
Articles 4 and 14 FTLPRC provide basic rules for the importation and exportation of most 
commodities. Article 4 provides that “The State applies a unified system of foreign trade, encourages 
the development of foreign trade and preserves a fair and free foreign trade order”.2970 Article 14 
stipulates that the State permits free import and export of goods and technologies unless the laws or 
administrative regulations provide otherwise.2971 Exceptions for agro-food products are provided in 
Articles 14 and 16. Following the general exception in Article 14, Article 16 specifies that the State 
may, if necessary, restrict or prohibit the import or export of agricultural, animal breeding and fishery 
products of any form in accordance with the provisions of international treaties or agreements signed 
or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China”.2972 
The international treaties and agreements are mainly referred to at the Protocol on the Accession 
of the People's Republic of China. Article 7 FTLPRC provides the non-tariff measures that the 
Chinese government may take regarding agro-food products: “In implementing the provisions of 
Articles III and XI of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture, China shall eliminate and 
shall not introduce, re-introduce or apply non-tariff measures that cannot be justified under the 
                                                          
2966 http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917139.htm 
2967 http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917139.htm 
2968 http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917139.htm 
2969 http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917139.htm 
2970 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383624.htm 
2971 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383624.htm 
2972 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383624.htm 
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provisions of the WTO Agreement.  For all non-tariff measures, whether or not referred to in Annex 
3, that are applied after the date of accession, consistent with the WTO Agreement or this Protocol, 
China shall allocate and otherwise administer such measures in strict conformity with the provisions 
of the WTO Agreement, including GATT 1994 and Article XIII thereof, and the Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures, including notification requirements”.2973 Article 9 states when and how 
the Chinese governments can influence the price of agro-food products “The goods and services listed 
in Annex 4 may be subject to price controls, consistent with the WTO Agreement, in particular Article 
III of the GATT 1994 and Annex 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Except in 
exceptional circumstances, and subject to notification to the WTO, price controls shall not be 
extended to goods or services beyond those listed in Annex 4, and China shall make best efforts to 
reduce and eliminate these controls”.2974 Article 12 includes Chinese government’s commitments and 
obligations as contained in China's Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and 
stipulates that China shall not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on agricultural products and 
that, under the Transitional Review Mechanism, it shall notify fiscal and other transfers between or 
among state-owned enterprises in the agricultural sector (whether national or sub-national) and other 
enterprises that operate as state trading enterprises in the agricultural sector.2975   
 
4.4. Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Patent law excludes patent protection for plant variety, only have patent protection for the processes 
used in the manufacturing of animal and plant varieties.2976  
Regulations of the PRC on protection of New Varieties of Plants 1997(amended on March 1, 
2013)2977 is administrative regulations. The hierarchy is lower than Laws issued by NPC.  The 
protection of varieties of plants are general between UPOV Convention 1978 and UPOV Convention 
1991(have not reach the minimum protection of 1991 UPOV). The protection of plant variety in the 
Regulations only covers the botanical genus and species in the national catalogue of protected plat 
varieties, rather than all plant genera and species.2978 The Regulations grant “15 years of protection 
for variety rights, and 20 years for vines, forest trees, fruit trees and ornamental plants and 15 years 
for other plants.”2979 The regulation grant an exclusive right to produce or sell for commercial 
purposes the propagating material of the protected variety, or use for commercial purposes in a 
repeated manner in the production of the propagating material of another variety.2980 Seed Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (SLPRC) (Amended in 2015) 2981 includes a new chapter: chapter IV 
Protection of New Varieties. Generally, SLPRC extended the exclusive right to produce, propagate, 
or sell the propagating material of the protected variety of plants without the consent from right 
                                                          
2973 https://www.wto.org 
2974 https://www.wto.org 
2975 https://www.wto.org 
2976 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China [Revised], 2008, see 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn028en.pdf Article 25 
2977 Regulations of the PRC on protection of New Varieties of Plants (hereinafter Regulations) see 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=15503  
2978 Regulations Article 13, Article 27 
2979 Regulations Article 34 
2980 Regulations Article 6 
2981 see: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Legislation/2015-11/05/content_1950421.htm The full text of 
SLPRC2015 is not available from official source. The English edition of SLPRC in NPC database has not been revised. 
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holders. SLPRC does not require the commercial purpose, and only requires commercial purpose 
when the propagating materials are used for the production of the propagating material of another 
variety.2982 
In terms of farmers’ right to access seed, Article 10 of Regulations: if farmers harvest the 
material of the protected variety on their own holdings and use for propagating purpose by farmers 
on their own holdings. The same article is also included in SLPRC 20152983. The legislation limits 
farmer’s right to the self-use and self-propagating extent. Also, the SLPRC and Regulation entitled 
Ministry of Agriculture to grant compulsory licensing to implement the variety rights for the sake of 
national or public interest.2984 
China ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on 8 June 2005, effective from 6 
September 2005. 
China has traditionally cautiously reviewed the introduction and development of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) and GM products. The authorities actively promote fundamental 
research but strictly control the planting of GM crops. In theory, crops that pass the safety tests are 
considered safe and can be planted. To date, China has approved seven GM crops of which only Bt 
Cotton is grown on a large scale. In addition, China has approved four imported GM crops (cotton, 
soybean, corn and canola) as raw materials for processing but they cannot be imported as seeds.  
Nestle was involved in the first GM labelling case in China. In 2003, Ms Yanling Zhu sued 
Nestle for not labelling GM ingredients in its cocoa powder product "Qiaobanban", and claimed 
compensation of the product price and an order for Nestle to label GM ingredients on its packaging. 
The full case report is not publicly available. The Court appointed the Shanghai Academy of 
Agricultural Science to test the cocoa product for GM ingredients: The result was negative when 
using the Protocol of the Quantitative PCR Analysis included in the recommended industrial 
standards issued by the Ministry of Agriculture. However, the sample tested positive on GM 
glyphosate-resistance soybean with the Nested PCR analysis provided by international standards. The 
GeneScan Analytics GmbH also confirmed the existence of a GM ingredient. The court ruled in 
favour of Nestle and no GM labelling was required. The case shows that Chinese courts rule on the 
basis of domestic standards. 
 
Seeds 
 
Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of 
China, the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants of 
1 October 19972985.中华人
民共和国保护植物新品
种条例 
a. UPOV Convention for 
the protection of new 
varieties of plants;2986 
 
b. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA): 
-Regulation of the People's 
Republic of China on 
Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (2014 Revision) ( 
                                                          
2982 SLPRC 2015 Article 28 
2983 SLPRC 2015 Article 29 
2984 SLPRC 2015 Article 30, Regulation Article 11,  
also see Implementing Rules for the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (Agriculture Part) (consolidated version of April 25, 2014) http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=15183 
Article 12 
2985 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=360025. 
2986 http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1991/act1991.htm . China has only signed the 1978  UPOV 
Convention, not the 1991. 
848 
 
 
 
Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement). 
中华人民共和国植物新品
种保护条例). 
Farmer’s right to access to 
seeds is provided in Article 
10 of this Regulation: “… 
shall by no means be 
prejudiced:       
(1) use of the authorized 
species for breeding and 
other scientific research 
activities;    
(2) self-use or self-
propagation by farmers of 
propagation materials of the 
authorized species”. 
  
- promulgated “The 
Implementing Rules for the 
Regulations of the People’s 
Republic 
of China on the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants 
(Agriculture Part)”( 中华人
民共和国植物新品种保护
条例实施细则(农业部分
)).2987 
- is responsible for the 
protection of new varieties 
of field crops, vegetables, 
ornamental species and fruit 
crops.2988  
State Forestry 
Administration (SFA) 国家
林业局: 
-promulgated “The Rules 
for the Implementation of 
the Regulations of the 
People's 
Republic of China On the 
Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (Forest Part)” 中华
                                                          
2987 http://www.cnpvp.cn/en/index.html. 
2988 In October 2011, the protection of plant varieties under the authority of MOA covered 80 genera and species, see 
http://www.cnpvp.com/english/Introduction%20of%20the%20Network.htm. 
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人民共和国植物新品种保
护条例实施细则(森林部分
)2989; 
- responsible for the 
protection of new varieties 
of forest trees, bamboo and 
woody rattan, woody 
ornamental plant (including 
woody flower e.g. roses), 
fruit tree (dry fruit), woody 
oil-bearing plants, plants 
used for beverage, plants 
used for condiment and 
woody herbs as well as other 
plants which are in 
conformity with Article 2 of 
the Regulations.2990  
 
Animal 
genetics 
The Patent Law, 19932991
专利法 
 
 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 1992生物多样
性公约 
 
The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), 1994 
State Science and 
Technology Commission 
("SSTC") 国家科学技术委
员会 
the China Food and Drug 
Administration (CFDA) 中
国食品药品监督管理局 
 
 
4.5. Competition law, superior bargaining power, and food value chains  
 
4.5.1. Competition laws and the food value chains 
 
Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML) 20082992中华人民共和国反垄
断法. AML governs four general issues: (1), abuse of dominant position; (2), abuse of administrative 
monopoly; (3), anticompetitive collaboration and agreements; (4), merger and acquisition. However, 
Article 56 AML provides that the AML does not apply to the association or cooperation by 
agricultural producers or rural economic organizations in their business activities of production, 
processing, sale, transportation, storage of farm products, etc.2993 
The competition law exemption for agro-food sectors generally targets the provisions 
                                                          
2989 http://www.cnpvp.net/index/index_en.aspx. 
2990 In October 2011, the protection of plant varieties under the authority of SFA covered 78 genera and species, see 
http://www.cnpvp.com/english/Introduction%20of%20the%20Network.htm. 
2991 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6503 
2992 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
2993 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
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included in AML Chapter 2. Article 16 forbids industrial organisations from organising concerted 
anticompetitive practices, while Article 13 forbids competitors from collaborating: specifically, 
prohibiting them from concluding the following monopoly agreements: “ (1) on fixing or changing 
commodity prices; (2) on restricting the amount of commodities manufactured or marketed; (3) on 
splitting the sales market or the purchasing market for raw and semi-finished materials; (4) on 
restricting the purchase of new technologies or equipment, or the development of new technologies 
or products; (5) on joint boycotting transactions; and (6) other monopoly agreements confirmed as 
such by the authority for the enforcement of the Anti-monopoly Law under the State Council. For the 
purposes of this Law, monopoly agreements include agreements, decisions and other concerted 
conducts designed to eliminate or restrict competition.”2994 Article 14 forbids anticompetitive 
collaborations between suppliers and dealers, specifically “(1) on fixing the prices of commodities 
resold to a third party; (2) on restricting the lowest prices for commodities resold to a third party; and 
(3) other monopoly agreements confirmed as such by the authority for enforcement of the Anti-
monopoly Law under the State Council.”2995  
Provisions against Pricing Abuse2996 反价格垄断规定is a department regulation enacted 
pursuant to AML. It primarily forbids anticompetitive pricing collaboration, price related 
administrative abuse, and pricing abuses. It also repeats Article 56 AML, negating the application of 
section 1 of Article 3: “a price fixing agreement reached by business operators”.2997 
Specialized Peasants’ Cooperatives constitutes the main form of conducting joint or coordinated 
actions that are provided for by Article 56 AML. These are protected and governed by Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Specialized Farmers Cooperatives (LPRCSFC) 2006. According to 
Article 2 LPRCSFC, specialized farmers’ cooperative are defined as  
“mutual-help economic organizations joined voluntarily and managed in a democratic 
manner by the producers and operators of the same kind of farm products or by the providers 
or users of services for the same kind of agricultural production and operation. Specialized 
farmers cooperatives mainly serve their members, offering such services as purchasing the 
means of agricultural production, marketing, processing, transporting and storing farm 
products, and providing technologies and information related to agricultural production and 
operation”.2998  
Agro-food production constitutes the starting point of any food value chain. As it is dependent on 
environment and fragile in nature, it is a standard international custom for this segment of food value 
chain to receive support from the government. As evidenced by the agro-food exceptions provided 
for in the aforementioned laws, LPRCSFC provides legal protection to farmers’ cooperation, which 
is important for maintaining stable product supply and distribution, which in turn benefits peasants 
themselves and stabilises the food value chain.  Article 6 LPRCSFC provides that “The State protects 
the lawful rights and interests of the specialized farmers cooperatives and their members, and no units 
or individuals may infringe upon such rights and interests”.2999 LPRCSFC provides that governments 
shall provide specialized farmers’ cooperative financial and tax support, in specific, Article 51 
provides that: “The policy-oriented financial institutions of the State shall adopt diversified means to 
                                                          
2994 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
2995 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
2996 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm 
2997 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-01/04/content_1777969.htm 
2998 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388023.htm 
2999 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388023.htm 
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provide funds through various channels in support of the specialized farmers cooperatives. The 
specific supportive policies shall be formulated by the State Council. The State encourages the 
commercial financial institutions to provide financial services to the specialized farmers cooperatives 
by diversified means”.3000 Article 52 provides that “The specialized farmers cooperatives shall enjoy 
preferential treatment in taxation prescribed by the State in respect of agricultural production, 
processing, circulation and services and other economic activities involving agriculture. Other 
preferential taxation policies in support of the development of specialized farmers cooperatives shall 
be formulated by the State Council”.3001 Despite of this, LPRCSFC specifies many provisions that 
specialized farmers cooperatives shall obey. Article 7 provides that “In production and operation, 
specialized farmers cooperatives shall obey the relevant laws and administrative regulations, observe 
social and business ethics, and act in good faith.”3002 It is noted that although Chinese competition 
law offers exemptions for “association or cooperation by agricultural producers or rural economic 
organizations in their business activities of production, processing, sale, transportation, storage of 
farm products, etc”,3003 the other three main areas that governs by Chinese competition law receive 
no exemption. There has, thus, been competition law enforcement in each of these three areas, namely 
distribution cartels, merger control, and abuse of a dominant position in the agricultural sector. These 
cases will be introduced in the following paragraphs. Regarding superior bargaining power, which is 
an academic and legislative frontier, it is not yet certain whether abuse of superior bargaining power 
to harm food production, distribution, and consumption constitutes an infringement of Chinese 
competition law, nor whether such abuse would also be subject to competition law exemption. 
Regulation of superior bargaining power in China will be introduced in the following section. 
 
4.5.2. Regulation of superior bargaining power and food value chains 
 
Abuse of superior bargaining power to gain unfair profits began to emerge in China more than a 
decade ago. Along with the application of market mechanisms within the territory, from around 2006, 
abuse of superior bargaining power started to be considered a serious legal problem, with the adoption 
of a number of department regulations in order to regulate it.  
On 3 March 2006, Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) launched a draft department regulation 
soliciting comments and entitled ‘Administrative Measures for the Sales Promotion Acts of Retailers’ 
3004. Article 4 of the draft provides that: “A retailer, when undertaking sales promotion activities, shall 
follow the principles of lawfulness, fairness and good faith and observe the commercial ethics, and 
may not undertake any sales promotion activity in violation of social moralities, disturb the market 
competition order and the social public order or impair the lawful rights and interests of consumers 
and other business operators”.3005  
On 13 Oct 2006, MOFCOM, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for 
Industry & Commerce, the State Administration of Taxation, the State Development & Reform 
Commission (incl. former State Development Planning Commission) jointly enacted a department 
regulation entitled Administrative Measures for Fair Transactions between Retailers and suppliers
                                                          
3000 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388023.htm. 
3001 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388023.htm. 
3002 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388023.htm. 
3003 Article 54 of AML. http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/14/content_21917139.htm. 
3004 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bh/200604/20060401951577.shtml. 
3005 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/bh/200604/20060401951577.shtml. 
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零售商供应商公平交易管理办法.3006 Article 6 of the regulation specifies five specific forms of 
abuse of superior bargaining power, providing that “No retailer may conduct any of the following 
unfair transactions by abusing its superior bargaining power: (1) (when) It signs with a supplier a 
contract on the supply of a particular commodity, in which both parties agree to the specifications, 
type, pattern, etc., but later it refuses to accept the commodity, with, however, the exception where 
the supplier should be liable for the matter, or the supplier so agrees, and where the retailer will bear 
the losses incurred therefrom; (2) It requires any supplier to bear the liability for the wasting of any 
commodity un-stipulated in advance; (3) There is no advance stipulation of conditions for removing 
any commodity from the shelf or counter, or where the conditions for removing any commodity from 
the shelf or counter are not met, but the retailer removes the commodity provided by the supplier 
from the shelf or counter without any justifiable reason, except that the retailer does so under any 
law, regulation, or under an administrative decision made by the administrative organ; (4) It forces 
any supplier to refund the sales profit unconditionally, or it sets a certain sales volume as the 
precondition for return of sales profit, but charges the supplier refund of profit in the case of failure 
to reach the stipulated sales volume; or (5)It forces any supplier to purchase any commodity it 
designates or accept any service it designates”.3007 
With the increasing number of cases, these department regulations gradually lost their 
effectiveness. Therefore, legislators are compelled to address the superior bargaining power abuse 
problem with national laws.  
Article 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) (中华人民共和国反垄断法) (implemented in 
2008) provides that the assessment of the existence of a dominant position depends on many factors, 
beyond market shares, such as the extent to which other undertakings rely on the undertaking in 
question, thus indirectly referring to situations of economic dependence3008. However, to our 
knowledge, there have not been any cases implementing the dependence perspective in interpreting 
Article 18 AML. 
In 2011, MOFCOM and other four ministries issued a Work plan against large scale retailers 
and suppliers’ illegal charge .(清理整顿大型零售企业向供应商违规收费工作方案) The work 
plan expressed concerns over the abuse of superior bargaining power of large-scale retailers, 
including supermarkets, general stores and electronic stores .3009 The main part of the work addressed 
three superior bargaining power abuse issues: product promotion, abusive prices and the display of 
the price tag in retail. 
In 2015, a draft version of the Commodity Circulation Law of the People's Republic of China
中华人民共和国商品流通法3010 was published soliciting comments. Article 2 of the draft law 
clarified the scope of the legislation’s application: “The Law applies to the commodity circulation 
within the territory of the People's Republic of China. For the purpose of the Law, commodity 
circulation refers to trade activities such as wholesale, retail and logistics of commodities and other 
relevant services.” No exemption for agro-food issues is mentioned in the draft law. Articles 41 and 
42 prohibit the abuse of superior bargaining power concerning commodity circulation and services 
between retailers and suppliers. Specifically, Article 41 provides that “During commodity circulation, 
                                                          
3006 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/200610/20061003442804.shtml. 
3007 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/200610/20061003442804.shtml. 
3008 Article 10, SAIC Rules on Abuse of Dominance; Article 18, NDRC Rules on Anti-Price Monopoly Conduct. 
3009 See, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/h/redht/201112/20111207899504  
3010 http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201503/20150300928533.shtml. The law is still in the legislation process at the 
time of writing. 
853 
 
retailers and suppliers are prohibited to abuse superior bargaining power, to hinder fair trade, to harm 
each other’s legitimate rights. Retailers are those who supply commodity to consumers. Suppliers are 
those who supply commodity to retailers, including manufacturers and others who supply the 
retailers. Superior bargaining power refers to one trading party’s advantage over its trading parties, . 
The advantage is formed due to one party’s economic reliance on its trading party. This economic 
reliance restraints one trading party’s ability to choose more trading parties, to contract negotiation 
and to establish trading conditions.” Furthermore, Article 42 provides that “Service fee between 
retailers and suppliers shall be based on negotiation, and shall go through formal agreements. 
Imposing fees that are not directly related to the commodity or are not based on service constitutes 
abuse of superior bargaining power.” 
On 25 February 2016, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council published the 
amending draft of the Anti­Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China (AUCL) 中华
人民共和国反不正当竞争法. The AUCL added the abuse of superior bargaining power as a 
prohibited act and no exemption for agro-food issues is mentioned in the draft amendment. 
The draft amendment defines superior bargaining power as where “in a certain transaction, a 
business operator holds a comparatively advantageous position as to capital, technology, market 
access, sales channel and raw material purchase etc., which renders the trading counterparty to be  
dependent on this business operator, (this manifested by) the difficulty (it has) to switch to other 
business operators”. AUCL Article 6 also identifies five forms of abuse of superior bargaining power 
as unfair trade: (1). restricting a trading counterparty to certain trading partners without any justifiable 
reasons; (2). restricting a trading counterparty to designated products without any justifiable reasons; 
(3). restricting a trading counterparty to certain trading conditions when dealing with other operators 
without any justifiable reasons; (4). charging unreasonable fees or unreasonably requesting other 
economic benefits from trading counterparties; and (5). imposing other unreasonable conditions. 
 
Article 6, AUCL Draft Amendement3011 
 
“An undertaking shall not engage in any of the following conduct of unfair trading by taking 
advantage of its comparative advantage position: 
(1)  Without justifiable reasons, restricting counterparties’ trading partners; 
(2)  Without justifiable reasons, restricting counterparties to purchase certain designated products; 
(3)  Without justifiable reasons, restricting the trading terms and conditions between counterparties 
and other undertakings; 
(4)  Abusively overcharging or unreasonably demanding counterparties to offer other economic 
interests; or  
(5)  Attaching other unreasonable trading terms. 
‘Comparative advantage position’ in this Law refers to an advantageous position in a specific 
transaction held by an undertaking in terms of capital, technology, market access, distribution channel 
and material procurement, etc. and its trading counterparty is reliant on such undertaking and is 
difficult to switch to other undertakings.”  
                                                          
3011 Unofficial translation prepared by the Anjie Law Firm. The translation was used by the ABA as an appendix of its 
Opinion. 
See https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_20160324_china.authche
ckdam.pdf 
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About a year before publishing the draft AUCL, an amendment of the AML was initiated in 2015 by 
the National Development and Reform Commission; one of the main issues touched upon by the 
amendment is whether the provision on superior bargaining power should be added to the AML. The 
draft amendment (to which SAIC contributed) was published by the Legislative Affairs Office of the 
Administration in February 2016 for public consultation.  
The majority of Chinese scholars agree to include a SPB clause in the national law, but in the 
AML, instead of the AUCL. The inclusion of a provision to govern superior bargaining power into 
the AML has long been suggested by the majority of Chinese scholars and the recent amendments 
ignited again the debate. Most Chinese scholars support the view that superior bargaining power 
(SPB) should be regulated by Chinese Antimonopoly Law (AML)3012. Prof. Guangyao XU has noted 
that it is not necessary to include the SPB clause into the Chinese unfair competition law, because 
SPB touches upon the same issues as those dealt by the concept of dominant position, or it constitutes 
a form of dominant position. He also noted that AML offers sufficient mechanisms for the regulation 
of SPB.3013 Dr. Qiang YU notes that SPB should be regulated by AML, noting the importance of 
addressing SPB in the AML on the basis of a global value/supply chain approach.3014 Prof. Xiaoye 
WANG has also criticised the inclusion of a provision on SPB into Chinese unfair competition law, 
in view of the fact that AML can regulate some of the SPB-abuse practice, but with limited scope and 
effectiveness and that the regulation of other types of SPB-abuses must rely on contract law, 
commercial law and sectoral-specific regulations.3015 Judge Li ZHU, suggests that the most of the 
concerns about the abuse of SPB could be addressed by the AML or the contract law, it is therefore 
unnecessary to include such a clause in the AUCL. Moreover, the risk of that clause being misused 
or abused is imminent and significant.3016 One should also note the position of Prof. Yanbei MENG 
who considers that it is baseless to include the regulation of SPB into Chinese Anti-Unfair 
Competition law. She explained that the regulation of SPB is contrary to the objectives of the AUCL. 
What’s even worse, according to her, if the regulation of SPB was included into the law, 
anticompetitive effects will be exempt from being punished.3017 
At the opposite side, Prof. Jian LI expresses some reticence in introducing a provision on SBP 
in AML. According to him, the theory of SPB has major defects, and its inclusion into competition 
law will produce negative implications to the theoretical analysis and legal practice for both antitrust 
law and unfair competition law.3018 For professor Jian Li, the inclusion of SPB into AML will be 
problematic in view of the fact that AML is market structure based, while SPB is economic 
                                                          
3012 See, for instance, 孟雁北，滥用相对经济优势地位行为的反垄断法研究，法学家，2004 年第6 期 ; 徐士英、
唐茂军，滥用相对支配地位行为的法律规制研究, 东方法学》，2008 年第3 期
http://qiduojun.csu.edu.cn/shichangguizhifa/512.html (explaining that that Article 18 AML should offerr the basis for 
relevant regulation) 
3013 许光耀，“相对优势地位”与“市场支配地位”的法理辨析——对《反不正当竞争法（征求意见稿）第6条的不
同解释》，价格理论与实践，2016年第5期。 
3014 于强，滥用优势地位与反垄断法的适用，竞争政策研究，2016年第4期。 
3015 王晓晔，论滥用“相对优势地位”的法律规制，现代法学，2016年第5期。 
3016 朱理，滥用相对优势地位问题的法律规制——虚幻的敌人与真实的危险，电子知识产权，2016年第6期。 
3017 孟雁北，论反不正当竞争立法对经营自主权行使的限制——以《反不正当竞争法（修订草案送审稿）为研
究样本，中国政法大学学报，2017年第2期。 
3018 李剑，相对优势地位理论质疑，现代法学，2005年第3期。 
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dependence based. Its inclusion may improperly expand the regulatory scope of AML and finally 
protect competitors and not competition.3019  
Professor Xianlin WANG, however, strongly suggests that a SPB clause should be included 
in the AUCL. He argues that the superior bargaining position is neither regulated by the AML (which 
covers the dominance regulation), nor the contract law. For example, some big retailers may impose 
significant tax and unfair fee on its small suppliers. For those non-dominant, but relatively superior 
retailers, it is important to regulate their behaviour by introducing such a SPB clause in the AUCL.3020 
Prof. Xianlin WANG has recently repeated his position on the inclusion of SPB into Chinese Anti-
unfair Competition Law explaining that if the regulation of SPB was excluded from the the draft law, 
no law can be used for governing it, taking the position that it is preferable in the long-run that the 
regulation of SPB should be included into Chinese Anti-unfair Competition Law.3021  Prof. Mingyu 
LV has also pointed out that the provision on SPB can be included into Chinese Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law if the wording of the clause was adjusted.3022  
Relations between the amendment of the AUCL and that of the AML remain subtle at present. 
However, there is no theoretical foundation for introducing regulatory provisions on superior 
bargaining power into the AUCL, whereas there are extensive theoretical and factual reasons for 
adding such a provision into the AML.  The key issues that need to be discussed are whether the 
regulation of superior bargaining power will be subject to AML exemption and, in the case of 
exemption being applied to agro-food sectors, which segments of supply chains will be affected. The 
proposed amendment of the AUCL was reviewed by the Chinese National People’s Congress for the 
first time in February 2017. Entrusted by and on behalf of the Premier, the head of SAIC gave a 
supporting explanation to the Congress on this session. The Congress published the bill it reviewed 
for public comments after the first reading. It is in this draft that the SPR provision was deleted. Since 
the first reading draft was prepared and proposed by the Administration for parliamentary review, it 
should be the Administration who may remove the SPR clause.  
After the first reading and the Congress’s first round of public consultation, the Law 
Committee of the Congress made some revisions to the first reading bill. The Congress then 
deliberated the bill for the second time in August 2017. The vice-chair of the Law Committee of the 
Congress explained why certain changes were made in that session. The Congress published the 
version used for the second reading, in which the SPR clause is still excluded. It will be another round 
of deliberation of the bill before the final vote on the amendment. For most of the cases, the bill does 
not incur any substantial changes after the second reading. However, if there is a disagreement among 
the legislators, the bill may also be revised significantly. Additional rounds of deliberations may be 
organised after the three readings. Procedurally, it is still uncertain if the SPR clause will be included 
in the amended AUCL.  
In any case it seems highly unlikely that a clause on Superior Bargaining Power will be 
included in the AUCL this time, in view of various objections to it by a number of scholars. The 
rationale against such inclusion seems to relate, inter alia, to possible worries of false positives, and 
to the theoretical and  institutional division between the AML and the AUCL. 
 
                                                          
3019 李剑，论结构性要素在我国反垄断法中的基础地位，政治与法律，2009年第10期。 
3020 王先林，对《反不正当竞争法（修订草案送审稿）》的两点解读，中国工商报，2016年3月2日。 
3021 戴龙等，“《反不正当竞争法》修订的重大问题学术研讨会”综述，竞争政策研究，2016年第4期。 
3022 孟雁北，《反不正当竞争法（修订草案）》研讨会综述，竞争政策研究，2017年第2期。 
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4.6. Competition Law Enforcement in specific segments of the food value chain 
 
4.6.1. Fertilisers       
 
Uralkali Open-end Corporate, Silvinit Open-end Corporate  2011 3023 
乌拉尔开放型股份公司吸收合并谢尔维尼特开放型股份公司 
MOFCOM reviewed the merger declaration of Uralkali Open-end Corporate's (Uralkali) and Silvinit 
Open-end Corporate (Silvinit), and decided to approve this merger. However, restrictive conditions 
were imposed pursuant to the AML and other relevant regulations. After analysing in depth the 
impact of this merger on market competition pursuant to Article 27, MOFTOM held that an 
unfavourable impact of eliminating and restricting competition may result in the Chinese potassium 
chloride fertiliser market. This is because the global potassium chloride fertiliser market is highly 
concentrated; more specifically, three giant firms hold more than 80% of the market share and the 
merging firms are two of them. Moreover, the two firms dominate the Chinese potassium chloride 
fertiliser market (as they hold more than 50% market share). Consequently, MOFCOM required the 
merged entity to offer non-discriminatory treatment to Chinese consumers.  
 
4.6.2. Beans                      
 
Marubeni Corporation, Gavilon Holdings, LLC 2012 3024 
丸红公司收购高鸿公司 
On 19 June 2012, MOFCOM received a notification concerning the acquisition of 100% of the equity 
in Gavilon Holdings, LLC (“Gavilon”) by Marubeni Corporation (“Marubeni”). After reviewing the 
case, MOFCOM decided to approve this acquisition with restrictive conditions pursuant to AML 
Article 30. MOFCOM examined this acquisition and analysed, in-depth, its impact on competition in 
accordance with the AML and its supporting regulations. It ultimately held that the acquisition may 
have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the import market for soybeans in China. 
China is the world’s largest importer of soybeans. The amount imported into China in 2012 
accounted for 60% of the total trading volume globally and 80% of the total supply in China. 
Marubeni exports 99% of its soybeans to China. Gavilon disposes of important capabilities in the 
procurement, storage, and logistics of soybeans in North America. Therefore, this acquisition would 
combine Gavilon’s strength in the soybeans market in North America with Marubeni’s 
comprehensive advantage in the export market of soybeans to China. In addition, it was considred 
that the acquisition would also improve Marubeni’s capability to export soybeans to China, and 
potentially enhance Marubeni’s power to control the import market of soybeans in China, potentially 
eliminating or restricting competition. Currently, China is heavily reliant on importing soybeans, as 
the domestic soybean-consuming market is highly fragmented, with small-sized businesses lacking 
bargaining power. This acquisition could further undermine the bargaining power of these small 
soybean businesses in the downstream market. The post-merger firm could further enhance its power 
to control the import market of soybeans in China, thereby further increasing the cost of market entry. 
Ultimately, this merger would have harmed downstream competition and, in turn, consumers. 
                                                          
3023 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201106/20110607583288.shtml 
3024 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201304/20130400100376.shtml 
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Upon assessing, Marubeni’s remedy proposal submitted on 17 April 2013, MOFCOM held 
that it could reduce the adverse effects on competition resulting from this acquisition and, 
consequently, decided to approve this acquisition with the following restrictive conditions.  
(i) Within six months after this decision becomes effective, Marubeni shall establish two 
independent legal entities together with two independent operation teams responsible for the export 
and sale of soybeans into China. Marubeni will export and sell soybeans into China through its 
soybean subsidiary. Gavilon will export and sell soybeans into China through its soybean subsidiary. 
All these actions are subject to reporting to the supervision trustee and receive the approval of 
MOFCOM.  
(ii) Marubeni’s soybean company and Gavilon’s soybean company, in respect of matters 
including, but not limited to, the appointment and dismissal of personnel, procurement, marketing, 
sale, pricings, etc, shall remain separate and independent firms. To ensure the enforcement of the 
principles of fairness and reasonableness, Marubeni and Gavilon shall formulate safeguarding 
measures in advance, which shall be carried out after reporting to the supervision trustee and upon 
the approval of MOFCOM. 
(iii) Upon completion of this acquisition, Marubeni’s soybean company shall not purchase 
soybeans from Gavilon’s American Asset (the facility located in the U.S.A., which is solely 
controlled by Gavilon and engaged in product procurement and export), unless conducted under fair 
market conditions. Upon the completion of the acquisition, if Marubeni’s procurement and export 
assets located in the U.S.A. are transferred and incorporated into Gavilon, Marubeni’s obligation to 
procure soybeans based on the principles of fairness and reasonableness shall be extended to such 
assets. To ensure the enforcement of the principles of fairness and reasonableness, Marubeni and 
Gavilon shall formulate safeguarding measures (including the possibility of setting up a firewall 
between Marubeni’s soybean company and Gavilon’s American Asset) in advance, which shall be 
carried out after reporting to the supervision trustee and upon the approval of MOFCOM.  
(iv) Marubeni’s soybean company and Gavilon’s soybean company shall not exchange 
competitive information with each other. “Competitive information” refers to any information that 
may lead Marubeni’s soybean company and Gavilon’s soybean company to coordinate their 
respective business behaviours, which includes, but is not limited to, the sales price of soybeans in 
China, information relating to the commercial terms for procurement and sales, cost, existing or 
potential customers, negotiation with customers and customers lists, marketing and strategic plans, 
etc. To ensure the achievement of the above goal, Marubeni and Gavilon shall formulate safeguarding 
measures in advance, especially by setting up a firewall between Marubeni’s soybean company and 
Gavilon’s American Asset to ensure that they would not exchange competitive information. Such 
measures shall be carried out after reporting to the supervision trustee and upon the approval of 
MOFCOM. 
 
JCCE, Inner Mongolian Zhalute Banner Hongye Grain and Oil Trading Co., Ltd., Taonan Ji Dou 
Economics Trade Co.,Ltd, and Other firms(109 firms) 20103025 
吉林玉米中心批发市场有限公司联合内蒙古扎鲁特旗正达粮油贸易有限公司、吉林省洮南市
吉豆经贸有限公司 
                                                          
3025 http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201007/t20100702_358457.html. 
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On 17 October 2009，JCCE3026, Inner Mongolian Zhalute Banner Hongye Grain and Oil Trading 
Co., Ltd., Taonan Ji Dou Economics Trade Co.,Ltd, spread wrong statistical data predicting that the 
amount of mung bean output within the main production areas (within Mainland China) would fall 
64.05% in 2009 compared to that in 2008. According to this data, JCCE and 109 other firms concerted 
to raise the price of mung beans nationwide, which is a violation of PLPRC. Consequently, JCCE 
received a fine of one million RMB, while Inner Mongolian Zhalute Banner Hongye Grain and Oil 
Trading Co., Ltd., Taonan Ji Dou Economics Trade Co.,Ltd received fine of half a million RMB each. 
 
4.6.3. Salt 
 
Inner Mongolia Chifeng Salt Company 2014 
内蒙古赤峰盐业公司垄断行为案 
In September 2014, Chifeng Salt Industry Company and its subsidiaries engaged in discriminatory 
treatment between different retailers. Specifically, Chifeng Salt Industry Company supplied only a 
few but expensive types of salt products to Chifeng. As the only edible salt wholesaler in Chifeng, 
Chifeng Salt Industry Company’s conduct amounted to abuse of dominance through discriminatory 
treatment, including a refusal to deal. The Inner Mongolia AIC found that such conduct violated 
Article 17 of the AML and constituted an abuse of market dominance. The AIC imposed financial 
penalties of CNY 2,988,358, which included CNY 1,940,544 in disgorgement and CNY 1,047,814 
in fines. 
 
Hunan Yongzhou Salt Company 2015  
湖南盐业永州市分公司搭售案 
During January 2014 and March 2015, the company had engaged in tie-in sales of unpopular salt 
products in the course of wholesale of popular salt products, which had wide-ranging impact and 
caused actual harm on the part of retailers and consumers. The Hunan AIC found that the company 
violated the (5) provision in first paragraph of Article 17 of the AML and therefore imposed a fine of 
CNY 272,000 (USD 39,172) and disgorgement of CNY 698,000. The fine is equivalent to 1% of the 
company's sales in 2014. 
 
4.6.4. Garlic      
 
Zhongmu County Cold Storage Association 2010  3027 
中牟县冷藏保鲜协会 
On 16 March 2010, Zhongmu County Cold Storage Association issued an executive document 
ordering its members to set the price of garlic storage service to 260—320 RMB/ton, with no 
members allowed to lower it. Consequently, NDRC fined Zhongmu County Cold Storage Association 
for 80.000 RMB for violating PLPRC. 
 
4.6.5. Sugar       
 
                                                          
3026 吉林玉米中心批发市场有限公司 
3027 http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201007/t20100702_358457.html 
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Guangxi Phoenix Biochemical  Ltd., Guangxi Nanhua Sugar Ltd. and other firms  20113028 
广西凤糖生化股份有限公司和广西南华糖业集团有限公司 
Between 2010 and 2011 Guangxi Phoenix Biochemical Ltd., Guangxi Nanhua Sugar Ltd. and other 
firms hoarded huge quantities of sugar and sold their sugar at unreasonably high prices, which were 
found to constitute violations of PLPRC. Consequently, NDRC imposed administrative fines to these 
firms and required them to sell 170,000 tons of sugar priced not higher than 7,000RMB/ ton before 
15 October 2011. 
 
4.6.6. Rice vermicelli           
 
Nanning Xianyige Food Factory  2014 3029 
南宁市鲜一阁食品厂 
On 1 December 2009, the director of Nanning Xianyige Food Factory - Zhihe Que, organised a cartel 
to raise the price of rice vermicelli within the geographic market of Nanning City. On 1 January 2010
，Zhihe Que and 17 other rice vermicelli suppliers raised their price in a concerted way. Several 
weeks later, Zhihe Que organised another similar cartel in the adjacent city of Liuzhou. NDRC fined 
Nanning Xianyige Food Factory and the two other main organising factories 300,000 RMB. Some of 
the cartel members received fines between 30,000 RMB and 80,000 RMB each, while others only 
received an administrative warning. NDRC did not publish the legal basis for these decisions. 
 
4.6.7. Beverages                     
 
Coca-Cola, Huiyuan   2009 3030 
可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司 
On September 18, 2008, the MOFCOM received notification materials for the merger of Coca-Cola 
Co. and China Huiyuan Co. Through its review, MOFCOM found that this merger would have an 
adverse impact on competition. Given Coca-Cola’s dominant position in the carbonated-beverage 
market, it could easily leverage the combined marketing power of a merged company to dominate 
China’s juice-beverage market by bundling products or offering special incentives and exclusive 
arrangements. Coca-Cola Co. then submitted a preliminary resolution proposal and a revised 
proposal. After assessment of the same, MOFCOM concluded that the revised proposal still could 
not effectively alleviate this merger’s adverse impact on competition. Therefore, pursuant to AML 
Article 28, MOFCOM decided to block the merger. 
 
4.6.8. Milk  
 
Speedfresh Resale Price Maintenance 
上海领鲜物流维持转售价格案 
On 27th December 2016, Price Bureau of Shanghai DRC imposed a CNY 1.978 million fine in total 
as 1% of the relevant turnover of Shanghai Speedfresh and ordered it to stop illegal conducts of 
implementing vertical monopoly agreements which fixed the resale prices.  
                                                          
3028 http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201110/t20111009_437580.html. 
3029 http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201402/t20140228_588558.html. 
3030 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200903/20090306108494.shtml 
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4.6.9. Milk Powder 
 
Infant Formula RPM 
合生元等乳粉企业限制竞争行为案 
On 7th August 2013, the NDRC imposed sancations on Biostime, MeadJohnson, Dumex, Abbott, 
Friso, Anumum, Wyeth, Beingmate and Meiji for the conclusion and implementation of monopoly 
agreements which fixed the resale prices. 
 
4.6.10. Alcohol 
 
Kweichow Moutai and Wuliangye 
茅台、五粮液限制转售价格案 
On 22 February 2013, Guizhou Provincial Pricing Administration released the decision to impose a 
penalty of RMB 247 million (about USD 39.8 million) on Kweichow Moutai, the most famous 
Chinese state-owned producer of premium liquor, for administering resale price maintenance 
(“RPM”).  On the same day, Sichuan PDRC released its decision to penalize Wuliangye, another 
state-owned premium liquor producer, in an amount of RMB 202 million (about USD 32.6 million) 
for RPM as well.  Both agencies are local counterparts of the National Development and Reform 
Commission, which is charged with the responsibility to enforce against price-related monopoly 
agreements, including RPM under AML. The case has made a huge stir, because this was the first 
time the Chinese AML enforcement agencies penalized RPM under the AML.  
 
4.6.11. Beer         
 
InBev, Anheuser  2008 3031 
英博集团公司收购AB公司 
On 18 November 2008, MOFCOM published its decision to approve InBev NV/ SA’s proposed 
US$52 billion acquisition of Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc, subject to conditions.  This was the 
first merger decision under the AML to be published and the first merger to be conditionally approved 
under the AML. The decision did not set out any detailed analysis of the transaction, mainly because 
the AML was enacted at the same year and there was no tradition of publishing detailed competition 
analysis.   
MOFCOM stated that, although the transaction may not eliminate or restrict competition in 
China’s beer market, it could nevertheless potentially lead to adverse effects on China’s beer market 
in the future if the market power of the post-merger firm was abused. Therefore, MOFCOM approved 
this transaction with the following conditions: 
•  Anheuser-Busch’s existing 27 % stake in Tsingdao Brewery must not be increased; 
•  InBev shall notify MOFCOM promptly if there are any changes in its controlling shareholders or 
the shareholders of such controlling shareholders; 
•   InBev shall not increase its existing 28.56 % stake in Zhujiang Brewery; and 
                                                          
3031 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.shtml 
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•  InBev shall not hold any stake in China Snow Breweries or Beijing Yanjing Brewery, and two 
other major breweries in China.   
•  InBev shall notify MOFCOM before seeking to take any such steps and to obtain MOFCOM’s 
prior approval.   
 
Anheuser-Busch InBev, SAB Miller2016 3032 
百威英博啤酒集团收购英国南非米勒酿酒公司股权 
MOFCOM received the notification for antitrust review of the concentration of brewers for the 
proposed acquisition of SABMiller plc (SABMiller) by Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (AB InBev). 
Upon review, MOFCOM decided to approve this concentration of business operators with restrictive 
conditions pursuant to Article 30 of the AML. 
AB InBev and SABMiller are mainly engaged in the production and sales of beer. As beer differs 
significantly from white spirits, wines and other alcoholic beverages in terms of ingredients, brewing 
process, alcohol content and consumer preference, beer was defined as a separate relevant product 
market. 
According to Article 27 of the Anti-monopoly Law, MOFCOM conducts in-depth analysis of 
the concentration’s effect on the market, taking into account the concentration of relevant market, the 
market share and control power of the operators concerned in the concentration, the difficulty of 
market entry, the effect on the consumers and other business operators and other factors, and believes 
that the concentration has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in the relevant market. 
MOFCOM found that (i) the Transaction would have further enhanced the control power of AB InBev 
in the relevant market, (ii) the Transaction would reduce the competition between the two leading 
competitors in the Chinese beer market, (iii) the Transaction would increase the entry barriers in the 
relevant market, (iv) the Transaction would harm the interests of downstream distributors. 
In summary, the merger would further enhance its power on the relevant market, reducing 
competition between the two close leading competitors in the market, raising entry barriers to the 
market, therefore harming the interests of the downstream dealers. MOFCOM considered that the 
merger would have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition on the relevant market, and 
consequently harm the interests of the Chinese consumers. 
After assessment, MOFCOM concluded that the final proposals of the restrictive conditions 
submitted by AB InBev and SABMiller on 14 July 2016 and 21 July 2016 respectively would be able 
to remove the negative effect that the Transaction has on competition.  
Given that the transaction will have the effect of eliminating and restricting the competition 
in the relevant market, according to MOFCOM [2008] No.95 Announcement, MOFCOM decided to 
conditionally clear the Transaction based on the final proposal of the restrictive conditions submitted 
by AB InBev and SABMiller and require AB InBev and SABMiller to fulfill, among others, the 
following obligations: 
•   To divest the 49% interest held by SABMiller in CR Snow. 
•   To sell the 49% interest in CR Snow to CRB strictly in accordance with the Agreement submitted 
to MOFCOM by AB InBev. 
                                                          
3032 http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201607/20160701369044.shtml 
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MOFCOM can monitor the implementation of commitments through a monitoring trustee or on 
their own.3033 
 
4.7. Agricultural Subsidies 
The Chinese Communist Party issued a “No. 1 Document” in early 2004 that gave top priority to the 
policy goal of increasing rural incomes. A whole range of policies has been introduced, but the two 
most prominent are direct subsidies for farmers and elimination of taxes on farmers. The stated goal 
of the policies is to raise the income of farmers, but the document also emphasizes the importance of 
increasing grain production.  
 
Direct Subsidies Paid to Farmers  
 
After several years of experimenting, China introduced its first nationwide direct subsidies for 
farmers during 2004. China’s Finance Ministry reported the total grain subsidies at 11.6 billion RMB. 
China allocated 10.28 billion RMB ($1.25 billion) from provincial “grain risk funds” to directly 
subsidize farmers in 13 major grain-producing provinces. Officials in 16 of China’s other provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions provided an additional 1.3 billion RMB ($158 million) in 
subsidies to farmers in grain-producing counties under their jurisdiction. Local authorities were urged 
to ensure that subsidies reached farmers before the 2004 spring crops were sown. Information about 
the subsidies was widely published in news media to ensure that farmers knew how much they were 
entitled to receive. Each province could set its own method for granting subsidies. The standard 
practice seems to be to pay farmers a set amount, generally around 10 RMB per mu (approximately 
$7.33 per acre), for area planted in grain. The method for calculating a farmer’s acreage base 
apparently varies from province to province, or even from county to county within the same province. 
In most cases, the payment appears to be based on historical production records. In a few areas, 
payments were tied to actual production or marketing of grain. The subsidy varied across both regions 
and commodities. Subsidies were not implemented in several poor western provinces or on the island 
province of Hainan. In some areas, reductions in agricultural tax were given in lieu of cash payments. 
The subsidies amount to roughly $2-$5 per ton of output. The subsidies per farm were also small 
since the average farm plants only 3-4 mu of each crop. 
The grain subsidies represent a small portion of the value of grain production in China. Grain 
production figures for China’s 2004 harvest were not yet available at the writing of this report, but 
China’s rice, wheat, and corn production are currently forecast by USDA at approximately 400 
million tons. At an average farm price of 1,500 RMB per ton, the RMB 11.6 billion in subsidies 
would be equal to less than 2 percent of the gross value of grain production.  
 
Agricultural Taxes Eliminated  
 
Another highly visible measure intended to increase farm incomes is the elimination of agricultural 
taxes. China has had an agricultural tax throughout its recorded history, and the current agricultural 
                                                          
3033 http://www.ab-
inbev.com/content/dam/universaltemplate/abinbev/pdf/investors/201607/20160729/English%20translation%20MOFCO
M%20announcement%20.pdf. 
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tax law dates back to the 1950s. Before 2004, Chinese farmers were typically assessed an agricultural 
tax based on the normal productive value of their land, an agricultural specialty product tax, and a 
myriad of additional local taxes and fees to fund road construction, schools, and various other projects 
and services undertaken by village and township authorities. The heavy tax burden on farmers has 
been the source of widespread dissatisfaction and occasionally outright rebellion by farmers. The 
government has been calling for local governments to reduce excessive fees and taxes and has carried 
out experimental reforms since 2001. Agricultural taxes were assessed differently in each locality, 
but the typical arrangement was to collect 7 percent of the normal value of production from a 
household’s land, based on each family’s allotted land area and an historical average price and yield. 
An additional surcharge of 20 percent was assessed to fund village administrative expenses, bringing 
the total tax to 8.4 percent. Some additional taxes were allowed, notably a tax on nongrain specialty 
crops and a “herding tax” on grazed livestock in grassland areas. In 2004, the “No. 1 Document” 
stipulated that the agricultural tax would be eliminated in 5 years. The tax was reduced by 3 
percentage points in 2004 and an additional 1 percentage point per year in subsequent years. China 
also eliminated the specialty crop tax (with the exception of tobacco) and taxes on grazing livestock. 
China’s State Council singled out Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces for complete elimination of the 
agricultural tax in 2004. Provincial authorities were given the go-ahead to cut taxes even faster, if 
possible. Five other wealthy provinces and municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and 
Fujian) eliminated the tax in 2004, and Tibet eliminated its grazing tax. Later in the year, the 
government decided to speed up elimination of the agricultural tax and announced in January 2005 
that 25 of China’s 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions would eliminate the 
agricultural tax in 2005. In 2003, the National Bureau of Statistics reported revenue from the 
agricultural tax at RMB 33.6 billion ($4 billion), specialty crop taxes at RMB 9 billion ($1 billion), 
and herding taxes at RMB 149 million ($18 million), a combined total of RMB 42.7 billion ($5 
billion). Other news reports indicate that agricultural tax revenues totalled RMB 60 billion ($7 billion) 
before the tax-elimination policy was implemented. These figures are equal to just 2-3 percent of all 
taxes collected in China.  
However, many rural local governments depend heavily on agricultural taxes to finance basic 
education and other local government activities. News reports indicate that the central government 
will transfer funds to local governments to make up for lost tax revenue, but no details have been 
announced about how this transfer is to be accomplished. Agricultural Inputs Subsidized Seeds and 
agricultural machinery also are subsidized under new policies. Subsidies for high-quality seeds, 
including high-oil soybeans, special-use corn and wheat, and high-quality rice varieties, are paid to 
seed supply companies, which are expected to pass on the subsidies to farmers. Targets of 10 million 
mu (1.65 million acres) of acreage planted in high-quality seeds were set for each of 13 provinces 
(the same provinces receiving direct subsidies for farmers). In Heilongjiang Province, the subsidy for 
improved corn and soybean seeds was set at 10 yuan per mu and the subsidy for rice seed was 15 
yuan per mu. According to a Xinhua News Agency report in August 2004, 1.6 billion yuan ($193 
million) in seed subsidies had been paid since October 2003. China also allocated an additional 40 
million yuan ($5 million) to subsidize purchases of farm machinery in 66 large grain-producing 
counties of 16 provinces. Subsidies can cover up to 30 percent of the purchase price. 
Farmers pay the subsidized price. After the sale, dealers collect the subsidy from provincial 
government offices overseeing farm mechanization.  
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Prices Set By Markets  
 
Over the past several years, China has been abolishing procurement of grain at “protection prices” 
(support prices at which government-sponsored marketing bureaus procure a set quota of grain from 
farmers), a policy introduced during the late 1990s when market prices for grain were falling from 
historical highs reached in 1996. By 2003, protection prices remained for only grain in important 
production areas, and most of those were eliminated in 2004. In 2004, the government maintained 
minimum “protection prices” for only rice, spurred by concerns about rising rice prices and spot 
shortages of rice in 2004. The setting of protection prices for rice reflects the political sensitivity of 
rice, the staple food grain throughout much of China. However, market prices rose 40-50 percent 
between 2003 and 2004 to levels well above the protection price. Grain prices are now mostly set in 
open markets, and government procurement prices appear to be following market prices.  
 
Grain Marketing Liberalized  
 
In addition to agricultural subsidies and tax reduction, China is privatizing the domestic grain 
marketing system, making large public investments in agricultural infrastructure, stepping up efforts 
to prevent loss of agricultural land to urban uses, and encouraging rural financial institutions to loan 
more money to farmers. China is encouraging better market infrastructure. In 2004, China resumed 
futures trading of corn (it had been suspended in the late 1990s), introduced a new futures contract 
for imported soybeans (futures contracts for domestic soybeans have been traded for a number of 
years), and began cotton futures trading at the Zhengzhou commodities exchange. In June 2004, 
China announced new regulations designed to liberalize grain markets by reducing the dominant role 
played by government-sponsored enterprises in domestic grain trade (Xinhua Domestic News 
Service). These regulations seem to be the culmination of a steady rollback of the monopoly power 
of government sponsored grain bureaus that had been under way for several years. While the 
marketing regulations appear to promote open competition, the key players in grain marketing are 
former government grain bureau procurement stations that were privatized by selling them to their 
managers. They still have close ties to government. These companies have access to government-
directed grain procurement loans and government-owned storage and processing facilities, while 
small private grain traders have difficulty obtaining bank loans and have limited storage capacity 
(Zhong). The regulations stipulate that the government can intervene in grain markets when prices 
are rising rapidly and that government departments have responsibility to ensure that grain supply 
and demand is balanced (the “governors’ responsibility system” introduced in 1995). Early 
assessments by observers report that grain markets are more competitive and open. Private and 
individual grain merchants are playing a greater role in grain procurement, state-owned enterprises 
are improving service and working with village brokers to purchase grain, and farmers have more 
alternatives for grain marketing (Hebei Rural Survey Team; Heilongjiang Rural Survey Team, 
November 11, 2004).  
 
Rural Infrastructure Investment Increased  
 
China is also working to improve the livelihoods of agricultural producers by increasing agricultural-
related public investments. The government planned to increase its financial support for agricultural 
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infrastructure in 2004 to 150 billion RMB ($18.1 billion), up from 120 billion RMB ($14.5 billion) 
in 2003. Projects include spending on infrastructure, such as improved irrigation facilities, rural roads, 
methane production facilities, rural hydroelectric plants, pasture enclosures, research, and 
construction of agricultural high technology parks. The Ministry of Water Resources reported 
investment in irrigation projects of RMB 58 billion ($7 billion) during the 8 months from September 
2003 to May 2004, an 11.7-percent increase over the previous year (Xinhua News Agency). Research 
has shown that such investments have been the most important source of China’s agricultural 
productivity growth. Historically, little of China’s infrastructure expenditure has actually reached 
farmers. A survey by the Development Research Center of China’s State Council found that only 30 
percent of funds appropriated for agriculture are spent on agricultural production. In the past, much 
of the expenditure on agriculture was used for operating expenses by various levels of government to 
purchase automobiles, pay for banquets, or otherwise misappropriated.  
 
More Loans for Farmers  
 
China is also seeking to boost farm investment by making more small loans to farm households 
through its vast system of 35,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs). During the 1990s, farm loans 
were frequently squeezed out by loans to rural factories and local governments. RCCs are now under 
pressure to make more loans to farm households. Many rural communities have adopted a micro-loan 
classification system that evaluates all households in a village and classifies each household into one 
of four or five loan-eligibility categories. Government reports indicate that new RCC agricultural 
loans totalled $23.4 billion during the first 9 months of 2004, an increase of 27.8 percent from year-
earlier amounts. These loans are small, nearly all under $2,500, and short-term (mostly 3-6 months). 
They are used for input purchases as well as modest investments, such as well-digging, livestock and 
fertilizer purchases, planting orchards, and greenhouse construction. China’s state-owned policy 
banks are also increasing loans to agricultural processing companies that meet criteria for size, 
management, facilities, and technology set by national or provincial governments. These “dragon 
head” enterprises receive favourable loan terms from state banks with the expectation that they will 
provide farmers with profitable outlets for farm products. The Agricultural Development Bank of 
China (ADBC) launched a specialized lending program targeted at “dragon head” agricultural 
enterprises in 2002, and lending grew to RMB 40 billion ($4.8 billion) in 2003. The China 
Development Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and RCCs also make preferential loans to these 
enterprises, but the total amount is not known (Xinhua News Agency). 
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Chapter 5: South Africa 
 
Dennis Davis & Liat Davis (University of Cape Town) 
 
5.1.The Food Chain(s) in South Africa 
 
The annual growth of the South African population stands at 1.6%.3034 Therefore, the country is 
expected to grow to over 80 million people by 2035.3035 In order to cater for this increase, food 
production must more than double using the same or fewer natural resources.    
The increasing problem of food security is exacerbated by the state of the agricultural sector.  
The contribution of agriculture to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been declining since 1960 
when the sector contributed 11.223% to 2.44% in 2016.3036 
Due to the increase in population farmers are under pressure to intensify their agricultural 
outputs to meet the increasing food demands. Farmers have not been able to keep up with this demand 
as they have to deal with increasing resource scarcity and limited direct investment in the agricultural 
sector. Consequently, the country has become a net importer of key food items, including wheat and 
meat.3037 Rice, sugar and poultry, which are part of the national food basket, are among the top seven 
products imported in terms of quantity. The country also imports considerable amounts of processed 
foods.3038 
South Africa has become a net importer of various agricultural products and foods. At the 
same time, the South African food market is significant, estimated to be worth over R200 billion, 
with the fresh-produce sector commanding a 15% share.3039 
Bulk products with far longer shelf-life – sugar, flour and long-life milk for example – are 
under growing threat from imports.3040 Although local production of these products may be 
competitive, the cost of transport, logistics and delivery time regularly allow for imported products 
to be supplied at a considerably cheaper price and sometimes more expeditiously.3041 
Local producers of bulk agricultural commodities are significantly constrained by the lack of 
an effective rail transport system.3042 Morris and Kaplan note that the “high inland transport costs 
alone may result in imported product being landed cheaper, at the coast.”3043 
Over 60% of the South African population now lives in urban areas3044 and with the rural 
population depending more on purchasing their food, the role of formal and informal food retailers 
in providing access to food is becoming increasingly recognised.3045 In 2013 it was reported that there 
were approximately 33 hypermarkets, which is the equivalent of 330 supermarkets, and 1352 actual 
                                                          
3034 http://www.infomineo.com/south-africas-agriculture/ 
3035 http://www.infomineo.com/south-africas-agriculture/ 
3036 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZA 
3037 file:///C:/Users/K1634807/Downloads/wwf006_ffl_report_low_res%20(1).pdf 
3038 file:///C:/Users/K1634807/Downloads/wwf006_ffl_report_low_res%20(1).pdf 
3039 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
3040 D. Kaplan & M. Morris, Potential for Developing Local Suppliers in the Retail Sector Report for Trade and Industrial 
Policy Strategies (TIPS), May 2017. 
3041 Ibid.. 
3042 Ibid.. 
3043 Ibid.,. 
3044 World Bank data: Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS 
3045 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
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supermarkets, amounting to almost 1700 supermarket equivalents in South Africa.3046 The make up 
less than 2% of food retail outlets, yet have an estimated retail share of 50-60%.3047  
In South Africa, only 13% of the land is arable, with only 3% considered to be high-potential 
agricultural land.3048 
Significant changes in food consumption have taken place since the 1970s. Amongst others, 
there has been an increase in supermarkets, while rising urbanisation and growing per capita incomes 
are expected to “double the demand for high-value foods such as dairy, meat, fresh fruits, vegetables 
and processed, packaged and prepared foods. Total food expenditure has increased for fruit and 
vegetables and processed foods such as spaghetti and over-ready meals, while expenditure on maize 
and wheat flour has declined.”3049 
The structure of the consumer goods retail sector has undergone a transition since 1994. 
During the apartheid era between 1948 to 1994, South Africa’s population went through an enforced 
process of segregation, with white people principally living in first-world suburban areas, and black 
people being removed to “townships”, quasi-independent rural homelands.3050 These townships had 
no commercial districts and white-owned businesses were not legally permitted to trade in such areas.  
These structures impacted significantly on the structure of the route-to-market, as the 
township markets represented a large consumer base for FMCG companies, however reaching them 
was not easy.3051 As a result, there was a rise of township entrepreneurs, particularly in the informal 
retail sector, running small local supermarkets and spaza shops. In order to service these independent 
retailers, a channel emerged consisting of large wholesalers and cash and carry’s established near 
commuter hubs.3052  
Due to local and international pressure, after democratisation trade liberalisation was 
deliberately increased.3053  In the first year after the dawn of democracy, the ANC developed the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which advocated removing controls and levies, 
and “’unsustainable subsidies to the large-scale farm sector’, and committed to a land redistribution 
target of 30% of land under white ownership.”  
Since 1994, with the lifting of trade restrictions significant developments took place in the 
route-to market. For example, corporate retail moved into townships and former homelands, led by 
Shoprite, Boxer and SPAR, with everyone following suit, including Pick n Pay and even 
Woolworths.3054 Furthermore, regional malls opened in most major townships. 
                                                          
3046 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
3047 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
3048 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/wwf006_ffl_report_low_res.pdf 
3049 L.C. Ronquest-Ross, N. Vink & G. O. Sigge, “Food Consumption changes in South Africa since 1994” in South 
African Journal for Science, Vol 111, No. 9/10, September/October 2015.  
3050http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
3051http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
3052http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
3053 Reconstruction and Development Programme www.sahistory.org.za; chapter 2.4 
3054http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
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As a result of these changes many South African operated independent and informal retailers 
in the townships were unable to compete with these supermarket chains and consequently went out 
of business. This in turn put significant pressure on the wholesalers who supplied them.3055 
In response to these changes wholesale operators restructured their business in the following 
ways3056:  
a. Using a hybrid model whereby they started operating as both retailer and wholesaler under 
one umbrella. This has seen the growth of Retail Cash & Carry stores which sell products 
in single units, shrinks as well as in cases catering for the needs of traders, hawkers as 
well as individual shoppers. Makro, IBC Group members, Elite Star members, Jumbo 
C&C are some examples of these stores.  
b. Using a redistribution model by increasing telesales capabilities, taking telephonic and 
electronic orders, and providing a product distribution service for their commercial 
(independent retail) customers.  
c. Some of the wholesale cash and carry operators saw wholesale as unsustainable and as a 
result shifted from having wholesale only members to focusing on growing their franchise 
retail members. In so doing, they used their wholesale outlets as distribution centres for 
franchise retail members.  
These models subsequently evolved. Today suppliers are able to reach consumers through the 
formal supermarket value chain. Under this format, products flow from supplier to distribution centre 
or end consumers directly buy the products from supermarkets.3057 There has been significant 
investment in distribution centres. All supermarket chains have numerous distribution centres.3058 
Increasingly, supermarkets are switching to their own centralised distribution centres instead of store-
to-store procurement.3059 Corporate or franchise stores find it cheaper to procure their products from 
distribution centres than individually negotiating and purchasing products directly from main 
suppliers.3060 This is due to scale economies and associated discounts and rebates that can be 
guaranteed by the suppliers when distribution centres buy products in bulk.3061 
Alternatively, suppliers sell products  through  independent retailers who are generally small 
businesses which target lower income customers in “peri-urban, township, industrial and central 
business district areas of cities.”3062 They follow the hybrid format which includes ‘cash and carrys’ 
that have both wholesale and retail offerings in addition to “numerous informal spaza shops, 
spazarettes and superettes.”3063An alternate model is in the form of buying group-led independent 
                                                          
3055http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
3056http://www.tcgfsummit.com/images/Media/GS_2016_Trade_Intelligence_Kantar_Retail_The_SA_Food_Retail__M
arket.pdf 
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retailing. Buying groups are separate, independent entities that play an integral role in supporting 
independent retailers.3064 Although each independent retailer that forms part of a buying group is 
owned by different individuals, the stores may be branded under a common name. Buying groups 
will buy large quantities from suppliers for the entire group  which they promote on behalf of the 
independent retailers, and provide important skills development to retailers in their group.3065 South 
Africa has five main buying groups, namely, Unitrade Management Services, Buying Exchange 
Company, Independent Buying Consortium, Independent Cash & Carry Group and Elite Star 
Trading.3066  
 
5.2.The food market in South Africa 
 
The value of the South African food market is estimated at R460 – R470bn.3067 Food is defined in 
this case to include edible groceries, non-edible groceries, commodities, tobacco, perishables, 
cosmetics, bakery, red meat, fruit and vegetables, cigarettes, but excludes food services.3068 
The difference between the South African food retail and other African countries is the highly 
developed and competitive formal retail market which make up almost 70% of total food sales.3069 
South Africa has a large informal trade sector which is serviced by hawkers, small local 
supermarkets and spaza shops. Informal traders largely purchase goods from wholesale outlets which 
make up approximately 30% of food retail sales.3070 However, some manufacturers, like Coca-Cola 
and Pioneer Foods, supply directly to independent and informal traders as well.3071 
The agro-processing sector in South Africa is highly concentrated implying that entry and 
active participation of small and medium enterprises remains limited.3072 
In 2013 imports and exports of processed products were respectively valued at R70 and R47 
billion. There has been a negative trade balance in respect of processed foods as the country imports 
more than it exports. Higher demand for processed products has been triggered by the growth of the 
middle class.3073 
The National Development Plan (NDP) “identifies historically high levels of concentration in 
agricultural value chains, high and increasing levels of vertical integration between agriculture and 
agro-processing, access to infrastructure (specifically irrigation and farming equipment) and lack of 
access to consumer markets as significant constraints to entry and growth in the sector.”3074 
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Food processing (excluding beverages and tobacco) accounted for “14.3% of total 
manufacturing value add in 2014 and was the largest manufacturing sub-sector by some distance, 
with the next largest category being coke and petroleum products. Food processing is also the largest 
manufacturing employer and accounts for 13.6% of total manufacturing employment, with 183 161 
jobs in 2014.”3075 
South Africa accounted for almost 60% of processed fruit in Sub-Saharan Africa by volume 
in 2011, with raisins, juice, and canned fruit the most significant products.3076 
Supermarkets are directly involved in all stages of the value chain – including primary 
production and packing, cold chain management and storage; transport; export; and sometimes even 
the final distribution.3077 Visser notes that supermarkets effectively control value chains: “their ability 
to set prices and determine the quality, processes and social standards under which goods are 
produced ….”3078 She indicates further that retailers’ have the ability to set “farm gate prices, such 
that most of the rent on the final retail price of (fresh) agricultural product accrues to them.” In South 
Africa, producer-cooperatives that export get approximately 28-30% of the final retail price, whereas 
supermarket retailers get about 35-40%.3079  
Visser notes that of the 2011 final retail price for table grapes exported to the UK, 
supermarkets capture 42%, distributors capture 32%, while growers receive 18% (and 26% if they 
pack their own fruit).   …  Apart from low prices, retailers’ poor purchasing practices also increased 
producer vulnerability. Retailers often do not provide written contracts or guarantees of purchase 
beyond a verbal agreement; and they often buy fruit on ‘consignment’ – with no prices agreed on 
until very close to the point of final delivery.”3080 
Labour costs are a major consideration in production costs and as a result farmers mechanise 
where possible.3081 For example, wine harvesting machines are able to replace up to seventy workers 
per twelve hour shift.3082 By 2014 approximately 58% of hectares belonging to (mostly larger) 
producers in its study group were mechanically harvested.3083 By contrast, the scope for 
mechanisation is far more limited for easily perishable crops, for as Visser states “[w]here producers 
cannot mechanise, they tend to use ‘labour augmenting technologies’, such as pre-cutters to prune 
vineyards.  In pack houses, however, up to 40% of workers can be replaced by mechanisation and 
pack house modification (Meyer 2012), so pack house mechanisation could result in job losses for 
almost 10 000 seasonal workers and 2 300 permanent workers.”3084 
The National Development Plan (NDP) emphasises the need of securing small business access 
to domestic value chains in order to facilitate “market entry in a highly concentrated 
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environment.”3085 The NDP encourages retailers to preferentially procure from small businesses with 
the aim of stimulating local producers and to “develop suppliers within the region in support of 
regional industrialisation objectives.”3086 Pursuant to this objective, legislative interventions have 
taken place. These include the Competition Act (1998), the Preferential Procurement Framework Act 
(2000) and the Revised Preferential Procurement Regulations (2011), and the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act (2003) and regulations. 
Von Broembsen indicates that the NDP underlines that the production of commodity 
foodstuffs is highly concentrated among a few large suppliers. Although small and sometimes 
informal suppliers take part in non-value add commodities, such as fresh produce, the majority of 
mass-consumed goods are produced by large suppliers; and often “supply chains are vertically 
integrated, as big retailers create their own brands and private labels.”3087 As a result of the 
considerable volumes that are produced suppliers are able to cut their margins per unit, which results 
in small and even medium sized competitors being squeezed out.3088  
South Africa has seen the growth of private label products in supermarkets. Every major 
supermarket has a range of their own brand/private label products.3089 The majority of Woolworths’ 
products are private labels. Shoprite has ‘Ritebrand’ and ‘Housebrand’ ranges in Checkers, which 
cover approximately 300 products.3090 Pick n Pay’s private label is “No Name” brand and it is looking 
to expand its private label range. Food Lover’s Market has “Freshers” and “Food Lovers Signature”. 
SPAR has its own private label products. SPAR does not allow major suppliers to manufacture its 
own private label products but rather allows new and smaller suppliers to enter the supermarket 
supply chain.3091 
Morris and Kaplan note that Shoprite Checkers currently has about 8% of turnover as private 
label and this will soon double.3092 South African supermarkets are moving in the direction of private 
labels as it is seen as key to their competitive edge in that it develops brand loyalty.3093 Moreover, 
this furnishes supermarkets with more leverage with the large suppliers who have branded 
products.3094 This is manifest in a recent example where Pick n Pay’s branded tomato sauce which 
within a few weeks of introduction claimed 15% of the overall local market.3095  
Private labels operate differently for large and smaller volume producers.3096 The use of 
private label by Pick n Pay and Shoprite, for example, often involves engaging large brand 
manufacturers to supply a specific large volume order which will be packaged in accordance with the 
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private label specifications.3097 Large supermarkets have sufficient influence to negotiate optimal 
deals under such circumstances. This notwithstanding, they are dependent on large brand 
manufacturers to supply the best quality.3098 For small supermarkets, such as Food Lovers Markets, 
order sizes are limited – “if they use a large branded manufacturer it would be on the basis of picking 
up over runs, and the power relations then are too asymmetric.”3099 As a result, small supermarkets 
opt for engaging with, and seeking out, small specialist manufacturers supplying their private label 
products.3100  
The growing trend to using private labels has implications for local producers. Such producers 
are able to focus solely on product, while functions like packaging, distribution, marketing is taken 
care of by the supermarkets.3101 The potential exists for suppliers and supermarkets to form long 
standing relationships and to improve the quality of the product. Moreover, it means that “the volume 
requirements for the local producer are somewhat reduced.”  
Significant downsides also exist as the local producer relies on a sole customer making it 
potentially vulnerable.3102 Although volumes are reduced, “they are still large – private label or house 
brands provide an entry for new producers but rarely for small producers.”3103 For example, Pick n 
Pay branded tomato sauce is supplied by a new but large well-capitalised food producer.3104 In 
addition, private labels compete with branded products. The large food processors in South Africa – 
Tiger Brands, Pioneer and others – are often “reluctant to supply products that compete with their 
own branded products.”3105 This is decidedly so, as supermarkets want to provide the private label 
products at considerably lower prices.3106 
 
5.3.Inputs to Primary Production:  
 
The total expenditure in 2013 on farms was R178.5 billion, with inputs accounting for 130.1 billion 
(73 percent); animals, R27.6 billion (15 percent); and salaries and wages, R20.7 billion (12 
percent).3107 The major input costs were R20.6 billion for animal feed (20 percent of the total); R10.2 
billion (8 percent) for repairs, maintenance and licences; R10 billion (8 percent) for fertilisers; and 
R8.3 billion (6 percent) for fuel.3108 Other significant inputs include depreciation, packing materials, 
contractors, seed and planting materials, and animal and crop remedies.3109 
The various inputs have their own dominant corporations. “The commercial animal feed 
sector tends to be vertically integrated, especially within the large poultry producers.”3110 Feed is a 
major source of profit for the poultry companies. The vertically integrated companies produce feed 
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for their “internal operations as well as for sale to others. Animal feed tends to employ far fewer 
workers than poultry operations. Animal feed accounts for a small share of overall revenue produced 
by the vertically integrated poultry producers, but animal feed operations account for most of the 
operating profit.”3111 
Agricultural machinery is mainly imported “with domestic and multinational corporations 
operating as agents and after-sales support, sometimes with exclusive brand rights in South Africa 
and regionally.”3112 According to the DTI in 2014 the imported agricultural machinery was valued at 
R6.5 billion.  
A high proportion of fertiliser raw materials and finished product are imported.3113 Prior to 
the 1980s the fertiliser industry was built under state protection. After deregulation, the industry could 
not sustain itself and as a result factories were closed and South Africa became a net importer of 
fertiliser from around 2000.3114 In 2000 fertiliser imports were valued at R858 million, rising to R7.4 
billion in 2014.  
In 2009 and 2010, the Competition Commission intervened in the nitrogenous fertiliser value 
chain. Prior to the intervention, several anticompetitive practices existed in the fertiliser market. 
Penalties were imposed for collusion, which led to the restructuring of the fertiliser industry.  
An ex-post assessment of the competition authorities’ intervention into the South African 
nitrogenous fertiliser industry was conducted. The assessment found that post-intervention many 
positive outcomes have been observed including new entry, increased customer choice and price 
competition as well as significant customer savings. The assessment noted that there had been entry 
and expansion in the downstream level of the value chain. Firms that were traders, previously reliant 
on Sasol for input supplies, expanded and acquired their own plants, thereby increasing the numbers 
of players at that level of the value chain. Moreover, there had been entry by smaller blenders and 
traders. The entry of new players into this level of the value chain has increased competition while 
simultaneously increasing the security of supply of fertiliser domestically.3115  
Despite the competitive gains resulting from the competition authorities’ intervention in the 
fertiliser industry, the assessment noted some further market developments, both negative and 
positive. There has not been any entry in the production of ammonia and Sasol remains the sole 
producer of ammonia in South Africa.3116There has been an increase in the importation of cheaper 
low quality fertiliser and depressed margins in the industry.3117  The exit of Sasol from the 
downstream level of the value chain may potentially reduce the pro-competitive benefits that arose 
from the increased competition at the upstream level. Moreover, there is the concern about the lack 
of growth of the smaller blenders and traders after significant market entries post intervention, as 
some of them have failed to stabilize and register growth in the market.  
In 2013/2014 commercial agricultural production was valued at R208.3 billion. Primary 
agricultural production can be divided into three broad areas: animal production (46 percent of gross 
                                                          
3111 Ibid.  
3112 Ibid.  
3113 Ibid.  
3114 Ibid.  
3115 S. Grimbeek, Giya, G. & Mahlalela, Q. (2017). “The Impact of Competition in the fertiliser industry after the Sasol 
divestiture of blending facilities in 2010.” Competition Commission of South Africa Working Paper No. 1. 
3116 Ibid.  
3117 Ibid..  
876 
 
value in 2013/2014), field crops (28 percent) and horticulture (26 percent).3118 According to Stephen 
Greenberg,  at the heart of the agro-food system South Africa has a grain-livestock complex. The 
combined poultry (meat and eggs), maize, cattle and dairy represented R104.4 billion of the total 
value of commercial primary production in 2014.3119 Beyond this, the grain-livestock complex 
extends upstream, “where animals purchased and animal feed alone had a combined value of R54.2 
billion in 2014; maize is the major commercial seed type, the sector uses a large share of fertiliser 
and machinery, etc.”3120 Downstream, the grain-livestock complex “extends into grain storage and 
handling, processing and further value addition.”3121  
 
5.4.Supermarkets:  
 
Over the past two decades there has been a significant spread of South African supermarkets into 
southern Africa. This has had important consequences for consumers, local supplier capabilities, and 
the competitive landscape.3122 This is due to the fact that supermarkets offer a wider range of grocery 
retail products at relatively cheaper prices, “given economies of scale and global sourcing strategies, 
compared to local, independent retailers.”3123 
Morris and Kaplan note that there are two significant trends in the supermarket environment 
that have implications for local production.3124 The first is a trend towards fresh products. This trend 
is not circumscribed to higher income groups as it is now widespread for almost all income groups.3125 
This notwithstanding, very poor consumers who lack refrigeration and storage are limited in 
partaking in this trend.3126  
This trend to fresh produce also favours local production. In all the supermarkets, fresh 
products were overwhelmingly supplied locally – “[t]he two largest supermarket chains gave the 
figure of 97%.”3127 The exceptions being some high-end products such as Italian meats; French 
cheese and olive oil.3128 
Local supply is somewhat restricted by seasonality.3129 The introduction of new varieties has 
however allowed for “the exploitation of different climatic zones in South Africa such that local 
supply now caters for a much larger part of the year.”3130 For example, Woolworth’s now obtains 
avocados for 9 months of the year from South Africa – “whereas local supply was formerly only 3 
months.”3131 
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Some fresh produce is supplied from elsewhere in Southern Africa. However, this is restricted 
by the difficulty of obtaining permits.3132 Morris and Kaplan’s report indicates that permits are being 
widely used to restrict entry into the South African market.  
The second trend is towards private label.3133 Although this trend allows new producers to 
enter the market, new entrants still have to supply at volume in respect of the large supermarkets.3134 
This makes it hard for small producers to enter the market.  
Successful new entrants are regularly bought out by the local large branded suppliers who are 
intent on protecting their local market dominance.3135 The limited entry of new local suppliers and 
the concentration of local suppliers with strong brands, has led some supermarkets to look for 
“exclusive supply” via importation.3136 This is particularly the case for large volume supermarkets. 
By contrast, the Woolworths favours a local production model as they see such a model as 
providing them with far more control over the ultimate quality of the product.3137 The considerable 
control that Woolworths exercises over the production processes is conducted in such a way as if the 
supplier were a subsidiary.3138 According to Von Broembsen “Woolworths assigns a food 
technologist to work with individual suppliers to help them improve recipes and to gain the 
technological know-how to improve products.”3139  
Only 10 – 12% of Woolworth’s processed foods are imported.3140 In the main, these are foods 
that cannot be produced in South Africa. The packaging of these imported products is often done 
locally.3141 
Although the growth of supermarkets have improved competitive pricing and accessibility to 
an expansive range of products, it has created challenges for local suppliers to enter the supermarket 
value chain.3142 
Moreover, “strategic behaviour of supermarkets with market power such as entering into 
exclusive supply agreements with large suppliers, and into exclusive leases with prime retail centres 
and shopping malls, has competition implications on new entrants, independent retailers, and small 
suppliers.”3143 
Von Broembsen indicates that the estimates of supermarkets aggregate share of the South 
African food retail market differ, from a total market share of the four big South African, in 2002, 
supermarkets of approximately 60 per cent share of the total retail food market in 2002 to a far more 
substantial share of the market of 93.8 per cent in 2006. The Competition Commission in 2015 
estimated that supermarkets capture 90 percent of the South African food market.3144  
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Shoprite/Checkers and Pick n Pay, the two key chains, hold the largest share of the market 
from between 24 and 40 per cent each.3145 However the different supermarkets service different 
markets: Shoprite targets low-income consumers, whereas Checkers serves the higher income 
market. Spar and Pick n Pay target both, whereas Woolworths only targets high-income consumers. 
Pick n Pay competes with Shoprite Checkers for the mass market, and with Woolworths for the upper 
income markets.3146 
As South Africa has a growing middle class, the consequence thereof is that a greater amount 
of middle class consumers constitute the market retail thus generate a greater demand for luxury 
foods.  Further the consumers diets have changed.3147 Fewer vegetables are consumed by the middle 
class who purchase more protein and highly processed foods.3148 
In terms of the supermarkets’ procurement system, two of the retailers in recent years have 
shifted from a regional to a central procurement system, which results in significant cost implications 
for suppliers that do not have a powerful brand.3149 In the past, suppliers had negotiated with a 
regional buyer and delivered goods to different regions. Procurement has now become centralised 
with buyers in Johannesburg making procurement decisions for the whole country.3150 
Another feature of the procurement structure is that all deliveries at Pick n Pay occur on a 
first-come, first-serve basis.  As Van Broembsen notes “[s]mall suppliers sometimes spend hours in 
the receiving depot queue – ‘you might only have a couple of boxes, but have to wait in the queue 
behind big trucks delivering mass orders… because Pick n Pay has no incentive to make it efficient.’ 
In relative terms this implies a larger cost for a small supplier.”3151 
The majority of South African food imports which are likely to be on the shelves of 
supermarkets are deep-sea imports which are not sourced from SADC countries.3152 By contrast this 
is not the case with South African food exports, the majority of which go to the SADC region.3153 
The spread of supermarkets can account for the growth in food exports to the SADC region, given 
that they are an important route to market.3154 “Poultry and preparations of cereal, flour, starch, milk, 
pasta, and biscuits show the highest average annual growth rate in exports with an average annual 
growth rate of 23.6 per cent and 20 per cent respectively over an 11-year period during 2003–14. 
Cereals (wheat, rice, rye, barley, oats, maize, corn), sugar and confectionery, and miscellaneous 
edible preparations (yeast, baking powders, soya sauce, tomato ketchup, soups) record the highest 
growth in absolute terms. These trends concur with past studies that the growth of supermarkets in 
food retailing is associated with increased sales of processed, dry, and packaged foods such as 
noodles, milk products, and grains. A key reason for this is that supermarkets have the advantage of 
economies of scale and such dry products have a longer shelf life.3155 
The following diagram illustrates the supply chain of grocery products3156:  
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What this diagram shows is that buying groups occupy a similar space for independent retailers as 
distribution centres do for the major supermarkets.3157  
 
5.5.Regulatory Framework:  
 
Prior to the agricultural sector in South Africa being deregulated, the state extensively regulated the 
production and marketing of most agricultural products. The state supported farmers through 
legislation, investment in research and development, infrastructure, land tenure, the securing of input 
supply, extension of services and the settlement of farmers, and the protection of domestic markets 
from international competition.3158 
A comprehensive system of support for white farmers was developed which included the 
establishment of the Land and Agricultural Bank, and the Co-operative Societies Acts of 1922 and 
1939 as well as the Marketing Act of 1937 (consolidated in 1968).3159 The Marketing Act instituted 
a system of controls which regulated the movement, pricing, quality standards and marketing supply 
of the majority of agricultural production.3160 Marketing schemes (“control boards”) controlled 
approximately 80% of agricultural products which involved various arrangements whereby the 
control boards would set prices, control marketing and remove surpluses.3161  Under the first 
democratic government liberalisation which had started in the 1980s continued. The Marketing of 
Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996 abolished control boards. 
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South Africa’s agriculture sector is regulated by the National Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF).  
 
5.5.1. Food and Safety Standards:  
 
The Department of Health (DOH), Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) and 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) are responsible for developing and enforcing food safety 
in South Africa. “Six Acts and regulations promulgated in terms of the Act govern the production, 
manufacture, transport and labelling of food manufacture.”3162  
These include:  
• The Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act (Act No. 54 of 1972). This Act 
governs the manufacture, sale and importation of foodstuffs, cosmetics and 
disinfectants. "It controls what goes into foods, rather than regulating the hygiene of 
food preparation.”3163 
• The Health Act (Act 63 of 1977) and various regulations which include hygiene 
specifications relating to foodstuffs.  
• The International Health Regulations Act (Act 28 of 1974) 
• The Agricultural Products Standards Act, 1990 (Act 119 of 1990).  
• The Meat Safety Act, 2000 (Act 40 0f 2000) 
• The Standards Act, 1993 (Act 29 of 1993).  
 
5.5.2. Seed Regulation:  
 
South Africa’s seed industry is regulated as following: 
• The Plant Improvement Act 53 of 1976 (as amended) deals with the registration of 
varieties, premises, certification, labelling, minimum quality standards, prohibition on 
the sale of uncertified seeds and requirements for seeds. Section 26 of the Act regulates 
the importation of plants whilst section 27 deals with exporting them. The Act 
provides for the registration of establishments where plants and propagation material 
are sold and packed. The Directorate of Plant and Quality Control is responsible for 
the enforcement thereof.  
• The Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 15 of 1976 (as amended) deals with plant breeders’ 
rights, the protection of such rights, the issue of licences in respect of exercising those 
rights and the registration of plant breeders. The Directorate of Plant and Quality 
Control is responsible for the enforcement thereof.  
South Africa has been a member of the UPOV Convention since 1977. The Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act gives effect to South Africa’s obligations under the UPOV Convention consequently 
affording protection to intellectual property for new plant varieties.  
The farmers’ privilege is contained in section 23 of the Act, which provide that farmers’ 
privilege is provided to “a farmer who on land occupied by him or her uses harvested material 
obtained on such land from that propagating material for purposes of propagation: Provided that 
                                                          
3162 von Broembsen at 16.  
3163 von Broembsen at 17.  
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harvested material obtained from replanted propagating material shall not be used for purposes of 
propagation by any other person other than that farmer.” This excludes the exchange of protected 
varieties among farmers.3164 
The Act is to be replaced by a new Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill which has already been 
approved by Parliament.3165 According to the African Centre for Biodiversity the new Bill 
substantially strengthens the rights of breeders and weakens the rights of farmers.  
The African Centre for Biodiversity purports that South Africa does not have any law in place 
to allow farmers the rights to replant, exchange or sell farm-saved seed. The 1976 Act allows farmers 
to only replant farm-saved seed from protected varieties on their own holdings.  
According to Biowatch SA, “current legislation exclusively protects the rights of the 
commercial breeder and seed sector, which is dominated by a handful of multinational 
corporations.”3166 As an illustration, the laws governing the seed sector “prevent the cultivation and 
sale of non-certified seed varieties, thereby destroying the market value of non-certified seeds and 
promoting reliance on varieties sold by registered commercial seed producers.”3167 This in turn 
creates a bias towards “monoculture” as the exemplar of agricultural production which favour large-
scale commercial seed producers at the expense of smallholders.3168 
Biowatch SA notes that the research that is available indicates that smallholders rely on farm-
saved seed for 60-70% of their seed needs.3169 Saving seed allows smallholders to save money and 
to deliver food security to their families and communities.3170 
 
• The Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983 (as amended) dealing with phytosanitary issues. It 
provides measures for the prevention of agricultural pests. The Directorates of Plant and 
Quality Control and of Resource Conservation are responsible for the enforcement thereof.  
 
• The Genetically Modified Organisms Act 15 of 1997 (as amended) which deals with 
the requirements for genetic modification.  
 
• There are also secondary acts which impact on seeds such as the Fertilisers, Farm 
Feeds, Agricultural Remedies, and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947 (as amended). This 
Act regulates the registration of Fertilisers, stock feeds, agricultural remedies, stock 
remedies, sterilising plants and pest control operators. It also provides for the control 
over the acquisition, disposal, sale and use of Fertilisers, farm feeds, agricultural 
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remedies and stock remedies. The Directorate of Agricultural Production Resources 
and Livestock Improvement is responsible for the enforcement thereof.  
  
5.5.3. Regulating contracts between retailers and SMEs through legislation:  
 
The Consumer Protections Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) 
regulate contracts between consumers and retailers. The legislation and regulations provide for a 
variety of consumer rights, including a right to information; and an institutional enforcement 
mechanism, including a Commission, provincial structure and a Consumer Goods and Services 
Ombudsman.3171 
 
5.6.Production 
 
5.6.1. Land Reform:  
 
Land reform was a prominent feature in the negotiations that brought the end of apartheid. Since 
1994, South Africa began redressing past injustices through land reform in the agricultural sector. 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution forms the basis of the land restitution and redistribution 
programme. In response to these constitutional imperatives, the South African government initiated 
a land reform programme which aimed at redistributing 30% of white owned commercial agricultural 
land by 2014 to black South Africans as well as settling all redistribution claims by 2005.3172 To date, 
all land claims have still not been settled and in 2014 less than 10% of the redistribution target had 
been achieved.  
The redistribution of agricultural wealth to previously disadvantaged people had been pursued 
through the liberalisation and deregulation agenda. This has resulted in “increased efficiency through 
vertical integration, and elaborate value chains at the expense of addressing the needs of the poor and 
the landless.”3173 Although some argue that the system has contributed towards keeping food prices 
affordable, “it has also constrained the entrance of new farmers and entrepreneurs into the system 
along the entire food value chain and has done little to redistribute agricultural wealth.”3174 
The debate around land reform fits into the larger issue about the need for agrarian reform that 
will include marginalised farmers and communities in the country’s food system.3175 Small farmers, 
manufacturers and retail outlets are faced with high barriers to entry to be part of the commercial 
formal food system in South Africa. The old agrarian and land system has essentially been left 
unchanged.  
In South Africa, only 13 per cent of the land is arable with only 3 per cent of that arable land 
considered to be high-potential land. In 2012, it was shown that 87 per cent of the arable land was 
                                                          
3171 Von Broembsen at 26. Although not legislation or regulation, in the most recent iteration of The Department of Trade 
and Industry’s Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), there are initiatives underway to increase the participation of small 
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Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 2014 Vol 14 No 2.  
3173 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
3174 http://awsassets.wwf.org.za/downloads/safl_the_future_of_south_africas_food_system.pdf 
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still owned by white commercial farmers.3176 “This is indicative of South Africa’s dualistic agrarian 
structure that comprises about 35 000 large-scale, mostly white commercial farmers who produce 
must of the country’s marketed output, and a much larger number (approximately 4 million) of small-
scale, black farmers who are largely confined to the former Bantustans.”3177 Beneficiaries of the land 
reform process have been faced with difficulties around developing or maintaining effective 
production on the newly acquired land and they have received limited government support.3178  
Notwithstanding the rhetoric favouring small-scale agriculture, since the end of apartheid 
neither the land reform programme nor the agricultural restructuring process has actually facilitated 
the realisation of this objective.3179 On the contrary, the government has been accused of “pandering 
to agribusiness by pushing a contract farming model to integrate selected small-scale black farmers 
into corporate value chains, which has left the fundamental corporate-driven agrarian and agri-food 
structure intact.”3180   
 
5.6.2. Acquisition of Agricultural Land:  
 
The transfer of immovable property is regulated by the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. Currently 
there is no restriction on the ownership of land or the acquisition of land by a foreign party. However, 
the new Land Holdings Bill will dramatically change this. The Bill proposes that foreign nationals 
and entities will not be entitled to own agricultural land in South Africa, but will be allowed to enter 
into a long term lease for a minimum period of 30 years.  
 
5.6.3. Consumer Interests:  
5.6.3.1.GMO’s:  
 
South Africa’s regulatory regime governing aspects of GMO use is fairly vigorous as it includes, 
contained use, trial release, commercial release, and transboundary movement. The primary 
legislation is the Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997 and its Regulations. The Act was 
amended in 2006, however the amendment only took effect in 2010, in part to give effect to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity which South Africa ratified in 2003.3181 There are additional laws 
which impose further rules on GMO-related activities, such as the National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act, the Consumer Protection Act, and the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and 
Disinfectants Act.3182 
The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) administers the GMO Act. 
The Department is responsible for promoting responsible GMO-related activities; limiting harm to 
the environment as well as to human and animal health; and establishing standards for conducting 
risk assessments for GMO-related activities.3183 
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The GMO Act establishes three institutions with specific functions – the Registrar, the 
Executive Council and the Advisory Council. Some of the Executive Council’s functions include 
determining whether an applicant for a permit should submit a risk assessment and an environmental 
impact assessment as well as approve applications for the use of facilities for conducting GMO-
related activities in consultation with the Advisory Committee.  
The Registrar is responsible for administering the GMO Act. The Registrar’s functions 
include examining applications, issuing permits and amending or withdrawing permits. Furthermore, 
the Registrar is required to keep a register of all the facilities involved in the contained use or the trial 
release of GMO’s and the names and addresses of all individuals involved in GMO-related activities.   
The Advisory Committee is a national advisory body on all matters concerning or related to 
the GMOs. The Committee is required to advise on all aspects relating to the introduction of GMOs 
into the environment, the contained use, the importation and exportation; and on proposed regulations 
and written guidelines.  
Once the GM crop is released, the impact on the environment is monitored by the South 
African National Biodiversity Institute established under the National Environmental Management: 
Biodiversity Act3184  
South Africa was the first country in Africa to approve commercial production of genetically 
modified crops. The first approval for the commercial use of a genetically modified crop was in 1997 
for Monsanto’s MON810 Yield Guard insectresistant maize.3185 According to the United Nations, 
South Africa currently has 2.3 million hectares of GM crops under cultivation of which 4.3 per cent 
in GM cotton, 17.7 per cent is GM soybean and 78.0 per cent is GM maize.3186 South Africa is the 
ninth largest producer of GM crops in the world.3187 
Maize is the staple foodstuff for the majority of South Africans, and it is also used as livestock 
feed.3188 Approximately 90% of South Africa’s maize crop is genetically modified3189, yet the change 
to GM maize was never properly publicised and the majority of South African’s do not know that 
they are consuming a GM product.3190  
At least 85% of the seed business for the big commodity crops are owned by Monsanto and 
DoPont/Pioneer Hi Bred/Pannar.3191  
Bt maize varieties in South Africa are expensive. Bt maize is sold at approximately double 
the price of popular non-GM hybrids and “five times that of the price of popular open pollinated 
varieties.”3192Furthermore, because commercialised Bt maize varieties are developed to give high 
yields under optimal agricultural conditions smallholders suffer as they do not have the economy to 
provide such an optimal environment, and commonly farm on lands which are not well-suited for 
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agriculture.3193  Consequently, planting the Bt maize that is currently available involves the risk that 
input costs will not be covered within one year.3194   
According to Biowatch numerous field trials have been approved for additional forms of GM 
maize, GM soya, GM cotton as well as GM sugar-cane, GM potato and GM cassava.3195 At the 
laboratory level (in universities and research institutes) research is being conducted on “drought 
tolerant GM maize and pharmaceutical production from GM maize and GM tobacco”.3196 
Biowatch notes that the principle of “substantial equivalence” has been proposed in justifying 
the lack of environmental and food safety tests on GM food crops.3197 For example, in South Africa 
food safety tests do not need to be conducted for GM soya as it is considered to be substantially the 
same as natural soya.3198 Biowatch contends that no subsequent studies have been conducted since 
the principle was adopted despite there being evidence that it impacts on both human and animal 
health. This suggests that approximately 70% of South Africa’s major food staple is now genetically 
modified, without it being tested for possible health effects.3199 
Farmers are faced with serious consequences when pollen from a field of genetically modified maize 
contaminates nearby fields of traditional maize or organically grown maize.3200 Affected farmers are 
not able to sue the GM seed producer responsible for contamination but rather the GM patent holder 
can sue the farmer if any GM material is found to be present in their crop without a GMO licence fee 
being paid.3201 
Biowatch notes that saving seeds for replanting, or exchanging seeds with other farmers is a 
traditional right for farmers. However, these practices are effectively put to an end with GMO seed 
patents. In the case of GM maize, GM soya and GM cotton the control and ownership of the seeds 
passes entirely to multinational corporations that hold patents, like Monsanto.3202 
It is a requirement that foodstuffs obtained through certain techniques of genetic modification be 
labelled as such before they are put on sale in the marketplace. The Consumer Protection Act imposes 
additional labelling requirements. It requires that “[a]ny person who produces, supplies, imports or 
packages any prescribed goods must display on, or in association with the package or those goods, a 
notice in the prescribed manner and form that that discloses the presence of any genetically modified 
ingredients or components of those in accordance with applicable regulations.” 
 
5.6.3.2.Food Safety:  
 
The Department of Health is responsible for ensuring food safety in South Africa. As part of its 
functions, it oversees the administration of food legislation, which includes publicizing regulations 
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for food safety, labelling food, and evaluating risk assessments for the DAFF that are related to 
agricultural chemicals and food produced through biotechnology.3203  
 
5.6.3.3.Food Security:  
 
South Africa is considered to be food secure at a national level, in terms of aggregate food availability. 
The National Development Plan indicates that being food secure at a national level means that it 
“earns a trade surplus from agricultural exports and is able to cover the cost of food imports from 
those exports.”  
The same cannot be said at a household and community level. Household food security is 
determined by the ability to access food as opposed to its availability. According to Statistics South 
Africa, the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale which is directed to determine household access 
to food revealed that the percentage of South African households with inadequate or severely 
inadequate access to food decreased from 23.9% in 2010 to 22.3% in 2016. During that period the 
percentage of individuals that were at risk decreased from 28.6% to 24.9%. Between the period of 
2002 and 2016, the percentage of households that experienced hunger decreased from 23.8% to 
11.8% while the percentage of individuals who experienced hunger decreased from 29.3% to 
13.4%.3204  
The National Development Plan was published in 2012 with the aim of eliminating income 
poverty by 2030. The Plan proposes a commitment to household food and nutrition security involving 
both public and private sector action. The Plan takes into account that low-income households spend 
approximately 35 per cent of their money on food whereas upper-income households spend 3 per 
cent.  
In 2013, Cabinet passed the South African National Food and Nutrition Security Policy which was 
gazetted on 22 August 2014. The Policy sets out five pillars for achieving food security, namely: 
improved nutritional safety nets; improved nutrition education; the alignment of investment in 
agriculture towards local economic development; improved market participation of the emerging 
agricultural sector; and food and nutrition security risk management 
.  
5.7.Competition Law 
 
5.7.1. Competition Law and Food Value Chains 
 
The specific context of competition law needs examination with the context of the history of South 
African agriculture.  The agriculture industry in South Africa has a long history of intense state 
intervention. The apartheid government extensively regulated the production and marketing of 
agricultural products through state sanctioned ‘control boards’ established by the Marketing Act of 
1937. Agricultural co-operatives were appointed and functioned as regional monopolies.3205 The co-
operatives played an important role in providing inputs and services such as storage, packaging and 
processing, as well as representing the broad interests of white farmers.3206 Farmers were paid fixed 
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prices on delivery of their produce, they were given price protection, subsidised finance and export 
subsidies.  
In order to address the legacy of a concentrated and closed economy with limited competition, 
the first democratic government liberalised the sector with the aim of promoting market efficiency 
and competitiveness. The competition legislation which was introduced was presented both as part 
of a standard microeconomic reform agenda to ensure liberalised markets work, and as a tool to 
address the market power of entrenched business which derived its power from apartheid-era policies 
favouring the white minority.3207 Consequently, the Competition Act was negotiated in the context 
of liberalisation, albeit through the prism of Apartheid history.  
Thus, the balance between addressing the legacy of apartheid and the liberalisation agenda is 
manifest in the combination of the relatively expansive objectives of the Act.3208 There is an emphasis 
on the ability of small and medium sized enterprises as well as historically disadvantaged persons to 
participate in the economy. Further, the Act aims to regulate the transfer of economic ownership in 
keeping with the public interest and to promote employment and advance the social and economic 
welfare of South Africans. Effects-based tests are specified in the Act for evaluating mergers and 
most anti-competitive conduct.3209   In general, a consumer welfare standard is applied to 
determination of abuse of dominance and merger cases.  The Competition Appeal Court has taken 
account of dynamic efficiency to allow the merger between Pannar & Pioneer3210 finding that as 
consequence of innovation, improved competition with Monsanto could take place.  In addition 
public interest factors like employment, the ability of small business controlled or owned by Black 
South Africans to become competitive are important factors in a merger inquiry. 
With liberalisation the agricultural sector was restructured. There was a decrease in the 
number of farmers by approximately 25% from 1996, with consolidation to form larger farms at high 
levels of mechanisation.3211 Moreover, there was a shift in patterns, with less land used for crops such 
as maize and wheat, as lower-yielding land was no longer used following the ending of the regulated 
prices guaranteed to farmers. Agricultural employment in 2011 was around 40% lower than in the 
mid 1990s.3212  
Since the liberalisation of the sector, food value chains concentration levels have remained 
consistently high, especially for most of staple food products, with the exception of poultry where 
new entry has created a more competitive environment for local consumers.3213 On the whole, there 
are high concentration levels in the manufacture and supply of inputs such as fertiliser as well as in 
processing, packaging and retail.3214 “The actual farming is relatively unconcentrated, meaning 
farmers are price takers on both sides.”3215 
The agricultural cooperatives converted into private companies and through mergers and 
acquisitions they extensively consolidated into “large agro-processing concerns, commodity traders 
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and suppliers of farming requisites.”3216 Today multinational traders occupy a significant role in local 
trading of agricultural commodities.3217  
 
5.7.2. Main competition law cases 
 
5.7.2.1.Main Merger Cases: 
 
5.7.2.1.1. Seed Industry 
 
In Pioneer Hi-bred International Inc and Another v Competition Commission and Another [2012] 
ZACAC 3 the South African Competition Commission prohibited the proposed merger by Pioneer-
Hi-Bred International (Pioneer), a US-based multinational seed producer of the South African seed 
company Pannar Seed (Pty) Ltd. The Tribunal upheld the Commission’s finding however on appeal 
to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) in 2012 the merger was approved. The Commission and 
Tribunal had found that the merger would substantially reduce competition in the maize seed markets 
which could not be outweighed by pro-competitive gains that may arise from the merger. The 
Tribunal regarded this as a three to two merger as the market only consisted of the two firms in 
question and one other. Moreover, the approach of the Tribunal was effectively to compel Pannar to 
seek a partnership with another company, not presently competing in the market.  
The CAC held that the reasons advanced by the Tribunal do not justify its rejection of the 
merger because the demise of Pannar is inevitable which will then reduce the market from three to 
two in any case. The Appeal Court cautioned the Tribunal from speculating that the target firm ought 
to enter into partnership with another firm as such an approach constitutes an intrusion into the 
management and control of private companies. The CAC held that the merger would increase 
competition which would result in long-term dynamic efficiency improvements in the nature and 
quality of seed production.  
 
5.7.2.1.2. Cereals 
 
The leading breakfast cereal manufacturer in South Africa, Pioneer Food Group (Pioneer), planned 
Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd & Future Life Health Products (Pty) Ltd Case No: LM017 May15 to merge 
with Future Life Health Products (Future Life), a smaller food manufacturer. The Competition 
Commission recommended that the merger be approved without conditions. However, the Tribunal 
approved the merger with conditions. The Commission examined whether the parties competed in 
the market for breakfast cereal, or whether the target sold a distinct, ‘functional food’. The 
Competition Tribunal found that a single market existed, primarily because the target sold at prices 
close to cereals rather than to supplements, which were three times more expensive, and because all 
the major retailers stocked both products next to one on grocery shelves. The Tribunal further stated 
that the products represented each other’s closest substitute.3218  
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The Tribunal imposed certain behavioural conditions on the merging parties. The founding 
shareholder of the acquiring undertaking would control pricing and marketing of cereal products. The 
exchange of proprietary information would be limited and a restriction was placed on the cross 
appointment of board members. The Tribunal intended for the conditions to deter coordinated effects, 
and limited their duration to five years. The Tribunal also determined that the acquirer could not 
reduce investment in the target for two years.  
 
5.7.2.1.3. Poultry 
 
In Astral Foods Limited and National Chick Limited (2) (69/AM/Dec01) [2003] ZACT 8 the acquirer 
supplied breeding stock to the South African broiler industry, holding a 69% market share.  Its closest 
competitor, Cobb, had a market share of 26%, but mostly supplied Rainbow Farms.  The acquirer 
supplied 38% of its parent stock (of chickens) [“PP”] to in-house broilers, and 62% to independent 
broilers.  The transaction involved horizontal and vertical elements, horizontal because both parties 
manufactured animal feed, vertical because the target produced day-old chicks. 
The Competition Tribunal found the vertical issues raised by the merger most disconcerting 
because a dominant supplier was buying its largest independent customer, and entry barriers into both 
markets were high.  The transaction reduced the share of PP available to independent broiler breeders 
from 60% to 40%, and they separately lacked the capacity to expand quickly to support the entry of 
Cobb.  The transaction further could permit the acquirer to price discriminate in favour of its own 
operations downstream.  Over the short-term, Cobb could not make-up the hypothetical diversion in 
production. On the other hand, the acquirer argued that it earned the highest margins upstream and 
thus had an incentive to maximize output rather than to foreclose downstream.  Moreover, Cobb had 
50% of the international market and could grow in South Africa over the medium term, particularly 
in response to price increases. 
Because of the risk of short-term foreclosure, the Tribunal imposed the following conditions. 
The acquirer could not discriminate when supplying its own operations over independent customers, 
and it could not demand exclusivity as a condition to supplying independent customers. 
As to the horizontal aspects of the merger, it would create a dominant feed producer in a particular 
region in South Africa, while removing an effective competitor from the market.  The acquirer agreed 
to divest its Nurex division. 
 
5.7.2.1.4. Fish 
 
Oceana Group Limited and Another v Competition Commission [2014] ZACAC 3:  
Foodcorp wanted to sell its fishing operations, including its quota and fish processing plants, to 
Oceana because it considered them to no longer be core to its future strategic investment and 
Foodcorp’s fishing rights, including the survival of its entire fishing business, were under threat from 
the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as a result of its reduced empowerment 
shareholding.  
The Competition Commission’s main concern had to do with the sale of the canned pilchards. 
Oceana’s Luck Star brand enjoyed 73% market share and Foodcorps Glenryck had a market share of 
8.2%. Lucky Star with access to Foodcorp’s fishing rights would result in a very dominant player in 
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the downstream canned pilchards market. As a result, the parties proposed excluding the Glenryck 
brand from the transaction.  
The Commission found that the proposed transaction resulted in horizontal effects in respect 
of the harvesting, processing and marketing of pilchards. It found that the merging parties pilchard 
brands were the closest competitors in the market with a combined market share of 80%, compared 
to 10% of its next closest competitor. Consequently, the Commission found that there was a high 
barrier to entry at the harvesting level; high capital requirements at the processing level; with no other 
effective competing brand at the marketing level. Moreover, the virtual removal of an effective 
competitor at each level of the value chain, would result in a substantial reduction in the vertically 
integrated market. the Commission found that access to sufficient local quota was vital to the support 
of the canned pilchards brand, and therefore the disposal of Glenryck without access to Foodcorp’s 
quota would lead to the removal of an effective competitor from the market. The Commission thus 
approved the merger subject to a condition that Glenryck be disposed of to a third party, together 
with Foodcorp’s fish quota.  
The merging parties consequently appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the CAC. The Court 
found that the Tribunal had drawn inferences from speculative evidence, which ultimately led to 
conclusions that were not based on the facts. The CAC therefore overturned the Tribunal’s decision 
and approved Oceana’s acquisition of the Foodcorp fishing business, subject to the condition 
proposed by the merging parties that Foodcorp retain and continue to operate the Glenryck brand in 
accordance with good business practice. Further, the CAC emphasised that the transaction had a 
significant public interest consideration in that the continued existence of the Foodcorp fishing 
business under Oceana would result in the survival of the Laaiplek processing facility and the 
employment associated therewith for approximately 1000 employees in a highly impoverished 
region, who would otherwise have been retrenched.  
 
5.7.2.1.5. Infant Milk Formula 
 
In Nestle SA and the Infant Nutrition Business of Pfizer Inc Case No: 65/LM/Jul12 (015248) Nestle 
produced, marketed, and sold food and beverage products worldwide.  It acquired Pfizer Nutrition, 
specifically its infant nutrition business.  The Competition Commission identified horizontal overlap 
as both parties were involved in infant nutrition, however their products were complementary rather 
than competitive. The Commission nevertheless found a “highly concentrated” market with only 
three competitors: (1) Nestle with greater than a 70% market share; (2) Pfizer with less than 10%; 
and (3) Aspen with a 20% share.  The Commission also determined that healthcare professionals 
constituted a significant route to market and that they tended to recommend the same baby food 
brands to customers, who also were loyal. This made entry difficult. 
The Competition Tribunal ordered the following rebranding remedies as conditions to 
approving the merger.  Nestle had to sell and provide (1) a 10-year license to use the Pfizer trademarks 
on certain baby food products currently active in South Africa, and agree to a subsequent 10-year 
“blackout” period during which it could not use the trademarks, so as to incentivize investment; (2) 
an exclusive 10-year license to use Pfizer’s product formulations; (3) a non-exclusive perpetual 
license relating to know-how to develop and manufacture the divested products; (4) a license to access 
pipeline products; (5) access to clinical and product trial results; and (6) other related conditions.  
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The Tribunal approved of the rebranding remedy relative to a permanent divestiture because 
rebranding maintained pre-merger competitive restraints while potentially creating a viable 
competitor over the medium-term.  It also reduced risk to reputational damage, insufficient 
investment and free-riding, collusion, and coercion from split ownership of the brands in different 
jurisdictions and either a contractual or customer relationship in South Africa. 
 
5.7.2.1.6. Retail 
 
Minister of Economic Development and Others v Competition Tribunal and Others, SACCAWU v 
Wal-Mart Stores and Another [2012] ZACAC 2 was a critical case for the development of the public 
interest criteria.  
In 2010 Wal-Mart made an offer to acquire 51% of Massmart’s ordinary share capital. At the 
time Massmart employed 27 000 employees in 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The transaction 
was notified to the Competition Commission which recommended its approval without conditions. 
However, trade unions and government opposed the deal before the Competition Tribunal. The 
Tribunal approved the merger subject to the voluntary conditions offered by the parties.  
The case was appealed to the CAC. The uncontested evidence before the Court was that prices 
of goods sold by Walmart would be lower, and in many cases significantly lower than those offered 
by existing firms operating in the South African market. Walmart had no presence in South Africa or 
indeed Africa before the merger. In turn, Massmart, at the most, held 25% of certain segments of the 
relevant market and was smaller than the two key competitors, Checkers and Pick n Pay.  
The entire dispute turned on whether the merger can or cannot be justified on public interest 
grounds. A key argument was the detrimental effect that the merger would have on small and medium 
sized South African enterprises which supplied which supplied products to the relevant supermarket 
chains and the consequent loss of employment.  
The CAC permitted the merger subject to certain conditions. Pursuant to that order the Court 
ordered the commission of a study “to determine the most appropriate means together with the 
mechanism by which local suppliers may be empowered to respond to the challenges posed by the 
merger and thus benefit thereby.”  
The Court held that the public interest provision in the Competition Act could not be employed 
as a surrogate for a coherent industrial policy. The challenges posed by globalisation had to be met 
by a comprehensive policy designed by the State to deal with the challenges that globalisation in 
general and global value chains in particular posed to the domestic South African economy. The 
Court held that a programme be developed and adequately funded to empower local, micro, small 
and medium sized enterprises, which may be affected by the merger.  
 
5.7.2.1.7. Beverages 
 
Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Ltd & Various Coca-Cola & Related Bottling Operations Case No: 
LM243Mar15 raised the possibility of broader public interest grounds being developed by the 
Competition Tribunal. 
The Tribunal considered the transaction as having two components, Bottling and Branding. 
The acquiring firms include SAB Miller and the company that owns the Coke trademarks. The 
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acquired firms consist of processors, including bottling companies. The transaction creates one 
bottling entity.  
The parties believed that the transaction enhances access to investment resources, creates 
scope for reinvestment in various initiatives, and improves distribution capacity. As to the impact on 
competition, the primary relationship between the parties is vertical. The Competition Commission 
found that the transaction would have a neutral effect on competition because the acquiring 
companies already have integrated the bottling operations of the acquired companies.  
The transaction also consisted of horizontal overlap in the carbonated drinks, fruit juice, and water 
product markets. The Commission found that the transfer of brands would have little competitive 
impact. The Commission further discussed subsidiary concerns under the heading of “public 
interest”, which included black empowerment, limiting job losses for three years while contributing 
funds to retaining, and creating a separate fund for disadvantaged farmers and suppliers.  
The Competition Tribunal found that the proposed merger could have a negative effect on the 
current local producers of tin cans, glass packaging, sugar crates in South Africa.  It also found that 
fruit juice concentrate of a particular brand (Appletiser), being sourced outside South Africa rather 
than in the country as was the case pre merger created a difficulty for the merger. 
An undertaking was thus made an order of the Tribunal that the production of Appletiser 
would be maintained in South Africa, that at least 20% of the equity in Appletiser SA be sold to  a 
black controlled company. Further, the merging parties were to invest no less than R400 m in 
developing the downstream and retail components of the South African soft drink market for 25000 
black retailers of the merging parties’ products 
Conditions also included ensuring that small retail outlets supplied with fridges by Cola-Cola 
were not required to exclusively sell Coca-Cola products but be free to sell competing products. The 
agreement opens fridge space in coolers owned or supplied by Coca-Cola to smaller retailers. Ten 
percent of fridge space will be available to rival products from smaller producers in retail 
establishments where only Coca-Cola supplied coolers are available. 
This opens the market to new entrants and small bottlers, helping to avoid restrictive business 
practices that keep small and medium-sized businesses out of markets. The Commission noted that 
similar commitments had been agreed to by TCCC in other countries in relation to exclusionary 
conduct investigations.3219  
In Pick n Pay and Fruit & Veg City 2014/09 MR 022007 the Commission recommended to 
the Tribunal that Pick n Pay should be prohibited from acquiring Fruit & Veg City. Pick n Pay and 
Fruit & Veg city are competitors in the retail market for fresh food. The Commission analysed the 
market from both a national and local perspective. At the national level, the combined market share 
of the parties in the retail fruit and vegetable market would have been 58%. The parties also had 
significant market share in various local markets. Fruit & Veg City was identified as a significant 
competitive restraint to Pick n Pay.  
The Commission took the view that the proposed acquisition would result in the removal of 
an effective competitor and that the acquisition of Fruit & Veg City would not just limit the 
competition in the market, but would weaken future competition in the market. the Commission was 
of the view that the merger would harm consumers directly, as prices were likely to increase and 
consumer choice would decrease after the merger.  
                                                          
3219 Press Release by Coca-Cola Company 10 May 2016 
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In The SPAR Group Ltd & Florida Foodliner (Pty) Ltd Case No: 020925; The acquiring 
undertaking conducts a wholesaling operation, buying cheap and selling various goods to SPAR 
Guild members.  It also runs distribution centres where it stores and ships “dry goods, perishable 
goods, liquor, general merchandise, [and] personal care goods,” again to members.  The acquiring 
undertaking lastly owns and manages nine retail centres.  The acquired undertaking operates retail 
supermarkets selling “fresh and processed foodstuffs, toiletries, household products,” etc., in addition 
to retail liquor stores. 
The acquirer simply seeks to expand its retail operations. The transactions present both 
horizontal and vertical issues. Horizontal overlap occurs at the retail level of food, groceries and 
liquor. Vertical overlap exists as well because the SPAR Group supplies goods to acquired 
undertakings. In the retail market for liquor, the parties do not compete in the same geographic 
market. Likewise, in the retail market for groceries the parties do not compete in the same geographic 
market. the Competition Commission thus concluded that the transaction does not pose horizontal 
concerns. The Tribunal agreed with this finding.  
Addressing the vertical issue, the Commission stated that while the target undertaking purchases 
between 92% and 96% of its products from the acquirer, the transaction does not risk foreclosure 
because competitive conditions do not change.  
 
5.7.2.2.Conduct Cases 
 
Liberalisation increased competition in formally regulated markets, however it inadvertently 
increased the incentives for firms to participate in cartels. As a result, after liberalisation many 
formerly price regulated industries turned to illegal collusion.3220 For example, the wheat value chain 
was highly regulated by the state from 1937 to 1996. The Wheat Board “was the sole buyer and seller 
of wheat at predetermined prices.”3221 It was expected that with liberalisation millers would compete. 
However, instead of competing the millers replaced state regulation with private regulation.3222 In 
2007 the bread, flour and maize meals cartels were uncovered.  
 
5.7.2.2.1. Fertiliser 
 
The Competition Commission alleged that defendant Foskor charged excessive prices for the sale of 
phosphoric acid.  Animal feed producers originally notified the Commission of the possibility of an 
abuse, as phosphoric acid constitutes an input to both livestock and poultry feed.  Foskor charged 
prices in South Africa by taking the export price as the base and adding 75% of the freight rate 
shipping phosphoric acid to India.  Foskor also contracted with Sasol to produce phosphoric acid on 
behalf of Foskor.  Their combined production accounted for over 80% of total local production 
                                                          
3220 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2015)23&docLanguage
=En 
3221 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2015)23&docLanguage
=En 
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http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2015)23&docLanguage
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capacity of phosphoric acid.  Foskor sold 95% of its product abroad; the entire domestic market would 
have accounted for 35.7% of Foskor’s total sales.  Foskor also produced phosphate rock to supply the 
South African fertiliser industry. 
The Commission determined that Foskor possessed the ability to sustain prices “substantially 
in excess” of the competitive level, to “the very limit” of its monopolistic power in the local market, 
and that the price that Foskor charged was “excessive and detrimental to consumers”.  To respond to 
the Commission’s concerns, Foskor eliminated the 75% shipping rate from the local phosphoric acid 
price, thereby substantially lowering prices.  Foskor additionally committed to adopt a competition 
law compliance program. The Commission initially did not demand that Foskor pay damages, but 
later required Foskor to pay 6,481,889.65 rand in administrative penalties. 
The Commission also found that the agreement with Sasol divided markets by allocating 
customers and particular types of goods. The Commission granted Foskor conditional immunity for 
this conduct and settled with Sasol.  
In 2009 and 2010, the Competition Commission intervened in the nitrogenous fertiliser value 
chain. Prior to the intervention, several anticompetitive practices existed in the fertiliser market. 
These practices can be divided into two mutually reinforcing categories.3223 The first pertains to 
practices that emanated from Sasol’s dominance and desire to maintain such dominance, whilst the 
second pertains to collusive practices among the major fertiliser blenders and distributors.  
Prior to the Commission’s intervention in the nitrogenous fertiliser value chain, Sasol was the 
sole supplier of ammonia in South Africa. Ammonia is the main input in the production of 
nitrogenous Fertilisers. In 1999 Sasol became the monopoly supplier of ammonia in South Africa 
when the production facilities of African Explosives and Chemical Industries (“AECI”) were closed 
down.   
Omnia, Foskor and Kynoch (Yara) are suppliers of imported ammonia. Each of these firms 
supply ammonia through their shared ownership of the Richards Bay ammonia import facility. They 
each own shares of 25%, with Sasol forming the fourth shareholder.  
The ammonia that is produced by Sasol and imported by Omnia, Foskor and Kynoch (Yara), 
is used to produce ammonium nitrate, which in turn is used in the production of Fertilisers.3224 Prior 
to the Commission’s intervention in 2009 and 2010, Sasol, Omnia and AECI were the firms that were 
involved in the manufacture of ammonium nitrate as they had the necessary infrastructure to produce 
it.  
At the downstream level of the value chain there are blenders and traders, such as Nutri-Flo 
and Profert, which prior to the Commission’s intervention sourced input from Sasol to create blended 
Fertilisers in order to on-sell to farmers. In 2003 and 2004 respectively, they both laid complaints 
alleging that they were subject to exploitative and exclusionary conduct on the part of Sasol. They 
alleged that Sasol, acted in concert with Omnia and Kynoch (Yara), which had the effect of depressing 
the ability of the complainants to achieve a competitive outcome in the market for the blending and 
distribution of nitrogenous-based Fertilisers.  Furthermore, it was alleged that the interdependence 
between Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch (Yara) frustrated market participants such as Nutri-Flo and Profert 
from expanding their businesses and effectively competing. 
                                                          
3223 This discussion draws on S. Grimbeek, Giya, G. & Mahlalela, Q. (2017). “The Impact of Competition in the fertiliser 
industry after the Sasol divestiture of blending facilities in 2010.” Competition Commission of South Africa Working 
Paper No. 1. 
3224 Ibid.. 
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In 2005, at the time of the Commission’s investigations, it was observed that Sasol produced 
more than 40% of the country’s ammonium nitrate. As a result of the collusive agreements entered 
into between Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch, Omnia’s incentive to effectively utilize its ammonium nitrate 
plants was significantly reduced.  
The Commission also noted that Omnia supplied very little ammonium nitrate to the open 
market due to its vertical integration. Moreover, Omnia was reliant on imported ammonia for its 
operations. The fundamental problem with that arrangement was the reliability of the rail wagons in 
transporting ammonia up from the Richards Bay import facility. Under an agreement with Kynoch 
(Yara), ammonium nitrate was produced by AECI, however that ceased in 2004. As a result, smaller 
players who required ammonium nitrate had to rely solely on Sasol. At present Sasol remains the 
main supplier of ammonium nitrate in South Africa. 
In short, the Commission’s investigations revealed that Sasol had been abusing its dominance 
upstream, charging prices as if the products had been imported. In addition, Sasol was found to be in 
a cartel with two other major producers of intermediate fertiliser products, Omnia and Kynoch.3225 
Upon the consolidation of its findings in 2005, the Commission referred the matter to the 
Competition Tribunal Sasol reached agreements with the Commission, which effectively imposed 
behavioural and structural conditions on Sasol.3226 On 20 July 2010 the Tribunal confirmed the 
settlement order in terms of which Sasol undertook to provide fertiliser on an ex-works basis and 
further not to discriminate across customer types (i.e. blenders, traders and end users) and across 
geographic regions.  Sasol also undertook to divest five of its blending plants, thus limiting its present 
in the downstream market.  
 
5.7.2.2.2. Bread Cartel 
 
Up until 1991 the bread industry was highly regulated. As a result of this regulated environment, 
“regular meetings took place between bread producers largely, through an industry association, the 
Chamber of Baking (“the Chamber”) to whom all of the bakers belonged.”3227 Although the 
legislative impediment to competition was removed with deregulation, the bread producers continued 
interacting with regard to their common issues. Moreover, the Chamber continued to operate as a 
forum for information sharing.  
There are four “primary bakeries who enjoy a combined market share of between 50-60 per 
cent of the domestic bread market in South Africa. Blue Ribbon owned by Premier Foods, Albany 
Bakeries owned by Tiger Consumer Brands, Sasko and Duens Bakeries owned by Pioneer Foods and 
Sunbake Bakeries owned by Foodcorp. The remainder of the market is served by smaller independent 
bakeries. The four primary plant bakeries are all vertically integrated. Their milling operations 
account for more than 90 per cent of all milled wheat. As milling companies they sell flour to the 
                                                          
3225 G. Makhaya & S. Roberts (2013) “Expectations and outcomes: considering competition and corporate power in South 
Africa under democracy,” Review of African Political Economy. 
3226  S. Grimbeek, Giya, G. & Mahlalela, Q. (2017). “The Impact of Competition in the fertiliser industry after the Sasol 
divestiture of blending facilities in 2010.” Competition Commission of South Africa Working Paper No. 1. 
3227 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2015)23&docLanguage
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independent bakeries. Plant bakeries and independent bakeries produce similar products and are 
competitors with each other.”3228 
The Competition Commission received information in 2006 about an alleged bread cartel 
operating in the Western Cape Province. After an initial investigation, the Commission initiated a 
complaint against Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands and Premier Foods, all of whom had allegedly been 
involved in the cartel.  
During the Commission’s investigation, Premier Foods applied for leniency indicating its 
willingness to fully cooperate with the Commission on its role in the cartel. It disclosed that Premier 
Foods, Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods had been operating a bread cartel in the Western Cape by 
fixing selling prices and other trading conditions. Further, it revealed that a bread cartel had been 
operated in other parts of the country and they had also entered into agreements which involved the 
division of markets by allocating territories. Based on that information the Commission proceeded to 
initiate another investigation. Thereafter the Commission referred both the Western Cape and 
National complaint to the Tribunal.  
Tiger Brands corroborated the information provided by Premier Foods. Tiger Brands provided 
additional evidence on the bread cartel, including information that the cartel was also fixing flour and 
maize meal prices. In November 2007 the Tribunal imposed a fine of R98 million on Tiger Brands 
for its role in the bread cartel. Foodcorp, a respondent in the national complaint, entered into a 
settlement agreement with the Commission and in 2009 the Tribunal confirmed the settlement 
agreement and imposed a fine of R45 million on Foodcorp. By contrast, Pioneer Foods denied that it 
was involved in a Western Cape Cartel.  
After contested proceedings whereby the Commission alleged that Pioneer Foods’ bread 
baking divisions engaged in price fixing and market allocation, per se offenses, Pioneer admitted to 
price fixing and market allocation in the Western Cape but only to the discount granted to agents or 
resellers setting the price of toaster bread, as competition primarily occurred through discounting 
downstream in this market. The three leading bakeries had capped the discount to agents at 90 cents 
per loaf, and agreed not to supply new distributors.  
The Tribunal refused to impose fines on Pioneer’s international turnover, but only its bread 
and bakery turnover in regions where it acted anti-competitively. To impose a fine on turnover in 
another product market, the Tribunal would require the monopolist to extend leverage on market 
power. The Tribunal found as aggravating circumstances the regressive impact of higher bread prices, 
the removal of capacity from markets, and Pioneers’ insistence on defending egregious conduct for 
which strong evidence existed.  
 
5.7.2.2.3. Wheat Flour Cartel 
 
The four major firms that operate in the wheat milling industry in South Africa control nearly 97 per 
cent of the wheat flour market. these firms are Premier Foods, Tiger Brands, Pioneer Foods and 
Foodcorp. The four firms are further vertically integrated in baking and production of other foodstuffs 
such as cereals and pasta.  
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The flour industry in South Africa is highly concentrated and is characterised by “multi-
market contact, homogenous products and a history of collusion, both at the level of milled wheat 
and in the main end consumer product, bread.”3229 The firms have extensive presence in a number of 
geographic markets and are also active on the downstream level of the value chain.  
The Commission’s investigations revealed that at various stages between 1999 and 2007 
private meetings and telephonic discussions took place between the wheat milling firms. During these 
meetings they agreed to fix the price of both wheat and white maize products and to create uniform 
price lists for wholesale, retail and general trade customers. Moreover, they agreed on the timing of 
the price increases and the implementation thereof. The agreements were used to secure coordination 
at both national and regional levels and were mutually reinforcing.  
In 2010 the Tribunal confirmed a consent agreement between the Commission and Pioneer 
Foods regarding Pioneer Foods’ involvement in the milling cartels. Pioneer admitted that it had 
engaged in price fixing and market allocation in the wheat and maize milling markets, that it 
exchanged information with competitors through industry associations and received cost and market 
share information in return, and that it lowered price to keep rivals from expanding in certain regions 
of South Africa. Pioneer committed (1) to cooperate in the Commission’s investigations by providing 
evidence and testifying, (2) to set-up a competition law compliance program, (3) to cease committing 
the conduct that the Commission found troublesome, including threatening price wars against rivals, 
(4) to lower the price of wheaten flour and bread products, which must equate to a reduction in gross 
profits of 160,000,000 rand, and (5) not to decrease the level of capital expenditure as a result of the 
following fine; rather to increase that expenditure by 160,000,000 rand.  Pioneer lastly agreed to pay 
an administrative penalty of 500,000,000 rand.  
 
5.7.2.2.4. Milk Cartel 
 
In 2004 the Commission received information alleging the existence of a cartel fixing the price of 
fresh milk. An investigation was initiated and the Commission found evidence of price fixing for raw 
and processed milk by Clover, Parmalat, Ladismith Cheese, Woodlands Dairy, Nestle, Lancewood 
and Milkwood Dairy. In 2006 the Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal. “The complaint 
related to collusion and/or price fixing at the milk procurement level, including exchange of 
information and exchanging milk between regions between processors instead of entering each 
other’s regions to procure milk, as well as price fixing in the sale of processed milk and dairy 
products.”3230 Moreover, there was a complaint relating to exclusive dealing in inducing suppliers not 
to deal with competitors.  
The Competition Commission held that defendant Lancewood had perpetrated a horizontal 
conspiracy that directly or indirectly fixed the procurement prices of milk and set other trading 
conditions.  The conspiracy members at both the field office and management levels exchanged price 
information by phone, email, or in person, including pricing data for procurement and retail sales, set 
prices based on hypothetical scenarios circulated among the group, and reported price movements 
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based on past, present, and future pricing.  Lancewood received economic pricing reports that detailed 
the factors used to set pricing by competitors and the different prices paid by processors, and that 
further requested a response based on Lancewood’s corresponding pricing information. Lancewood 
once requested and received aggregated pricing data from an independent third-party targeted at an 
area where it did not compete. Lancewood admitted to exchanging pricing information and agreed to 
pay an administrative penalty of 100,000 rand.  It further committed to instituting a competition law 
compliance program and to cooperating with the Commission’s prosecution of other conspiracy 
participants. 
 
5.7.2.2.5. Poultry Cartel 
 
The Competition Commission initiated an investigation regarding complaints on anti-competitive 
conduct in the market of poultry breeding stock and broiler production, poultry products as well as 
poultry feed. The investigations were initiated against the South African Poultry Association 
(“SAPA”), Animal Feed Manufacturers Association, Rainbow Chickens Ltd, Pioneer, Country Bird 
Holdings Ltd and Afgri Ltd.  
The Commission’s investigation involved market allocation specifically against Pioneer and 
Rainbow; exclusive supply agreements against all broiler producers (including Astral); tying 
allegations against certain breeding stock suppliers and information exchange against all of the 
respondents through their membership in SAPA. After its investigation the Commission decided not 
to refer the complaint to the Tribunal subject to undertakings by the respondents regarding future 
exchanges of information. 
The Commission initiated an investigation into alleged price fixing against Rainbow, Astral, 
Country Bird Holdings and Afgri. The Commission received a leniency application from Pioneer in 
respect of cartel behaviour in the market of fresh poultry products in the Western and Eastern Cape. 
This matter formed part of the Commissions R960 million settlement with Pioneer on all outstanding 
cases.3231 Subsequently, Astral admitted to collusive behaviour in that market and settled with the 
Commission. 
 
5.7.2.2.6. Packaging 
 
The Competition Commission alleged that defendant Rooibos had entered into exclusive supply 
agreements with the four main rooibos packers that required the packers to buy all or “a substantial 
amount” of their rooibos requirements from defendant, thereby preventing the packers from obtaining 
rooibos upstream from other suppliers.  Rooibos also offered volume discounts “based on targets” to 
induce packers not to buy rooibos from defendant’s rivals.  The Commission further found that 
Rooibos had dominance in the upstream market for “the processing and supply of bulk rooibos to 
packers,” that the exclusive agreements had foreclosed rivals upstream and had maintained 
dominance, and that the volume discounts had produced a similar effect. 
Rooibos agreed not to enter into any further exclusive agreements, not to offer individualized 
discounts, not to offer discounts above a threshold that apply to the entire volume purchased, not to 
                                                          
3231 “Competition Dynamics and regional trade flows in the poultry sector: the case of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia 
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lower price on incremental sales below the average variable cost to produce that portion of output, 
and only to offer discounts on equivalent terms to all customers.  The Commission agreed not to 
impose an administrative penalty.  
 
5.8. Agricultural Subsidies 
 
Prior to the deregulation of the sector in the 1990s, the Agricultural sector in South Africa was 
supported by a system and framework of regulation that included the establishment of the Land Bank, 
the enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, Land Acts of 1913 and various other 
components of agricultural policy which included control boards (price setting of agricultural 
commodities), investments in R&D, access to extension services and infrastructure (Kirsten, Van Zyl 
and Van Rooyen, 1994). In line with other apartheid era policies, this framework served to support a 
number of agricultural products produced by a small proportion of market participants, mainly white 
commercial farmers and large processors, at the expense of black farmers and processors.   
Field crops such as maize and sugar received the most support although subsidies were also 
directed towards wheat products and the dairy industry. Other sectors such as horticulture and poultry 
received little support during this period. The support to field crops largely comprised protection from 
foreign competition, subsidies and in the case of maize, access to productive technology. The maize 
farmers’ access to this technology is largely considered to be responsible for the high level of 
production of the maize industry even today despite the reduction in the amount of land on which 
maize seed is planted. 
The maize sector was also one of the most significant lobby groups in the agricultural sector. 
They used their political influence to, amongst other things, strengthen the position of (white 
commercial) farmers to gain access to resources (Kirsten et al. 1994). It is no surprise that until 1995, 
maize was a dominant product in South Africa’s export basket largely due to the subsidies received 
(Edwards, Kirsten and Vink, 2007). Today, South Africa remains a net exporter of maize although 
this has reduced over time, partly due to the redistribution of land and drought conditions experienced. 
A further protection the maize industry benefited from was a guaranteed payment from the state 
should export losses be incurred by the maize board. These guaranteed prices were largely responsible 
for the substantial amount of land dedicated to maize production in earlier years. 
Like for other products, the protection in the sector was facilitated by control boards and 
agricultural cooperatives. With the deregulation of the sector in the 1990s in which the control boards 
were dismantled, new systems began to emerge in which the agricultural market system was more 
self-regulating.  
Between the 1960s and 1990s, the support received by maize and wheat crops went beyond 
subsidies and extended into financing and processing, which contributed to the creation of a powerful 
lobby group for farmers in this sector (Tregurtha, Vink and Kirsten, 2010). It also resulted in the 
control of key infrastructure such as the operation and ownership of grain silos, constructed with state 
support.  The power of the lobby groups and cooperatives extended to capacity payments, handling, 
debt relief and tax concessions (Armin and Bernstein, 1995). This created significant distortion or 
direct government intervention across agricultural products. 
The sugar industry is another field crop that received significant state support and in which 
there has been limited reform since even before the 1990s (Edwards, Kirsten and Vink, 2007). It is 
still a key sector identified for targeted interventions based on its value-add, export performance and 
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economy-wide multiplier effects, in accordance with the 2016/17-2018/19 IPAP iteration (the dti, 
2016 – see table 1 below). The industry is yet to be deregulated and remains highly protected. The 
industry is regulated in terms of the Sugar Act of 1978 and Sugar Industry Agreement (SIA) of 2000, 
binding on all sugarcane growers and producers of sugar products (DAFF, 2016), in addition to other 
underlying domestic policies and regional agreements regulating the industry. 
The sugar industry benefits from tariff protection on sugar imports when the world sugar price 
drops below a pre-determined dollar-based reference price,  a tariff is placed on imports.3232 The 
dollar-based reference price for sugar is periodically reviewed by International Trade Administration 
Commission (ITAC) (das Nair et al., 2017). The tariff protection is not without its challenges as it is 
considered to benefit the larger millers and harm the rest of the sector. It also appears to penalise 
domestic and industrial consumers because it does not differentiate between different types and 
qualities of sugar (das Nair et al., 2017; Barnes et al. 2015).  
The sugar sector receives additional protection under the Sugar Act and Sugar Industry 
Agreement (SIA) in which local and export quotas or volumes produced are determined. In addition, 
the Sugar Act and SIA determine sugarcane prices using the Division of Proceeds (DoP)3233 formula. 
The rationale for the setting of prices is to protect growers from low global sugar prices and from the 
buying power of millers. The Sugar Act and SIA are currently under review by the dti, including 
consideration of the potential for anticompetitive outcomes (Canegrowers, 2014).  
The agricultural policies that subsequently developed for field crop other than sugarcane 
aimed firstly to correct injustices of past policy, largely through land reform; secondly to make the 
sector more labour-intensive and lastly to increase competitiveness internationally.  The passing of 
the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act in 1996 heralded the new liberalised agricultural system 
in which marketing boards were dismantled and statutory export monopolies ended (Greenberg, 
2017). This Act essentially created a ‘free market’ system for food and effectively removed 
government’s control over prices and subsidies in the agricultural sector.  
Table 1 below outlines the key policy changes from the 1980s to present.  
 
Table 1: Key policy changes in the agriculture and agro-processing sectors 
 
Deregulation and policy reform (from 1980’s) 
• Deregulation of marketing 
• Liberalisation of price control 
• A change in tax treatment of agriculture 
• Change in direct budgetary expenditure on agriculture 
• Scrapping of Land Acts (in 1991) 
• Tariffication of farm commodities 
Subsequent policies (since 1990’s to 2007) 
• Land reform 
• Institutional restructuring  
• Promulgation of Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (no 47 of 1996) 
                                                          
3232 See das Nair et al. 2017 for details of how the dollar reference price works. 
3233 See das Nair et al. (2017) 
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• Trade policy (quantitative restrictions, duties, price controls, import/export permits 
replaced by tariffs)3234 
• Labour market reform 
• Bilateral and regional trade agreements (SACU, SADC and TDCA3235) 
Policies from 2007 
• Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) (2012-2017)3236 
• Agricultural Policy Action Plan (APAP) (2015-2019)3237 
• National Policy Framework on the development of small and medium agro-processing 
enterprises (2015) 
Source: Edwards, Kirsten and Vink (2007); IPAP iterations; (DAFF, 2014), (DAFF, 2016) 
 
A key outcome of the policy changes was the redistribution of land from field crop production to the 
production of horticultural products and to pastoral use. The shift to horticultural production was 
largely driven by export demand following trade liberalisation. The amount of land dedicated to 
maize production was significantly reduced by about a million hectares while the land dedicated to 
pasture increased by about 700, 000 hectares. 
Between 1939 and 1997, the fruit and nut industry was regulated by the citrus board through 
agricultural marketing boards. The board determined the volumes of fruit allocated to each processor 
as well as the quantity to be sold in the fresh market. The sector was deregulated post-1997 with the 
closing of the marketing boards.  The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) from 2010-2017 and the 
Agricultural Policy Action Plan (APAP) from 2014-2019 now identifies fruit as a strategic sector in 
the agro-processing value chain with high growth potential and labour absorptive capacity. The action 
plans aim to grow the fruit sector by improving access to export markets, growing exports in existing 
markets, assisting firms with complying with standards and investing in critical infrastructure.  
A number of initiatives/support systems have been set to achieve this goal: 
• the dti established a National Food Control Agency to address fragmentation and duplication 
of roles in food safety regulation in 2010. 
• the dti established a Public Private Partnership (PPP) fruit caning initiative in partnership with 
South Africa Fruit & Vegetable Canners’ Association (SAFVCA), in 2005, to improve 
competitiveness and ensure the long-term sustainability of the fruit and vegetable canning 
industry. 
• the dti assisted the industry to access new markets in China and India between 2010 and 2011 
and grow sales in these markets.  
 
Table 2: Agricultural and agro-processing subsidies in IPAP and APAP 
                                                          
3234 The sugar industry was the only industry not subjected to this process of liberalisation. 
3235 Southern Africa Customs Union, Southern Africa Development Community, and Trade, Cooperation and 
Development Agreement (with the European Union).  
3236 IPAP agriculture and agro-processing policies include industrial financing, procurement, trade policies, competition 
policy, demand side skills strategies, development of special economic zones and a regional agricultural plan 
3237 The APAP is focussed on key action programmes in 11 sectors: poultry/soya beans/maize integrated value chain, 
red meat, wheat, fruit and vegetables, wine industry, sugar, biofuels, forestry, small-scale fisheries, Aquaculture 
Competitiveness Improvement Programme (ACIP). 
902 
 
Form of subsidy Level of support Areas/crops to 
benefit 
Philosophy Institutions in 
charge 
Year 
Agro-Processing 
Support Scheme 
(APSS) 
20% to 30% cost-
sharing grant 
Agro-processing Increased capacity, 
employment creation, 
modernised 
machinery and 
equipment, 
competitiveness and 
productivity 
improvement and 
broadening 
participation 
DTI 2017/18 
Aquaculture 
Development and 
Enhancement 
Programme 
Cost-sharing grant of up 
to a maximum of R30 
million 
Aquaculture Develop emerging 
agriculture farmers; 
Increase production;  
Sustain and create 
jobs; 
Encourage 
geographical spread 
DAFF, DTI Current 
Agricultural Broad-
Based Black 
Economic 
Empowerment 
(AgriBEE) 
Up to R5m Agriculture Skills development in 
agriculture, 
transformation 
DAFF 2003 - 2007 
Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support 
Programme (CASP) 
 Agricultural 
support services 
 DAFF Since 2004 
The Micro 
Agricultural 
Financial Institutions 
of South Africa 
(MAFISA) 
Up to R500,000 Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fisheries 
Purchase of 
production inputs 
(fertilizers, seeds, 
pesticides etc.); 
Purchase of small 
equipment and 
implements such as 
Knapsack spray, bird 
drinkers and feeders, 
wheelbarrow, spades 
etc.; 
Purchase of breeding 
livestock, 
medication, feed, 
branding material 
DAFF Current 
Ilima-Letsema 
programme 
 Agriculture Increased production DAFF 2016 
Provide hatcheries 
for SMMEs 
 Aquaculture Increase seed supply DAFF, 
Department of 
Science and 
Technology 
(DST), 
Distributed 
Wind Energy 
Association 
(DWEA) 
2011/12 
Establishment of 
small-scale millers 
 Milling Increase competition 
and reduce prices 
Industrial 
Development 
Corporation 
(IDC), 
Economic 
Department of 
Development 
2014/15 
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(EDD), NMC, 
Provincial 
Departments of 
Economic 
Development, 
Foundation for 
African 
Business & 
Consumer 
Service 
(FABCOS) 
Agro-processing 
competitiveness fund 
established from 
fined levied against 
Pioneer for its role in 
the bread cartel 
R250m Various food value 
chains 
promote 
competitiveness, 
employment and 
growth in food value 
chains. It will provide 
finance on favourable 
terms to small and 
medium enterprises. 
IDC  
Establishment of a 
feed mill 
R28m Feed mill Increase feed 
production 
DTI 2015/16 
Establishment of 
incubator farm 
R20m Barley Increase barley 
production 
DTI, FABCOS 2015/16 
Bronkhorstspruit 
soya crushing facility 
R1bn Soya Facilitate import 
substitution of soya 
cake, increase local 
soya bean cultivation, 
create at least 48 
permanent jobs and 
have an indirect 
employment impact 
of more than 1 000 
jobs. 
DTI, IDC 2013 
Agroprocessing 
facility 
R86m Multi-user facility It is designed to 
enable small, micro 
and medium 
enterprises 
(SMME’s) to expand 
their processing and 
value-addition 
activities in the 
Eastern Cape. 
Provides affordable 
industrial space for 
many small-to-
medium companies. 
It would also create 
thousands of 
employment 
opportunities to the 
NMB community. 
DTI, Coega 
Development 
Corporation 
2015/16 
Manufacturing 
Competitiveness 
Enhancement 
Programme (MCEP) 
 
R5.8bn over 3 years. 
Production Incentive 
(administered by the dti) 
• Capital Investment 
– capped at R30 
million 
A range of sectors 
falling under the 
SIC 3 classification. 
Agroprocessing 
industry was the 
major recipient in 
2015. Agro-
industries 
supported include 
dairy, bread, 
The MCEP 
comprises two sub-
programmes: 
Production Incentive 
(PI) and the Industrial 
Financing Loan 
Facilities 
DTI, IDC Since 2009 
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• Green Technology 
– capped at R20 
million 
• Enterprise 
Competitiveness 
Improvement – 
capped at R10 
million 
• Feasibility Studies – 
capped at R8 
million 
• Cluster 
Competitiveness 
Improvement – 
capped at R50 
million 
Industrial Financing 
Loan Facilities 
(administered by IDC) 
• Pre and post 
dispatch; Working 
Capital 
• Industrial Policy 
Niche Project 
Funding 
milling, beverages, 
meat, etc 
Establishment of e-
centre 
 Agro-processing To create a shared 
space in which 
produce can be 
marketed 
internationally. 
dti, EDD and 
Cape Agulhas 
Municipality 
2015/16 
Establishment of 
domestic agri-
business hub 
 Agro-processing stimulate the local 
economy, create 
employment, 
optimise agricultural 
potential and agro-
processing by 
creating a central 
processing and 
marketing hub 
dti, LIV 
foundation, 
DAFF, KZN 
Provincial and 
Local 
government and 
Department of 
Rural 
Development 
and Land 
Reform 
(DRDLR),. 
2015/16 
Agricultural Policy 
Action Plan 
Import tariffs 
AGRI BEE Charter 
Government Preferential 
Procurement Policy 
Infrastructural 
development 
Supplier development 
programmes 
Support for R&D 
Land allocation 
Acquisition of new 
technology 
Skills development 
Poultry/soya 
beans/maize 
integrated value 
chain 
Red meat value 
chain 
Wheat value chain 
Fruit and 
vegetables 
Sugar value chain 
Biofuels value 
chain 
Meet the objectives 
of the National 
Growth Plan (NGP), 
National 
Development Plan 
(NDP) and Industrial 
Policy Action Plan 
(IPAP): 
• Contribution to 
food security 
• Job creation 
DTI, DAFF, 
Agricultural 
Research 
Council (ARC), 
DRDLR, 
National 
Agricultural 
Marketing 
Council 
(NAMC), 
Agriculture 
Sector 
Education 
2015-2019 
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• IPAP 2011-2013 developed a Food Processing Strategy and Action Plan to facilitate the 
building of strong local brands that can compete in world markets.  
• IPAP 2015 and 2016 highlighted plans to establish a targeted shared infrastructure programme 
through the South Africa products hub aimed at increasing exports. The hub involved sharing 
of facilities and services such as transport, storage and packaging for firms located in the same 
area. Furthermore, the programme enabled farmers in the same sector to procure inputs in 
bulk and market their produce to international markets. 
• Beyond infrastructure support, IPAP 2016-2017 plans to develop an agro-processing supplier 
development programme in partnership with large retailers and agri-processors to provide 
shelf space and support to emerging and marginalized producers and farmers.  
• IPAP 2016-2017 focuses on identifying and extending support to high-growth and high-value 
niche sectors with export potential such as blueberries and other fruit varieties that constitute 
high-value products with demand in developed export markets. Support for niche sectors 
includes market information and marketing, dissemination of new technologies, removing of 
unnecessary regulatory and infrastructural barriers and delays, and provision of finance.  
The dairy sector was also highly regulated prior to the 1990s. The Dairy Industry Control Board was 
established in 1930. The Dairy Industry Control Act in 1930 and The Marketing Act of 1937 allowed 
for extensive state intervention in the dairy industry (Kassier et al., 1992; Scrimegour and Sheppard, 
1998; Groenewald, 2000).  The Marketing Acts of 1937 and 1968 set out to stabilise the incomes of 
South Africa’s milk producers by regulating the flow of milk and by restricting perceived ‘harmful 
competition’ between market participants (Groenewald, 2000).   
More recent policies as outlined in the IPAP 2015 and 2017/18-2019/20 have focused on 
developing and facilitating small-scale dairy processors to increase South Africa’s exports of 
processed milk products and help new entrants to become more competitive in the global dairy 
market. They also aim to develop models for small dairy producers to become bottlers and 
distributors, including improving access to appropriate cold chain technologies and retail outlets.   
Although difficult to comprehensively map out and quantify the full magnitude of support 
given to the different crops over time, an initial attempt is made in Table 2 below for the support 
mechanisms by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), as well as other institutions, in more recent years. 
 
5.9. Conclusion  
 
Market promotion 
Support for improved 
practices and 
standardisation 
(any of these 
quantified?) 
Small-scale 
fisheries 
Aquaculture 
Competitiveness 
Improvement 
Programme (ACIP) 
• Value of 
production 
• Growth potential 
• Potential 
contribution to 
trade balance 
(including via 
export expansion 
and import 
substitution). 
Training 
Authority.  
(AgriSETA), 
South African 
Sugarcane 
Research 
Institute 
(SASRI).  
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Competition law in South Africa has concentrated mainly exclusively, upon mergers, not 
unexpectedly in a sector of the economy under significant economic pressure as described above. 
However, the inquiry into this sector has been extended recently as a result of the Competition 
Commission having established a market inquiry in November 2015 into the grocery retail section.  
It is designed to focus on the role of supermarket chains in townships, particularly in peri urban and 
rural areas.  Its report once completed, will throw further light on the role of supermarket chains in 
the promotion or retardation of small and medium sized businesses and the relationship of the retail 
sector to the pressing question of the supply of food to the South African population.3238   
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PART VI: Case studies 
 
Chapter 1: Insights from selected value chains in South Africa3239 
 
Teboho Bosiu, Reena das Nair and Anthea Paelo 
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
This paper is South Africa’s contribution to the BRICS Working Group on Food and Agro-
processing’s overarching report on ‘The Global Food Value Chain and Competition Law and Policy 
in BRICS countries’. The Working Group’s overarching report aims to first provide an overview of 
key developments in various segments of global food value chains in the BRICS countries and to 
then focus in more detail on the impact of the recent consolidation in plant protection and seeds 
segments of value chains.  
This paper contributes to the overarching report by providing an overview of developments and 
competition concerns in the following food and food-related segments in South Africa: 
1. Seeds 
2. Fertilisers 
3. Animal feed and poultry 
4. Maize and wheat milling 
5. Dairy  
6. Retail  
These value chains were selected because of their importance as critical inputs into food production 
and given their significance as part of a typical food basket for consumers in southern Africa. These 
foods are increasingly retailed through supermarkets in the region. The selected value chains are also 
important because they have the potential to promote value addition and industrialisation in the 
region. 
We employ a framework that allows for the evaluation of competition and regulatory 
dynamics in agro-processing value chains using a regional value chain approach, alongside the global 
value chain (GVC) approach which has been employed for a range of products including agricultural 
commodities and cash crops. The motivation for this approach is provided in Section 2.  
This rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 provides a brief background of the history 
and evolution of the broader food sector in South Africa. This is important to understand some of the 
outcomes we see in food markets today, including the competition problems. This section also 
introduces more recent developments in food value chains in South Africa, such as rising levels of 
institutional shareholders, growth of agri-investment companies, increase in financialization and 
greater cross-ownerships within and across food value chains. It further highlights the growing 
internationalisation of food markets in South Africa. These developments have implications on the 
strategies of lead firms in food value chains and how they compete.  
Sections 4 to 9 then assess each of the selected value chains focusing on mapping out the value 
chain; assessing ownership patterns, levels of concentration and performance in terms of production, 
trade and investments; and reviewing competition interventions and impacts thereof. While the key 
                                                          
3239 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not of the Competition Commission of South Africa. 
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historic competition interventions in each sub-sector are discussed, the decisions over the past five 
years are tracked and implications on competitive rivalry, development and upgrading opportunities 
within the value chain are assessed. The implications of global mega-mergers and global cartels for 
South Africa are also considered. 
 
 
1.2.A value chain approach in conjunction with industrial organisation principles 
 
A GVC approach provides valuable insights into the interaction between producers, intermediate 
players and retailers in food value chains, the governance of these chains, as well as an understanding 
of the distribution of rents and power dynamics at each level. The governance includes a range of 
mechanisms for vertical control and coordination. Such analyses can then potentially set the 
foundation for designing appropriate tools for competition law interventions (Lianos and Lombardi, 
2016 a, b; Davis et al, 2016). It is an area where competition authorities in developing countries are 
becoming increasingly interested in to foster conditions where markets can work better for 
investment, value added and a share of the rents for the producers in those countries.  
 
1.2.1. Regional value chains? 
 
While a GVC approach in evaluating dynamics in agro-processing markets provides useful insights, 
research in several value chains in southern Africa has shown that this approach has greater 
applicability when further refined to a regional value chain level, at least with regard to a number of 
important agro-processing activities through to retail.  
Increasing regional integration and consolidation of global value chains has seen new patterns 
of trade and investment emerge. Multinational enterprises, in search of fewer, larger and more capable 
suppliers are likely to turn to more regional sourcing (Cattaneo et al. 2010; Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark, 2011) and are increasingly investing in regional operations. Emerging economies in southern 
Africa and an increase in regional trade agreements further promotes regional value chains.3240 This 
is evident in the recent increase in intra-regional trade in processed foods and diversified 
manufactured products.  An assessment of value chains that is either too narrow in that it only looks 
at national dynamics or too wide in that it only looks at global dynamics leaves out a critical 
geographic area over which production is happening– the southern African region. This therefore has 
strong implications for growth and industrialisation of the region as a whole. 
There are several reasons why assessing value chains, including agro-processing value chains, 
from a regional perspective in southern Africa is relevant.  
First, as highlighted, recent trade data from South Africa shows that exports of 
processed/prepared food products are increasingly going to the rest of Africa (Figure 1). We note 
however that the sharp spike in shares into the rest of Africa between 2009 and 2010 is likely to be 
an adjustment in reporting of exports to Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries. This 
implies a considerable under-reporting of exports to Africa in earlier years.3241 In any case, it is clear 
that the rest of Africa is the most important ‘market’ for South African exports of processed/prepared 
                                                          
3240 Only a few studies have looked at regional value chains in southern Africa (see Keane, 2015, Farole, 2015 and Morris 
et al. 2012), and even fewer have looked at selected value-chains in depth (Fessehaie et al, 2015; 2016; Ncube et al, 2016). 
3241 Prior to 2010 exports of food-stuffs by South Africa to other SACU countries were not recorded as exports.  
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foodstuffs. Further, this is being driven by exports to southern African countries (Figure 2). The 
southern African region as a whole therefore is an important market for South Africa. Other studies 
have also identified substantial gains from intra-regional trade in agro-processing products and South 
Africa has been identified as being a key driver of regional value chains as a market and as a source 
of inputs (AfDB et al. 2014; Jensen and Sandrey, 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Shares of South Africa’s exports of processes/prepared foodstuffs by destination 
 
Source: Calculations from Quantec data. The 2009-2010 jump is largely due to reporting adjustments 
for exports to SACU.  
 
Figure 4: South Africa’s exports of processes/prepared foodstuffs to Africa are driven by 
exports to SADC and SACU exports 
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There are obvious transport cost advantages for South African suppliers supplying the region as 
opposed to deep sea markets. In addition, the spread of supermarkets and the related investments in 
logistics and distribution centres have lowered costs for supply within the region.  
The movement of processed food in the region has been driven in the last two decades by the 
rapid expansion of South African supermarket chains. The two main South African supermarket 
chains, Shoprite and Pick n Pay jointly have almost 400 stores in 16 African countries, majority of 
which are in southern African countries. In most countries, a handful of supermarket chains dominate 
the formal retail sector. These chains target, through different formats, high-end affluent consumers 
in urban areas as well as lower income consumers in peri-urban and rural areas.   
The processed and packaged food products sold in supermarket chains located outside of 
South Africa are largely imported from South Africa and deep-sea suppliers. For example, it is 
estimated that more than 80% of the products sold in supermarkets in Zambia are imported, mostly 
from South Africa (Ziba and Phiri, 2016). The region as a whole has a net trade deficit in food 
products, due in large part to the deficit of South Africa, meaning opportunities for suppliers in the 
southern African region to build scale, capabilities and competitiveness through supplying 
supermarkets in the region. There are also opportunities for South African suppliers to grow their 
exports into the region through the expanding network of supermarket chains.  Supermarkets 
therefore can be a strong catalyst to stimulate food processing and light manufacturing industries in 
southern Africa. The development of such industries is squarely in line with the Southern African 
Development Community’s ‘Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap, 2015–2063’ (das Nair and 
Chisoro, 2016). The relationships and balance of power between retailers and suppliers in the region 
is therefore important for agro-processing value chains. 
Second, there is potential for firms to build capabilities for global competitiveness through 
competing regionally (Fessehaie and Morris, 2013; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2015). Upgrading in 
regional value chains is likely to be easier than in global value chains as these chains are likely to be 
less tightly governed or controlled (Keane 2015). According to UNCTAD (2013:92): “Regional value 
chains present opportunities for improving productivity…both for domestic firms with export 
potential and those that produce goods predominantly demanded at the national and regional levels. 
For domestic firms…regional value chains give them the opportunity to upgrade and achieve 
international competitiveness, thereby making it easier to connect with GVCs.” (cited in Keane, 
2015). 
Third, given existing regional integration agreements and policies (in the case of southern 
Africa, the SADC free trade agreement, SACU etc.), there is greater scope for collaborative efforts, 
including by governments, in supporting upgrading and developing value chains. In this context, the 
political and economic realities and the respective country policies are important. 
Finally, a few large regional players in agro-processing value chains dominate not just South 
African, but also regional markets in terms of ownership, production and investment. In the case of 
key processed food products for instance, South African multinationals like RCL Foods Limited, 
Country Bird Holdings Limited and Astral Foods Limited are key players across the region in poultry; 
Illovo Sugar and Tongaat Hullet dominate the region in sugar and Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods 
lead in milling. These firms are also often vertically integrated. Understanding strategies, investment 
decisions and relationships in the value chain is important in evaluating relative bargaining power.   
At the retail end, it is the same handful of South African supermarket chains that collectively 
dominate the formal retail sector in many southern African countries. This allows upgrading 
912 
 
opportunities for suppliers as these supermarkets have a greater incentive to develop suppliers that 
can supply their stores throughout the region with products of the required quality, consistency and 
characteristics. But there are also clear concerns of abuse of buyer power that arise given the market 
power of large supermarket chains as this paper highlights. 
 
1.2.2. Competition policy and links to industrial and other policies 
 
Understanding strategies of the large lead firms that control regional food and agro-processing value 
chains is critical for formulating effective policy interventions. This requires mapping out the 
structure of each value chain beyond national borders where appropriate and evaluating the balance 
of power at each level. From a BRICS perspective, it is also useful to be able to compare the relative 
experiences of other BRICS countries to southern Africa’s in similar value chains.  
The overviews suggest that in agro-processing value chains the power often rests with firms 
that control key inputs (for instance, in poultry and sugar, but also in other sectors such as fertiliser); 
with firms that have economies of scale advantages (in animal feed and poultry, but also in sectors 
like dairy) and with firms that control important routes to market (the supermarket chains). This is 
not to suggest that there have been no competition concerns at other levels, for instance, at the 
processing level (e.g. in milling and baking, and in dairy). However even in these cases, the lead 
firms exert considerable control over the entire value chain including through substantial vertical 
integration.  
Competition policy is only one of the tools available to improve competitiveness and to 
promote growth in these value chains. While it can be effective in curbing anti-competitive conduct 
and maintaining competitive rivalry between existing players, it cannot actively introduce new 
players into a value chain. In South Africa, inclusive participation in the economy is a key objective 
of several economic policies, including competition policy. This is where well-designed industrial 
and agricultural policies can help, in conjunction with competition policy. But this requires 
coordination between government departments and players in the value chain, nationally and 
regionally, to ensure ‘optimal’ competition at each level.  Coordination is essential for investment in 
production capacity and development of capabilities and it includes supporting long-term 
competitiveness of the whole value chain. The coordination required extends to the governance of 
the value chain to ensure that large or lead firms do not continue to extract the maximum rent that 
they can, and that new entrants are allowed the opportunity to participate. Competition authorities 
and other relevant government departments in the southern African region can be part of supporting 
dynamic regional value chains, and improved global competitiveness of regional producers through, 
for example, coordinating on how competition concerns are collectively tackled in the region.  
In the supermarket sector for instance, intervention can take the form of more organized, 
sustainable and regionally focused efforts to increase the participation of suppliers. These 
interventions could aim to, in addition to reducing bargaining power imbalances, build capabilities 
of suppliers. Successfully developing supplier capabilities requires a much larger, long-term and 
commercially-oriented approach by supermarkets in partnership with governments. This can be done 
through the creation of supplier development programmes like the Massmart/Walmart programme 
(discussed in section 9). Voluntary or mandatory codes of conduct between suppliers and 
supermarkets can also be a useful way to control the exertion of buyer power, level the playing field 
and reduce information asymmetries between suppliers and supermarkets.  Such codes of conduct 
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can be encouraged by national governments, and harmonised across the region given that it is largely 
the same retailers that operate in the different countries in the region. There are initiatives underway 
currently to develop such a code of conduct (discussed in Section 9 and 10). 
 
1.3.Brief background on the history and evolution of food sectors in South Africa 
 
1.3.1. History of protection in the food sector 
 
The history of the development of the food sector in South Africa is important to understand some of 
the outcomes we see today. 
The former Union of South Africa established a comprehensive support system for white 
farmers through the Land and Agricultural Bank, and the passing of the Co-operative Societies Acts 
of 1922 and 1939. The support measures included the provision of agricultural finance, inputs, 
extended land tenure, and marketing services (Vink and Kirsten, 2000). 
The Marketing Act of 1937 (consolidated in 1968) became the cornerstone of agricultural 
policy governing the marketing of the majority of agricultural production in South Africa. The main 
provisions of the Act included those giving powers to the Control Boards for the following functions: 
the imposition of levies; the authority to buy a product at determined prices or on such basis the 
Minister may approve (‘surplus removal’); sales through a marketing board (‘single channel 
marketing schemes’); and, fixing prices and margins (Kassier, 1992: 7-8). State intervention into the 
agricultural sector continued in much the same fashion over the next few decades, characterized by 
single marketing channels and tightened controls over prices and the movement of produce, as well 
increased subsidies to white farmers (Kirsten and van Zyl, 1996). 
With regard to the main grain crops, the Maize and Wheat Boards were the intermediaries between 
the farm gate and the processing levels. The industry operated through a single marketing channel, 
with producer cooperatives providing for input procurement and marketing of produce. Over time 
cooperative activities extended to other production functions (such as financing and processing), 
importantly becoming a powerful collective bargaining tool for famers (Tregurtha et al., 2010). A 
key activity of the cooperatives included the operation and ownership of grain silos, constructed with 
massive state support extending to infrastructure, capacity payments, handling, debt relief and tax 
concessions (Amin and Bernstein, 1995; LAPC, 1994). These effectively became regional 
monopolies as they were appointed as agents by the respective boards (Vink, 2012). The cooperatives 
and the control boards were also exempted from competition law (Kassier, 1992). 
The deregulation by the new Marketing Act of 1996 abolished the control boards and fully 
liberalized all markets except for sugar (Vink and Van Rooyen, 2009; Sandrey and Vink, 2007). The 
process included the establishment of the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC), and 
followed trade liberalisation. The aim was to promote improved marketing of agricultural products 
and market access to all market participants (Vink and Kirsten, 2002).  
Liberalisation generally meant decreased support. There have been the expected changes in 
land use, with a declining area planted with maize, and changes in the composition of output 
(Tregurtha et al., 2010). Poultry production and horticulture, which had not been supported, have 
both performed relatively well (Sandrey and Vink, 2007), although still with ongoing imports as we 
note in the case of poultry in Section 6.  
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However, several competition concerns that have arisen since liberalisation stem from 
conduct that has continued post liberalisation as illustrated by the maize and wheat cartel discussed 
in Section 8. 
The main historic changes in the food sector over time is depicted in the Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 5: Key historic changes in the food sector in South Africa 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration 
 
1.3.2. Recent developments in the food sector in South Africa 
 
While the history is important in understanding some of the outcomes, more recent developments in 
the food sector also have implications on ownership, market power, control and incentives to 
compete. This sub-section provides a very brief overview of recent developments in food value chains 
in South Africa. 
 
Increasing financialisation and growth of agri-investment companies 
 
Along with rising corporatisation, which has resulted in powerful corporate players shaping the 
availability, affordability and acceptability of foods (Greenberg, 2017), there has been increasing 
financialisation of the food sector. The rise of controlling institutional shareholders has given 
significant power to financial actors in agri-food markets, of which principal institutional investors 
include insurance companies and pension funds (Clapp, 2012). Large food corporations, such as Tiger 
Brands, Pioneer Foods and Shoprite have institutions such as the Public Investment Corporation 
(PIC)3242 (the largest investment fund in South Africa) as their controlling shareholder giving the PIC 
effective control over investment decisions (Greenberg, 2017). Similarly, as noted in Section 5.5, the 
                                                          
3242 The PIC has a key mandate to manage the pension funds of government employees. 
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Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) recently acquired a key player in the fertiliser 
industry. 
Agri-investment companies in South Africa have also been on the rise. JSE-listed investment 
company, Remgro, for example, holds shares in the agro-food system3243 with major interests in RCL 
Foods and Unilever, as well as in several other strategic economic sectors. This potentially weakens 
the influence of other actors over agro-food system outcomes and gives such conglomerates an 
opportunity to maintain or establish positions of power (Clapp, 2012).  
Such agri-investment companies are typically large conglomerates with controlling and passive 
shareholdings in numerous sectors. This increasing web of cross-ownership can have an impact on 
incentives to effectively compete (for cross ownerships in seeds, for instance, see Section 4.4). 
 
Rising internationalisation 
 
There has also been increasing global ownership of previously local companies in the South African 
food sector. In the sugar industry, for instance, Illovo is now a subsidiary of Associated British Foods, 
while the largest agri-services and grain storage company in South Africa, Afgri, is now owned by 
Canadian investment group, AgriGroupe. US giant Walmart took over Massmart in the retail sector. 
This has implications on the strategies of the firms (such as procurement strategies and business 
models adopted from home countries) and their conduct. 
 
Technology revolution 
 
Advances in technology have eroded the sectoral boundaries that previously existed between 
manufacturing and agriculture (Page, 2014). The confines between agriculture and industry, and 
essentially processed and unprocessed agricultural products, are becoming less distinct - partly a 
result of the global agricultural sector employing more capital and sophisticated technology, giving 
scope to rising productivity, transforming global competition and the structure of production. The 
global agricultural value chain for horticultural crops provides a useful example of agro-industry 
activities that require technologies and complex industrial processes (keeping products fresh, 
packaging and innovation are all value adding activities).  This means that industrial policies and 
agricultural policies of a country need to closely speak to each other.  
 
1.4.Assessment of the Selected Value Chains 
 
A recent study by the Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP) in South Africa highlights the 
high input costs faced by maize farmers in South Africa relative to other maize producing countries, 
including Brazil.  Figure 4 below shows the ‘establishment costs’ in South Africa to produce a tonne 
of maize compared to costs incurred by farmers in the US, Argentina, Brazil and Ukraine. As evident, 
South African farmers face higher input costs and a key contributor is fertiliser costs. This adds to 
food inflation given that maize meal is a staple food in South Africa and raises serious concerns about 
the affordability of basic foods for poor consumers. Sections 4 and 5 below evaluate two of these 
inputs in more detail - seeds and fertilisers. 
                                                          
3243 See Mondliwa, Nhundu, Paelo, Thosago, & Vilakazi (2017) for a detailed assement of Remgro’s investment strategies  
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Figure 6: BFAP estimation of maize establishment cost (US$ per ton maize produced) 
 
Source: Reproduced from BFAP (2016) - Policy Brief on the 2015/2016 drought 
 
1.4.1. Seeds Value Chain 
1.4.1.1.A mapping of the key players and ownership structures 
 
The seed market in South Africa is made up of three main categories of agricultural seeds: 
agronomical seeds, horticultural seeds and forage seeds (Table 1). As of 2014/2015, agronomical 
seeds made up about 74.5% of the total market retail value of the whole seed industry with 
horticultural crops accounting for 16% while forage and pasture seeds accounted for 9% (SANSOR, 
2015).3244  
 
Table 1: Composition of seed markets in South Africa, 2014/15 
Seed type Total Market value 
based on Retail 
Selling Price (R 
Millions) 
% Share of seed 
market (2014/15) 
% Share of seed 
market (2010) 
Agronomical seeds 4 121.69 74.5% 73% 
Horticultural seeds 887.64  16.1% 18.5% 
Forage and pasture seeds 521.20 9.4% 7.5% 
Total 5530.53 100% 100% 
Source: SANSOR ( 2015) and DAFF (2015) 
 
                                                          
3244 Agronomical seeds include maize, soya bean, wheat, sunflower, barley, sorghum etc.; Horticultural crops largely 
consist of vegetables and fruit e.g. spinach, squash, sweet corn, tomato etc. 
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The seed value chain consists of three main levels: 1) Research and Development; 2) 
Production/multiplication of seeds; 3) Processing/ packaging and distribution (Figure 5). Research 
and development involves the innovation required to develop seeds with high yield rates and with 
resistance to disease, drought and other environmental stresses. Under research and development, 
there are three main components necessary: a diverse germplasm pool, advanced breeding 
technologies and trait selection or development. Germplasm contains the genetic material from which 
seed characteristics such as the amount of crop yield and reaction to the environment are determined 
(Competition Tribunal, 2010). The breeding technologies are the processes and technology used to 
improve the qualities of the seed.  The biotech traits are specific genes taken from other organisms 
used to create additional improved qualities to the seed such as pesticide resistance.  
Seed companies can be involved in at least one of these stages of the research, development 
and breeding of seeds. Once this process is complete and a viable seed has been created, the seeds 
then go into the production and multiplication stage of the value chain. The end products are then 
processed, packed, stored and distributed to consumers. Depending on the type of seeds developed, 
the seeds then go to the milling, fertiliser or animal feed sectors. 
 
Figure 7: Value chain of the commercial seed market 
 
Source: (DAFF, 2015) 
 
The seed market globally and nationally is highly concentrated and has continued to consolidate over 
the last five years. Globally, only seven firms control about 71% of the global seed market (ETC 
Group, 2015). In South Africa, the seed market is even more concentrated with only two main players 
in the market: Monsanto and Pioneer Hi-Bred International. 
Monsanto is the largest seed firm in South Africa. It has the highest amount of sales for maize 
seed and supplies 90% of commercially planted soybean in South Africa (African Centre for 
Biodiversity, 2017a). It began operations in South Africa in 1968 and is part of a global group 
involved in the research, manufacture, production and distribution of seeds, herbicides and vegetables 
(Who Owns Whom, 2017a). In the 1990s, it acquired Sensako and Carnia, two local seed companies, 
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providing it with a major stake in the South African market. Sensako’s acquisition alone gave 
Monsanto 45% of the agrochemical market for field crops. In 2005, Monsanto acquired Seminis, the 
world’s largest fruit and vegetable seed company which gave it ownership of plant breeders’ rights 
to a range of South African seed varieties (Pollack, 2005; African Centre for Biodiversity, 2017a). In 
May 2017, the Competition Commission conditionally approved a merger in which Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft (Bayer) acquired Monsanto Corporation (Monsanto) (Competition Commission 
South Africa, 2017a) (see section 4.4) on discussion of mergers concerning Monsanto).  
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc (Pioneer) is a subsidiary of E.I. DuPont De Nemours & 
Co (DuPont), a diversified bio-chemical company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Its main 
activities include research, product development of commercial seeds as well as the production and 
distribution of seed varieties such as alfalfa, canola, corn, inoculants, mustard, pearl millet, rice, 
sorghum, soya beans, sunflower and wheat. In 2012, Pioneer acquired Pannar Seed, a South African 
company involved in research and development of seeds in South Africa. Pannar had been in 
operation since 1958. The acquisition gave the firm, a post-merger market share of 48% of the hybrid 
maize seed market. 
In July 2017, the Competition Commission also conditionally approved DowDuPont Inc. 
(DowDuPont) acquisition of Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company (DuPont) (Competition Commission South Africa, 2017b). Dow is a global diversified 
chemicals company involved in the research, development, production and distribution of plastics 
and chemicals, agricultural sciences including seeds, hydrocarbon and energy products and services. 
Bayer’s merger with Monsanto would raise their combined market share to 29% while Dow’s 
merger with DuPont (Pioneer) would give it a 25% market share (ETC Group, 2015). Together these 
companies would hold a 54% market share of the global seed market. 
 
1.4.1.2. Regulation and barriers to entry 
 
Several acts and regulation govern the seed industry. Some of the main regulations include: 3245 
• The Plant Improvement Act, 1976 (Act No. 53 of 1976); 
• The Plant Breeders’ Rights Act, 1976 (Act No. 15 of 1976); 
• The Agricultural Pests Act, 1983 (Act No. 36 of 1983); 
• The Genetically Modified Organisms Act, 1997 (Act No. 15 of 1997); 
• Various secondary acts such as the Fertilisers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies, and Stock 
Remedies no. 36 of 1947 (as amended).  
Due to the high level of research and innovation involved in the seed industry, seed companies are 
given plant breeders rights or patents to enable them to gain returns from their investments. These 
Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) and patents, may however, have the additional impact of raising 
barriers to entry. PBRs are often offered with regards to hybrid varieties and give the breeder a 20 
year exclusive commercial production of the protected hybrid variety (Competition Tribunal, 2010). 
The rights protect the variety and not the method in which the seed is obtained which means that a 
farmer can save and reuse the seeds. There are certain requirements that need to be fulfilled in order 
for the breeder to gain a PBR over a seed variety which include distinctness, uniformity, stability and 
novelty (Competition Tribunal, 2010). Patents are offered with respect to GMs as genetic 
                                                          
3245 SANSOR website.  
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modifications is essentially the creation of a wholly new crop (Competition Tribunal, 2010).  Patent 
protection can extend beyond the seed product to include the process as well. Under the patent, 
farmers are only permitted to use the seed to plant one crop and not reused. Companies often use 
contracts to enforce these conditions and have been known to make unannounced inspections of crop 
fields. PBRs and patents serve to bolster the market power held by the seed companies.  
The extended periods required to develop the seed and to gain regulatory approval for seed 
development also acts as a significant barrier to entry (African Centre for Biodiversity, 2017a), As 
discussed above, there are three components of the breeding level of the value chain, a germplasm 
pool, advanced breeding technologies and biotech traits. With regards to the pool of germplasm, a 
number of years are required to develop competitive amounts of germplasm to enable breeding of 
seeds. Pannar took about 52 years to develop its pool of germplasm specifically suited for the South 
African region (Competition Tribunal, 2010). Prior to the merger between Pioneer and Pannar, 
Pioneer had been present in South Africa for 18 years but was yet to develop germplasm suited to the 
regions of South Africa or Africa (Competition Tribunal, 2010). Further, a Greenfields entrant would 
require at least eight years gain regulatory approval for trait development and then a further three to 
five years to get approval for the use of the traits within South Africa (Competition Tribunal, 2010). 
Given the time required for an entrant to develop and market a commercially viable seed, an entrant 
would struggle to compete effectively with the incumbents in the market. The costs of research can 
be prohibitive. The second component of advanced breeding technologies as well as the development 
of biotech traits requires substantial capital investment. While, both of these components can be 
accessed through contracts and licensing with large companies such as Monsanto, it also means that 
companies are forced to source essential inputs from their rivals which has its own competition 
concerns.  
A combination of these barriers to entry means that there is unlikely to be a Greenfields entrant 
into the seed development market. The present structure of two seed companies with substantial 
market power raises a number of competitive concerns especially since seeds remain a key input in 
the food value chain. 
 
1.4.1.3.Performance of the seed industry in South Africa 
1.4.1.3.1. Production 
 
An analysis of agronomic seed groups, which accounts for over 70% of the seed market, shows that 
maize makes the greatest share of the retail price value in the market with 88.63% (Table 2). This 
includes both white maize (generally used for human consumption) and yellow maize (generally used 
for animal consumption). Soya bean and wheat have next highest market value although together 
their share is less than 10%. 
 
Table 2: Top 10 South African commercial agronomic seed crops by value, 2014/15 
 
Crop Value (R’000) % of total market value 
Total maize 56 655 954  88.63% 
Soya bean 3 941 814  6.17% 
Wheat 1 705 729 2.67% 
Dry bean 761 219 1.19% 
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Sunflower 351 412 0.55% 
Barley 310 194 0.49% 
Grain sorghum 111 635 0.17% 
Other 43 165 0.07% 
Groundnut 39 456 0.06% 
Total market 63 920 578 100% 
Source: DAFF (2015) 
 
In terms of production, growth has been inconsistent with an increase in the 2011/12 season before 
production dropped again ( 
Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Total agronomic seed production (tons), 2010/11 - 2014/2015 
 
Source: DAFF (2015) 
 
Although production has dropped over the last five years, yield rates particularly for maize, wheat 
and grain sorghum have been rising over the last twenty years. By contrast, yield rates for groundnuts, 
soya bean and sunflower have remained largely constant over the same period of time (Figure 9). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the main seeds in which the large seed firms mentioned above are invested 
in are for maize, wheat and grain sorghum. Substantial investment has likely been made into the 
development of new varieties of these seeds resulting in higher yield rates. 
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Figure 9: Yield rates for main agronomical seeds (1990/91 -2016/17) 
 
Source: DAFF (2017) 
 
1.4.1.3.2. Exports and Imports 
 
Exports of agronomic seeds have declined steadily between 2010/11 and 2014/15 largely due to the 
decline in maize seed which accounts for the bulk of agronomic seeds. (Figure 10).  The decline was 
particularly sharp between 2011/12 and 2012/2013, likely due to drought conditions that persisted 
into the 2014/15 season. 
 
Figure 10: South Africa's agronomic seeds exports, 2010/11-2014/15 
 
 
Source: DAFF (2015) 
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Maize seed exports dropped significantly from the 2011/2012 financial year coinciding with high 
increase in prices (Table 3). The high prices however may have been reflective of low supply of 
maize.  
Imports of agronomic seeds into South Africa have also been inconsistent. There were 
significant imports in 2012 contributed largely by imports of maize seed and grain sorghum. This 
dropped the following year (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 11: Imports volume of agronomic crops seeds, 2011-2015 
 
Source: DAFF (2015) 
 
1.4.1.3.3. Prices 
 
Prices have generally been on the rise for the period 2013 – 2015. Except for the 60,000-kernel bag 
of yellow maize seeds, different varieties of agronomical seeds both GM and non-GM have 
experienced an increase in prices (Table 3). It is not yet clear why prices of the 80,000-kernel bag of 
yellow maize seeds have increased while that of the 60,000-kernel bag of yellow maize seeds have 
deceased. This will be investigated further. 
There have been increases in prices for grain sorghum seed as well as the GM white maize 
seeds variety. These are the two product markets in which both Pioneer and Pannar were operating 
in and which were considered for purposes of the Pioneer/Pannar merger (Competition Tribunal, 
2010). The conditions imposed on the merging parties upon approval of the merger included 
undertakings that prices for all Pannar maize hybrids and for Open-Pollinated Varieties (OPVs) were 
not to exceed inflation for a period of three sales season (see section 4.4.1). While the price increases 
for GM white maize seeds have not been substantially greater than inflation, the increase for grain 
sorghum seeds have been.  
It is important to note however that average prices alone may provide an inaccurate picture of 
the trends in the market. In the hybrid maize market, in particular, due to high levels of innovation, 
there are new varieties of seed released regularly.3246 These seeds may have better characteristics 
including higher yield rates and faster rates of maturity. This in turn attracts greater demand and 
                                                          
3246 Telephonic Interview with the Agricultural Research Council, conducted on 21 September 2017. 
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higher prices even as the prices of older varieties drop. In a market as concentrated as this, concerns 
arise as to whether the pricing of new varieties is competitive or set to extract maximum rents. The 
same competition concerns arise as to the levels of innovation and new products released into the 
market. 
 
Table 3: Average Rand price of agronomical seeds (2013-2015) 
 Cultivars/weight 2013 2014 2015 % change 
(2013 – 15) 
White maize seeds (60 
000 kernels/bag) 
Non-GM 1 233 1 310 1 350 9.5% 
GM 1 900 2 167 2 353 23.8% 
Yellow maize seeds (60 
000 kernels/bag) 
Non-GM 1 488 1 653 1 755 17.9% 
GM 2 298 2 638 1 765 -23.1% 
White maize seeds (80 
000 kernels/bag) 
Non-GM 2 042 2 151 2 266 10.9% 
GM 2 821 2 970 3 129 10.9% 
Yellow maize seeds (80 
000 kernels/bag) 
Non-GM 2 014 2 156 2 364 17.3% 
GM 2 699 2 852 3 030 12.2% 
Grain sorghum seeds 20Kg 1 150 1 336 1 476 28.3% 
25Kg 1 287 1 568 1 750 35.9% 
Soya bean seeds 25Kg  594 659 690 16.1% 
Sunflower seeds 150DP/bag  1 476 1 501 1 566 6.0% 
180DP/bag 1 499 1 681 1785 19.0% 
Source: (DAFF, 2015) 
1.4.1.4.Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases 
 
As mentioned above, the global seed industry is highly concentrated and continues to consolidate. 
The highly concentrated nature of the global market is replicated in the South African market. There 
are two main companies that own significant portions of the registered varieties. In the maize market, 
for both yellow and white GM maize seeds, Du Pont Pioneer and Monsanto own 80% of the seed 
varieties in the market (Table 4).  
 
Table 4: Number of maize registered varieties owned by major seed companies in South Africa, 
November 2016 
Maize variety Du Pont Pioneer/Pannar % Monsanto % Total % 
Yellow 
maize 
GM  71.6 12.7 84.8 
Hybrid  56.4 5.8 63.4 
OPV  14.3 0 14.3 
White 
maize 
GM  80.3 8.6 88.9 
Hybrid  41.8 6.2 48 
OPV  6.9 3.4 10.3 
Source: African Centre for Biodiversity (2017) 
Three main types of seed systems exist in South Africa: Open-Pollinated Varieties (OPVs), hybrids 
and Genetically Modified (GM) seeds. OPVs refer to seeds that are a result of random cross-
pollination (Grain SA, 2011). While the yield potential is less than other varieties, the costs are low 
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and the seed can be recycled. They also have a broader genetic base and are resistant to environmental 
stresses. They are also not subject of Plant Breeders’ Rights IPBRs) or other Intellectual Property 
(Competition Tribunal, 2010). Hybrid seeds are the result of cross-pollination and breeding between 
the first generation progeny of two unrelated plants of related species (Grain SA, 2011). These seeds 
usually have higher yields but are often more expensive and cannot be recycled (Competition 
Tribunal, 2010). GMs are completely new strands of crops created by breeding a particular gene 
sequence taken from an unrelated species and combining it with the genes of the seed to be modified 
(Competition Tribunal, 2010).  
Overall, OPVs account for the majority of the seed systems making up about 56% of the total 
seed market. However, in the maize seed market (which makes up at least 70% of total seed industry 
turnover), hybrid maize makes up 80% of the total maize seed sold and 56% of the value of the total 
seed market (Competition Tribunal, 2010; DAFF, 2015). This is important because it means that the 
firms involved in the production of maize seed and hybrid maize seed, in particular, are in the more 
profitable portion of the value chain. Commercial breeders often have little incentive to develop 
OPVs over hybrids because they are less profitable (Competition Tribunal, 2010). The average bag 
of hybrid seeds can be as much as five times more expensive than OPVs (Competition Tribunal, 
2010). 
For the hybrid varieties, the Du Pont Pioneer and Monsanto own 63.4% of the varieties of 
yellow maize and 48% of the varieties of white maize. Du Pont Pioneer and Monsanto, by contrast, 
own less than 15% of the OPV seeds of both yellow and white maize, giving credence to the fact that 
there may be less incentive to develop these seeds as they are less profitable. 
Monsanto and Du Pont Pioneer also have ownership of a substantial portion of the other 
registered agronomic seed varieties. Their ownership stands out in particular for wheat as well as for 
GM and non-GM cotton seed varieties (Table 5). The three major players – Monsanto, Du Pont 
Pioneer Pannar, and Karoo Seed own nearly 70% of the top eight crop varieties (African Centre for 
Biodiversity, 2017a). 
 
Table 5: Percentage of registered seed varieties owned by merging parties in South Africa, 
November 2016 
Seed variety Du Pont Pioneer % Monsanto % Total % 
Soya GM 34.9 4.6 39.5 
Soya non-GM 11.4 2.9 14.3 
Wheat 19.0 54.3 73.3 
Cotton GM  84.6 84.6 
Cotton non-GM - 66.7 66.7 
Other agronomic 37.4 0.5 37.9 
Source: (African Centre for Biodiversity, 2017b) 
 
In terms of market shares calculated for antitrust purposes in 2010, the Competition Commission 
prior to the Pioneer/Pannar merger found that Monsanto, Pannar and Pioneer had 90% of maize, 
wheat and sorghum seed markets (Competition Tribunal, 2010). The firms’ ownership of patents 
served to bolster their market shares in these markets. Prior to the merger, the market shares in the 
hybrid maize market which made the largest percentage of the seed market were 50% to Monsanto, 
30% to Pioneer and 18% to Pannar (Competition Tribunal, 2010). Pannar’s market share in the hybrid 
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maize market had been declining steadily from about 60% in the 1990s to 51% in the 2000s to 18% 
in 2010. Smaller companies including Linkseed, K2 Agri and Agricol had a combined market share 
of less than 5% in 2010 (Competition Tribunal, 2010).  
The concentration in the sector is underlined by the number of active breeders in South Africa. 
The maize market is dominated by the private sector with 26 active breeders out of 27 being private 
entities (African Centre for Biodiversity, 2017a). The soya bean market has only seven active 
breeders, sunflower has ten and wheat, nine. Even in these markets, the private sector dominates with 
only two public sector breeders, sunflower and wheat markets combined had only 26 active breeders. 
Monsanto, Pannar and Dupont-Pioneer together employ 80% of private sector maize breeders, 100% 
of soybean and 100% of sunflower breeders in the country (African Centre for Biodiversity, 2017a).  
A major concern with the continued consolidation of the sector is that Monsanto, DuPont 
Pioneer and Dow Chemicals, which recently merged with Du Pont Pioneer, share the same 
institutional investors (Lianos and Katalevsky, 2017). For instance: 
• BlackRock Inc. controls 5.97% of Monsanto, 6.31% of Dupont and 6.58% of Dow Chemical; 
• The Vanguard Group controls 6.82% of Monsanto, 6.99% of Dupont and 6.65% of Dow 
Chemicals; 
• The State Street Corp. controls 4.59% of Monsanto, 4.91% of Dupont and 3.97% of Dow 
Chemicals. 
The challenge with having the same investors in competing firms is the potential for collusion. The 
investors have access to information on all three companies that would not have been otherwise 
accessible that would enable them to take part in parallel exclusion or cumulative foreclose (Lianos 
and Katalevsky, 2017). Parallel exclusion refers to conduct by several firm that block entry by new 
participants in the sector while cumulative foreclosure effect arises as a result of a network of 
agreements, exclusive obligations and non-compete clauses. In a sector where firms depended on 
contracts to access GM seeds or biotech traits in research and development, foreclosure is possible 
and even facilitated by shared ownership of institutional investors (see also Seldeslachts et al., 2017). 
 
1.4.1.4.1. Competition cases and historical interventions 
 
In 2010, a merger between Pioneer Hi-Bred International (Pioneer), a US-based, vertically-integrated 
commercial seed company and Pannar Seed Limited (Pannar), a South African seed company was 
prohibited by the Competition Commission of South Africa. The merger would increase Pioneer’s 
stake in Pannar from 20% to 80%. An appeal made by the parties at the Competition Tribunal was 
subsequently dismissed when the Tribunal upheld the Commission’s decision to prohibit the merger. 
A further appeal to the Competition Appeal Court (CAC) resulted in an approval of the merger with 
conditions. An attempt by the Competition Commission to appeal the decision at the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (SCA) was dismissed in June 2012. 
The Commission’s case largely centred on the breeding and commercialisation of hybrid 
maize seed, a highly concentrated market in South Africa which made up a significant portion of the 
annual turnover of the South African seed industry. The market was made up of three main players: 
Monsanto with a 50% market share, Pioneer with around 30% and Pannar third with around 15%. 
Pannar’s market share in the hybrid maize market had been declining steadily from about 60% in the 
1990s to 51% in the 2000s to 18% in 2010.  
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Both Pioneer and Pannar are involved in the breeding and selling of hybrid maize seed. Three 
components are required for the breeding of hybrid seed varieties namely a diverse pool of local seed 
germplasm; advanced breeding technologies and biotech traits. The main reason stated for Pannar’s 
steady decline was the lack and inability to grow their advanced breeding technologies making them 
less able to compete with companies such as Monsanto. A merger with Pioneer would enable Pannar 
to access these advanced breeding technologies necessary to compete in the market. In turn, Pioneer 
could benefit from Pannar’s deep and    gains arguments. 
The Competition Commission prohibited the merger on the basis that it would result in a 
duopoly and may result in price increases, incentivise collusive behaviour and raise barriers to entry. 
There were also public interest concerns in South Africa losing its sovereignty in the seed industry to 
foreign companies. GMOs were also likely to proliferate the market at the expense of non-GMOs that 
were cheaper, recyclable and preferred by smaller farmers. The Commission determined that the 
efficiency gains were insufficient to counteract the competitive concerns raised by the merger.  
The Tribunal agreed with the approach by the Competition Commission. The Competition 
Appeal Court, however, took a different approach, accepting the parties’ argument that the 
Competition Commission did not fully consider the counterfactual of what would happen should the 
merger not go ahead. The parties suggested that should the merger not take place, Pannar would 
eventually leave the market making obsolete the wide pool of germplasm Pannar holds. The 
Competition Commission’s suggestion that Pannar merges with another international company other 
than Pioneer was found to be unfeasible as the international companies had to have capabilities in 
developing seed for a particular region. Other companies such as Syngenta and Dow were found to 
be incompatible in this regard.  
The Appeal Court also criticised the approach that the Commission and Tribunal used in 
analysing the efficiencies argument presented by the merging parties. The Commission had focussed 
on quantification of the efficiencies but the Appeal Court argued that verification rather than the 
precise quantification of efficiencies should have been used, arguing that the Tribunal should have 
looked at long term efficiency gains rather than short term static gains.  The merger was approved 
with a number of conditions:  
• Prices for all Pannar maize hybrids and for OPVs were not to exceed inflation for a period of 
three sales seasons. 
• For a period of three sales seasons, there would be no increase in prices of the Developing 
Farmer Products and thereafter, actual selling prices of the products would not increase 
beyond CPI on an annual basis for a further five sales seasons. 
• Pannar customers will continue to receive discounts from the date of closing. 
• Concerning employment, there would be no job losses or retrenchments for a period of two 
years. 
• The parties committed to establishing an International Research and Technology Hub in South 
Africa by 2016. 
• Establish and participate in community programs and partnerships in the interest of farmers. 
• Maintain the same maize hybrids currently marketed and sold. 
• Main developing farmer products in sufficient commercial quantities for developing farmer 
and to maintain breeding programs related to sunflower, grain sorghum, forage sorghum, 
wheat, dry beans and soybeans for five years. 
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• To licence the plant materials in the genetic material list to public institutions on a non-
exclusive and perpetual basis. 
The Competition Commission of South Africa is currently carrying out an ex-post assessment of the 
merger to determine its impact on markets. This will include an assessment of maize prices as well 
as levels of innovation. The assessment is important for understanding the impact of the continuing 
trends of concentration in the food value chain on food prices and accessibility. 
1.4.1.4.2. Recent mergers and acquisitions 
 
Four main mergers have taken place in the industry for the period under review (last 5 years). (Table 
6). All four involved large companies with significant global market share signalling substantial 
consolidation of the sector. The mergers were all approved with conditions although the first merger, 
Pioneer/Pannar was prohibited twice as discussed above before it was approved following an appeal 
by the parties at the Competition Court of Appeal. 
 
Table 6: Main mergers and acquisitions in the seed industry 
Year Primary 
Acquiring Firm 
Primary 
Target Firm 
Size Status Conditions 
2012 Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International Inc. 
Pannar Seed 
(Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
with 
conditions 
Discussed in section 4.4.1 
above. 
2016 China National 
Agrochemical 
Corporation 
Syngenta AG I Approved 
with 
conditions 
Merging parties are not to 
relocate their manufacturing 
plant from North West 
Province in South Africa for a 
certain period of time. 
2017 DowDuPont Inc.  Dow Chemical 
Company and 
E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours and 
Company 
(DuPont)  
L Approved 
with 
conditions 
Dow will make available 81 
maize hybrids and 7 maize 
inbred lines to other third 
parties for licensing in South 
Africa.  
 
Dow is to register its 
PowerCore and Enlist 
biotechnology traits in 
South Africa within 2 years of 
approval of the merger. 
2017 Bayer 
Aktiengesellschaft  
 
Monsanto 
Corporation 
I Approved 
with 
conditions 
The merged entity to divest 
and sell the entire global 
Liberty Link trait technology 
and the associated Liberty 
branded agro-chemicals 
business of Bayer. 
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The potential buyer of the 
divested businesses has to 
commercialize the divested 
products in South Africa, or 
alternatively, license the 
divested business to a South 
African third party to 
commercialize anywhere in 
the world should the 
purchaser be unable to do so.  
 
Limit retrenchment and 
support emerging farmers. 
Source: Competition Commission website.  
 
China National Agrochemical Corporation and Syngenta AG 
 
In June 2016, China National Agrochemical Corporation (CNAC), an international company based 
in China and involved in the development, manufacture and sale of agrochemicals notified the 
Competition Commission of its intention to merge with Syngenta, another international company 
with its headquarters in Switzerland. Syngenta is involved in seeds and crop products in over 90 
countries. The companies’ activities overlap in the market for the manufacture and supply of 
agrochemicals or crop protection products, namely fungicides, insecticides, herbicides (selective and 
nonselective) and seed treatment products (Competition Commission, 2017). 
Although both companies are involved in seed production, they do not operate in the seed 
market in South Africa. The Competition Commission therefore assessed the effects in the following 
markets: insecticides, non-selective herbicides, selective herbicides, fungicides and seed treatment, 
finding that the merger was unlikely to substantially prevent or lessen competition in the mentioned 
markets as there were a number of other suppliers of the same products. The Commission did find 
that there were some public interest concerns with regards to employment, particularly if the parties 
were to import all its product rather than use the manufacturing plant in the North-West Province. 
The Commission therefore approved the merger on condition that the manufacturing plant in the 
North West not be moved for a certain period of years.  
 
DowDuPont Inc. and Dow Chemical Company and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company 
(DuPont)  
DowDuPont Inc. (DowDuPont) is an international company with its headquarters in the USA and 
involved in the research, development, production and distribution of plastics and chemicals, 
agricultural sciences including seeds, hydrocarbon and energy products and services received 
approval from the Competition Commission to merge with the DuPont Group. The group is involved 
in the research development, production distribution and sale of chemical products, polymers, 
agrochemicals, seeds, food ingredients amongst other products (Competition Commission South 
Africa, 2017b). The Commission found that there was no overlap in the commercialisation of hybrid 
and GM hybrid maize in South Africa but that the merger would likely result in the removal of 
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potential competitor as Dow had had prior intentions to enter the South African commercial maize 
see market. To address this concern, the conditions placed by the commission involved Dow making 
available 81 maize hybrids and seven maize inbred lines to other third parties as well as registering 
its PowerCore and Enlist biotechnology traits in South Africa within two years of approval of the 
merger. 
The Commission had also found that the merger was likely to lead to the substantial reduction 
of competition in the market and development of insecticides for certain fruits and vegetables.  To 
remedy this, the Commission required DuPont to divest its global insecticide business Liberty Link 
technology and the associated Liberty branded agro-chemicals business to a third party.  
 
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and Monsanto Corporation 
In May 2017, the Commission conditionally approved the merger between Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 
(Bayer) and Monsanto Corporation (Monsanto) (Competition Commission South Africa, 2017a). The 
Commission found that there were competition concerns in the market for the supply of GM cottons 
seeds as Monsanto is already a monopoly in South Africa with regards to this market. It would also 
result in the removal of a potential competitor, not only in the development and production of seed 
traits but also in the development of herbicides. The cross-licensing agreements that characterised the 
market also made it conducive for coordinated conduct. The Commission therefore required the 
companies post-merger to divest of global Liberty Link trait technology and the associated Liberty 
branded agro-chemicals business of Bayer. The new buyer would be required to commercialise the 
divested products within South Africa or to license the business to a South African third party. 
Additional conditions related to maintain employment and providing support to emerging farmers. 
While not all the mergers discussed above were in the same market they occurred in parallel or 
complementary product markets in the agricultural sector which raises concerns around a few firms 
dominating key segments of agricultural value chains. Such large-scale mergers are approved in 
South due to the limited competitive effects on a national level. However, there are long term anti-
competitive effects of the increased concentration and consolidation of the sector on a global level 
including impacts on Research and Development (R & D), prices and innovation. There is a need, 
therefore, for such large-scale mergers in already concentrated sectors to be assessed more broadly. 
In this respect, there is a role for closer collaboration between the different BRICS authorities to 
ensure that approvals of mergers in certain jurisdictions do not have inadvertent long-term impacts 
on others and that conditions imposed are consistent across jurisdictions with regards to certain 
aspects, for instance, innovation and R & D. 
 
1.4.2. Fertiliser Value Chain 
1.4.2.1.A mapping of the value chain and key players3247 
 
Fertiliser is a key input into agricultural value chains. The estimated value of the overall fertiliser 
industry in South Africa was around R10bn in 2016.3248 The industry supplies around 2 million tons 
of fertiliser products to the local market, with the maize industry consuming between 40% and 50% 
of this. A major challenge for the industry is the changing weather patterns due to climate change. 
                                                          
3247 This section draws mostly from Grimbeek et al (2017) and the recent report by Who Owns Whom (2017), as well as 
Ncube et al (2017) and Vilakazi (2017). 
3248 Who Owns Whom report (2017).   
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This is evident from the decrease in fertiliser usage due to the drought experienced in 2015 and 2016 
in South Africa. 
The fertiliser industry consists of three main segments: nitrogen (N); phosphate (P); and 
potash (K). In South Africa, manufacturing of inputs into fertilisers is dominated by Sasol, Foskor 
and Omnia. Sasol remains the largest producer of chemical inputs into fertiliser, and Foskor focuses 
on the mining of phosphate rock and the production of phosphoric acid and phosphate-based 
fertilisers. Another source of inputs is ArcelorMittal as several by-products (i.e. blast furnace slag 
and steelmaking slag) from the production of steel are sold into the fertiliser value chain. Thus, the 
individual markets for N, P and K are highly concentrated. 
The location of input materials largely influences the manufacture of fertilisers. An important 
node of manufacturing activity is in Sasolburg where Sasol and Omnia production plants are situated. 
ArcelorMittal is also located close to these companies. Foskor mines and processes phosphate rock 
in Phalaborwa, Limpopo Province, which is then carried by rail to the production facility in Richards 
Bay in KwaZulu-Natal. The production facility is strategically located in Richards Bay since Foskor 
imports some raw materials to combine with mined products (i.e. phosphate rock) and then exports 
phosphoric acid. 
Figure 10 shows the nitrogenous fertilisers value chain. We focus more on nitrogenous 
fertilisers due to their significant usage (67.9% consumed in 2015, Table 7) relative to the other 
fertilisers and given the competition concerns in this market. Nitrogenous fertilisers include 
Limestone Ammonium Nitrate (LAN), Ammonium Nitrate Solutions (ANS), and urea. Ammonia, 
which is produced by Sasol at its Secunda and Sasolburg plants, is the key input into the production 
of nitrogenous fertilisers. Other suppliers of imported ammonia in South Africa are Omnia, Foskor 
and Kynoch. However, Sasol remains the dominant supplier of ammonia in South Africa. Urea is 
largely imported given that it is made from ammonia in a different production process, one that is not 
undertaken in South Africa. 
 
Table 7: Consumption by Fertiliser type 
 Consumption (%) 
Year Nitrogen Phosphate Potash 
2011 69.8 13.5 16.7 
2012 69.8 13.8 17.1 
2013 69.7 13.3 16.8 
2014 67.9 16.8 18.5 
2015 67.9 15.1 16.6 
Source: Who Owns Whom (2017b) 
 
In the upstream level, as seen in the diagram, Sasol is the monopoly local producer of ammonia to 
independent manufacturers of fertilisers and is also active throughout the rest of the value chain. In 
fact, prior to 20093249, Sasol was the sole supplier of ammonia in South Africa. Sasol became the 
monopoly supplier of ammonia in South Africa in 1999 following the closure of African Explosives 
and Chemical Industries (AECI)’s production facilities. Sasol’s produces ammonia from its coal-to-
                                                          
3249 The Competition Commission intervened in 2009 and 2010 leading to noticeable reconfigurations. This is described 
further in the section 5.5.1. 
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liquid fuel processes, and from natural gas (about 50%) imported from Mozambique. Post 2009, 
Omnia has undertaken significant investments into the rail wagons required to transport imported 
ammonia, as well as investments into expansion of its nitric acid plants. However, Omnia’s imports 
of ammonia are strictly for internal use in its own downstream operations and are not available for 
use by third parties. 
The ammonia produced by Sasol (and that imported by Omnia, Foskor and Kynoch) is then 
used to produce ammonium nitrate, used in the production of fertilisers or explosives. Sasol, Omnia 
and AECI have the necessary infrastructure, in particular nitric acid plants, to produce ANS. LAN 
production, which is produced by reacting ANS with limestone to stabilise it, forms solid fertilisers. 
LAN is produced by both Sasol and Omnia. 
 
Figure 12: Nitrogenous Fertiliser Value Chain 
 
Source: Grimbeek et al, 2017 
 
The midstream segment of the value chain mainly involves the production of ammonium nitrate. This 
segment is also highly concentrated. Prior to 2009, Sasol, Omnia and AECI were the firms involved 
in the manufacture of ammonium nitrate, which all owned nitric acid and ammonium nitrate plants.  
In 2005 Sasol produced more than 40% of the country’s ammonium nitrate. Omnia supplied very 
little ammonium nitrate to the open market due to its vertical integration. Furthermore, the collusive 
arrangement3250 between Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch, reduced Omnia’s incentive to effectively utilise 
its ammonium nitrate plants. AECI produced ammonium nitrate under an agreement with Kynoch 
which ceased in 2004. Smaller players requiring ammonium nitrate were therefore effectively 
dependent on Sasol. Currently Sasol still remains the main supplier of ammonium nitrate in South 
Africa. 
The downstream segment involves the blending and trading of ammonium nitrate derivatives. 
In general blending provides a means for growers to receive the correct ratio of nitrogen, phosphorus, 
potash, and micro nutrients. Ammonium nitrate in fertiliser production can either be mixed with water 
to form ANS or combined with limestone/ calcium to form LAN or Calcium Ammonium Nitrate 
                                                          
3250 See section 5.5.1 below 
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(CAN). Apart from Kynoch and Omnia, other downstream players include Nutri-Flo and Profert 
Holdings. Omnia leads the downstream fertiliser market with a 45% market share for LAN, followed 
by Kynoch Fertiliser and Profert Holdings with an estimated 15% market share each.3251  
The industry value chain thus reflects a range of organisational forms, ranging from vertically 
integrated companies to companies involved in blending, distribution or retail only. Moreover, 
several smaller players have emerged since the Competition Commission’s intervention in 2009, with 
some involved in retail and wholesale of fertiliser directly to farmers or co-operatives. Co-operatives 
have become an important source of fertiliser sales. They purchase, store and distribute fertiliser for 
their farmer members. Thus, farmers are able to collectively negotiate better prices for fertilisers. The 
fertiliser industry however still remains highly concentrated. And interestingly, government remains 
a significant shareholder in the fertiliser sector, specifically in Sasol and Foskor where the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) held in 8.2% and 59% respectively in 2013.3252 
 
1.4.2.2.Regulatory framework  
 
A range of legislation is used to regulate the fertiliser industry. These include;  
• Fertilisers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies & Stock Remedies Act No. 36 of 1947 
• Agricultural Products Standards Act No.119 of 1990 
• National Regulations for Compulsory Specifications Act No. 5 of 2008 
• Marketing of Agricultural Products Act No. 47 of 1996 
• National Environmental Management Act No. 107 of 1998 
• National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act No. 39 of 2004 
• Environment Conservation Act No. 73 of 1989 
• Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act No. 54 of 1972 
• Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 101 of 1965 
Additionally, the National Treasury is expected to release a revised Carbon Tax Bill in 2017. 
Furthermore, a revised regulation for the carbon offset allowance, which enables firms to reduce their 
carbon tax liability will be published by mid-2017. There are currently no import tariffs on imports 
of fertiliser. 
 
1.4.2.3.Performance of the Fertiliser industry 
1.4.2.3.1. Consumption 
 
The domestic industry has an estimated value of about R10bn, a decline from R14bn in 2009. The 
decline since 2009 saw the value of the industry reaching R7.5bn in 2015, before picking up to R10bn 
in 2016 (Who Owns Whom, 2009; 2015; and 2017b). The consumption of fertiliser has also been 
declining since 2011 (Table 8). About 1.9 million tonnes of fertiliser were consumed in 2015, 
reduction from 2.1 million tonnes in 2014. The reduction in consumption is attributable to drought 
conditions in South Africa, and possibly due to pricing concerns as shown in the following sub-
section. 
 
                                                          
3251 Who Owns Whom report (2017) 
3252 Who Owns Whom report (2017) 
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Table 8: Fertiliser consumption (in tonnes) 
Year Consumption (tonnes) 
2011 2,002,071 
2012 2,052,858 
2013 1,991,370 
2014 2,198,230 
2015 1,978,407 
Source: FERTASA 
 
1.4.2.3.2. Prices 
 
The prices of fertiliser in South Africa are substantially higher than the rest of the world. In 2015, the 
average cost of fertiliser used in the production of maize was 78% higher in South Africa than in 
other international maize producing countries (Figure 11). The maize industry consumes about 40% 
to 50% of total fertiliser consumption in South Africa. The high costs of fertiliser are partly a 
reflection of high concentration levels resulting in uncompetitive pricing of fertiliser products.  As 
discussed in section 5.5.1 below, there have been a number of cases brought to the Competition 
Commission against Sasol in 2004. The cost of certain fertilisers is also however determined by the 
costs of importing, including all the related transport and distribution costs and the trader and agro-
dealer margins. For instance, transport costs can account for 50% of the delivered price to farmers 
when including all the related costs and margins.3253 The other reason for high domestic prices is the 
difference in suitability and availability of natural resources like soil quality and climate when 
compared to countries such as Brazil, Argentina, the US and Ukraine.3254 For instance there is 
evidence of considerable acidification and nutrient depletion in South African soils, which means the 
country requires more Fertilisers given the poorer quality of soil. 
Figure 13: Fertiliser cost: International key maize producing countries vs. South Africa 
 
Source: Reproduced from BFAP & Agri Benchmark, 2015 
 
                                                          
3253 See Ncube, Roberts and Vilakazi (2016) 
3254 BFAP (2015) 
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Figure 12 below shows the overall inland and coastal monthly price trends for Sasol’s Limestone 
Ammonium Nitrate between 2005 and 2015. Inland regions include North West, Northern Cape, 
Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Limpopo. Coastal region refers to KwaZulu Natal. Pre-
intervention and post-intervention periods refer to periods in relation to the Competition 
Commission’s intervention in the fertiliser industry cartel between Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch, 
discussed further in section 5.5.1. Overall prices comprise average prices to blenders, traders, and 
farmers. Notably, fertiliser prices rose dramatically in 2008 due to a combination of factors such as 
increased demand as a result of higher food prices and increased energy costs which are particularly 
important in producing nitrogenous fertilisers. The high price increases slowed down after 2009. 
Figure 14: Overall Inland and Coastal Monthly Price Trends for LAN (Jan 2005-June 2015) 
 
Source: Grimbeek et al, 2017  
 
Generally, inland prices were higher than coastal prices in the pre-intervention period, driven by the 
cartel conduct. Under normal circumstances it would be expected of Sasol to charge higher prices for 
the inland region since inland customers are located much closer to Sasol’s production facilities 
compared to coastal customers. Further, the cartel allowed Sasol to price lower in the coastal region 
where it faced competition from imports. In the post-intervention period, inland prices are generally 
relatively lower than coastal prices. Thus, the intervention by the Competition Commission which 
mandated no price discrimination across customers between inland and coastal regions appears to 
have yielded the desired effects. A more detailed analysis of the Commission’s intervention is 
presented in section 5.5.1. 
 
1.4.2.4.Key investments  
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There have been noticeable episodes of investment in the fertiliser sector. An important one being in 
the Free State where Westfert has created a facility to house 200,000 tons of fertiliser.3255 The facility 
is apparently the fourth-largest dome structure in the world and has significant capacity to improve 
the logistics of moving fertilisers to farms. 
The other important investment (worth R1.35bn) is that involving Kropz SA (Pty) Ltd through 
the continuation of the development of its Elandsfontein Phosphate Project3256. Approximately 95% 
is being spent within the South Africa, with effort taken to maximise direct benefit to local businesses 
in the Saldanha Bay Municipality. Kropz is miner of fertiliser feed minerals that includes a Black 
Economic Empowerment partner, Africa Rainbow Minerals (ARM). 
Post 2009 Omnia expanded its operations for the production of ammonium nitrate by undertaking a 
large investment in a new nitric acid plant. This facility has the capacity to produce 40% more nitric 
acid per annum compared to Omnia’s first nitric acid plant’s capacity of 73 000 tons which was in 
operation pre-2009.3257 Omnia has also invested in the new rail wagons to ensure more reliability and 
efficiency in the importation of ammonia. 
Other investments in the downstream segment involved several acquisitions of Sasol’s plants 
following Sasol’s divesture of its blending businesses post-2009, as a result of the intervention by 
competition authorities. This is discussed further in section 5.5.1. Profert acquired Sasol’s 
Potchefstroom and Bellville plants in Cape Town in March and August 2011 respectively. GWK, an 
agricultural cooperative that is also involved in the blending and distribution of granular and liquid 
fertiliser products, acquired Sasol’s Durban plant in June 2011. Kynoch acquired both Sasol’s 
Kimberley and Endicott plants. 
 
1.4.2.5.Trends in concentration and outcomes of key mergers  
 
As highlighted in previous sections, the fertiliser industry is highly concentrated. Moreover, there are 
signals of further consolidation and/or integration evidenced by recent merger activity in the sector. 
In 2016 for instance, South African fertiliser producer Omnia Holdings agreed to acquire an oil 
products and lubricants supplier as part of its strategy to expand its chemical business. Table 9 lists 
other mergers and acquisition between 2010 and 2017. (note: there have been mergers in the organic 
fertiliser segment which are not presented here). Of interest is the recent large acquisition by the 
Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) of ETG (Kynoch) which was unconditionally 
approved in 2017. This is an example of growing institutional investors in food value chains. 
 
Table 9: Mergers and Acquisitions (2010 – 2017) 
Date Acquiring firm Target firm 
2010 Kynoch Fertiliser Yara South Africa 
2011 
Profert Sasol’s Potchefstroom and Bellville plants 
GWK Sasol’s Durban plant 
Kynoch Fertiliser Sasol’s Kimberley and Endicott plants 
2012 Gromor National Plant Food 
2013 Grinrod NWK Ltd 
                                                          
3255 Who Owns Whom report (2017) 
3256 Kropz website 
3257 Grimbeek et al (2017) 
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2014 Export Trading Group (ETG) Kynoch Fertiliser 
2015 Rolfes Ag-Chem 
2017 Government Employees Pension 
Fund (GEPF) 
ETG (Kynoch) 
Source: Who Owns Whom (2017b); Grimbeek et al (2017) 
 
Several mergers and acquisitions also took place internationally. This suggests increased 
consolidation of global fertiliser markets. Key deals include the following: 
• PotashCorp of Saskatchewan and Agrium which would create a new US$36bn player. The merger 
however occurs in a context where both companies have reported losses, and where the potash 
price has been lower. 
• The US agrochemical company, Brandt, acquired the Spanish agrochemical and fertiliser 
company, Tratamientos Guadalquivir.  
• Belgian specialty chemicals distributor Azelis acquired the Italian specialty chemical distributor 
for agrochemical and fertiliser formulations, Ametech. 
Although it is not clear if these companies have operations in South Africa, some of them have 
footprint in Africa. Tratamientos Guadalquivir’s website indicates that the company services the 
Middle East and African markets as well. Azelis has footprint in Ivory Coast and Morroco. 
Nonetheless, South Africa imports fertilisers from some of the countries in which these companies 
are based. For instance, the third largest source of South African phosphatic fertiliser imports is Spain, 
which hosts Tratamientos Guadalquivir, a producer of phosphatic fertilisers amongst a range of 
products. 
 
1.4.2.5.1. Overview of competition interventions 
 
The key competition cases in the South African fertiliser market include the abuse of dominance case 
brought against Sasol as well as the collusive case between Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch. In 2003 and 
2004, Nutri-Flo and Profert filed complaints with the Commission alleging that Sasol, acting in 
concert with Omnia and Kynoch (Yara), engaged in a range of anticompetitive practices. The 
complainants alleged that the conduct negatively affected the ability to achieve a competitive 
outcome in the market for the blending and distribution of nitrogenous based fertilisers. The abuse of 
dominance practices by Sasol involved exclusionary pricing, excessive pricing and price 
discrimination. Nutri-Flo and Profert further submitted that the collusive relationship between Sasol, 
Omnia and Kynoch prevented them from expanding their businesses and competing effectively. 
Subsequently Sasol admitted in 2009 to having acted in concert with Omnia and Kynoch 
(Yara) through agreements on various pricing formulae for, and discounts to, products manufactured 
or supplied by itself, Kynoch (Yara) and Omnia, thereby contravening section 4(1)(b) of the Act. 
Sasol paid an administrative penalty of approximately R250 million. Sasol reached an agreement 
with the Commission in respect other contraventions. 
In order to limit Sasol’s presence in the downstream market and reduce its ability to 
manipulate market conditions, agreements were reached between Sasol and the Commission that 
resulted in the imposition of a series of behavioural and structural conditions on Sasol. For instance, 
Sasol undertook to provide fertilisers on an ex-works basis and to further not discriminate across 
customer types (i.e. blenders, traders and end- users) and across geographic regions (i.e. inland and 
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coastal regions). Moreover, with regards to the structural conditions, Sasol undertook to divest five 
of its blending plants.  
In other important rulings, the Competition Commission entered into a consent agreement 
with Foskor, to end an agreement between Foskor and Sasol that reduced options for buyers of 
phosphates. A case of price fixing against the Fertiliser Association of Southern Africa (FERTASA) 
and five agricultural lime manufacturers was referred to the Competition Tribunal in 2014, following 
an investigation that revealed that the manufacturers made use of FERTASA to fix commissions paid 
to agents. Furthermore, a group of 58 farmers won a case against Sasol in March 2015, where Sasol 
was accused of fixing fertiliser prices between 1996 and 2004. Following the Tribunal’s intervention 
in 2009, the group of farmers affected by Sasol’s actions lodged a private legal case seeking financial 
compensation from the company, resulting in a confidential settlement between Sasol and the 
farmers.3258 
 
1.4.2.5.2. Ex-post assessment of the Competition Commission’s intervention in 20093259 
 
There has not been any entry in the production of ammonia and Sasol remains the sole producer of 
ammonia in South Africa. This can be explained by the significant capital outlay required in building 
an ammonia plant. However, we note that there has been an increase in the importation of ammonia 
since 2010. Prior to the intervention, Omnia was restricted from importing Ammonia as per the 
agreement with Sasol. Post intervention, Omnia had to seek alternative sources of raw materials for 
their plants, in the form of imports. Omnia’s entry into the market provides some competition to Sasol 
as it increases the number of competitors in the upstream market from one to two. However, the bulk 
of Omnia’s production is dedicated towards internal consumption. The Commission’s intervention 
has also resulted in increased supply of nitrogenous fertilisers. As mentioned above, Omnia’s new 
ammonium nitrate facility has the capacity to produce 40% more nitric acid per annum compared to 
its first nitric acid plant’s capacity of 73 000 tons. 
One of the other impacts of the Competition Commission rulings is that there are now more 
blending and trading companies, particularly as a result of the divestiture of most of Sasol’s blending 
facilities. Atlas Organic Fertilisers (Pty) Ltd and Aquasol Nutri are two examples of additional 
blending companies in the sector. Moreover, the firms that were previously reliant on Sasol input 
supplies have subsequently expanded and acquired their own blending plants. Further, the divestiture 
of Sasol’s blending facilities implies increased competition along the nitrogenous fertiliser value 
chain, given that the level of Sasol’s vertical integration along the value chain has been reduced. 
Sasol’s operations at the retail level of the industry have also declined. The intervention also 
decreased the magnitude of price increases in the post-intervention period, thereby generating 
substantial customer savings of between R1 billion and R10.5 billion from 2010 to 20153260. That is, 
post-intervention prices increased by less than they would have increased absent the intervention by 
competition authorities.  
This finding by the Commission is based on various assumptions and scenarios as follows. 
The first scenario assumes that post-intervention prices would have continued to increase at the pre-
                                                          
3258 Farmer’s Weekly. Available at: https://www.farmersweekly.co.za/agri-news/south-africa/sasol-settles-fertiliser-
price-fixing-case-with-farmers/. See also Who Owns Whom (2017) 
3259 Following the judgements on the abuse of dominance and cartel cases involving Sasol, Omnia and Kynoch. 
3260 See Grimbeek et al (2017) 
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intervention annual average rate (excluding the years 2008 and 2009) had the authorities not 
intervened. Building on the first, the second scenario tries to smooth the prices in 2008 and 2009 to 
account for outliers observed due to economic crisis. In the third scenario, the calculation of average 
annual prices in the pre-intervention period includes 2008 and 2009. Scenario four applies the 
Producer Price Index (PPI) to calculate prices, starting from the year 2009. These scenarios result in 
four possible values of consumer savings ranging from R1 billion and R10.5 billion as mentioned 
above. 
 
1.4.2.5.3. Regional and global collusive practices 
 
The Sasol cartel in South Africa specifically had a structure known as ‘The Export Club’, which was 
used to share information on sales of fertiliser in order to coordinate bids to the southern Africa 
region. Thus, major importers of South African fertilisers such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Botswana were negatively impacted, effectively limiting the growth of agricultural sectors in these 
countries. This has reciprocal effects on South Africa since its growth linked to the growth of the 
region, mainly because the country supplies many of the agricultural input products (incl. capital 
equipment) to the region. This illustrates the importance of considering the regional dimension to 
competition enforcement, and a regional value chain approach to sector analyses. Moreover, cartel 
cases busted in South Africa present an opportunity to other competition authorities to investigate 
and establish impact in their respective jurisdictions. In Zambia for instance, Omnia Fertilisers 
Zambia Limited and Nyiombo Investments Limited were also found to have rigged government 
contracts for fertiliser supply between 2007 and 2011. 
Globally there is prevalence of government sanctioned export cartels. The following examples 
are found in potash, phosphates and nitrogenous fertilisers. In potash, two dominant cartels account 
for 80% of reserves. These are Canpotex (includes North American PotashCorp, Agrium and Mosaic) 
and BPC (joint venture between Russian and Belarusian potash producers, Uralkali, Silvinit and 
Belaruskali). Uralkali has exited the cartel in 2013. Canpotex controls over a third of the global potash 
production capacity. In phosphates, there is PhosChem, a USA Webb-Pomerene export cartel 
(includes PotashCorp and Mosaic), and OCP of Morocco, a government owned monopoly over 
phosphate mining. There is also likely collusion in nitrogenous fertiliser market based on studies of 
observable pricing trends.  
Global fertiliser cartels impact South Africa because the country is still a net importer of 
certain phosphatic, nitrogenous and potassium fertilisers. Other BRICS member-states including 
Brazil, India and China are directly affected since they are major destinations of Canpotex’s 
potash.3261 Evidently, these cartels have significant global market shares and influence, which might 
prove challenging for national competition authorities to prosecute given political economy 
dynamics, especially since these cartels are sanctioned by governments in their countries of origin. 
In Canada for instance, a proposed acquisition of PotashCorp by BHP Billiton was blocked by 
government on the grounds that it would reduce government’s revenues from the Canpotex cartel 
since BHP Billiton intended to exit the Canpotex partnership.3262 Again, collaborative efforts between 
                                                          
3261 Canpotex website 
3262 See Krugel, Lauren (2010-08-19). "Small Sask. potash producers bask in glow of BHP bid for Potash Corp." Yahoo! 
Finance. Canadian Press 
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competition authorities at regional and global levels remain crucial in this segment, particularly 
collaboration between the BRICS countries’ competition authorities. 
 
1.4.2.5.4. Barriers to entry  
 
There are barriers to entry for manufacturing of fertilisers, significant amongst them being high levels 
of capital requirements. For instance, the manufacturing process for synthetic production of 
chemicals used in fertilisers is estimated to require about R200m working capital.3263 Other barriers, 
such as compliance with relevant legislation, are found in blending fertiliser variants. Thus, a 
relatively less sophisticated company may find regulatory requirements challenging to meet. 
Nonetheless, bio-fertilisers require a much lower capital investment and face lower regulatory 
barriers, providing an opportunity for smaller businesses in the sector to develop niche products.  
 
1.4.3. Animal Feed to Poultry Value Chain3264 
1.4.3.1.A mapping of the key players and ownership structures 
 
The animal feed to poultry value chain is an important part of the agricultural sector in South Africa. 
In 2014, broiler production alone accounted for almost 15% of all agricultural production in terms of 
value and 33% of all animal products produced in South Africa (SAPA, 2014). In fact, the poultry 
industry provides 65% of all animal protein (excluding milk) consumed in South Africa. Poultry 
consumption reached almost 38kg per capita in 2014 with beef consumption a distant second at 18kg 
per capita (SAPA, 2014). Poultry meat has consistently been the lowest cost source of animal protein 
since 2009. 
The poultry value chain has multiple levels - from the production and processing of 
agricultural commodities through to a quasi-industrial process of batch production of the rearing, 
processing, to the distribution of poultry in fresh and frozen form (McCleod et al. 2009). (Figure 13). 
The value chain approach is particularly important from a competition perspective when considering 
that many cases of anti-competitive behaviour emerged around the difficulty to accessing key inputs, 
and the existence of exclusive supply agreements along the value chain. The value chain starts with 
the two main inputs—animal feed and breeding stock (Figure 13). Animal feed, which is generally 
made from milled maize and soybean or sunflower, accounts for between 50 and 70 per cent of the 
total input costs (Bagopi et al. 2014). Animal feed production is carried out in the feed mills where 
the main ingredients (maize and soya), including vitamins and antibiotics, are combined to produce 
stock feed. 
                                                          
3263 Who Owns Whom report (2017) 
3264 This section draws largely from the research project conducted by CCRED in 2016 and titled “Competition, barriers 
to entry and inclusive growth: Agro-processing”, as well as from the recent working papers (Ncube et al., 2017; Ncube 
et al., 2016; and Ncube and Zengeni, 2016) 
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Figure 15: Animal feed to poultry value chain 
 
Source: Bagopi et al. (2014) 
 
There are only two main firms providing poultry breeding stock to South Africa, Aviagen which is 
privately owned by German-based EW Group, and Cobb-Vantress Inc, a USA-based multinational. 
This highlights the global dimension of the poultry value chain. Typically, the holder of the 
intellectual property such as Aviagen and Cobb-Vantress would sell grandparent stock to a distributor 
(usually through a franchise arrangement) who will then breed parents to supply day-old parent stock. 
The customers of this parent stock are either fully integrated broiler producers who sell their product 
to the retail market or they are day-old broiler chick producers who in turn supply independent broiler 
producers. Once the day-old chicks are fully grown (between 32 and 42 days old) they are taken to 
slaughter at an abattoir and processed for sale in the retail market and fast food restaurants. In some 
cases, the chickens are sold live. This is normally the case with small-scale farmers. Vertical 
integration with key inputs such as animal feed is also a key characteristic in poultry value chain 
globally particularly for the larger players. This is important for the co-ordination of production, 
especially for those firms operating on a large scale. 
In South Africa, the great majority of poultry is produced by large-scale commercial players 
who are also generally vertically integrated with key inputs such as animal feed, all the way to 
slaughtering operations (DAFF 2014). The two main producers are Rainbow Chicken and Astral. The 
poultry production of these two companies represents 46 per cent of total broiler meat production 
(Table 10). The other key producers are Country Bird Holdings Limited (CBH), Quantum, and 
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Daybreak. Smaller players such as Sovereign Foods and new entrant Grain Field Chickens (GFC) 
make up the rest of the production. 
 
Table 10: Market shares of leading poultry producers (2014 production volumes) 
Company Market share (%) 
Rainbow Chicken 24 
Astral 22 
Country Bird Holdings 7 
Tydstroom 6 
Fouries 6 
Daybreak 5 
Others 25 
Source: DAFF, 2014 
 
Rainbow Chicken, Astral and CBH are the only holders of exclusive commercial genetic breeding 
licenses in South Africa. Astral holds a license for the Ross 308 breed, Rainbow Chicken for the 
Cobb 500, while CBH holds a license for Abor Acres breed (Quantum also holds a license for the 
Cobb breed but it is only for internal production and not for commercial sales like the other licenses 
held by Rainbow, Astral and CBH). All the three breeds are provided by multinationals Aviagen and 
Cobb-Vantress. That is, Ross 308 and Abor Acres are provided by Aviagen, while Cobb 500 is 
provided by Cobb-Vantress. As a result, any producer seeking to participate within the poultry value 
chain in South Africa would need to purchase breeding stock from Rainbow Chicken, Astral or CBH, 
whether for their own production or for commercial sales. The industry is thus characterised by high 
levels of concentration at the upstream level, and highlights the importance of scale in the poultry 
value chain.  
Rainbow Chicken is the fully integrated poultry-producing subsidiary of RCL. RCL Foods 
is a diversified food company made up of four subsidiaries – Foodcorp, Rainbow, TSB Sugar and 
Vector Logistics. Rainbow Chicken manufactures its own feed through its feed division Epol. The 
company also has business interests in Zambia and Botswana.  
Astral has poultry operations in South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia and feed 
mills in South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia. In Zambia, Astral has introduced a new broiler 
breed, Lohmann Meat, through its breeder farm and hatchery division, Tiger Chicks. Lohmann Meat 
is also owned by Aviagen. In Mozambique, Astral recently constructed a hatchery called Mozpintos 
and is currently constructing a breeder farm. Astral has also been engaged in expansion activities in 
South Africa through the purchase of other poultry operations. 
Quantum is a former subsidiary of Pioneer and consists of three integrated business units, 
Tydstroom (broiler business), Nulaid (eggs and commercial laying hens), and Nova Feeds (animal 
feed). The company recently disposed of the abattoirs of its Tydstroom unit, effectively exiting from 
the broiler meat production business. It is now in an agreement with Astral to supply it with 550,000 
live birds per week to its Western Cape abattoir and another agreement with Sovereign Foods to 
supply 250,000 live birds per week to its Gauteng abattoir. Quantum also has broiler and layer 
breeding operations in Zambia and Uganda and acquired a commercial egg business in Zambia in 
2013. 
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Country Bird Holdings (CBH) is a holding company formed in 2005 incorporating 
integrated poultry and stock feed business operations in South Africa, operating as Supreme Poultry 
(Pty) Ltd and Nutri Feeds, and poultry breeding operations in the region operating as Ross Africa 
Limited. CBH currently operates in South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique. The company’s poultry breeding operations in Botswana and Zambia operate under 
the Ross subsidiaries and the animal feed production operates under the Master Farmer subsidiary. 
CBH’s Mozambique operations are still to be incorporated but they will include a fully integrated 
poultry business. In Zimbabwe, CBH operates the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise. 
Grain Field Chicken (GFC) is a fully integrated division of the Vrystaat Koöperasie Beperk 
(Pty) Ltd (VKB) which is based in the eastern Free State, established in 2010. VKB is a farmer-
owned agricultural company which specialises in the storage and marketing of agricultural products. 
GFC sources its maize and soybean from VKB. This has given it a unique competitive advantage, 
ensuring that GFC has not had to import maize or soybean for their animal feed needs so far. Thus, 
VKB has created an almost fully self-sufficient business in GFC. They buy maize from VKB farmers, 
have a stake in a soya oil crushing plant, and also own an abattoir. The GFC abattoir currently 
slaughters approximately 750 000 chickens per week. This is half of the production of Daybreak, one 
of the smaller vertically integrated players. VBK also has 22 VKB retail outlets and 41 NTK outlets 
through which they market their agricultural produce, including the broilers. It also supplies the Boxer 
Group of supermarkets and there are prospects of supplying SPAR supermarkets (Coleman, 2013). 
Through a contract with Eagle’s Pride, GFC uses both Cobb and Ross birds, with Cobb making up 
85% of the day-old chicks that they purchase. The main markets of GFC are in Gauteng and KZN. 
As can be seen, all these producers are integrated with feed and broiler production, and 
processing, which includes abattoirs (Table 11). It is also important to note that the animal feed 
companies that are vertically integrated with the poultry companies shown in Table 2—Nutri Feeds 
(Pty) Limited, Epol, Meadow Feeds, and Nova Feeds—along with Daybreak are the top five 
producers of animal feed in South Africa (Louw et al. 2013).  
However, the recent restructuring indicates that non-vertically integrated companies can also 
be competitive. The changes in Pioneer to form Quantum involved the closure of their abattoir and 
an agreement with Astral for supply of live birds (Magwaza, 2014). In the case of Grain Field 
Chickens, the breeding stock is sourced from specialised breeding business Eagle’s Pride, and 
independent out-growers are used for broiler rearing. Apart from Quantum, all the producers shown 
in Table 11 also have breeding facilities. Moreover, a number of the players, especially large South 
African poultry companies, have operations in more than one country in the region. This emphasises 
the important regional dimensions of the value chain. 
 
Table 11: Company structure of main integrated poultry firms in South Africa 
 
Country Bird 
Holdings (CBH) 
Limited 
RCL Foods Limited Astral Foods Limited 
Quantum Foods 
(formerly, 
subsidiary of 
Pioneer Foods) 
Breed 
 
Breed 
 
Breed 
 
 
 
Ross Africa Limited Cobb 500 Ross 308 
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Feed DOC Feed DOC Feed DOC Feed DOC 
Nutri Feeds 
(Pty) Limited 
Ross Epol 
Rainbow 
Chicken 
Meadow Feeds 
National 
Chicks 
Nova 
Feeds 
Bergvlei 
Chicks 
Broiler 
processing 
 
Broiler processing 
 Broiler 
processing 
  
Supreme Poultry 
(Pty) Limited 
Rainbow Astral 
RETAIL/FAST FOOD MARKET 
Source: Ncube, Roberts and Zengeni (2016) 
DOC: Day Old Chicks 
 
1.4.3.2.Regulatory framework 
 
As with the rest of the agro-processing sector, the poultry industry in South Africa is subject to 
domestic regulation specific to food, which at times has an effect of creating structural barriers to 
entry. Aside from market conduct/economic regulation governed by the Competition Act, regulations 
affecting the sub-sector include licensing, food safety, quality and environmental laws (Banda, et al, 
2015). Non-economic regulations include the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries’ 
regulation of animal feed. The department’s regulation is concerned with monitoring quality and 
assessing whether the feed formulation matches the need of the animals. The feed is regulated by the 
Fertilisers, Farm feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947, Act 37. The 
registration of feed involves a four-stage process, namely, verification, technical screening, 
assessment and approval.  
Though feed manufacturers acknowledge that a registration process is necessary to ensure the 
quality of feed produced, it may be restrictive to new entrants. Small animal feed producers find it 
costly to test feed in laboratories. This restricts smaller firms from producing feed for sale in the open 
market. However, these costs are not prohibitive for a feed manufacturer or poultry producer who 
plans to enter at significant scale. 
Other non-economic regulations include3265: 
• Labelling and Advertising of Foods (R429 of 29 May 2014) 
• Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, 1972 (Act No.54 of 1972) 
• Agricultural Product Standards Act 1990, (Act No.119 of 1990) 
• Good Manufacturing Practice 
• South African National Standards SANS 885:2011 
• South African Poultry Association (SAPA) Code of Practice for Broiler Production3266 
 
1.4.3.3.Performance of the South African poultry industry  
1.4.3.3.1. Production 
 
                                                          
3265 Government gazette (2014, vol. 587, No. 37695). 
3266 SAPA website 
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The animal feed to poultry value chain in South Africa has seen high levels of growth over the last 
decade. The production of broiler meat has increased from 928 000 tons in 2004 to 1.7 million tons 
in 2014 (Table 12). This growth has been driven in large part by increases in the scale of production 
of the larger poultry producers, together with the growth in local consumption from 23kg per capita 
in 2003 to almost 38kg per capita in 2014. For example, Astral increased broiler production from 2.1 
million birds per week in 2006 to 4.4 million birds per week in 2014 (Astral Foods 2006, 2014). 
CBH’s production has increased from 1.2 million birds per week in 2008 (CBH, 2008) to 1.5 million 
birds per week in 2014. Interestingly, the production of the largest producer – Rainbow Chickens – 
has not increased as much as that of Astral, increasing from 4 million birds per week in 2004 to just 
4.5 million birds per week in 2015 (Rainbow Chicken, 2005). As previously noted, Rainbow Chicken 
and Astral account for 46% of total broiler meat production (DAFF, 2014).  
One of these major producers – CBH – is a relatively new entrant into the poultry industry. The story 
behind CBH’s entry and growth highlights how competition law can open access to markets (see 
section 1.4.3.5. below). 
 
Table 12: Broiler meat production and consumption in South Africa (thousands of tonnes) 
Year Production Consumption 
2004  928 1 082 
2005  1 019 1 204 
2006  1 143 1 383 
2007  1 200 1 470 
2008  1 276 1 508 
2009  1 358 1 558 
2010  1 430 1 645 
2011  1 478 1 753 
2012  1 499 1 836 
2013  1 529 1 899 
2014  1 711 2 023 
2015 1 726 2 170 
2016 1 677 2 199 
Source: DAFF (2014); Lovell (2012); SAPA (2015, 2017) 
 
While entry by vertically integrated players has grown the number of independent players in the 
market, growth has also been driven by the increase in the number of contract growers. Broiler 
production by contract growers has increased over the years and is currently at approximately 60-
80% of total broiler production. The shift towards a greater reliance on contract growing has largely 
been as a result of an increasing desire by the major poultry producers to shift costs associated with 
owning large pieces of farm land from themselves to the contract growers. 
The entry of contract growers has been partly facilitated by the sale of the poultry farms by 
the major poultry producers to new contract farmers, like in the case of Daybreak Farms which sold 
off seven of its farms to black poultry producers. The current Daybreak Farms is the result of the 
divestiture of Afgri Poultry from the Afgri group of companies. Afgri Poultry was sold to the AFPO 
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Consortium, through a transaction which was funded by the Public Investment Corporation (PIC). 
The divestiture was in line with Afgri’s strategic decision to focus on its core grain businesses.3267  
Contract growing also creates more opportunities for entry given the low cost of capital 
required to start up in comparison with other stages of the value chain which require a significantly 
higher level of expertise. The increasing prevalence of contract growers is also important in the 
context of inclusive growth. Ease of entry means more people can become contract growers thereby 
creating employment. However, while there has been entry at the contract growing level, the entry of 
CBH and the GFC illustrate that in order for entry to result in large scale production and to be 
considered a serious competitor in the poultry industry, it has to be at multiple levels of the value 
chain. Thus, while contract growing is an important means by which potential poultry farmers can 
enter the poultry value chain, the recent episodes of entry raise important questions about its 
effectiveness as a possible avenue of inclusive growth, particularly in the context of the Department 
of Trade and Industry’s vision of creating Black Industrialists. 
 
1.4.3.3.2. Prices of poultry 
 
Fresh chicken prices are generally higher than prices of frozen chicken, however the latter are higher 
after accounting for brining (Figure 14). Frozen chicken (after accounting for brining) is more 
expensive than fresh chicken but only by a very small amount after 2011. The reduction in frozen 
chicken prices of about 20% (R5) in early 2008, occurred around  about the same time that Country 
Bird exited from the Elite joint venture with Astral and introduced a new breed, Arbor Acres.3268 The 
introduction of the breed not only led to increased production but it also increased rivalry in the 
provision of breeds.3269 It is likely that this rivalry affected the pricing of frozen chicken (which is 
the largest consumed category locally), resulting in the dip in chicken prices in 2008 and the price 
moderation between 2008 and 2011. 
Poultry prices started increasing following the spike in feed prices in 2012 (Figure 14). 
Interestingly, a similar spike in the price of feed in 2014 did not result in an associated increase in 
chicken prices. This is likely due to increased import penetration in 2014 (Figure 15) which squeezed 
local poultry producer margins as feed cost increases could not be passed onto consumers. A similar 
fluctuation in imports in the last quarter of 2012 saw a concurrent decline in local poultry prices. 
Notably, frozen chicken prices are mostly affected by imports than fresh chicken prices, as imports 
come in frozen form, making them compete directly with frozen chicken produced locally. 
                                                          
3267 See http://www.afgri.co.za/afgri-strengthens-focus-on-grain-business-through-sale-of-poultry-business-and-pic-
provides-funding-for-transaction/  
3268 See section 6.5 below 
3269 Ncube et al, 2016. 
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Figure 16: South African Quarterly Feed and Poultry Prices (2008 – 2015) 
 
Source: Ncube et al., 2016 
 
1.4.3.3.3. Import and exports 
 
There was a significant spike in the South African poultry imports in the third quarter of 2012 (Figure 
15). The end of 2012 saw imports increasing from US$80 million to US$140 million, a 75 per cent 
increase from one quarter to the next. These led to applications for anti-dumping duties against Brazil 
in 2013 (ITAC, 2013), which was the major source of South African imports prior 2012. 
After the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Brazilian imports, there was a decline—albeit 
with fluctuations—in the value of imports (Figure 15). The anti-dumping tariffs—ranging from 12 to 
82 per cent—were imposed on whole birds, boneless cuts, bone-in portions, and offal imported from 
Brazil (ITAC 2013). Thereafter, there was a switch towards imports from the EU, where the dumping 
duties did not apply as a result of the free trade agreements with South Africa (Kwaramba and 
Tregenna 2014). 
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Figure 17: South Africa poultry trade flows (2010Q1 – 2016Q4) 
 
Source: Trade Map (ITC 2010–2016) 
 
A smaller spike at the beginning of 2014 was due to an increase in imports from Europe, even though 
only increasing to the levels at the end of 2011. This increase led to another bid for an anti-dumping 
investigation being submitted by SAPA to ITAC in 2014. ITAC made a final determination on 27 
February 2015, recommending the imposition of anti-dumping duties of 31.30–73.33 per cent on 
Germany, 3.86–22.81 per cent on the Netherlands, and 12.07–30.99 per cent on the United Kingdom 
(ITAC 2015). In its determination on this matter, ITAC indicated that though the poultry industry 
suffered material injury from dumping, other factors also contributed to its performance such as rising 
production costs related to feed, fuel, electricity and labour costs (ITAC 2015). 
South Africa also has a combination of anti-dumping duties, tariffs, and a quota for imports 
from the United States. Recently, there has been a battle between South Africa poultry producers and 
American poultry producers as the latter threatened to have benefits of the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) repealed if access is not granted to American poultry farmers (Mnyandu, 
2015). The resultant solution was a duty-free quota of poultry imports from the USA of 65 000 tons 
available on a twelve-month basis from 1 April 2016 (DTI, 2016). 
The issue of imports is important to South African producers because it reflects different 
chicken consumption patterns found in North American and EU countries when compared to South 
Africa. In the South African market, bone-in portions are the most widely consumed, generally in the 
form of IQF portions (SAPA, 2014). In contrast, high-income overseas markets mostly consume 
fillets such as breast portions that are sold at a premium. Since bone-in portions are not in high 
demand in overseas markets, they are then sold in other markets, such as South Africa, for a lower 
price. It is alleged that overseas players, including Brazilian producers, make their margins on fillet 
meat and sell bone-in portions at costs that allow them to cover the tariffs and logistical costs of 
shipping the meat to South Africa. 
Other important imports in the poultry value chain include animal feed imports. Feed is the 
largest cost of producing chicken, accounting for 50–70 per cent of the cost of producing a 
chicken3270, with maize and soybean being the two key inputs in the production of feed. South Africa 
                                                          
3270 Ncube et al, 2017 
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is less competitive in the cost of both day-old chicks and animal feed, when compared with countries 
such as Brazil and Netherlands (Table 13). Brazil price of feed is 45% cheaper than South Africa. 
 
Table 13: Prices of feed and day-old chicks in selected countries in US$ per kilogram of live 
weight 
 
  South Africa Netherlands United Kingdom Brazil 
Day-old chicks 0.21 0.19 0.23 0.14 
Feed 0.89 0.84 0.92 0.66 
The data above is for 2013 for Netherlands, United Kingdom and Brazil. It was converted to US$ 
using an exchange of £1=US$1.32. South Africa data is for 2012. 
Source: Zengeni, 2017  
 
South African imports of oilcakes used in the production of animal feed, mostly made up of soybean 
oilcake, are larger than the imports of poultry. Argentina is the main source of South Africa’s imports, 
accounting for 54 per cent of the total share of oilcake imports in 2014. However, the implementation 
of Department of Trade and Industry’s soybean strategy (DTI, 2012) has meant investment in 
processing capacity and has reduced imports of soybean meal from 2012.3271 Through this strategy 
and financing from the Industrial Development Corporation in 2013, South African soybean crushing 
capacity has been substantially expanded to approximately 2.1 million tons per year. 
South Africa is still constrained in soya production albeit being a surplus producer of maize. 
The country is generally reliant on imported soya with Argentina being the main source of South 
African soya cake (Ncube et al, 2016). Figure 16 below compares soya bean prices per ton in South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil and Zambia. South African soya prices generally reflect the Argentina and 
Brazil prices which are the main sources of imports. The Zambian prices have been on a downward 
trend since 2010 reflecting the increase in production that the country is currently experiencing. 
Moreover, the Zambian prices are below the South African prices in 2013, 2014 and 2016, thus 
showing the increasing competitiveness of Zambia as a soya producing country.  
                                                          
3271 Ncube et al, 2016 
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Figure 18: Soya prices per ton U$ 
 
*The 2016 prices are up to September and July 2016 for Zambia and South Africa. 
Source: Zengeni, 2017  
 
Despite the decrease in Zambian prices, these are still at times higher than the imputed price of the 
processed product imported from Argentina (Figure 16), raising important questions about the 
conditions that would be necessary for Zambia to reach the scale and cost structure to enable import-
substitution from deep-sea sources for both soybeans and oilcake. Necessary conditions include, 
amongst others, investment to support agriculture production and storage facilities. The need to invest 
in storage facilities is important, given that one of the largest feed producers in Botswana indicated 
the poor quality of soybeans from Zambia was due to a lack of storage (Ncube et al., 2017). The 
potential to replace deep-sea soya imports from South America into South Africa’s poultry feed sector 
by imports from Zambia is recognised in the latest iteration of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 
Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), reinforcing the importance of developing regional value chains. 
“A team is now working with the regional soya and poultry industry and logistics providers to focus 
on the price points required to enable processed soya to be landed at prices that are competitive with 
or better than deep-sea imports” (IPAP, 2017/18 – 2019/20). 
South Africa’s exports of poultry have been substantially lower, mainly to the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU). At the beginning of 2013, poultry exports increased from US$4.7 
million in the fourth quarter of 2012 to US$22 million in the first quarter of 2013 and remained at 
around these levels thereafter (Figure 15 above). The increase was largely due to a sharp recorded 
increase in exports to Lesotho and Namibia as a result of the improvement in the recording of intra-
SACU trade from 2013 and under-reporting before that point (Ncube et al, 2016).  
 
 
1.4.3.3.4. Key investments  
 
Due to high levels of integration, investments in the poultry value chain are very costly and typically 
require huge capital outlays to sustain the high working capital requirements. Importing grandparent 
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stock can cost up to R8 million a flock (Grimbeek and Lekezwa, 2013), and it can take anything from 
15 to 24 months from receipt of grandparent stock to produce the first commercial-level day old chick 
(Bagopi et al., 2014; SAPA, 2014i). Due to this lengthy production cycle, new poultry producers 
require up to two years’ worth of capital to sustain their business before they earn revenue from the 
sale of their first commercial broilers. 
Notwithstanding, the South African poultry industry has experienced investments in different 
stages of the value chain, evidenced by the expansion of operations by existing firms as well as the 
entry of new firms. For instance, in 2014, CBH had acquired a loan of $25 million from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) for the installation of soya deactivation plants at two of its 
feed mills, and increasing its broiler processing capacity in South Africa (IFC, 2013). The loans were 
also for increasing day-old chick production in Botswana and Zambia. 
The entry of Grain Fields Chicken (GFC) saw a total investment of R350 million, with the 
abattoir alone costing R200 million to construct. The establishment of GFC occurred through a joint 
venture between VBK and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). VKB borrowed 
approximately R88 million from the IDC which the IDC sourced from the Department of Labour's 
Unemployment Insurance Fund as well as from the Agro Processing Competitiveness Scheme (IDC, 
2014). The role of development finance from the IDC has played a crucial role, however the ‘patient’ 
nature of the total capital expenditure contributed even more to GFC’s successful entry. For instance, 
GFC had four successive years of significant losses before making a profit in its fifth year of 
operation. The diverse operations of its parent company, VKB, assisted in sustaining the business 
owners during this time.  
Other investments involve the 2006 acquisition of Daybreak Farms at a cost of R120 million, 
which marked Afgri’s re-entry into the broiler business. At the time, Daybreak was a fully integrated 
broiler producer, processor and distributor of poultry products in South Africa. Afgri saw its 
participation in the broiler business as a strategic investment to ensure the growth of its animal feed 
business. Accordingly, the acquisition of Daybreak saw Afgri embark on a significant drive to 
increase the production capacity of its new broiler business. Afgri undertook an estimated expenditure 
of R410 million to expand their broiler business. The expansion increased weekly production capacity 
from approximately 325 000 birds to 650 000 birds per week in 2009. Afgri’s expansion of its broiler 
business continued in 2010 with the acquisitions of Midway Chix, a Limpopo-based hatchery with 
capacity to produce 875 000 chicks per week as well as the acquisition of another broiler producer, 
Rossgro Chickens, with a capacity of 350 000 chickens per week. It also secured broiler supply from 
local growers located near the old Daybreak farm in Delmas, Mpumalanga. The overall production 
capacity of Afgri Poultry increased rapidly to over 1 million birds per week. 
There have also been significant investments by South African firms in the region. For 
instance, in Mozambique, Astral recently constructed a hatchery called Mozpintos and is currently 
investing in a breeder farm. In Zambia, it has introduced a new broiler breed, the Lohmann Meat. 
CBH has also been expanding into the rest of the southern African region and other parts of Africa. 
It has expanded its operations in Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Swaziland. It 
has also recently received conditional competition approval from the Botswana Competition 
Authority to acquire the KFC business in Botswana (Botswana Competition Authority, 2015). 
 
1.4.3.4.Trends in concentration and outcomes of key cases in South Africa 
 
951 
 
To reiterate, the poultry value chain is highly concentrated, typically at each stage of the value chain. 
At the feed stock level, the five major producers —Nutri Feeds (Pty) Limited, Epol, Meadow Feeds, 
Nova Feeds and Daybreak— account for almost 50 per cent of the total animal feed production in 
South Africa. The breeding stock level is also highly concentrated, with only three players— 
Rainbow Chicken, Astral and CBH. These companies hold exclusive commercial genetic breeding 
licenses. As a result, any producer seeking to participate within the poultry value chain in South 
Africa would need to purchase breeding stock from Rainbow Chicken, Astral and CBH, whether for 
their own production or for commercial sales. 
In the early 2000s, the breeding stock market was effectively a duopoly. Astral had a market 
share of 69% of breeding stock, while its main competitor, Rainbow Chicken, had a market share of 
26% of the great grandparent market. This changed around 2007 due to the introduction of a new 
breed by CBH (discussed in section 4.5 below). At the downstream level, the two major poultry 
producers— Rainbow Chicken and Astral—produce 46 per cent of total broiler meat production 
(DAFF 2014). 
The poultry industry has continued to consolidate, as well as vertically integrate, increasing 
concentration levels, as evidenced by mergers and acquisition activity in the past 7 years (Table 14). 
Table 15 outlines the mergers which were approved conditionally. The overall competitive effect of 
these mergers is mixed. On one hand, there has been rationalisation and acquisitions to ensure security 
of supply to manage processing costs (Pioneer). On the other hand, there have been acquisitions as 
part of expansion into new geographic markets (Astral and Rainbow). While these mergers may not 
immediately raise competition concerns, concerns about market power in local and regional markets 
arise should the trend of acquisitions continue. 
 
Table 14: Merger Activity in the Poultry Sector (2010 – 2016) 
 
 Case No. Primary Acquiring Firm Primary Target Firm Size Status 
2010May5134 
Country Fair Foods, a division 
of Astral Operations Limited 
Vredebest (Pty) Ltd and Byways 
Poultry Farm (Pty) Ltd S Approved 
2010Sep5336 Daybreak Farms (Pty) Ltd  Rossgro Chickens (Pty) Ltd L Approved 
2011Apr0016 Astral Operations Ltd 
The Abbatoir business operated 
by Corpclo 2410 (Pty) Ltd I Approved* 
2011Jun0102 Afgri Operations Limited Pride Milling Company (Pty) Ltd L Approved 
2011Nov0375 
Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd and 
Vector Logistics (Pty) Ltd 
Bushvalley Chickens Partnership 
and Rodev Chickens (Pty) Ltd I Approved 
2012Jun0356 Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 
Lohmann Breeding SA (Pty) Ltd 
and Avichick (Pty) Ltd I Approved 
2012Jul0370 Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 
DFC Breeder Farm (Pty) Ltd and 
DFC Broiler Farm (Pty) Ltd I Approved 
2012Nov0653 Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd Amaqanda Farms (Pty) Ltd S Approved 
2013Oct0481 
AgriGroupe Holdings (Pty) 
Ltd AFGRI Limited L Approved 
2015Jun0312 
VKB Agriculture Proprietary 
Limited, Louis Dreyfus  
The Kromdraai Group of 
Companies L Approved* 
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2015Jul0435 Sovereign Foods  
Quantum Foods Proprietary 
Limited I Approved 
2015Nov0647 
Quantum Foods Proprietary 
Limited 
Olifantskop Feeds Proprietary 
Limited I Approved 
2016Feb0052 AFGRI Operations Limited 
Pride Milling Company 
(Proprietary) Limited L Pending 
2016Aug0411 VKB Landbou (Pty) Limited  
Lomina Vyf (Pty) Ltd trading as 
Farmpak I Approved 
2016Aug0410 
Country Bird Holdings 
Proprietary Limited  
Sovereign Food Investments 
Limited I Approved*  
2016DEC0004 
The Humansdorp Co-
Operative Limited and 
Friendshelf 1722 (Pty) Ltd 
Umtiza Farmers Corp Limited 
and the business of UFC Trust I Approved 
*Approved with conditions (outlined in Table 15 below) 
Source: Competition Commission website 
 
Table 15: Mergers approved with conditions 
 
Merger (Case No.) Conditions 
Astral vs Corpclo (2011Apr0016) • The Corpclo shareholders shall continue to 
source, on average over a period of 6 months, no 
less than 90,000 day-old chicks per week from 
Stonor. 
 
• Transparent prices and terms and conditions for 
each for dealings between Astral and Corpclo. 
 
• All discounts and incentive schemes offered by 
the Astral Group will be communicated separately 
from the day-old chick and broiler feed prices, and 
will not be designed so as to compel the Corpclo 
shareholders to source broiler feed and day-old 
chicks from the Astral Group to the exclusion of 
competitors. 
 
• The Corpclo shareholders will report to the 
Commission every three months on their 
obligation to procure from Stonor. 
VKB vs Kromdaai (2015Jun0312) • Merging parties shall not retrench any employees 
at the merged entity as a result of the merger 
• VKB shall give first preference to the affected 
employees should positions arise at VKB for a 
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period of 12 months after the approval of the 
merger 
CBH vs Sorereign (2016Aug0410) • no merger-specific job losses for an indefinite 
period; 
 
• the introduction of a 4% B-BBEE shareholding in 
Sovereign Foods within 2 years of CBH acquiring 
substantial shareholding in Sovereign Foods. 
Source: Competition Commission website 
 
Adding County Fair as part of Astral together with Astral’s acquisition of National Chicken (Natchix) 
in 2002 and Earlybird Farms in 2004 increased the total Astral’s group broiler production to just 
below that of Rainbow. Rainbow has also expanded their operations through strategic acquisitions of 
Vector Logistics in 2004 which resulted in the company becoming even more vertically integrated in 
the poultry supply chain3272. 
There have been further 9 cases of notified mergers and acquisitions in animal feed and 
poultry between 2010 and 2015. Pioneer made two acquisitions in 2012, both of which included 
broiler breeding and layer operations. Pioneer’s primary rationale for these acquisitions was the need 
to ensure increased throughput for its existing abattoirs. Pioneer also acquired Amaqanda farms, 
which appears to have been a previous contract egg producer for Pioneer. 
Astral’s acquisition in early-2011 of broiler breeding farms and abattoir facilities in the 
KwaZulu-Natal region was done primarily to expand its footprint into a new geographic area. Astral 
Foods (County Fair) also acquired three broiler farms in the Western Cape, near Paarl. The 
Commission held that the transaction will not lessen competition significantly, as these farms 
previously provided most of their production to the Astral group. Rainbow’s acquisition of a 
processing facility in the Tzaneen area in September 2011 was also aimed at entering a new 
geographic market. 
Large poultry mergers reported in the 2010-2015 period involved the acquisitions by Afgri of 
Midway Chix, a Limpopo-based hatchery with capacity to produce 875 000 chicks per week, and 
Rossgro Chickens, with a capacity of 350 000 chickens per week. However, on 1 April 2015, Afgri 
divested its poultry operations together with the Kinross Animal Feeds Mill to AFPO Consortium 
(Pty) Ltd; a transaction funded by the Public Investment Corporation (PIC). Following this 
transaction, Agfri Poultry was renamed Daybreak Farms. Daybreak Farms is the first fully black-
owned vertically integrated poultry firm with the scale (at broiler production and feed level) to 
potentially compete against the larger incumbents. 
The features of the poultry business thus mean that the sector is dominated by a small number 
of large vertically integrated businesses. The businesses also generally have strategic linkages into 
related areas of agricultural value chain such as maize and soya production, milling and storage, and 
logistics. The concentrated nature of the sector means there is likely to be scope for the exertion of 
market power, whether unilaterally or through coordinated arrangements. The behaviour of the large 
producers influences the space for smaller entrepreneurial producers and the spread of activities.  
 
                                                          
3272 See cases 113/LM/Nov05, 74/LM/Sep04, 57/LM/Aug04 ,69/AM/Dec01 
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1.4.3.5.Overview of other competition interventions  
 
Despite the highlighted episodes of entry, the South African poultry industry is still highly 
concentrated, with significant barriers to entry. Furthermore, local producers and suppliers of parent 
stock have exclusive supply agreements with overseas suppliers. For instance, as a result of the high 
barriers to entry and limited countervailing power due to lack of alternatives, the duopoly of Rainbow 
Farms (Rainbow) and Astral dominated the market in South Africa for many years due to the fact 
that they were the only commercial suppliers of parent breeding stock. 
Several competition cases in the poultry sector illustrate the potential for incumbents to raise 
entry barriers and exclude smaller rivals. The case brought by CBH against Astral demonstrates the 
importance of obtaining a high performing breed, and highlights how competition law can open 
access to markets3273. CBH was a major poultry producer in Zimbabwe and Botswana before entering 
South African poultry market in 1992, through a joint venture with Astral and National Chick Limited 
(Natchix) known as the Elite Joint Venture. 
One of the terms of the joint venture was obliging CBH to source at least 90% of its breeding 
stock from Elite, effectively preventing CBH from trading with Astral’s rivals. CBH lodged a 
complaint of exclusionary abuse with the Competition Commission in 2007, following which CBH 
exited the Elite joint venture shortly thereafter to establish a rival breeding business with the new 
breed known as Arbor Acres, also sourced from Aviagen. This saw the entry of a third breed into the 
South Africa market to challenge the Astral/RCL duopoly. Astral has since settled the allegations 
with the Commission, admitting to the contravention of section 8(c) and 4(1) (b) (i) for which it was 
fined R16.7.3 million. 
Incumbents can thus foreclose downstream rivals from inputs, and this might require rivals to 
enter at both upstream and downstream levels, substantially increasing the entry costs. In the Elite 
case, the fact that Rainbow was vertically integrated effectively meant there were no good 
competitors to Astral and its Ross breed. Similarly, there could be customer foreclosure where 
incumbents control abattoirs which are required to buy and process the birds from independents. 
Nonetheless, it does not appear as if there have been cases reported in this regard. 
There have also been cases of collusive conduct penalised across the animal feed to poultry 
value chain between 2010 and 2016 (Table 16).3274 In 2013 Astral, through its subsidiary County 
Fair, admitted to entering into an agreement with a competitor (Pioneer through its division known 
as Tydstroom Poultry) to fix the prices of fresh poultry in the Western Cape for a period between 
2003 and 2007. Astral was subsequently charged an administrative penalty of over R16 million. There 
were also several cases in grain storage, which will be discussed in section 5 below. 
 
Table 16: Cartels in the Animal to Poultry Value Chain (2010 – 20163275) 
 
Cartel Firms involved Date Case No.  Penalty 
Animal feed 
Wes Enterprises, 
MGK Operating Company 2013  017517/017509 R 34355.43   
                                                          
3273 Competition Tribunal (2011, 2013). 
3274 This only shows cases that were successfully penalized. There several other cases that were not referred and penalized 
by the Competition Tribunal. 
3275 There is no record of other cartels penalized beyond 2013 
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Poultry 
Astral Operations, 
Tydstroom 2013  015891 
R 16 732 
894.47 
Poultry 
Astral Operations, 
Country Bird 2013 No.74/CR/JUN08 No penalty 
Source: Competition Tribunal 
 
The Commission has also investigated a case of market allocation, exclusive supply agreements and 
information exchange against all members of the South African Poultry Association (SAPA) under a 
single case (no. 2009Apr4389). The Commission’s investigation focused on the largest players which 
are all integrated up to the feed level, namely Rainbow Chickens, Astral, Pioneer and CBH. The 
allegations included market allocation by Pioneer and Rainbow; exclusive supply agreements 
involving all broiler producers; tying allegations against certain breeding stock suppliers; and 
information exchange against all the companies. However, following undertakings by the 
respondents, the Commission took a decision not to refer the exclusive supply agreement as well as 
information exchange allegations. Thus, the Commission did not prosecute Astral for the above-
mentioned conducts. 
At the feed level, the Commission uncovered collusive conduct and penalised two companies 
- Wes Enterprises and MGK Operating Company – for fixing the prices of animal feed. The 
Commission’s investigation revealed that Wes Enterprises entered into an agreement with MGK’s 
retail division to supply MGK with its products which MGK would then sell in its retail stores to 
farmers countrywide. Wes also issued its distributors with the price list that indicated the price at 
which distributors can obtain the products from Wes as well as the suggested prices to farmers. 
A post-intervention assessment of the competition concerns highlighted above indicates some 
positive results. The Astral/CBH ruling has led to the introduction of a new breed in the South African 
poultry value chain, effectively increasing rivalry in the supply of breeding stock. This saw increase 
in production volumes accompanied by the decline in margins of major producers from around the 
time restrictions on CBH ended in 2007 (Ncube et al, 2016). Further, following the unearthing of the 
animal feed cartel, there is clear decline in feed prices from late 2013/early 2014 (Figure 14 above). 
On the other hand, the conditions imposed on some of the mergers have mainly aimed at addressing 
public interest concerns only, particularly the potential loss of employment. While these have helped 
in safeguarding jobs that would have otherwise been lost as a result of the mergers, they trend towards 
increasing concentration and vertical integration remains a concern. 
However, in the Astral/Corpclo merger, the Commission did find the potential for the merged entity 
to foreclose rivals in the supply of day old chicks and animal feed. The undertakings by the merging 
parties to ensure transparent prices and the agreement that discounts and incentives would not be 
designed so as to compel Corpclo to source feed and day-old chicks from Astral to the exclusion of 
competitors, have helped to alleviate the foreclosure concerns. 
 
1.4.4. Dairy Value Chain 
 
1.4.4.1.A mapping of the key players and ownership structure 
 
The dairy value chain (Figure 17) involves a number of activities including the production and 
marketing of raw milk, pasteurized milk and cream, fermented milk, long-life milk and cream, 
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yoghurt, cheese and its by-product whey, milk powder, sweetened and unsweetened concentrated 
milk, butter and butter oil (ghee). 
 
Figure 19: Dairy industry marketing channels 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (2012a) 
 
There are two main sources of raw milk for processing: commercial dairy farms and small and 
medium dairy farms. Milk from commercial dairy farms usually goes straight into bulk collection for 
dairy processors who then produce dairy products such as cheese, butter and yoghurt. The products 
are then either exported or channelled into primary distribution which goes to retailers and smaller in 
formal trade institutions which then goes to consumers. Small and medium dairy farms either supply 
consumers (producer-distributors) or contribute to the bulk collection of milk (Midgley, 2016). Dairy 
processors can also import raw milk to use in their production processes. 
The dairy sector in South Africa consists of a number of large players. Figure 18 below 
contains the market shares of different companies in the dairy sector based on retail value. In 2016, 
the firms with the highest market shares in terms of retail value were Clover (17.5%), Lactalis the 
maker of popular Parmalat brand (14.6%) and Dairybelle3276 with 5.4%. What stands out about the 
sector is the presence of multinational company with operations in a number of countries within and 
outside Africa at various levels of the value chain including in the packaging and transport logistics 
of dairy products. 
 
                                                          
3276 DairyBelle was liquidated in May 2017, See: http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/dairybelles-assets-to-be-
auctioned-off-9456293  
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Figure 20: Company market shares of dairy products based on retail value, 2011 -2016 
 
Source: Euromonitor (2017) 
 
An analysis of market shares at an aggregate dairy product level gives the appearance of a very 
competitive sector with several players. However, an analysis by type of dairy products provides a 
different picture with one or two companies having significant market shares. Euromonitor (2017) 
provides markets shares by different type of dairy products: Cheese; drinking milk products; yogurt 
and sour milk products and other products. 
For drinking milk products, Clover has the highest market share in terms of retail value with 
35.5%, more than twice the market share of its next competitor. Pick ‘n’ Pay and Parmalat follows 
with 11.9% and 11.6% respectively (Figure 21). Together these three companies hold 59% of the 
market share. In terms of cheese products, Parmalat has the highest market share of 28%. Dairybelle 
and Clover follow with market shares of 15% and 11% respectively. These three again hold a 
combined market share of 54% of the market. However, the market shares held by the incumbents 
may be underestimated because they most likely produce the house brand milk products sold by Pick 
n Pay and other retail supermarkets. 
For yoghurt and sour milk products, Danone is the dominant player, holding 41% of the 
market share, several times the market share of its closest competitors Parmalat and Clover each with 
6% market share. For other milk products including chilled desserts and coffee whiteners, Nestlé 
leads with a 35% market share followed by National Brands with 18% and Danone with 10%. Clover 
continues to lead drinking milk products and accounted for 36% value share in 2016, a share three 
times that of its closest competitor. Clover, Parmalat, Danone and Dairybelle make repeated 
appearances in terms of high market share of the different types of products. 
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Figure 21: Market shares of various dairy products, 2016 
 
 
Source: Euromonitor (2017) 
Note: Drinking milk products include flavoured milk drinks, milk, powder milk and milk alternative 
while other dairy products include Chilled and shelf desserts, chilled snacks, coffee whiteners, 
condensed milk, cream and fromage frais and quark. 
 
Clover SA (Pty) was established in1994 but originated from a butter factory formed as early 
as 1898 in KwaZulu-Natal Midlands (Ncube et al., 2016). The company produces a number of dairy 
products including milk, cheese, cream, condensed milk, flavoured milk drinks, juice and bottled 
water (Euromonitor, 2017).  In 1998, Clover and Danone formed the joint-venture Danone Clover 
(Pty) Ltd in which Clover supplied Danone with a number of service the production of yoghurt and 
other sour milk products. The joint venture came to an end in 2010 when Danone Clover became 
Danone Southern Africa (Pty Ltd taking over the Danone brand in yoghurt and sour milk drinks 
(Euromonitor, 2017). Clover maintained an agreement with Danone in which Clover would continue 
to produce Danone’s yoghurt products which expired in December 2014. In 2003 the company listed 
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on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Clover diversified its product offering by acquiring Real 
Juice Co Holdings (Pty) Ltd from AVI Ltd in 2012 and acquiring the yoghurt and long-life/UHT milk 
business of Dairybelle in 2014 for ZAR 200 million (Clover, 2014). Clover also provides distribution 
and logistics services which incidentally contributes 50% of the company’s revenue despite making 
up about 30% of Clover’s operations (Ncube et al., 2016). 
Parmalat began operations in South Africa in 1998 and is a subsidiary of Lactalis, a French 
dairy company, the largest in the world by turnover (Ncube et al., 2016). Some of its products include 
Parmalat Everfresh UHT milk, Steri Stumpie flavoured drinking milk, milk powder, cheeses under 
the brand names Simonsberg, Melrose and Bonnita brands, Bonnita-branded butter, yoghurt. maas, 
and custard, and Aylesbury ice cream. It also produces a range of fruit juices under the PureJoy brand. 
Parmalat operates a UHT milk processing plant and UHT warehouse in Parow (Western Cape) and 
in Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape). Its annual milk demand amounts to approximately 400 million litres 
(Ncube et al., 2016).  
Nestlé South Africa was first established in South Africa in 1866 although it was only 
formally registered in 1916.  It has eight manufacturing facilities and three distribution centres across 
the country. Nestlé’s dairy segment comprises concentrated dairy products such as KLIM, Nespray 
and Nido instant milk powder, evaporated milk, and condensed milk. It also produces dairy-based 
powdered beverages such as Milo, Nesquik and Nestlé Hot Chocolate. Nestlé does not produce fresh 
or UHT milk in South Africa. Nestlé procures its own raw milk, but outsources the conversion of raw 
milk into milk powder to other processors including Clover and Parmalat. They pay a conversion cost 
to these processors and use the milk powder in the production of their dairy-based beverages (Ncube 
et al., 2016).  
Danone entered the South African market when it created a joint venture with Clover SA.3277 
In 2010, Danone acquired 100% of the joint-venture creating Danone Southern Africa which also 
operates in Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. The company 
specializes in the production of fresh dairy products and desserts. Some of its brands include 
Nutriday, Ultra Mel, Yogi Sip, Inkomazi and Activia. The company has two manufacturing facilities 
based in Gauteng which makes use of 5% of all milk produced in South Africa.  
Woodlands Dairy first began operations in 1995 when it packaged milk from the Woodlands 
Farm. They now manufacture a range of concentrated dairy products including cheese, butter, cream, 
amazi, flavoured milk, and extended shelf-life fresh milk in addition to packaging private label UHT 
milk for Spar and Woolworths (Ncube et al., 2016).3278 It is based in Humansdorp in the Eastern 
Cape. Its majority-shareholder, with a 75% stake in the company, is Gutsche Family Investments 
(GFI). The remaining 25% of Woodlands Dairy is held by African Pioneer Limited and Nozala 
Investments (Pty) Ltd. 
 
1.4.4.2.Regulatory framework 
 
The South African dairy industry is regulated primarily by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (DAFF) although certain regulation pertaining to the dairy industry is regulated by other 
government departments including the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Department of 
                                                          
3277 Danone website. 
3278 Woodlands Dairy website. Available at http://www.woodlandsdairy.co.za/  
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Health (DOH). Some of the main legislation governing the sector include the following (Dairy 
Standard Agency, 2016):  
• Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act, 1972 (Act 54 of 1972) – governing most the 
health-related aspects in the industry 
• The Animal Diseases Act, 1984, Act 35 of 1984 
• Export: Veterinary procedural Notice 20/2010-01 Standards for the registration of a 
veterinary approved dairy establishment for export. 
• Agricultural Product Standard Act, 1990, Act 119 of 1990 
• South African Bureau of Standards compulsory and non-compulsory standards relating to 
Food safety and Quality 
• International Standards Organisation requirements and guidelines 
• Codex standards relating to production of various products and processes along the value 
chain 
Other than the above legislation, there are also guidelines for the operation of the sector. These 
include3279: 
• Code of Practice for Milk Producers 
• Code of Practice for the Secondary Industry 
• Documentation Development 
• Guidelines for the interpretation of quality problems in milk 
• Guide to Dairy Product Labelling 
• International Dairy Federation/Food Agriculture Organisation (IDF/FAO) Guideline 
Documentation on: Animal Production and Health; Guide to Good Farming Practice 2004 
New dairy regulation R260 was introduced by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
and implemented in March 2016. The regulation requires firms to indicate ingredients lists, batch 
codes and best by/use by/sell by dates on packaging. It further added restrictions with fat content 
categorization (Euromonitor, 2017). Products with 4.5% fat are considered high fat products,  3.3-
4.5% fat as full fat, 1.5%-3.3% as medium fat,  1.5-3.3% fat as low fat and products containing 0.5-
1.5% fat as fat-free (Euromonitor, 2017). These appear not to be prohibitive. While strict, it just 
requires companies to change their labelling. Few companies changed their recipes to fit the new 
categories. 
 
1.4.4.3.Performance of the South African dairy sector 
1.4.4.3.1. Production and trade in the dairy sector  
 
As of 2014, whole fresh cow milk was the third largest agricultural product in terms of tonnage and 
fifth highest in terms of value (Midgley, 2016).  Milk production has grown consistently over the 
years with an average annual growth rate of just over 2% from 1960 million litres in 2000 to 2780 
litres in 2014 (Figure 22). The number of producers has by contrast dropped, from 5980 in 2000 to 
1890 in 2014, pointing towards a trend of fewer farms with larger herds and production capacity.  
 
                                                          
3279 Dairy Standard Agency website. 
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Figure 22: Milk Production in South Africa (2000 - 2014) 
 
Source: Milk Producers’ Organisation 
 
The emergence of these large commercial farms also points towards the growing consolidation and 
concentration of the sector discussed further in section 7.4. The large farms producing more than 
5000 litres of milk per day currently supply about 80% of the total milk production in South Africa 
(Ncube et al., 2016). The economies of scale characterised by such large production can raise the 
barriers to entry for smaller entrants into the sector. 
 
1.4.4.3.2. Prices in the Dairy sector 
 
Average prices for dairy products have been consistently increasing between 2011 and 2016 for 
different dairy products particularly for fresh and long-life milk (Table 17). Prices for Fresh milk rose 
by 9% and 10% on average for full cream and low fat milk respectively for the period under review. 
 
Table 17: Average Domestic Prices for Dairy Products, 2011 - 2016 
Product Unit 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAG
R 
Fresh Full Cream Milk 1 Litre 8.53 9.38 10.09 11.35 12.13 12.9
6 
9% 
Long Life Full Cream 
Milk 
1 Litre 9.55 10.2
2 
10.87 11.98 12.77 13.4
3 
7% 
Fresh Low Fat Milk 1 Litre 8.74 9.79 10.78 12.48 13.38 14.3
6 
10% 
Long Life Low Fat Milk 1 Litre 9.61 10.4
1 
11.00 12.06 12.68 13.3
0 
7% 
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Plain Yoghurt 500 
Gram 
12.8
1 
13.5
8 
14.08 14.84 15.54 15.8
0 
4% 
Flavoured Yoghurt 500 
Gram 
12.4
0 
11.9
4 
13.88 14.59 15.38 16.0
8 
5% 
Cheddar Cheese Per 
Kilogra
m 
87.3
7 
94.3
2 
103.4
9 
111.8
7 
119.5
2 
98.7
5 
2% 
Sour Milk 1 Litre 10.9
1 
12.0
0 
12.72 13.26 13.76 15.2
6 
7% 
Custard 1 Litre 21.4
4 
22.0
7 
22.71 23.93 24.67 25.5
5 
4% 
Source: Stats SA (Statistics South Africa). (n.d)  
 
The difference between retail and producer prices (farm to retail price spread) displayed in Figure 23 
below rose from R5.44 per litre in January 2010 to R8.95 in July 2017. In 2015, retail prices dropped 
following a fall in producer prices in previous months. This was likely due to the drought that affected 
milk produced. Retail prices in 2016 rose significantly and disproportionately from the growth in 
producer prices.  
Figure 23: Monthly milk producer and retail prices, 2010 - 20163280 
 
Source: (MPO, 2017) 
 
1.4.4.3.3. Imports and exports 
 
                                                          
3280 The retail prices reflected in the figure are of fresh milk per litre for milk packaged in 2-litre plastic containers and 
are compared to producer prices. 
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In terms of trade data, exports have grown with a CAGR of 21% while the CAGR for imports was 
6%. Exports experienced particularly strong growth in 2010. This dropped in 2015. Between 2009 
and 2012, imports were experiencing consistent growth but the value of imports began to drop in 
2013 (Figure 24).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Total South African Imports and Exports of Dairy products, 2006 – 2016 
 
Source: UN Comtrade data. Note: net exports are on the RHS axis 
 
From 2010 onwards, exports of dairy products have been significantly higher than imports in to the 
region. A large proportion of these exports have been to the SADC region (Figure 25). In 2009, while 
there is a large spike in exports of the main categories of dairy products, as previously noted, this 
spike is exacerbated by SACU exports now being included in SA’s export data figures. There is 
growth of exports into the SADC region nonetheless, and this is likely due to the growing trend of 
expansion of South African retail chains into southern Africa (das Nair and Chisoro, 2016).  
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Figure 25: Dairy Exports form SA to SADC (2005 – 2016) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade data 
 
1.4.4.4.Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases 
1.4.4.4.1. Overview of competition interventions 
 
At the lower levels of the value chain, there has been considerable consolidation. At the primary 
level, as of January 2016, there were 1683 milk producers, a decline of 54% from 3665 in January 
2008 (Milk Producers’ Organisation, 2016). The reduction in the number of milk producers, however 
did not result in a similar decline in milk production but rather coincided with increased productivity 
by large scale farmers (Figure 22).  At the secondary level, the number of producer-distributors 
dropped from 178 in September 2008 to 115 in April 2016 while the number of milk buyers dropped 
from 163 to 150 during the same period (Milk Producers’ Organisation, 2016). While there are about 
150 milk buyers in the country, the four largest milk buyers (which are also the main processors, 
(Clover, Nestlé, Parmalat, and Woodlands) purchase more than 50% of the total milk production 
(Ncube et al., 2016).  
The continued concentration in the sector particularly amongst the milk buyers has resulted 
in the substantial bargaining power being held by a small number of buyers. It is perhaps in response 
to this that the South African Milk Co-operative (Samilco) made up of dairy farmers applied for an 
exemption from the Competition Commission in August 2013 to enable their members to participate 
in collective price negotiations with milk processors. The exemption was to allow for the possible 
sharing of sensitive information during the collective negotiations.3281 The exemption was amended 
in October 2014 to include an “equalization mechanism”. Under the equalization mechanism, a 
farmer who produced milk in excess of the amount required in a stipulated contract would re-
distribute the milk to farmers who had been unable to meet their contract volumes enabling them to 
satisfy their contracts. Before this mechanism was implemented, the farmer who produced excess 
                                                          
3281 The initial exemption application was published in the Government Gazette, No. 36760. 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/36760_gen856.pdf  
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milk would generally sell it to the processors at lower prices than the contract price. In this way, the 
farmers could meet their volumes at the higher contract prices. The exemption highlights the 
existence of the asymmetric bargaining power in the industry and is also reflected in the complaint 
the MPO brought against the major retail chains in 2009, alleging that the supermarkets used their 
bargaining power to suppress prices at the farm.3282 
Concentrated sectors such as this one are often characterized by concerns of collusive and 
anti-competitive conduct. At least four cases have been brought against the dairy industry since the 
early 2000s and include most of the main players identified above. 
In 2006, the Competition Commission of South Africa brought four main charges against 
Clover South Africa, Parmalat, Ladismith Cheese, Woodlands Dairy, Nestlé, Lancewood and 
Milkwood Dairy for collusive conduct, the price fixing and the use of exclusive supply agreements 
between 1 January 2002 and 30 March 2006. The charges concerned the following: 
• The information exchange between the processors which allowed them to agree on the 
purchase price of raw milk. 
• Milk supply and exchange agreements between Clover, Parmalat, Woodlands and Nestlé in 
which they agreed to sell their surplus milk to one another, rather than to sell it to end users 
at lower prices which kept retail prices high.  
• Exclusive agreements between Clover and Parmalat and milk producers in which the 
producers were compelled to supply their total milk production exclusively to Clover and 
Parmalat and not to rivals. This prevented the producers from accessing more competitive 
prices from third parties or for smaller processors to access milk supplies. 
• Price-fixing of UHT milk by Clover and Woodlands, and by Woodlands and Milkwood. 
Woodlands and Milkwood were also alleged to have engaged in market division  
The case, however, was dismissed in 2011 on procedural grounds. There were apparent irregularities 
in the way in which the Competition Commission had initiated and investigated the case. The 
Commission withdrew the case in late 2011. 
A more recent competition case has involved an investigation into alleged abuse of dominance 
by Parmalat. The case was initiated in November 2014 and concerns a bonus scheme Parmalat 
implement with the aim to reward milk producers in the Eastern and Western Cape for continuous 
uninterrupted 12 months’ supply of milk to Parmalat.  In August 2016 however, the Commission 
decided to drop the complaint against Parmalat finding that there was insufficient evidence to 
illustrate that competition between milk processors had been substantially lessened as a result of 
Parmalat’s bonus scheme (Competition Commission South Africa, 2016).  
 
1.4.4.4.2. Recent cases (2011- 2016) 
 
At least six mergers took place in the sector for the period under review, the majority of which 
involved Clover, the largest dairy processor in South Africa (Table 18). The mergers involved 
Clover’s attempt to expand into new or niche markets:  In all four cases, Clover is expanding into 
new or niche markets; an expansion into juice in June 2012, into yogurt distribution in November 
2014, and an expansion into Ayrshire milk production in December 2014 via the acquisition of 
Nkunzi Milkway. Acquisition of businesses in adjacent or niche segments appears to be the main 
                                                          
3282 https://mg.co.za/article/2009-07-04-supermarket-chains-investigated 
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means by which firms can obtain access to new and niche markets cost effectively (Ncube et al., 
2016).  
 
Table 18: Mergers and Acquisitions in the Dairy Sector (2011 - 2016) 
Year Primary 
Acquiring Firm 
Primary Target 
Firm 
Size Status Conditions 
2012 Clover SA (Pty) Ltd Real Juice Co. 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
conditionally 
Extension of 
agreements with 
independent 
distributors 
2014 Clover S.A. (Pty) 
Ltd 
Dairybelle's 
Yoghurt/UHT Milk 
Businesses 
L Approved 
conditionally 
Continue to provide 
Danone with secondary 
distribution services 
until June 2015 
 
No retrenchments 
should result from this 
merger.  
 
Clover to create an  
employee grant of R30 
000 to fund business 
opportunities in the 
event of retrenchments. 
2014 Clover S.A. (Pty) 
Ltd 
Nkunzi Milkyway 
(Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
conditionally 
Clover will invest in 
production capacity 
and facility upgrades 
2016 Bongicel 
Proprietary Ltd 
Lusitania Food 
Products 
Proprietary Ltd 
L Approved  
2016 Nestle S.A. (Nestle) P&R Ice Cream 
Public Ltd Co. 
L Approved  
Source: Competition Commission website. 
  
The Competition Commission’s efforts to address competition concerns are illustrated clearly in the 
merger between Clover and Dairybelle.  Clover issued a notice to terminate its provision of secondary 
distribution services of Danone yoghurt products.3283 Prior to the merger, Clover was not in the 
yoghurt business, the issuance of the termination notice could be considered anti-competitive as 
Clover, now a rival would refuse Danone access to essential distribution services. The CCSA’s 
condition in this regard ensured that Clover continued to provide this essential service. 
                                                          
3283 Competition Commission Media Release 16 October 2014. Available here: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Commission-recommends-approval-of-the-acquisition-of-Dairybelles-businesses-by-Clover-
with-conditions.pdf 
967 
 
The other conditions related to the above mergers appear to mostly concern public interest 
issues such as employment. In the Clover/Real Juice merger, the condition related to the continued 
use of independent suppliers particularly with regards to distribution of its juice products rather than 
Clover’s use of its own distribution network, largely to maintain employment. Similarly the condition 
in the Clover/Nkunzi case relating to improved production capacity was a commitment that Clover 
would not shift production from Nkunzi’s Silverton facility in Pretoria to its Clayville facility in 
Johannesburg thereby resulting in retrenchments (Hancock, 2015). Nkunzi was one of only six 
suppliers of Ayrshire milk, a niche product with only one buyer in Woolworths SA.  
 
1.4.4.4.3. Barriers to entry 
 
One of the major barriers to entry in the industry is the significance of logistics in the sector. In 
addition to producing milk, entrants must be able to transport highly perishable raw milk to the 
processing plant. This is costly especially because raw milk is low in value relative to the volume. 
Furthermore, daily output of milk is uncertain and fluctuates daily, as a result, tanker routes must be 
planned daily in order to ensure that the largest volume of milk is collected over the shortest possible 
distance to enable efficiency. The fact that there is no return load further increases the price. This 
challenge exists further down the value chain during transport of finished products from the processor 
to distribution centres and to stores. Managing this logistics process efficiently is often a significant 
challenge for entrants. 
Another important part of the value chain is packaging and labelling of the processed products. 
Packaging costs represent approximately 17% of the cost of finished products. The packaging used 
for fresh and UHT milk is either imported or priced at import parity prices which contribute to the 
significant costs. Due to the absence of supply of this product and high levels of concentration in the 
packaging market, this cost can form a significant barrier to entry for new processing firms.  
The lack of capital is another barrier especially considering the costs required to take a product 
from its raw milk state to processing, packaging and finally distribution. While incentive programmes 
such as the Department of Trade and Industry's Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement 
Programme (MCEP) were available, many of the applicants complained about the lengthy and 
burdensome process involved in acquiring the funding. In many cases, consultants had to be hired to 
guide the firms through the process which further added to their costs. 
 
Mode of entry 
 
The main means of entry into the sector appears to be through the acquisition of smaller firms in new 
or niche markets as illustrated by Clover in the section below. However, dairy firms appear to be 
entering the processing level of the value chain through the establishment of their own milk 
processing plants. For instance, in 2015, the acquisition of Honeydew Dairies in KwaZulu-Natal by 
Dairy Day. Farmers in the Port-Elizabeth region in the Eastern Cape also established Coega Dairy in 
2015.  
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1.4.5. Milling Value Chain 
 
1.4.5.1.A mapping of the key players and ownership structures 
 
The maize and wheat value chains form an important part of the food processing sector as main 
sources of food for the economy. It is also a sector that has been characterized by cartel conduct from 
established incumbents after the liberalisation of the sector. Anti-competitive conduct has been 
present from storage and trading through processing (milling) to collusion in final product prices of 
bread and white maize products.  
The figure below illustrates the main areas of the maize value chain (Figure 24). Farmers and 
producers source their seeds from input suppliers. Their harvest is then transported to silo owners of 
which there is a limited number due to the expense required to construct a silo. There have in fact 
been no new constructions of silos since before the 1990s. From the silos, the products are then 
transported to traders, to exporters or to the local market for sale. At the local market, the products 
are sold to the animal feed industry, to maize millers or to other millers such as wet milling and 
brewing. The products are then exported or sold to the wholesale/retail market where it is accessed 
by the final consumer. 
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Figure 26: Maize Market Value Chain 
 
Source: Louw et al. (2010) 
 
There are four main players in the maize meal and wheat value chains: Tiger Brands Ltd, Pioneer 
Foods, Foodcorp (now RCL Foods) and Premier (Ncube et al., 2016).  
Tiger Consumer Brands Ltd was founded in 1921 and listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
exchange in 1925. The company manufactures and distributes products in several FMCG products 
including packaged food, home and personal care products, baby care products and soft drinks 
(Euromonitor 2017; Ncube et al. 2016). It also has substantial market share in a number of food 
segments including baked goods (25.3%), Breakfast cereals (23.1%), Confectionery (23.2%).  
Pioneer Foods is a result of a merger between Bokomo (a milling company formed in 1920) 
and Sasko (a wheat producer formed in 1929). It was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 
2008. It is one of the largest manufacturers and distributors of packaged food, non- alcoholic drinks, 
and related products in South Africa (Euromonitor, 2017).  
RCL Foods (previously Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd) is one of the largest food producers in South 
Africa. It made up of four subsidiaries Foodcorp, Rainbow Chicken, TSB and Vector which involve 
poultry production, sugar production, milling and baking as well as a logistics division among other 
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consumer products.3284 Its product range includes peanut butter, pet food, mayonnaise, edible oils, 
bread and bakery products, canned pilchards as well traditional South African products such as rusks 
and white maize meal (Euromonitor 2017; Ncube et al. 2016). 
Premier Foods was founded in 1882 in Port Elizabeth as a fast-moving consumer goods 
company. It operates 16 bakeries, 5 wheat mills, 2 maize mills, a sugar confectionery plant and 24 
distribution depots in South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho. It also has a home and personal operation 
based in the United Kingdom.3285  
An analysis of company market shares of baked goods by retail value, Pioneer Foods and 
Tiger Brands have the highest shares with a 30% and 25% respectively. Company market shares have 
been maintained over the last six years (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27: Company market shares for baked goods by retail sales value, 2011 - 2016 
 
Source: Euromonitor (2017) 
Note: The baked goods category includes bread, cakes, dessert mixes, frozen baked goods and 
pastries 
 
1.4.5.2.Regulatory framework 
 
Some of the main regulations governing the milling sector are as follows3286: 
• Consumer Protection Act – Labelling of GMO’s 
• Act 36 of 1947 Fertilisers, Farm Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies. Proposed 
Repeal of Regulation R2054 (% moisture on Hominy Chop). 
• Act No. 119 of 1990 Agricultural Products Standards Act as amended by Act No. 129 of 1993 
and Act N. 63 of 1998 – Maize Product Standards Act  
• Draft wheat grading regulations (noting the removal of the Cultivar list) 
                                                          
3284 RCL Foods website. 
3285 Premier website. 
3286 National Chamber of Milling website. 
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• Act 47 of 1996 Marketing of Agricultural Products Act as amended by Act No. 59 of 197 and 
Act No. 52 of 2001. 
• Act No. 54 of 1972 Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants - No. R 2003 Regulations relating 
to the Fortification of certain food stuffs. 
 
Most of the regulation has to do with correct labelling of GMO products, health fortifications grading 
of the milling products as well as food safety concerns. 
 
1.4.5.2.1. Performance of the South African Milling sector 
1.4.5.2.1.1.Production  
 
Maize production has generally been growing over the last 30 years although there has been a decline 
in the area of land on which maize is grown (Figure 26). Between 1994 and 2017, there was a 36% 
decline in the size of area on which maize was planted. Part of this was due to the withdrawal of 
government subsidies that resulted in higher costs of production for farmers (Kirsten, Edwards and 
Vink, 2009). However, maize production grew by 8% during the same period, likely due to an 
increase in crop yields from 2.8tons/ha to 4.8tons/ha. The dip in production in 2015 was likely a result 
of the drought experienced in 2015. 
 
Figure 28: Maize Production in South Africa (1981 - 2017)3287 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from DAFF (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries) (n.d.) 
There appears to be some reduction in wheat production. Between 1994 and 2017, wheat production 
declined by 3% while wheat land use dropped by 53% (Figure 27). 
 
                                                          
3287 The DAFF Marketing year of May to April is used. 
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Figure 29: Wheat Production in South Africa (1981 - 2017)3288 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from DAFF (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries) (n.d.) 
 
The reduction in the area planted seems to point to the emergence of a small number of large farms 
as was the case in the dairy sector. It supports the notion of the increasing consolidation and 
concentration of different agricultural value chains. Where these farms are vertically integrated with 
upstream and downstream activities such as the development of seeds, their production wholesale 
and retail trading, this can be problematic in terms of raising barriers to entry and creating dominant 
players.  
 
1.4.5.2.1.2.Imports and exports 
 
Volumes of export of maize have fluctuated erratically between 1981 and 2017. Wheat, however, has 
remained relatively stable. Low wheat exports are likely due to the low wheat production in the 
country (Figure 28). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3288 The DAFF Marketing year of May to April is used. 
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Figure 30: Volume of Maize and Wheat Exports 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from DAFF (Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries) (n.d.) 
In value, wheat has the highest value in terms of imports and exports. There was a dip in trade for 
both wheat and maize in 2009, likely due to the financial crisis. The market recovered in 2010 before 
experiencing another dip in 2015 likely due to drought conditions (Figure 29).  
 
Figure 31: Value of Exports and Imports (2005 - 2016) 
 
Source: UN Comtrade data 
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Retail prices for both white and brown bread prices have steadily risen between 2008 and 2016 
(Figure 32).3289 This price increase has been disproportionate to the price of wheat which accounts 
for on average 18% of production costs of white bread and 20% for brown bread. Retail flour prices 
(since producer prices were unavailable as a time series), on average accounted for 41% of the price 
of white bread and 42% for the price of brown bread.   
 
Figure 32: Bread and wheat prices (2008-2016) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from NAMC (National Agricultural Marketing Council) 
(n.d.) 
 
Notably, the wheat price dropped between 2009 and 2010 coinciding with signing of agreements by 
the milling companies implicated in the bread and milling cartels (Mncube, 2014b). However, bread 
prices soon rose and remain high despite the limited growth of input prices perhaps reflecting the 
market power at the baking level of the value chain. It could also be due to the low price elasticity of 
                                                          
3289 The 2009 NAMC Input Cost Monitor reports that 468g of flour is required to produce 1 loaf of white bread and 439.6g 
of flour produces 1 loaf of brown bread. The wheat to flour conversion ratio for is 76% for white bread flour and 81% for 
brown bread flour (i.e. 1 ton of wheat produces 760kg of white flour and 810kg of brown flour).   
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demand for bread although there are a number of other costs involved that make up the retail price 
including marketing to build brand awareness (Ncube et al., 2016). The large vertically integrated 
firms such as Pioneer foods are able to benefit from flour price and retail price spread as well as from 
their brand power making entry difficult. 
 
1.4.5.2.1.4.Key investments  
 
In terms of storage, the control boards in partnership with the state managed the storage infrastructure 
by determining on their establishment, location and capacity. A total of 266 silos were constructed, 
220 in the northern parts of the country with a total capacity of around 15.5 million tons and 46 silos 
were constructed in the Western Cape with a capacity of just under 1 million tons (NAMC, 2004). 
The silos were operated as local monopolies and owned by farmers in their vicinity. The cooperatives 
were not to compete with each other.3290 Once the sector was deregulated the silos, they were 
transferred to newly privatized agro-conglomerates.  It costs about R10m to construct a silo with a 
capacity of 8000 tons which has acted as a disincentive. In the last 20 years, no new silos have been 
constructed. The history of control and information exchanged in the sector has contributed to the 
collusion cases that have been investigated in the sector. 
A number of new investments have been made in the sector. Some of them include: 
In 2013, Oos Vrystaat Kaap Operations Limited (OVK), an agricultural cooperative located 
in Ladybrand (Free State), commissioned a new state-of-the-art wheat mill in 2013. The mill has a 
capacity of 150t per day and was built at a cost of R40 million. The facility produces white bread 
flour, brown bread flour, and brown bread flour mix for the “Power” and “Super Bake” brands 
(Booysen, 2013). Also in 2013, Afgri constructed a wheat milling plant in Harrismith in the Free 
State. The mill produces cake flour, bread flour, and specialised products used in the baking, pizza, 
and pasta industries (Ncube et al., 2016). 
In 2014, Lethabo Milling commissioned a new maize mill in Ventersburg with a throughput 
of about 3000 tons per month. The funding used to construct the new mill was from the Massmart 
Supplier Development Fund, one of the conditions the Competition Commission placed on the 
approval of the Walmart/Massmart merger. Bakhresa, a diversified Tanzanian firm involved in food 
products, beverages, and transport and packaging obtained a $25mn loan from the International 
Finance Corporation in June 2014 to refurbish the Union Mill in Durban and build a plant with a 
capacity to mill 750 tons of wheat per day. Another wheat mill, Westra owned by agricultural co-
operative GWK due to start operating late in 2015 (Ncube et al., 2016). 
 
1.4.5.3. Trends in concentration and outcomes of key competition cases 
1.4.5.3.1. Overview of competition interventions 
 
Stemming from the history of collusion in the sector, there have been a number of cartels related to 
the milling sector. A brief description of these cartels is provided below. 
 
The storage cartel 
                                                          
3290 For a description of the silo industry, see Competition Commission vs Senwes, Competition Tribunal Case 
Number 110/CR/Dec06 
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There were two competition cases that the Competition Commission dealt with in relation to storage. 
The first involved Senwes Limited, a 106-year old entity and former cooperative with physical silo 
operations in the Free State, Northern Cape, North West and Gauteng. Senwes controls about 25% 
of the country’s storage capacity and handles about 30% of the country’s summer grain 
production.3291 Senwes also traded grain alongside commodity traders and farmers. Early in 2003, 
Senwes changed its storage policy in a way that raised competing traders’ costs relative to Senwes’ 
own traders and essentially made it unviable for competitors to trade grain in competition with 
Senwes. The Tribunal confirmed that this conduct constituted a margin squeeze in contravention of 
section 8 (c) of the Competition Act and that Senwes had abused its unilateral market power in grain 
storage to exclude competing traders. It however, did not receive a penalty as this was its first offence.  
The second case involved collusion amongst private silo owners who had continued to 
collectively agree on dairy storage tariffs for grain within the silo industry. The sixteen silo owners 
implicated and the silo industry association, the then Grain Silo Industry (Pty) Ltd (now Agbiz Grain), 
entered into a consent agreement with the Commission in 2011, admitting to the collusive 
determination of silo tariffs.3292 
 
The maize and wheat milling cartels 
 
In 2006, the Commission uncovered cartel conduct in the wheat and milling levels of the value chain. 
The cartel involved collusive agreements at the milling level and into the downstream markets for 
wheat flour, maize meal and bread. 
The regional cartels were coordinated nationally by large vertically integrated miller that collected 
information through the National Chamber of mining. At the baking level, pricing, trading conditions 
and even maximum allowable discounts were coordinated by large vertically integrated bakers and 
facilitated by the Camber of baking that enable them to monitor each other’s market shares, pack size 
by category level, customer channel at provincial level. (Kalicharan, 2010). 
 
The bread cartel 
 
The bread cartel, as mentioned above, was an extension of the cartel at the milling level. It involved 
four of the four major bread producers: Premier, Tiger Brands, Foodcorp and Pioneer. Premier Foods 
provided assistance to the Commission during the investigation and was granted leniency. Tiger 
Brands and Foodcorp entered into consent agreements in 2007 and 2009 respectively, paying 
administrative penalties while Pioneer initially disputed the extent of its involvement, eventually 
entering into a consent agreement with the Competition Commission in 2010 (Grimbeek and 
Lekezwa, 2013). 
Pioneer also admitted to taking part in anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct in the 
Western Cape (Mncube, 2014a). An independent bakery in Mossel Bay (Mossel Bay Bakery) laid a 
complaint that alleged that Pioneer had threatened to initiate a price war unless the bakery raised the 
price of its bread. Pioneer was also at the time selling its bread at predatory prices especially since 
                                                          
3291 Senwes website. Available at http://www.senwes.co.za/  
3292 Tribunal Case Number 43/CR/Jun11 
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the bread it sold in Mossel Bay was transported from Worcester and yet was cheaper in Mossel Bay 
than in Worcester. Pioneer also admitted to having acted anti-competitively at various point by 
launching “fighting brands” through which it sold bread at very low prices to deter new entrants or 
persuade competitors to increase the price of their bread. Pioneer’s behaviour served to create a 
reputation of a fierce competitor in order to discourage entry or influence its rivals to maintain high 
prices. 
 
1.4.5.3.2. Recent cases (2011- 2016) 
 
For the period under review, there were four large mergers that took place, in addition to other smaller 
cases (Table 19). In the grain value chain, two of the transactions involved acquisitions by Afgri, 
namely the 2011 acquisition of a yellow maize milling plant (Pride Milling) and the November 2013 
acquisition of four grain storage silos to extend Afgri’s storage capacity in Limpopo, Gauteng, and 
the North West. The third transaction involves the acquisition of various Eastern Cape-based bakeries 
by the Premier Group which extended Premier’s footprint into a new province alongside the 
intermediate mergers described above. 
The fourth grain-related merger involved the acquisition of the Kromdraai Group of 
companies, which are involved in the wheat–to–bread value chain, by global commodity illustrating 
the trend of further consolidation. Here global commodity traders are integrating into processing and 
storage levels of the grain value chain. 
A number of entrants in maize and wheat milling have attempted to participate at small 
(micro), medium, and large scale with varying degrees of success. Entry at the medium and larger 
scale appears to mostly be driven by agricultural cooperatives or firms that are already involved in 
milling elsewhere in the country.  
 
Table 19: Mergers in the Milling Sector (2011 -2016) 
Case Number Primary Acquiring Firm Primary Target 
Firm 
Size Status 
2011Mar5685 Tiger Brands Limited Davita Trading 
(Pty) Ltd 
L Approved 
2011Jun0081 Tiger Consumer Brands Limited and 
Tiger Food Brands Intellectual 
Property Holding Company (Pty) Ltd 
Unilever plc and 
Unilever South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
2012Dec0721 Tiger Consumer Brands Limited and 
Tiger Food Brands Intellectual 
Property Holding Company (Pty) Ltd 
The Mrs H.S. Ball's 
Chutney Business, 
which Is a part of 
Unilever Plc. and 
Unilever South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
017434 Premier Group Limited Eastern Cape 
Bakeries 
L Approved 
2014Nov0682 Premier Group (Pty) Ltd Mister Bread 
Milling (Pty) Ltd 
I Approved 
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2015Apr0205 Pioneer Foods Proprietary Limited Future Life Health 
Products 
Proprietary Limited 
L Approved 
2016Jan0022 Acorn Agri (Pty) Ltd Conafex Cape 
Holdings Ltd and 
Grassroots Group 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
I Pending 
2016Feb0052 AFGRI Operations Limited Pride Milling 
Company 
(Proprietary) 
Limited 
L Pending 
2016Feb0058 Africum Limited Agrifriend 
Equipment 
Proprietary Limited 
I Approved 
2016Sep0499 Sun Village Supermarket (Pty) Ltd Ltd Alpha Bakery 
Confectionary (Pty) 
Ltd, in respect of 
the businesses 
known as Sun 
Village 
SUPERSPAR 
I Approved 
2016Nov0629 K2016491554 (Proprietary) Limited Awesome Snacks 
(Proprietary) 
Limited 
I Approved 
2016DEC0015 Puratos Group NV  Bidvest Bakery 
Solutions 
Proprietary Limited 
I Approved 
with 
conditions 
 
1.4.5.4. Barriers to entry  
 
The main barriers to this entry are access to capital, access to markets and the barriers that resulted 
from high levels of vertical integration in the sector. Using a case study of an entrant into the sector, 
Nkhonjera, et al (2016) showed the difficulty in accessing funding for entry and expansion in the 
sector. Lethabo Milling took about four years to get funding and required about ZAR 9.8 million to 
refurbish the facility and purchase inputs. The funding was obtained through the programme set up 
following the Walmart/Massmart merger. Massmart provided additional support which included 
training, waiving of listing fees and assisting with the pricing model. 
In addition to the capital, an entrant requires access to markets and branding. Even if an entrant 
is able to access funding and produce an item, they need access to good shelf space in retail chains in 
order for consumers to see and access their product. However, there are certain costs attached to 
acquiring such shelf space which as explained in the retail section (Section 9) can be restrictive. The 
market is also highly contested due to customer loyalty to particular brands. An entrant, therefore, 
has to invest significantly in advertising and promotions. Here again, Lethabo Milling was able to 
benefit from access to good shelf space from Massmart. 
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Small millers have found alternative ways to access the markets by supplying their products 
to local municipal market and informal shops such as spazas. Buyers also travel to the mills to 
purchase the flour ensuring that the millers have lower operational costs and that there is a better cash 
flow. Because they eliminate transport costs, these millers are able to sell a 20kg bag of flour for as 
much as 20% less than traditional suppliers. 
Furthermore, entrants are likely to be competing with companies that are vertically integrated 
across the value chain and therefore have access to inputs and more efficient processes than entrants. 
New firms will likely be competing against their suppliers. They also do not benefit from the 
economies of scale and scope that the vertically integrated agro-conglomerates are able to enjoy.  
 
1.4.6. The role of retail in food value chains 
 
1.4.6.1.Mapping the retail landscape  
 
The value chain for food products in South Africa is depicted in Figure 31 below. Suppliers can 
access consumers through the formal supermarket value chain, where products flow from supplier to 
distribution centre or directly through supermarkets to the end consumer. Alternatively, suppliers can 
sell via independent retailers who are typically small businesses, targeting lower income customers 
in peri-urban, township, industrial and central business district areas of cities. They include cash and 
carrys that have both wholesale and retail offerings (hybrid format) as well as numerous informal 
spaza shops, spazarettes and superettes. Suppliers typically sell to wholesalers or buying groups, who 
in turn sell to independent retailers. Around 30-40% of grocery retail market is served by independent 
retailers while the balance is served by a handful of large multinational supermarket chains (discussed 
in Section 9.3). 
Buying groups in South Africa are separate, independent entities that play an important role 
in supporting independent retailers.  While each independent retailer that is part of a buying group is 
owned by an individual, the stores may be branded under a common name.  Buying group-led 
independent retailing is an important alternative model in South Africa. These groups have reduced 
certain barriers to entry faced by independent retailers (see Section 1.7.5.5.). They assist in lowering 
costs given that they buy large volumes from suppliers for the group, they advertise and promote on 
behalf of independent retailers and they offer important skills development and training to retailers 
in their group. The main buying groups in South Africa are Unitrade Management Services, Buying 
Exchange Company, Independent Buying Consortium, Independent Cash & Carry Group and Elite 
Star Trading. They also provide an alternative route to market for suppliers.  
The modernisation of supermarkets in South Africa has seen significant investments in 
distribution centres (DCs). All supermarket chains have multiple DCs and invest annually in the 
upkeep and expansion of these centres. The centres serve not only their South African stores, but also 
their regional stores in southern Africa. 
 
Figure 33: Role of retail in food value chains in South Africa 
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Source: das Nair and Chisoro (2016) 
 
1.4.6.1.1. Significance of retail in South Africa 
 
In terms of the contribution to GDP in South Africa, wholesale and retail trade fall under the broad 
‘Trade, catering and accommodation services’ category. This broad sector has remained fairly 
constant in terms of percentage contribution to actual GDP (at 2010 constant prices) at around 14-
15%, and is the third largest contributor to GDP (Figure 32). 
 
Figure 34: Contribution of trade (including retail), catering and accommodation sector to GDP 
in South Africa 
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Source: Quantec, % shares based on Rand millions at constant 2010 prices 
 
Within this broad category however, wholesale and retail trade has grown by around 34% between 
2005 and 2015 (Figure 33). 
 
Figure 35: Growth of wholesale and retail trade sector, Rand millions at constant 2010 prices 
 
Source: Quantec, Easy Data  
 
Figure 34 shows that retailers, which include supermarkets, are the third largest sector in terms of 
number of listed firms in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Top 40 ranked by turnover, with 
six firms featuring in the Top 40. 
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Figure 36: Number of firms by sector in JSE Top 40 (turnover), 2015  
 
Source: I-Net BFA. Note: 2016 data is only available for some companies 
 
Five of the six retailers in the JSE TOP 40 by revenue are supermarkets (the sixth being Steinhoff, a 
furniture retailer). Turnover for the listed supermarkets has increased significantly between 2010 and 
2015 highlighting the growth of supermarkets (Table 20). 
 
Table 20: JSE Top 40 by turnover (R billion), 2010 and 2015 
 Company Sector 
2015 
Turnover 
2010 
Turnover 
1.  Glencore Plc Mining 2653 1813 
2.  BHP Billiton Plc Mining 636 404 
3.  Anglo American Plc Mining 318 184 
4.  British American Tobacco Plc Tobacco 299 153 
5.  SABMiller Plc Beverages - Brewers 269 131 
6.  Sanlam   Financials 239 123 
7.  The Bidvest Group   Diversified industrials 205 110 
8.  Sasol   Chemicals 185 122 
9.  MTN Group   Telecoms 147 115 
10.  Old Mutual Plc Financials 145 70 
11.  Steinhoff International N.V. Retailers 137 48 
12.  Richemont SA Luxury Goods 136 51 
13.  Mondi Limited Packaging and paper 115 55 
14.  Shoprite Holdings   Retailers (supermarket) 114 67 
15.  Imperial Holdings   Transport 110 54 
16.  Massmart Holdings   
Retailers (includes 
supermarkets) 
85 47 
17.  Vodacom Group   Telecoms 77 59 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Luxury Goods
Media
Chemicals
Beverages -…
Construction
Food processors
Transport
Tobacco
Pharmaceuticals
IT
Steel
Diversified…
Packaging and…
Hospitals
Telecoms
Retailers
Mining
Financials
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18.  Datatec   IT 75 29 
19.  Sappi   Packaging and paper 75 46 
20.  The SPAR Group   Retailers (supermarket) 73 35 
21.  Naspers   Media 73 28 
22.  Anglogold Ashanti   Mining 67 262 
23.  Pick n Pay Stores   Retailers (supermarket) 67 55 
24.  Standard Bank Group   Financials 65 38 
25.  Barloworld   Diversified industrials 63 42 
26.  Anglo American Platinum   Mining 60 46 
27.  Woolworths Holdings   Retailers (supermarket) 57 26 
28.  Liberty Holdings   Financials 54 22 
29.  Aveng   Construction 44 34 
30.  FirstRand   Financials 40 18 
31.  Barclays Africa Group   Financials 39 23 
32.  Kumba Iron Ore   Mining 36 39 
33.  Aspen Pharmacare Holdings   Pharmaceuticals 36 10 
34.  MMI Holdings   Financials 35 10 
35.  Mediclinic International Hospitals 35 17 
36.  Netcare   Hospitals 34 22 
37.  Impala Platinum Holdings   Mining 32 25 
38.  Telkom SA SOC   Telecoms 32 37 
39.  Tiger Brands Limited Food processors 32 19 
40.  ArcelorMittal SA   Steel 31 30 
Source: INET BFA. Note: 2016 data is only available for some companies so has not been reported 
 
In terms of their JSE market capitalisation in 2015/2016, Woolworths and Shoprite are the largest 
supermarket chains in the retail industry in South Africa (Table 21). The relative market shares of 
key retailers are discussed below. 
 
Table 21: Supermarket groups ranked by JSE market capitalization, March 2016 
 Market capitalisation as reported in 
annual reports (ZAR billions) 
Woolworths 
Holdings 
74.2 
Shoprite Holdings 109.9 
SPAR Group  34.5 
Pick n Pay Stores 34.4 
Massmart Holdings 32.6 
Choppies Limited 4.3 
Source: INETBFA 
 
1.4.6.1.2. Key players and market shares 
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Shoprite and Pick n Pay are the largest supermarket chains in South Africa, with around 30% of the 
national market each (in terms of store numbers), while SPAR is the next largest with around 20% of 
the market. This is followed by Woolworths, with the rest mainly held by Fruit and Veg City, and 
new entrants in food - Game through Foodco (which following the Walmart acquisition diversified 
into grocery retail offerings) and Cambridge Foods (also Walmart), and Botswana-owned 
Choppies3293 (Figure 35). 
 
 
Figure 37: Market Share of Grocery Retailer in South Africa, 2016 based on store numbers 
 
Source: Annual Reports and interviews  
Note: Only the grocery retail stores are counted. Revenue or sales data by country for each 
supermarket is a better measure of relative size in each country. This data is however not consistently 
publicly available per country for all supermarkets.  
 
1.4.6.2.Policy and regulatory frameworks 
 
There is currently no specific policy for the retail sector in South Africa. While subject to regulation 
on health and safety, standards etc., there is no regulator for market conduct other than the 
competition authorities and the Consumer Protection Commission. This has led to concerns about 
behaviour that the narrow tools available in competition law have been unable to address (discussed 
below), although the CCSA is trying to address some of these concerns through the Grocery Retail 
Market Inquiry.  
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has however in its latest Industrial Policy Action 
Plan (IPAP) (2017/2018) iteration identified the need to intervene in the retail sector to increase the 
participation of small farmers and suppliers.3294 IPAP 2017/2018 notes the need to get commitments 
from the main retailers to develop a procurement charter, to facilitate supplier development 
programmes and to facilitate easier access to outlets. This is yet to be implemented. 
1.4.6.2.1. Nature of competitive rivalry and a review of competition concerns in South Africa 
1.4.6.2.1.1.Nature of competition 
 
                                                          
3293 For descriptions of these players, see das Nair and Chisoro 2015 and 2016. 
3294 http://www.thedti.gov.za/DownloadFileAction?id=1171 
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Pick n Pay; 
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A supermarket offering today is much more than a ‘basket of goods’ at a specific price. Supermarkets 
offer consumers a wide selection of products under one roof that is convenient, easily accessible, has 
secure parking options, is open for long hours in addition to a range of other ancillary services.3295 
Modern retailers are thus said to offer a “Price-Quality-Range-Service” (PQRS) package (Dobson, 
2015). This can greatly reduce overall costs for consumers, including transport, time, search, 
information and storage costs. The offering includes an ‘overall customer experience’, which brings 
in elements of accessibility, ambiance, range and variety (Nooteboom, 1980; Betancourt, 2006; 
Basker and Noel, 2013). In providing these offerings, modern retailers differentiate between 
themselves through store formats (González-Benito et al. 2005) such as supermarkets, 
hypermarkets, convenience stores, cash and carrys, discount stores etc.  
Competition within same format supermarkets (‘intra-format’) depends on how similar the 
offerings of supermarkets are in terms of product and service range; and how prepared consumers are 
to substitute between offerings (‘closeness of competition’). The competitive reaction to lost market 
share between same format stores can be through increasing promotional activity and price 
discounting (Dobson, 2015; Ellickson and Misra, 2008). All the supermarket chains in South Africa, 
except for Woolworths, have extended their offering to target customers across the full range of 
income groups. Woolworths has a single format offering that targets high income consumers. For the 
other supermarkets, there has been a focus on increasingly targeting low-income consumers, either 
by opening new stores (like Shoprite’s Usave) or by acquiring existing stores (like Pick n Pay’s Boxer 
and Spar’s SaveMor) in peri-urban, township and rural areas. Most of the supermarket chains have 
also diversified their formats to include hypermarkets, convenience stores, express stores at fuel 
forecourts and fast food offerings.  On the upper-income end, Shoprite competes with Pick n Pay and 
Food Lovers’ Market and is increasingly targeting Woolworths’ clientele through its Checkers 
offering. Supermarkets thus compete to offer a full suite of formats, where similar formats compete 
more vigourously.  
Intra-format competition is especially seen in the offering of lower-priced house brands (das 
Nair and Chisoro, 2016; 2017). There is also a degree of inter-format competition with vertically 
integrated wholesalers and retailers, buying group led-independent retailers and general independent 
retailers. There is also a degree of inter-format competition with vertically-integrated wholesalers and 
retailers, buying group-led independent retailers and general independent retailers. 
Whilst there may be some competition between existing supermarket chains, there has been limited 
entry of new supermarket chains with formats that compete directly with the incumbents in the region. 
The South African supermarket industry remains concentrated with the top 4 - Shoprite, Pick n Pay, 
SPAR and Woolworths - collectively dominating markets. It was several years before FVC gained 
traction to become an effective rival. The other significant new players, Choppies and Game, only 
entered almost two decades after FVC. This is reflective of the high barriers to entry into the industry.  
From an IO perspective, supermarkets have been characterised as natural oligopolies, where a few 
powerful chains offer quality products and low prices (Ellickson, 2013). This stems from Sutton’s 
(1991) endogenous sunk cost model of competition. In this model, market structure is determined by 
competition to provide higher quality and wider service offerings. In turn, as the market grows, 
existing firms expand sunk cost investments to remain competitive. Such investments limit the 
number of firms that can profitably enter even large or fast-growing markets. There may be a small 
                                                          
3295 Money transfer, credit, mobile telephony, pharmaceutical and delivery services etc. 
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but vibrant set of fringe players that grow alongside large supermarket chains, but these do not 
compete on quality and variety in the same way that large chains do, and can grow without investing 
in large sunk investments as demand grows (Ellickson, 2013). This ties in with the observation in 
South Africa of a few large supermarket chains collectively dominating markets, with limited 
competition from a fringe of independent retailers.  
Modern supermarket chains do indeed heavily invest in infrastructure. Investments include 
those in supply chains, centralised distribution centres (DCs), IT systems and transport fleets to get a 
wide range of products on shelves at the lowest possible costs (Harvey, 2000). Supermarkets in South 
Africa are increasingly moving towards centralised DCs instead of store-to-store procurement as they 
modernise. While offering numerous cost saving benefits, including scale and scope economies, 
investing in DCs also substantially raises barriers to entry (Basker and Noel, 2013). Given high entry 
barriers and sunk costs, supermarkets can be characterised as having become increasingly 
oligopolistic over time where there are a few large, powerful chains. These chains tend to have both 
significant market power (oligopoly) and buyer power (oligopsony), with a consequent high degree 
of control over entire value chains (Dobson, 2015).   
 
1.4.6.2.1.2..Competition concerns at a horizontal level 
 
The strategic behaviour of incumbents with market power further creates barriers to entry. A historic 
concern in South Africa is the practice of supermarkets entering lease agreements with property 
owners in shopping centres that contain exclusivity clauses (‘exclusive leases’).  This prevents new 
retailers and specialist stores like butcheries and bakeries from locating in lucrative spaces, limiting 
their ability to grow.  Physical location and attractive store sites are important if an entrant is to 
become an effective competitor. Property developers provide supermarkets with these sites, with the 
most desirable sites being located inside shopping centres where customer traffic is dense. Exclusive 
leases signed between property developers and anchor tenants, which are often supermarkets, grant 
them rights to operate as the sole supermarket in the mall.  
From the property owners’ point of view, incumbent supermarkets are ‘must have’ anchor 
tenants to secure financing from banks given the high footfall they attract. Although banks do not 
necessarily insist on exclusivity clauses in leases, they do require anchor tenants before they approve 
finance to guarantee returns. The typical argument by anchor supermarkets for exclusive leases is 
that they are crucial for the development of the mall and property developers would not construct a 
mall without commitments from the supermarket. This highlights their strong bargaining position.   
In practice, leases in South Africa typically last ten years, but anchor tenants have several 
options for renewal resulting in exclusivity that spans decades. While exclusive leases might arguably 
be justified in the initial phases of investment to allow anchor supermarkets to recoup investments, 
gain footfall and establish markets, it is hard to see how they can be reasonable for extended periods 
of time. It also appears that small property developers, particularly in rural areas, who do not have 
bargaining power against major supermarkets are more inclined to succumb to exclusive leases to 
kick-start developments. Lack of competition has far-reaching consequences in rural areas where 
pricing is a key factor for low-income consumers and where the nearest alternative supermarket is 
further away than in urban areas, increasing transport and search costs. 
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The CCSA has received complaints about exclusive leases over the years (including from 
FVC and Walmart), and in 2015 announced a market inquiry into the retail sector considering this 
issue amongst others (the Grocery Retail Market Inquiry). The inquiry is on-going.3296 
Internationally, the UK Competition Commission required phasing out exclusive leases in its 
Groceries Market Investigation Order of 2010 following recommendations from the former Office of 
Fair Trading. In Australia, following an inquiry by the competition authority, the major supermarket 
chains voluntarily provided court-enforceable undertakings which phased out exclusive leases. 
Interviews in South Africa revealed that such leases are still prevalent.3297 This was also 
strongly highlighted in the recent Gauteng leg of hearings of the retail inquiry in June 2017, where 
both buying groups and independent specialist retailers gave submissions on how difficult it is to get 
mall space from property developers/owners on competitive terms to the big supermarket chains. The 
hearings revealed how before the construction of the mall even commenced, space was already 
allocated to the bigger players, and that existing businesses in the area were often not even notified 
of the construction. Their inability to locate in the mall and the rental terms they are faced with often 
puts them on a back foot in terms of participating and growing.3298 
Some of the South African supermarkets appear to have ‘exported’ the practice of entering 
into exclusive leases to the countries to which they have internationalised. In Botswana, the 
competition authority has reached a settlement with a supermarket that required exclusive leases, 
resulting in the removal of the clause and an undertaking that it would not continue with this practice. 
In Zambia, some supermarkets attested to having exclusive leases with shopping malls. Others 
claimed that these leases no longer exist but did so prior to the CCPC discouraging such conduct.  
Another avenue in which competition between supermarkets may be dampened is when a 
dominant supermarket uses its buyer power to enter into exclusive supply agreements with key 
suppliers, preventing them from supplying ‘must-have’ products to rival supermarkets. In South 
Africa, suppliers interviewed generally noted that supermarkets did not impose exclusivity conditions 
in their trading terms (where, if on the supermarket’s supplier list, they are prevented from supplying 
rival supermarkets). This bears out in practice in that most suppliers usually sell to multiple 
supermarkets. The exception to this is in the supply of house brands. Certain suppliers are developed 
exclusively by supermarkets to supply house brands and these suppliers are typically not permitted 
to sell the brand to other supermarkets. There were no major concerns raised about this in the four 
countries.3299 Aside from a few instances in the supply of house brands, suppliers were free to supply 
any supermarket chain, new entrant chain, or independent retailer. However, even if suppliers are 
free to supply independent retailers, the various costs imposed on them by large supermarkets may 
negatively affect the trading terms with independent retailers as compensation for these higher costs 
(the waterbed effect). In South Africa, it is often difficult for independent retailers, wholesalers, or 
                                                          
3296 The transcripts of the Gauteng hearings are available at http://www.compcom.co.za/transcripts-3/. Transcripts from 
the Cape Town hearings are available at http://www.compcom.co.za/transcripts-2/. 
3297 A range of factors affect whether exclusive leases are insisted upon in South Africa. These include shopping centre 
size, whether the centre is a new or existing centre, whether the centre is in a rural or urban area, or whether it is a 
corporate or franchise store. 
3298 The transcripts where these issues were raised are available at http://www.compcom.co.za/transcripts-3/.  
3299 There are other ad hoc instances where supermarkets require exclusive commitments from suppliers. For instance, in 
Zimbabwe, when supermarkets are running promotions, they may require a temporary exclusive commitment from a 
supplier for certain products. 
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buying groups to get similar trading terms to what the large supermarket chains get for seemingly 
equivalent transactions. 
The extent that this ‘waterbed effect’ has a negative impact on independent retailers in South 
Africa was clearly highlighted by buying groups, UMS and Elite Star Trading, at the Gauteng leg of 
the CCSA’s retail inquiry hearings. These buying groups made submissions to the panel on the 
entrenched commercial relationship between suppliers and the big supermarket chains resulted in 
highly skewed trading terms in favour of the supermarket chains, even for the same volumes of 
product bought. These buying groups highlighted that they could not secure equal rebates and volume 
discounts as the big supermarkets could from suppliers, and that there could be up to a 20-25% price 
difference from what the buying groups had to pay versus what the big supermarkets pay. This 
immediately places the buying group supported independent retailers on an unlevel playing field and 
makes them less competitive.3300 
 
1.4.6.2.1.3.Implications on suppliers – main vertical competition concerns 
 
Given the market power of the large supermarket chains, suppliers, particularly small- and medium-
sized suppliers, are often not able to secure attractive trading terms to enable long-term participation 
in supermarket value chains, investment and growth. Over and above demanding lower costs and 
higher standards from suppliers, supermarkets in South Africa often impose a range of other costs 
through trading terms. Large supermarket chains in many cases are able to control pricing in their 
trading terms by controlling elements such as listing fees, rebates, advertising and slotting 
allowances, promotion fees, payment period terms, settlement discounts, and new store openings fees 
(Reardon and Gulati 2008). This unilateral control of trading terms is reflective of the buyer power 
of large supermarket chains globally (Clarke et al. 2002).  
Supplier interviews revealed that the large supermarket chains generally dominate the 
negotiations of trading terms. Contracts between suppliers and supermarkets are usually evergreen, 
with the trading terms typically renegotiated on an annual basis. Given that majority of the same 
retailers that operate in South Africa also operate in the other countries, the practices in the different 
countries in the region are generally similar. 
The South African supermarkets often require suppliers to pay listing fees to be listed in their 
books. According to supermarkets, given vigorous competition for shelf space, payment of listing 
fees shows the supplier’s commitment and confidence in their ability to supply supermarkets and in 
the quality of their product. Examples of listing fees in South Africa range from USD 350 to 
USD 3,500 for a single product line for a limited time period, or 12–15 per cent off the list price, to 
as high as USD 17,000 to USD 20,000 for till positions for a limited time period. 
Access to good shelf space (including in gondola ends during promotions) is critical for 
suppliers to successfully sell their products. For new entrants and small suppliers, it is a constant 
battle to access prime shelf space that is usually taken up by dominant suppliers. Similarly, access to 
cooler/refrigeration space is important for suppliers of cold products (such as soft drinks, ice creams, 
and frozen products). There have been numerous competition cases globally that have recognized the 
                                                          
3300 http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/6-June-Competition-Commission-Retail-Enquiry-
Transcript-1-1.pdf   
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harm to competition of dominant suppliers imposing exclusivity on cooler space.3301 Recently in 
South Africa, a settlement was reached in the SAB Miller/Coca-Cola bottlers merger which included, 
among other things, an undertaking to allow 10 per cent of Coca-Cola fridge space in small retail 
outlets to stock competitors’ carbonated soft drink products. 
Settlement discounts are also given to supermarkets for paying the supplier within the 
number of days stipulated in the trade agreement, which varies depending on the supplier. In South 
Africa, it is commonly 15–30 days from statement and the discount for paying within this period is 
usually in the range of 2.5–5 per cent off the list price.  
Long payment periods put considerable pressure on suppliers’ cash flow and working 
capital, which is problematic for small suppliers. There are allegations suggesting that suppliers are 
subsidising supermarkets with these long payment periods and that this money was a cheaper way 
for supermarkets to replenish stock rather than to seek other sources of finance (such as bank loans) 
to do so. These remain unsubstantiated however and requires further investigation. 
Supermarkets sometimes require advertising discounts off the purchase price for indirectly 
advertising on behalf of suppliers when they advertise the supermarket chain generally. However, not 
all suppliers are required to pay such fees, especially those that heavily invest in advertising their 
own brands. Suppliers pay supermarkets to participate in different promotions and to get special 
shelf space for these promotions.3302 Promotion fees can range from USD 2,500 to USD 7,000 in 
South Africa, depending on the scale of the promotion and the size of the outlet. Suppliers can also 
run promotions at their own cost in the supermarket premises.   
An important factor in supplying supermarkets is the ability to supply products at the lowest 
cost, to supply at the required quality, and to consistently supply the required volumes across all 
outlets. This is difficult for small and medium suppliers, or new entrants, who have not yet gained 
scale.3303 However, for franchise stores such as SPAR, small suppliers with limited scale are able to 
participate in the value chain as there is less of a requirement to have consistency across all the 
franchises given individual ownership of stores. A supplier can just supply a single SPAR store. The 
Fruit and Veg City model of procurement, which is predominantly from municipal fresh produce 
markets, also allows small farmers who cannot get into formal supermarket supply chains a chance 
to participate in retail markets. Similarly, buying group-led independent retailers also offer small to 
medium sized suppliers an alternative to supplying formal supermarket chains and usually impose far 
less stringent terms on them. This highlights the importance of alternative and diverse models of 
retail. 
Other costs that suppliers occur include the basic legal standards that suppliers have to adhere 
to, such as South African Bureau of Standards (SABS). Further, there is a range of food safety, health 
and safety, environmental, packaging, and labelling standards.  
                                                          
3301 European Commission Decision Case COMP/39.116/B-2 Coca-Cola. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39116/39116_258_4.pdf; Competition Commission of 
Mauritius (2013). Investigation into the supply of coolers to retailers by Phoenix Beverages Limited and Quality 
Beverages Limited CCM/INV/019. Non-confidential report. Available at 
http://www.ccm.mu/English/Documents/Investigations/INV019-Final%20Report%20of%20Undertaking-NC.pdf; 
Competition Commission of Singapore (2013). ‘Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages changes business practices in local soft 
drinks market following enquiry by CCS’, Media Release (accessed on 21/04/16). 
3302 In South Africa, these include Back to School, Hey Days, Easter, and Christmas promotions. 
3303 This may be addressed through the DTI’s recent policy objectives in its 2017/2018 IPAP to increase procurement 
from small suppliers. 
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Over and above these basic legal requirements, supermarkets impose private standards on 
suppliers. In South Africa, supermarkets sometimes insist that suppliers have Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) accreditation. HACCP is an internationally recognized system for 
reducing the risk of safety hazards in food. The HACCP system requires that potential hazards are 
identified and controlled at specific points in the process including biological, chemical, or physical 
hazards.  
In some cases, supermarkets impose higher accreditation standards than HACCP, such as 
Food Safety System Certification (FSSC 22000) which is also an international accreditation. In other 
cases, suppliers are taking it upon themselves to get higher accreditations to have a competitive edge 
over rivals. Regardless of accreditation, it appears that retailers typically send their own auditors to 
audit the supplier at the supplier’s cost. Estimates from suppliers are that HACCP can cost as much 
as USD 5,500 and FSSC 22000 can cost up to USD 13,800 per annum, with additional USD 6,900 
annual fees for maintenance. 
Other private standards include sustainability requirements. For instance, Woolworths 
requires that its food suppliers farm sustainably under its ‘Farming for the Future’ initiative in 
addition to other sustainability requirements. Shoprite’s fresh produce arm, Freshmark, has its Good 
Manufacturing Practices standard for all pack-house facilities. Most supermarkets require Halaal and 
Kosher certifications in South Africa. In the poultry industry, almost all producers are Halaal 
approved, and abattoirs need to be approved by the government. Supermarkets also impose private 
standards on house brands for many of these products. In addition, supermarkets are increasingly 
requiring barcoding on the packaging of products in the countries assessed. Other global initiatives, 
such as GlobalG.A.P. (Good Agricultural Practice), also have implications for local suppliers trying 
to export to international markets (see das Nair and Chisoro 2016). 
The costs of adhering to all these standards and audits are borne entirely by the supplier, 
making it increasingly costly to supply formal supermarket chains. Independent retailers on the other 
hand often have lower, if any, private standards. Independent retailers therefore provide an avenue 
through which new suppliers can start building scale 
There has been growth in private label products in supermarket shelves in South Africa 
recently. Every major supermarket chain has a range of own brand/private label products.3304 Many 
suppliers of branded products also manufacture and sell private labels to supermarkets. Supplying 
house brands is a way in which suppliers can get their products on supermarket shelves. Suppliers 
can use this as a stepping stone to get onto supermarkets’ preferred supplier lists especially for 
suppliers that have not yet built a brand name. House brands also confer some bargaining power to 
supermarkets over large, multinational suppliers. However, concerns were highlighted around 
suppliers being ‘forced’ into supplying house brands at lower margins than their own branded 
products and this was used as a tool to negotiate down prices for branded products.  
 
1.4.6.2.2. Outcomes of key competition cases  
 
                                                          
3304 Majority of Woolworths’ products are private labels. Shoprite has its ‘Ritebrand’ and ‘Housebrand’ ranges in 
Checkers, which covers around 300 products.  Pick n Pay has its ‘No Name’ brand and is looking to further expand the 
private label range. Food Lover’s Market produces its own house brands ‘Freshers’ and ‘Food Lover’s Signature’. SPAR 
also has its own branded products. SPAR does not allow major suppliers to manufacture its own private label products, 
thus allowing new and small suppliers to enter the supermarket supply chain. 
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There have been very few major competition cases in the retail sector, other than mergers. In 2007, 
the Competition Commission recommended that the Competition Tribunal prohibit the large merger 
between Pick n Pay and FVC on grounds that the merger would result in the removal of an effective 
competitor in the retail market for fresh food. The Commission found that FVC was a growing 
effective competitor to Pick n Pay and the other major retailers, and would provide an even greater 
product offering in the future. Allowing the merger would therefore stifle both current and future 
competition. It appears that the Commission was correct in its prediction of FVC’s future growth. 
FVC subsequently showed impressive growth. Turnover has grown steeply from R1.6 billion in 2006 
to R15 billion in 2015, with a growth rate well ahead of the major listed food retailers.3305 FVC’s 
turnover grew by approximately 21% per year, compared to the 15% growth rate of the other major 
supermarkets.3306  The number of stores has also grown particularly between 2006 and 2012.3307 
The second key retail merger involved the take-over of Massmart by Walmart. The merger 
between Walmart and Massmart was ultimately approved with several conditions. Created as part of 
the conditions imposed by the Competition Appeal Court, the merged firm had to set up a Supplier 
Development Fund (SDF) and make available ZAR 240 million over a period of five years to develop 
suppliers. This stemmed from concerns that Walmart would divert its sourcing away from local 
suppliers and to its massive global supplier base. This raised public interest concerns around local 
supplier participation and development. The other key conditions involved employment. 
The SDF has been operating for approximately 4 years. Massmart worked with TechnoServe, 
a non-profit organisation, to upskill and train farmers to supply fresh produce to its stores, in addition 
to providing preferential finance terms and inputs. The retailer invested R40 million in smallholder 
farming to support Massmart’s move into fresh produce and grocery market. However, this 
programme was relatively unsuccessful and has been discontinued due to several setbacks:  
• Small farmers were vulnerable to crop disease and weather and could not afford insurance 
leading to huge crop losses. Massmart ended up covering their costs and purchasing seeds for 
new crop;  
• Massmart entered into pricing agreements with farmers but did not require exclusivity 
arrangements. The result was that farmers would supply other retailers who offered better 
prices than Massmart. In the end, Massmart only received suppliers’ produce when the market 
price was low (below the contract price) thereby incurring losses.   
• Massmart was required to provide support in terms of farming equipment, logistics, pack 
houses, extension services (soil science and Fertilisers) and carry out significant investment 
in attaining food safety requirements. Massmart underestimated the cost of these investments 
and they were not financially prepared to carry out such investments.  
There were however some successful initiatives on the manufacturing/processing side of the initiative 
(e.g. Lethabo Milling, The Noodle Factory, Thistle Bakery and Marble Gold). The Noodle Factory 
based in Cape Town has been listed with Makro for 13 years supplying an Indonesian noodle brand 
called Alhami. The firm has started supplying other retail chains such as Fruit & Veg City and 
                                                          
3305 Growth rates of the major listed supermarket chains were reported at about 15% per year between 2006 and 2012, 
while that of FVC was 20% per year. http://www.financialmail.co.za/business/2012/07/18/fruit-veg-city-grows-market-
share, accessed 15/01/2015. 
3306 http://www.financialmail.co.za/moneyinvesting/2013/10/31/woolworths-rides-high-in-sa-food-sector, accessed 25 
August 2015 
3307 See also http://www.entrepreneurmag.co.za/advice/success-stories/entrepreneur-profiles/fruit-and-veg-city-michael-
and-brian-coppin/, accessed 25/08/2015 
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Shoprite Checkers. Thistle Bakery based in Kempton Park is a baked goods manufacturer receiving 
financial assistance from the SDF. Thistle Bakery supplies baked goods under Massmart’s 
Marketside private branding to 32 Game stores.3308 
Lethabo Milling, a maize milling company based in Free Sate received financial assistance as 
part of the programme. Lethabo received a R1.6 million grant from Massmart towards refurbishing 
its plant. The support extended to an offtake agreement with Massmart which helped Lethabo further 
secure a loan from a commercial bank. Lethabo has a guaranteed route to market through supplying 
Massmart stores in South Africa and has received additional support for training, waived listing fees, 
fast-track payments (7-day payment period as opposed to 30-day payment terms), and assistance with 
pricing models. Lethabo Milling is still receiving assistance from the SDF following the challenges 
brought about by the drought resulting is escalating grain prices. The programme is assisting by 
providing revolving credit for the miller’s operations and assisting with negotiations to secure access 
to grain supply with Farmwise Grains.  
Massmart discontinued investment in direct farming projects given the difficulties faced and 
because it was not a market leader in the category of fresh produce. Therefore, it could not influence 
the end selling price of fresh produce, resulting in a squeeze in profits for products produced by 
farmers under the programme. Massmart has since shifted its supplier development programmes to 
focus on building supplies category where it is regarded as a market leader. The current Massmart 
model focuses on established business that can be up-scaled quickly in FMCG, General Merchandise, 
DIY and Building, where it makes mutual commercial sense for both Massmart and the supplier.3309 
A brief look at the recent merger activity involving supermarkets in the past three years shows 
that the large supermarket chains have been buying up smaller independent retailers (Table 22). This 
is consistent with the concerns around the growing market share of chain supermarkets and increasing 
market power. All these mergers were approved by the Commission without any conditions, except 
for the merger involving Shoprite and Stone Acres SuperSpar. The conditions were however on 
employment issues under public interest criteria.3310 
 
Table 22: Merger cases involving grocery retail in South Africa 
Year Acquiring firm Target firm Status 
2014 Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 
The assets and liquor license of the Stone 
Acres SuperSpar and Tops, Mafikeng of 
Klipakkers (Pty) Ltd 
Approved with 
conditions 
2015 Cambridge Foods 
Gree State 
(Proprietary) Limited 
Powersave Wholesalers CC t/a 
Powersave Cash & Carry and as Reezas 
Supermarket CC t/a Savemore 
Supermarket 
Approved 
2015 The Spar Group Ltd Florida Foodliner (Pty) Ltd, Florida 
Junction Superspar and Florida Junction 
Tops@Spar, and Memoire Trading 130 
Abandoned 
                                                          
3308 Supplier Development Programme Massmart Report (2015). 
3309 Supplier Development Programme Massmart Report (2015). 
3310 http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/37912_gen658.pdf 
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Pty Ltd, Gordon Road Superspar and 
Gordon Road Tops@Spar 
2015 The Spar Group 
Limited 
Florida Foodliner (Pty) Ltd, in respect of 
the business known as Florida Junction 
SUPERSPAR and Florida 
JunctionTops@Spar and Memoire 
Trading 130 (Pty) Ltd, in respect of the 
business known as Gordon Road 
SUPERSPAR and Gordon 
RoadTops@Spar 
Approved 
2015 The Spar Group Ltd Mqanduli Traiding Store CC, In respect 
of the business known as Nozukile 
SUPERSPAR and Nozukile Tops at Spar 
Approved 
2015 The Spar Group Ltd  Kwankcenke Trading cc known as 
Engcobo SUPERSPAR and Ndu’s Spar 
CC 
Approved 
2015 Pick 'n Pay Retailers 
(Pty) Ltd 
Trio Belville (Pty) Ltd Approved 
2016 The Spar Group Ltd  Kayur Superstore (Pty) Ltd in respect of 
the business knows as Gateway 
SuperSpar and Gateway Tops at Spar 
Approved 
2016 Choppies 
Supermarkets South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd 
Retail Business of Jwayelani Retail 
Proprietary Limited 
Approved 
2016 Sun Village 
Supermarket (Pty) 
Ltd Ltd 
Alpha Bakery Confectionary (Pty) Ltd, 
in respect of the businesses known as Sun 
Village SUPERSPAR 
Approved 
2016 The Spar Group Ltd Algoa Supermarket (Pty) Ltd, in respect 
of the businesses known as Algoa SPAR 
and Tops and Aspen SPAR and Tops 
Approved 
2016 The Spar Group Ltd Andramaria Supermarket CC, in respect 
of the business known as Rant en Dal 
SUPERSPAR and Tops at SPAR 
Approved 
Source: Competition Commission website 
 
In terms of abuse of dominance and cartel cases in the retail sector, there have been no major historic 
or recent finalised cases, but the grocery retail inquiry could potentially recommend further 
investigations to be initiated.3311 Unlike the Kenyan Competition Act for instance which has been 
amended to include abuse of buyer power specifically, the South African competition law is a blunt 
instrument to deal directly with issues of buyer power (hence there is an inquiry in this area). The 
dominance threshold for a single supermarket is often not met and the burden of proof for small 
                                                          
3311 There have only been two failures to notify merger transactions by Fruit and Veg City that were considered in 2016. 
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retailers to show a substantial lessening of competition is prohibitively high. Therefore only a few 
cases are successfully prosecuted. This may call for an amendment of the Act, which is something 
that is being considered currently and/or other measures, such as codes of conduct that govern the 
behaviour or retailers specifically, something that DTI is currently considering. 
 
1.4.6.3.Barriers to entry 
 
The main structural barriers to entry in this sector are a function of the inherent characteristics of 
supermarket chains. Some of the biggest barriers are the substantial investments required in 
distribution centres and logistics networks as part of the supply chain of supermarkets, as well as 
scale and scope economies in having multiple stores. Investments in distribution centres by the largest 
supermarkets Shoprite and Pick n Pay have been significant and give an indication of the orders of 
magnitude involved. Shoprite invests annually in distribution centres, related equipment and vehicles. 
It invested around R400mill in 2014 and over R650mill in 2015 (an increase of 63%). In 2015, this 
was around 14% of total capital expenditure. Pick n Pay invested R628 million in 2010 in one of its 
largest distribution centres in Longmeadow, as well as another similar investment in its Philippi 
distribution centre in 2012.  
The lack of access to distribution centres and logistics networks places independent retailers 
and new entrants at a considerable competitive disadvantage. Suppliers often provide additional 
discounts for sales to distribution centres even for the same volumes of product. These include 
distribution, warehouse and pallet discounts, which could amount to up to 10% off the price of 
products. Investments in distribution centres therefore can contribute to levelling the playing fields 
with respect to sourcing for smaller players who have access to them (das Nair and Chisoro, 2015). 
Advertising costs are also a significant barrier to expansion for supermarkets and independent 
retailers. Independent retailers have found ways of partially overcoming this through the buying 
groups they are affiliated with. These groups undertake advertising and promotions, including 
through the use of knock-and-drop advertising and direct marketing on behalf of independent 
retailers. Other major barriers for small players include lack of business management skills, retail 
capabilities and access to finance.  
Access to finance and lack of retail skills were also key barriers identified in the southern African 
countries. Other areas where government assistance was sought include rehabilitation of 
infrastructure (such as rail, road, and energy infrastructure), better access to agricultural extension 
services, greater protection from imports, regularly reviewed ‘sensitive product’ industries, and 
facilitation of access to export markets. 
 
1.5. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This paper, through a RVC lens, has assessed developments in the following selected key food value 
chains in southern Africa: 
1. Seeds 
2. Fertilisers 
3. Animal feed and poultry 
4. Maize and wheat milling 
5. Dairy  
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6. Retail  
An RVC approach is strongly advocated for in evaluating market outcomes as a complementary 
tool to traditional industrial organisation approaches to competition matters. In many of the value 
chains assessed, it is the same multinational players that operate across countries and the conduct of 
these firms with market power tends to be similar in the different countries. A RVC approach further 
provides useful insights into bottlenecks in the value chain that can span across countries in the 
region, and provides insights into opportunities for upgrading. Bilateral or multilateral efforts by 
competition authorities and other government departments of the respective countries may be 
required to address these. Understanding the governance role of large lead firms in value chains also 
adds to assessments of market power that competition authorities can benefit from. 
The cooperation of competition authorities within the region is therefore vital to successfully 
detect and prosecute anticompetitive behaviour. This requires constant monitoring of trends and 
market outcomes through, for instance, a ‘market observatory’ platform, coordinated and shared 
between national and regional competition authorities.  
The history of development of food markets in South Africa has resulted in many legacy 
competition concerns, but the paper has highlighted more recent trends that affect competitive 
dynamics that should not be ignored. The increased financialisation, cross-ownerships and 
internationalisation of large lead local firms in the food sector affects the strategies and incentives to 
effectively compete. Mergers that involve institutional players may not, on the face of it, present 
direct competition concerns, but in the long run may result in diminished incentives to compete. These 
trends in food markets are not unique to South Africa. Again, there is a role for competition authorities 
globally, especially BRICS countries’ authorities, to cooperate and collaborate on matters that have 
global impacts. 
The role of the retail level of the value chain for the development of food markets cannot be 
underestimated. Large retail chains with significant market power (as is the case in southern Africa) 
influence the participation and development of suppliers. Effective competition at this level is 
important to reduce effects of abuse of buyer power on suppliers. It is therefore important to foster a 
competitive environment for a diversity of retail models and to keep retail spaces open to entrants to 
allow them to gain a foothold in the market. Competition authorities need to engage with local 
government/municipalities to ensure that urban planning policies open up retail space. This should 
include planning and licence conditions that ban exclusive leases or limit the duration of these to no 
more than 5 years on exceptional grounds.  
To further curb abuses of buyer power may require a multi-pronged approach. Amending the 
Competition Act to more effectively address abuses of buyer power by including lessening, 
preventing or distorting competition as tests for anticompetitive effects under the abuse of dominance 
provisions is one approach. Initiatives to amend the Act are currently underway and the experiences 
in the retail sector can provide useful insights to this process on the limitations of the Act as it 
currently stands. Powers can also be given to the Grocery Retail Market Inquiry undertaken by the 
Competition Commission to make orders based on its findings. A complementary approach involves 
setting up a code of conduct that governs the relationship between supermarkets and suppliers.3312 
Given the multinational nature of supermarkets in the region, such a code can be harmonised across 
                                                          
3312 In the UK for example, the Groceries Supply Code of Practice was set up specifically to oversee the relationship 
between supermarkets and their suppliers following an inquiry by the former Office of Fair Trading.  
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the region. Policy can also require that supermarkets support local small and medium sized suppliers 
through investing in formal supplier development programmes. Both a code of conduct and supplier 
development initiatives are currently being considered by the Department of Trade and Industry in 
its industrial policy going forwards. 
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Chapter 2: GM Cotton Seeds: Emerging Jurisprudence vis--à-vis Competition, Price Control 
and Patent Licensing in India  
 
Ujjwal Kumar (CUTS) 
 
2.1.Background 
 
The first (and so far the only) genetically modified (GM) crop that has been approved for commercial 
release in India is Bt Cotton. The approval was given to Monsanto’s BG-I3313  cotton technology for 
commercial release in 2002 and to BG-II in 2006.  While Monsanto never applied for patent in India 
for BG-I, its BG-II was granted patent3314 in India in March, 2009. 
‘Monsanto Inc. is a major global player in agricultural products, including developer and licensor of 
GM traits and has a 100 percent subsidiary in India in form of Monsanto Holdings Private Limited 
(MHPL).  Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company (MAHYCO) is an Indian company, engaged in R&D, 
production, processing and marketing of seeds. MHPL holds 26% stake in MAHYCO. Mahyco 
Monsanto Biotech (India) Limited (MMBL), a 50:50 joint venture formed between MHPL and 
MAHYCO, is engaged in sublicensing of the patented Bt cotton technology of Monsanto Inc. in 
India.’3315   
 
Figure 1: The Monsanto Group 
Monsanto Inc. (USA) 
100% 
 
 
MHPL (India) 26%      
MAHYCO (India) 
 
50:50 
MMBL (India) 
 
 
Many Indian seed companies (around 50) have entered into sub-licensee agreements with MMBL for 
procuring its Bt cotton technology in consideration of an upfront one time non–refundable fee 
(Rs.5mn) and recurring fee called as ‘Trait Value’. The ‘Trait Value’ is the estimated value for the 
trait of insect resistance conferred by the Bt gene technology and is to be paid to MMBL on the basis 
of MRP of 450 gm seed packet in advance for each crop season.  
This “fixation or determination of GM trait value and its licensing” has been the trigger for 
various interventions by central and state governments and central point of almost all (mostly on-
going) disputes between Monsanto and its licensees. Because of these disputes several important 
                                                          
3313 Bollgard is the brand owned by Monsanto Inc. BG-I contain one Bt gene stacked with the base cotton variety and 
BG-II contains two Bt genes.  
3314 Patent No. 232681, with effect from June 05, 2002 
3315 CCI order dated 10.02.2016 on Reference Case No. 2 of 2015 & Case No. 107 of 2015 
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issues – scientific, environmental, regulatory, socio-economic, political-economy – emerged or re-
emerged.  
This Chapter, however, has limited scope. Part I contains factual illustrations on the following three 
recent developments: 
• Dispute before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) alleging inter alia abuse of 
dominance by the Monsanto group;  
• Notification of Cotton Seeds Price (Control) Order, 2015 empowering Central Government 
to fix price for Bt Cotton seeds, including the trait value; and 
• Issuance of Draft Licensing and Formats for GM Technology Guidelines, 2016 by the Central 
Government.  
The Part II of the Chapter analyses and examines the following three contentious issues arising out 
of the above-said developments (with concluding remarks included within each analysis): 
• Does the CCI have jurisdiction on the matters related with patent technology and its licensing? 
• Can and should government intervene into regulation of licensing agreement of a proprietary 
technology using ECA, and consequently fix trait value as well as issue licensing guidelines?  
• Should gene patents be licensed on FRAND terms in seed sector?  
 
2.2.Recent Developments 
2.2.1. Competition Enforcement3316 
 
The fixation of trait value had been a matter of dispute in the erstwhile competition authority the 
MRTPC, which had observed in an interim order in May 2006, that “There is a basic difference 
between royalty and trait value …and are not synonymous… In any case the lumpsum payment of 
Rs.50 lakhs may be considered as royalty for the same, but the future payments on sale cannot be 
termed as royalty”.3317  
Later when the MRTPC was dissolved, the matter was transferred to the Competition 
Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) as per the new Competition Act. The COMPAT disposed of the 
matter in December 2009 viewing the fact that the parties to the dispute had reached an agreement 
and a new price (Rs.750/pack) had been fixed for Bt Cotton seeds. However, it was categorically 
stated by COMPAT that “…if there may be future modifications in the prices the same may give rise 
to further cause of action”.3318 
In November 2015, the Central Government made a reference3319 to CCI alleging certain anti-
competitive practices on the part of MMBL. In December 2015, three private seed companies 
(Informants), whose licenses were terminated by MMBL, also moved to CCI raising allegations of 
anti-competitive practices by MMBL. Later few more private seed companies joined as informants. 
  
Box 1: Allegations against MMBL and its defence before CCI 
 
The Central Government’s allegations against MMBL are: 
                                                          
3316 This section is largely based on the CCI Order dated 10.02.16 on Reference Case No. 2 of 2015 & Case No. 107 of 
2015 
3317 CCI, Case No. 02/2015; p7; 
http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/Ref%20Case%20022015%20%26%20others.pdf (accessed on 17.01.17)  
3318 Ibid p8 
3319 Under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act 
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• Abuse of dominant position by charging unreasonably high trait fees for Bt cotton seeds   
• Creating a monopoly through restrictive (licensing) agreements for unjust enrichment 
by charging high trait value from its licensees and ultimately from farmers  
• Its sub-licensing agreements with the Indian seed manufacturing companies are anti-
competitive  
 
The private seed companies’ allegations are: 
• The sub-license agreements between MMBL and the seed companies are one-sided, 
arbitrary and onerous as well as it is restrictive if sub-licenses want to deal with new 
technology provider  
• Linkage of the trait value to the MRP of seed packets is without any economic 
justification and as such is unfair  
• MMBL has not entered into any sub-license with MAHYCO and MHPL, hence they 
are not subject to unfair conditions. This amounts to discriminatory conduct on part of 
MMBL. 
 
MMBL, on the other hand, contended that these allegations are emerging from contractual 
dispute between the parties and has no competition issue involved. MMBL justified the trait 
value by stating that they are entitled to reward for innovation and claimed that the trait value 
charged from Indian seed companies is lowest in the world. On restrictiveness, MMBL 
submitted that the sub-licensees are only required to intimate it regarding proposed negotiations 
with any of the sub-licensor’s competitor and the same is not abusive or unreasonable. To 
counter the allegation regarding discriminatory treatment and leveraging of its dominant 
position, MMBL contended that the market share of MAHYCO and MHPL in the cotton seed 
market has reduced from 13 percent to 7 percent since 2013. 
 
Broadly, there were two issues before the CCI to decide for the purpose of initiating a thorough 
investigation:  
• Whether the conducts of MMBL amounts to “abuse of dominance” 3320 within the meaning of 
the Competition Act?  
• Whether, sub-license agreements between the Licensees and MMBL are “anti-competitive 
agreements” 3321  within the meaning of the Competition Act? 
After detailed deliberations the CCI came to conclusion that the “provision of Bt cotton technology 
in India” is the relevant market for the purpose of analysis. It also figured out that there also exist 
entry barriers in the form of rigorous regulations and requirement of huge investment.  
Does MMBL enjoy a dominant position? The CCI found that there were few other companies offering 
single gene Bt Cotton technology. However, for the two gene Bt cotton technology (BGII), MMBL 
is the only player. In addition, out of 1128 Bt Cotton hybrids approved by the GEAC (till May 2012), 
986 were having Bt technology sub-licensed by MMBL. The CCI also found that the MMBL’s Bt 
cotton technology was used in more than 99 percent of area under Bt cotton cultivation. Therefore, 
for CCI the dominant position of MMBL in the relevant market is apparent.  
                                                          
3320 Under Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(a)(ii), 4(2)(b), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the Act 
3321 Under Sections 3(1) and 3(4) of the Act 
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Is such alleged dominance by MMBL being abused? The sub-license agreements contain certain 
terms and conditions that appeared to the CCI as being abusive, stringent and restrictive as well as 
unfair. For instance, the termination of a license would have the effect of denial of market access to 
the seed manufacturers, given their dependence on MMBL for Bt cotton technology. These conditions 
also amount to restriction of development of alternate Bt cotton technologies.  
 
Box2: Restrictive conditions in the Licensing Agreement 
 
The sub-licenses between MMBL and seed companies have been alleged to contain the 
following abusive and restrictive terms & conditions: 
• License requires the sub-licensee to intimate MMBL within 30 days from date of 
undertaking development of hybrid cotton based on a trait obtained from a competitor 
of MMBL, failing which may trigger termination of the license with immediate effect  
• The consequences of such termination require the sub-licensee to immediately cease 
selling the GM cotton seed produced under the agreement and immediately destroy all 
such seeds  
• The sub-licensee shall immediately destroy all parent lines or other cotton germplasm 
which has been modified to contain the Monsanto’s technology 
• MMBL is empowered to terminate the sub-license agreement with immediate effect, if 
at any time, any laws in the territory restrict the sub license fees (trait value) payable 
by the sub-licensee 
 
 
According to the CCI, the termination of license, while the matter was still sub-judice, and invoking 
stringent termination conditions, prima facie points towards MMBL using its dominance in the 
upstream market to protect its presence in the downstream market through its group entities. MMBL 
also could not provide evidence to get rid of the allegations of discriminatory conduct favouring its 
groups companies. As any discrimination has the potential to distort the level playing field in the 
downstream Bt cotton seeds market, CCI felt the need for further examination.  
As regards the allegations of “anti-competitive agreements,” the CCI observed that the notification 
requirements coupled with the stringent termination conditions in the sub-license agreement entered 
into between MMBL and the aggrieved seed manufacturers were in the nature of refusal to deal and 
exclusive supply agreements within the meaning of S.3(4)(b) and 3(4)(d) of the Act.  
To the CCI, the termination conditions were found to be excessively harsh and did not seem to be 
reasonable as may be necessary for protecting any of the IPR rights, as envisaged under S.3(5) of the 
Act. Such agreements discourage and serve as a major deterrent for the sub licensee from exploring 
dealing with competitors. The agreements thus, have the effect of foreclosing competition in the 
upstream Bt Technology market which is characterised by high entry barriers.  
The CCI came to the conclusion that there exists a prima facie case of contravention of the provisions 
of S.3(4) and S.4 of the Act by the Monsanto Group and consequently directed the Director General 
to conduct an investigation into the whole matter.  As of now, the DG is yet to complete the 
investigation. 
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One Member3322 of the CCI, however, did not agree with the conclusion reached by the 
majority. Even if MMBL holds a dominant position vis-à-vis BG-II, there is no prima facie case for 
abuse of such dominance. The dissenting note says, “…it is not a violation of any provision of the 
Act, though it may have competition concerns. The remedy lies elsewhere. The decision of the 
Central Government to fix trait fee and prescribe terms of licensing under the Essential Commodities 
Act, 1955 could be one.”3323 
In the meantime, MMBL moved to the Delhi High Court3324 asking it to stop the CCI from 
investigating. MMBL’s main contention is that the CCI has no jurisdiction in respect of any matter 
related to IPRs, including rights pertaining to licensing of patents, which falls within exclusive 
jurisdiction of the patent authority, civil courts as provided under the Patents Act, 1970. The Court3325 
refused to stay the investigations but directed CCI not to pass any final order. The matter is still sub 
judice.  
However, in another case (Ericsson case; discussed below) with similar issues, the Delhi HC 
has ruled that CCI does have jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.2. Cotton Seeds Price (Control) Order, 2015 
 
The Cotton Seeds Price (Control) Order, 2015 (CSPCO) was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Farmers Welfare (MoAFW), India on 7th December 2015 in exercise of the powers conferred by 
Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (ECA).  ECA is “an Act to provide, in the interest 
of the general public, for the control of the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and 
commerce, in certain commodities”. As per S.2(a)(ix) of ESA, “cotton seed” forms an ‘essential 
commodity’.  
According to the S.3 of ECA, “if the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or 
expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of essential commodity or for securing their 
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, …, it may, by order, provide for regulating or 
prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein”. 
Accordingly the CSPCO has been issued “to provide for an effective system for fixation of sale price 
for cotton seeds to ensure their availability to the farmers at fair, reasonable and affordable prices”.  
 
Box 3: Important features of CSPCO, 2015 
 
The CSPCO was issued on farmers demand and it was necessitated because of fixation of sale 
price by multiple authorities that resulted in different prices in different states. This Order is 
for uniform regulation across India of the sale price of cotton seeds with the existing and future 
GM technologies. 
 
The Controller under the Seed (Control) Order 1983 shall be the competent authority under 
CSPCO as well and shall have the power to regulate the sale price of cotton seed. The 
Controller shall advise the Government on the following:  
                                                          
3322 M.S. Sahoo 
3323 CCI Order dated 10 February 2016, Case No. 02/2015   
3324 Writ petition (civil) No. 1776/2016 and WP(C) No.1777/2016 
3325 Vide its Order dated 29th February 2016 
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• Regulation of sale of Cotton Seeds at notified Maximum Sale Price (MSP)  
• Prescription of licensing guidelines and format for all the GM Technology Licensing 
Agreements 
• Any other matter referred to him for advice by the Government. 
 
The CSPCO empowers the Government to notify MSP of cotton seeds from time to time. In 
determining the MSP the Government would have to take into consideration  
• seed value  
• license fee (trait value)  
• trade margins 
• other taxes.   
 
The Government, while fixing the MSP, shall also fix and regulate the Seed Value and License 
Fee including royalty or trait value. For the purpose of fixing MSP, the Government may 
constitute a Committee, which shall have recommendatory power.  
 
The fixed MSP would be notified on or before 31st March of every year applicable for the next 
financial year. “MSP fixation along with fixation of its components” shall be binding on all 
stakeholders including the Licensor and the Licensee, notwithstanding anything contained in 
any contract or instrument to the contrary. And importantly, the Government may also 
prescribe, by notification, a format for License Agreements.   
 
The CSPCO further states that “any person who contravenes any of the provisions of this Order 
or fails to carry out any direction or requisition made thereunder, shall be punishable under 
section 7 of the ECA. This section prescribes imprisonment or fine or both. 
 
 
After adhering to the recommendations of a nine-member Committee for the purpose of fixing MSP 
of Bt cotton seeds, in March 2016, the Government notified the MSP of Bt cotton seeds. The MSP of 
Bt Cotton seed (packets of 450gms) for financial year 2016-17 for the whole of India was fixed for 
BG-II at Rs.800, which included a cap of Rs.49 on Trait Value. It remained the same for 2017-18. 
Furthermore, invoking the powers conferred by the CSPCO, the M/o AC&FW issued a 
Notification on 18th May 2016 containing “Licensing and Formats for GM Technology Agreement 
Guidelines”, which was subsequently revoked and was published for comments. These guidelines are 
discussed below in details. 
Meanwhile, within days of issuance of the CSPCO, MMBL filed a writ petition in Delhi HC 
challenging inter alia the provisions empowering the Govt. to determine royalty fee/trait value, as 
illegal and unconstitutional. MMBL submitted that the Government is unfairly regulating and 
expropriating its IPRs and freedom to negotiate and contract the terms of its licensing agreements 
with its sub-licensees. While the petition is still sub judice, the Court did not grant any stay.  
Subsequently, the Association of Biotechnology Led Enterprises Agriculture Group (ABLE-AG), of 
which MMBL is a member, also filed a writ petition in Karnataka High Court, reportedly on same 
grounds as those raised by MMBL in Delhi HC. The Karnataka HC first granted a stay vide its 21st 
March Order, but in May, 2016 it revoked its stay order. The matter is pending in both the high courts.  
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2.2.3. Licensing and Formats for GM Technology Agreement Guidelines 
 
Invoking the powers conferred by the CSPCO, the M/o A&FW issued a Notification on 18th May 
2016 containing “Licensing and Formats for GM Technology Agreement Guidelines, 2016”3326. But 
due to opposition and viewing its wide implications, the notification was rescinded on 24th May 2016, 
and had been put as draft for comments. So far there has been no development on this.  
The central philosophy, encompassing the issuance of the Guidelines & Formats, is that the 
protection and management IP of a transgenic plant variety per se is governed by the PPVFR Act and 
not the Patents Act, even though biotechnology inventions are patentable.  
 
Box 4: Relevant features of the Draft GM Licensing Guidelines and Format 
 
The central philosophy, encompassing the issuance of the Guidelines & Formats, can be read 
into the following paragraphs from the (draft) notification:  
 
“…section 3 of the Patents Act, 1970 excludes a method of agriculture or 
horticulture and plants and animals in whole or any part thereof other than 
microorganisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially 
biological processes for production or propagation of plants and animals from 
the inventions… 
 
…even though biotechnology inventions are patentable, once the GM Traits 
developed through biotechnology are transferred into a variety (“transgenic 
variety”), the transgenic variety per se cannot be patented; the seeds carrying 
such trait also cannot be patented and hence, the plant varieties including 
transgenic varieties carrying the GM Traits can be protected only under the 
Protection of Plant varieties and Farmer's Rights Act, 2001… 
 
…the transgenic varieties become the intellectual property of the breeder or 
company who has developed it… 
 
…based on the existing intellectual property rights regime for 
biotechnology, plants and varieties in the seed industry, it is felt necessary to 
prescribe the licensing guidelines so that all seed companies have access to the 
GM Traits without any restraint and at the same time biotech trait development 
is adequately rewarded under the fair, reasonable and non-discriminative 
mechanism (FRAND mechanism)…” 
 
With respect to fixation of trait value, the guidelines states taking into account the following 
additional factors: 
• year of patenting and commercialisation of the trait in India 
                                                          
3326 http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2016/169713.pdf  
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• efficacy of trait and gradual reduction in trait value from the year of commercial use in 
India   
 
Post-notification of the guidelines, the maximum trait value may be up to 10 percent of MSP 
of GM Cotton seed (as fixed by the Government) for the initial period of five years from 
commercialisation. From sixth year the trait value shall taper down by 10 percent of initial trait 
value every year.  
 
The Guidelines further states: “as the GM Traits are expected to have a limited period of 
efficacy, any GM Trait which loses its efficacy as reported by States and verified by the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) shall not be eligible for any trait value whatsoever. 
Presence of the trait in the seed after the loss of efficacy shall not be a reason for claiming any 
trait value merely on the basis of patent for the technology which is used to develop the trait.” 
 
If new GM Traits commercialised after the publication of these Guidelines, the mutually agreed 
upfront fee will be subject to maximum ceiling not exceeding Rs.2.5mn payable in two equal 
annual instalments.   
 
In addition, the guidelines also provide certain clarifications/principles to be part of any GM 
licensing agreement. For instance: 
• The Agreement shall be based on principles of equity and FRAND terms 
• The GM Trait transfer will be on non-exclusive basis covering entire India 
• The GM Technology used for developing the GM Trait shall be the property of 
Licensor, but the commercial exploitation rights and IPRs under PPVFR Act of 
transgenic cotton varieties developed by Licensee under this agreement shall rest with 
Licensee  
• Although Licensee cannot transfer the GM Trait under the Agreement to any party 
without prior approval of the Licensor, the Licensee may license the transgenic variety 
developed by them under the agreement, having IPRs under the PPVFR Act, to any 
other company 
• The Licensor shall transfer GM Trait to the licensee within 15 days of receipt of first 
instalment of upfront fee 
• The Licensor shall not put any restrictive condition in the Agreement restraining 
licensee to get similar or other GM Traits or any other technology from other 
technology developers/licensor 
• The Licensor shall also permit the Licensee to stack any other appropriate GM Trait 
from any other Licensor or trait developer as and when required so as to provide better 
agronomic value to the farmers 
 
 
The GM Licence Guidelines requires that the licensor cannot refuse the grant of license to obtain 
approved GM Trait by any eligible seed company. That means the access to GM trait shall not become 
a barrier to entry into market. If the licensor does not award such license within 30 days of a request, 
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the Licensee is deemed to have obtained the license for the GM Trait as per FRAND mechanism and 
the licensor shall abide the Guidelines.  
 
2.3.Examining Contentious Issues 
 
From the above descriptions at least three key contentious issues arise: 
• Does the CCI have jurisdiction on the matters related with patent technology and its licensing? 
• Can and should government intervene into regulation of licensing agreement of a proprietary 
technology using ECA, and consequently fix trait value as well as issue licensing guidelines?  
• Should gene patents be licensed on FRAND terms in seed sector?  
 
2.3.1. CCI’s jurisdiction 
 
The Patents Act bestows rights on a patent holder to prevent third parties from making, using, offering 
for sale, selling or importing the products using the said patent without its consent. The Act also 
presents a framework for exercise of such rights and remedies in cases of abuse of the patent rights. 
Therefore, it is generally contended that such matters pertaining to patents and licensing need to be 
dealt under the Patents Act and not under the Competition Act.  
The Delhi High Court considering precisely the same issue related with the jurisdiction of the 
CCI in the case Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Competition Commission of India & Another3327 
held that CCI has the jurisdiction to entertain cases related to ‘abuse of dominance’ and ‘anti-
competitive agreements’ even when the product concerned is patented. The following paragraphs 
summarise the logic and reasoning given by the Court.   
The Section 62 of the Competition Act states that “the provisions of this Act shall be in 
addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force”. 
Also S.60 of the Act says, “the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force”. Therefore, mere plain 
reading of these two provisions, it is evident that the intention of the Parliament in enacting the 
Competition Act was not to curtail or whittle down the full scope of any other law, as the Act would 
be “in addition to, and not in derogation of” any other Act.  
The Court also observed that the remedies as provided under Section 27 of the Competition Act for 
abuse of dominant position are materially different from the remedy as available under Section 84 
(Compulsory License) of the Patents Act. It is also apparent that the remedies under the two 
enactments are not mutually exclusive; in other words grant of one is not destructive of the other. 
Thus, it may be open for a prospective licensee to approach the Controller of Patents for grant of 
compulsory licence in certain cases. The same is not inconsistent with the CCI passing an appropriate 
order under Section 27 of the Competition Act. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Sections 21 and 21A of the Competition Act indicate that the 
intention of the Parliament was not to abrogate any other law but to ensure that even in cases where 
CCI or other statutory authorities contemplate passing orders, which may be inconsistent with other 
statutes, the opinion of the concerned authority is taken into account while passing the such orders. 
These provisions clearly indicates the Competition Act co-exist with other regulatory statues and be 
                                                          
3327 W.P.(C) 464/2014; Judgement delivered by Delhi High Court on 30.03.2016 
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harmoniously worked in tandem with those statues and as far as possible, statutory orders be passed 
which are consistent with the concerned statutory enactments including the Competition Act.  
The Court also observed that the operative width of the two enactments is different. Whereas 
the Patents Act provides specific remedy to the ‘person’ seeking relief, the orders passed by CCI are 
in ‘rem’ (i.e. against or about a ‘thing’). While the doors are open for the parties to initiate proceedings 
related with a patented product under the Patents Act, the jurisdiction of the CCI cannot be curtailed 
and hence any proceeding initiated on such product under the Competition Act are maintainable.  
Unless until, contrary view is given by the Supreme Court, this may be taken as settled.  
 
2.3.2. Government Intervention under ECA 
 
Although Essential Commodities Act, 1955 does not expressly provide for regulation of trait value, 
it gives wide powers to regulate or prohibit any class of commercial or financial transactions relating 
to foodstuffs or cotton textiles in public interest. The Indian Patents Act also does not supersede or 
eclipse the provisions of ECA vis-à-vis patented products. Thus, as per the rules of interpretations, 
both the enactments should be read together unless there is an express provision to the contrary.  
The Karnataka High Court while revoking its earlier stay order (discussed above), had 
observed: “it is prima facie seen that the source of power to fix the maximum sale price including 
trait value is available and such step is taken to see that the essential commodity is made available at 
a fair price to farmers… to continue the interim order would not be in public interest… it is the 
government’s duty to ensure production and supply of cotton seeds at a fair price and the interim 
order was hampering this”.3328  
On the process of price fixation, the Court further observed that “it cannot be stated as 
arbitrary fixation at this stage since the documents produced on behalf of the government indicates 
that a committee was constituted to consider the price fixation and after providing opportunity to all 
the concerned parties, the price has been fixed, which has been notified”3329.  
It may be noted that before governments began to intervene in controlling MSP of cotton 
seeds, trait value/license fee used to constitute around 67 percent of the retail price3330, making it 
evident that higher license fees was leading to higher seed prices. In 2006, Indian farmers were paying 
about Rs.1600 to Rs.1700 for 450 gram of Bt cotton seed, of which Rs.1250 was going to MMBL as 
trait value3331.  
Even the noted agriculture scientist, Dr MS Swaminathan has advocated for price control, 
saying “the government should have authority to use price controls in certain situations, but not to 
usurp the role of the market”3332.  He further warns: “High seed prices and trait fees will come in the 
way of social inclusion on technological access – and social inclusion is fundamental to growth of 
the sector”.3333 
 
                                                          
3328 The Mint, 05-05-16 
3329 Financial Express, 05-05-16 
3330 Manjunatha et al.: Need for Government Intervention in Regulating Seed Sale Price & Trait Fee; Journal of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Vol 20, November 2015, p385; 
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/33583/1/JIPR%2020(6)%20375-387.pdf 
3331 Chaturvedi, Sachin; Technological Change and New Actors: Debate on Returns and Regulations; RIS, 2010 
3332 Seeds of Strife, Down to Earth, 31st August 2010; http://www.downtoearth.org.in/news/seeds-of-strife-1737   
3333 Ibid 
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Table 1: Snap Shot of Price Control Initiatives by Various State Governments 
 
 
Source: RIS Discussion Paper #1683334 
 
Be that as it may, there have been backlash also on the CSPCO under the ESA. Monsanto warned by 
saying: “It is difficult. . . to justify bringing new technologies into India in an environment where such 
arbitrary and innovation-stifling government interventions make it impossible to recoup research and 
development investments. . . and where sanctity of contracts is absent”.3335   
Similarly, Ashok Gulati has stated: “…This one will hit India’s credibility in protecting IPR 
and, no wonder, most global seed companies feel hesitant in bringing their latest technologies to India 
precisely for this reason. Our public research is pitiable. Look at the entire ICAR budget for the 
country, which was around Rs.4840cr (USD0.8bn) in 2014-15. But Monsanto alone spent USD1.7bn 
in R&D in 2014.”3336  
Would government move really hit India’s credibility in protecting IPRs, and consequently 
discourage investment and transfer of technology? In this regard, it must be noted that under IP policy 
‘agriculture’ and ‘health’ have been looked upon differently since long, not only in India but in many 
other countries.  These formed one of the most contentious items during Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations and the trend continues in any other international negotiation.  
Contrary to what Monsanto Inc. has observed, Boeing in its submission to the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) has said: “the Boeing Company conducted a detailed review and 
determined that India maintains adequate Intellectual Property Rights legal framework for the 
company’s aerospace and defence products… Boeing continues to have a positive experience with 
Indian customers, partners, and suppliers on IPR protection…3337 Indian IPR laws are comparable to 
IPR regulations in developed countries as India is signatory to all major conventions and treaties on 
this subject".3338  
Similarly, Honeywell International is on record saying: "India's IPR framework was one of 
the key enablers in the establishment of Honeywell's engineering and technology presence."3339 
                                                          
3334 Supra17 
3335 Financial Times, 14.03.2016 
3336 Indian Express, 14.03.16 
3337 The Hindu Business Line, 15.04.2016 
3338 The Economic Time, 13.05.2016 
3339 ibid 
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Therefore, India’s IP regime is very much conducive to attract R&D investments in the country. It 
does have differentiated approach for seed and pharmaceutical sectors, but the same is akin to the 
policy space provided under international agreements. More so, the Central Government has shown 
much restraint in intervening into matters of patented technology and has a National IPR Policy to 
facilitate investment in innovation. 
Since 1988, when the seed industry was liberalised through New Policy on Seed 
Development, there has been tremendous growth of private (both domestic and foreign) seed 
companies. By 2010 more than 80 percent of turnover in seed business came from private seed 
companies.3340 About 90 percent of new varieties that has been registered under PPVFR Act are 
hybrids developed by private seed companies.3341  
Similarly, the National Seed Policy, 2002, recognises the importance of GM technology, when 
it says: “Biotechnology will be a key factor in agricultural development in the coming decades. 
Genetic engineering/ modification techniques hold enormous promise in developing crop varieties 
with a higher level of tolerance to biotic and abiotic stresses. A conducive atmosphere for application 
of frontier sciences in varietal development and for enhanced investments in research and 
development is a pressing requirement. At the same time, concerns relating to possible harm to human 
and animal health and bio-safety, as well as interests of farmers, must be addressed”. 
The point is that the policy environment for foreign investment in Indian seed sector, in 
general, and GM seed sector, in particular, is quite conducive. And few government regulations to 
safeguard national/farmers’ interests do not create such a bad situation for investment and technology 
transfer. The Indian seed market remains more liberalised than that of China, which severely restricts 
FDI and trading in certain types of seeds.3342   
Farmer groups have been the main demanders for price regulation of Bt cotton seed and so 
far various State Governments have been fulfilling this demand. But when due to fixed MSP (without 
capped trait fee), the domestic seed companies (sub-licensee companies) found their profits getting 
significantly squeezed, they began to put pressure on respective state governments. Subsequently, 
Telangana/Andhra Pradesh began intervening into fixing ‘royalty/trait value’. This triggered similar 
actions by cotton growing states, which in turn led to number of court cases.   
While one set of court cases were initiated challenging the said move of the state governments, 
another set of court cases were initiate between few sub-licensees and MMBL, whether to pay 
according to government fixed trait value or as prescribed by the license contract between the two 
parties.  Most of these cases are still pending. The Central Government, in the meantime, decided to 
issue CSPCO, assuming itself the responsibility of price control of Bt cotton seeds, including fixing 
trait value/fee.  
It may also be pertinent to note here that most stakeholders (farmers groups, state governments 
etc.) have been demanding inclusion of price control under the new Seed Bill (introduced twice in 
the Parliament, 2004 and 2010). 3343 Major part of the Bill, if it becomes an Act, would be 
implemented by State Governments, where chances of adhering to populist measures are much 
                                                          
3340 Manjunatha et al.: Need for Government Intervention in Regulating Seed Sale Price & Trait Fee; Journal of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Vol 20, November 2015; p376 
3341 Ibid; p377 
3342 Ibid 
3343 Ibid 
1017 
 
higher. Almost all the private seed companies (domestic and foreign) are opposed to this approach of 
price control – directly under an Act, implemented by state governments3344.  
If at all a price control regime is needed, the seed companies would rather prefer a softer law 
approach under an administrative Order, implemented by Central Government. Under this approach 
it is easier to amend and withdraw notifications than that under the former approach.  
Therefore, the present move by the Central Government in fixing MSP of Bt cotton seeds, 
including royalty/trait value, vide an administrative order, tends to bring more certainty, transparency 
and homogeneity as far as policy environment is concerned. The emerging price control pattern in 
GM cotton looks like: patent holder (say Monsanto) would negotiate “royalty/trait fee” for 
transferring its patented technology (say BG-III) with GOI. Once that is done, GOI would notify the 
MSP of such GM cotton seed for whole of India.  
This emerging pattern seems to present a middle path, from regulation and competition 
perspective. On the one extreme is a situation where a patent holder using its dominance in the market 
negotiates with domestic seed companies individually, having weak bargaining power, resulting in 
unreasonable MRP. On the other extreme is a situation where state governments in their populist zeal 
intervening to control the price, including royalty fee, and reducing it to such lower level that neither 
patent holders nor (sub)licensees are happy. 
 
2.4.Patents and gene-editing 
 
Patents on life forms had been a subject matter of contentious debate since the Uruguay Round of 
trade talks, mainly because of its effect on pharmaceutical (health) and seed (agriculture) sectors. 
After intense negotiations, the text in the TRIPs Agreement, that finally emerged in form of Article 
27(3)(b), excluded plants and animals from patentable subject matter. The TRIPs Agreement gave 
choice to Member states to exclude from patentability: (i) plants and animals, and (ii) essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants and animals. But it required Members to provide 
patent protection for: (i) microorganisms, and (ii) non-biological and microbiological processes for 
the production of plants and animals. However, the Agreement provided for review of the Article 
27(3)(b), which is still pending and the issue can re-emerge any time in future. 
Using the flexibility, the Indian Patents Act excluded from patentability: (1) discovery of any 
living thing or non-living substance occurring in nature3345, and (2) plants and animals in whole or 
any part thereof other than micro-organisms but including seeds, varieties and species and essentially 
biological processes for production or propagation of plants and animals3346. 
Therefore, patents related to genes can be contested on at least two grounds. First, does the isolation 
of gene amount to a ‘discovery’; and second, whether genes are ‘parts of plant or animal’. More or 
less, such contentions are found in most jurisdictions, including that of developed countries. For 
instance, in the case of the Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc. (2013), the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter under 
                                                          
3344 It should be noted that “Agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against pests and 
prevention of plant diseases” is a State Subject under the Constitution of India, which enables the State Government to 
regulate Bt Cotton seed price. 
3345 Section 3(c) 
3346 Section 3(j) 
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United States law, and that such isolated nucleotide sequences are barred by the ‘product of nature’ 
exclusion to patentability. 
The US Supreme Court, however, did allow that DNA manipulated in a lab is eligible to be 
patented because DNA sequences altered by humans are not found in nature. Thus complimentary 
DNA (cDNA) sequences can be patented in the US. The Court held: “A naturally occurring DNA 
segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but cDNA 
is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.” 
The same gene patent of Myriad Inc. was also subject of litigation in Australia. Unlike the US 
law, where “laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas” are exceptions to patentability, 
under the Australian law an invention is prima facie patentable if it is a ‘manner of manufacture’.  
The High Court of Australia (the apex court), in D’Arcy v. Myriad Genetics, held that a gene’s 
substance is information embodied in arrangements of nucleotides and hence is not a manner of 
manufacture. The information is not ‘made’ by human action. Disallowing the Myriad patent, the 
Court observed that “while the invention claimed might be, in a formal sense, a product of human 
action, it was the existence of the information stored in the relevant sequences that was an essential 
element of the invention as claimed”.  Thus, the key element of isolated DNA – the genetic 
information itself – is not patentable in Australia.  
Although it was human gene that was involved in the above said Myriad cases, the rulings 
does/would have effects on the patents pertaining to agricultural biotechnology. The Indian Patent 
Office (IPO) has also granted multiple patents claiming isolated genetic material and nucleotide 
sequences3347. The Bt Cotton Technology was granted patent in India in 2009.  
The “Guidelines for Examination of Biotechnology Applications for Patent” (GEBAP), 
published by the IPO in 2013, explicitly states that “products such as microorganisms, nucleic acid 
sequences, proteins, enzymes, compounds, etc., which are directly isolated from nature, are not 
patentable subject-matter”. 
 
Box 5 
Guidelines for Examination of Biotechnology Applications for Patent: Relevant Features 
 
The GEBAP, which is meant for patent examiners and are non-binding in nature, has cautioned 
saying:  
 
“…there are some issues relating to patentability of biotechnological inventions 
which are of serious concern to the users of Patent System such as novelty, 
obviousness, industrial applicability, extent of disclosure and clarity in claims. 
In addition, a few special issues have also evolved such as those relating to 
moral and ethical concerns, environmental safety, issues relating to patenting of 
Expressed Sequence Tags of partial gene sequences, cloning of farm animals, 
stem cells, gene diagnostics, etc. Thus, the patenting of inventions in the field 
of biotechnology poses challenges to the applicants for patents as well as to the 
                                                          
3347 Jefferson, David J. and Padmanabhan, Meenu S., Recent Evolutions in Intellectual Property Frameworks for 
Agricultural Biotechnology: A Worldwide Survey; Asian Biotechnology and Development Review, Vol.18 No.1; RIS 
2016 
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Patent Office… These guidelines are intended to help the examiners and 
controllers of the Patent Office so as to achieve uniformity and consistency” 
 
“biotechnology deals with living subject matters and involves alteration of 
genomic materials of an organism. Such change may influence or may have a 
deep impact upon the environment or the human, animal or plant life or may 
involve serious questions about morality. Hence, adequate care should be taken 
while examining the inventions vis-à-vis their primary or intended use or 
commercial exploitation and it should be carefully dealt so that the subject-
matter must not be contrary to public order, morality or causes serious prejudice 
to human, animal or plant life or health or to the environment.” 
 
As far as biotech patents in India are concerned, till 2002, patents were not granted for inventions 
relating to (a) living entities of natural or artificial origin, (b) biological materials or other materials 
having replicating properties, (c) substances derived from such materials and (d) any processes for 
the production of living substances/entities including nucleic acids.  
In 2002, the Calcutta High Court, in its decision in Dimminaco AG v. Controller of Patents 
and Designs opened the doors for the grant of patents to inventions where the final product of the 
claimed process contained living microorganisms. The court held that a new and useful art or process 
is an invention, and where the end product (even if it contains living organism) is a new article, the 
process leading to its manufacture is an invention. That there was no statutory bar in the patent statute 
to accept a manner of manufacture as patentable even if the end product contained a living organism. 
In 2002, the Patents Act was amended and biochemical, biotechnological and microbiological 
processes were included within the scope of chemical processes for the grant of patent. The definition 
of “invention” was also changed to “any new product or process involving an inventive step and 
capable of industrial application” thereby deleting the word “manner of manufacture” as mentioned 
in the earlier Act. The 2005 amendment of the Patents Act paved the way for the grant of product 
patents in any field of technology including biotechnology with certain exceptions.  
Although, microorganisms are excluded from non-patentability list, a conjoined reading with 
Section 3 (c) of the Act implies that only modified microorganisms, which do not constitute discovery 
of living thing occurring in nature, are patentable subject matter under the Act.3348  
Be that as it may, India does not provide for patents on seeds. Using TRIPS flexibility, India provides 
protection to the new plant varieties via a sui generis legislation Protection of Plant varieties and 
Farmer's Rights Act, 2001 (PPVFR Act). Under this law, like plant breeders, farmers also have 
‘rights’, inter alia to save, exchange and sell (in non-branded form) seeds from their fields, even if 
the same is protected under the Act. India is not a member of UPOV, mainly because of farmers’ 
rights under PPVFR Act; even though the concept of Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) is largely based 
on those provided under UPOV. 
Private seed companies mostly develop hybrid varieties, which though can be re-sown but 
yield declines substantially. Therefore, farmers would need to buy every season. This gives protection 
to the investments of seed companies.  
                                                          
3348 Guidelines for Examination of Biotechnology Applications for Patent, 2013 
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Bt cotton seed, however, presents a special case where the ‘Bt cotton technology’ is patented, 
while the new varieties in which Bt gene has been inserted are provided with PBRs under the PPVFR 
Act. According to the draft GM License Guidelines (discussed above) in such a situation the IP 
protection of the GM seed would be per se under PPVFR, which does not pose much hurdles in the 
access of patented GM traits. A case for licensing under FRAND term has been made. This apparently 
goes against the rights of patent holders under the Patents Act, and hence presents a conflicting 
situation between the two IP legislations.  
The National Seed Association of India (NSAI), body of domestic seed companies (of which 
most Bt licensees are members), however, goes a degree further. According to the NSAI 
interpretation, all breeders and researchers – public or private – have “right to access to trait” and the 
trait owner can be compensated under benefit sharing scheme provided by the PPVFR Act. (See Box 
6 for details.)  
 
Box 6: Stated position of NSAI 
The position of NSAI with respect to the application of right legislation for fixation of trait 
value can be read into the following paragraphs, taken from their letter to Niti Ayog. Excerpts: 
 
We would like to reiterate that as per the Indian IPR laws which are TRIPS 
compliant, the seeds and plants cannot be patented. Monsanto obtained patents 
in India for cotton transformation and event identification based on their patents 
of US under PCT. However, it can be noted that the claims granted to them by 
the Indian patent office does not cover any IP rights to Monsanto on seeds and 
plant varieties as specifically prohibited under Section 3(j) of the Indian Patents 
Act, 1970. The IPR for seeds and plant varieties are covered by a sui generis 
enactment known as Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights (PPVFR) 
Act, 2001 in India. Therefore, the subject of Bt cotton seeds is entirely covered 
only under this enactment. 
 
As per the provisions under Section 30 of PPVFR Act, all the breeders in public, 
private seed companies or research institutes have a right to use any protected 
variety including a transgenic variety carrying a transgenic trait for developing 
new varieties which are registerable for IP protection under Section 18 of the 
Act and can enjoy IP protection under Sections 24 and 28 which includes rights 
to exclusive commercialisation.  
 
The developer of a trait like Monsanto is also provided rights under Section 26 
to claim benefit share which has to be determined only by the PPVFR Authority. 
All the breeders who used such trait are liable to pay a trait value as determined 
by the Authority under the benefit sharing agreement. The Authority is also 
empowered to facilitate recovery of the benefit share amount in case the 
breeders fail to pay to the trait developer. 
 
The provisions of the PPVFR Act are balanced taking care of the interest of the 
trait developers, breeders, seed companies and the farmers. The trait developer 
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can make claims and justify such claims so that the Authority can fix appropriate 
trait value.  
 
NSAI recommended to the Department of Agriculture & Cooperation to issue 
guidelines under the PPVFR Act so that the PPVFR Authority determines the 
trait value which the breeders have to mandatorily pay for using such trait for 
developing new varieties. As access to trait is provided as a right under PPVFR 
Act, no licensing of a trait is required under the law. This is part of the IP 
legislation of India and therefor there may not be any need to use the provisions 
of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.  
Source: Letter from NSAI to Niti Ayog; dated 09.09.2016, Ref: NSA/2016/107 
 
In light of the interpretations presented by the D/o Agriculture Cooperation and Farmers’ Welfare 
and the NSAI, it becomes apparent that there is an inherent tension between the two legislations – 
Patents Act, 1970 and the PPVFR Act, 2001 – demanding legal clarity on the issue. In addition, as 
the two laws are under the jurisdiction of two different departments/ministries (viz. DAFW and DIPP) 
matter could become worse.  
The National Intellectual Property Rights Policy, 2016 (adopted by the Cabinet on 12th May 
2016) clearly visualise such situations when it says:  
“Intellectual property in India is regulated by several laws, rules and regulations under 
the jurisdiction of different Ministries/Departments. A number of authorities and 
offices administer the laws. The legal provisions need to be implemented 
harmoniously so as to avoid conflict, overlap or inconsistencies among them. It is 
necessary that the authorities concerned administer the laws in coordination with each 
other in the interest of efficient administration and user satisfaction. Legal, 
technological, economic and socio-cultural issues arise in different fields of IP which 
intersect with each other and need to be addressed and resolved by consensus in the 
best public interest.” (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, the Objective 3 of the National IPR Policy, 2016 is “to have strong and effective IPR 
laws, which balance the interests of rights owners with larger public interest”. Under this objective, 
the Policy inter alia envisages “identifying important areas of study and research for future policy 
development”, which includes: (1) Interplay amongst IP laws, and between IP laws and other laws to 
remove ambiguities and inconsistencies; and (2) IP interface with competition law and policy. 
Therefore, to resolve the said conflict “by consensus in the best interest of public”; studies should be 
conducted to remove ambiguities and inconsistencies and also stakeholder consultations in different 
parts of the country. Further, studies on the IP interface with competition law and policy in the GM 
Cotton Seed sector may also be conducted with the aims to make policy recommendations vis-à-vis 
balance of the rights and obligations, which may include licensing on FRAND terms.  
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Chapter 3: New forms of financing the agricultural sector in Brazil: The experience of the 
soybean chain 
 
Sylvia Saes (USP, Brazil), Rodrigo Lanna F. da Silveira (Unicamp, Brazil), Beatriz Saes (USP, 
Brazil) 
 
3.1.Introduction 
 
Since the late 1980s, Brazilian agricultural chains have undergone profound transformations resulting 
from structural economic changes. On one hand, the opening up of the national market from the 1990s 
contributed to the concentration and internationalization of input companies. On the other, increased 
exports, coupled with technological progress, stimulated the expansion of production to the frontier 
areas, constituting also a concentrated industry structure based on the use of modern inputs. The new 
forms of financing required by the emerging agriculture producers were not met by the State, whose 
role in the economy was already decreasing. From the late 1980s and early 1990s, the private sector 
gradually assumed functions previously carried out by the State, such as the financing of agricultural 
production, the provision of information, and the development of mechanisms to stabilize production. 
Our paper aims to analyze the evolution and recent trends in the organization of agricultural 
markets and their implications for agricultural chains’ actors and for the financing of agriculture. We 
seek to shed light on the relationships between soybean farmers and agro-industries, focusing on the 
Central-West region of Brazil, which is characterized as the main agriculture frontier in the late 20th 
century, and is also currently the region with the highest grain production in the country. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with a brief contextualization of the 
structural change in Brazilian agriculture. In addition, we present the main aspects of the 
consolidation of Brazilian exported-oriented soybean agriculture. Section 3 focusses on the central 
role of the new organizational forms of Brazilian soybean chains to explain the sector performance. 
Section 4 presents our final considerations regarding these new trends of the organization in the 
agricultural chains. The study notes that while these new forms of financing enable the market to 
function properly, they also represent a way for input and processors firms to appropriate margin on 
both sides of the production chain. 
 
3.2. Structural change in Brazilian agriculture  
3.2.1. The effects of the Brazilian crisis of the 1980s on rural credit  
 
The Brazilian industrialization policies between 1930s and 1970s, characteristic of the import 
substitution model,3349 had important consequences for the agricultural sector. Especially from the 
1960s, in addition to supplying a growing urban population, the performance of domestically-oriented 
agriculture was seen as functional to national industrialization since it was an essential factor in 
keeping real wages in urban areas at low levels. As a result, the rigidity of agricultural supply was 
seen as one important cause for the emerging inflationary process. Because the advance of 
industrialization also depended on the expansion of the capacity to import machinery and equipment, 
                                                          
3349 The import substitution model is a model of late industrialization that existed in Latin America approximately between 
the 1930s and 1960s. It was based on the protection of national industrial sectors in order to reduce the import coefficient 
of these economies. For more information, see Hirschman (1968). 
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the investment in the development of new crops and the modernization of agriculture was seen as a 
means of diversifying the export basket, still heavily dependent on coffee and sugarcane.3350 
In 1965, based on the hypothesis that technology diffusion was fundamental to agricultural 
development, the National System of Rural Credit (NSRC) was created to provide subsidized 
financing to producers for the acquisition of modern inputs. The Minimum Price Guarantee Policy 
from 1966 sought to guarantee minimum income to producers and reduce future price uncertainty, as 
well as indicate which production should increase in order to supply the domestic market. Finally, in 
the 1970s, the special programs for occupancy of the Cerrado biome promoted the development and 
modernization of agriculture in Brazil’s Central-West. Their main effect was to expand the 
agricultural frontier in the country through grain production (Souza et al., 1999, Coelho, 2001). 
The Brazilian external debt crisis in the 1980s, followed by low economic growth and 
increasing inflation, definitively compromised the import substitution model and the agricultural 
policies associated with it. In particular, World Bank credit supports to Brazil from 1982 were 
provided with specific conditions related to deregulation of national markets and public debt 
reduction. From 1987, economic policy reforms that promoted trade liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization of Brazilian companies were reflected in important changes for the agricultural sector, 
including a more export-oriented strategy (Farina, 2001).  
By the late 1970s, the NSRC had consolidated two main sources of financing: the required 
ratio on demand deposits3351 and funds from the National Treasury. The required ratio on demand 
deposits provided between 10% and 15% of total rural credit in the 1970s, while the resources from 
the National Treasury accounted for about 85% (Coelho, 2001). However, the price inflation from 
the late 1970s undermined the volume of demand deposits available to rural credit, despite the 
increased level of deposit liabilities to be used by the NSRC. In the face of rising inflation, the 
population had to leave their money in savings to protect their wealth, with the result that from 1972 
to 1989, the ratio of money resources (money and demand deposits) to total financial resources in 
commercial banks fell from 37% to only 7.8% (Araújo, 2011).  
Furthermore, the extinction of the Bank of Brazil’s Movement Account in 1986, from which 
the State could fulfill its economic policy objectives based on automatic monetary supplies, 
significantly reduced the rural credit available from the National Treasury (Saes and Silveira, 2014). 
Just before the extinction of the Movement Account (1985), the National Treasury provided around 
90% of total resources granted by rural credit. By the late 1980s, it provided less than 30% (Coelho, 
2001). This drastic rupture of public financing channels of agriculture in the 1980s is described by 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Annual credit from the National System of Rural Credit and Brazilian grain production  
 
                                                          
3350 It is also important to observe that, as in other countries, agriculture policies were designed to deal with the specific 
characteristics of national agriculture, including the uncertainties associated with the dependence on environmental and 
climatic factors. 
3351 A minimum percentage of demand deposits that commercial banks are required to lend to agriculture. 
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Source: Central Bank of Brasil (Department of Regulation, Supervision and Control of Operations 
of Rural Credit and Proagro-DEROP—Department of Regulation, Supervision and Control of Rural 
Credit Operations and Proagro-DEROP) and Conab (Brazilian Food Supply Company). 
  
It is true that after reaching its lowest level in 1996, the amount of annual rural credit began to recover, 
and in the 2000s underwent significant growth. The stabilization of prices following the Real Plan in 
1994 dramatically reduced the subsidy embedded in the interest rates of the rural credit,3352 but also 
increased the available volume of demand deposits. The required ratio on demand deposits had an 
increasing role in rural credit, reaching 28% of the total by 2016 (Figure 2). Also, the Rural Savings 
Account, created in 1986 in response to the financing crisis, has grown significantly, taking the place 
of the National Treasury as the most important financing source.3353 In its first year of operation 
(1987), the credit from Rural Savings already represented 23% of total credit, and although it has 
undergone several cycles in the 1990s and 2000s, its participation reached 34% in 2016. Likewise, 
BNDES has become an important financing source since 1991, mainly through the FINAME line 
(Financing of Machinery and Equipment) (Coelho, 2001, Araújo, 2011, BCB, 2017).  
In the meantime, Law 11,076 created new agribusiness financing securities in 2004, aiming 
to expand the participation of the private sector in financing agribusiness, thus reducing the role of 
the federal government. Although the spread of these new securities is relatively recent, we can see 
in Figure 2 that the Agribusiness Credit Bill (LCA) already represented 8% of total rural credit in 
2016.3354 The LCA is a nominative and freely negotiable security representing the promise of 
payment in cash originated from businesses between rural producers—or their cooperatives—and 
                                                          
3352 Between 1973 and 1993, real interest rates were often negative due to high inflation rates (Araújo, 2011). 
3353 Despite the drastic reduction of its role as a lender, the National Treasury from the mid-1990s began to concentrate 
its resources on the equalization of interest rates (by paying the banking system the difference between the interest rate it 
would like to receive and the one set by the NSRC). Therefore, the National Treasury, even if indirectly, also stimulated 
the increase of rural credit supply (Ramos and Martha Junior, 2010).   
3354 The other securities created by Law 11,076 are Certificate of Agricultural Deposit (CDA), Agricultural Warrant 
(WA), Agribusiness Receivables Certificate (CRA), and Agribusiness Credit Rights Certificate (CDCA). 
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third parties. They are issued exclusively by a financial institution, public or private, and are income 
tax-free, which make them more attractive for investors. 
 
Figure 2. Rural Credit by financing sources in 2016 
 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
 
Even with the recovery of rural credit from 1996, it remained far short of the financing needs and 
growth of Brazilian agricultural production. While annual rural credit only returned to 1970s levels 
by 2015, grain production showed a significant and steady growth throughout the period—from less 
than 50 million tons to about 200 million tons (Figure 1). Thus, in relative terms the recovery of rural 
credit was much less vigorous, either for grains or in agriculture in general. In addition, the 
importance of diversifying the beneficiaries of financing was recognized in recent decades. From the 
mid-1990s, there was an important effort to undo distortions and imbalances that had been produced 
by the rural credit policy, since mainly a small number of large producers were able to appropriate 
the subsidized credits. In this sense, the National Program for the Strengthening of Family Agriculture 
(PRONAF) was instituted in 1996 with the purpose of financing agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities operated by family farmers.3355 
Another interesting aspect of Figure 1 is the apparent non-correlation between rural credit and 
grain production. Indeed, the granting of subsidized credit had been of great importance for the 
expansion of grain production in the 1970s. However, the abrupt reduction in the supply of credit 
during the following decade did not have a negative effect on the upward trend in grain production. 
In order to understand how grain production, and particularly soybean production, was not negatively 
affected by the scarcity of rural credit, we will present in the next section the transformations of the 
sector in the last decades, which were determinant for the emergence of alternative sources of 
financing to official rural credit.  
 
3.2.2. Consolidation of Brazilian exported-oriented soybean agriculture 
 
                                                          
3355 In the 2000s, Pronaf's share of the total volume of rural credit was around 11%. Nevertheless, some studies point to 
a still unequal distribution of rural credit, in which small producers, landless farmers, and other disarticulated groups find 
many obstacles to access credit (see Belik, 2015). 
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Although the first soybean crops in Brazil date from the end of the 19th century, it was only in the 
1960s that its production became significant, concentrated mainly in the southern region of the 
country. Since the 1970s, soybeans have been the fastest growing grain crop in both Brazil and the 
world. In Brazil, the production growth since 1980 has been over 500%, and made this crop the main 
Brazilian agribusiness. Figure 3 shows this important growth, which resulted from both a significant 
expansion of cultivated land and increasing productivity over time, insofar as production increased 
more sharply than planted area. 
 
Figure 3. Brazilian soybean production, exports and planted area 
 
 
 
Source: Conab (Brazilian Food Supply Company) and UN Comtrade Database. 
 
Many factors contributed to this rapid rise in soybean cultivation. First, as already emphasized, it was 
fundamental to grant a large volume of credit subsidized through the National Rural Credit System 
from 1965 onwards. Particularly throughout the 1970s, subsidies increased significantly due to the 
inflationary process, reaching the maximum level of -38.5% (measured by the difference between the 
interest rate and the inflation rate). On the other hand, the Minimum Price Guarantee Program 
(PGPM) had the role of eliminating price risks for the producer by setting a guaranteed price before 
planting, to take effect after harvest. The system was operated from two main instruments: Federal 
Government Loans (EGF) and Federal Government Acquisitions (AGF). The first, which made it 
possible to stock the crop in the harvest/off season, was the main financing instrument for marketing 
in agriculture and was especially important for soybeans—about 55% of EGFs between 1975 and 
1983 were destined for soybeans. AGFs, in turn, were important in stimulating the advancement of 
the agricultural frontier, since they involved subsidies to transport costs (Coelho, 2001). 
Even more important for the advancement of the agricultural frontier were the special 
programs for the occupation of the Cerrado (Brazilian savannah). The POLOCENTRO (Program for 
Development of the Cerrados), implemented between 1975 and 1982, was intended to stimulate a 
rapid development and modernization of the Brazilian Center-West region by granting subsidized 
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credit for both agriculture and infrastructure (mainly roads and electrification). The main 
beneficiaries were large and medium producers, and except for areas of livestock pasture, the most 
cultivated product was soybeans. The Program involved a significant area: during its term, 6 million 
acres of Cerrado were converted into cultivated land, but directly and indirectly, the Program reached 
more than 9 million acres. Of no less importance was the participation of the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), which promoted the development of agronomic research and 
appropriate technologies for the Cerrado (Coelho, 2001, Dall'Agnol et al., 2007). The success of these 
policies that aimed to promote the advancement of the agricultural frontier can be seen in the change 
in distribution of soybean production among Brazilian regions throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Regional distribution of Brazilian soybean production (in million bushels) 
 
 
Source: Conab (Brazilian Food Supply Company) 
 
The advance of soybean cultivation to the Center-West region was accompanied, as shown in Figure 
3, by the expansion of exports from the 1990s. It is possible to say that Resolution 155 of the National 
Council of Foreign Trade (CONCEX) of 1988, which put an end to the qualitative and quantitative 
restrictions on rice, maize, and soybean exports, marks the beginning of a growing orientation of 
soybean cultivation towards the external market (Souza et al., 1999). Especially in the Center-West 
region, production growth was also directly related to the development of so-called export corridors, 
based on waterways and railroads located in the central and northern regions of the country 
(Fearnside, 2001). 
In this context, despite the scarcity of rural credit and the weakening of PGPM, the warming 
of the international market certainly contributed to the expansion of the production of this crop. And, 
despite the appreciation of the Brazilian currency (Real) in the second half of the 1990s, exports 
continued to expand significantly. A factor that contributed to this was the introduction of the Kandir 
Law (Complementary Law 87) in 1966, which promoted the exemption of the ICMS tax on Brazilian 
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exports of basic and semi-processed products, thus stimulating exports of grains. In the 2000s, this 
process was further stimulated by the great expansion of Chinese demand for commodities in the 
international market. 
However, greater trade liberalization and the expansion of soybean exports alone are not 
sufficient to explain how the rural credit crisis did not significantly affect the growing performance 
of soybeans. Certainly fundamental was the expansion of the participation of foreign capital in the 
sector, with important consequences for the organization of the sector and for relations among the 
agents of the soybean production chains. As Jank et al., (2001) shows, the liberalization of foreign 
investments throughout the 1990s led to a rapid internationalization and concentration, through 
mergers and acquisitions, of the Brazilian agro-industrial chains. Increasing foreign investment, 
promoted mainly by multinational corporations, was seen as an opportunity both to penetrate the 
domestic market and to take advantage of the recent liberalization of international trade. 
In the soybean chain, there has been a rapid concentration since 1995 as a result of the 
acquisition of 12 large national companies by four multinationals: Bunge, Louis Dreyfus 
Commodities, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), and Cargill (collectively known as ABCD) (Jank et 
al., 2001). These four trading companies alone acquired almost 60% of all grains exported by Brazil 
in 2003. Although in recent years Asian trading companies have increased their share of the Brazilian 
grain market, the ABCD still play a decisive role in the negotiation of soybean crops (see Bonato, 
2016). In Brazil, trading companies have always been more important in the Cerrado, where soybean 
cultivation is more recent and to some extent has progressed with the entry of these multinationals. 
In traditional farming areas located in southern Brazil, cooperatives played a greater role in the 
acquisition of soybeans (Lazzarini and Nunes, 1998). 
On the other hand, the input industry for soybean cultivation was also affected by the 
economic transformations underway in the 1990s. In the previous decades, the genetic material for 
the crop was developed mainly by public institutions such as EMBRAPA and by some domestic 
private companies. The entry of multinational biotechnology companies in the country only occurred 
after the sanction of the Law of Protection of Cultivars (Law 9.456) of 1997, which protected the 
intellectual property rights of cultivars. Since 1997, the multinational Monsanto has acquired several 
national companies and developed the RR (Round-Up Ready) GM soy, consolidating itself as the 
leading producer of genetically modified seeds (Lazzarini and Nunes, 1998). In 1998, the National 
Technical Biosafety Commission (CTNBio) concluded that the use of the genetically modified 
Roundup Ready cultivar does not pose environmental or health risks, authorizing the planting of 
transgenic soybeans in Brazil. In the 2016/17 crop, it was estimated that 96.5% of soybean production 
was GM, equivalent to 32.7 million hectares (Celeres, 2017). 
The dependence of domestic production on the use of inputs produced by large technology 
companies, coupled with the change in Brazilian agricultural policy, especially concerning the 
financing instruments, resulted in a new organization and coordination of agro-industrial systems, 
characterized by the greater participation of the input industry. In addition to determining more 
complex relationships between the productive segments, this general process delineates and 
influences a large part of the determinants of the return margins of the producer segment. 
 
3.3.  New organizational forms of Brazilian soybean chains 
 
1030 
 
In the last decades, as mentioned in the previous section, important changes in institutional, 
organizational, and competitive environments have been observed in the soybean agro-industrial 
chain in Brazil. As a consequence, a new scenario has arisen involving different forms of 
commercialization of the production and financing of the agricultural activity. Two main factors 
explain this process: the first is based on the gradual exit of the State as a financier of agricultural 
activity, given the fiscal crisis of the State in the 1980s. Part of this role has been transferred to the 
private sector, promoting changes in the pattern of financing of national agriculture. 
The second factor is the increase in competition and market concentration in the input and 
grain processing sectors. Large multinational companies, with the objective of expanding market 
share and/or guaranteeing grain provision, have developed and implemented new contractual 
arrangements with producers, bringing innovations in the forms of commercialization and financing 
of the activity. 
The first milestone of this changing scenario occurred in the 1980s, when so-called “troca-
troca” (“swap”) and “green soy” contracts were first observed in the Central-West region of Brazil. 
The first represents an agreement in which the producer receives inputs (seeds, Fertilisers, and 
pesticides) from a company before planting, and undertakes to pay with sacks of soybeans obtained 
at harvest. The second consists of an early sale of the production to a grain trader or mill. The producer 
receives a set amount of resources from the company at the time of planting and delivers part of its 
production, tied to the financial volume captured, during the harvest period (Terra, 2012). 
This framework of innovations has gained new shape since 1994, with the creation of the 
Rural Product Certificate (CPR). Defined as an exchange note, tradable in the market, the CPR 
consists of a promise of future delivery of a certain agricultural product. Upon the issuance of this 
paper, carried out by a rural producer (or a cooperative/producers' association), a commitment is made 
to the issuer, and there is a duty to settle on maturity. At first, this repayment occurred only by 
physical delivery. In addition to eliminating the risk of a lack of funds for planting costs, the producer 
manages the price and marketing risk of the product. However, the reliance on physical delivery 
represented an obstacle to the expansion of the negotiation of the CPR, since it prevented the 
participation of potential financiers not interested in receiving the agricultural product. In 2001, in 
order to attract new agents in this market, the financial CPR was developed (Silva and Lapo, 2012). 
In this contract, instead of delivering the goods to the counterparty, the producer liquidates the 
security in cash at a certain price, which can be fixed (defined at the time of the transaction) or indexed 
by an indicator relative to the spot or futures market. However, it should be noted that in the financial 
CPR, the producer has the risk of commercialization of the product, and there is also the price risk 
when considering the modality with fixed price quotation. 
 
Figure 5. Modalities of Rural Product Certificate (CPR). 
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 (a) Physical CPR (b) Financial CPR 
 
New forms of fundraising were created in 2004 with the creation of five titles: Agricultural Deposit 
Certificates (CDA), Agricultural Warrant (WA), Agribusiness Credit Letters (LCA), Agribusiness 
Credit Rights Certificates (CDCA), and Agribusiness Receivables Certificates (CRA). In general, 
these securities are based on agricultural products or agricultural debt securities. In addition, they 
have the function of increasing fundraising in the financial market directed to different agents that 
operate in the agribusiness. Table 1 presents a summary of the characteristics of these securities. 
While the CDAs and WAs have a unique focus on agricultural producers (with the goods deposited 
in the warehouse), the LCAs, CDCAs, and CRAs allow the collection of resources by different 
agribusiness agents, being backed by credit rights (CPRs, Rural Promissory Notes, CDAs, WAs, and 
export contracts, among others). 
Of note in this set of securities is the growth in funding through CRAs, given the possibility, 
since 2012, of public offers. According to Aoun (2012), the issuance of these bonds goes through 
three stages: i) agribusiness agents (producers, cooperatives, and companies) buy inputs from a 
supplier, using CPRs as collateral; ii) the company supplying the inputs issues CDCAs, these being 
backed by the CPRs; and iii) securitization companies buy discounted CDCAs and then issue CRAs 
to investors. For the latter, the advantage lies in the fact that there is no levy of income tax on earnings, 
besides the existence of attractive profitability. On the other hand, when the transaction matures, 
because the payment of receivables occurs directly from agribusiness agents to investors, the latter 
are exposed to credit risk. Large agribusiness companies, such as Monsanto, Bayer, Bunge, and 
Syngenta, have used this tool to raise funds. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the CDA, WA, ACL, CDCA, and CRA 
Title Definition Issuer 
CDA 
 Title based on the promise of 
delivery of a product deposited in 
warehouse 
 Warehouse at the request of the 
depositor of the agricultural product 
WA 
Title that grants the right to pledge 
on the underlying asset to CDAT 
Warehouse at the request  of the 
depositor of the agricultural product 
CDCA 
Representative title of promise of 
payment, with credit rights backed 
(denominated receivables), 
originating in businesses carried out 
by agribusiness agents 
Agricultural cooperatives or legal 
entities engaged in commercialization, 
processing or industrialization of 
agricultural products or inputs 
(including machinery) 
LCA Public or private financial institutions 
CRA 
Agribusiness receivables securitization 
companies 
Source: Silva (2006) 
 
In this context of transformations and creation of new titles involving the agribusiness, contractual 
arrangements have developed in which large multinational companies advance resources or inputs to 
producers, becoming an important alternative for financing the agricultural activity. Contractual 
variations are observed in relation to the price setting, the payment term, and the agents (Leme and 
Zylberstajn, 2008). 
An example of such arrangements is based on the “harvest term” sales mechanism, performed 
between soybean producers and input suppliers. The latter deliver seeds, Fertilisers, and pesticides to 
the producers who, after approximately six months (with the commercialization of the grain), make 
the payment. Silva and Lapo (2012, p. 7) point out that the concession of inputs “can occur through 
direct sales to the producer (from the manufacturer itself) or between the manufacturer and the input 
distributor (resale or cooperative), who will then pass the harvest term condition to the producer (their 
client).” 
Another modality of production financing, which has been particularly widespread in the 
grain market of Brazil’s Central-West for the costing of soybeans and winter corn, is called a barter. 
This consists of a triangular operation between producer, input company, and trading company 
(agribusiness or exporter). As can be seen in Figure 6, the producer receives the input (technological 
package) from the supplier/company before planting, and is committed to delivering a portion of its 
production to a trading company as a form of payment. The latter agent, when selling the grain, makes 
the payment to the input company. The collateral for these operations is generally the CPR, which is 
issued by the producer. 
 
Figure 6. Exchange operation (barter) 
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Source Silva (2012). 
 
The mechanism described above illustrates a more complex organizational form in which 
coordination between different actors in the chain (from input to export companies) is required. In 
recent years, agricultural machinery companies (especially manufacturers of tractors and harvesters), 
such as Case New Holland and AGCO Corp., have also made barter operations available to soybean 
producers in Brazil, with Cargill partnering. The barter service is offered in Brazil by large companies 
such as Bayer, Pioneer, Monsanto, Syngenta, Cargill, ADM, Adama, Bunge, and Louis Dreyfus 
(Clarifi, 2017). In addition, Banco do Brasil, the country's leading rural credit bank, has developed a 
barter model in which the bank advances resources, with CPRs as collateral. Thus, the risk of the 
operation, which was concentrated in the input suppliers, is transferred to the bank. In order to obtain 
funds for such an operation, the bank uses LCA emissions as collateral. 
On the one hand, these operations allow management of the risk of lack of resources for the 
farmer's activity. As Silva (2012, p. 69) mentions, “the producer receives the input and markets his 
production without the need for financial disbursement.” Such operations are still capable of 
generating benefits related to the risk price management (grain price, input price, and exchange rate), 
as well as reducing the need to stock the products and ensuring greater practicality and time savings 
in the establishment of contracts between the agents involved (Arakawa, 2014, Leme and 
Zylbersztajn, 2008). On the other hand, since some large companies act simultaneously in the input 
sector (especially in the field of Fertilisers) and as buyers of grain, this operation represents a way of 
appropriating margin of both sides of the supply chain, besides being a form of increasing market 
share (Silva, 2012). Bertrand et al. (2005) observe the fragilities of these contractual arrangements 
due to the dependence from the producer to the input and trading companies. In addition, the producer 
ends up with short-term obligations at higher interest rates compared to government credit. 
As already mentioned, rural credit arising from these contractual arrangements with the 
private sector has been gaining importance in the grain supply chain in Brazil. Buainain et al. (2014) 
analyze data from the Agrosecurity consultancy company, which points out that in the 2009/10 
harvest, 47% of the resource requirements for the Central-West producers were supplied by 
companies in the sector, and only 24% originated from loans from banks and credit unions. In the 
South, there is an inverse participation: 45% of the funding needs come from financial institutions 
and 27% from input and trading companies. Equity in both regions corresponds to approximately 
one-third of the capital requirements for the cost of the activity. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of resource sources for funding in the Center-West and Southern regions 
of Brazil in the 2009/2010 harvest. 
 
 
Source: Silva (2012) 
 
According to the Matogrossense Institute of Agricultural Economics (IMEA), between 2008 and 
2017, resources for crops in Mato Grosso do Sul— Brazil's largest soybean producing state, 
responsible for approximately one third of national production—came primarily from multinationals 
and resellers (43%), followed by equity (33%), and loans from the banking system (24%). 
In this context, Leme and Zylberstajn (2008), based on interviews with 200 soy producers in 
the states of Mato Grosso and Goias, studied the factors determining the choice of soybean producers 
for contractual arrangements with companies to purchase Fertilisers. The results showed that 
producers who opted for exchange operations, had the perception that such transactions generated 
savings in time and resources, as well as solving problems of lack of own capital for acquiring the 
input. In addition, higher-yielding, more risk-averse, and more reliable soy producers had a greater 
tendency to adopt such contractual arrangements. 
 
Figure 8. Participation of resource modalities in the financing of soybean producers in the state 
of Mato Grosso between 2008 and 2017 
 
  
Source: IMEA (2017) 
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Thus, changes in the institutional and competitive environments of the soybean agro-industrial chain 
in Brazil have led to new forms of grain commercialization and financing of production costs. Such 
innovations have allowed a reduction of the transaction costs among the agents of the chain, besides 
being arrangements that guarantee, in general, less exposure to the risks of price and 
commercialization to the producer. It should be noted, however, that given the high interest rates that 
these contracts charge, these operations are especially used by producers in periods of low availability 
of rural credit from the federal government and own resources (as in 2016/17 given the 2015/16 crop 
failure). 
 
3.4.  Conclusions 
 
This study aimed to explore how soybean production in Brazil has become one of the most important 
in the world in terms of quantity and productivity, despite having to deal with severe restrictions in 
state financing since the 1980s. 
Throughout the text it is possible to emphasize that, in seeking to understand the logic of the 
relationship between business strategy and the organization of agricultural supply chains, one must 
take into account the institutional and competitive environments that surround them, particularly with 
regard to the deregulation of markets and increasing industrial concentration. 
It was observed that the new configuration of financing for the sector came into being first 
through the previous support of public policy in the years of abundant subsidized credit, which 
allowed the opening of border areas to large properties, and second, due to investments in agricultural 
technology, with emphasis on the research by EMBRAPA – Brazil`s Research Corporation. No less 
important was the restructuring of the downstream and upstream segments of the production segment, 
previously marked by more competitive characteristics but subjected to mergers and acquisitions, 
resulting in a strong concentration of this market. The concentration of the processing segment has 
led to a greater need to acquire inputs by promoting more “tied” contracts, which determine the 
consolidation of new patterns of financing of agricultural production, with a strong role in obtaining 
input and guaranteeing the “fidelity” of supply. 
In addition to generating more complex relationships among the productive segments, these 
new configurations, in determining the property rights of resources, show how the distribution of 
income occurs in the value chain. 
As a result of this process, there is no denying the creativity of companies to adopt, test, and 
improve different forms of financing that have enabled the sector to obtain competitive gains, 
becoming the top soy exporter in the world. However, it should be emphasized that these new forms 
also represent the dependence of the producer on the trading companies, which end up appropriating 
margins from both sides of the supply chain operation. 
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